# 1NC vs Adaolisa

## OFF

### 1-Nebel-T

#### Interpretation: The aff may not defend a subset of states banning lethal autonomous weapons.

#### **Violation – they only defend China**

Other states exist

A close up of a map

Description automatically generated

#### **Vote neg:**

#### **1] Limits – you can pick anything from Israel to India to North Korea and there’s no universal DA since each state has different geopolitics and LAWs – it explodes neg prep and leads to random state of the week affs, especially due to preemptive bans, which makes cutting stable neg links impossible**

#### **2] TVA – read the aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff.**

#### **Voters:**

#### **Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.**

#### **Precision o/w – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.**

#### **Drop the debater – they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to**

#### Prefer CI: reasonability causes a race to the bottom, we should try to set the best norms to improve debate

#### **No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms,**

#### **Evaluate T before 1AR theory -- norms – we only have a couple months to set T norms but can set 1AR theory norms anytime**

### 2- Xi Disad

#### Despite resistance, the CCP regime is stable now – but challenges to legitimacy cause lashout

Ball, MA in IR, 20

(Joshua, University of St. Andrews, <https://globalsecurityreview.com/degree-chinas-internal-stability-depend-economic-growth/>, April 10) BW

For decades, Western academics, policymakers, and analysts assumed that China’s embrace of capitalist economic policies would set the stage for democratic reform. Almost three decades later, however, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains firmly in power under the increasingly autocratic leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping. While the CCP-controlled government faces a range of threats from groups within its borders, the idea of a downturn in the Chinese economy remains a very legitimate threat. The Chinese government has radically modernized its economic policies over the past three decades, completely reversing their initial Marxist or Maoist aversion to providing monetary compensation for labor. These reforms are responsible for the significant growth of the Chinese middle class, which has the potential to be the most influential group in China when looked at in regards to socio-economic status. As a result, the considerably large middle class has come to perceive the CCP as being responsible for their rising levels of prosperity. China has undoubtedly experienced the effects of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis; it indeed fared much better than the majority of the world. However, China still faces many hurdles to overcome. Rising Debt and Escalating Unemployment for Chinese College Graduates It is becoming increasingly difficult in China for college graduates to find jobs, the volume of China’s exports is dropping, and tens of millions of workers are out of work. The possibility of a financial crisis in China could challenge Beijing’s ability to hold up its side of the deal with the population. Since the inception of Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents,’ meant to attract private entrepreneurs to party membership, the middle and upper classes have seen the party as being responsible for their economic well-being. The government provides an environment for a healthy, regulated economy, to encourage the creation of private wealth and property, and in return has its rule legitimized by its people. Arguably, while it is individuals are responsible for the creation of personal wealth, the party made it possible. If the government or party cannot guarantee jobs to the people, there remains the little reason for the people to tolerate the strict control that the party maintains over the state. If the CCP-controlled government cannot sustain economic growth, it could be perceived by members of the growing middle class as violating the social contract that has existed between China’s citizens and the country’s ruling party elite. The CCP could face a challenge to its legitimacy if and when the time comes that it is unable to guarantee a healthy economy, prompting potential discontent from the middle class. Beijing has a track record of effectively suppressing unrest The Chinese government has become particularly adept at maintaining or regaining control over its people via means of physical repression, censorship, and through the creation of an environment where fear of speaking out is a legitimate means of control. Indeed, the likelihood of an economic downturn eliminating the CCP’s influence is minimal. Rising social discontent isn’t likely to be enough to force the party itself from power, but it might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to take advantage of the situation to their political benefit, thus leading to internal instability within the party and damaging its credibility. While the CCP has an extraordinary ability to suppress dissent, many argue that it can only contain such dissent for so long. However, due to the rapid proliferation of advanced technologies including surveillance, censorship, and controlled access to information, the Chinese authorities are empowered as never before, to monitor, identify, and censor those whose activities are a perceived threat to the party. Nevertheless, a sustained economic downturn poses a threat to the CCP’s legitimacy. Continued civil unrest on the part of groups desiring independence from CCP rule as a result of religious suppression and ethnic inequality illustrate not-insignificant threats to the party’s ability to maintain total control over the Chinese state. Regardless, the most significant threat to the power monopoly held by the CCP is a pronounced economic downturn.

#### The plan erodes CCP legitimacy. Xi and CCP leadership have made LAWS their top priority for military and economic superiority.

Allen et al. 19 (Contributing Authors: Mr. Gregory Allen (Center for a New American Security (CNAS)), Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI, Inc.), Dr. Michael Beckley (Tufts University), Dr. Belinda Bragg (NSI, Inc.), CAPT (ret) L. R. Bremseth (Computer Systems Center Incorporated (CSCI)), Mr. Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation), Dr. Skye Cooley (Oklahoma State University), Dr. Dale Copeland (University of Virginia), Mr. Joseph DeFranco (George Mason University), Dr. David R. Dorondo (Western Carolina University), Prof. Anoush Ehteshami (Durham University), Mr. Daniel J. Flynn (Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)), Lt. Col. Chistopher D. Forrest (US Air Force HQ AF/A3K (CHECKMATE)), Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown University), Col E. John Gregory (United States Military Academy, West Point), Dr. Robert Hinck (Monmouth College), Dr. Maorong Jiang (Creighton University), Dr. Michael Mazarr (RAND), Dr. Eric McGlinchey (George Mason University), Mr. Girish Nandakumar (Old Dominion University), Prof. Cynthia Roberts (Hunter College, City University of New York (CUNY) / Columbia University), Mr. John Schurtz (Georgia Tech Research Institute), Dr. Thomas Sherlock (United States Military Academy, West Point), Dr. Robert Spalding III (Hudson Institute), Dr. Cynthia Watson (National Defense University), Dr. Richard Weitz (Center for PoliticalMilitary Analysis, Hudson Institute), Dr. Nicholas D. Wright (Intelligent Biology; Georgetown University; University College London; New America), December 2019, Chinese Strategic Intentions: A Deep Dive into China’s Worldwide Activities A Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) White Paper, <https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/SMA-Chinese-Strategic-Intentions-White-Paper-FINAL-01-Nov-2.pdf>, JKS)

Chinese Leadership Beliefs About AI

In mid-2017, China’s State Council published the Chinese government’s national strategy for artificial intelligence. The document, which received significant and sustained attention from the highest levels of Chinese leadership, describes AI as a “strategic technology” and “a new focus of international competition” in both economic and military dimensions (China State Council, 2017). A year later, in October 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping led a Politburo study session on AI, which offered experts and leaders from commercial and academic AI sectors the opportunity to present before China’s most senior leadership. In his speech during the session, Xi was reported to have said that China must “ensure that our country marches in the front ranks where it comes to theoretical research in this important area of AI, and occupies the high ground in critical and AI core technologies” (Xi, 2018). Xi’s speech demonstrates that China’s leadership continues to subscribe to the main arguments of both the AI national strategy document and Made in China 2025: that China should simultaneously pursue global leadership and self-reliance in AI technology. China’s desire for AI preeminence extends to the military sphere, where Chinese military leaders and scholars predict that continued progress in AI technology will, in aggregate, lead to an “intelligentized” (智能化) military technology revolution that will be as significant as the information technology revolution of the past several decades. China’s AI strategy document states that China will “promote all kinds of AI technology to become quickly embedded in the field of national defense innovation.” In October 2018, Major General Ding Xiangrong, Deputy Director of the General Office of China’s Central Military Commission, said in a speech that China’s main goal for AI is to “narrow the gap between the Chinese military and global advanced powers” (Allen, 2019). Other Chinese leaders, including senior executives at state-owned weapons manufacturers, have said that they believe that lethal autonomous weapons using advanced AI technology will be the primary basis of military power in the future.

#### \*The plan prompts domestic backlash and undermines CCP stability—it’s viewed as a Chinese foreign policy concession

Nicholas **Wu 16**. Reporter specializing in the effect of domestic politics on China’s strategy in the South China Sea, The Huffington Post, “Fighting History: Domestic Politics in the South China Sea”, 5/06/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/china-hands/fighting-history-domestic\_b\_9856776.html

American policymakers and commentators must consider China’s domestic political landscape and resist the urge to caricature the Chinese government as a monolithic body that can pass policy by fiat regardless of public opinion. American officials cannot afford to make that mistake, given the volatility of the South China Sea situation. If planners miscalculate in their strategy, it could provoke a huge domestic backlash in China that will affect the strategy of Chinese leadership. After the first FONOP, netizens posted on sites like Weibo that China needed to resolutely defend itself against “foreign incursions” to prove that the nation’s defenses were not merely “paper tigers.” Chinese foreign policy is in part predicated on the perception in China of a long history of encirclement and humiliation. Henry Kissinger famously wrote in his book On China that a large degree of Chinese strategic thinking is aimed at preventing encirclement by foreign powers, as in the Chinese intervention to save North Korea during the Korean War. That theme of encirclement still resonates strongly among the Chinese public. Even the Xinhua and Global Times editorials about the South China Sea allude to the “threatening of national security” by American FONOPs. The concept that China has been subject to a “century of humiliation” by foreign powers and is only now coming out of that period is a very salient argument for the Chinese national psyche. \*\*\* In the eyes of many Chinese citizens, the issues at hand in the South China Sea are critical. According to Bonnie Wang, a Chinese national currently living in North Carolina, “the advocacy of national sovereignty is very important to an ordinary Chinese citizen.” According to Professor Jessica Weiss, Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University, “Perceptions of foreign humiliation and encroachment on Chinese sovereignty and interests are easily reawakened by new slights and perceived insults. In the absence of tough words and actions, many among the Chinese public—particularly ‘netizens’—will accuse the Chinese government of being too soft in standing up for Chinese interests.” Indeed, after the first FONOP, netizens posted on sites like Weibo that China needed to resolutely defend itself against “foreign incursions” to prove that the nation’s defenses were not merely “paper tigers.” Furthermore, there is a precedent for large-scale grassroots demonstrations in China in response to perceptions of Chinese foreign policy weakness, as with the anti-American protests after the accidental bombing of the Sarajevo Chinese Embassy in 1999 or the large-scale anti-Japanese protests in 2012 after the Japanese government purchased the Diaoyu/Senakau Islands from private owners. The threat of domestic backlash can have large consequences for the Chinese government’s foreign policy-making and diplomacy. Perhaps surprisingly, no major protests have occurred yet over the South China Sea, be they government-organized or grassroots protests. Professor Weiss explains, “The Chinese government has held the upper hand so far in its territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines, so Beijing has not needed protests to convey its resolve. But the situation could change with further US involvement and the international ruling on the nine-dashed line.” China is attempting to expand its physical presence in the region without provoking severe regional backlash. The illiberal nature of an authoritarian system allows it to frame, organize, or suppress domestic protests in a way conducive to diplomacy as a form of providing credible signals in negotiations. The government’s position could be contingent upon the cost of suppressing protest. If the cost of suppressing protest would be too high, as in the case of the 2012 anti-Japanese protests, then the government will permit them. But in cases regarding smaller countries like Vietnam that lack historical animus with China, the cost of suppressing protest is significantly lower. Yet, the United States’s involvement threatens to change that dynamic, as belligerent action from the US might make it more difficult for China to mitigate domestic backlash. As the government of the PRC moves away from its traditional ideology-based legitimacy and as the government’s economic performance-based legitimacy flags amidst economic difficulty, nationalism becomes an increasingly important tool. Nationalist causes can provide a “rally around the flag” effect that increase support for the government. Alternatively, if the government is seen as too weak on issues related to nationalism, it could endanger the legitimacy of the CCP. According to Dalton Lin, a research fellow at Princeton University, Chinese nationalism can be built upon two ideological tenets: one is anti-imperialism; the other is the drive to move China away from colonialism. With the decline of the former colonial powers, however, what used to be anti-colonialism has become blurred with anti-imperialism. Taiwan and the United States are very much linked to the anti-imperialism issue because of historical animosity, but smaller countries like Vietnam and other claimants in the South China Sea are not as much of a part of China’s anti-imperialist narrative. Nationalist fervor in China is much stronger than most outside observers realize. As evidenced by conversations with Chinese citizen s and the posts of the netizens, a perceived weak foreign policy remains a central political concern. American planners need to be wary of China’s domestic political conditions and of China’s effort to avoid another “century of humiliation” regarding foreign incursions on its territory. No major protests have yet occurred against the United States, but the possibility remains. If China does see protests, the cost of suppressing them will only rise for the Communist Party because of the way that the United States could be tied into the historical anti-colonialist narrative. In other words, more aggressive Freedom of Navigation actions could provoke a huge anti-colonialist backlash in China because of the perceived slight against Chinese territorial integrity. This could even lead to the Communist Party being forced to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy stance in order to placate domestic opposition. American planners neglect this domestic element of the crisis at their peril.

#### Domestic backlash prompts regional aggression—escalates

J. Michael **Cole 14**. Senior fellow with the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute, associate researcher at the French Center for Research on Contemporary China, senior officer of the Thinking Taiwan Foundation, and former analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service with a Master’s Degree in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, “Where Would Beijing Use External Distractions?” The Diplomat, July 10, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/where-would-beijing-use-external-distractions/

Throughout history, embattled governments have often resorted to external distractions to tap into a restive population’s nationalist sentiment and thereby release, or redirect, pressures that otherwise could have been turned against those in power. Authoritarian regimes in particular, which deny their citizens the right to punish the authorities through retributive democracy — that is, elections — have used this device to ensure their survival during periods of domestic upheaval or financial crisis. Would the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose legitimacy is so contingent on social stability and economic growth, go down the same path if it felt that its hold on power were threatened by domestic instability? Building on the premise that the many contradictions that are inherent to the extraordinarily complex Chinese experiment, and rampant corruption that undermines stability, will eventually catch up with the CCP, we can legitimately ask how, and where, Beijing could manufacture external crises with opponents against whom nationalist fervor, a major characteristic of contemporary China, can be channeled. In past decades, the CCP has on several occasions tapped into public outrage to distract a disgruntled population, often by encouraging (and when necessary containing) protests against external opponents, namely Japan and the United States. While serving as a convenient outlet, domestic protests, even when they turned violent (e.g., attacks on Japanese manufacturers), were about as far as the CCP would allow. This self-imposed restraint, which was prevalent during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was a function both of China’s focus on building its economy (contingent on stable relations with its neighbors) and perceived military weakness. Since then, China has established itself as the world’s second-largest economy and now deploys, thanks to more than a decade of double-digit defense budget growth, a first-rate modern military. Those impressive achievements have, however, fueled Chinese nationalism, which has increasingly approached the dangerous zone of hubris. For many, China is now a rightful regional hegemon demanding respect, which if denied can — and should — be met with threats, if not the application of force. While it might be tempting to attribute China’s recent assertiveness in the South and East China Seas to the emergence of Xi Jinping, Xi alone cannot make all the decisions; nationalism is a component that cannot be dissociated from this new phase in Chinese expressions of its power. As then-Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi is said to have told his counterparts at a tense regional forum in Hanoi in 2010, “There is one basic difference among us. China is a big state and you are smaller countries.” This newfound assertiveness within its backyard thus makes it more feasible that, in times of serious trouble at home, the Chinese leadership could seek to deflect potentially destabilizing anger by exploiting some external distraction. Doing so is always a calculated risk, and sometimes the gambit fails, as Slobodan Milosevic learned the hard way when he tapped into the furies of nationalism to appease mounting public discontent with his bungled economic policies. For an external distraction to achieve its objective (that is, taking attention away from domestic issues by redirecting anger at an outside actor), it must not result in failure or military defeat. In other words, except for the most extreme circumstances, such as the imminent collapse of a regime, the decision to externalize a domestic crisis is a rational one: adventurism must be certain to achieve success, which in turn will translate into political gains for the embattled regime. Risk-taking is therefore proportional to the seriousness of the destabilizing forces within. Rule No. 1 for External Distractions: The greater the domestic instability, the more risks a regime will be willing to take, given that the scope and, above all, the symbolism of the victory in an external scenario must also be greater. With this in mind, we can then ask which external distraction scenarios would Beijing be the most likely to turn to should domestic disturbances compel it to do so. That is not to say that anything like this will happen anytime soon. It is nevertheless not unreasonable to imagine such a possibility. The intensifying crackdown on critics of the CCP, the detention of lawyers, journalists and activists, unrest in Xinjiang, random acts of terrorism, accrued censorship — all point to growing instability. What follows is a very succinct (and by no means exhaustive) list of disputes, in descending order of likelihood, which Beijing could use for external distraction. 1. South China Sea The South China Sea, an area where China is embroiled in several territorial disputes with smaller claimants, is ripe for exploitation as an external distraction. Nationalist sentiment, along with the sense that the entire body of water is part of China’s indivisible territory and therefore a “core interest,” are sufficient enough to foster a will to fight should some “incident,” timed to counter unrest back home, force China to react. Barring a U.S. intervention, which for the time being seems unlikely, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has both the numerical and qualitative advantage against any would be opponent or combination thereof. The Philippines and Vietnam, two countries which have skirmished with China in recent years, are the likeliest candidates for external distractions, as the costs of a brief conflict would be low and the likelihood of military success fairly high. For a quick popularity boost and low-risk distraction, these opponents would best serve Beijing’s interests. 2. Jammu and Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh Although Beijing claims that it is ready for a settlement of its longstanding territorial disputes with India, the areas remain ripe for the re-ignition of conflict. New Delhi accuses China of occupying 38,000 square kilometers in Jammu and Kashmir, and Beijing lays claim to more than 90,000 square kilometers of territory inside the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. A few factors militate against the suitability of those territories for an external distraction, chief among them the difficult access in winter, and the strength of the Indian military, which would pose a greater risk to PLA troops than those of Vietnam or the Philippines in the previous scenario. Nevertheless, memories of China’s routing of the Indian military in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 could embolden Beijing. Though challenging, the PLA would be expected to prevail in a limited conflict with Indian forces, and China would have taken on a greater regional power than Vietnam or the Philippines, with everything that this entails in terms of political benefits back home. 3. East China Sea and Japan Sparking a war with Japan, presumably over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islets, would represent a major escalation on Beijing’s part. Assuming that rational actors are in control in Beijing, a decision to begin hostilities with the modern and skilled Japan Self-Defense Forces would only be made if domestic instability were serious enough. Still, high resentment of the Japanese stemming from Japanese aggression before and during World War II and the competitive nature of the bilateral relationship make Japan the perfect candidate for an external distraction. More than any other conflict, hostilities with Japan would rally ordinary Chinese to the flag and tap into hatred that the leadership knows it could exploit if necessary. Although the chances of prevailing would be much smaller than in the South China Sea or Indian scenarios (especially if the U.S. became involved), the dividends of victory against Japan — anything from teaching Tokyo a lesson to redressing historical injustices — could be such as to become a major factor in appeasing major domestic unrest in China. Unless the CCP were on the brink of collapse, it is unlikely that the leadership in Beijing would escalate tensions with Japan beyond the disputed islets. In other words, military action probably would not extend to other parts of Japan’s territory, unless, of course, the conflict widened. Containing the conflict by limiting it to the Senkaku/Diaoyus would therefore be part of Beijing’s strategy. 4. Taiwan The “reunification” of Taiwan remains a so-called “core interest” of China and a major component of the CCP’s legitimacy with the public. Despite rapprochement in recent years, a substantial component of the PLA remains committed to a Taiwan contingency. Although the risks of war in the Taiwan Strait are low at the moment, China never shelved its plans to annex the island by force if necessary, and has vowed to do so should Taipei seek to unilaterally change the status quo by declaring de jure independence. Under Xi, Beijing has also signaled that while it is willing to be patient with Taiwanese and would prefer to use financial incentives to gradually consolidate its grip on Taiwan, it does not intend to be patient forever. In other words, foot-dragging on Taiwan’s part, or the election of a political party that is less amenable to rapprochement than the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), could prompt Beijing to choose a more aggressive course of action. Serious unrest on the island could also provide Beijing with the “justification” it needs to involve the PLA, which would be deployed to “protect” Taiwanese “compatriots.” Given that definitions of progress on “reunification” are very much Beijing’s to decide, any incident could theoretically warrant the use of force against Taiwan, especially if major domestic unrest compelled the CCP to seek an external distraction. Militating against such a decision is the fact that anything short of a full invasion of the island would probably forever kill any chance of “peaceful unification” with Taiwan, as the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis demonstrated. A limited military campaign against Taiwan is therefore probably not a good option for an external distraction, as the backlash against aggression would undo years of calibrated Taiwan policy and destroy hopes of unification, which would greatly discredit the CCP with the Chinese public, not to mention the PLA. A full invasion of Taiwan would then provide greater chances of success, at least if we measure success by its impact on public opinion amid serious unrest in China. However, the growing power imbalance in the Taiwan Strait notwithstanding, invading the island would be an extraordinarily difficult — and costly — task; talk of a “quick, clear war” remains just that, and pacifying the island would be a formidable challenge. Should the conflict drag on, as it most certainly would, whatever advantage the CCP may have accumulated by tapping into nationalist sentiment could dwindle and further contribute to resentment against the party. Consequently, unless the CCP were on the brink of collapse, Taiwan would be an extremely poor candidate for external distraction, worse even than Japan, where the chances of success in a limited campaign are higher. 5. United States The last, and least likely, candidate for external distraction would be for the PLA to turn its sights on U.S. forces in the Pacific. For obvious reasons, such a course of action would be a last resort, a last-ditch effort to prevent the complete collapse of the CCP due to domestic factors. The chances of prevailing in a direct military confrontation with U.S. forces in the region would be next to nil. A decision to attack the U.S. would qualify as irrational, a departure from the realm of calculations that would buttress decisions in any of the alternative scenarios discussed above. Still there are examples of countries that embarked on what, in hindsight, can only be described as suicidal adventures by attacking a much more powerful enemy. Japan demonstrated that this is possible during World War II. A likelier source of conflict between the PLA and U.S. forces would be indirect, such as U.S. involvement in limited hostilities between China and any of the countries mentioned above (with Japan and Taiwan as the likeliest). As the PLA is configured not to take on the U.S. military directly but rather asymmetrically, China would increase its chances of scoring domestic points by playing to its strengths — by inflicting damage on U.S. forces with its anti-access/area-denial, or A2/AD. Sinking an aircraft carrier on its way to the East China Sea or towards the Taiwan Strait, for example, could do wonders in terms of public opinion and provide temporary cover for an embattled CCP. Ultimately, however, the costs of taking on the U.S. military, added to the extremely low likelihood that Chinese troops could secure the kind of victory that would be necessary to rescue the CCP from internal strife, mean that the U.S. is an especially bad candidate for external distraction. Facing serious domestic instability that does not immediately threaten to topple the CCP, Beijing’s likeliest candidates for succor in external distraction would be Options 1 and 2; much more substantial unrest would probably make Option 3 the most appealing. Given the costs and low chances of success, Options 4 and 5 are extremely poor choices.

#### SCS conflict goes nuclear

Polina **Tikhonova 15**. Writer, journalist and a certified translator. Over the past 7 years, she has worked for a wide variety of top European, American, Russian, and Ukrainian media outlets. Polina holds a Master's Degree in English Philology from the University of Oxford and a Bachelor's Degree in Journalism from the Saint Petersburg State University, 11-28-2015, "US Faces Nuclear War Threat Over South China Sea," ValueWalk, http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/us-nuclear-war-south-china-sea/

China is willing to start a nuclear war with the United States over the South China Sea, according to a Chinese professor. Beijing’s rhetoric after an incident with a U.S. warship sailed to the South China Sea suggests that Chinese decision-makers could resort to more “concrete and forceful measures” to counter the U.S. Navy, according to Zhang Baohui, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. “If so, a face-off between the two navies becomes inevitable. Even worse, the face-off may trigger an escalation towards military conflicts,” the professor wrote in a piece for RSIS Commentary. But, according to Baohui, the U.S. military is “oblivious” to this scenario, since Washington decision-makers think America’s conventional military superiority discourages China from responding to such “provocations” in the South China Sea militarily. However, this “U.S. expectation is flawed, as China is a major nuclear power,” the professor wrote. “When cornered, nuclear-armed states can threaten asymmetric escalation to deter an adversary from harming its key interests,” he added. Baohui then refers to the military parade in Beijing that took place on Sept. 3 and revealed that China’s new generation of tactical missiles – such as the DF-26 – are capable of being armed with nuclear warheads. Moreover, according to the latest reports, China’s air-launched long-range cruise missiles can also carry tactical nuclear warheads. U.S. could provoke nuclear war with China And while the U.S. does not have its core interests in the South China Sea, the disputed islands present China’s strategic interests, which is why this kind of asymmetry in stakes would certainly give Beijing an advantage in “the balance of resolve” over Washington, according to the professor. And if the South China Sea situation escalates and starts spiraling into a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and China, Washington will face a choice of either backing down first or fighting a nuclear-armed power and the world’s largest military force with a strength of approximately 2.285 million personnel. “Neither option is attractive and both exact high costs, either in reputation or human lives, for the U.S.,” Baohui wrote. So it would be unwise for the U.S. to further provoke China in the disputed area, since China’s willingness to defend its interests, reputation and deterrence credibility could easily escalate the conflict into a military confrontation that would ultimately harm U.S. interests, according to the professor. China will join Russia in nuclear war with NATO With NATO member state Turkey downing a Russian jet in its airspace, there is already a high risk of military confrontation in the world. And with China being so close and allied with Russia, Beijing decision-makers could see the incident with the Russian warplane as an opportunity to avenge the West for the South China Sea provocations. The Turkish military said it had shot down a Russian jet on Tuesday, triggering a furious response from Moscow and escalating the already hot tensions in the Syrian conflict. With Russian President Vladimir Putin warning the West of “serious consequences,” analysts believe the Kremlin is willing to unleash a nuclear war over the incident. Despite the fact that Turkey is backed by NATO’s 5th Article, which states that an attack on one Ally shall be considered an attack on all NATO members, the chances that Putin will start a nuclear war over the incident with the Russian jet are very “likely,” according to Pavel Felgengauer, Russia’s most respected military analyst. Felgengauer said Turkey wants to protect a zone in northern Syria controlled by the Turkmens, Ankara’s allies, while the downing of the Russian warplane in the region must prompt the Kremlin to either accept the zone or “start a war with Turkey,” which means starting an all-out war with NATO. And the only way Russia could win a war against NATO is by going nuclear, Felgengauer said. “It is most likely that it will be war,” said Felgenhauer, as reported by Mirror. “In other words, more fights will follow when Russian planes attack Turkish aircraft in order to protect our [Russia’s] bombers. It is possible that there will be fights between the Russian and Turkish navies at sea.” U.S. provokes China to respond militarily The U.S. recently asserted its freedom of navigation in the disputed South China Sea. On Oct. 27, the USS Lassen traveled inside the 12-mile nautical zone around Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands archipelago. This reef is one of seven reefs China has artificially built in order to claim its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and the sea around it. Even though Beijing did not take immediate action to counter the U.S. vessel, such further “provocations” could seriously destabilize the peace and stability of the whole region, according to Baohui. “They could touch off an unintended escalation and push the two countries towards military conflict. The logic is quite obvious,” the professor wrote. The U.S. Navy’s further operations in the South China Sea could thus corner Beijing and force China to respond militarily. After all, China cannot risk its national interests and power reputation, according to the Chinese professor. Shortly after the incident, Vice-Admiral Yi Xiaoguang, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) deputy chief of staff, warned that China “will use all means necessary to defend its sovereignty” if the U.S. conducts similar provocations. China: we can seize more islands in the South China Sea China recently said it can use military force to kick out nations illegally to seize more islands in the disputed South China Sea, but China is now showing restraint, as reported by ValueWalk last week. “The Chinese government has the right and the ability to recover the islands and reefs illegally occupied by neighboring countries,” Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin said, speaking about the disputed artificial islands but not naming any particular country. China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei all have sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. All but Brunei have military fortifications in the disputed area, which raises concerns about a high risk of military confrontation in the region. “But we haven’t done this [seized the islands]. We have maintained great restraint with the aim to preserve peace and stability in the South China Sea,” Liu said. If China gains complete control over the Spratly Islands, it gets the key to controlling waters through which $5 trillion in trade passes every year, mostly to and from China. The professor concluded that reckless actions by one or both parties may well turn mistrust into “bloody military conflicts.” But nobody, especially countries in the region, are interested in such a scenario. “If the US claims to be the defender of world peace and regional stability, it must do everything to avoid this scenario through unintended escalations,” Baohui wrote.

### 3- AI Innovation DA

#### Banning LAWS triggers AI winter – kills innovation and incentives to adopt AI tech across the board which undermines investment expectations.

Castro and McLaughlin 19 Daniel Castro and Michael McLaughlin, 2-4-2019, “Ten Ways the Precautionary Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial Intelligence,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, <https://itif.org/publications/2019/02/04/ten-ways-precautionary-principle-undermines-progress-artificial-intelligence>, SJBE

In the early 2000s, privacy advocates called for bans of radio frequency identification (RFID) chips, which use radio waves to transmit data, in several use cases, including on government identification documents.33 These advocates warned that stores, governments, and even terrorists would use RFID to track the movements of individuals. For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) argued that a 2005 U.S. State Department proposal to require RFID chips in passports would turn passports into “terrorist beacons,” stating “that's precisely what they'll become if we allow the State Department to move ahead with this plan.34 While the fears of stores, governments, or terrorists tracking individuals with RFID never materialized, RFID tags are helping manufacturers and retailers increase sales and reduce theft and labor costs. They are also in U.S. passports, expediting the scanning of passports.35 Policies that ban technologies do not allow society to gain the technologies’ potential benefits, and most people understand in hindsight that bans only held back progress. Banning Lethal Autonomous Weapons Many groups have started movements to ban lethal autonomous weapons—autonomous robotics systems that can independently identify and engage targets based on programmed constraints—due to fears that they will lead to armed conflict on a scale greater and faster than ever before. For example, 116 founders of mostly small robotics and AI companies, including Elon Musk, signed a letter to the United Nations (UN) in 2017 that urges the body to ban lethal autonomous weapons.36 In 2018, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that “machines that have the power and the discretion to take human lives are politically unacceptable, are morally repugnant, and should be banned by international law.”37 Also in 2018, members of the European Parliament adopted a resolution asking member states and the European Council for “the start of international negotiations on a legally binding instrument prohibiting lethal autonomous weapons systems.”38 If policymakers enacted such a ban, it would slow research into AI, as historically, at least in the United States, defense agencies have been a source of significant funding for technology advancement, such as the Internet. And much of the research to support autonomous weapons would yield dual-use technology that could be used for commercial purposes. For example, a fully autonomous tank will likely rely on large portions of the same algorithms and data used to develop a fully autonomous military transport vehicle.39 These same algorithms would be relevant to developing autonomous vehicles for civilian use. Banning Facial Recognition in Government Some fear that facial recognition, which uses AI, could lead to mass surveillance, biased policing, and databases hackers target to steal biometric information.40 Consequently, many privacy and civil liberty advocates argue law enforcement, or the government in general, should not use facial recognition. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has said there should be a moratorium on all law enforcement uses of facial recognition.41 It has also called on companies to “stop selling face surveillance technology to governments.”42 In addition, the Algorithmic Justice League and the Center of Privacy & Technology at the Georgetown University Law Center created the Safe Face Pledge, which asks firms to not sell facial recognition technology to law enforcement unless lawmakers pass legislation to explicitly allow it.43 If firms and the U.S. government acceded to such demands, several beneficial applications, ranging from fighting sex trafficking to identifying imposters with fake passports, would not be available in the United States. Banning Autonomous Vehicles There have been calls to ban autonomous vehicles over both safety concerns and to avoid job loss.44 In 2018, for example, four Minnesota state legislators proposed a bill banning autonomous vehicles until proven safe.45 And in 2017, the Upstate Transportation Association, a group that represents the taxi industry, urged New York to ban self-driving cars for 50 years due to fears that ride-sharing services such as Uber and Lyft will deploy autonomous vehicles and cause massive job loss. The president of the association even argued “it doesn't do anything for the local economy to have driverless cars.”46Similarly, Chicago lawmakers introduced an ordinance in 2016 to ban autonomous vehicles on Chicago streets because they are a “job killer.”47 Outside of the United States, Indian Minister of Road Transport and Highways, Nitin Gadkari, has stated that India should not allow autonomous vehicles. He argues that “in a country where you have unemployment, you can't have a technology that ends up taking people's jobs.”48 Not only would a ban eliminate the possibility of autonomous vehicles reducing fatal accidents, any ban of autonomous vehicles also ignores how disruptive technologies spur economies forward, without exacerbating unemployment.49 Banning Delivery Robots Some have suggested that sidewalks should only be for humans and have advocated for banning delivery robots, which can deliver food as well as packages. For example, San Francisco temporarily banned delivery robots on most city sidewalks in 2017. The city’s supervisor, Norman Yee, who proposed a complete ban, stated that “our sidewalks should be prioritized for humans” and one activist argued that sidewalks “are not playgrounds for the new remote-controlled toys of the clever to make money and eliminate jobs.”50 But “eliminating jobs” is simply another phrase for “boosting productivity” and “increasing consumer welfare.” While San Francisco ultimately passed legislation to create a permitting process that allows such robots on their sidewalks, the application and permit extension fees for one robot are over $1,400. In addition, permits are only good for 180 days and can only extend for 180 more.51 This regulatory approach by the city is in direct contrast to the approach of several states, such as Virginia, Idaho, and Ohio, which allow such robots, and ignores that delivery robots can improve consumer experiences through more same-day deliveries, more flexible delivery hours, and lower delivery costs.52 Policies That Treat AI as Too Dangerous Unless Proven Safe Some policies treat specific uses of AI as “guilty until proven innocent.” These policies require companies to obtain special permission from the government before using AI. The major problem with this “Mother may I?” style regulation is that it slows down the pace of innovation, creating unnecessary roadblocks to the development, testing, and use of new technologies. While there are several proposals for this “Mother may I?” style regulation in regards to AI, such calls are not new. For example, several jurisdictions worldwide have required Google to gain permission to deploy its service, Google Street View, which takes panoramic pictures to allow people to take street-level tours of specific locations using the Internet, due to concerns that the service would violate individuals’ privacy or reduce security.53 These jurisdictions include India, which has yet to give Google Street View permission to launch the service in the nation except at a few tourist sites.54 These policies ignore that Google takes the images from public property, and Google has also responded to concerns by blurring license plate numbers, removing personally identifiable details, and even lowering the height of its cameras to avoid capturing photos of people in compromising situations through the windows of their homes.55 Federal Algorithm Safety Board Stemming from fears that AI is inherently dangerous, some have proposed requiring some algorithms gain governmental approval before operators use them. Several individuals, including University of Maryland computer science professor Ben Schneiderman, have advocated for such proposals. In 2017, Schneiderman proposed the creation of a “National Algorithms Safety Board” to independently oversee the use of “major” algorithms, such as by auditing, monitoring, and licensing algorithms when a company wants to deploy one. Schneiderman argues that “If you’re a major company, and you’re about to put out a major algorithm, or you’re a bank and your about to change the way credit is assigned, I think it’s appropriate that you come before the National Algorithms Safety Board and that there is a review.”56 Attorney Andrew Tutt has a similar proposal, but his idea is to create an agency that would have the power to “prevent the introduction of certain algorithms into the market until their safety and efficacy has been proven through evidence-based premarket trials.”57 In addition, attorney Matthew Scherer has called for the creation of a federal agency to certify AI programs’ safety.58 There are several problems with these and related proposals. First, existing regulatory bodies are already capable of providing oversight. For example, the FDA is already providing oversight of algorithms in medical devices, including a device that uses AI to analyze images of the eye to detect if diabetes patients may be developing diabetic retinopathy, which causes vision loss.59 Second, even Schneiderman acknowledges there are legitimate concerns about his proposal, including “which projects are big enough to warrant review.”60 For example, many people believe the algorithms social media companies use to choose which content to display have a significant impact on society, but there are serious free-speech implications of allowing a governmental body to influence what information people see in their news feeds.61 Furthermore, there would be significant challenges to defining and classifying which algorithms should be subject to regulatory scrutiny, especially because the code of an algorithm may be less consequential than the specific ways in which companies use the technology. Lastly, creating a national safety board or regulator for algorithms would suggest to the public that algorithms themselves pose an inherent risk and need regulatory oversight, even though most algorithms likely involve minor decisions, such as what movie to recommend, which pose little risk to consumers.62 Phasing in Autonomous Trucks Due to fears that autonomous trucks will cause significant job loss, the International Transport Forum (ITF), an inter-governmental organization within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), recommends that governments “consider a temporary permit system to manage the speed of adoption” of autonomous trucks. The ITF argues that “A permit system would offer influence over the speed of uptake as well as revenue to support displaced drivers.” It also believes that the “funds for transition assistance should be generated by the main beneficiaries of the operation of driverless trucks.”63 This suggestion to phase in autonomous trucks resembles New York City’s 2018 decision to cap the number of for-hire vehicles such as Uber for a year.64 Phasing in autonomous trucks ignores that they can increase net welfare as society reaps the benefit of faster, cheaper, and more plentiful services.65 Nonetheless, in an effort to modernize regulations, the U.S. Department of Transportation provided guidance in 2018 stating that it will “adapt the definitions of “driver” and “operator” to recognize that such terms do not refer exclusively to a human, but may in fact include an automated system.”66 But prior to the 2018 DOT guidance, which is an interpretation of existing federal laws and regulations and not a formal rulemaking, there were several examples of precautionary thinking related to autonomous trucks in the United States. For example, in 2017, the Teamsters union successfully lobbied the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee to not include autonomous trucks in a bill to speed up the deployment of autonomous vehicles.67 Likewise, the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee did not include autonomous trucks in its companion bill. Both bills allow most autonomous vehicles, but not large commercial autonomous trucks, to be exempt from meeting safety standards that are unnecessary for autonomous driving, including steering wheels.68 Teamsters President James Hoffa applauded the legislation, stating that “It is vital that Congress ensure that any new technology is used to make transportation safer and more effective, not used to put workers at risk on the job or destroy livelihoods.”69 If policymakers had endorsed this way of thinking in the early 1900s, they would have enacted legislation to preserve the safer horse and buggy industry and protected those jobs. FAA Drone Permits The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act that passed in 2018 requires the FAA to create rules for autonomous drone (unmanned aerial vehicles) delivery.70 The FAA has also proposed other preliminary rules that make the FAA’s regulatory approach more aligned with the innovation principle. For example, in early 2019, the Secretary of Transportation announced an upcoming FAA rulemaking that would allow the remote operation of drones over people and at night, which current FAA rules do not permit, if the drones meet safety standards.71 Yet, until these rules pass, the FAA still requires most drone operators to obtain a special exemption waiver for any flights at night, flights out of line-of-sight of the operator’s or an assistant’s unaided sight (i.e. without using binoculars or built-in video cameras), or those involved in package delivery.72 Even under the FAA’s new proposal, drones would still need special exemption to fly over people faster than 100 miles per hour, when visibility is less than three miles, and when their weight is above 55 pounds.73 While the safe integration of drones into the national airspace requires thoughtful regulation, the FAA’s slow implementation of rules has significantly limited drone uses, particularly for delivery, especially when compared to other countries. In contrast, Iceland’s more permissive rules for drones, which still require drones to meet several mandatory provisions, have enabled thousands of drone deliveries.74 Policies That Treat AI as Dangerous Without Some Unnecessary Restrictions Some policies set unnecessary restrictions on AI, including how and when operators can use it. These policies prohibit AI unless it meets specific and unnecessary design or use requirements, such as requiring express consent to use facial recognition and requiring that significant decisions made by AI be explainable. While policymakers create these laws and regulations to protect human safety, privacy, and financial well-being, the impact is reduced adoption of AI, resulting in higher prices and fewer services. Similar calls in the past for unnecessary regulation would have halted progress with other technologies. For example, in the 1960s, some U.S. elected officials were so afraid that transistors would aid widespread surveillance that one proposed requiring licensing of all bugging equipment.75 If passed, the legislation would have greatly impeded the development of technologies we take for granted such as smartphones, which people can and have used to surreptitiously record conversations.76 Biometric Identifier Laws Requiring Express Consent Harkening back to Louis Brandeis’ view in 1890 that the rise of instantaneous photography was a threat to privacy, some groups today argue that some uses of AI, such as facial recognition, are a threat to individual’s privacy, which is why they propose requiring operators to gain express consent from third parties to deploy them.77 In 2016, the Connecticut General Assembly considered a bill that would have required businesses to get prior consent from customers before using facial recognition technology.78 Other laws place conditions on when and how long a business can capture any biometric identifier, such as a person’s fingerprint, iris scan, or voiceprint for commercial purposes. Illinois passed the first U.S. biometric law—the Biometric Information Privacy Act—in 2008 under pressure from privacy activists.79 The law requires companies to obtain informed written consent from customers before capturing an individual’s biometric identifier and to permanently destroy the identifier when the identifier has satisfied its initial purpose for collection. It also provides citizens a right of action against any company that violates one of the law’s provisions.80 Texas has a similar biometric statute, but it requires informed consent, not written consent, and does not provide citizens a right to action. Nonetheless, it requires firms to destroy the identifier within a year of when the purpose for collecting the identifier expires and subjects violators to civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each violation.81 Biometrics can use AI to improve accuracy and expand applications, such as mobile authentication, but these kinds of laws discourage firms from using biometrics and AI to deliver better services instead of punishing solely those who maliciously or negligently use biometric data.82 As a result, such laws lead to firms barring certain customers from using their services due to fears of potential penalties. For example, Nest does not offer a feature of one of its smart doorbells, which uses a camera to recognize a face, in Illinois.83 Autonomous Vehicle Restrictions Fears about the safety of autonomous vehicles have led several states to craft restrictive rules for testing or using autonomous vehicles. For example, New York requires all autonomous vehicle testing to happen under the supervision of the state police and for companies to pay for the escorts they receive. Unsurprisingly, there has been very little autonomous vehicle testing in the state given the unnecessarily costly testing requirements.84 Such requirements contrast with other states’ more logical regulation of autonomous vehicles. For example, California’s initial autonomous vehicle rules in 2014 required a driver behind the steering wheel during testing.85 In 2018, as the technology continued to improve, California allowed driverless cars without a human behind the wheel.86 Algorithmic Explainability Some groups fear that AI will make decisions without any accountability, and that decisions will be flawed, including being biased against underrepresented groups. This is why they advocate that decisions made by AI systems should be explainable. For example, the AI Now Institute at New York University believes that core public agencies, which it defines as including those responsible for criminal justice, healthcare, welfare, and education, should not use “black box” systems that deploy algorithms that are difficult, or nearly impossible, to understand.87 France’s Secretary of State for Digital Affairs, Mounir Mahjoubi, goes farther by claiming that no part of the government should use an algorithm if it cannot explain its decisions.88And the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the new EU law that regulates how organizations use or process the data of anyone living in the EU, provides EU citizens a right to “meaningful information about the logic involved” in an algorithmic decision that has legal or similarly significant effects.89 Explainability can be a useful tool to make AI accountable, particularly in areas such as the criminal justice system, where market forces to use high-quality AI are not as strong as in the private sector. But there is a tradeoff between the explainability of an AI system and its accuracy, and the aforementioned proposals hold algorithmic decisions to a standard that does not exist for humans.90 For example, medical patients often do not know why their doctors referred them to a particular physician or facility, even though some medical practices frequently pressure their physicians to refer their patients to more expensive in-house physicians and facilities.91 Moreover, broad requirements to require that governments only use explainable AI may make it difficult for agencies to use several beneficial applications of AI that may be difficult to explain. Manual Human Review There are proposals that significant decisions made by AI should be subject to human review. Once again, the fear is that AI will make incorrect decisions without recourse. Yet humans make many incorrect decisions today without recourse. Nonetheless, the GDPR creates a right to human review for European citizens in Article 22 by stating “The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”92 Such a right undermines the purpose of automating tasks, which is to perform a task faster, cheaper, and easier than a human could.93 Requiring manual review also disregards the many laws that already exist that guarantee a right to an explanation for certain high-impact decisions, such as why a company fired an employee, whether the firm used AI or not.94 But there are other significant decisions made by humans, such as refusing a loan, where firms only have to tell applicants what their decisions are based on but not the logic of their reasoning.95 Requiring AI systems to explain the reasoning for all their decisions creates an artificial and unnecessary hurdle to using AI. HOW POLICIES BASED ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IMPACT AI Policies based on the precautionary principle can impact AI in several ways. They can make it more expensive to develop AI, limit the testing and use of AI, and even ban certain applications. Clearly nations have the right to impose any regulations they chose (assuming they do not violate World Trade Organization rules or other global treaty obligations). But they should not delude themselves into believing that regulatory regimes based on the precautionary principle will not limit increased productivity, competitiveness, and innovation. To provide a more detailed discussion of the negative effects policies based on the precautionary principle can have on AI, the following section analyzes the effects of policies discussed earlier in this report. In many cases, these policies have multiple negative effects on AI. 1. Slower and More Expensive AI Development Policies based on the precautionary principle both slow and make the development of AI more expensive. For example, if all fifty U.S. states had laws such as New York’s, which requires autonomous vehicle firms to perform road testing under the paid supervision of police, testing such vehicles would be more expensive. Moreover, proposals to require even non-medical algorithms to undergo pre-market trials would hurt the development of AI because such trials are time-consuming and expensive. Such proposals may also make AI systems that use machine learning, and thus may change frequently and need more testing, significantly less viable because such systems could constantly need to go through a new approval process.96 Finally, policies that increase the cost of developing AI would likely discourage innovation in AI by creating a substantial barrier to entry for startups that lack sufficient funding to cover the cost of proving their AI system is safe. For example, the GDPR has dampened investment in European technology startups and led to a 30 percent decrease in the market share of small online advertising firms that lack the resources to easily comply with the regulation.97 Restrictions on one AI technology can also limit ways to develop another AI technology. For example, researchers in Germany are using drones hovering hundreds of meters above highways to record the movements of vehicles. This data can help develop simulations to test autonomous vehicles; such simulations are important tools for improving the safety of autonomous vehicles because otherwise they would need to travel billions of miles for safety validation.98 While this novel method of collecting data to validate the safety of autonomous vehicles may or may not prove valuable, implementing it in the United States would be would be difficult to do at scale until the FAA implements its new rules that allow out-of-sight drone flights and flights over people.99 2. Less Innovation AI will spur innovation so policies that limit the development of AI will limit innovation.100 For example, proposals to ban or limit the introduction of autonomous vehicles would also limit the generation of new businesses, business models, and ways to do deliver services through the “passenger economy.” The passenger economy, a term coined by Intel and research firm Strategy Analytics, “is the economic and societal value that will be generated by fully autonomous…pilotless vehicles.”101 The firms envision a world where a significant portion of vehicle ownership is replaced by fleets of autonomous vehicles that provide on-demand transportation. Productivity would also increase as autonomous vehicles free employees to work during their commutes and autonomous trucks to operate more efficiently. The firms estimate the value of this economy could be $7 trillion by 2050.102 Nations that ban autonomous vehicles will not experience the benefits of such an economy. 3. Lower-Quality AI There is often a negative correlation between making an AI system more explainable and its accuracy.103 As a result, any policies that require AI to be explainable could lead to less accurate AI. For example, researchers at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York developed an AI system called Deep Patient that can predict whether a patient is contracting any of a wide variety of diseases.104 The researchers trained Deep Patient on the health data from 700,000 patients, using hundreds of variables, such as test results, which allow it to predict diseases such as schizophrenia—which doctors struggle to predict—extremely well.105 Even though its operators can verify its accuracy by measuring outcomes, such as if a person is developing a disease, it is difficult for its own developers to know why it made a particular decision.106 Many sophisticated forms of AI pose a similar problem. Developing an AI system capable of explaining itself or justifying its decisions is an incredibly challenging technical feat, so much so that the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) devoted $75 million in 2017 to research how AI could achieve it.107 Some groups are skeptical that requiring explainability would chill innovation. They cite DeepMind, a British company owned by Google parent-company Alphabet, developing an AI system in 2018 that can analyze eye scans to predict diseases while also providing doctors a map of the features of disease it sees, such as hemorrhages.108 However, the fact that one of the world’s leading AI companies could achieve a form of explainability in a system it worked on for nearly two years is not evidence that all other operators should or would be able to achieve explainability for their AI easily.109 To be clear, it is legitimate for companies, such as IBM, to create internal requirements for AI explainability.110 Requiring all firms to meet such a standard, however, would create a barrier to adopting AI, because not all AI systems are alike and not all businesses have a similar level of expertise. Nonetheless, it is important for AI operators to continually assess their AI system’s accuracy to ensure it is generating or predicting the correct outcomes. The other option is to allow only AI applications that operators can explain; this would lead to AI systems that consider fewer variables and that use simpler algorithms to make decisions. In turn, this would reduce the effectiveness of AI that can generate significant impacts such as identifying a terminal illness before a doctor can. 4. Less AI Adoption The right to human review illustrates how attempts to mitigate the impact of AI could also stifle its adoption. One of the reasons firms use AI is because it increases productivity as it can analyze large amounts of data significantly faster and cheaper than humans. For example, LawGeex, a firm that uses AI to automate the review and approval of contracts, created an AI system that outperforms lawyers in identifying risks in non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). During a test in which 20 lawyers and LawGeex’s AI were each given five NDAs to review, the lawyers took an average of 92 minutes to review the contracts and had a mean accuracy score of 85 percent. LawGeex’s AI, however, achieved 94 percent accuracy and only took 26 seconds to review all the contracts.111 A right to human review would require firms to review significant decisions made by algorithms. Such a requirement is particularly problematic because the complexity and amount of data used by some AI systems to make accurate decisions can make it nearly impossible for firms to explain exactly why a system made one decision, even though they may be able to provide a general explanation of how the system works. Thus, it would take significant time and expertise for a firm to explain many decisions made by AI, which then makes using AI more expensive—negating one of its benefits. Firms subject to a right to human review can make one of three choices. They can: 1) use sophisticated AI, but face litigation if they cannot properly explain a decision, 2) implement simple, and therefore more explainable but less useful, forms of AI, or 3) leverage no AI at all. The first option is not viable over the long term, leaving firms with only the latter two options. And if firms choose either of these options, the economy will be less productive.112

#### AI is the most important innovation regarding climate change control – absent innovation regulation is nearly impossible and carbon emissions explode.

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Although climate change is a human-made problem, it affects all living species. The problem has only got severe in recent years so much so that influential people like innovators, public figures, and celebrities alike are raising awareness about climate change and doing their bit to stop it. **Climate change has become a complex problem, and it cannot be solved completely using basic solutions. That’s where technologies like artificial intelligence step in. Artificial intelligence can be used to analyze the current causes of climate change, predict future scenarios, and even create new products and services that can help minimize the causes and effects of climate change**. Leveraging AI for climate change may not work as a silver bullet, but it can significantly help in our fight against it. Leveraging AI for climate change We need to act now and act smartly to tackle climate change. From bringing simple changes in our daily habits to adopting complex technological solutions to combat climate change, every step matters. **AI can assist in our battle for thwarting climate change in the following ways:** AI for climate change Providing better weather predictions Spotting the early warning signs of a catastrophic event can help save lives and reduce damage to property. By **using AI for climate change monitoring, scientists are able to identify dangerous events such as tropical cyclones and atmospheric rivers. This can significantly help minimize casualties and loss to movable assets as people can be relocated to safer areas well in advance.** With further advancements in artificial intelligence and machine learning, other events such as floods or famine can be predicted well in advance. Such accurate predictions can not only help during a disaster but also help prevent it altogether by allowing us to control the major sources of air pollution and greenhouse emissions that ultimately contribute to climate change. **AI can also help us gain new insights into climate change through climate modeling. Climate models can simulate the interactions of important aspects of climate, including ice, atmosphere, oceans, and land surface. With AI and machine learning, the model can be used to simulate future events and help isolate places severely affected by climate change.** Better predictions can help governments draft better climate policies, prepare governments and citizens alike for change, and tap uncovered areas to find solutions for climate change. Developing smart products for smart homes We are headed for a smart-home future where every device in our homes will be internet-connected and ‘smart.’ Manufacturers can leverage **AI technologies to ensure that these devices cut down on their greenhouse emissions.** These products work the same way as regular smart devices. However, they can play a huge part in preserving the environment. Such devices include; Smart thermostats to regulate energy consumption According to the U.S Energy Information Administration, only 3% of US households use a smart thermostat. The thermostat can observe and learn usage patterns and can program itself accordingly. This not only eliminates the need for human intervention but also helps reduce power consumption. A smart thermostat can identify external conditions such as temperature and humidity and adjust the indoor temperature accordingly. They can also automatically adjust the temperature depending on the time of the day or whether the user is at home or away. A smart thermostat can help save 10% on heating and 15% on cooling. Smart water solutions to conserve water American households utilize gallons of water daily for maintaining their landscapes. Smart irrigation solutions can help save up to 9,000 gallons of water per household every year. AI-enabled smart devices can gather and analyze the local weather data and update user whether to water the lawn or not, in case of expected rains. Other smart devices can incorporate sensors to warn users of water wastage. Zeroing on the major sources of climate change **Power plants are a major source of harmful emissions. Even though nuclear energy proves to be an efficient method of energy production with low carbon emissions, we are yet to harness it in a safe and economical way.** Thus, coal power plants continue to remain a major source of energy production. **Artificial intelligence can help track the sources of greenhouse gas emissions from power plants. Google is already providing grants to a non-profit organization for its satellite imagery system. The satellite can measure power plant emissions from space and can make the information available to the public. AI technology will use the latest algorithms to detect and track power plant emissions. The project will combine data from multiple sources for maximum accuracy.** Regulations can then be imposed by governments or international organizations on power plants generating excessive quantities of greenhouse gases than the prescribed limit. Upgrading the current procedures to minimize emissions **Artificial intelligence can be used to streamline the supply chain processes in the manufacturing, retail, fashion, and food industries to make them more environment-friendly. AI can help minimize inefficiencies, thus helping reduce carbon emissions. AI can also help in the prediction of the supply and demand cycle. Businesses can, therefore, plan their operations accordingly based on market demands and cut down on unnecessary power consumption. They can even switch towards more eco-friendly methods of production, packaging, and transportation to reduce their impact on the environment.** Businesses can also reap financial benefits by implementing these efficient work methods.

#### Warming guarantees extinction

Specktor 19 [Brandon Specktor] “Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims.” Live Science. June 4, 2019. <https://www.livescience.com/65633-climate-change-dooms-humans-by-2050.html> TG

[According to the paper](https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_b2c0c79dc4344b279bcf2365336ff23b.pdf), climate change poses a "near- to mid-term existential threat to human civilization," and there's a good chance society could collapse as soon as 2050 if serious mitigation actions aren't taken in the next decade.

Published by the Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration in Melbourne (an independent think tank focused on climate policy) and authored by a climate researcher and a former fossil fuel executive, the paper's central thesis is that climate scientists are too restrained in their predictions of how climate change will affect the planet in the near future. [[Top 9 Ways the World Could End](https://www.livescience.com/36999-top-scientists-world-enders.html)]

The current climate crisis, they say, is larger and more complex than any humans have ever dealt with before. General climate models — like the one that the [United Nations' Panel on Climate Change](https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/) (IPCC) used in 2018 to predict that a global temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) could put hundreds of millions of people at risk — fail to account for the sheer complexity of Earth's many interlinked geological processes; as such, they fail to adequately predict the scale of the potential consequences. The truth, the authors wrote, is probably far worse than any models can fathom.

How the world ends

What might an accurate worst-case picture of the planet's climate-addled future actually look like, then? The authors provide one particularly grim scenario that begins with world governments "politely ignoring" the advice of scientists and the will of the public to decarbonize the economy (finding alternative energy sources), resulting in a global temperature increase 5.4 F (3 C) by the year 2050. At this point, the world's ice sheets vanish; brutal droughts kill many of the trees in the [Amazon rainforest](https://www.livescience.com/57266-amazon-river.html) (removing one of the world's largest carbon offsets); and the planet plunges into a feedback loop of ever-hotter, ever-deadlier conditions.

"Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability," the authors hypothesized.

Meanwhile, droughts, floods and wildfires regularly ravage the land. Nearly one-third of the world's land surface turns to desert. Entire ecosystems collapse, beginning with the planet's coral reefs, the rainforest and the Arctic ice sheets. The world's tropics are hit hardest by these new climate extremes, destroying the region's agriculture and turning more than 1 billion people into refugees.

This mass movement of refugees — coupled with [shrinking coastlines](https://www.livescience.com/51990-sea-level-rise-unknowns.html) and severe drops in food and water availability — begin to stress the fabric of the world's largest nations, including the United States. Armed conflicts over resources, perhaps culminating in nuclear war, are likely.

The result, according to the new paper, is "outright chaos" and perhaps "the end of human global civilization as we know it."

## Case

### Subs

#### 1] Their evidence is highly speculative posing a hypothetical situation in which maybe a country attacks another country’s nuclear subs which leads to a preemptive strike – there is no warrant for why use or lose pressures are actually created

#### 2] Alt causes – this ev has little to do with LAWs, especially NC3 in that it just says that hunting nuke subs is bad – that’s non uq and happens anyways

### Arms Racing Wrong

#### No global sprint or arms race – aff claims overexaggerate normal military behavior and ignore actual spending.

Perry and Scharre '20 [Lucas and Paul; 3/16/20; Project Coordinator at the Future of Life Institute; Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security; "AI Alignment Podcast: On Lethal Autonomous Weapons with Paul Scharre," https://futureoflife.org/2020/03/16/on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-with-paul-scharre/?cn-reloaded=1]//GJ

Paul Scharre: If there’s an arms race, it’s a very strange one because no one is building the weapons. We see militaries advancing in robotics and autonomy, but we don’t really see sort of this rush to build autonomous weapons. I struggle to point to any programs that I’m aware of in militaries around the globe that are clearly oriented to build fully autonomous weapons. I think there are lots of places where much like these incremental advancements of autonomy in cars, you can see more autonomous features in military vehicles and drones and robotic systems and missiles. They’re adding more autonomy. And one might be violently concerned about where that’s going. But it’s just simply not the case that militaries have declared their intention. We’re going to build autonomous weapons, and here they are, and here’s our program to build them. I would struggle to use the term arms race. It could happen, maybe worth a starting line of an arms race. But I don’t think we’re in one today by any means.

It’s worth also asking, when we say arms race, what do we mean and why do we care? This is again, one of these terms, it’s often thrown around. You’ll hear about this, the concept of autonomous weapons or AI, people say we shouldn’t have an arms race. Okay. Why? Why is an arms race a bad thing? Militaries normally invest in new technologies to improve their national defense. That’s a normal activity. So if you say arms race, what do you mean by that? Is it beyond normal activity? And why would that be problematic? In the political science world, the specific definitions vary, but generally, an arms race is viewed as an increase in defense spending overall, or in a particular technology area above normal levels of modernizing militaries. Now, usually, this is problematic for a couple of reasons. One could be that it ends up just in a massive national expenditure, like during the case of the Cold War, nuclear weapons, that doesn’t really yield any military value or increase anyone’s defense or security, it just ends up net flushing a lot of money down the drain. That’s money that could be spent elsewhere for pre K education or healthcare or something else that might be societally beneficial instead of building all of these weapons. So that’s one concern.

Another one might be that we end up in a world that the large number of these weapons or the type of their weapons makes it worse off. Are we really better off in a world where there are 10s of thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger versus a few thousand weapons or a few hundred weapons? Well, if we ever have zero, all things being equal, probably fewer nuclear weapons is better than more of them. So that’s another kind of concern whether in terms of violence and destructiveness of war, if a war breakout or the likelihood of war and the stability of war. This is an A in an area where certainly we’re not in any way from a spending standpoint, in an arms race for autonomous weapons or AI today, when you look at actual expenditures, they’re a small fraction of what militaries are spending on, if you look at, say AI or autonomous features at large.

#### No pre-emptive deployment – militaries will ensure robust checks in place

1AC Horowitz 19, Michael C. "When speed kills: Lethal autonomous weapon systems, deterrence and stability." Journal of Strategic Studies 42.6 (2019): 764-788. (Michael C. Horowitz is Political Science Professor, Director of Perry World House, and Richard Perry Professor at the University of Pennsylvania.)//Elmer

Another risk is that competitive dynamics mean countries will accelerate their weapons development cycles and deploy LAWS before fully testing them, due to a fear of falling behind. This would essentially resolve the trust dilemma in a way that makes accidents more likely.61 Given concern that LAWS could be more prone to accidents, such a development would be especially dangerous. This risk of an LAWS arms race causing countries to take short cuts in weapons development seems unlikely, however. Militaries **want weapons they can control** (excluding potential exceptions noted above), and they are unlikely **to approve of deploying weapon systems they view as less able** to accomplish a mission, or more **likely to put their own forces in danger**, than alternatives. Thus, the incentive to deploy effective systems will hedge at least somewhat against short-cuts in the weapons development process. Moreover, public awareness about the risks of AI could play a role in shaping how militaries consider deploying AI systems, even in a competitive scenario. **Fear of AI should lead most militaries to be more careful**, rather than less careful, in the testing and **development of LAWS**. The pressure to stay ahead will compete with the pressure to deploy effective systems.

#### No impact – states use caution, won’t give weapons full autonomy, no accidental war, and bans don’t solve because cheating is so easy even if everyone complied nobody would trust it – conclusion of their author

Horowitz et al 19 [Michael C. Horowitz is Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. " When speed kills: Lethal autonomous weapon systems, deterrence and stability." https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2019.1621174]

Conclusion

This article assesses the growing integration of AI in military systems with an eye towards the impact on crisis stability, specifically how countries think about developing and deploying weapons, as well as when they are likely to go to war, and the potential for arms control.68 Contrary to some public concern and media hype, unless AI capabilities reach truly science fiction levels, their impact on national and subnational military behaviour, especially interstate war, is likely to be relatively modest. Fundamentally, countries go to war for political reasons, and accidental wars have traditionally been more myth than reality.69 The effects for subnational use of AI could be more significant, especially if military applications of AI make it easier for autocrats to use military force to repress their population with a reduced number of loyalists.

The commercial spread of machine learning in the private sector means some form of spillovers to military applications will be inevitable. The desire for faster decision-making, concern about the hacking of remotely piloted systems, and fear of what others may be developing could all incentivise the development of some types of LAWS. However, awareness of the potential risk of accidents regarding these systems, as well as the desire for militaries to maintain control over their weapons to maximise their effectiveness, will likely lead to caution in the development and deployment of systems where machine learning is used to select and engage targets with lethal force.

One of the greatest risks regarding applications of AI to military systems likely comes from opacity concerning those applications, especially as it interacts with the potential to fight at machine speed. Unlike missiles or bombers, it will be difficult for countries to verify what, if any, AI capabilities potential adversaries have. Even an international agreement restricting or prohibiting the development of LAWS would be unlikely to resolve this concern. Fear would still exist. Given that uncertainty makes disputes harder to resolve, this could have an impact.

These factors make international regulation potentially attractive, in theory, but challenging in application, because the very thing about LAWS that might make international regulations on LAWS attractive – their ability to enable faster and more devastating attacks, as well as the risk of accidents – may also make those regulations harder to implement and increase the risks if cheating occurs. But discussions at the CCW are ongoing, and may yet yield progress, or at the least agreement on considering safety and reliability issues when evaluating the development and use of autonomous systems. Humanity’s worst fears about an intelligent machine turning against it aside, the integration of machine learning and military power will likely be critical area of inquiry for strategic studies in the years ahead.

### Solvency

#### Blurry definition setbacks and circumvention deck solvency.

Anderson et.al 14 Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner, Matthew Waxman, “Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems”, *International Law Studies, U.S Naval War College,* [*https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=ils*](https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=ils)// NA-RR

Before addressing some of the enforceability problems and dangers of any effort to prohibit autonomous weapons, it is important to understand the proposed formulas do not, as it may seem initially, contain a bright line that would be useful for promoting adherence. Lawyers experienced in the law of armed conflict will quickly see that each of these seemingly clear-cut definitions leaves many open questions as to what systems would be banned under any particular formulation. Even something as seemingly plain as “lethal decision making” by a machine does not address, among other things, the lawfulness of targeting a tank, ship or aircraft which is ultimately the source of the threat, but inside of which is a human combatant. Beyond definitions, the technology and basic architecture of an autonomous system and a nearly autonomous, highly automated system are basically the same—if you can build a system that is nearly autonomous, for example with human override, then you can probably reprogram it to eliminate that human role. Moreover, whether a highly automated system—say, one with a human supervisor who can override proposed firing decisions—is in practice operating autonomously depends on how it is being manned, how operators are trained and how effectively oversight is exercised. It also depends on operational context and conditions, which may limit the degree to which the human role is in any way meaningful. For these and other reasons, a fully autonomous system and a merely highly-automated system **will be virtually indistinguishable** to an observer without knowing a lot about how that system is used in particular operational conditions. The difference might not matter very much in practice, given the variable performance of human operators. In any case, these systems will be easily transitioned from one to the other. The **blurriness of these lines means that it will be very difficult to draw and enforce prohibitio**ns on “fully” autonomous systems or mandates for minimum levels of human decision making. Given the great practical difficulty of distinguishing between autonomous and highly automated systems, **applying a legal ban on autonomous systems would be relatively easy to circumvent** and very difficult to enforce. At the same time, and as alluded to above, imposing a general ban on autonomous systems could carry some highly unfavorable consequences— and possibly dangers. These could include providing a clear advantage in autonomous weapon technology to those States which generally would not join (or in reality comply with) such a ban. They could also include losing out on the numerous potential advantages of autonomous systems of improving decision making on the battlefield, including through avoiding emotion-based response; improving system accuracy, thereby probably minimizing collateral injuries; and possibly limiting human loss of life on both sides and among civilians.