# 1nc

## 4-off

### 1-Disclosure OS

#### Interpretation: Debaters should open source all read positions on the NDCA wiki

#### Violation – you didn’t

#### 1. Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.

**Antonucci 5** [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8; <http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-December/064806.html> //]

a. *Open source systems are preferable* to the various punishment proposals in circulation. *It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation*. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, *open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal* I've seenobviously *fails at the level of enforcement*. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions(circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, *an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level*. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. *An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy without targetting anyone* or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.

#### 2. Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify before round that cards aren’t miscut – full text doesn’t solve since you could have highlighted unethically.  That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### <I will extemp paradigm issues and voters>

### 2-Spec IPRs

#### Interp – The affirmative debater must specify which Intellectual property rights they reduce in a delineated text in the 1AC

#### Violation – They don’t

#### There are different entities within “intellectual property rights”

**Stallman 15** [Did you say "intellectual property"? It's a seductive mirage - gnu project - free software foundation. &nbsp;[A GNU head]&nbsp;. (n.d.). <https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/not-ipr.en.html>.] CB DM

**It has become fashionable to toss copyright, patents, and trademarks**—three separate and different entities involving three separate and different sets of laws—**plus a dozen other laws into one pot and call it “intellectual property”.** The distorting and confusing term did not become common by accident. Companies that gain from the confusion promoted it. The clearest way out of the confusion is to reject the term entirely.

#### Prefer-

#### 1. Shiftiness—Lacking of definition, the aff is vague. Leads to ability to shift advocacies. CX doesn't check because a. they can be sketchy and b. it kills pre-round prep

#### 2. Ground- Hurts my strategy since I’ll err on the side of caution, especially hurts CPs and DAs that may apply to one type of test but not others. Fairness-restricts the choices that the neg has.

#### 3. Clash—Not defining means I don’t know what to run in-round which kills high-quality engagement—absent clash debate becomes two ships passing in the night which is irresolvable—also means vote neg on presumption b/c the aff gets circumvented. Clash key to fairness- if aff gets circumvented, then the aff gets additional route to ballot. Education- allows for critical thinking skills and argument generation.

#### 4. Good Norms- the other side would justify an infinite number of affirmatives because the definition is vague. Fairness- leads to unpredictability which forces underplaying and shallower debates.

#### Voters:

#### Same voters from disclosure shell

#### CX Doesn’t Check

#### [a] topic ed: asking a million questions about the advocacy means that we don’t get to discuss the central issues of the case or the warrants, that’s what makes the case true

#### [b] They can shift out in CX as I ask disad questions, which is the abuse of my shell.

#### [c] Infinitely regressive – this justifies the aff just saying “if you don’t understand the Plan – ask me about it in cross-x”

#### [d] Not verifiable. We can’t know if they would have actually specified. People are trained in CX to be shady as possible- no way I could get an actual concession.

#### [e] Prep skew –I don’t know what they will be willing to clarify until CX which means I could go 6 minutes planning to read a disad and then get screwed over in CX when they spec something else – means CX can’t check.

### 3-BWC CP

#### CP – States should comply with the biological weapons convention

#### Solvency advocate is 1AC Lentoz evidence that says the Biological weapons convention is what protects the world from the risk of biological weapons

### 4- WTO Heg K

#### The World War II order is the rise of multilateral organizations that seek to maintain a structural grasp on the world to maintain profit and stability all under the backdrop of capitalism accumulation, dispossession, global imperialism, and forced economic agreements that decimate the global south – the post war LIO creation by Woods is not one of peace and prosperity but one of racial capitalism and genocide

Jayati Ghosh 15 7-1-2015 Monthly Review Monthly Review https://monthlyreview.org/2015/07/01/the-creation-of-the-next-imperialism/ Accessed 8-29-2021 CSUF JmB Loyola

The early theorists of imperialism, including V.I. Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin, took the existence of colonial structures for granted. Obviously, the national liberation movements of the twentieth century, the disintegration of colonial power in the second half of the century, and the resulting lack of direct political control changed the landscape in terms of how dominance could be exercised. Just after the Second World War, in the Bretton Woods period, the undisputed dominance of the United States in the capitalist world order played a central role in ensuring that many of the earlier requirements were met through a combination of global policing and economic rules of the game set by the hegemonic leader. By the closing decades of the late twentieth century and the opening decades of the twenty-first, however, the world had become much more complex geopolitically and economically. The United States had become the sole superpower, but one enfeebled by over-extension (as the wars in Iraq and the subsequent inability to control events across the Arab world showed clearly) and its own increasing economic dependence on capital inflows from across the world. Competitive threats from Western Europe and Japan were short-lived due to rampant internal contradictions in both, but the emergence of new powers in the developing world, and in particular the economic rise of China, created a more complex global dynamic. The growing power of multinational corporations was accompanied by the increased diversity of their countries of origin (though major multinationals—the top 200 or even the top 500—remained highly concentrated in geographic as well as economic terms). Technological changes that enabled production relocation along with the vertical disintegration of production led to the emergence of value chains in which the operating requirements of multinational corporations became somewhat different. Insofar as imperialism is about the struggle over and capture of economic territory (which must be broadly defined to include not just geographical territory such as land and natural resources, but also the creation of new markets, sources of labor, and forms of surplus transfer such as are reflected in intellectual property), these changes have created distant demands upon imperialist structures and processes. In the absence of a world state, and in a much more complex and constantly changing politico-economic environment, how can capital (which is increasingly global in orientation) generate the superstructures through which the transfers of value are ensured and the investment risks are moderated and contained? It will be argued that there has been an endeavor to resolve this by refashioning the global institutional architecture in ways that operate to increase the conditions of “stability” for large capital while increasing its bargaining power vis-à-vis working people and citizens, as well as nation-states and even smaller capitalist enterprises. International Trade Agreements The past two decades have witnessed an explosion in the treaties, agreements, and other mechanisms whereby global capital imposes rules, regulations, and modes of behavior upon governments and their citizenry. It is true that the post-Second World War international financial system created by the Bretton Woods agreement also specified rules for member countries, and the conditionalities imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank also severely limited the autonomy of countries that were forced to turn to them for assistance. But the recent proliferation of trade agreements (multilateral, regional, and bilateral), investment treaties, and more comprehensive economic partnership agreements impose such a plethora of conditions that Bretton Woods agreements and World Bank and IMF policies almost pale in significance. What is more significant is that these rules operate even for countries that are not in the positions of debtor-supplicants to international financial institutions, and so they require all countries to restrict their policies in ways that are directly related to the possibilities of generating autonomous development in periphery countries. Consider how the multilateral trading system has evolved. Earlier Rounds of GATT (the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) recognized Special & Differential Treatment (S&D) for developing countries, which required less than full reciprocity and were couched in developmental terms. The Uruguay Round (signed off in 1994) moved to a single-tier system of rights and obligations, under which developing countries have to implement fully all the rules and commitments, with flexibility only in longer transition periods. This was seen as quid pro quo for market access in agriculture and textiles, sectors that were highly protected in the developed countries. But this affected the possibilities of autonomous development in the periphery by constraining the policy choices open to them, and denying them some of the most important instruments that had been used by the current capitalist core in its own industrialization and development process. For example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) does not allow practices like local content specifications to increase linkages between foreign investors and local manufacturers, or foreign exchange balancing requirements or restrictions on foreign exchange use by foreign investors. The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) allows for the concentration and privatization of knowledge, and additionally severely restricts reverse engineering and other forms of imitative innovation that have historically been used for industrialization. It has forced the extension of patent life in many countries, allows patenting of life forms, and puts the burden of proof on the defendant. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) prohibits subsidies that depend upon the use of domestic over imported goods or are conditional on export performance. Ongoing negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) are currently based on requiring much deeper tariff cuts in developing countries, which will further deprive them of a crucial trade measure that can support infant industry. The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) contained fine print that effectively allowed developed countries to continue with massive subsidization and protection of their own agriculture and agri-businesses, but it prevents developing countries from doing even a small fraction of this. Most developing countries are allowed only 10 percent de minimis support, unlike most developed countries that have to ensure only a 36 percent reduction of certain subsidies and limit some others, while maintaining and even increasing the rest. Developing countries (like India) that attempt to provide some protection to farmers to ensure food security are coming up against this constraint, because according to the AoA, even in developing countries all such subsidies are measured in relation to 1986–1988 prices, not current prices! Instead of recognizing the ridiculous nature of this clause, the developed countries are resisting any change and have only agreed to provide a Peace Clause for a limited period to certain countries. However, if the WTO has created rigidities and constraints on policy space in developing countries, the many Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) that have been signed in the past two decades are often even worse on this front. There are nearly 400 such agreements in operation, and they have become more comprehensive over the past twenty years. Most (especially North-South agreements) tend to be either “WTO-plus,” i.e., they augment provisions already covered by the multilateral trading regime, or “WTO-extra,” i.e., contain provisions that go beyond current WTO agreements. Thus they often require reductions of actually applied tariffs, rather than of “bound” tariff rates (the GATT limit rate that cannot be exceeded without permitting retaliation). They demand more deregulation in services trade. They typically require more stringent enforcement requirements of intellectual property rights (IPRs) such as: reducing exemptions (e.g., allowing compulsory licensing only for emergencies); preventing parallel imports; extending IPRs to areas like life forms, counterfeiting, and piracy; extending exclusive rights to test data (e.g., in pharmaceuticals); and making IPR provisions more detailed and prescriptive. They have been known to forbid technology and knowledge transfer demands or conditions on the nationality of senior personnel, extending provisions to taxes and charges. They also enter into a range of areas that the WTO still leaves open to individual countries’ policy choices, such as competition policy, rules on investment and capital movement, government procurement, environmental standards, and even labor mobility. Further, unlike the WTO, most RTAs do not provide exceptions to countries in the case of serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties. In addition, there are the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), of which there are more than 4,000 in operation in the world at present. These are about protecting and promoting private investment, of all types, and effectively privileging the rights of investors over the rights of citizens in the host country. There is typically a very broad, asset-based definition of investment that includes Foreign Direct Investment, some types of portfolio investment in equities, real estate, and even IPRs! There is also a very strong and expansive view on what constitutes “expropriation” for which compensation can be demanded—not just nationalization of assets but all sorts of rules and regulations (even those for environmental protection or labor protection) as well as taxation have been interpreted as “expropriation.” All this matters greatly because BITs and increasingly RTAs are subject to dispute settlement mechanisms, both between states and between an investor and a state, that tend to be highly arbitrary, opaque, not open to public scrutiny, and generally pro-investor in their judgments. Since they are legally based on “equal” treatment of legal persons with no primacy for human rights, they have become known for their pro-investor bias, partly due to the incentive structure for arbitrators, and partly because the system is designed to provide supplementary guarantees to investors, rather than making them respect host countries’ laws and regulations. The significance of these treaties and binding legal arrangements is so important for large capital today that new agreements are being lobbied for, which further push the boundaries in terms of constraining regulation and inhibiting measures and policies that would ensure the social and economic rights of citizens. Thus the Obama administration in the United States has joined with Republicans in Congress, with whom otherwise there is great antipathy, to push for fast-track negotiating authority in order to conclude two major trade agreements: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). The goal is to use such forced, fast-track trade agreements to put into place rules that will ensure the continuing dominance of the economies of the triad, making it all the more difficult for emerging nations to catch up, while also securing the power of the mega-multinational corporations with their headquarters in the core economies. Rules Governing International Finance and Debt Restructuring The rules governing international finance and debt are now generally recognized to work in ways that reinforce the unequal global power relations between large capital and people across the world. Nowhere is this more evident than in the rules and legal structures governing sovereign debt. The lack of any coherent system to deal with debt default and to enable the viable restructuring of sovereign debt has led to situations in which countries and their populations are bled over years and even decades, merely to service debt generated in the past and through the piling up of earlier loans at ever-higher interest rates. Austerity measures that reduce public spending on social essentials are forced upon unwilling societies on the basis of supposedly “technocratic” notions that are, in fact, deeply ideological and elite-serving. Developing countries have known this for some time, but this is now also being experienced by some developed countries such as crisis-ridden economies of the European periphery. Countries that somehow manage to restructure some of their debt, or that unilaterally decide to renege on some patently unfair debt taken on in the past, are punished through complex and unbalanced legal systems. These do not even accord to entire populations the minimum conditions of debt workout that are routinely extended to private and corporate debtors within national systems. And here too, the arbitrations and other legal proceedings tend to be excessively biased towards investors and show little recognition of the minimum rights of the citizenry in affected countries. The fact that legal systems and other institutional structures in the core countries tend to support such biases, and investors in general, reinforces the point that this is another way in which contemporary imperialism is expressed.

#### Their reliance on the WTO and its imperialist practices further continues the genocides and upholds the liberal international order. Cross-X checks that they believe that the WTO is necessary, links them to K.

Pallavi Arora and Sukanya Thapliyal 19 11-20-2019 TWAILR Digital Colonialism and the World Trade Organization https://twailr.com/digital-colonialism-and-the-world-trade-organization/ Accessed 8-29-2021 CSUF JmB Loyola

Despite its ongoing existential crisis, the World Trade Organization (WTO) continues to be a vital constituent of the imperial global order. It is well on its way to burying the developmental aspirations of Third World states’ aspirations contained in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) at the urging of more dominant states in the global trading system. ‘New issues’ are being introduced for WTO negotiation, without reaching a conclusion on the contentious ‘traditional issues’ that the DDA sought to address. The most fractious amongst these new issues is the liberalization of electronic commerce (e-commerce). The agenda to liberalize e-commerce has been introduced by digitally advanced states at the behest of Big Tech companies, such as Apple, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Facebook. Digitally advanced states seek to maintain their oligopoly over developing country markets by calling for the deregulation of e-commerce, particularly an unrestricted flow of data across borders. Their demand is contested by a group of African states, Least Developed Countries, and India. These countries have a repository of unprocessed data but lack the infrastructure to harness its potential. They are fearful of being reduced to suppliers of data for Big Tech, which would process such data to reap colossal profits. In a sense, their apprehension is reminiscent of India’s famed handloom industry that was decimated when the British Raj exported raw cotton from India to the ‘dark Satanic Mills’ of Victorian England, and then shipped it back in the form of manufactured cloth, generating vast sums of money for the British East India Company. This reflection highlights the lasting entanglement of the WTO with imperialism by examining dialogues around e-commerce liberalization. It reveals the WTO’s corporate heart that pursues the interests of Big Tech while eroding the economic sovereignty of Third World peoples. We start with an overview of the WTO negotiations on e-commerce and the motivations of various member states, followed by an exposition of conflicting viewpoints on neoliberal e-commerce. We argue against liberalization of e-commerce insofar as it forecloses the ability of Third World states to incentivise their domestic e-commerce industry. WTO E-Commerce Negotiations The internet has steadily displaced traditional methods of commerce, becoming a truly global marketplace. Standing on the brink of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, it seems certain that the future belongs to digital technology and innovation. As participants in the digital ecosystem, we all generate vast amounts of data, the lifeblood of the digital economy. Access to data is a prerequisite for e-commerce services, be it digital goods (such as music and software), digital services (such as cloud storage and Big Data analytics), or as a complement to manufacturing and packaging e-commerce deliveries. Thus, while a trite comparison, data is indeed the new oil. Having said that, unprocessed data is of negligible value. It is only after raw data is processed that it becomes essential to the functioning of the digital economy. The differential capacity of states to accumulate and process data leads us to the North-South dimension underlying the digital space. While developing countries are an untapped repository of data, they lack the technical know-how and infrastructure to accumulate and process it. Developed countries, on the other hand, are home to the world’s leading digital firms that are at the forefront of technology and innovation. On the back of an unrestricted supply of data from developing countries, these corporations have achieved enormous profits by processing such data and, thus, capturing developing country markets. It is of utmost importance for developing countries to bridge the digital divide lest they remain subservient to Big Tech corporations of the North. The WTO has been at the centre of negotiations on trade-related aspects of e-commerce since 1998, when its General Council established the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce. Dismayed by the lack of convergence amongst members, the US, EU and Japan (hereafter ‘proponents’) sought to introduce a broader negotiating mandate in 2016. Broadly premised on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement(TPP), their proposals envisage an unregulated internet free for all. They are, inter alia, opposed to any encumbrances upon cross-border data flows, digital custom duties, and forced technology transfers.1 According to these proponents, the neo-liberal vision holds the promise of a strong digital economy. Similar provisions on e-commerce are found in other bilateral and regional trade agreements including the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement (2012), Mexico-Panama Free Trade Agreement (2015), and ongoing negotiations in the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), among others. After the US withdrawal from TPP in January 2017, the same text forms part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (2018) (CPTPP). Although the TPP has disintegrated, it still forms the basis for negotiations at various bilateral and multilateral forums, hence for the purposes of this Reflection we refer to TPP rules. Seventeen developing and two developed countries, identifying themselves as ‘Friends of E-Commerce for Development’, joined the chorus as they also see merit in liberal e-commerce as their ticket to digital growth. These include Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uruguay, and the MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia) group. Notably, China’s reasons for advocating the liberalization of digital trade are quite distinct from the proponents. While principally in favour of liberal e-commerce, China is against an unrestricted flow of cross-border data and limitations on data-localization, citing reasons of national security. This is in line with China’s aspirations to grow in digital trade, while also securing the Chinese government’s heavy regulation of the internet.2 On the other end of the spectrum are the African Group, Least Developed Countries, and India (hereafter ‘opponents’), who oppose a TPP-style framework on e-commerce for its complete lack of developmental flexibilities. These opponents contend that their large quantity of user data must be considered a valuable resource in the digital economy. Instead, a TPP-style agreement on e-commerce assigns no economic value to unprocessed data and calls for its unimpeded flow across borders. Agreeing to such a framework ˗ opponents contend ˗ would make their markets a goldmine for Big Tech, which would consolidate their market share and obliterate domestic e-commerce platforms. The problem is exacerbated by lack of infrastructure and technology in developing countries to support domestic e-commerce initiatives. Opponents seek to realize the economic value of their data as a means to closing the digital divide. More importantly, they envisage a greater role for the state in regulation of its laggard e-commerce sector to bring it up to speed with digitally advanced states. Opponents successfully lodged their opposition at the Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference in 2017. But proponents have nonetheless commenced exploratory work with support from the WTO Secretariat and endorsement by the World Economic Forum. Given these developments, it is a tall order ahead for developing countries, some of which have already bought into the ‘grand myth’ of development through e-commerce liberalization. From a TWAIL perspective, the WTO negotiations on digital trade, among other things, occasion a reflection on what it means to ‘do TWAIL’ at a time when historical alliances amongst countries of the South have either disintegrated or are in jeopardy. To Regulate or not to Regulate The debate over e-commerce repeats two longstanding competing visions of global political economy: an open Internet ostensibly free from governmental control as opposed to government regulation over e-commerce. The centre-piece of the opponents’ argument is that the neoliberal vision of free e-commerce subverts the role of the state in the digital economy and thereby undermines the domestic e-commerce industry of Third World states. To substantiate this claim, we revisit Chimni’s prescient piece, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making’ that traces the synergies between international institutions, corporate actors, and dominant states in shaping the imperial global order.Chimni argues the WTO is working in the interests of an emerging transnational capitalist class and powerful states to the disadvantage of the Third World. With the purported objective of regulatory harmonization, the WTO prescribes uniform global standards that remove impediments to capital accumulation at the global level. It is through this process that economic sovereignty of Third World states has been ceded to the WTO in crucial areas such as agriculture, intellectual property, and services. Orford also identifies how this ‘pose[s] an illegitimate constraint on the political choices open to peoples and governments’, undermining substantive democracy in the Third World.

#### The alternative is a global revolution against the violence of the US led LIO – movements in that status quo are working and subverting the US and their imperialism exerted through multilateral institutions – even if those movements fail the orientation of those movements is what is necessary because the only way out of US neoimperalism is to continue to fight – the Vietcong forces are proof that movements can stand up to US imperialism

**Sirohi & Bhupatiraju** 20**21 (R. A., S. “Reassessing the Pink Tide. doi:10.1007/978-981-15-8674-3) ajoseph**

For the left to accept such a possibility however would be to miss the polarizing effects of capitalism on a global scale; it would be to ignore the reality of the vast transfers of surpluses from the South to the North that sustain the system. Moreover, to accept such an understanding would also put the left in direct confrontation with its mass base-the poorest sections of society who bear the brunt of imperialism. This is precisely why a generation of anti-imperialist thinkers argued that the way out of underdevelopment and poverty that the peripheries were stuck in, was *to break away from global trading and financial networks* and not in the hope that imperialism could be made benevolent. Their preferred strategy was for 12Here Harvey seems to be differentiating between “accumulation by dispossession” on the one hand and “primitive accumulation” on the other. By doing so, even as he takes to task those versions of Marxism that relegate the violence of dispossession to the margins of capitalism and even as he asserts the continued relevance of such forms of accumulation, his reading nonetheless remains stuck in a stadial conceptualization of capitalism. 4 REARMING THE LEFT 179 peripheral regions to regain hold of the nation state and use the national sovereignty thus obtained to push against the boundaries of imperialism. Thus while radical critics of capitalism are correct in suggesting that only an “inner” transformation of our societies can provide lasting answers to the problems that we face today, for the Global South this process must begin first and foremost through an “outer” transformation of its external links. What is more is that this assertion of sovereignty does not necessarily have to come at the cost of socialist internationalism and indeed historically, the most vociferous demands for political and economic independence have gone hand in hand with heroic acts of internationalism. In a speech delivered in 1965, Che Guevara emphasized this relation as follows: “To raise the living standards of the underdeveloped nations, therefore, we must fight against imperialism. And *each time a country is torn away from the imperialist tree, it is not only a partial battle won against the main enemy but it also contributes to the real weakening of that enemy*, and is one more step toward the final victory. There are no borders in this struggle to the death. We cannot be indifferent to what happens anywhere in the world, because a victory by any country over imperialism is our victory, just as any country’s defeat is a defeat for all of us. The practice of proletarian internationalism is not only a duty for the peoples struggling for a better future, it is also an inescapable necessity” (Guevara 1965). These words remain as true today. Countries like Brazil and India which have diversified industrial bases and major agricultural capabilities can afford to think of an ambitious project of delinking, but such a strategy is likely to be much harder for smaller economies without some sort of international or at least regional level cooperation. Moreover, countries of the Global South that seek to radically challenge capitalism in this way are bound to face the wrath of capital in imperial centres through sanctions, military interventions and so on, and thus the success of delinking in any one country no doubt can benefit from cooperation and support of workers and peasants across the world. Left forces in the North have a particularly important role to play in this regard and in some senses the new contours of the global world economy make such solidarity more possible than ever before. Because although imperialism today continues to rely on extracting super profits from the peripheries, this renewed cycle of imperialism today has gone hand in hand with an erosion of the welfare state in the North and an intense commodification of labour in these parts of the world, all of which have served to weaken the “internal alliances” between capital and labour; Alliances, one 180 R. A. SIROHI AND S. BHUPATIRAJU might add, that Samir Amin at one point saw as constituting a crucial feature of autonomous capitalist development in centres of world capitalism. Conditions such as these can serve to sharpen class conflict and raise working-class consciousness to an entirely new levels in the North, thus providing fertile soil for genuine socialist internationalism. Beyond Developmentalism If the left in the Global South is to emphasize delinking, then such a strategy directly brings home the question of state power to the centre of discussion. It was Lenin’s major contribution to show how important it was for the left not to be satisfied merely by taking state power. In order for socialist movement to move forward and not get trapped within the boundaries of capitalism, *the state would have to be “smashed”.* And yet the very concept of “smashing” has been very fuzzy. Smashing the state did not for once imply a rejection of economic planning for instance. It was not some nihilistic strategy aimed at the destruction of all things that the state had its hands in. It did not for example mean that there was no room for provision of public services like health and education within socialist society.13 It however did mean destruction of the army, prisons and all those arms of the state that were bulwarks of status quo. It also implied a level of decentralization that the capitalist state could never dream of accommodating. Thus what Marxists implied when they sought the smashing of the state was the destruction of the alienating form that the state took; an institution that people create but one that nonetheless comes to dominate them as if it were an external force.

## Case

### Util

#### Prob x Mag enables sacrificial genocide and excuses capitalist violence – Prefer prob before mag.

Santos 3 2003, Boaventura de Souza Santos is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Coimbra, “Collective Suicide?”, Bad Subjects, Issue # 63 , http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge , and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage" , to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

### Indo-Pak War

#### South Asian deterrence is stable – despite modernization, Indian policymakers will not conclude that they would have an advantage in a conventional war with Pakistan

Ladwig 15 – Walter C. Ladwig III, Lecturer in International Relations at King's College London, Ph.D. in International Relations from Merton College, Oxford, 2015 (“Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, May 11th, Taylor & Francis Online)

Headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense budget and a high-profile military modernization program have alarmed observers who worry that these developments could undermine the conventional military balance credited with maintaining ‘ugly stability’ in South Asia. While on their face these concerns have validity, upon deeper examination, there is still good reason to continue to be optimistic about the prospects for conventional deterrence. India’s defense procurement continues to under perform, producing far less in terms of military power than its spending would suggest. Conversely, Pakistan –assisted by China and others –has prevented the emergence of sharp asymmetries in the conventional military balance and even narrowed previously existing gaps.

Modernizing or not, the Indian military is capable of bringing far less force to bear in a limited conflict with Pakistan than the pessimists realize. As a result, it is unlikely that Indian policymakers would conclude that they can either achieve strategic surprise against Pakistan or carry out highly-effective air strikes with little escalatory risk, each of which is a necessary condition for deterrence failure. Consequently, Pakistan’s justification for its current efforts to develop tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems on security grounds lacks a firm foundation. These systems only increase the likelihood of an inadvertent nuclear exchange, while adding little to the deterrence value of Pakistan’s force posture. There may be a variety of reasons why Islamabad is expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal, but a rational response to the threat posed by India’s on-going military modernization is not one of them.140

#### No Indo-Pak War – not in the strategic interest of either country

Ali 14 (<http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/20987/india-does-not-want-to-invade-us-and-the-us-is-not-our-enemy/>, India does not want to invade Pakistan and the US is not our enemy!, Rafay Bin Ali, A software developer working with financial clients from Toronto. He is currently doing his MBA from IBA, Karachi, and is planning an entrepreneurial set-up in Pakistan, 2/23/14)

India no longer considers Pakistan a threat. Let’s face it. India is poised to become a global economic engine; [its economy](http://defence.pk/threads/india-once-again-becomes-10th-largest-economy-in-the-world.214724/) is the 10th largest and [third by Purchasing Power Parity](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)). India is a member of the G4 and has recently acquired almost absolute control of the International Cricket Council (ICC). Having a [G4 membership](http://voices.yahoo.com/g4-reforming-un-japan-india-germany-brazil-on-33722.html) alone raises India’s global influence. Further, the day is near when India would be a permanent member in the [UN Security Council](http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/India-prepares-for-another-stint-on-UN-security-council/2013/11/25/article1909109.ece#.UwX352KSw44). India played its cards well and is a potential super-power. It is time for Pakistan to come out of its shell of denial and recognise India’s swift progression. Myth 1: India is Pakistan’s eternal enemy Pakistanis are often found lamenting when India is offered a better deal by the US. The tendency of the [West to prefer India](http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/15965/a-pakistani-in-india/) has irked me for the longest of times. Nonetheless, when I analyse it rationally, I find asking myself, “Why would they have it any other way?” India has proven its mettle across diverse sectors of national importance. So, why should it, then, not be offered a better package than us? Further, given our all too frequent [anti-US rhetoric](http://tribune.com.pk/story/400313/part-1--pew-report-anti-american-sentiment-rife-in-pakistan/), we should be grateful that the US still provides us abundantly, which in return sustains a big chunk of Pakistan. Rationally speaking, whatever interest India may have had in the past to invade Pakistan is probably now lost. Now India is a lucrative [business destination](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/India-surpasses-China-as-most-attractive-investment-destination-Survey/articleshow/26314084.cms) for many, including the US, and has repositioned itself as a competitor on a global level. With Indians stationed at key places globally, Indian leaders have re-imagined the world where the epicentre of power (economically at least) is India. This dream may be far off but is certainly not far-fetched. Subsequently, it is not in India’s strategic interests to continue to apportion [defense budgets](http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/india-s-defence-budget-hiked-10-percent-to-rs-224-000-crore-114021700938_1.html) to fight a war with Pakistan in the hopes of an invasion – more so when Pakistan is in the midst of the worst crisis inflicted by rapid radicalisation of society. In the same way, Pakistan must reduce the combatant engagement reserved for a war with India because it serves no other purpose but to satisfy inflated egos. National sovereignty is vital, yes, but it is important to realize that India has upped the ante and has no strategic advantage by conquering Pakistan – as many would have us believe. The money spent fighting India could be spent elsewhere more productive; besides that, a peaceful South Asia is in everybody’s interest. It would be great and to the benefit of both the nations, if India and Pakistan were to reach a trade agreement like the [North American Free Trade Agreement](http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/20987/india-does-not-want-to-invade-us-and-the-us-is-not-our-enemy/%22http:/www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/index.aspx?) (NAFTA) and opened borders for tourism and trade. If Pakistan has an enemy it is not India it is the wretched [forces of extremism](http://tribune.com.pk/story/624240/understanding-extremism-in-pakistan/) that have wreaked havoc on a typical Pakistani’s lifestyle.

#### No War - Peace talks-

**Pakistan Today 14** 7/1/14, Pakistan Today, “India-Pakistan relations”, <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014/07/01/comment/india-pakistan-relations-2/>♥Tina

Lately, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif wrote a letter to the newly elected Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi. Naturally, what he wrote to the Indian prime minister couldn’t have been different, in any manner, from what he has been stating verbatim, time and again, vis-a-vis the mired bilateral relations between the two countries. PM Nawaz **Sharif took the initiative and broke the ice**, once again, **by writing** to PM Modi despite his detractors’ awfully critical stance on the recent overtures made by him **to his Indian counterpart for peace.** PM Modi’s response to Pakistan premier’s letter was equally encouraging. By expressing his government’s desire to work closely with PM Nawaz Sharif’s government**, in an atmosphere free from confrontation and violence in order to chart a new course in bilateral relations**, **he has undeniably kindled a ray of hope for improvement in ties** between the two countries.

#### No escalation-

**Wright '13,** Tom Wright, reporter for the Wall Street Journal, 1/16/13, "Don't Expect Worsening of India, Pakistan Ties," Wall Street Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/01/16/dont-expect-worsening-of-india-pakistan-ties/♥Tina

There’s no end for now to the hostile rhetoric between India and Pakistan. But that doesn’t necessarily presage anything more drastic. Pakistan claims another of its soldiers died Tuesday night in firing across the Line of Control in Kashmir, the divided Himalayan region claimed by both nations. Indian army chief, Gen. Bikram Singh, on Wednesday, said Pakistan had opened fire and India retaliated. “If any of their people have died, it would have been in retaliation to their firing,” Gen. Singh said. ”When they fire, we also fire.” It was the latest in tit-for-tat recriminations over deaths in Kashmir that began last week. Pakistan claimed one of its soldiers died on Jan. 6. Two days later, India said Pakistani forces killed two of its soldiers and mutilated the bodies. Tuesday night, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said the mutilations meant it could not be “business as usual” between the countries. That has worried some that peace talks, which have been in train for two years, could be about to break down. Mr. Singh’s comments built on a drumbeat of anger from India. Gen. Singh, Monday called the mutilations “unpardonable” and said India withheld the right to retaliate to Pakistan aggression when and where it chooses. Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, who is in the U.S., Tuesday termed the Indian army chief’s comments as “very hostile.” There are some other worrying signs. India said Tuesday it was delaying the start of a visa-on-arrival program meant to make it easier for some Indians and Pakistanis to visit each other’s countries. The visa program, like talks on opening up bilateral trade, is supposed to pave the way toward broader peace talks that would encompass thornier issues, like how to solve the Kashmir problem. Also Tuesday, nine Pakistani hockey players who had come to participate in a tournament in India were sent home due to fears of protests and violence against them. Still, there’s little benefit for either side to escalate what is now still sporadic firing over the Line of Control, the de facto border in Kashmir. Pakistan is embroiled in its own political meltdown sparked by the Supreme Court’s decision Tuesday to order the arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf on allegations of corruption. Tens of thousands of protesters Tuesday took to the streets in Islamabad, and remain there today, demanding immediate elections and a greater role for the army and Supreme Court in politics. Pakistan’s military continues to play an important political role, dominating defense and foreign policy. But it has so far shown little sign of mounting a full-blown coup despite persistent rumors of military intervention. Pakistan’s government must hold national elections by May, meaning the next few months are likely to be choppy ones in Pakistan politics. In such an environment, the military is unlikely to want to dial up tensions with India. On the Indian side, despite Mr. Singh’s unusually strident tone Tuesday, there also will be pause before taking matters to the next level. Mr. Singh has put immense personal political capital into trying to improve ties with Pakistan since he came to power in 2004. Last year, he hosted Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari in New Delhi and promised a return visit. Such a trip is clearly off the table for now. But India still has put too much into peace talks to throw away the progress made so far on visas, trade and other issues. Even Gen. Singh, India’s army chief, Monday said he did not believe the latest flare-up would lead to a broader escalation in violence and an official end to a 2003 ceasefire agreement in Kashmir. The clashes so far, he noted, have been limited to specific areas of the Line of Control

#### No risk of bioterrorism.

Ivanov 2014 (Sandra Ivanov, postgraduate student at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Otago in New Zealand, 9-23-14, “HOW TO MAKE THE ‘EBOLA BOMB': WHY YOU SHOULD STOP WORRYING ABOUT BIOTERRORISM,” <http://cimsec.org/make-ebola-bomb-stop-worrying-bioterrorism/13069>) gz

Many studies from a health, as well as a humanities perspective, assume that terrorists could successfully generate biological or chemical agents and weaponise them. Taking this initial premise, a lot of literature has been based around this looming threat, subsequently offering policy advice, public health recommendations, and technological investment to avoid such catastrophes. However it would be useful to deconstruct this claim entirely. So I’ll begin by offering a baking recipe, to explore at the very core, what a group would need to do to successfully create a biological weapon, in this case, utilising the Ebola virus. Ingredients Firstly, any terrorist group wanting to create and weaponise a biological or chemical agent will need to have an appropriate kitchen. In the case of the Ebola virus, a standard biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) scene will be required (Adeline M. Nyamathi et al., “Ebola Virus: Immune Mechanisms of Protection and Vaccine Development“, Biological Research For Nursing 4, No. 4, April 2003: 276-281). Some features of these laboratories include decontamination mechanisms, pest management systems, air filters, and special suits. Sometimes the kitchen will have to be in a separate building, or in an isolated area within a building to meet the safety requirements. Not only will the kitchen be under strict conditions, the baking process will need to be kept in total secrecy. The constant threat of law enforcements raiding facilities, and intelligence and secret services detecting activities will have to be avoided. Also, there are only some fifty of these laboratories successfully maintained worldwide. Before starting, make sure there is a baking dish of ‘uncertainty’ readily available to just throw all of the following ingredients into: 1 Tablespoon of Proper Agent Initially, a terrorist group must decide what kind of agent they would like to use in a bioterror attack. This is one part of the recipe which can be modified, but the other ingredients will be standard for all types of attacks. The recent spread of the deadly Ebola virus will be the agent of choice for this bomb. Ebola is a virus which is passed to humans through contact with infected animals. The spread of the virus from person-to-person is brought about through blood and bodily fluids, as well as exposure to a contaminated environment. An infected live host with Ebola would need to be maintained in a human or animal – only a few animals are able to be used as hosts, such as primates, bats, and forest antelope. Although Ebola infection of animals through aerosol particles can be effective, it has not successfully been transferred with this method to humans (Manoj Karwa, Brian Currie and Vladimir Kvetan, “Bioterrorism: Preparing for the impossible or the improbable“, Critical Care Medicine 33, No. 1, January 2005: 75-95). 1 Bucket of Resources and Money In order to develop a biological weapon, a substantial amount of material and money is required. Investment is needed from the very outset – taking into account membership size and capabilities of a terrorist group, financial assets of a group, and making sure territory and proper infrastructure is available for the biological agent. For a successful bomb to be created, a group must think about the resources they will need for each stage of the baking process, such as weapons production, potential testing phases, and logistics, such as transportation and communications technologies (Victor H. Asal, Gary A. Ackerman and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Terrorism“, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2006). Resources needed for an “Ebola Bomb” will most likely need to be imported from the outside, and a group must determine the feasibility of acquiring the materials and technologies needed for the bomb (Jean Pascal Zanders, “Assessing the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation to terrorists“, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1999: 17-34). A surplus of money would also be a smart idea in case technical difficulties arise. 5 Cups of Expertise With all the correct resources and necessary amount of monetary support, the recipe will require the right kind of know-how. For an operation like this, a terrorist group should have members with high levels of education and training in science, engineering, and technological development, to deal with highly virulent agents, and for successful weaponisation (Zanders). A group may need to be integrated into knowledge flows and institutions, or be able to recruit members to their cause with this specific expertise (Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer). Knowledge and expertise is required to create the correct strain, handling the agent, growing the agent with the desired characteristics, and maintaining the agent. Taking Ebola specifically requires synthesising proteins which make it infectious, and becomes a task that is difficult and unlikely to succeed (Amanda M. Teckma, “The Bioterrorist Threat of Ebola in East Africa and Implications for Global Health and Security“, Global Policy Essay, May 2013). If Ebola is successfully created in the kitchen, it is not itself a biological weapon – an expert will be required to transform the virus into a workable mechanism for dissemination. A Teaspoon of Risk The decision to use biological weapons for an attack is in itself extremely risky. There is a risk that bioterrorism could cause dissenting views among followers, and that public approval and opinion may channel the way a group operates. After all, terrorists are political communicators, wanting to bring attention to their grievances. If a group becomes polarised or resented by their actions, they will not see the benefits of pursuing certain methods. Terrorists want to send powerful messages, gain more members, in which these members assist to bring about certain plans and demands. Therefore, public opinion and political opportunism will be risked in a quest to create a bioweapon such as an “Ebola Bomb” (Zanders). Secondly, a terrorist group may be subject to more scrutiny or attention. This is why keeping activities covert will be a key to success. States will be more vigilant towards groups that are known to be seeking and acquiring biological and chemical capabilities (Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer). And finally, risk will always cling on to funding requirements, and potential technical difficulties in all stages of the bioweapon making process. A Fist of Time Now this recipe is going to take a while to prepare and bake in the oven, and there is no particular moment to determine when it should be removed from the baking dish. So, whatever group wants to make this bomb, will need to realise this is a long-term and complex effort. It will not work like most conventional weapons, which produce a high number of casualties with a single explosion, and that could be a reason why bioterrorism is not the most popular means for a violent attack – demanding time, effort, and resources without guarantees of a concrete result. A fist full of time may be needed so that knowledge, both tacit and explicit, can be acquired, as well as accounting for the various mistakes and learning curves to overcome (Asal, Ackerman and Rethemeyer). It can also refer to how long it will take to cook up, maintain and prepare a virus for an attack. It will take time to create a successful weapon with prior testing, and wait for the correct environmental conditions when it comes to dissemination. Time will have to be a group investment – it is not the kind of bomb that will detonate immediately. A Pinch of Curiosity of the Unknown The teaspoon of risk coincides with uncertainty, and there will need to be a commitment to potential unknown factors. It is unknown what will happen once a virus is disseminated. Will the weapon even work in the first place? Weather conditions are unpredictable and Ebola will not have a prominent effect in certain environments. What happens to the terrorist group if the attack fails? What happens to the reputation of the group and its membership, or will the group cease to exist? If the recipe is a success, it is impossible to control the biological agent which is released – not only can it affect the targeted population, but it may annihilate the terrorist group itself. There will be an unknown into potentially losing local and international support, and donors if this causes widespread catastrophe. Method: Weaponisation and Dissemination Mix that up good in your baking dish of what is now “deep uncertainty” and pop it in the oven to bake. But as time passes, it seems as though the ingredients are not rising. The process of turning a biological agent into a weapon for attack is the phase with the most hurdles for terrorist groups. In order for a virus to inflict a lot of harm, it has to be disseminated through an effective delivery mechanism. As mentioned previously, the Ebola virus needs a live host. Weaponising a live host is more difficult than other agents which can be cultured on dishes of nutrients. The process has many stages which involve testing, refining, upgrading, and toughening. The methods to disseminate an agent are only known to few people, and rarely published – it is not a basement project (Teckman). Let’s take Aum Shinrikyo as an example of conducting a bioterrorist attack (even it was “only” a chemical attack). This apocalyptic religious organisation in Japan managed to release sarin gas inside a Tokyo subway, killing a dozen people, and injuring 50. However, even with money and resources, they failed to effectively weaponise the chemical. Factors which led to their failure included internal secrecy and breakdown in communication; selecting members only solely dedicated to their cause to work on the weapons, ultimately employing unskilled people to operate and maintain the project, causing accidents and leaks (Zanders). Aum Shinrikyo’s attempt to disseminate botulinum toxin into Tokyo using a truck with a compressor and vents, did not work because they had not acquired an infectious strain (Sharon Begley, “Unmasking Bioterror“, Newsweek, 13.03.2010; “Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW Activities“, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2001). Finally, a major obstacle to successfully disseminating Ebola, is because this virus requires a specific environment in order to thrive. Weather conditions can be unpredictable, and Ebola particularly needs high temperatures and humidity to remain effective. Decoration: Results and Conclusions Obviously, this “Ebola Bomb” has not come close to containing the right requirements needed to explode. Looking back historically, pathogens, and all kinds of toxins have been used as tools in sabotage and assassinations since the beginning of time. Now, it would be silly to say this recipe will never work – there will always be a possibility that Ebola or other viruses may be used as biological weapons in the future. However, the likelihood of its development and use by a terrorist group is quite improbable. Mentioning Aum Shinrikyo again, they are an organisation which at the time, had a war chest of more than $300 million, with six laboratories and a handful of biologists, in the end having insurmountable difficulties with the weaponisation and dissemination processes, and killing a dozen people (Begley). There is a greater amount of knowledge and technology available in our day and age than in 1995 with the Aum Shinrikyo attacks, but it is still unlikely that this will be the weapon of choice. Examining state biological weapons programmes, Soviet Russia had almost 60,000 personnel employed in their weapons development, with only about 100 people that actually knew how to take an agent through the full production process. In the United States, at Fort Detrick, there were 250 buildings with 3,000 personnel, and it took them a while to weaponise a single agent, such as botulinum (Manoj Karwa, Brian Currie and Vladimir Kvetan). Nowadays, the narrative has assumed a worst case scenario analysis, and subsequently narrowed down bioterrorism to a single threat prognosis. There is little distinction made between what is conceivable and possible, and what is likely in terms of bioterrorism. Anything can be conceived as a terrorist threat, but what is the reality? The “Ebola Bomb” is not a danger. The likelihood of a bioterrorist attack remains highly unlikely (Teckman). The focus should be on preventing natural pandemics of human disease, such as tuberculosis, SARS, AIDS and influenza – emphasis placed on how we can cure diseases, and how medical training could be improved to contain, and avoid viruses such as Ebola altogether. Resources are being pumped into biodefence in the security as well as the medical sector, but preparedness and investment in bioterrorism needs to be in proportion to actual threats, otherwise, funds are diverted away from much needed public health programmes: The effectiveness of biological weapons has never been clearly shown, the numbers of casualties have been small and it is likely that hoaxes and false alarms in the future will continue to outnumber real events and create disruptive hysteria (Manoj Karwa, Brian Currie and Vladimir Kvetan). Emphasis needs to be back on medical research, as well as social science investigations into the roots of why terrorist groups would even want to pursue biological weapons, and the lengths they would go to use them. Let this be an avenue for further pondering and exploring, the realities of bioterrorism.

#### No bioterrorism—their impact is hype.

Davenport 14 (Mason Ryan Davenport is a MA candidate @ American Public University. “The Lingering Specter of Bioterrorism: Assessing Al-Qaeda ’s Intent and Capability to Use Biological Weapons against the U.S.” <http://digitalcommons.apus.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=theses&sei-redir=1&referer=https%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fstart%3D20%26q%3Dbioterror%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%2C47%26as_ylo%3D2015#search=%22bioterror%22>) 5/19/15 RK

A slew of academic papers refute much of Washington’s furor over alQaeda’s bioweapons program. Seemingly, discussions in the Legislative and Executive branches mainly revolve around generalizations or outright misinformation. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer, provides a pointed case study in this regard. Titled “Al-Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype of Reality?,” the report investigates the veracity of a U.S. government-issued warning from 2003 in which an al-Qaeda WMD attack was predicted within two-year’s time (Mowatt-Larssen 2010a). Likewise, a predicted 2013 attack of a biological or chemical nature, as written in 2008 by Congress’s Graham/Talent WMD Commission, also failed to materialize (Sharoff 2011). Mowatt-Larssen, a former Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Specter of Bioterrorism 14 Department of Energy, could be considered one of the foremost authorities on the subject of WMD-terrorism as his work is frequently referenced in other papers. His report presents a chronology of al-Qaeda WMD items of interest from 1998 to 2003, allowing the reader to draw their own conclusions about the legitimacy of the 2003 warning. However, MowattLarssen does pose the question as to whether the threat was “hyped for political purposes” (Mowatt-Larssen 2010a, 9). Leonard Cole’s article in the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) Sentinel, “Bioterrorism: Still a Threat to the United States,” takes D.C. to task over bloated and “misapplied” biodefense spending (Cole 2013, 10). Simply put, Cole’s argument is similar to those of other detractors: Washington excels at exaggerating the bioterrorism threat. For evidence of Washington’s propensity to overstate the bioterror threat, most scholars refer to standard U.S. bioterror exercise scenarios. Clark emphasizes that these scenarios are “extreme…often inflating the capabilities of the terrorists” (Clark 2008a, 19). Leonard Cole echoes this sentiment, writing that “descriptions of possible bioterrorism scenarios are often hyperbolic” (Cole 2012, 11). Ostensibly, most U.S. bioterrorism exercise scenarios were noted as having a tendency for oversimplification: “scenarios for national biological weapons (BW) exercises that posit various BW agents in advanced states of preparation in the hands of terrorist groups Specter of Bioterrorism 15 simply disregard the requirements in knowledge and practice that such groups would need in order to work with pathogens” (Leitenberg 2005, 88). One of the more unfortunate aspects of the U.S.’s effort to counter bioterrorism is the fact that it may be giving extremists a ‘playbook’ they didn’t previously have: “years of widely broadcast public discussion has provided such groups, at least on a general level, with suggestions as to what paths to follow” (Leitenberg 2005, 88). Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s current leader, is even on record admitting that the terror group didn’t put much thought into biological weapons until the U.S. Congress started sounding the alarm in the ‘90s. In “Revisiting Al-Qaeda’s Anthrax Program,” authors Rene Pita and Rohan Gunaratna break down the group’s early biological weapons program. They focus particular attention upon an electronic message sent by al-Zawahiri to Mohammed Atif (former military chief of al-Qaeda): “Despite [bioweapons’] extreme danger, we only became aware of them when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be produced simply with easily available materials…” (Pita and Gunaratna 2009, 10). Tellingly, the terror outfit only began its push for a bioweapons research laboratory after Secretary of Defense Cohen’s dramatic press hearing with the bag of sugar meant to represent anthrax. Still, as previously covered, aspirations alone don’t really equate to successful enterprise. Many researchers note how Aum Shinrikyo failed to acquire or cultivate a lethal pathogen despite significant financial backing and state-of-the-art laboratories. Al-Qaeda has never come close to the capability of Aum Shinrikyo. For similar reasons, fears of lone-wolf bioterrorism appear just as implausible. Ellis surmises that lone wolf bioterror threats are most probable when it is an “insider” as it was in the case of Amerithrax (Ellis 2014, 214). Some of the literature uncovered during preliminary research showed a strong inclination, by researchers, to group biological weapons into the broader WMD / CBRN category: the Ellis, Mowatt-Larssen, and Salama/Hansell reports are all prime examples of this trend. This approach was considered as having a negative impact on this research paper’s main aim. Basically, viewing biological weapons on the same terms as nuclear and chemical issues marginalizes what could otherwise be a concise appreciation of al-Qaeda’s bioweapons agenda. Tucker’s report follows a similar, if slightly different model: it lumps biological weapons with chemical ones (not nuclear or radiological) (Tucker 2009). Chemical weapons are often grouped with bioweapons in their own distinct category (CB), but doing so glosses over the many distinct differences between chemical and biological weapons. For one, research indicates that chemical weapons, while presenting the same dispersal challenges, are far more readily available than biological ones. An interesting notion is that the last decade’s worth of preventative measures, on the part of the U.S. and other Western nations, may have forced al-Qaeda to rethink bioweapons entirely. A chief contention is that Specter of Bioterrorism 17 D.C.’s consistent trend towards hyperbole, when framing the bioterrorism threat, has inevitably led to a stronger national defense against biological weapons. Potentially, bioweapons may now be ill-suited to extremist aims of high-visibility, high-casualty attacks. For instance, “the U.S. has now developed vaccines or drugs to counter most known conventional pathogens”

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(Clark 2008a, 183). Project BioShield, established in 2004, provides U.S.-based drug companies with a monetary incentive to develop, produce, and stockpile various vaccines and drugs that would otherwise have no commercial appeal. Mark Sharoff and Leonard Cole each contend that Project BioShield has been largely ineffective in its main objective; yet, regardless of some high-profile failures in the program (VaxGen’s unstable anthrax vaccine), increased budgetary allotments are nevertheless considered a worthy enterprise since even one new vaccine further limits terrorists’ options. The BioWatch program involves air samplers in several U.S. cities in order to detect aerosolized pathogens. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) development of the Strategic National Stockpile and ‘push packages’, pre-packaged, rapidly deployable cargo containers full of vaccines and other medical supplies, further diminishes the impact and extent of any prospective bioterror incident (Clark 2008a, 114). Due to all the hype surrounding the issue of bioterrorism, some experts urge policymakers, and the general public, to put the threat in context. Clark and Leitenberg each contrast bioterrorism with other modern- Specter of Bioterrorism 18 day global issues that pose far greater danger to the U.S. way-of-life. Clark actually ends his book with a discussion of climate change, saying “challenges in the years ahead…make bioterrorism pale in comparison” (Clark 2008a, 190). Leitenberg also compares the threat of bioterrorism with that of climate change plus several additional planet-spanning problems: ocean pollution, population growth, war, poverty, nuclear terrorism, and naturally-occurring pandemics / epidemics (Leitenberg 2005, pp. 2-3). In light of the magnitude of these issues, such as HIV / AIDS already killing 5 million people “year in, year out”, these comparisons reveal a sense of imbalance in U.S. national security priorities (Leitenberg 2005, 3). Compellingly, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen proffers the hypothesis that al-Qaeda could be engaging in a “deception ruse”: continually drawing attention to their supposed desire for bioweapons if only to put the U.S. off the scent of their legitimate tactics (Mowatt-Larssen 2010a, 8). This concept certainly warrants further investigation. Assumptions about al-Qaeda’s plans to pursue biological weapons over easier-to-acquire and less problematic conventional attack means has not really been explored in depth. 21st century terror attacks thus far have involved predominantly small-arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Much of the literature demonstrates distinctly Western mindsets (when regarding terrorism) or, at least, views bioterrorism through the scope of U.S.-specific defense concerns. There is an evident desire among U.S. Specter of Bioterrorism 19 politicians and scientists to boost their cases for increased biodefense budgets or, as Leitenberg puts it, “a small coterie of individuals constantly calls for increasing [biodefense] expenditures still further” (Leitenberg 2011). This fact alone has unnecessarily complicated academic research into bioterrorism since 9/11. Furthermore, the literature overwhelmingly indicates that a biological attack on the homeland is far from the apocalyptic scenario that Congress and the White House typically portrays; a bioterror attack on U.S. soil is likely to cause “disruptions rather than mass casualties” (Ellis 2014, p. 220). Incidentally, the numerous statements and press releases from al-Qaeda primarily serve as propaganda, making it difficult to differentiate between genuine intent and fear-mongering.

#### No impact to bioterror

Synthetic biology is hard, terrorists won’t do it – empirics, scale up, storage, dissemination, tech, logistical, healthy people, public health

Dvorsky 14 [George Dvorsky contributing editor at io9 and producer of the Sentient Developments blog and podcast. Dvorsky currently serves as Chair of the Board for the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies 9-19-2014 http://io9.com/are-the-threats-from-synthetic-bioweapons-being-exagger-1636829313]

The advent of synthetic biology and DNA synthesis has raised concern that amateurs will use these technologies to turn pathogens into weapons of mass destruction. But as **experts point out**, this may be **far easier said than done.** As argued by Catherine Jefferson, Filippa Lentzos, and Claire Marris — all researchers in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King's College London — there are several dominating narratives currently permeating scientific and policy discussions on the security threat posted by synthetic biology. They can be summarized like this: Synthetic biology is making it easier for non-experts to manipulate dangerous pathogens and, therefore, making it easier for terrorists to concoct bioweapons. Synthetic biology has led to the growth of a do-it-yourself biology community that could offer dual-use knowledge and equipment to bioterrorists seeking to do harm. DNA synthesis has become cheaper and can be out-sourced, making it easier for terrorists to obtain the basic materials to create biological threat agents. Non-experts could use synthetic biology to design radically new pathogens. Terrorists want to pursue biological weapons for high-consequence, mass- casualty attacks. But these narratives, they say, rely on several **misleading assumptions**: **Synthetic biology is not easy**, DIY biology is not particularly sophisticated, building a dangerous virus from scratch is hard — and even experts have a hard time enhancing disease pathogens. Perhaps alarmingly — at least to me — the authors claim that the bioterror weapons of mass destruction is a myth: The first [dimension of this myth] involves the identities of terrorists and what their intentions are. The assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass-casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be **quite small**. This judgment is backed up by **historical evidence**. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were **small-scale**, **low-casualty events** aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. The second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. **Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary** for the processes of **scaling up**, **storage**, and **dissemination**. These processes present **significant technical and logistical barriers**. They go on to argue that, even if a bioweapon were to be disseminated successfully, the outcome of the attack could be affected by other factors, like the "**the health of the people** who are exposed and the speed and manner with which **public health** authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak."

#### Terrorist can’t obtain and correctly deploy bioweapons

Ouagrham-Gormley 14 – Assistant Professor of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, Monterey Institute for International Studies, research director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies office in Kazakhstan , founding editor of the International Export Control Observer (Sonia Ben, Cornell University Press, November 2014, “Barriers to Bioweapons”, http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100857780)

In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs. Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production.

#### No risk of bioterror

**Keller 13** (Rebecca, 7 March 2013, Analyst at Stratfor, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters **the risk is minimal**. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the **likelihood** of a **successful attack** is **very low**. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are **severe constraints** that make **success** using either of these methods **unlikely**. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is **beyond the capability** of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as **wind patterns** and **humidity** can render an attack **ineffective**. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is **doubtful** with a **serious disease** like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

#### The worst case scenarios have already occurred.

Dove 12 - Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it.¶There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies.¶ Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died.¶That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that.¶ Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack.¶Thesecond genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed,and had many highly educated members, so this release over the world’s largest city really represented a worst-case scenario.¶Nobody got sick or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon.¶ Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

#### No motive or means for bioterrorism

**Hoffman**, Georgetown security studies director, 20**14**

(Bruce, “Low-Tech Terrorism”, April, nationalinterest.org/print/article/low-tech-terrorism-9935)

Fortunately, the report’s most breathless prediction concerning the likelihood of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has not come to pass. But this is not for want of terrorists trying to obtain such capabilities. Indeed, prior to the October 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had embarked upon an ambitious quest to acquire and develop an array of such weapons that, had it been successful, would have altered to an unimaginable extent our most basic conceptions about national security and rendered moot debates over whether terrorism posed a potentially existential threat. But just how effective have terrorist efforts to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction actually been? The September 11, 2001, attacks were widely noted for their reliance on relatively low-tech weaponry—the conversion, in effect, of airplanes into missiles by using raw physical muscle and box cutters to hijack them. Since then, efforts to gain access to WMD have been unceasing. But examining those efforts results in some surprising conclusions. While there is no cause for complacency, they do suggest that terrorists face some inherent constraints that will be difficult for them to overcome. It is easier to proclaim the threat of mass terror than to perpetrate it. THE TERRORIST ATTACKS attacks on September 11 completely recast global perceptions of threat and vulnerability. Long-standing assumptions that terrorists were more interested in publicity than in killing were dramatically swept aside in the rising crescendo of death and destruction. The butcher’s bill that morning was without parallel in the annals of modern terrorism. Throughout the entirety of the twentieth century no more than fourteen terrorist incidents had killed more than a hundred people, and until September 11 no terrorist operation had ever killed more than five hundred people in a single attack. Viewed from another perspective, more than twice as many Americans perished within those excruciating 102 minutes than had been killed by terrorists since 1968—the year widely accepted as marking the advent of modern, international terrorism. So massive and consequential a terrorist onslaught naturally gave rise to fears that a profound threshold in terrorist constraint and lethality had been crossed. Renewed fears and concerns were in turn generated that terrorists would now embrace an array of deadly nonconventional weapons in order to inflict even greater levels of death and destruction than had occurred that day. Attention focused specifically on terrorist use of WMD, and the so-called Cheney Doctrine emerged to shape America’s national-security strategy. The doctrine derived from former vice president Dick Cheney’s reported statement that “if there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping Al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.” What the “one percent doctrine” meant in practice, according to one observer, was that “even if there’s just a one percent chance of the unimaginable coming due, act as if it’s a certainty.” Countering the threat of nonconventional-weapons proliferation—whether by rogue states arrayed in an “axis of evil” or by terrorists who might acquire such weapons from those same states or otherwise develop them on their own—thus became one of the central pillars of the Bush administration’s time in office. In the case of Al Qaeda, at least, these fears were more than amply justified. That group’s interest in acquiring a nuclear weapon reportedly commenced as long ago as 1992—a mere four years after its creation. An attempt by an Al Qaeda agent to purchase uranium from South Africa was made either late the following year or early in 1994 without success. Osama bin Laden’s efforts to obtain nuclear material nonetheless continued, as evidenced by the arrest in Germany in 1998 of a trusted senior aide named Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, who was attempting to purchase enriched uranium. And that same year, the Al Qaeda leader issued a proclamation in the name of the “International Islamic Front for Fighting the Jews and Crusaders.” Titled “The Nuclear Bomb of Islam,” the proclamation declared that “it is the duty of Muslims to prepare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God.” When asked several months later by a Pakistani journalist whether Al Qaeda was “in a position to develop chemical weapons and try to purchase nuclear material for weapons,” bin Laden replied: “I would say that acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty.” Bin Laden’s continued interest in nuclear weaponry was also on display at the time of the September 11 attacks. Two Pakistani nuclear scientists named Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed spent three days that August at a secret Al Qaeda facility outside Kabul. Although their discussions with bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and other senior Al Qaeda officials also focused on the development and employment of chemical and biological weapons, Mahmood—the former director for nuclear power at Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission—claimed that bin Laden’s foremost interest was in developing a nuclear weapon. The movement’s efforts in the biological-warfare realm, however, were far more advanced and appear to have begun in earnest with a memo written by al-Zawahiri on April 15, 1999, to Muhammad Atef, then deputy commander of Al Qaeda’s military committee. Citing articles published in Science, the Journal of Immunology and the New England Journal of Medicine, as well as information gleaned from authoritative books such as Tomorrow’s Weapons, Peace or Pestilence and Chemical Warfare, al-Zawahiri outlined in detail his thoughts on the priority to be given to developing a biological-weapons capability. One of the specialists recruited for this purpose was a U.S.-trained Malaysian microbiologist named Yazid Sufaat. A former captain in the Malaysian army, Sufaat graduated from the California State University in 1987 with a degree in biological sciences. He later joined Al Gamaa al-Islamiyya (the “Islamic Group”), an Al Qaeda affiliate operating in Southeast Asia, and worked closely with its military operations chief, Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali, and with Hambali’s own Al Qaeda handler, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—the infamous KSM, architect of the September 11 attacks. In January 2000, Sufaat played host to two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, who stayed in his Kuala Lumpur condominium. Later that year, Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged “twentieth hijacker,” who was sentenced in 2006 to life imprisonment by a federal district court in Alexandria, Virginia, also stayed with Sufaat. Under KSM’s direction, Hambali and Sufaat set up shop at an Al Qaeda camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where their efforts focused on the weaponization of anthrax. Although the two made some progress, biowarfare experts believe that on the eve of September 11 Al Qaeda was still at least two to three years away from producing a sufficient quantity of anthrax to use as a weapon. Meanwhile, a separate team of Al Qaeda operatives was engaged in a parallel research-and-development project to produce ricin and chemical-warfare agents at the movement’s Derunta camp, near the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad. As one senior U.S. intelligence officer who prefers to remain anonymous explained, “Al Qaeda’s WMD efforts weren’t part of a single program but rather multiple compartmentalized projects involving multiple scientists in multiple locations.” The Derunta facility reportedly included laboratories and a school that trained handpicked terrorists in the use of chemical and biological weapons. Among this select group was Kamal Bourgass, an Algerian Al Qaeda operative who was convicted in British courts in 2004 and 2005 for the murder of a British police officer and of “conspiracy to commit a public nuisance by the use of poisons or explosives.” The school’s director was an Egyptian named Midhat Mursi—better known by his Al Qaeda nom de guerre, Abu Kebab—and among its instructors were a Pakistani microbiologist and Sufaat. When U.S. military forces overran the camp in 2001, evidence of the progress achieved in developing chemical weapons as diverse as hydrogen cyanide, chlorine and phosgene was discovered. Mursi himself was killed in 2008 by a missile fired from a U.S. Predator drone. Mursi’s death dealt another significant blow to Al Qaeda’s efforts to develop nonconventional weapons—but it did not end them. In fact, as the aforementioned senior U.S. intelligence officer recently commented, “Al Qaeda’s ongoing procurement efforts have been well-established for awhile now . . . They haven’t been highlighted in the U.S. media, but that isn’t the same as it not happening.” In 2010, for instance, credible intelligence surfaced that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—widely considered the movement’s most dangerous and capable affiliate—was deeply involved in the development of ricin, a bioweapon made from castor beans that the FBI has termed the third most toxic substance known, behind only plutonium and botulism. Then, in May 2013, Turkish authorities seized two kilograms of sarin nerve gas—the same weapon used in the 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway system—and arrested twelve men linked to Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Al Nusra Front. Days later, another set of sarin-related arrests was made in Iraq of Al Qaeda operatives based in that country who were separately overseeing the production of sarin and mustard blistering agents at two or more locations. Finally, Israel admitted in November 2013 that for the past three years it had been holding a senior Al Qaeda operative whose expertise was in biological warfare. “The revelations over his alleged biological weapons links,” one account noted of the operative’s detention, “come amid concerns that Al Qaeda affiliates in Syria are attempting to procure bioweapons—and may already have done so.” Indeed, Syria’s ongoing civil war and the prominent position of two key Al Qaeda affiliates—Al Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant—along with other sympathetic jihadi entities in that epic struggle, coupled with the potential access afforded to Bashar al-Assad’s chemical-weapons stockpiles, suggest that we have likely not heard the last of Al Qaeda’s ambitions to obtain nerve agents, poison gas and other harmful toxins for use as mass-casualty weapons. NONETHELESS, A fundamental paradox appears to exist so far as terrorist capabilities involving chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are concerned. As mesmerizingly attractive as these nonconventional weapons remain to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, they have also mostly proven frustratingly disappointing to whoever has tried to use them. Despite the extensive use of poison gas during World War I, for instance, this weapon accounted for only 5 percent of all casualties in that conflict. Reportedly, it required some sixty pounds of mustard gas to produce even a single casualty. Even in more recent times, chemical weapons claimed the lives of less than 1 percent (five thousand) of the six hundred thousand Iranians who died in the Iran-Iraq war. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo succeeded in killing no more than thirteen people in its attack on the Tokyo underground in 1995. And, five years earlier, no fatalities resulted from a Tamil Tigers assault on a Sri Lankan armed forces base in East Kiran that employed chlorine gas. In fact, the wind changed and blew the gas back into the Tigers’ lines, thus aborting the attack. Biological weapons have proven similarly difficult to deploy effectively. Before and during World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army carried out nearly a dozen attacks using a variety of germ agents—including cholera, dysentery, bubonic plague, anthrax and paratyphoid, disseminated through both air and water—against Chinese forces. Not once did these weapons decisively affect the outcome of a battle. And, in the 1942 assault on Chekiang, ten thousand Japanese soldiers themselves became ill, and nearly two thousand died, from exposure to these agents. “The Japanese program’s principal defect, a problem to all efforts so far,” the American terrorism expert David Rapoport concluded, was “an ineffective delivery system.” The challenges inherent in using germs as weapons are borne out by the research conducted for more than a decade by Seth Carus, a researcher at the National Defense University. Carus has assembled perhaps the most comprehensive database of the use of biological agents by a wide variety of adversaries, including terrorists, government operatives, ordinary criminals and the mentally unstable. His exhaustive research reveals that no more than a total of ten people were killed and less than a thousand were made ill as a result of about two hundred incidents of bioterrorism or biocrime. Most of which, moreover, entailed the individual poisoning of specific people rather than widespread, indiscriminate attacks. The formidable challenges of obtaining the material needed to construct a nuclear bomb, along with the fabrication and dissemination difficulties involving the use of noxious gases and biological agents, perhaps account for the operational conservatism long observed in terrorist tactics and weaponry. As politically radical or religiously fanatical as terrorists may be, they nonetheless to date have overwhelmingly seemed to prefer the tactical assurance of the comparatively modest effects achieved by the conventional weapons with which they are familiar, as opposed to the risk of failure inherent in the use of more exotic means of death and destruction. Terrorists, as Brian Jenkins famously observed in 1985, thus continue to “appear to be more imitative than innovative.” Accordingly, what innovation does occur tends to take place in the realm of the clever adaptation or modification of existing tactics—such as turning hijacked passenger airliners into cruise missiles—or in the means and methods used to fabricate and detonate explosive devices, rather than in the use of some new or dramatically novel weapon. THE TERRORISTS have thus functioned mostly in a technological vacuum: either aloof or averse to the profound changes that have fundamentally altered the nature of modern warfare. Whereas technological progress has produced successively more complex, lethally effective and destructively accurate weapons systems that are deployed from a variety of air, land, sea—and space—platforms, terrorists continue to rely, as they have for more than a century, on the same two basic “weapons systems”: the gun and the bomb. Admittedly, the guns used by terrorists today have larger ammunition capacities and more rapid rates of fire than the simple revolver the Russian revolutionary Vera Zasulich used in 1878 to assassinate the governor-general of St. Petersburg. Similarly, bombs today require smaller amounts of explosives that are exponentially more powerful and more easily concealed than the sticks of TNT with which the Fenian dynamiters terrorized London more than a century ago. But the fact remains that the vast majority of terrorist incidents continue to utilize the same two attack modes.