# Beller Aff – ND

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#### Come one come all to the advancements of late-stage capitalism the algorithmic codes of the world have been connected under a logic of racial capitalism meant to allow for the computation of all life – these connections are only made possible by the World Computer – the machine of violence and abstraction that “understands the history of the commodification of life as a process of encrypting the world’s myriad qualities as quantities.” No one is safe from the violence – all forms of expression are trapped within the semiotics of the World Computer as they are conscripted by the algorithms that intensify inequality by being put to service of racial capitalism – which is driving the nearapocalyptic world failure of global racial capitalism

#### The topic is a neoliberal response to the ongoing violence of giant corporations exploitation of workers – the World Computer has coopted those responses – it’s colonization of semiotics has rendered all forms of democratic modes of governance outmoded to save those who designed it for the violence purpose of extraction politics – the worker strikes becomes another means of the system to correct itself and table radicalism as strikes just becomes another state endorsed method of resistance leaving the structures of racial capitalism inevitable

#### The World Computer’s operating system is terminally unsustainable – it writes global apartheid into every interaction, seeking ongoing financialization and extraction to feed the racial unconscious of the West – that produces planetary crisis making it impossible for the engineering project of the aff to escape its own history

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The notion of computation currently dominant is that it is an information management tool that helps to reveal the inner workings of nature whether in the analysis of cognitive function, markets, or galaxy formation: scientific tools reveal nature’s ontological character. Simulation helps us understand reality. Information science, like other sciences and like “reality itself,” is presumed to pertain beyond the merely social, even if it turns out that “reality itself” is a simulation. In the thought experiment that is The World Computer, the aim is to understand that this thinking of information as being everywhere—and thus, as everywhere legible, at least in principle, is a direct extension of the colonial project and carries with it the legacies of slavery, wage labor, heteropatriarchy, and proletarianization. Modern computation, rather than revealing a stand-alone truth in things, is foregrounded here as always already the bureaucratic thought of capitalism —and thus also its practice, its practical organization of production. It is the alienated and alienating thought of the bios. Computation is the thought of finance capital in the same manner that, for Lukacs in Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, Kant’s categorical thought was the thought of reification and of the consequent spatialization of time imposed by the commodity-form and wage-labor, respectively. And again, computation is for finance capital just as, for Sohn-Rethel in Intellectual and Manual Labor, the real abstraction known as “money” was for the social act of commodity exchange. Sohn-Rethel argues that real abstraction opens the space for the transcendental subject of philosophy—the subject of and for the exchange of equivalents who was represented—we might say formatted—as the owner of their commodity to other commodity owners, similarly formatted. In our day, the real abstraction that is the computationally mediated process of exchange develops the complex relationship between market and subject by opening the space for AI and the social derivative. We interface as nodal points on a distributed network—a network that constitutes us as agents for exchange, and we assemble our relationships as best we can to wager on an income stream for our activity machine. In considering computation as the alienated and alienating thought of the bios, an autonomization of the thinking of racial capitalism that all of us, perhaps without exception, are forced to game, it is useful to recall Postone’s account of abstract time, or what is effectively, the alienation of time and its consequent conversion to a real abstraction. Postone notes that antecedent, “concrete time” was a dependent variable whose character was determined by the concrete relations of a given society, but the emergence of socially necessary labor time converted time into “abstract time,” an independent variable. Because abstract human labor constitutes a general social mediation, in Marx’s analysis, the labor time that serves as the measure of value is not individual and contingent but social and necessary [190].… As a category of the totality, socially necessary labor time expresses a quasiobjective social necessity with which the producers are confronted. It is the temporal dimension of the abstract domination that characterizes the structure of alienated social relations in capitalism. The social totality constituted by labor as an objective general mediation has a temporal character wherein time becomes necessity [191].… In capitalism, abstract temporal measure rather than concrete material quantity is the measure of social wealth. This difference is the first determination of the possibility in capitalism that, not only for the poor, but for society as a whole, poverty (in terms of value) can exist in the midst of plenty (in terms of material wealth). Material wealth in capitalism is, ultimately, only apparent wealth [194]. Examining the process by which “time becomes necessity” Postone takes his readers thorough an account of the standardization of time in Europe by the systemically coordinated need to measure labor time, that included factory discipline, the organization of village life and the development of clocks. “Variable hours” became invariable, and abstract time became “the uniform, continuous, homogeneous ‘empty’ time … independent of events” (202). “The temporal forms have a life of their own and are compelling for all members of capitalist society” (214). As opposed to the dependent variable that was concrete time situated in various communities and their particular, seasonal temporalities, “abstract time is an independent variable; it constitutes an independent framework with which motion events and actions occur [and can be measured]. Such time is divisible into equal, constant, nonqualitative units” (202). Postone writes, “The abstract form of time associated with the new structure of social relations also expressed a new form of domination (214). “As a result of general social mediation, labor time expenditure is transformed into a temporal norm that not only is abstracted from but also stands above and determines individual action. Just as labor is transformed from an action of individuals to the alienated general principle of the totality under which the individuals are subsumed, time expenditure is transformed form a result of activity into a normative measure for activity. Although … the magnitude of socially necessary labor time is a dependent variable of society as a whole, it is an independent variable with regard to individual activity. This process, whereby a concerte, dependent variable of human activity becomes an abstract independent variable governing this activity is real and not illusory. It is intrinsic to the process of alienated social constitution effected by labor” (215). The independence of time from concrete situations, “real and not illusory,” is a historical result, a consequence of production. Abstract time is a real abstraction, a social relationship embedded in a new form of time that confronts humanity as both alien in its independence and as necessity in its indifference to all qualities. This of course is the same objective, homogeneous time that allows for the development of modern physics, calculus and computation. Categoricality, abstraction, computability, and the horizon of omniscience become the basic architecture of capitalist planning and perception—the ever finer granularity of computation means precisely the capillary ramification and reorganization of the life-world, of space, time and consciousness, by means of the modular affordances of objective and objectifying content—indifferent 1s and 0s. These two numbers were and are of course ideologically neutral because content-indifferent—unless, of course, content indifference is itself an ideology, naturalized in the same manner that so many have naturalized abstract time. Is such a degree-zero view of number a blindness to the message that is its medium? Simulation, as Baudrillard (2004) powerfully intuited, was not just an effect of political economy; it was in effect a praxis, and thus a (quasi-) philosophy—of a kind that meant the end of traditional notions of both. It also meant a new period of capital and a new mode of production. “Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it” (365). In theorizing hyper-reality, he almost could have written, “All that is solid melts into information.” Computability liquifies the solid in accord with the requisites of capital. Just here in the informatic flux, we can see, alongside its vast achievements, computation’s intimate link, in the alienation of the territory by means of the map, to the colonial project, the industrial project, and globalization in the derealization of traditional forms of space and time. Capital’s ability to infiltrate, organize, and predict, to simulate a model and to impose it, to abstract and to subsume difference in accord with its own code (and, where necessary, to generate difference and distinction to serve the expansion and development of this code), to operationalize and then self-optimize, provided and continues to provide the conceptual, material, and existential basis, along with the urgency, for the further development of computation. Tragically, it also provides the urgency to transform its process, its processors, its processing. Compounding the tragedy of this millennium, those who are or might be in a position to best interrogate computational process most often view it as a ratification of their assumptions about nature by relegating the material conditions of computation and of their thought to the unthought. In sharp contrast, we view computation as a strategy of efficient risk management—a cost-benefit analysis of the “substitutable choices” for the essential program of capital. It opens new ways of apportioning resources and does so in keeping with the potential profitability of new sites of value extraction necessary in order to stave off the falling rate of profit. In this respect, computation has the structure of a derivative on any activity whatever, opening up a market for risk management and liquidity preservation to wager on an exposure to the underliers of any calculation whatever. Engineers, scientists, and coders manage their portfolio of interests to create their income streams. “Create needs, then help,” writes Trinh T. Minh-Ha (1981), summarizing the colonial logic of “development.” Thus, as with the development of colonial banking, analyzed by Rosa Luxembourg, that puts colonies and colonial labor in the service of capital—first by making them service an ever increasing debt incurred on their purchases from the colonizer of the instruments for the modernization of production, and second by making them compete each against the other in debt servicing—the development of computation, despite the democracy-themed PR that accompanied the rise of the desktop computer, further pits each against all. “Yes, but email,” some will exclaim, or, “FaceTime!” “The Higgs Boson!” We can’t help but wonder if the creators of Slack and Zoom savored the irony of their platform names. No more slacking off while zooming in on the requisites of the value form! Let’s intensify the production and invisibility of our own off-screen death in pursuit of pure production! Long live the factory code. Innovation organized by entrepreneurs of the self, of the cyberself, creates possibilities for arbitrage on those super-sets of labor-time, attention and life-time; and all the while, everyday risk management is underpinned and indeed anchored by the calculus of genocide. From the binary of the Abomb to IBM’s punch-carding of the Nazi Holocaust, from the calculus of sovereign debt to that of social media, the lives of people (in Nagasaki, in Auschwitz, in Furguson), become the substrate that registers the meaning of the compute—at least the meaning as far as they may have been concerned. So many are posited as but renewable pawns in an endless game, and the game goes on. Dispossession and genocide, and the capacity to wreak these, guarantee the liquidity of the financial system by guaranteeing that there will always be some billions willing or forced to do anything for its money and the access to information, to informed matter and therefore to life that it provides. In our era, we see clearly that, under capital, the “stability” imposed by systemic integration and its programs of finance, surveillance, security, mediation, and so on produces ever greater volatility, and we see that this volatility risk can be bought and sold; it can be cut up, bundled, bought, and resold, priced as content-indifferent numbers based upon volatility indices. Meanwhile the markets roil, dispossession rages, and the planet boils. As history could confirm, by the mid-twentieth century, the complexity of the techniques for the management of societies, from markets to warfare, from media to cybernetics, and now from social media to the derivatives created by synthetic finance, all required discrete state machines to store and manage the pertinent inventories, schedules, and programs—their valuable information. Though usually thought of as properly belonging to the history of science, communication, mathematics, or computation, the socioeconomic endeavors composing the history of the discrete state machine and its ever more supple functionality are to be thought as part of the increasing complexity of capitalist abstraction and thus the abstraction of social relations. They are the elaboration of real abstraction, the expansive formalization of the field of exchange taking place “behind the backs” of living people. These socioeconomic endeavors such as Google, Facebook, the security state, are the effective occupation of space and time at all scales by the logistics of exchange and its expanding field of production. 12 Datalogical representation is already risk management. Management, efficiency, optimization; Foucault’s entrepreneur of the self; and even Brian Massumi and Erin Manning’s “more than human of the human” all recognize a technological paradigm of control operating in and through (and as) the individual (Massumi 2018). We may also observe that the technologic of capitalism bent upon efficiency—the maximum exploitation of the laboring substrate to meet the demands of the falling rate of profit—prevails across all organizational scales, from the individual to the laboratory to the university to the jail, the township, the state, and the nation-state. In “cultural” spaces, representative agents (a.k.a. subjects) manage and aggregate resources, offering themselves as profiles or brands that are themselves not only marketable, but marketable as derivative exposure to their underliers: their audiences, networks, assets, and currencies. I “friend” you to add you to me, to gain exposure to your network, to add you to my portfolio. I am an “influencer.” “Culture,” too, understood as a semiautonomous domain separable from materiality and technology, can today only be a fetish—another case of platform fetishism—because the generalization of computing means that culture as the connective, communicative tissue of the sociosemiotic is ever more subject to the granularization and grammartization of commodification on the “object” side (and, its other aspect, the fractalization of fascism on the “subject” side) in what, from a global standpoint, is a racial capitalist sociocybernetic bio-techné. Such is “culture” today—an expression of an overall informationalization of social relations subject to historically imposed computability. Cultural form, computable because inseparable from computation, heretofore always a way of connecting to (or disconnecting from) a multiplicity of networks, is now itself a derivative—a social derivative. Its derivative condition explains what was known as “the postmodern condition,” and is instituted by the universal expansion of the factory code toward the total colonization of space, time, representation, and mind: sociality itself in the largest sense. That the principles of the ordination of matter, being, time, and value by number (or of publics by statistics, and/or of opinions by likes) were perceived to be universal, that is, generally applicable to all phenomena, was more than convenient. It was, as we have said, colonial. It was racializing and gendering. It was capacitating and maiming (Puar 2017). The math, though famously “content-indifferent,” was never value free. Nor were the devices, from desktops to mainframes, from bombers to smartphones, that it spawned. As Diane Nelson (2015: 56) writes in Who Counts?, her astonishing ethnography of Mayan number systems and genocide and, also and as importantly, her scathing ethnography of Western mathematics and genocide, “Double-entry bookkeeping is also an ‘ethnomathematics,’ but one with an army.” Double-entry bookkeeping was also a proprietary technique; its truth claims, in the form of accounts, implied pathways of control and functionality that served as conduits for capitalization and colonization. It was a system of representation that repressed noise (context) to clearly resolve the value signal called price in a calculus of profit and loss. In our own period, where we see very clearly (simply by looking at the business pages or, for that matter, the culture pages in any newspaper) that contemporary global capitalism is in lockstep with computation, we might expect that the politico-economic meaning of computation as an emergent order of proprietary organization is becoming clear. As new and powerful terms such as platform sovereignty (Bratton 2016), algorithmic governance, and the society of metadata or “metadata society” (Pasquinelli 2018) indicate, it appears that it is the information itself that has (or indeed is) value. But the argument here is that it is only valuable within the framework of computation, and indeed within the framework of computational racial capital—at least thus far. Information is the result of that framework; it is an ethno-graphic (not just anthropocentric) instantiation composed from, in, and on states of matter. The framework, a computational infrastructure that is also primarily fixed capital, emerges in conjunction with the myriad phenomena that are now treated informatically; the apparatus is the other side of the supposedly raw material of information. Information is and can only be a relation. The clear implication of this argument is that, just as a DVD presupposes a technical world that can record it and make it play, the very presence of “information” implies the background armature of computation as a mechanism of perception and organization that is fundamentally social and historical. This background armature of perception and organization further indicates the background armature of racial capital as the primordial condition—the meta-machine architecture—of the present social system of accounts. We note, and not only in passing, that this way of narrating the epic poem of AI puts anti-Blackness, slavery, settler colonialism, indentured servitude, imperialism, sexism, proletarianization, racial capitalism, and the active organization of oppression for profit at the epistemic center of a compute that could be called world history. It is computation that perceives information, and it is capital expansion that requires the perceptualinstrumental processes endemic to quantification, digitization, and computation. The entire system has its conditions of possibility and derives both its significance and its character from the history of capital accumulation, that is itself theft and only theft, and which is, to defer again to the chorus: colonialism, slavery, white heteropatriarchy, imperialism, globalization, financialization, and genocide. Let us not romanticize the awesome capacities of so-called civilization. Sadly, indeed tragically, with the encroachment of value thus described, to value something, anything, threatens to be a mode of evaluation for capital. Odds are, anyway. And so much has been swept away, repressed, annihilated. In this book we will also have occasion to dwell on the remainder, on what Neferti Tadiar calls “remaindered life,” a category I understand as designed to demarcate the domains or haecceities of experience that fall outside of systematization—a dialectical category for that which is beyond the resolution of the dialectic. Remaindered life—a social derivative on capital whose market value went to zero but that nonetheless persists as lived experience, existence, or survival beyond the horizon of capitalized representation. As I understand it, remaindered life is the disavowed context and condition of relations for any and all value creation. However, despite our adherence to an “immanent outside” (Massumi) in this volume and everywhere, the dominant and dominating principles organizing value and evaluation have been colonized by what Randy Martin called “the financialization of daily life” in the “society of risk,” centuries in the making. This financialization structures representation, and the structuring of evaluation—internal to the elaboration of the value-form and to the universe of information—gives renewed meaning to this longstanding and recurrent theme in my own work adopted directly from Marx and already invoked here: again, the forming of the five senses is a result of the entire history of the world down to the present. As Marx’s observations themselves imply, and as this text is at pains to elaborate in a sociocyborg vein, our senses have been further informed— by/as information and informatics—since he wrote that line. The urgent and perhaps ultimate question of whether or not we might use these emerging perceptual capacities to reprogram the socius echoes Marx’s abiding stake in revolution and what today (at least before Spring 2020) for many seems even more unthinkable than ever before—the abolition of private property and the withering away of the state. However, in the key of Marx in The Communist Manifesto, we hasten to add that this abolition and this withering has already been achieved for more than 2 billion people—that is, for twice the living population of Earth during the time Marx wrote. We must take courage from the fact that much of what “we” might claim to value has already been lost for two planetfuls of people. For that allows us to see that what would like to pass as “our values”—which in one way or another might include an allegiance to the enduring virtues of the nation state, of private property, of “liberal” society and its pleasures—have fallen into the black hole of self-contradiction and self-negation. As the shiny and pleasant other side of dispossession, they are never to be resurrected or redeemed, for beneath their veneer they are literally the expressions of hell on Earth. And this adherence to their bloody privilege is why the “liberals” of today are closet fascists, and why at the time of revising the copyedits for this book, Joe Biden, a racist, misogynist white man, is the liberal candidate for President of the United States. Therefore, the event horizon of this book is the end of capitalism, a horizon that forcibly, it must be admitted, exceeds the horizon of contemporary common sense—at least it did when I began writing it. Witness Stanford economists who, dismissive of the very possibility of revolution, blithely suggest along with the Daily Telegraph writer James Bartholomew (2015) that we “learn to love economic inequality.” But as Gramsci (1971: 170–171) reminds us in The Modern Prince, “Anybody who makes a prediction has in fact a programme for whose victory he is working,” and this without doubt includes today’s self-proclaimed realists, as well as a more reactionary faction in open pursuit of profits from the volatility of racial war. Another aspect of the topos of the argument here is that not only have the imaginary and symbolic been transformed by capitalist informatics, but a corresponding transformation of (human, but not only human) being itself has been instantiated. It is thus unsurprising that those with the big paychecks (economists at Stanford) uncritically parrot the logic of computational racial capital, even if they may be partially unconscious of its basis in slavery and murder-by-numbers, and even if they refrain from explicitly demanding that we lick the bottom of their boots. But people get the unconscious they can afford. Most can no longer afford to build our egos on such self-serving ignorance—if they ever could. But are fascists really people? We demand the right to wonder if anyone is left in there after being fully colonized by computational racial capital’s AI. Capital’s realization and generalization of simulation by digital logic— as, for example, with spectacle in the aesthetic register, or by means of statistical modeling in the computational register, and with multiple grids of intelligibility and evaluation (algorithmic governance) in various other academic and social disciplines—allows for the machine-(re)thinking of ontologies in general in terms of the effects of processes of instrumental inscription and codification. Metaphysics itself is under siege. Is there any remainder in the fascist? Thus, when considering the recent interest in ontology, Fredric Jameson’s “Always historicize!” comes to mind (1981: 9). Machinethinking, which is one with execution, entails a reconfiguration of ontologies. As Alex Galloway (2012) taught us, the medium of computing, which instantiates its objects via programming, is metaphysics. And as Allen Feldman (2015) brilliantly demonstrates in analysis ranging from South Africa to Guantánamo to drone warfare, metaphysics is a medium of war. However, in a classic disappearing act of the medium, this fact of the instantiation of executable ontologies by computation, as well as their ascription to physical forms, most often goes unremarked—despite the fact that the reformatting is “the message.” The question is whether or not it is possible to critique this computational, capitalist ordination of phenomena and thought—and the stakes here are far higher than what is generally meant by “academic.” Ontological claims, such as “x is y,” always have an addressee. The ontological layer, what something is, is an artifact of data visualization—in short, an inscription, an act of writing, and a speech-act— and never a neutral endeavor. Simulation deconstructs objects into distribution patterns; it makes us skeptical about who or what is present, both objectively (as we regard the perceptible) and subjectively (in ourselves as consciousness). It ordains “a tremendous shattering of tradition” (Benjamin: 236). Fake news! Data teaches us that we, as subjects, may not be the privileged addressee. The reign of simulation is everywhere imposed as antecedent forms of subjectivity are garbled, shattered, reformatted, and placed on a continuum with informatic throughput. Through an inversion of the priority between world and data visualization, the digital simulation of the world by concepts encoded in apparatuses at once reveals the stakes of intervention in the protocol layer of computation and raises the pointed and possibly still political question of what may remain of so-called humanity beyond the purview of a now fully financialized knowing that is a kind of doing—and here again, we glimpse the remainder. It does so by posing the question of the possibility of a “beyond” to (contemporary) simulation, particularly in a world—and in keeping with current physics, a cosmos—in which simulation has overtaken the place of truth as ground, and has done so in a way that both implies and corroborates the insight that number, deeper than matter or energy, is the fundamental component of All. I’m not sure, but it seems that some of us have an awareness of remaindered life and its possible alternative futures, and others not at all. It is no wonder the oppressed called Pinochet’s brutal fascist supporters “mummies.” This appeal, in the face of foreclosure, to alternate strategies of account —to ontology, otherwise—would be the place to reflect for a moment on the fact that a marginal strand of thought, namely, deconstruction, has today become the dominant mode of state power, practiced on a massive scale by what Feldman (2017) calls “the deconstructive state.” Ironic that this intervention in the protocol layer of language function was introduced by philosophers, but then again, none of us really know whose thinking we are doing. The incredible grammatical and conceptual innovation that Derrida used to dramatize dif eránce was first developed and utilized to intervene in the axiology of the extant colonial, imperial, and patriarchal epistemes. These knowledge formations supported the hegemony of various Western regimes, sustaining a broadband governance that functioned by producing and mobilizing a contiguous, persistent, dominant reality, along with its attendant objects and subjects. Derrida’s technique of shattering these statesupported knowledge formations ostensibly grounded on axiology with a kind of accuracy that combined the skills of diamond cutter and watchmaker, disassembled seemingly—inviolable metaphysical first principles such as the superiority of Western civilization, or of men over women, and other forms of “truth” like “God” or “Man” or Truth. At the time deconstruction was a highly specialized strategy and toolkit developed by certain forms of feminist and postcolonial theory: Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabha, to name only a few. The appropriation and inversion of these strategies of deconstruction for the disruption of ontology by hegemonic actors who now deploy it tactically, if without subtlety or study (there is an analogy to be made with a hatchet somewhere), to scramble marginal ontologies is shocking, yet it must be seen as another example of the right-wing appropriation of left political techniques. Deconstruction has been financialized—it’s a volatility inducing accumulation strategy. When the United States and Israel defend freedom of speech and democracy, when pinkwashing enables embarking on the representational and practical deconstruction of the individuals, families, homes, organizations, and nations which are their targets and victims, we must observe that there has been a sea change in both the calculus of dominant representation and the status of its objects. The discursive overturning of local reality now occurs by means of an executable language backed by media platforms and military power, by a formalization and calculus of what, almost twenty years ago, Sarah Ahmed (2004) called “affective economies.” By a strange inversion, “reality” has gone from an independent variable to a dependent variable. It has become dependent upon the information that produces it and that allows stakeholders to bet on its outcomes. It is information itself that is now the independent fact and has the status previously held by “reality.” It, information, is now the necessary condition, ground and medium for any wager on the future. Google’s and Facebook’s recent forays as defenders of privacy against the state’s encroachments on our information is a similar result illustrating the priority of information over any specific reality: it is not a defense of “us” but only a proprietary strategy, a narrative and datalogical exploit for control over the means of production of on-demand realities. The organization of affect driven by the profit motive, depends upon the deconstruction and recomposition of read-write ontologies. In gesturing toward the situatedness of even this world of total and indeed quasi-totalitarian computation, a totalized world that, whether by means of finance, physics, or the screen most often has the force of a (rewritable) fact, we observe that the deracinated, ascetic world of computational racial capital’s dollars and sense is simultaneously the world of financial derivatives. Computation writes options on reality. Derivatives, as it turns out, are only more elaborate and more structured schematizations of the liquidity risk endemic to financial contingencies present in the very process of commodity formation (production and consumption) through what was always distributed production and sale. The financial derivative allows for the breaking apart of an asset or bundle of assets to sell off its various components in pieces, so that it become possible for example to structure risk and trade it without owning the underlier. The risk management necessarily engaged in, one way or another, by all participants in a capitalist economy can now be managed from above by a specialized cartel of market makers offering specialized products—executable contracts of new types—all to the greater benefit of financiers. Additionally, as we shall further demonstrate, advertisers and politicians become the authors of social derivative compositions, semiotic forms of risk and information management. These derivatives formalize the contingencies bearing on their liquidity and are operative everywhere in both formal ways as financial instruments and in informal ways as advertising and social media currencies of affect such as likes and votes, and, like most everything else today, these instruments best succeed through data analysis and can only do their accounting with computers—they are extensions of computer programs. By a process that the brilliant new work of Robert Meister (2021) defines as collateralization, packages of risk may be rigorously defined and (Gramscian) bets made on the contingent outcomes of events. Derivatives are thus liquidity premiums that would in principle allow exposure to the upside of any asset whatever while limiting the downside by clearly structuring risk. The last chapter of this book treats this question of the derivative directly, moving in a direction suggested by Randy Martin’s understanding of the social derivative as a strategy that was social before it was formalized by finance, and in accord with Bob Meister’s key question “Is justice an option?” It partially accepts the historical shattering of ontologies and endeavors to offer a way forward—one that neither mandates nor fully excludes forms of historical return, for example, to the subject/object or to experiences of truth. Because colonial “invasion is a structure not an event” (Wolfe: 388), and because we recognize that economy is a network of networks, it will be argued here—and this may be a hard pill to swallow—that a successful revolution capable of sustaining a postcapitalist sociality, will have to have, in addition to all other requirements, a new financial imaginary. Financial derivatives are sustained by ambient computation, although they nonetheless also have their own psychotropic, experiential, aesthetic, metaphysical, and behavioristic affects and effects. We shall see here that the explicitly financial derivative is only the most obvious form of what, culturally speaking, has become a general case in relation to the acceleration of computational calculus that iterates recursively and consequently induces volatility as it pursues its arbitrage on labor-power through the articulation of social difference and capacity. The result is unending (e)valuation in every domain and continuous risk management— in Randy Martin’s term again, the financialization of daily life. Such is the situation for the implantation of the cognitive-linguistic and such is the situation for the image and for the body—navigating a volatile world of increasing precarity. Logically this situation extends to any people who may be involved—more or less everyone. Indeed, we know now (or at least are in the position to know) that there is no semiotics (to speak of, much less to tweet about) without media platforms, and we also have begun to openly suspect that, with “convergence”—another way of saying the general absorption of mediation by digital computing—these platforms, whatever they may have been in the past (“natural language,” “writing,” “humanism”) have been more or less completely subsumed and thus “denatured” by full financialization. As the factory code morphs into social codes and computer code and into “the New Jim Code” (Ruha Benjamin 2019: 1–48), and as institutions migrate into platforms, the meanings we may most easily produce and transmit are those in some way consonant with and therefore supportive of racial capital. If capital has its way, these meanings that conform to capitalist production and reproduction would, very generally speaking, include all of them—even the ones that as noted by Stew and quoted in the epigram that opens this Introduction “speak truth to power.” The everyday disavowal of the capture of expressivity by platform-based mediation is also a disavowal of the derivative condition of knowledge. The deeper significance for semiotics—of the content indifference of the mathematical theory of communication and of racial capital—is the full colonization of meaning, representation, and consciousness. Consciousness is instrumentalized by a vertically integrated background order that delimits the significance of any expression whatever to an option on the value form. Paradigmatically, social media profits from anything and everything you can say or photograph, but this case is just the most obvious one in a system in which representational media have been captured and subordinated wholesale by computational logistics. Thus, we should not be the least bit surprised by the effective if not also actual racism of a Mark Zuckerberg or, similarly the fascism of a Jeff Bezos. By means of informatics, the logic of capital has been combined with the very substance of things and of expression at the level of their appearance—we confront a logistics of perception and simultaneously an instrumentalization of the objects of knowledge organized by computation and capital and the exploitation of social difference. Psychologically, many experience a balancing act between “reality” and psychosis, between abjection and megalomania, that informs everyday violence, domestic terrorist gunplay, melancholia, and the insane oscillations between murderous rage and delusional mastery. Critical poetics dances on the high-tension lines and in the borderlands linking what appears with what could be; it calls for a restoration of politics through an abolition-feminist reclamation of the power of expression (and economy) and seeks sustainable practices of anarchocommunism in ungovernable and utopian pursuits of the not-yet. 13

#### The terminal operating system of the world computer has proliferated the hierarchical systems of capitalist organizations there is no more a single boss – rather a connected matrix of power at the intersections of globalization and technological control

Berardi 11 [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism “Chapter 4 Exhastion and Subjectivity.” After the Future, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011. P. 107-108]

The financial cycle is bleeding the social environment dry: sucking energies, resources, and the future. And giving nothing back. Recovery of the financial process of valorization of capital is totally separated from the cycle of material production and social demand. Financial capitalism has obtained autonomy from social life. Let’s consider the political side of the same problem: once upon a time when society was suffering the blows of recession, workers reacted with strikes, struggle and political organization, and forced state intervention in order to increase demand. Industrial growth needed mass consumption and social stability. What is impressive in the ongoing crisis, on the contrary, is the widespread passivity of the workers, their inability to unionize. The political trend in Europe is the meltdown of leftist parties and the labor movement. In the US, Obama is daily attacked by racist and populist mobs, but no progressive social movement is emerging. 1.2 million people have had their mortgages foreclosed upon and lost their houses following the sub-prime swindle, but no organized reaction has surfaced. People suffer and cry alone. In the old time of industrial capitalism, the working class could fight against a target that was precisely identified: the boss, the entrepreneur who was the owner of material things like the factory, and of the product of his laborers. Nowadays the boss has vanished. He is fragmented into billions of financial segments, and disseminated into millions of financial agents scattered all around the world. The workers themselves are part of recombinant financial capital. They are expecting future revenues from their pension fund investments. They own stock options in the enterprise exploiting their labor. They are hooked up, like a fly in a spider web, and if they move, they get strangled, but if they don’t move, the spider will suck their life from them. Society may rot, fall apart, agonize. It is not going to affect the political and economic stability of capitalism. What is called economic recovery is a new round of social devastation. So the recession is over, capitalism is recovering. Nonetheless, unemployment is rising and misery is spreading. This means that financial capitalism is autonomous from society. Capitalism doesn’t need workers: it just needs cellular fractals of labor, underpaid, precarious, de-personalised. Fragments of impersonal nervous energy, recombined by the network. The crisis is going to push forward technological change, and the substitution of human labor with machines. The employment rate is not going to rise in the future, and productivity will increase. A shrinking number of workers will be forced to produce more and more, and to work overtime. The real bubble is the work bubble. We have been working too much; we are still working too much. The human race does not need more goods, it needs a redistribution of existing goods, an intelligent application of technology and a worldwide cut in the lifetime dedicated to labor. Social energies have to be freed from labor dependence, and returned to the field of social affection, education, and therapy. We should take seriously the concept of autonomy. In the present condition autonomy means exodus from the domain of economic law: Out-onomy, abandonment of the field of economic exchange, self-organization of knowledge and of production in a sphere of social life which is no longer dependent on economic culture and expectations – barter, free exchange of time and of competence, food self reliance, occupation of territories in the cities, organization of self-defense.

#### Meaning has become circumscribed by this episteme of financialization. Realities of antiblack and colonial systems of genocide are *crystalized through derivatives and risk management strategies*, from the ledgers and cargo holds of slave ships to modern bail, debt, and housing, to the creation and sharing of informatics of leftist movements. The world computer runs on this *codification and recodification of information as social difference* that becomes inseparable from reality itself. The creation of mass-scale computation that encodes water management arose out of this unconscious automation of social relations, deriving from the poisoning of water a numerous black communities form Flint, Baltimore, Herculnem, Serbring and DC.

#### This is the horror of the world computer – the disappearance of the world itself into the banality of information, where social difference ceases to be anything other than the mutable substrate of financialization. Our challenge to this systemic commodification of life requires a challenge at the level of abstraction, an interruption of the information-paradigm where meaning and truth are restricted to the feedback process of the world computer.

Alliez and Lazzarato, 18 (Éric Alliez, philosopher and Professor at Université Paris 8 and at the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy at Kingston University, London. Maurizio Lazzarato, former activist in the workers' movement Autonomia Operaia in Italy, founding member of Multitudes, researcher at Matisse/CNRS, Pantheon-Sorbonne University (University Paris I), and a member of the International College of Philosophy in Paris. “Introduction: To Our Enemies,” *Wars and Capital*, translated by Ames Hodges, *Semiotext(e)*, May 2018)

1. We are living in the time of the subjectivation of civil wars. 1 We did not leave the period of triumph of the market, automation of governmentality, and depoliticization of the economy of debt to go back to the era of “world views” and the conflicts between them. We have entered a time of building new war machines. 2. Capitalism and neoliberalism carry wars within them like clouds carry storms. While the financialization of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to total war and the Russian Revolution, the 1929 crash and European civil wars, contemporary financialization is at the helm of global civil war and controls all its polarizations. 3. Since 2011, the multiple forms of subjectivation of civil wars have deeply altered both the semiology of capital and the pragmatics of the struggle to keep the manifold powers of war from being the perpetual framework of life. Among the experiments with anticapitalist machines, Occupy Wall Street in the US, the Indignados in Spain, the student movements in Chile and Quebec, and Greece in 2015 all fought with unequal arms against the debt economy and austerity policies. The “Arab Spring,” the major protests in Brazil, and the Gezi Park clashes in Turkey circulated the same watchwords of organization and disorder throughout the Global South. Nuit Debout in France is the latest development in a cycle of conflict and occupation that may have started with Tiananmen Square in 1989. On the side of power, neoliberalism promotes an authoritarian and policed post-democracy managed by market technicians to stoke the flames of its predatory economic policies, while the new right (or “strong right”) declares war on foreigners, immigrants, Muslims, and the underclasses in the name of the “de-demonized” extreme right. This extreme right openly comes to occupy the terrain of civil wars, which it subjectivizes by rekindling racial class warfare. Neofascist hegemony over the processes of subjectivation is confirmed by the renewed war on the autonomy of women and the becoming-minor of sexuality (in France, “La Manif pour tous”) as an extension of the endocolonial domain of civil war. The era of limitless deterritorialization under Thatcher and Reagan is now followed by the racist, nationalist, sexist, and xenophobic reterritorialization of Trump, who has already become the leader of the new fascisms. The American Dream has been transformed into the nightmare of an insomniac planet. 4. There is a flagrant imbalance between the war machines of Capital and the new fascisms on the one hand, and the multiform struggles against the world-system of new capitalism on the other. It is a political imbalance but also an intellectual one. This text focuses on a void, a blank, a theoretical and practical repressed which is, however, always at the heart of the power and powerlessness of revolutionary movements: the concept of “war” and “civil war.” 5. “It’s like being in a war,” was heard in Athens during the weekend of July 11–12, 2015. And for good reason. The population was faced with a large-scale strategy of continuing war by means of debt: it completed the destruction of Greece and, at the same time, triggered the selfdestruction of the “construction of Europe.” The goal of the European Commission, the ECB, and the IMF was never mediation or finding compromise but defeating the adversary on an open field. The statement “It’s like being in a war” should be immediately corrected: it is a war. The reversibility of war and economy is at the very basis of capitalism. And it has been a long time since Carl Schmitt revealed the “pacifist” hypocrisy of neoliberalism by reestablishing the continuity between economy and war: the economy pursues the objectives of war through other means (“blocking credit, embargo on raw materials, devaluation of foreign currency”). Two superior officers in the Chinese Air Force, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, define financial offensives as “bloodless wars”; a cold violence, just as cruel and effective as “bloody wars.” With globalization, as they explain, “while constricting the battlespace in the narrow sense, at the same time we have turned the entire world into a battlefield in the broad sense.” 2 The expansion of war and the multiplication of its domain names has led to the establishment of a continuum between war, economy, and politics. Yet from the beginning, liberalism has been a philosophy of total war. (Pope Francis seems to be preaching in the desert when he asserts, with a clarity that is lacking in politicians, experts of all stripes, and even the most hardened critics of capitalism, “Let's recognize it. The world is in a state of war in bits and pieces … When I speak of war, I talk about real war. Not a war of religion. No. There is a war of interests. There is a war for money. There is a war for natural resources. There is a war for domination of peoples. This is the war.” 3) 6. During that same year of 2015, a few months after the defeat of the Greek “radical left,” the president of the French Republic announced on the evening of November 13 that France was “at war” and declared a state of emergency. The law authorizing him to do so and authorizing the suspension of “democratic freedoms” to grant “extraordinary” powers to the administration of public security had been passed in 1955 during the colonial war in Algeria. Implemented in New Caledonia in 1984 and during the “suburban riots” in 2005, the state of emergency brought colonial and postcolonial war back into the spotlight. What happened in Paris on an awful night in November is what occurs daily in cities in the Middle East. This is the horror that the millions of refugees “pouring” into Europe are fleeing. They are visible evidence of the oldest colonialist technology to regulate migratory movement by its “apocalyptic” extension in the “infinite wars” started by Christian fundamentalist George Bush and his cabinet of neocons. Neocolonial war is no longer taking place only in the “margins” of the world. In every way possible, it moves through the “center” by taking on the figure of the “internal Islamist enemy,” immigrants, refugees, and migrants. The eternal outcasts are not left out: the poor and impoverished workers, those in unstable jobs and long-term unemployment, and the “endocolonized” on both sides of the Atlantic … 7. The “stability pact” (“financial” state of emergency in Greece) and the “security pact” (“political” state of emergency in France) are two sides of the same coin. Constantly dismantling and restructuring the world-economy, the flows of credit and the flows of war are, with the States that integrate them, the condition of existence, production, and reproduction of contemporary capitalism.

#### Against the demand to input a binary 1 or 0 into the operating system of the world computer, our affirmation of the resolution refuses the presumed instrumentality of the question, in favor of the proliferation of the beautiful, cacophonous noise of the otherwise and outside. Only this rethinking of thinking can reveal the geopolitical alternatives that are excluded from the episteme of the world computer.

#### Thus, we recognize the universal right of workers to engage in a cognitive general strike

#### Rather than continue the automation of thought around governments unconditional right to strikes, our affirmation insists that our mutual dispossession must be refigured as the condition of possibility for a new communist horizon. This affirmation invites you to join us in a cognitive strike against the instrumentalization of the world computer. If we are all nodes in the world computer, then this revolutionary experiment demands that we refuse the technological prosthetic of abstraction that it offers, and instead proliferate alternative models of knowledge that cannot be enunciated or truncated through the derivative form. This is not a demand for legal recognition, but rather a form of radical self-governance that asserts the only governing body that can regulate us is ourselves. This cybernetic communism mobilizes a new conceptual armature and reparative knowledge operations to devise tools of revolution against the World Computer, radicalizing and restructuring the semiotic, libidinal, and political economies.

Beller, 21 [Jonathan Beller, Professor of Humanities and Media Studies and Critical and Visual Studies @ Pratt Institute, has written extensively on the Philippines, computation, political economy, and the attention economy. "The Computational Unconscious Technology as a Racial Formation," in The World Computer: Derivative Conditions of Racial Capitalism, Duke University Press, 2021. Accessed 8/25/21] CSUF JmB

Therefore we may draw a conclusion that presents itself as the statement of a problem: if what one means by advertising is “the public marketing of commodities for the purpose of capitalist valorization,” then “advertising” has become a general condition, the real name for informatic throughput in capitalism. Advertise, from Latin advertere, “to direct one’s attention to; give heed”—literally, “to turn toward,” from ad (“to, toward”) and vertere (“to turn”). 2 The formula M–I–Mʹ implies the convergence of information and advertising, an alignment of interests. If, given the postmodern intensification of the disappearance of the referent of the sign, the cynosure of postmodernism was that everything meant something else, in postFordism we could say that everything advertises something else—and also itself. This pithy formula could be further reduced to a precise deduction of what is nothing short of the reigning imperative of post-Fordist societies. As if in direct response to Fredric Jameson’s famous injunction, the late capitalist riposte to “always historicize!” is “always advertise!” “Information” is in fact an advertisement for itself. Advertisarial relations, as we may want to call the spectacular competition for recognition apparently permanently enshrined by contemporary computational racial capitalism, should be understood not only as a general condition in the competition for visibility and attention characteristic of all informatic activity but as the mode by which the multitudes (for lack of a better term) are dispossessed of history—the result is Hobbes plus social media. Thus, in the screen-war of each against all, where signs have become instruments of production, the imperative to advertise is also the imperative to erase by rewriting the archive (the noncapitalist and noncapitalizable strata) of shared, collective becoming. The native lands of the psyche, the libido and the imagination must be colonized and turned to production. This representation is indeed an encounter with the real suggesting as it does that the expropriative and racializing logics of settler colonialism are repeated and fully active in today’s conquest. Indeed the computational colonization of psychic life and affective power aids and abets the ongoing violence of settler colonialism and the wake of slavery. In the creation of a variant of subjectivity “adequate” to the universe of technical images, “one” must write not just over the past but on history—on its claimants, and its constituencies. A thesis: The real subsumption of society by capital marks the conversion of representation itself to advertising. As we shall show further, advertising is also a derivative on volatility, an informatico-semantic wager. The ontological lack that Lacan ascribed to the subject of language is now ecological too—a condition of an entire ecology devoted to the instrumental erasure of certain kinds of individuals and ontologies (people) in order that, by means of incorporation, other kinds of individuals (profiles and fractal celebrities) may appear. Virtuosity—which is to say, omnipresent command performances within the social factory, performances that at once mark the expropriation of the cognitive-linguistic capacities of the species and the rise of the programmable image that now scores the general intellect— means that we speak for capital (which is precisely the role of advertising) in order to speak for ourselves. This prescription effects a thoroughgoing colonization. Speaking for capital also happens to be the role of the news, the state, and the military-industrial complex which, understood thus, suddenly appear more starkly than ever to be on a continuum with advertising itself. Although, as is noted throughout this chapter, most of these sentences were written several years before the arrival of 45, his sorry regime only bears out these claims. Dialectically then, within the framework of actually existing capitalism, media convergence (the movement of all platforms toward digital computation, and the movement of all digital computation toward digital capitalism) implies the movement of all cultural-semiotic practice toward advertising. Data mining must therefore be understood as a vast uptake of the commons, of the residuum of our common cultural and attentional practices, designed to intensify the imposition of an advertisarial relationship on every semiotic—and by extension, biotic—process. This mode of capitalist production, in which thought and “noetic acting” directly produce surplus value, strives to include all the sedimented attentional practices which were once relatively and at times avowedly unproductive: the very stuff of literature, art, theater, music, culture, and history, not to mention all that “mindless” yet oh so astute banter, gossip, and shade. My discussion here of advertisarial relations having colonized the fabric of representation is not really meant to disagree with the anti-Google idea of opt-in-only advertising, nor to undercut policy recommendations that seek to limit the perpetration of advertisers’ distinctively diabolical exploits, as in Christian Fuchs’s injunctions cited above. But that type of intervention, I’m afraid, is but the tip of the iceberg. Given the sea change in the nature of languages and images themselves—their wholesale transposition and transformation from a means of representation to a means of production— the difficulty here is both with the substrate of communication (its bits) and with the us-versus-them perspective: we want to ban advertisers, but today we must also confront the disturbing possibility that we are them. Remember, “they” program “our” language and “our” imagination, “we” speak “their” thought—indeed, that is our work, or rather our labor. What to do with the fact that “we have seen the enemy and he is us?” One could say, one could want to say, “I don’t care who you are: if you live in the first world, if you live in the Global North, then fuck you! You ain’t no victim, even if you’re sick.” But who would be saying that? Probably some other Northerner, writing about how culture or the Venice Biennale, as if it were, could or should be more than a lavish spectacle of global suffering staged for a cosmopolitan elite. As capital’s nations, banks, armies, schools, languages, newspapers, and films did to its colonies and colonial subjects, the current institutions from states to computer-media companies do to “us”: they command us to make ourselves over in capital’s image for their own profit through networked strategies of expropriation and dispossession. “We” do it to ourselves, and our representations of self and other are designed to sell a version of ourselves back to ourselves so that we can perform further work on what is now the raw material for the next iteration of images. Therein lies our ontological lack, an ontological lack of solidarity and of even the possibility for solidarity. Therein lies the desire for and indeed necessity to become a plantation manager—the word is overseer. Though it is beyond the scope of this essay, this digital neocolonialism that practically commands global Northerners to in one way or another accept Nazism and genocide with their cappuccino could be understood as being on a continuum with the internal colonization of Europe by the German banks—which depends of course on the distributed production of a kind of neoliberal “realism” that Mark Fisher (2009) called “capitalist realism,” and was only ever a hair’s breadth away from fascism. This fact of our investment in and by advertising, the conversion of the sign to what I call the “advertisign,” poses a genuine problem for theory— indeed an unprecedented one. This problem is particularly evident considering the material conditions (class, nationality, education, race, language, etc.) of the participants in the would-be counterhegemonic theoretical discussions of culture and policy that presuppose the books, computers, schools, and institutions that sustain these. Those within the circuit of these discussions have already passed through a homogenization process which programs them in compatible systems languages. Without submitting ourselves and our own aspirations to radical critique, without conducting a Gramscian inventory of our ostensibly internal constitutions, we run the risk of merely trying to set up a competing corporation with a new business model. The revolution will not be televised; decolonization will not be a brand. Any would-be anticapitalist “we” runs this risk of coopting and cooptation from the get-go, particularly if it does not think about the materiality of social production from top to bottom: class, yes, but also race, nation, gender, sexuality, ability, geolocation, historical stratification. The world’s postmodern poor, the two billion–plus living on two dollars a day, also labor to survive in the material landscape organized by the post-Fordist social factory its anti-Blackness, its Islamophobia, its endless and mutating racism and imperialism. However, from the standpoint of capital, the role of those at the bottom is to serve as substrate for image-production and semiosis; not only in factories, cottage-industries, subsistence farming, and informal economies, but also as starving hordes; “irrational,” criminalized or surplused populations; subject-objects for policing, encampment, and bombing; desperate refugees; and even as voids in the idea of the world—as sites of social death. Forgive me, but I’d wager that no one capable of understanding these words can claim full exemption from the indictment they issue regarding structural complicity with the production and reproduction of everyday life. Humans are troped (via discourse and the screen) to organize military production, national policy, internment camps and prisons, bourgeois imaginations, museum shows, corporate strategy, and market projections. Let us clearly state here that any program that does not admit this excluded planet into dialogues that vitiate the monologues imposed by capitalist informatics and advertisigns is still floating in the realm of the ruling ideas and therefore participant in murder. These ruling ideas are the ones whose density and weight, whose material support and very machinery, threaten to further crush the late-capitalist poor out of not just representation but out of existence. This erasure and disposability, imposed by systems of informatic inscription designed to absorb every output of sense, is the achievement of the advertisarial relations endemic to computational racial capitalism. When information is an advertisement for itself that presupposes the operating system of the world computer as virtual machine, banning what we recognize as advertising on the internet, even if an excellent beginning, is just not adequate to address these issues of representation, social justice, planetary and climate racism, and emancipation. To summarize: the forms of sociality which are the conditions of possibility for the online, informatically organized relations—best characterized as advertisarial—run through every sector and register of planetary life. The internet, while recognizable as an effect and a cause of the current form of planetary production and reproduction, cannot be considered in isolation as a merely technical platform or set of platforms if its historical role is to be properly understood. To take the internet as an autonomous technological force results in a species of platform fetishism that disavows both the histories and material conditions of its emergence, conditions that are, in short, those of screen culture and racial capitalism; this is to say that it, the internet, is the very means by which the capitalist suppression of global democracy (which is emphatically, economic democracy as well) has been accomplished and continues. If the internet is autonomous, it is because it expresses the autonomization of the value form. As noted previously, with the hijacking of communications and semiotic infrastructures by racial capitalism, the medium is the message and the message is murder. To ban advertising on the internet would be a good start —but what if the whole thing is advertising? One reading of what I have said thus far might suggest that, given the expropriation of the cognitive-linguistic, our volition is overtaken by capital logic; and given our inability to cogitate in any way that is genuinely resistant to capitalist expropriation, coercion, strictly speaking, is no longer necessary to impose cooperation for capitalist production. We “want” to cooperate productively, our desire—which, from the dispossession of even language and mind constitutes ourselves as subjects in the media ecology of the capitalist technical image, that is, in and through the organization of digital information—is itself an iteration of capital, a script of becoming predestined to become capital. The old language scored by the new image machines and their extractive algorithms locally organizes cooperative subjects who want to cooperate with vectoral capitalization. We want to provide content in order to derive currency and survive. Our solidarity on the internet produces more internet. Thus, in a certain way—and particularly since we no longer properly have any thoughts of our own—we all collaborate in a world organized by images and screens, thereby participating more or less mindlessly in the seamless realization and triumphant apotheosis of the programming business. However, I am sorry to have to report that the dystopian vision here is not quite as bucolic as even this already dreary picture of unwitting and irredeemable pulverization and servitude. While I do see that representation and semiotics have been increasingly flattened à la Orwell and Marcuse by a vast internalization of the apparatuses of oppression (in which “thought” is the [productive] thought of the [capitalist] Party and “repressive desublimation” is an engine of capitalist-fascist production) the “old problems” like the hierarchy of class have not gone away; neither have racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, and fascist nationalisms ceased playing their roles to create vectors of privilege for white male–identifying aspiration. Indeed, most thought today, such that it is, is all about maintaining hierarchical society. The thinking runs thus: capital is nature, capital is eternal, capital is information is nature. Or, in a more pedestrian mode: human beings are naturally acquisitive and competitive, economic growth and technological advancement mean progress, this tech provides, or almost provides, a color-, gender-, and religion-blind society, and so on—and one must advance one’s place in it by any (crypto- or not-so-cryptofascist) means necessary. Of course, there exists better thinking out there. Mia Mingus: “As organizers, we need to think of access with an understanding of disability justice, moving away from an equality based model of sameness and ‘we are just like you’ to a model of disability that embraces difference, confronts privilege and challenges what is considered ‘normal’ on every front. We don’t want to simply join the ranks of the privileged; we want to dismantle those ranks and the systems that maintain them” (Mingus 2011, cited in Puar 2017: 16). However, there is broad-band, ambient programming that facilitates assuming neo-liberal and full-on fascist subjective sovereignty. This programming seeks triumphant brushes with plenitude (communion with the big Other, as distinct from the racial or otherwise other, becomes the ego-ideal), and this same programming is violent, competitive, hateful, mean-spirited, and alienating when embraced —at the same time that it is also cooperative, simpering, and abject. Servitude, even when automatic and mostly unconscious, is unhappy and, as we can see any day from the daily news, utterly pathological and sick. Of course, this diagnosis represents a huge generalization, but despite its broad-brushing lack of subtlety we may find that such a schizoid oscillation between entitled adjudicator and abject supplicant sums up the contours of your average reality television show or comments section on YouTube. It is Bateson’s (2000) and Deleuze and Guattari’s (1977) schizophrenic, caught in the double-bind, who has become the capitalist norm—the one who struggles to negotiate in the form of contradictory signals the aporias of hierarchical society, while reproducing it, and all the while experiencing their own psychic dissolution as an injunction to create. 3 With this schizoid capture in mind, let me then develop my question about the internet—“What if it is all advertising?”—in the framework of post-Fordist production. The argument is that, in the context of virtuosity and the expropriation of the cognitive-linguistic by computational racial capital, sociality itself has become advertisarial, a ceaseless waging of capitalized exploits designed to garner attention and value for oneself and one’s capitalists. This situation represents—indeed imposes—a derivative logic, a logic in which every action is a hedge, a kind of risk management devoted to maximize a return. In addition to the fractalization of fascism, in which agency is manifest as a profile that has aggregated the attention of others, advertising has worked its way into the sign itself, into the image, and into data visualization, and it has generated the advertisign. All signs become points of potential cathexis, derivative positions on the underlier that is social currency and ultimately value. This new type of sign is not simply the brand but also an element of vectoral language (Wark 2007): functionalized words in a production channel, engaging in the micromanagement of desire, the production of new needs, and the capturing of the imagination, all in order to induce linguistic and behavioral shifts in the attention of others while aggregating their attention for oneself—turning their heads with an interface. This combination of the manipulation of market conditions (that is, everyday life) through techniques of risk management is no longer merely the province of advertising but of socalled human interactivity (what was once just communication and before that culture), now become advertisarial through and through. From Smythe’s claim in the “Blindspot” essay (1977) that all leisure time has become labor time, to Virno’s (2004) notion of virtuosity, we have seen aspects of this model for the capitalist overdetermination of apparently unremunerated time before. However, here—with the financialization of expression—we clearly grasp that the financialization of everyday life means also the convergence of semiotics and financial derivatives. Given the thoroughgoing intensification of vectoral, and in fact matrixial, signs, we need to investigate its implications in the context of a discussion of radical media practice. I will make two additional points here before shifting gears and turning at the end of this chapter to what I identify as an aesthetics of survival—an aesthetics that emerges from within the matrix of advertisarial, schizoid capture. The final chapter of this volume will endeavor to extend aspects of such socioaesthetic forms, those resistant to computational racial capitalism, to new notions of radical finance and the possibility of platform communism. If, as was already becoming true in the cinematic mode of production, the dominant means of representation have become the dominant means of production, the questions of and models for political agency are radically transformed, and the urgent need to decolonize communication and decolonize finance presents itself. Future communication will require a cybernetic approach, and, as we shall argue, this cybernetic approach will necessarily be financial, though it will be reaching toward a different order and different mode of production. Like communism, because it will need to be communist, it will see economic transformation of the material relations of production and reproduction as essential to the revolution. It will draw on the repressed and extracted cognitive-linguistic resource of the racialized and otherwise marginalized and configure ways to make our voices matter both as meaning and as tools for the reorganization of the material world and the social relations therein prescribed. Language and images are neither inside nor outside; they are part of the general intellect—currently they are at once media of thought and of capital. We also know that languages and images are not isolable, meaning that they are not and have never been stand-alone entities but rather exist in relation to their media, their platforms, which are again inseparable from society and its institutions. Furthermore, each platform relates to another platform. Paraphrasing McLuhan, we could even say that the “content” of a media platform is another platform. Thusly the general intellect is inseparable from its media platforms and their financials. We see that the general intellect, once largely held in common, is increasingly being privatized; the very media of our thought belong to someone else. This expropriation of the media commons is precisely the precondition of the real subsumption of society by capital. It is an extension of the ongoing expropriation begun by primitive accumulation and money as capital, and it has been accomplished through the financialization of media as platforms of extraction. The ramification of mediation by computation and information has resulted in its convergence into formats offering derivative exposure to underliers that are the expressive vitality and futurity of our communication. We therefore no longer have any organic relation to the materials for thought itself (sincerity has become a myth, at least in the medium-term of most circles)—the words, images, and machines we require to think, to express ourselves, to interact, and to know have been ripped from the species and privatized via the longue durée of dissymmetrical exchange. We work on the words and images, but as numbers they belong to someone else. The media themselves have become forms of capital—forms of racial capital—and our usage of these media means that we work to add value that valorizes capital, for the capitalist and within a relation designed as much as possible to guarantee that our creative acts necessarily occur as dissymmetrical exchange with capital. I write this book in a discourse that does not just not belong to me because it is shared, but in a discourse that is increasingly the property of a set of institutions— publishers, journals, universities—that all have their eye on the bottom line. The means by which we most intimately know the world, ourselves, and our desires (our images and words) are themselves vectors of capitalization intent upon converting our very life-process into surplus value (which is to say value for capital). We need strategies that will seize the means of production and create a reverse subsumption of affect, intellect, knowledge, capability, communication, and community. When all media have converged as economic media, it is economic media that must be reengineered. Again, I think this subsumption of cognitive and affective capacity, the quasi-automating (scripting) of productive labor for capital, is what Stiegler means by the proletarianization of the nervous system—which would include the proletarianization of the pathways of feeling and thought. Our affective capacities are put to alienated and alienating work in the social factory, and their product too is alienated, producing ever-intensifying and ever-accumulating dispossession and disempowerment as the dialectical antithesis of its simultaneous production of unprecedented wealth and power for the cyborg avatars of the great media conglomerates. Intellect and emotional intelligence, the product of thousands of years of speciesbecoming, is being strip-mined so that extraction machines may continue their furious innovation to further discount people. I write this book aware of the pressure to think it just right, to at once extend thinking in order to command attention and produce new needs, but also to delimit it, to control myself, and to put the reins on whatever counterpower may rage within my body, because academia can tolerate only so much “bullshit” and no more. Yes sir, I’ll be careful not to cross that line, but a word to the woke: the bullshit is the best part. From a historical perspective, this encroachment on the means of representation—that Banksy and I and a billion others join the silenced majority in opposing—indicates that the individual subjective agent, itself a platform for sociality that developed with the rise of capitalism (as the subject who relates to other subjects in the market, the bearer of the commodity and thus its thought), is nearly defunct. As has been noted previously, in a world where life processes are stripped, ripped apart, rebundled, and sold as derivative exposures, the individual subject is an outmoded technology despite the fact that it still appears as a skeuomorph in certain updated technosocial apparatuses—like the latest forms of films, games, influencers, and versions of national politics that proffer invitations to momentary individualistic identification for the dividual purpose of providing a sense of familiarity and orientation. While palliative for some in small doses, such individuality is no longer a viable (which is to say, sustainable) fantasy. The real thought is that of the infrastructure, of the AI that codes our meat and scripts our sheets. Sure I take up the mantle for a few moments each day to appear as the agent of this text, suiting up as the operator of an intellect that might be adequate to the informatic shit-storm of racist, capitalist, imperialist, patriarchal, for-profit assaults, but then I drop off into an ocean of petty concerns, food shopping, and home repairs. And even when I say “I,” to perform as the nexus of all this insight, I also know that it’s hardly me talking. I’m just curating at the gates of shit that needs to be said, and hopefully titrating to let the right stuff through. That’s part of my politics though Dog knows that I could create a more lucrative named-professor type profile with just a little more discipline, a bit more self-interested adherence to the protocols of the academy’s factory code. Instead, there is the effort to overturn, to be or at least to live something beyond being the scribe of the world computer, to at once witness the drama of the emergence of the intelligence of commodification, testify to its outrage, and intimate the possibility of its overthrow. Such would be the art of this text, practiced at the limits of disciplinarity and of subjectivity, guaranteed by nothing and no one. The expiration of the subject form, imminent since the subject’s first intimation of mortality—and made structurally mandatory by Freud and especially, with the full-blown rise of the sign at the moment of it radical marginalization by visuality, by Lacan—is not necessarily a cause for lament, despite the increasingly intense fading of its incalculable beauty, its sad reduction to cliché. From a political perspective, it means that within each concrete individual body the presumed continuity of the individual is riddled with contradictory and indeed unassimilable indicators; it means also that there exists in differing quantities and qualities capitalist and noncapitalist striations or sectors. Hallways of emptiness, but also hallways of love. Like bundled assets, the mind-body is tranched by executable logics organized by a calculus of risk available to investors. There are, to be a bit simplistic, aspects of desire that are programmed (indeed farmed) to produce practices that function in perfect accord with capitalist accumulation strategies (individualizing or schizoid) and aspects of desire that are atavistic or collectivist, utopian, communist, or maybe even just plain lonely, and, in short, subprime. In reality, of course, desire is more singular than even such formalizations might indicate. Insert your favorite snippet of poetry here. Hortense Spillers in “All the Things You Could Be by Now If Sigmund Freud’s Wife Was Your Mother” (1997) invokes “the Dozens” and the music of and like that of Charles Mingus (152–3), to make present an “interior intersubjectivity”(140) testifying to the rich unaudited psychic life of what might today be called Blackness. There are vast resources beyond the easy resolution of hegemonic hermeneutics whether deployed by institutionally validated psychoanalysis or compressed by current systems of informatic extraction. In agreeing with Freud that consciousness makes up a small part of mental life when compared to the preconscious, the unconscious, dreams, and so on, but in rejecting the normative assumptions and disavowals (including his own Jewishness) that situate Freud and the psychoanalytic discourse that will become part of European and U.S. bourgeois society, Spillers recognizes a vast store of mental life and the possibility of listening anew. However, when speaking of politics now, we therefore necessarily speak of the abstract forms available for the conceptualization and deployment of concrete emergences whether referring to haecceities that are innumerable or collective forms of existence and psychic life actively mediating between “the one” and “the ‘masses’ ” (141). Let us listen anew. Acknowledging that we ultimately and if possible immediately want to “marry our thought” (Wynter 1994b: 65) to the wealth of subaltern forms of life and the care of the bios, allow me then to put the situation of the post- Fordist subject thusly: in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin (1939) showed how imperialist dividends complicated class issues in England, since many people, otherwise part of the working class, got a share of the dividends of imperialism by clipping the coupons of their investments in racist, exploitative British enterprises across the globe. Today this race-based class fractionalization is fully internalized in the Global North; on our iPads built by Chinese slaves from blood metals extracted from the Congo, we may momentarily feel like biomorphically unmarked nobles in the global cosmopolis; while on the job market or when simply seen in our raced and gendered embodiments, we are abjects. Materially and intellectually we are nodal points on a global network. The signal oscillates between narcissistic megalomania and utter abjection and can be affected by a billion parameters taking us from melancholia to outrage. Thus, even the concrete individual is composed of class fractions, race fractions, gender fractions. In the form of signs, we clip coupons that validate our investments. The language of object-identification, we observe here, cannot really keep up with the fluctuations resulting from the throughput of code as we work to identify and disidentify our agency. Can we audit a different mode of emergence, a different futurity than one inexorably overcoded by capital? Of course this is still somewhat simplistic and also class-specific, as many (billions even) never get to participate as an enfranchised global citizen in any aspect or moment of life, even if the lived experience of these same billions is radically overdetermined by the class(es) from which they are excluded. 4 The gilded poverty of the enfranchised, as opposed to the mere poverty of the rest, is now a measure of connectivity. A more complete view is that we are the product of the world system and thus everything we are has been produced vis-à-vis globalization, and therefore everything bears the trace of the system in its entirety (again, in varying proportions). This conceptualization of concrete individuals (bodies) as global communitarian products forced to varying degrees into templates of individualized risk by capitalist states, is not to erase class; however, it suggests that, just as Fanon saw the great European metropoles as the product of third world labor, we are all products of the worst conditions prevailing in the Global South and around the planet. Global inequality is internal to our being. It is us. How then does one (such a one who is relatively enfranchised by the derivative language of texts such as this one) inventory those relations and produce them as formations of solidarity rather than as disavowed residuum? Is there another data-sphere, a communist one? Can we build communist interfaces, networks, and finance? How would we register, track, amplify, and render actionable the communitarian affinities, solidarities, obligations, and debts, the resources in the wake of too many genocides to count, that in actual practice underpin the official economy, collective life, and whatever authentic hope is left to our species? Perhaps we have arrived at a question worthy of theory: Is there, could there be communist algorithms? Communist derivatives? Derivative communism? We are looking for that path. To add to my point about the shifting, distributed character of political actors—that goes so far as to suggest that we can no longer think only of actors but rather must think of vectors and fields in addition to thinking of the resources developed in cultures of survival—I will make a second observation. A political intervention in the advertisarial relations that have this planet heading toward environmental doomsday requires not only revolutionary policy but revolutionary culture. (I defer further discussion of a third requirement, revolutionary finance, to the final chapter.) This culture must take into account that, for many on this planet, Armageddon is not the future but an ongoing constant. My call here (which should not be entirely unfamiliar, as it gives petit bourgeois intellectuals something important to do) is to (re)politicize semiotic and affective structures and practices, including and perhaps especially those we might control, for example our own utterances—our expression. Of course, to call them “our own” seems to contradict what I’ve said about the expropriation of the cognitivelinguistic and the intensification of aphanisis by visual, verbal, and digital media derivatives, but it is here precisely that we confront one of the significant material contradictions of our time: who or what speaks in us? This question, which I shorthand using the phrase the politics of the utterance and which you can experience palpably right now (as you endeavor to think), seems to me to insist that our idea-making must actively produce its solidarity with the dispossessed. We must struggle for the radical constellation. The question concerning the politics of the utterance, asked here in a strange passage of this text through a beyond-academic terrain, a moonless forest the traversal of which may or may not at this point lead us back to the plot, also raises the question of becoming, as well as the questions of agency and of action within the capitalist image— programmable images, racializing and racist images that, in the terms we have set out, are functionally omnipresent. Continuous media throughput has generated a capitalist imaginary structuring both language function and imaging processes, coordinated at scales and by calculative logics that exceed individual comprehension. Though the occasion is upon us, we must struggle for space and time to think. We must open a spread on which to bet against the dominant order. We glimpse, and we feel, that to insist upon the unremitting relevance of both culture-making and of cross-cultural transnational solidarity helps to avoid platform fetishism because it sees the internet and its machines not as a set or collection of autonomous technologies but as a historically emergent system of value-expropriative communication and organization, built directly upon older but nonetheless contemporaneous forms of inequality, including but not limited to historically emergent techniques of gendering, racialization, and imperialism, and embedded in the living flesh of the world. All of this calculative interconnectivity and networked agency implies, contradictorily, in fact, that the internet is not all advertising—but neither is advertising all advertising. It is also murder and struggle. Banksy knows that. The advertisarial relation is the programmatic relation encrypted in the apparatuses of capital: the war of each against all, taken all the way from finance, computation, and surveillance to the speech act and the imagination in accord with the autopoietic algorithm of the distributed Leviathan. Marx himself saw capitalism as vampiric, and today’s processes of capitalization are even more totalitarian, more widely distributed, and more blood-, life-, and indeed soul-sucking than even in prior eras—though such comparisons don’t do those killed by past iterations of capitalism any good. Despite the disavowals to the contrary, we recognize that capital needs labor, needs metabolic time more desperately and more voraciously than ever before (what else is biopolitics?) and, furthermore, that it wages war on life-time on all fronts, in order to secure labor power, its product and basis, at a discount. The pyramids of inequality become internal fractals, and even as the base broadens, the tip with the all-seeing eye (that is not a subject) ascends ever higher. We do not yet know what can be destroyed or indeed built with the massive appropriation of Banksy’s rocks, but we do know that at present there is total war against our using them to build anticapitalist, nonhierarchical, horizontal, solidary sociality. The refusal or détournement of capital’s encroachment is itself a creative act. Perhaps we have only begun to glimpse what a total refusal might achieve.

### UV

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater – 1AR are too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time – competing interps – otherwise the 2NR could drown the aff in arguments while playing defense. Aff theory first – much larger strategic loss – ¼ of the 1AR vs. 1/7 of the 1NC. Fairness is a voter because its constitutive to debate and education is a voter because its what we retain after we leave the activity.

#### Permissibility and presumption affirm –

#### A] neutrality- otherwise we would not be able to justify morally neutral actions like drinking water since there isn’t a prohibition and we would needlessly have to prove an obligation.

#### B] Trivialism- statements are true until proven false, if I told you my name you’d believe me.

#### C] Affirming is harder – that was above

#### D] Negation Theory- Negating requires a complete absence of an existing obligation

Negate [is to]: to deny the existence of

That’s Dictionary.com- “Negate” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/negate.

# 1ar blocks

### 1ar ov

#### The world computer is the virtual machine of capitalism -- a historically materialized logic that codes the value and truth of a genocidal project through quantification -- the extension of thought through which prosthetics of computation that programs the collective unconscious of the polis, giving every informatic act back to the system that sends a signal which is manifested through their evidence

#### voting affirmative is taking a wager against the democratic modes of water management, betting on the possibility outside of information – our aff asks you to participate in a cognitive general strike against the instrumentality of predication and cognitive labor that is withdrawn via the structure of debates prediction – withdrawing opens up space of what is and what could be that forecloses the cybernetics unconsciousness that creates a political horizon to produce a communist politic

## Fw

### T – Just Government Recognition

#### 1. W/M – we recognize the universal right of workers to engage in strikes

#### 2. Governments are assemblages, of relations and force -their interp destroys clash.

Sparrow et al 2015 (JT, William, Stephen, “Boundaries of the State in US History” William J Novak, Stephen W Sawyer James T Sparrow, The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London) ajoseph

In an attempt to develop a conceptually coherent approach to historicizing the state, the essays in this volume explore boundary conditions, where the limits of government authority have revealed the principles of its operation. Focusing on boundary conditions allows us to move beyond a refractory view of the state, to probe the ways in which state power has been constitutive of politics and indeed of social categories themselves. Rather than positing a state that was a mere forum for the clash of contending interests or electoral behaviors, each essay historicizes in its own way the institutionalization of power in and through the state. It was the historical formation of institutions created by democratically contending interests and factions that generated the modern American state as a distinctive modality of rule, thereby producing—not merely reflecting—the ever-shifting currents of public power that have directed the course of US history.10 A great and understudied source of the American state’s dynamism has emerged along the limits or boundaries of public authority. Indeed, it would appear that these boundaries were not simply loci of visibility, but were themselves generators of power. The power of the state may be said to have been precisely this infrastructural capacity to summon social power—in the sense indicated by Michael Mann—for projection beyond the confines of its societal origins (whether that was in the family, the local community, the region, or the nation) by legitimately inscribing or reinforcing the boundary of public and private authority for effective use.11 By delineating and manipulating strategically chosen boundaries—for example, those separating “private” contractors, litigants, and voluntary organizations from “public” agencies; or those divorcing “America” from “the world” through hardened distinctions between republic and empire, native soil and foreign land, citizen and alien, legal and illegal immigrant, American and un-American, lawful and unlawful combatant—political actors could organize imbalances of 6 / James T. Sparrow, William J. Novak, and Stephen W. Sawyer force and social power into extraordinary configurations of state authority with enormous consequences for the course of American history. In search of this new analytical vantage point privileging political contention at the boundaries of power, the essays in this volume are organized around two broad areas where the new scholarship on the state is at its most dynamic: “America in the world,” and “civil society.” These are also, not coincidentally, constructions that have sometimes blinded historians to the persistent development of governmental efficacy. The first category, “the world,” articulates the external boundary that has until recently been defined in sharp relief against the domestic doings within the nation. As the following essays make clear, the US government has functioned in, and been profoundly formed by, a broader world whose myriad inhabitants— ranging from multinationals, NGOs, international organizations, and nation-states, to ambassadors, immigrants, and refugees—shaped the United States even as they were shaped by it. The second category, “civil society,” sets the internal boundary that has circumscribed “the social” since the days of Tocqueville. By definition it is counterposed against the state, even though civic organizations’ legal status and public responsibilities are authorized, when not subsidized or even directed, by the state. Both categories, “the world” and “civil society,” have served as foils, alternately spurned and valorized, operating in the service of American exceptionalism. The two terms naturalize a pair of exceptionalisms that have proven ideologically central to the project of building the American state. The exceptionally dynamic “crusading state” has been portrayed as jealously retaining its independence from the sordid “entanglements” of power politics to spread the blessings of liberty throughout the world.12 The exceptionally “limited” American state has been imagined as perpetually held at bay by citizens jealous of their liberty.13 These are the two most durable masks worn by the Janus-faced state Ira Katznelson identified in Shaped by War and Trade. 14 By historicizing both categories, we seek to marshal empirical evidence, analytical precision, and historical context in order to think freshly about the state—rather than fall into the trap of thinking with the ideas and categories bestowed on us by state builders and other ideological entrepreneurs.15 One of the most vibrant areas of scholarship in recent years has centered on locating “America in the World,” the thematic focus of the first section of the volume. The essays in this section examine the formation of Boundaries of the State in US History / 7 American government outside national territory—the conceptual container within which most APD and US history have until recently confined themselves. Just as internal boundaries, such as the line demarcating state from civil society, were more apparent than actual and even served to generate state power when configured properly, so too did external boundaries prove formative in marshaling state power for extraterritorial projection. These five essays look at sites where state authority attended the movement of subjects and the projection of power across and beyond geopolitical borders, in empire, diplomacy, war, and international economic development. The first essay, by Gautham Rao, reveals not only that the early American state intervened far more robustly in the economy and society than has commonly been assumed, but also that this development was a response to the challenges of launching a new nation into a dangerous world dominated by imperial powers. The fledgling American republic could not survive without a robust maritime economy that depended on a seafaring labor force vulnerable to the hazards of the high seas. This basic fact, in turn, required pooling the medical risks incurred by sailors so they could visit doctors secure in the knowledge that their “hospital money” entitled them to affordable care. Consequently, the federal government provided an early health care system for merchant mariners through a network of Marine Hospitals. In the late eighteenth century, these hospitals provided services according to a paternalist logic of local responsibility for dependents. As the system expanded and the Treasury centralized control over the dispensation of this entitlement, it increasingly rejected cases where sailors could not demonstrate their productivity. This critical intervention, designed to provide budgetary discipline after the war of 1812 and serve the ideological needs of an emerging market society, simultaneously heightened federal discipline of local hospital administrators and customs officials, even as it was driven by the crescendo of antistatist politics in the 1820s. For sailors who could no longer contribute to the maritime economy, this was certainly no “Age of Good Feelings.” While concrete realms of policy such as those pertaining to health care and maritime trade provided one arena for the American state’s formation in the broader world, other, less concrete realms may have been equally important in shaping its influence. In tracing the insinuations of the American state into the world, sometimes the least tangible salients of power, such as those involved in the conceptual distinctions of political theory, have proven the most consequential. Certainly this was the case for the United States’ international influence as a model of liberal governance. As Stephen Sawyer shows in chapter two, even the most “foreign” political theory—the thought 8 / James T. Sparrow, William J. Novak, and Stephen W. Sawyer and political leadership of Adolphe Thiers, French minister throughout the 1830s and ‘40s and then the first president of France’s Third Republic—drew on readings of American government that circulated well beyond US borders. American civil society impressed him, not for the limitations on state power that his countryman Alexis de Tocqueville rhapsodized, but rather for the efficacy and extension of influence it afforded public authorities. Engaging French debates over republican governance in the July Monarchy and later the Third Republic, Thiers, like Tocqueville, drew on American models of liberal state practice, from the regulation of associations in civil society to the Lincoln administration’s use of emergency power and fiscal policy in the recently concluded Civil War. Unlike Tocqueville, Thiers saw the vibrant society of the United States as a garden cultivated by the judicious use of selective, but effective, state power.

#### Multi model debate is good and predictable – better for education

**Johnson, 15** (Paul E. Johnson, 4-26-2015, accessed on 10-5-2021, Learn Policy Debate, "Opportunity, Not Crisis:A Response to Dr. Greenstein", <https://learnpolicydebate.wordpress.com/2015/04/26/michael-greensteins-anti-performance-article-in-the-rostrum/> Accessed 10/5/21) CSUF JmB

To judge from Dr. Michael Greenstein’s recent essay, “An Activity at Risk: A Call for TopicCentered Debate,”1 one imagines a debate community in crisis. Take Greenstein’s words: “the current state of debate is on a collision course with irreversible consequences”; “our activity is at risk”; “I fear for the life of an event that for so long has done so much for so many.” What does Dr. Greenstein fear? Greenstein worries that debates no longer mirror the mores, assumptions, and attitudes of the world outside debate. For Dr. Greenstein, this world’s central features are formal institutions and their representatives: legal venues, university administrators, employers, and so forth. Crucially, the scope of actions imaginable by these institutions and their representatives is static and fixed, standing outside persuasion. That is, students in debate are to learn what does and does not work in the world, and these parameters are fixed and definable. **The real world apparently places robust, almost ironclad constraints on student learning. The real world in the guise of employer will fire you if you point out the presence of sexism and racism at a workplace** (never mind that there is the relevant concept of retaliation under employment law). **The real world in the guise of the law will not listen to you if your knowledge of it is not intricate. And, crucially, the real world is a place where your personal experience does not matter.** For Greenstein, **debate exists as an instrument that trains students to live in—and with—the world as it is**, **with its attendant possibilities but also accompanying circumscriptions of action, attitude, and opportunity**. No doubt there is a hint of truth in Greenstein’s description of the harsh realities of the world outside the contest round. But, what is wrong with debaters seeing these failings of the real world as imperfections in need of modification rather than permanent facts? Greenstein risks investing too much power into the content of educational practices rather than emphasizing that debate is a method for producing certain habits of mind and thought. One generation’s facts can be another generation’s discarded, outmoded mores. Debate teaches students to raise questions about the status of certain propositions as uncritically accepted facts. Attitudes about our realities are just that— attitudes—and making the character of our world subject to contestation and interlocution is perfectly in line with sound argumentative practice. As I see it, the main benefits to Policy Debate education are providing an unparalleled level of preparation, competition, and contestation. The nature of Policy Debate, which is to have a single topic for an entire season and to structure research around this single topic, is particularly unique in that it encourages students to dig deep into these various and sundry areas of discussion. For a long time the contours of this research were focused almost exclusively on the conventionally understood policy minutiae of the topic: implications various plans might pose for international stability, economic growth, disadvantages posed in terms of netnegative consequences for the adoption of some policy, and challenges to the ability of these plans to solve problems. Some critiqued this practice, suggesting that esoteric topic focus results in an overly technocratic and narrow relationship to the topic, one that delves into details of policy matters at the expense of producing more generalizable knowledge. Debaters have also come under fire for the rapid-pace of their delivery, more akin to auction hawker than deliberative democrat. In fact, the precise sort of debate that Dr. Greenstein argues against does work as a corrective to these concerns because it places the burden on conventional debate practitioners to defend their educational choices. Raising relevant questions about the real world implications of the traditional model of debate advocacy does not so much moot these values as force its advocates to think about some of their own taken for granted theories about the world. Of course, a legitimate counterargument holds that some of the theories now in vogue among a segment of critical arguers are themselves dense and di!cult to interpret. On this point I agree to an extent: these texts are challenging. **If debaters making arguments utilizing these bodies of literature are not communicating with judges, then judges will not vote for these arguments, which should encourage the refinement of the competitor’s arguments**. Competitors should continue to point out logical flaws in arguments, as we all should know full well that disagreeing is not the same thing as devaluing one’s competitor. Only where disagreement comes without the elements of sound argumentation— grounds, data, and backing—does disagreement slip from meaningful democratic practice into prejudicial prejudgment. Perhaps the most attractive attribute to a college admissions o!cer reviewing a high school student’s application is a capacity for critical thinking. **Debaters who adopt less traditional argumentative stances are still learning the vital skills of advocacy, communication, and revision. Even if this process is unfamiliar and seems slightly alienating to us as judges at times, it remains highly valuable for students themselves**. In this vein, Dr. Greenstein’s concerns about what he takes to be flagging interest in Policy Debate suggest that teachers and judges should think carefully about how they discuss argument choices with students. One option is to conflate familiarity with desirability, to understand these practices as evidence of an activity in intellectual decline. The other path involves acknowledging that di!culty and unfamiliarity are often vital signs that education is occurring. Dr. Greenstein’s own examples are actually more ambiguous than he acknowledges. He laments the naïveté of the student in Michigan who protested their admissions practices, claiming the student would have been better o" “to go through legal channels and work within the system by engaging the government in the hope the Supreme Court would reverse its previous decision.” In narrowly defining the political choice of protest as hopelessly naïve, Dr. Greenstein not only ignores that symbolically petitioning an institution is, in fact, a form of governmental engagement, he also fashions institutional decisions and actions as hopelessly static, using a narrow heuristic to define meaningful political action as that which correlates with an immediate instrumental outcome instead of understanding that protests can have broader salutary effects. One need only to look at the student’s statements at the protest to see that she understands there is a broader context for her actions. Of course the University of Michigan is constrained by the law: protests gesture at inequalities in society, even—or especially—legal inequalities, to underscore their unfairness. Dr. Greenstein wants to tag this story “Debater Fails to Understand Reality” instead of “High School Student Engages in Meaningful Political Action.” Do we really want to teach students that the world is immune to their protestations and claims, that no amount of education and reason-giving can change reality? Such a belief goes against almost everything for which debate stands. Similarly, the example of Charles Athansopoulos’ and Geo Liriano’s appeal to the Tournament of Champions can be read as debaters utilizing the “portable skill” of risk calculation taught and employed by debaters for time immemorial. Debaters often argue that high magnitude impacts (getting to debate at a prestigious tournament) with a low probability outcome (rules cannot be broken, but are often subject to broad interpretation) warrants taking a chance that has a low rate of success. There is every reason to believe the students involved understood that what they were doing had a low perhaps even a near-zero chance of succeeding. Yet they petitioned onward. These two examples serve as evidence of the success of debate pedagogy by A) showing that even against institutional constraints one can still create change, albeit at a socio-political level rather than the purely legal plane Dr. Greenstein imagines, and B) that debate teaches skills that transcend the content of the debates. As was their right, the TOC denied their appeal, suggesting it was not even particularly disruptive. Dr. Greenstein makes another set of arguments related to A) the introduction of personal experience and/or people’s social location into contest rounds, B) the importance of preserving the comfortable and safe space of debate, and C) broader structures of exclusion operational in society, noted in his essay as encompassing race and gender. I share Greenstein’s concerns about the introduction of personal experience as a means of resolving debate rounds in one sense: I am uncomfortable with calling on judges to render verdicts on di!cult-to-verify facts from outside the debate round. However, the objections to arguments derived from personal experience are strong enough that they might be deployed in the contest round in order to push back against these positions. For example, Joan Scott’s insightful essay “The Evidence of Experience” in Critical Inquiry provides some very straightforward objections to this mode of arguing.2 Also, individual experiences do have a role to play in political deliberation: they are another form of data that should be engaged with in the process of contestation. There are, and always have been, multiple ways of interpreting the relationship the debaters have to the topic. These arguments go by the name “topicality.” Today, people continue the tradition of interpreting the topic, albeit in seemingly more idiosyncratic ways than in days past. But, I would suggest, these are often matters of degree rather than kind, with the di"erential perception of the two having more to do with the chosen impact claims advanced by today’s debaters. Debating the topic has value, and if there are a!rmative teams who either refuse to debate the topic or who manufacture unpersuasiveto-the-point-of-being-specious claims to be topic-relational, competitors can still demonstrate that a traditional approach to the topic produces valuable knowledge and persuade judges of this claim. It is on this basis that I find Greenstein’s call for work outside of debate rounds to increase the investment of resources into promoting debate in a broader swath of communities confusing. No one is suggesting that there is a zerosum relationship between raising these questions in debates and working outside of them to grow debate’s reach. On the matter of discomfort, safe spaces, and discussions of broader lines of discrimination in society, Dr. Greenstein has certainly raised valuable points. We should be mindful that there is no such thing as a perfectly comfortable space. Instead, we are di"erentially aware of the discomfort that pervades our daily lives. This is especially true in high school, which at best is still a socially di!cult space. It follows that I am especially sensitive to the idea that students might raise charges of racism or sexism, but it is always important to remember that power structures like racism have individual and institutional components. Pointing out that some practices contribute to racial stratification is di"erent than accusing someone of being a racist. Competitors would do well to remember this point. Incidentally, these observations and others are discussed at-length by a number of well-regarded scholars in education and pedagogy. I would argue the bulk of peer-reviewed scholarship on pedagogy and education, especially in the context of race, concludes that posing the question in terms of facilitating comfortable spaces makes more di!cult the vital work of raising questions regarding broad, societal inequality.3 We must understand that the world— especially the one that Dr. Greenstein envisions as the “real” one, riven as it is with competition that is nasty, brutish, and short—imposes itself in an especially harsh manner upon those who do not presumptively fit into its confines. In a debate round, one may argue the impertinence of theses about structural racism with regards to a particular case: “no link” arguments continue to be persuasive. **But when we explicitly or implicitly suggest such theses have little to no value by deciding in advance that they are inaccurate, we are forswearing the hard, argumentative work of subjecting our own beliefs to rigorous testing and interrogation.** Many debate competitors—and coaches—do not live and work in diverse environments. Coding certain debate arguments as inappropriate simply because they acknowledge the complexities and di!culties of the world contributes to a confirmation bias where the discomfort of the judge or coach upon hearing the argument indicts the argument’s soundness, where it might very well suggest the opposite. Today we are seeing debaters raising incredibly urgent questions about how debate’s prioritization of a certain set of hyperbolic impact claims might occur at the expense of everyday impacts related to discrimination and exclusion. Hearing these arguments out is not tantamount to uncritically accepting ideological proclamations. Frankly, considering such claims is beneficial to educators and students whose daily lives do not include such a breadth of perspective.

#### Defense:

#### 1AC preserves good clash, fairness, predictability, and iterative skills- we don’t deviate from the resolution – they are a criminalization of kaffs

#### We aren’t un-predictable – Resolution and mechanism debate predicts K aff ground like the 1AC we defend a global strike if you can’t find disads – do better. their interp is to solely exclude K affs.

#### Reject the arg and the team. Its more real world and checks back on implicit bias which is an apriori issue because it’s already predetermined that judges, coaches, students, staff etc. come to debate with different ethical reasons for debating but agrees those biases could be racially or ethically wrong and should be refused in order to make more ethical decisions.