# 1nc vs HWL NL

## 4-off

### 1nc - Disclosure

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose frameworks and advocacy texts to their opponents through any means thirty minutes before round.

**Violation: they didn’t – – check the doc**

1. **Engagement – disclosure allows in-depth preparation before the round which checks back against unpredictable positions and allows debaters to effectively write case negs and blocks—allows for reciprocal engagement where each side has an equal opportunity to prepare. Engagement outweighs on uniqueness – only it shifts debate from a monologue to dialogue, without engagement debate becomes Original Oratory.**
2. **Small School Inclusion – Big schools will always get your docs through having a lot of judges, competitors, and coaches with connections to other judges only disclosure allows small schools equal access.**
3. **Reciprocity - They have infinite prep before round to make the perfect aff – only disclosure allows us to have a crumb of the amount of time they had. Reciprocity outweighs because it controls the internal link to fairness – irreciprocal burdens create inherent advantages.**
4. **Academic Ethics—disclosure deters mis-cutting, power-tagging, abuse of brackets and ellipses, and plagiarism – makes it harder to beat evidence because I can’t find all the issues in-round—independent voter for academic honesty—it’s a real-world norm and debate loses all educational value if we can just make up cards. I cannot go through all their cards in four minutes and still manage to craft an NC and answers. I cannot check in round. Academic Ethics outweighs because it controls entry to universities and higher learning – biggest internal link to education, universities will kick you out if you are academically dishonest.**

#### Fairness is a voter because debate is a competitive activity with a winner and a loser – Force them to answer as to why it’s a competition. Education is a voter because schools, educational institutions, pay for it.

#### No RVIs because its illogical – you wouldn’t win chess for playing properly – Prefer logic for it’s a litmus test for other arguments

#### Prefer competing interps because a) reasonability is a race to the bottom pushing the limits on how much abuse is justifiable b) reasonability is subjective and invites judge intervention

#### Drop the debater cuz disclosure is constitutive of the whole aff

### T-REDUCE

#### Interpretation: “reduce” indicates permanency. The aff may not defend suspensions on intellectual property rights

#### Reduce indicates permanency – it’s distinct from “suspend” Prefer our evidence – legal and should o/w all other definitions. This is the only legal interpretation of reduce in the court system which means that it applies to all legal implementations of the plan

Reynolds 59 – Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway.  [\*\*\*13]  The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

#### Violation –they violate because COVID-19 patent waivers are temporary – hold the line – don’t let them shift out by saying that they defend permanency, they should’ve specced that in the 1ac and their advantages say nothing about the permanent benefits of having waivers

#### Melimopoulos, 21 (Elizabeth Melimopoulos, 6-29-2021, accessed on 8-15-2021, Al Jazeera, "Explainer: What are patent waivers for COVID vaccines?", https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/29/explainer-what-are-covid-vaccine-patent-waivers)

What does an IP waiver do? A waiver temporarily “removes” the intellectual protections provided by the WTO

#### Vote neg –

#### 1 – Limits – they can cherrypick from multiple timeframes which means that a) they shift out of multiple DAs by saying the patents will be gone by then which moots neg offence and b) non-permanency kills NCs and Ks because they can just delink in the 1ar and forces us to start over c) this links to fairness and ed because we can’t have proper educative clash and they moot offence

#### 2 – Predictability – Not following the resolution legally allows them to come up with whatever plan they want and a) that destroys our ability to predict because they can just go with something random and there is no way we can prep for that before the first tourney on the topic

#### Extend paradigm issues from disclosure shell.

### Heg K

#### The World War II order is the rise of multilateral organizations that seek to maintain a structural grasp on the world to maintain profit and stability all under the backdrop of capitalism accumulation, dispossession, global imperialism, and forced economic agreements that decimate the global south – the post war LIO creation by Woods is not one of peace and prosperity but one of racial capitalism and genocide

Jayati Ghosh 15 7-1-2015 Monthly Review Monthly Review https://monthlyreview.org/2015/07/01/the-creation-of-the-next-imperialism/ Accessed 8-29-2021 CSUF JmB Loyola

The early theorists of imperialism, including V.I. Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin, took the existence of colonial structures for granted. Obviously, the national liberation movements of the twentieth century, the disintegration of colonial power in the second half of the century, and the resulting lack of direct political control changed the landscape in terms of how dominance could be exercised. Just after the Second World War, in the Bretton Woods period, the undisputed dominance of the United States in the capitalist world order played a central role in ensuring that many of the earlier requirements were met through a combination of global policing and economic rules of the game set by the hegemonic leader. By the closing decades of the late twentieth century and the opening decades of the twenty-first, however, the world had become much more complex geopolitically and economically. The United States had become the sole superpower, but one enfeebled by over-extension (as the wars in Iraq and the subsequent inability to control events across the Arab world showed clearly) and its own increasing economic dependence on capital inflows from across the world. Competitive threats from Western Europe and Japan were short-lived due to rampant internal contradictions in both, but the emergence of new powers in the developing world, and in particular the economic rise of China, created a more complex global dynamic. The growing power of multinational corporations was accompanied by the increased diversity of their countries of origin (though major multinationals—the top 200 or even the top 500—remained highly concentrated in geographic as well as economic terms). Technological changes that enabled production relocation along with the vertical disintegration of production led to the emergence of value chains in which the operating requirements of multinational corporations became somewhat different. Insofar as imperialism is about the struggle over and capture of economic territory (which must be broadly defined to include not just geographical territory such as land and natural resources, but also the creation of new markets, sources of labor, and forms of surplus transfer such as are reflected in intellectual property), these changes have created distant demands upon imperialist structures and processes. In the absence of a world state, and in a much more complex and constantly changing politico-economic environment, how can capital (which is increasingly global in orientation) generate the superstructures through which the transfers of value are ensured and the investment risks are moderated and contained? It will be argued that there has been an endeavor to resolve this by refashioning the global institutional architecture in ways that operate to increase the conditions of “stability” for large capital while increasing its bargaining power vis-à-vis working people and citizens, as well as nation-states and even smaller capitalist enterprises. International Trade Agreements The past two decades have witnessed an explosion in the treaties, agreements, and other mechanisms whereby global capital imposes rules, regulations, and modes of behavior upon governments and their citizenry. It is true that the post-Second World War international financial system created by the Bretton Woods agreement also specified rules for member countries, and the conditionalities imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank also severely limited the autonomy of countries that were forced to turn to them for assistance. But the recent proliferation of trade agreements (multilateral, regional, and bilateral), investment treaties, and more comprehensive economic partnership agreements impose such a plethora of conditions that Bretton Woods agreements and World Bank and IMF policies almost pale in significance. What is more significant is that these rules operate even for countries that are not in the positions of debtor-supplicants to international financial institutions, and so they require all countries to restrict their policies in ways that are directly related to the possibilities of generating autonomous development in periphery countries. Consider how the multilateral trading system has evolved. Earlier Rounds of GATT (the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) recognized Special & Differential Treatment (S&D) for developing countries, which required less than full reciprocity and were couched in developmental terms. The Uruguay Round (signed off in 1994) moved to a single-tier system of rights and obligations, under which developing countries have to implement fully all the rules and commitments, with flexibility only in longer transition periods. This was seen as quid pro quo for market access in agriculture and textiles, sectors that were highly protected in the developed countries. But this affected the possibilities of autonomous development in the periphery by constraining the policy choices open to them, and denying them some of the most important instruments that had been used by the current capitalist core in its own industrialization and development process. For example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) does not allow practices like local content specifications to increase linkages between foreign investors and local manufacturers, or foreign exchange balancing requirements or restrictions on foreign exchange use by foreign investors. The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) allows for the concentration and privatization of knowledge, and additionally severely restricts reverse engineering and other forms of imitative innovation that have historically been used for industrialization. It has forced the extension of patent life in many countries, allows patenting of life forms, and puts the burden of proof on the defendant. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) prohibits subsidies that depend upon the use of domestic over imported goods or are conditional on export performance. Ongoing negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) are currently based on requiring much deeper tariff cuts in developing countries, which will further deprive them of a crucial trade measure that can support infant industry. The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) contained fine print that effectively allowed developed countries to continue with massive subsidization and protection of their own agriculture and agri-businesses, but it prevents developing countries from doing even a small fraction of this. Most developing countries are allowed only 10 percent de minimis support, unlike most developed countries that have to ensure only a 36 percent reduction of certain subsidies and limit some others, while maintaining and even increasing the rest. Developing countries (like India) that attempt to provide some protection to farmers to ensure food security are coming up against this constraint, because according to the AoA, even in developing countries all such subsidies are measured in relation to 1986–1988 prices, not current prices! Instead of recognizing the ridiculous nature of this clause, the developed countries are resisting any change and have only agreed to provide a Peace Clause for a limited period to certain countries. However, if the WTO has created rigidities and constraints on policy space in developing countries, the many Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) that have been signed in the past two decades are often even worse on this front. There are nearly 400 such agreements in operation, and they have become more comprehensive over the past twenty years. Most (especially North-South agreements) tend to be either “WTO-plus,” i.e., they augment provisions already covered by the multilateral trading regime, or “WTO-extra,” i.e., contain provisions that go beyond current WTO agreements. Thus they often require reductions of actually applied tariffs, rather than of “bound” tariff rates (the GATT limit rate that cannot be exceeded without permitting retaliation). They demand more deregulation in services trade. They typically require more stringent enforcement requirements of intellectual property rights (IPRs) such as: reducing exemptions (e.g., allowing compulsory licensing only for emergencies); preventing parallel imports; extending IPRs to areas like life forms, counterfeiting, and piracy; extending exclusive rights to test data (e.g., in pharmaceuticals); and making IPR provisions more detailed and prescriptive. They have been known to forbid technology and knowledge transfer demands or conditions on the nationality of senior personnel, extending provisions to taxes and charges. They also enter into a range of areas that the WTO still leaves open to individual countries’ policy choices, such as competition policy, rules on investment and capital movement, government procurement, environmental standards, and even labor mobility. Further, unlike the WTO, most RTAs do not provide exceptions to countries in the case of serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties. In addition, there are the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), of which there are more than 4,000 in operation in the world at present. These are about protecting and promoting private investment, of all types, and effectively privileging the rights of investors over the rights of citizens in the host country. There is typically a very broad, asset-based definition of investment that includes Foreign Direct Investment, some types of portfolio investment in equities, real estate, and even IPRs! There is also a very strong and expansive view on what constitutes “expropriation” for which compensation can be demanded—not just nationalization of assets but all sorts of rules and regulations (even those for environmental protection or labor protection) as well as taxation have been interpreted as “expropriation.” All this matters greatly because BITs and increasingly RTAs are subject to dispute settlement mechanisms, both between states and between an investor and a state, that tend to be highly arbitrary, opaque, not open to public scrutiny, and generally pro-investor in their judgments. Since they are legally based on “equal” treatment of legal persons with no primacy for human rights, they have become known for their pro-investor bias, partly due to the incentive structure for arbitrators, and partly because the system is designed to provide supplementary guarantees to investors, rather than making them respect host countries’ laws and regulations. The significance of these treaties and binding legal arrangements is so important for large capital today that new agreements are being lobbied for, which further push the boundaries in terms of constraining regulation and inhibiting measures and policies that would ensure the social and economic rights of citizens. Thus the Obama administration in the United States has joined with Republicans in Congress, with whom otherwise there is great antipathy, to push for fast-track negotiating authority in order to conclude two major trade agreements: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). The goal is to use such forced, fast-track trade agreements to put into place rules that will ensure the continuing dominance of the economies of the triad, making it all the more difficult for emerging nations to catch up, while also securing the power of the mega-multinational corporations with their headquarters in the core economies. Rules Governing International Finance and Debt Restructuring The rules governing international finance and debt are now generally recognized to work in ways that reinforce the unequal global power relations between large capital and people across the world. Nowhere is this more evident than in the rules and legal structures governing sovereign debt. The lack of any coherent system to deal with debt default and to enable the viable restructuring of sovereign debt has led to situations in which countries and their populations are bled over years and even decades, merely to service debt generated in the past and through the piling up of earlier loans at ever-higher interest rates. Austerity measures that reduce public spending on social essentials are forced upon unwilling societies on the basis of supposedly “technocratic” notions that are, in fact, deeply ideological and elite-serving. Developing countries have known this for some time, but this is now also being experienced by some developed countries such as crisis-ridden economies of the European periphery. Countries that somehow manage to restructure some of their debt, or that unilaterally decide to renege on some patently unfair debt taken on in the past, are punished through complex and unbalanced legal systems. These do not even accord to entire populations the minimum conditions of debt workout that are routinely extended to private and corporate debtors within national systems. And here too, the arbitrations and other legal proceedings tend to be excessively biased towards investors and show little recognition of the minimum rights of the citizenry in affected countries. The fact that legal systems and other institutional structures in the core countries tend to support such biases, and investors in general, reinforces the point that this is another way in which contemporary imperialism is expressed. This is starkly shown by the travails that the government of Argentina currently faces in U.S. courts in lawsuits brought by financial vulture funds. This situation has its origins in the 1990s, when the government of Carlos Menem fixed the Argentine peso at the value of one U.S. dollar, through a currency board arrangement that restricted base money supply to the amount of external reserves, and then sought to increase its spending through the buildup of external debt. This was obviously an unsustainable strategy, which exploded in a financial crisis in 2001, bringing on a major devaluation of the currency and a default on around $100 billion of external debt. In 2005, the government of Nestor Kirchner, which had then managed to revive the economy to some extent, offered its creditors debt swaps that significantly restructured the debts. Since Argentine bonds were trading at a fraction of their face value in the secondary market anyway, this deal, which reduced the value of the debt by nearly 75 percent, was acceptable to most of the multinational banks and other creditors. (Since unpaid interest is added on to the principal and compounded, the actual face value of the debt in such cases is typically much more than the amount originally borrowed.) Indeed, creditors holding 93 percent of government bonds participated in the debt swaps of 2005 and 2010. However, a tiny minority of creditors held out and refused to accept the negotiated settlement. These then sold their holdings to hedge funds (in this case known as “vulture funds,” which are funds that take on distressed assets in the hope of recouping a higher value from them), including NML Capital, a subsidiary of Elliot Capital Management, which is run by U.S. billionaire and major Republican party donor Paul Singer. This fund bought Argentine bonds at around 20 percent of the face value in 2008. It has pursued the case both legally and physically: hiring mercenaries to detain and try to seize an Argentine ship where it was docked off the coast of Ghana; and grabbing the Argentine presidential plane from an airport as “collateral” for its supposed holding of debt. NML Capital and another vulture fund, Aurelius Capital Management LP, have fought a case in a New York district court, demanding full payment on their debt, valued at around $1.5 billion. (This would amount to a return of more than 1,600 percent on the initial investment made by these vulture funds.) In 2012, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New York Thomas Griesa ruled in favor of the hedge funds, and an appeal by the Argentine government was then dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The judgement was based on a peculiar and unprecedented interpretation of the pari passu (equal treatment) clause, which holds that all bondholders must be treated alike, meaning that a sovereign debtor must make full payment on a defaulted claim if it makes any payments on restructured bonds. So if the bondholders who agreed to restructure 93 percent of the Argentine debt were paid according to their agreement, then the other resisting bondholders would also have to be paid the full value of their debts. The ruling also insisted that any third party—including banks facilitating such transactions—that attempts to pay these bondholders would be held in contempt of court. This effectively disabled Argentina from repaying debt to other bondholders (who had already received around 90 percent of their dues), unless it also pays the holdouts in full, thereby forcing the country into technical default. Interestingly, this judgement made a mockery of all debt renegotiation agreements, since there would be no incentive for any creditor to accept less than full value of the debt if some other creditor will be paid in full. No credit system can function or has ever functioned with zero default. The possibility of default is embedded into credit contracts through the interest rate, with interest rate spreads operating as the market estimate of the probability of a default. So those who are seen as less likely to be able to repay are forced to pay higher interest rates, in both formal and informal credit transactions. A creditor who has been demanding and receiving a higher interest rate based on this probability cannot then demand full repayment as a right, since the contract reflected that very likelihood. So the ruling actually negates the basic principles upon which all credit markets function. Another extraordinary feature of the U.S. court judgment is the requirement that banks involved in handling the payments made to Argentine bondholders must turn over information to holdout bondholders on all the assets that the Argentine government holds worldwide. This is a major violation of banking secrecy laws everywhere, including in the United States. Even Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who sits on the U.S. Supreme Court, the body that decided this case, was constrained to ask: “By what authorization does a court in the United States become a ‘clearinghouse for information’ about any and all property held by Argentina abroad?” This also severely erodes sovereign immunity, which can even have adverse effects on the United States and may be illegal under other U.S. laws. In fact, this judgement was also in contradiction to the United States’ own bankruptcy laws under Chapter 9 and Chapter 11. Yet the U.S. government has actually pressured Argentina to meet these ridiculous requirements. It therefore provides one more example of how institutional arrangements have taken the form of legally binding constraints that generally privilege the interests of large capital over all other concerns. New Forms of “Economic Territory” One of the intriguing aspects of recent capitalist dynamism has been its ability to create new forms of economic territory, and to bring them within the ambit of capitalist economic relations—and therefore also subject to imperialist contestation. Two of the more prominent new forms of economic territory that are increasingly significant as arenas for imperialist penetration and competition today are the basic amenities and social services that were earlier seen to be the sole preserve of public provision and the generation and distribution of knowledge. A major feature of our times is the privatization of much of what was earlier generally accepted as the basic responsibility of public provision, such as amenities like electricity, water, essential transport infrastructure, and social services such as health, sanitation, and education. Of course, the fact that these were seen as public duties does not mean that they were fulfilled. Indeed, expanding public provision and enabling wider (and ideally universal) access to good quality amenities and infrastructure has only come about historically as the result of prolonged mass struggles and social and political mobilization. And issues of inequality in such provision have always existed. Nevertheless, the fact that provision is no longer necessarily in the public domain, and that private providers are increasingly seen as the norm, has opened up huge new markets for potentially profit-making activity. This may have been a crucial way of maintaining markets and effective demand given the saturation of markets in many mature economies and the inadequate growth of markets in poorer societies. The prying open of such markets has occurred through a combination of inadequate and reduced public delivery (the expansion of the global bottled water industry, for example, is a result of the failure of public delivery of potable water), as well as changes in economic policies and regulatory structures that not only enable but actively encourage private investment in these areas. And these changes in turn have been pushed by global institutions—the formal organizations such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO through its various agreements, as well as more informal but increasingly influential bodies such as the World Economic Forum. This is a more complicated playing out of the imperialistic drive for control over economic territory than can be expressed through purely national mechanisms, but that does not make it any less consequential. Another new form of economic territory that is increasingly subject to imperialist struggle relates to the control of knowledge generation and dissemination. The privatization of knowledge and its growing concentration, through the proliferation and enforcement of IPRs, have become significant barriers to technology transfer and social recognition of traditional knowledge that would be necessary for any kind of economic diversification as well as greater economic justice. They also matter greatly in determining the relative power of profits over people within countries as well as between countries. This is clearly evident in terms of access to medicines (even essential and life-saving drugs) and crucial technologies for food cultivation. But it is also very much the case with respect to industrial technologies as well as the transfer of critical knowledge required for mitigating and coping with adverse environmental changes that themselves result from the production systems created by global capitalism. The national and international institutional structures that should provide checks and balances to the privatization of knowledge, and ensure that knowledge production and dissemination are not subservient to a small elite but directed towards social goals, are not just more fragile and less effective in recent times, but in effect work in the opposite direction. New Global Forms of Capitalist Organization The rise of the multinational enterprise as the dominant and defining feature of global capitalism is arguably one of the most significant processes of the past century. Yet this too was remarkably presaged by Lenin and Bukharin a century ago. As Bukharin noted, vertical integration of production tends to be combined with geographical disintegration of production processes. There is going on a continuous process of binding together the various branches of production, a process of transforming them into one single organization. This expresses itself, first of all, in the form of combined enterprises, i.e., enterprises combining the production of raw materials and manufactured goods, the production of manufactured goods with that of unfinished products, etc., which process can and does absorb the most diverse branches of production, since under the prevailing division of labour in our times every branch depends upon the other to a larger or lesser degree, directly or indirectly.1 This he saw as operating in tandem with “the growing internationalisation of economic life,” in which competition and centralization of capital are reproduced on a world scale.2 Yet he was obviously not able to anticipate the sheer extent to which this would occur. The technological changes of the past half century, particularly the advances in shipping and container technology that dramatically reduced transport costs and time involved, as well as the information technology revolution that enabled a much more detailed breakdown of production into specific tasks that could easily be physically separated, were both critical in this. Together they enabled the emergence of global value chains, which are typically led by large multinational corporations, and involve regional and global networks of both competing and cooperating firms. The large corporation here is not necessarily in direct control of all operations—and indeed, the ability to transfer control over production as well as the risks associated with production to lower ends of the value chain is an important element in increasing the profitability of such activities. This adds a greater intensity to the exploitation that can be unleashed by such global firms. Because they are less dependent upon workers and resources in any one location, they can use competition across suppliers to push down their prices and conditions of production, and are less burdened by regulatory processes that would seek to reduce some of their market power. These changes in production organization combine with other incentives to create what has been called a “downsize and distribute” model that is driving more of the global production chain investment by multinational corporations. The focus in many developed and developing countries on judging the performance of companies by “shareholder value” has created incentives for cost reduction and short-termist behavior that greatly exceed similar tendencies in the past. The lead firms are therefore subject to the discipline of financial markets that demand rapid profits, forcing the construction of global value chains in ways that are much less likely to enable or benefit a program of industrial development in countries in the periphery, and also less likely to provide a viable platform for successful economic diversification. The Rise of New Powers It is often argued that the rise of new powers—in particular China, but also India, Brazil, and others—means that notions of imperialism are no longer valid. Yet the imperialist phase of capitalism has been characterized throughout by the emergence of “new kids on the block,” some of which have gone on to become the neighborhood bullies as well. When Lenin wrote his pamphlet, the emergence of the United States as the dominant global power was far from evident. Yet the United States, which seemed at that time to be a minor player among the major European actors, emerged to dominate the world scene for nearly a century. Similarly, the rise of Japan, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, by no means signified a weakening of imperialist power generally; it merely necessitated a more complicated assessment of such power. At present, the emergence of China is being considered a sign that the global economic landscape is completely transformed. Certainly it is true that the growing weight of China in world trade and investment has had major effects on terms of trade and volumes of exports for many primary producing countries and has brought more countries into manufacturing value chains, even as China has also become the most significant source of manufactured goods imports for most countries. Yet there are dangers of overplaying its current significance. Even now, China accounts for less than 9 percent of global output (measured at constant 2005 prices); its per capita GDP is less than half (around 45 percent) of the global average, and is still many multiples below the average of the so-called “developed” capitalist economies that form part of the imperialist core.3 In relative terms China remains a “poor” country, but it is also true that Chinese capital in various forms is a significant player in the ongoing struggle for control over economic territory occurring across the world. It is worth noting that many of the current hyperbolic mainstream analyses and predictions with respect to China are eerily similar to the descriptions and predictions for Japan in the 1970s, as the emerging giant soon to take over the role of global economic leadership from the United States. A similar point can be made even more forcefully for several of the other nations that were ecstatically described as “emerging markets” that supposedly provided proof that forces of imperialism are no hindrance to the rise of developing countries. Together the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) account for less than 15 percent of world GDP in current price terms, even though their share of global population is just under half. This is still so small as to mean that announcements of these countries as the new imperialist powers may well be very premature, especially when global institutional structures are still very much balanced in favor of the established powers. One reason why the newly emerging economies are often thought to be more significant is because many analyses are not based on nominal exchange rates to compare incomes across different countries, but rather on the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates, which seek to establish the relative purchasing power of each currency in terms of prices of a common basket of commodities. However, the use of PPP exchange rates can be quite dubious, as they are based on prices of supposedly representative baskets of consumption goods in certain countries, which may not be so relevant to consumption elsewhere, especially the poor in much of the developing world. They are unchanging over time across reference periods, even though consumption patterns tend to shift with technological change and evolving preferences. PPP exchange rates are also notoriously imperfect because of the infrequency and unsystematic nature of the price surveys that are used to derive them, which can make them quite dated or even misleading. An even more significant conceptual problem with using PPP estimates is less-widely recognized. In general, countries that have high PPP— that is, where the actual purchasing power of the currency is deemed to be much higher than the nominal value—are typically low-income countries with low average wages. It is precisely because there is a significant section of the workforce that receives very low remuneration, that goods and services are available more cheaply than in countries where the majority of workers receive higher wages. Therefore, using PPP-modified GDP data may miss the point, by seeing as an advantage the very feature that reflects greater poverty of the majority of wage earners in an economy. It would certainly overstate the quantitative significance of such countries in the world economy. All this does not mean that there have been no changes in global economic and political power. It is evident that there have been and will continue to be significant and even transformative changes. However, these changes in the position of countries in the economic and geopolitical ladder do not mean that the basic undercurrent of imperialistic tendencies that drive the global system have disappeared—they may even become more intense as the struggle for economic territory becomes more competitive. Indeed, if the lessons of history are to be recognized, it is likely that the emergence of new powers on the world capitalist stage will generate immense new conflicts—economic, political, and military—as the old imperial powers seek to retain their dominance over the world system. The current trade negotiations reflect Washington’s determination to make an economic pre-emptive attack and lock-in the present power structure based on the U.S.-led triad of the United States/Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. The goal is to create a political-legal superstructure for world trade that will reinforce the advantages of those who currently have the most economic power, including the mega-multinationals centered in the triad. Moreover, it is necessary “to do it today,” as Obama openly declared in May 2015, in a speech at Nike Inc.: “We have to make sure America writes the rules of the global economy, while our economy is in the position of global strength…. Because if we don’t write the rules for trade around the world” there will come a time when “guess what—China will.”4

#### Their reliance on the WTO and its imperialist practices further continues the genocides and upholds the liberal international order. Cross-X checks that they believe that the WTO is necessary, links them to K.

Pallavi Arora and Sukanya Thapliyal 19 11-20-2019 TWAILR Digital Colonialism and the World Trade Organization https://twailr.com/digital-colonialism-and-the-world-trade-organization/ Accessed 8-29-2021 CSUF JmB Loyola

Despite its ongoing existential crisis, the World Trade Organization (WTO) continues to be a vital constituent of the imperial global order. It is well on its way to burying the developmental aspirations of Third World states’ aspirations contained in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) at the urging of more dominant states in the global trading system. ‘New issues’ are being introduced for WTO negotiation, without reaching a conclusion on the contentious ‘traditional issues’ that the DDA sought to address. The most fractious amongst these new issues is the liberalization of electronic commerce (e-commerce). The agenda to liberalize e-commerce has been introduced by digitally advanced states at the behest of Big Tech companies, such as Apple, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Facebook. Digitally advanced states seek to maintain their oligopoly over developing country markets by calling for the deregulation of e-commerce, particularly an unrestricted flow of data across borders. Their demand is contested by a group of African states, Least Developed Countries, and India. These countries have a repository of unprocessed data but lack the infrastructure to harness its potential. They are fearful of being reduced to suppliers of data for Big Tech, which would process such data to reap colossal profits. In a sense, their apprehension is reminiscent of India’s famed handloom industry that was decimated when the British Raj exported raw cotton from India to the ‘dark Satanic Mills’ of Victorian England, and then shipped it back in the form of manufactured cloth, generating vast sums of money for the British East India Company. This reflection highlights the lasting entanglement of the WTO with imperialism by examining dialogues around e-commerce liberalization. It reveals the WTO’s corporate heart that pursues the interests of Big Tech while eroding the economic sovereignty of Third World peoples. We start with an overview of the WTO negotiations on e-commerce and the motivations of various member states, followed by an exposition of conflicting viewpoints on neoliberal e-commerce. We argue against liberalization of e-commerce insofar as it forecloses the ability of Third World states to incentivise their domestic e-commerce industry. WTO E-Commerce Negotiations The internet has steadily displaced traditional methods of commerce, becoming a truly global marketplace. Standing on the brink of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, it seems certain that the future belongs to digital technology and innovation. As participants in the digital ecosystem, we all generate vast amounts of data, the lifeblood of the digital economy. Access to data is a prerequisite for e-commerce services, be it digital goods (such as music and software), digital services (such as cloud storage and Big Data analytics), or as a complement to manufacturing and packaging e-commerce deliveries. Thus, while a trite comparison, data is indeed the new oil. Having said that, unprocessed data is of negligible value. It is only after raw data is processed that it becomes essential to the functioning of the digital economy. The differential capacity of states to accumulate and process data leads us to the North-South dimension underlying the digital space. While developing countries are an untapped repository of data, they lack the technical know-how and infrastructure to accumulate and process it. Developed countries, on the other hand, are home to the world’s leading digital firms that are at the forefront of technology and innovation. On the back of an unrestricted supply of data from developing countries, these corporations have achieved enormous profits by processing such data and, thus, capturing developing country markets. It is of utmost importance for developing countries to bridge the digital divide lest they remain subservient to Big Tech corporations of the North. The WTO has been at the centre of negotiations on trade-related aspects of e-commerce since 1998, when its General Council established the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce. Dismayed by the lack of convergence amongst members, the US, EU and Japan (hereafter ‘proponents’) sought to introduce a broader negotiating mandate in 2016. Broadly premised on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement(TPP), their proposals envisage an unregulated internet free for all. They are, inter alia, opposed to any encumbrances upon cross-border data flows, digital custom duties, and forced technology transfers.1 According to these proponents, the neo-liberal vision holds the promise of a strong digital economy. Similar provisions on e-commerce are found in other bilateral and regional trade agreements including the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement (2012), Mexico-Panama Free Trade Agreement (2015), and ongoing negotiations in the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), among others. After the US withdrawal from TPP in January 2017, the same text forms part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (2018) (CPTPP). Although the TPP has disintegrated, it still forms the basis for negotiations at various bilateral and multilateral forums, hence for the purposes of this Reflection we refer to TPP rules. Seventeen developing and two developed countries, identifying themselves as ‘Friends of E-Commerce for Development’, joined the chorus as they also see merit in liberal e-commerce as their ticket to digital growth. These include Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uruguay, and the MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia) group. Notably, China’s reasons for advocating the liberalization of digital trade are quite distinct from the proponents. While principally in favour of liberal e-commerce, China is against an unrestricted flow of cross-border data and limitations on data-localization, citing reasons of national security. This is in line with China’s aspirations to grow in digital trade, while also securing the Chinese government’s heavy regulation of the internet.2 On the other end of the spectrum are the African Group, Least Developed Countries, and India (hereafter ‘opponents’), who oppose a TPP-style framework on e-commerce for its complete lack of developmental flexibilities. These opponents contend that their large quantity of user data must be considered a valuable resource in the digital economy. Instead, a TPP-style agreement on e-commerce assigns no economic value to unprocessed data and calls for its unimpeded flow across borders. Agreeing to such a framework ˗ opponents contend ˗ would make their markets a goldmine for Big Tech, which would consolidate their market share and obliterate domestic e-commerce platforms. The problem is exacerbated by lack of infrastructure and technology in developing countries to support domestic e-commerce initiatives. Opponents seek to realize the economic value of their data as a means to closing the digital divide. More importantly, they envisage a greater role for the state in regulation of its laggard e-commerce sector to bring it up to speed with digitally advanced states. Opponents successfully lodged their opposition at the Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference in 2017. But proponents have nonetheless commenced exploratory work with support from the WTO Secretariat and endorsement by the World Economic Forum. Given these developments, it is a tall order ahead for developing countries, some of which have already bought into the ‘grand myth’ of development through e-commerce liberalization. From a TWAIL perspective, the WTO negotiations on digital trade, among other things, occasion a reflection on what it means to ‘do TWAIL’ at a time when historical alliances amongst countries of the South have either disintegrated or are in jeopardy. To Regulate or not to Regulate The debate over e-commerce repeats two longstanding competing visions of global political economy: an open Internet ostensibly free from governmental control as opposed to government regulation over e-commerce. The centre-piece of the opponents’ argument is that the neoliberal vision of free e-commerce subverts the role of the state in the digital economy and thereby undermines the domestic e-commerce industry of Third World states. To substantiate this claim, we revisit Chimni’s prescient piece, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making’ that traces the synergies between international institutions, corporate actors, and dominant states in shaping the imperial global order.Chimni argues the WTO is working in the interests of an emerging transnational capitalist class and powerful states to the disadvantage of the Third World. With the purported objective of regulatory harmonization, the WTO prescribes uniform global standards that remove impediments to capital accumulation at the global level. It is through this process that economic sovereignty of Third World states has been ceded to the WTO in crucial areas such as agriculture, intellectual property, and services. Orford also identifies how this ‘pose[s] an illegitimate constraint on the political choices open to peoples and governments’, undermining substantive democracy in the Third World.

#### Put away your generics for the good of US empire – Their nostalgia for the US-led liberal international order deflects focus on the violence inherent to it away from itself towards proximate solutions like the alt – this deflection normalizes and ensures US global empire, imperial control, neoliberal exploitation, and racialized violence globally.

Morefield 19 (Jeanne Morefield, Professor of Politics at Whitman College, Professorial Fellow at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University, PhD from Cornell University, January 8, 2019, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Isn’t the Problem,” *Boston Review*, <https://bostonreview.net/politics/jeanne-morefield-trump%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy-isn%E2%80%99t-problem>)

After two years of President Donald Trump, critics and commentators are still struggling to make sense of his foreign policy. Despite some hopes that he might mature into the role of commander in chief, he has continued to thumb his nose at most mainstream academic frameworks for analyzing and conducting foreign policy. Indeed, what makes Trump’s interactions with the rest of the world so confusing is the way he flirts with, and then departs from, the script. He may issue policies and give speeches that include words such as “sovereignty,” “principled realism,” and “peace through strength,” but they frequently appear cheek by jowl with racist rants, crass opportunism, nationalist tirades, and unrestrained militarism.

It is this uncomfortable mixture of familiar and jarring that has proven disconcerting for many mainstream international relations scholars, particularly those “intellectual middlemen” who straddle the realms of academia, policy think tanks, and major news outlets. Yet rather than ask how U.S. foreign policy might have contributed to the global environment that made Trump’s election possible, most have responded to the inconsistencies of Trump’s world vision by emphasizing its departure from everything that came before and demanding a return to more familiar times. International relations experts thus express nostalgia for either the “U.S.-led liberal order” or the Cold War while, in outlets such as *Foreign Affairs* and the *New York Times*, they offer selective retellings of the country’s past foreign policies that make them look both shinier and clearer than they were. These responses do not offer much insight into Trump himself, but they do have much to tell us about the discourse of international relations in the United States today and the way its mainstream public analysts—liberals and realists alike—continue to disavow U.S. imperialism.

For example, liberal internationalists such as John Ikenberry argue that Trump is guilty of endangering the U.S.-led global order. That system, according to Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney, emerged after World War II, when the liberal democracies of the world “joined together to create an international order that reflected their shared interests,” while simultaneously agreeing, as Ikenberry once put it, to transfer “the reins of power to Washington, just as Hobbes’s individuals . . . voluntarily construct and hand over power to the Leviathan.” The vision of cooperating nation-states may have originated in values that first “emerged in the West,” they argue, but these values have since “become universal.” In this accounting, Trump threatens the stability of U.S. liberal hegemony in two ways: by retreating from multilateral agreements such as the Iran nuclear deal, and by refusing to participate in the narrative of enlightened U.S. leadership. Future great threats to global stability, Ikenberry grumbled, were supposed to come from “hostile revisionist powers seeking to overturn the postwar order.” Now a hostile revisionist power “sits in the Oval Office.”

By contrast, when realists such as Stephen Walt or John Mearsheimer criticize Trump, they start from the position that the liberal world order is a delusion, perpetuated most recently by post–Cold War members of the “elite foreign policy establishment.” Walt and others rightly point to the baseline hypocrisy of a “liberal Leviathan,” noting that the current fury over Russian election tampering and cyber espionage rings hollow given the long U.S. reliance on both strategies. This view accompanies a wistful longing for the putatively gimlet-eyed realism of the Cold War, a time when U.S. presidents understood that their role was to deter the Soviet Union, prevent the emergence of dangerous regional hegemons, and preserve “a global balance of power that enhanced American security.” Seen thus, Trump’s hyperbolic and embarrassing nationalism is a symptom of the abandonment of great power politics, while his fawning treatment of Vladimir Putin shatters any remaining hope that his self-styled “principled realism” might take us back to a more strategically realistic time. In the words of former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, watching the Trump–Putin news conference was like “watching the destruction of a cathedral.”

But what is Trump actually doing to destroy this cathedral? What makes Trump’s words and behavior so objectionable? Previous presidents have pulled out of multilateral agreements, entered into disputes with allies, and engaged in protectionism and trade wars. The majority of the Trump administration’s planned and ongoing military deployments are in regions where the military was already deployed by previous administrations in the name of the War on Terror. Moreover, Trump’s national security and national policy statements are littered with the vocabulary of the very experts who find him so terrifying. What, then, makes Trump’s foreign policy such a singular threat?

Trump’s foreign policy is disturbing because it is uncanny—both grotesque *and* deeply familiar. Like a funhouse mirror, Trump’s vision of the world reflects back a twisted image of U.S. global politics that *is* and *is not* who we are supposed to be. For instance, deterrence strategy may require the rest of the world to believe that the U.S. president might use nuclear weapons, but the president is *not* supposed to hint that he might actually do so. The president is supposed to be concerned with regulating the flow of immigrants but not reveal that race plays a role in these calculations by blurting the phrase “shithole countries.” The president is supposed to believe that the United States is the most blessed, exceptional country on Earth—as Barack Obama put it, “I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being”—but *not* engage in excessive nationalism by making “total allegiance” the “bedrock” of his politics, or combine it with a commitment to “make our Military so big, powerful & strong that no one will mess with us.”

Sometimes Trump’s utterances hit so close to home that they surpass uncanniness. In an essay by Sigmund Freud on the uncanny, Freud says dolls and mannequins unsettle precisely because of the possibility that they might actually be alive, a discomfort that has inspired nightmares, works of literature, and horror movies. Trump, by contrast, is a living nightmare. He opens his mouth and the things-which-must-never- be-said simply fall out. Thus, when Bill O’Reilly asked him why he supported Putin even though he is a “killer,” Trump shot back, “There are a lot of killers. You think our country’s so innocent?”

Trump’s willingness to say such things has precipitated an existential crisis in the international relations world. U.S. foreign policy, as an academic discourse and political practice, is built on the delicate foundation of what Robert Vitalis has called the “norm against noticing,” This deflective move has long been the gold standard of international relations; under its rules of play, IR experts act as if the United States has never been an imperial power and that its foreign policy is not, and has never been, intentionally racist. The norm against noticing thus distinguishes between the idea of the United States as a necessary world-historical actor and the reality of how the United States acts.

In that reality, the United States has long been an imperial power with white nationalist aspirations. Given the racialized nature of U.S. imperial expansion, it makes sense that Alexis de Tocqueville predicted, in a chapter entitled “The Three Races of the United States,” that the United States would one day govern “the destinies of half the globe.” In its early days, while still a slave-holding country, the United States asserted its sovereignty through genocide on a continental scale and annexed large portions of northern Mexico. The country went on to overthrow the independent state of Hawaii, occupied the Philippines and Haiti, exerted its regional power throughout Latin America, expanded its international hegemony after World War II, and became what it is today: the world’s foremost military and nuclear power with a $716 billion “defense” budget that exceeds the spending of all other major global powers combined.

“Taking over from the British Empire in the early twentieth-century,” argues James Tully, the United States has used its many military bases located “outside its own borders”—now nearly 800 in over 80 countries— to force open-door economic policies and antidemocratic regimes on states throughout the formerly colonized world. An extremely partial list of sovereign governments that the United States either overthrew or attempted to subvert through military means, assassinations, or election tampering since 1949 includes Syria, Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon, the Congo, Cuba, Chile, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada, Cuba, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq, Yemen, Australia, Greece, Bolivia, and Angola. Such interventionist policies have contributed substantially to today’s inegalitarian world in which an estimated 783 million people live in profound poverty. In sum, for untold millions of humans in the Global South, the seventy years of worldwide order, security, and prosperity that Ikenberry and Deudney associate with Pax Americana has been anything but ordered, secure, or prosperous.

And yet the norm against noticing prevents foreign policy analysis from even acknowledging—let alone grappling with—the relationship between race and imperialism that has characterized U.S. international relations from the country’s earliest days. This regime of politely un-seeing—of deflecting—connections between U.S. foreign policy, race hierarchy, and colonial administration was clearly not in effect when *Foreign Affairs* was released under its original name: the *Journal of Race Development*. This began to change, however, in the 1920s. Among other contributing factors, World War I, the rise of anti-colonial revolutions, and the emergence of liberal internationalism as a popular ideology helped convince foreign policy experts in the United States and Europe to adopt a policy language oriented toward “development” rather than imperialism or racial difference. Mainstream international relations scholarship today remains committed to a narrative in which the discipline itself and U.S. foreign policy has always been and remains race blind, concerned solely with the relationship between sovereign states who cooperate, deter, or compete with one another in a global system in which the United States is simply, like Caesar, the “first citizen” (Ikenberry) or “the luckiest great power in modern history” (Walt). For liberals, this involves a studied erasure of the imperial origins of twentieth-century internationalism in the League of Nations’ Mandate system and the complicity of Woodrow Wilson in preserving, as Adom Getachew puts it, “white supremacy on a global scale.” For realists, it requires both forgetting the anti-Enlightenment origins of postwar realist thought and reinserting the “security dilemma” back into history so that, with the help of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, the world can—as Slavoj Žižek says—“become what it always was.”

International relations experts will acknowledge U.S. violence and overreach when necessary, but routinely read the illiberalism of U.S. foreign policy as an exception that is not at all representative, in Anne Marie Slaughter’s words, of “the idea that is America.” Slaughter, with Ikenberry, can consider bad behavior only briefly and only in the service of insisting that what matters most is not what the United States actually *does* with its power but what it *intends* to do. Yes, “imperialism, slavery, and racism have marred Western history,” Ikenberry and Deudney argue, but what matters is that liberalism “has always been at the forefront of efforts—both peaceful and militant—to reform and end these practices.” Indeed, even those public intellectuals such as Niall Ferguson and Michael Ignatieff who, after September 11, called for the United States to *embrace* its status as an imperial power, framed their arguments in deflective, liberal terms. By contrast, because realists project the security dilemma retroactively into history (while also simultaneously excising imperialism) they can only see the U.S. destabilization of Third World economies, assassinations, and secret bombings as tragic necessities (great powers, claims Mearsheimer, “have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system”) or as the result of liberals’ ill-advised desire to force “our” values on other nations. Both of these deflective strategies reinforce the illusion that we live, in Nikhil Pal Singh’s words, in an “American-centered, racially inclusive world, one organized around formally equal and independent nation states” where some states just happen to have more power than others, and where the alternative—Russian or Chinese hegemony—is too frightening even to contemplate.

That deflection would play such an outsized role in supporting the ideological edifice of international relations today is hardly surprising. Turn-of-the-century British liberals who supported their empire also drew upon a variety of different deflective strategies to reconcile the violence and illiberalism of British imperial expansion with the stated liberal goals of the Empire. Such deflection made it impossible for these thinkers—many of whom would go on to work as some of the first international relations scholars in Britain and help found The Royal Institute of International Affairs—to link the problems of empire with the violence and disruption of imperialism.

Similarly, deflection within international relations today obscures the U.S. role in maintaining the profoundly hierarchical, racist, insecure, deeply unjust reality of the current global order. It also makes it impossible to address how U.S. foreign policy (covert and overt) has contributed to the destabilization of that order by creating the circumstances that give rise to “failed states,” “rogue regimes,” and “sponsors of terrorism.” Moreover, it impedes any theorizing about how the widespread appeal of Trump’s xenophobia at home might, in part, be the product of U.S. foreign policy abroad, the bitter fruit of the War on Terror and its equally violent predecessors. In other words, in the grand tradition of liberal empire, U.S. foreign policy deflection actively disrupts the link between cause and effect that an entire science of international relations was created to explain.

What makes Trump’s attitude toward foreign policy so uniquely unhinging for international relations experts, then, is the fact that it is essentially undeflectable. When he explains to Theresa May that refugees threaten European culture or calls Mexican immigrants killers, he lays bare the meant-to-be unutterable fear of nonwhite migration that has haunted British, U.S., and European imperialists and foreign policy experts for over a century. When he summons the fires of nationalism to demand an unprecedented increase in the military budget, and then gets it with the overwhelming support of House and Senate Democrats, he reveals that constitutional checks on the commander in chief are only as good as the willingness of Congress to resist jingoism. When he calls nations populated by brown and black people shitholes, he openly advertises the unspoken white supremacist edge that has informed U.S. economic, development, energy, and foreign policies since the late nineteenth century. Trump’s Muslim ban is simply the War on Terror on steroids. In short, Trump’s foreign policy is unprecedented not because of what it *does*, but because Trump will openly *say* what it does—and because of what that then says about us as a nation.

The discomfort Trump provokes ought to prompt international relations experts to reflect on the failings of their discipline to reckon with the relationship between U.S. imperialism, U.S. foreign policy, and the constellation of xenophobia, militarism, racism, and nationalism that haunts our days. The fields of intellectual and legal history and political theory are far ahead of international relations in their critical interrogation of the ideologies that sustain empire at home and abroad. In addition, Trump’s election has emboldened activists to make increasingly explicit the connections they see between a racialized, anti-immigrant politics of domestic dispossession and violence and the history of U.S. imperialism in the world. Unfortunately the same does not appear to be true for the majority of intellectual middlemen who set the public tone for U.S. foreign policy.

#### The alternative is a global revolution against the violence of the US led LIO – movements in that status quo are working and subverting the US and their imperialism exerted through multilateral institutions – even if those movements fail the orientation of those movements is what is necessary because the only way out of US neoimperalism is to continue to fight – the Vietcong forces are proof that movements can stand up to US imperialism

**Sirohi & Bhupatiraju** 20**21 (R. A., S. “Reassessing the Pink Tide. doi:10.1007/978-981-15-8674-3) ajoseph**

For the left to accept such a possibility however would be to miss the polarizing effects of capitalism on a global scale; it would be to ignore the reality of the vast transfers of surpluses from the South to the North that sustain the system. Moreover, to accept such an understanding would also put the left in direct confrontation with its mass base-the poorest sections of society who bear the brunt of imperialism. This is precisely why a generation of anti-imperialist thinkers argued that the way out of underdevelopment and poverty that the peripheries were stuck in, was *to break away from global trading and financial networks* and not in the hope that imperialism could be made benevolent. Their preferred strategy was for 12Here Harvey seems to be differentiating between “accumulation by dispossession” on the one hand and “primitive accumulation” on the other. By doing so, even as he takes to task those versions of Marxism that relegate the violence of dispossession to the margins of capitalism and even as he asserts the continued relevance of such forms of accumulation, his reading nonetheless remains stuck in a stadial conceptualization of capitalism. 4 REARMING THE LEFT 179 peripheral regions to regain hold of the nation state and use the national sovereignty thus obtained to push against the boundaries of imperialism. Thus while radical critics of capitalism are correct in suggesting that only an “inner” transformation of our societies can provide lasting answers to the problems that we face today, for the Global South this process must begin first and foremost through an “outer” transformation of its external links. What is more is that this assertion of sovereignty does not necessarily have to come at the cost of socialist internationalism and indeed historically, the most vociferous demands for political and economic independence have gone hand in hand with heroic acts of internationalism. In a speech delivered in 1965, Che Guevara emphasized this relation as follows: “To raise the living standards of the underdeveloped nations, therefore, we must fight against imperialism. And *each time a country is torn away from the imperialist tree, it is not only a partial battle won against the main enemy but it also contributes to the real weakening of that enemy*, and is one more step toward the final victory. There are no borders in this struggle to the death. We cannot be indifferent to what happens anywhere in the world, because a victory by any country over imperialism is our victory, just as any country’s defeat is a defeat for all of us. The practice of proletarian internationalism is not only a duty for the peoples struggling for a better future, it is also an inescapable necessity” (Guevara 1965). These words remain as true today. Countries like Brazil and India which have diversified industrial bases and major agricultural capabilities can afford to think of an ambitious project of delinking, but such a strategy is likely to be much harder for smaller economies without some sort of international or at least regional level cooperation. Moreover, countries of the Global South that seek to radically challenge capitalism in this way are bound to face the wrath of capital in imperial centres through sanctions, military interventions and so on, and thus the success of delinking in any one country no doubt can benefit from cooperation and support of workers and peasants across the world. Left forces in the North have a particularly important role to play in this regard and in some senses the new contours of the global world economy make such solidarity more possible than ever before. Because although imperialism today continues to rely on extracting super profits from the peripheries, this renewed cycle of imperialism today has gone hand in hand with an erosion of the welfare state in the North and an intense commodification of labour in these parts of the world, all of which have served to weaken the “internal alliances” between capital and labour; Alliances, one 180 R. A. SIROHI AND S. BHUPATIRAJU might add, that Samir Amin at one point saw as constituting a crucial feature of autonomous capitalist development in centres of world capitalism. Conditions such as these can serve to sharpen class conflict and raise working-class consciousness to an entirely new levels in the North, thus providing fertile soil for genuine socialist internationalism. Beyond Developmentalism If the left in the Global South is to emphasize delinking, then such a strategy directly brings home the question of state power to the centre of discussion. It was Lenin’s major contribution to show how important it was for the left not to be satisfied merely by taking state power. In order for socialist movement to move forward and not get trapped within the boundaries of capitalism, *the state would have to be “smashed”.* And yet the very concept of “smashing” has been very fuzzy. Smashing the state did not for once imply a rejection of economic planning for instance. It was not some nihilistic strategy aimed at the destruction of all things that the state had its hands in. It did not for example mean that there was no room for provision of public services like health and education within socialist society.13 It however did mean destruction of the army, prisons and all those arms of the state that were bulwarks of status quo. It also implied a level of decentralization that the capitalist state could never dream of accommodating. Thus what Marxists implied when they sought the smashing of the state was the destruction of the alienating form that the state took; an institution that people create but one that nonetheless comes to dominate them as if it were an external force.

#### The signals of the collapse of neo-imperialism along with capitalism are being revealed – the 2008 financial crisis, collapse of the Eurozone, and challenges to US hegemony are all proof of it – the alternative is the only method to find a way out of neo-imperialism because it galvanizes movements toward material decolonization – like the Vietcong, the Chinese and North Koreans during the Korean war prove that we can stand up to US neo-imperialism but only through collectivity

Yu 20 [Bin, Neo-imperialism, the Final Stage of Imperialism, Taylor & Francis Online, International Critical Thought, Vol. 10, 1 p. 495-518 Accessed 3-11-21] CSUF JmB NDT 2021

In the 1980s, the Japanese-American scholar Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama advanced the concept of “the end of history” (Luo 2019), the essence of which is the contention that the form of human society will end with the neo-imperialism that is now in its heyday. However, the course of events before and after the US financial crisis shows that it is neo-imperialism that is facing its end. William Tabb was once concerned that the United States might go bankrupt due to a loss of competitiveness and the excessive cost of maintaining the operations of imperialism (Tabb 2006). After making an elaborate calculation, Joseph Stiglitz and Professor Linda Bilmes from Harvard University concluded that based on a conservative estimate the total US expenditure on the Iraq War would reach 3 trillion US dollars, and that the sum might perhaps be even more than the 5 trillion US dollars (discounted for inflation) that the United States spent on the Second World War (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2009). Such a huge cost is obviously unbearable for neo-imperialism. When asked by a journalist if the Iraq War was the cause of the slowdown of the US economy, Stiglitz answered in the affirmative. 17 When confronting the socialist camp, (neo-)imperialism for a time made relatively large concessions to the domestic working class, even adopting a strategy of buying off the working class in the countries of the neo-imperialist core through implementing the so-called “welfare state” model (Meng 1981). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, however, the neo-imperialist countries one after another seized their “peace dividend,” slashing workers’ welfare provisions and withdrawing numerous concessions made earlier to the working class. Despite this, the European sovereign debt crisis shows that neo-imperialism, perhaps surprisingly, now finds this model unbearable. Marx once stated, Without the great alternative phases of dullness, prosperity, over-excitement, crisis and distress, which modern industry traverses in periodically recurring cycles, with the up and down of wages resulting from them, as with the constant warfare between masters and men closely corresponding with those variations in wages and profits, the working-classes of Great Britain, and of all Europe, would be a heart-broken, a weakminded, a worn-out, unresisting mass, whose self-emancipation would prove as impossible as that of the slaves of Ancient Greece and Rome. (Marx [1853] 2010, 169) Obviously, with the economic crisis in the neo-imperialist countries and the great reduction of welfare caused by the US financial crisis, opposition on the part of the working class inside the neo-imperialist group will grow increasingly strong. The fact that the US financial crisis of 2008 was triggered by a financial product, subprime mortgages, shows that neo-imperialism is the last stage of imperialism and the last stage of capitalism, in which money capital and productive capital experience the most thorough separation. In the face of this situation, human society can move forward only by actively rejecting capitalism, which is obsolete and unsuited to the development of the productive forces. Only by advancing toward socialism can human society rid itself of the economic crisis that has brought disaster to billions of people, and attain salvation. Although neo-imperialism possesses an arsenal powerful enough to destroy the earth and all humanity, this cannot stave off the system’s demise. On the contrary, neo-imperialism is forced to devote immense wealth to its armaments industry, and to continuously conduct research and development on weapons such as unmanned aerial vehicles that need no or few humans to pursue the fight. This is precisely a manifestation of the vulnerability of neo-imperialism, and proof that neo-imperialism dare not trust or rely on anyone. In reviewing the history of the twentieth century, Yu and Zhang also pointed out that during the Korean War in the 1950s, the United States had the most powerful navy and air force (its ground forces were second only to those of the Soviet Union) and absolute air supremacy. Nevertheless, China and North Korea fought side by side for three years and finally defeated US imperialism. In the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s, the United States still had absolute air supremacy, and US planes kept bombing Vietnam. The people of Vietnam, however, were united as one, fought dauntlessly, and with the support of people all over the world finally drove out the US invaders. These examples demonstrate that even countries that are at a disadvantage can defeat US imperialism so long as their people unite and fight bravely. It should also be pointed out that Cuba, located in the “backyard” of the United States, has thwarted endless US conspiracies and adhered to socialism for sixty years. The fact that Cuba remains standing is further proof of the mythical nature of the claim that “the empire is invincible.” When saluting the Cuban people, we should brim with confidence that we can rise to the challenge posed by neo-imperialism, and defeat its menaces (Yu and Zhang 2003). The productive forces of neo-imperialism can no longer promote the development of the capitalist relations of production, since these productive forces have now developed to such an extent that capitalist relations can no longer accommodate them. Neo-imperialism has become a roadblock obstructing the further development of the productive forces, and when the productive forces begin to break through this obstacle, the whole of neo-imperialist society must fall into chaos. The new and higher relations of production, i.e., socialist relations of production, have already started bursting through the constraints of capitalism, and through their distinctive practice, are providing both positive and negative experience. All round the world, people have scientific Marxism as their guide. The end of neo-imperialism and the complete demise of capitalism are not only unavoidable, but no longer belong solely to the distant future.

## Case

### Util

#### Util enables sacrificial genocide and excuses capitalist violence

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According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge

, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage" , to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

### Drezner

#### You should be skeptical of the predictions of the disad/aff – foreign policy analysts are riddled with bad predictions about conflict – they do this because it gives them a pay check – especially overexaggerating Russian and Chinese power

Drezner 21 [Daniel W. 1-15-2021 Foreign Policy Wonks Gone Wild https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/foreign-policy-predictions-always-bad-worst-international-relations-rewards-catastrophic-thinking/ Accessed 3-7-2021] CSUF JmB NDT 2021

In a world defined by scarcity, there will always be a bountiful harvest of bad predictions about the future. This is true for both foreign policy and Foreign Policy alike. In January 1989, East Germany’s leader, Erich Honecker, declared that the Berlin Wall would still be standing in “50 or even 100 years.” He turned out to be off by 49 to 99 years; the wall crumbled 10 months after his statement. No one writing in the pages of this magazine has been as consequentially wrong as Honecker. Nonetheless, even a cursory perusal of Foreign Policy’s archives reveals some serious errors in foresight. One article in the Winter 1999-2000 issue by the Russia expert Daniel Treisman claimed that Boris Yeltsin’s successor as president of Russia would “find himself blocked in by the realities of Russia’s political game, pushed back toward a set of policies and a style of governing that closely resemble Yeltsin’s.” In retrospect, this seems like a poor description of Vladimir Putin’s style of governance. This is less Treisman’s fault than a consequence of the ever present danger of believing the status quo will persist. Similarly, a 1995 article by the sociologist Jack A. Goldstone asserted that rapid economic growth would not save the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and that “we can expect a terminal crisis in China within the next 10 to 15 years.” It is safe to say that the CCP has, so far, managed to endure and entrench itself. Goldstone was proved wrong because the past didn’t predict the future; Chinese economic growth accelerated to a historically unprecedented rate. Likewise, in early 2009, the economist William Easterly forecast that the 2008 financial crisis would immiserate those who had just emerged from extreme poverty. Over the next five years, however, growth in the developing world actually outpaced growth in the wealthier economies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Predictions that did not come true were by no means limited to the pages of Foreign Policy; the field of international relations is full of them. In the 1970s, the Club of Rome predicted that resource depletion would stunt global prosperity. Instead, the greatest reduction in global extreme poverty began a few years later. In the late 1990s, when petroleum prices were plummeting, some took to these pages to predict the end of OPEC. Instead, the price of oil skyrocketed well past $100 a barrel. This, in turn, led to renewed claims of “peak oil”—the idea that petroleum reserves would near depletion and the industry would go into decline. Fracking and the development of alternative energy systems proved that to be wrong as well. When the Cold War ended, multiple prognosticators predicted geopolitical chaos in Europe and a great-power rivalry between the United States, Europe, and Japan. Oops. The 100th anniversary of the start of World War I led many historians to envisage a replay of those events in the Pacific Rim in 2014. Thankfully, this too did not come to pass. With a surfeit of bad takes, it would be logical to conclude that there have been few good foreign-policy ideas over the same time period. This assumption is incorrect. Consider two examples from the early 1970s. After the 1973 OPEC embargo, the fear of commodity cartels gripped national security analysts. The political scientist Stephen D. Krasner argued in this magazine, however, that oil was the exception. History proved him right. The push by civil rights activists to make human rights a key component of U.S. foreign policy during the Carter administration was one of those ideas that seemed to bear little fruit at the time. This emphasis, however, persisted into the Reagan administration, and the result was the dawn of the third wave of democratization that transformed Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Pacific Rim. Some ideas that are underappreciated when first proposed acquire momentum over time. A number of concrete foreign-policy ideas have been responsible for tangible improvements in people’s lives. Weirdly, however, these constructive arguments get less attention than famously wrong ones, like Samuel P. Huntington’s proposed clash of civilizations or the neoconservative belief that forcible regime change can contribute to democratization. The past 30 years have demonstrated that wars within civilizations are far more bloody than those between them and that forcible regime change is far more likely to lead to military quagmires than Madisonian republics. For anyone intimately familiar with the marketplace of foreign-policy ideas, this phenomenon should be unsurprising. Scholars like to think that, in the public sphere, good notions drive out bad ones, but that’s not necessarily true. Even foreign-policy experts tend to dwell on spectacularly bad ideas rather than helpful suggestions. Francis Fukuyama has a long, distinguished career of trenchant scholarship, but most foreign-policy observers remember him only for his premature prediction of the “end of history” in the early 1990s—the idea that Cold War ideological confrontation would give way to the triumph of liberal democracy. A review of the worst predictions and most useful ideas of the past half-century reveals a few lessons for the readers of Foreign Policy. The first is that foreign-policy observers are a pessimistic lot. We are awash with doomsaying that has proved no more accurate than a cult member holding a sign declaring “The end is nigh” on the street corner. The second is that when examining trends within countries, the primary source of bad predictions is the fallacy of extrapolation: the belief that the future will be just like the present, only more so. The third is that the most useful ideas are not rooted in grand strategy or doctrine. Sometimes grand narratives get the big things right, but just as often they create cognitive blinders that make it difficult to recognize error. By contrast, small-bore ideas—grounded in concrete, specific, well-defined problems—have made the most tangible contributions to international affairs. To be fair, international relations experts are hardly the only social scientists with a poor record of projecting the future. Economists have also proved extremely bad at forecasting, even though there are some awfully powerful incentives for economists to get things right. What makes foreign-policy analysts different is the bias in their forecasting errors. Economists are overly rosy about the future. This profound “optimism bias” explains the errors of the Bretton Woods institutions. On average, for example, a 10-year macroeconomic forecast from the International Monetary Fund or World Bank overestimates a country’s annual GDP growth by 1.1 percentage points. Political forecasters, however, suffer from a different bias: We are a profoundly pessimistic lot. As the Yale University professor John Lewis Gaddis once delineated in painstaking detail, international relations scholars failed to predict both the peaceful end of the Cold War and the manner of the Soviet collapse. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, realists in particular made overly pessimistic predictions about how the post-Cold War order would affect NATO, nuclear proliferation, violent conflict, and balancing against the United States. In reality, the 20 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union saw dramatic declines in almost every category of political violence. The realist line sounds slightly more accurate now, but prognosticators earn no points for predictions that might come true 30 years late. There are three reasons why foreign-policy analysts are so morose. First, it’s good for business. International relations is a countercyclical profession; bad times in the world are good times for geopolitical analysts—and there are incentives for doomsaying. The growth industry of political risk analysis, the first generation of which emanated from international relations scholarship, is predicated on things going wrong. One high-ranking officer at a prominent risk consultancy once explained the company’s sales pitch as follows: “You scare the shit out of them first. That’s what gets the clients through the front door.” Second, much like the reasons for having insurance on your house or car, it pays to devote greater attention to the extreme negative event. Over the past 50 years, there have been positive events: the end of the Cold War, collapse of apartheid, reduction in extreme poverty, and growing ease of cross-border communication. Nonetheless, both government officials and corporate leaders are compelled to respond to negative shocks like a terrorist attack, a global financial crisis, or a pandemic, which will have a far greater impact on politics and profits than a spate of good news. This is partly because human beings are hard-wired to be wary of threats; governments are, too. As one academic paper recently observed, “States tend to inflate threats, exhibit loss aversion, and learn more from failures than from successes.” Even if the probability of bad events happening is low, warning about them has minimal downside. No officials have ever been punished because they were too prepared for a worst-case contingency. Leaders get punished for sleeping at the wheel far more than they do for appearing too vigilant. Finally, there’s an asymmetry in the marketplace of foreign-policy ideas. It is much safer to predict doom and gloom than to predict that everything will work out fine. Warnings about disaster scenarios that never happen carry less cost to one’s reputation—that is someone just being cautious and prudent—and if you happen to be right, you’re treated as a prophet, as the Foreign Policy columnist and health writer Laurie Garrett recently discovered. History has stigmatized optimistic prognosticators who, in retrospect, turned out to be wrong—see, for example, the caricatures of Norman Angell’s 1909 book, The Great Illusion, which predicted that economic interdependence would make war obsolete, or Fukuyama’s end of history. When in doubt, predict the worst-case scenario. These professional tendencies have led to some bad collective forecasts. The end of U.S. hegemony in world politics has been the hardiest of bad predictions. By my count, in Foreign Policy’s 50 years, the death of U.S. hegemony has been declared after at least six different events: the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime in the early 1970s, the stagflation of the mid-1970s, the late 1980s “twin deficits” crisis, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the election of Donald Trump. U.S. hegemony will end at some point, but America’s status as a superpower has outlived many of its most pessimistic prognosticators. If forecasters have been too pessimistic about the state of the world, they have been too complacent in their assessments of the great powers. When it comes to country analyses, the natural tendency has been to extrapolate from current trends. Indeed, two political scientists made this very point in these pages in 2012 when characterizing U.S. National Intelligence Council documents: “The reports almost inevitably fall into the trap of treating the conventional wisdom of the present as the blueprint for the future 15 to 20 years down the road.” While this is a natural human tendency, large complex societies have a way of confounding that instinctual view. Sometimes trends do persist, but just as often they stop abruptly or reverse course. Predictions about China are a case in point. Two decades ago, predictions about the future of Chinese politics ran the gamut from democratization to stable authoritarianism. In March 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton predicted, “The more China liberalizes its economy, the more fully it will liberate the potential of its people. … And when individuals have the power not just to dream but to realize their dreams, they will demand a greater say.” Even more sober analysts noted that by the early 2000s China had seemed to institutionalize the transfer of power, a rarity in authoritarian regimes. Instead, under Xi Jinping, China has transformed into the most personalist regime since the days of Mao Zedong. The fallacy of extrapolation also applies to forecasts about China’s economy. A decade ago, Robert Fogel, a Nobel-winning economist, made waves with a Foreign Policy article predicting that China’s economy would swell to $123 trillion by 2040. He made this prediction simply by assuming that China’s double-digit growth rates from the early 2000s would persist and extrapolating from there. In the decade since, China’s growth rate has slowed significantly—and even those growth figures are likely to be exaggerated. Over the past quarter century, China’s productivity growth has fallen by two-thirds. Now, some experts believe that people should fear a faltering China more than a rising one. China is the standout for bad predictions about national trajectories, but it is hardly alone. U.S. analysts persistently overestimated the capabilities of Soviet Russia during the Cold War. These same analysts underestimated Russian power during the days of Yeltsin. Under Putin, the pendulum has swung back toward exaggerating Russian power. Fifteen years ago, in his book Expert Political Judgment, the political scientist Philip Tetlock warned about the poor predictive ability of most political experts. The discipline’s short-term predictive abilities are lackluster. Worse, the public tends to pay attention to the out-of-the-box prediction that proves correct. The problem is that these kinds of predictions also tend to be wrong more frequently. Tetlock later wrote that these conditions would create a ripe environment for charlatans: “The demand for accurate predictions is insatiable. Reliable suppliers are few and far between. And this gap between demand and supply creates opportunities for unscrupulous suppliers to fill the void by gulling desperate customers into thinking they are getting something no one else knows how to provide.” It would be easy to infer from this that the foreign-policy community has produced nothing but 50 years of bad ideas. Indeed, this is what younger generations tend to think. A recent Rand Corp. report concluded, “A generation of Americans have come of age in an era in which foreign policy setbacks have been more frequent than advances.” Anyone as old as Foreign Policy has some memory of successful foreign policies: containment, the peaceful end of the Cold War, the cessation of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, beneficial trade agreements, and the expansion of U.S.-created international institutions to the rest of the world. Any American who came of age after the 9/11 terrorist attacks would be hard-pressed to identify similarly successful policies in this century. Any autopsy of this shift is likely to arrive at the same explanation for the cause. Because the U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan’s strategy of containment is now viewed as a smashing foreign-policy success, successive generations of foreign-policy analysts have tried to devise a similar “big idea” in grand strategy that would prove to be just as valuable. The world is a more complex place than it was during the 1950s, however, making it next to impossible for a single grand strategy to suffice. None of the post-Cold War grand strategies, from George W. Bush’s neoconservative democracy-promotion-by-force to Donald Trump’s America First, has served the United States well. This does not mean, however, that there haven’t been any good ideas in foreign policy. A more fine-grained analysis reveals the success of small-bore initiatives. The most significant foreign-policy accomplishment of the post-Cold War era was arguably the Nunn-Lugar program. This program helped ensure the security of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal after the collapse in 1991. Over the next two decades, the program succeeded in preventing both nuclear material and nuclear scientists from furthering proliferation across the globe. Unsurprisingly, as one historian noted, “this success did not get major publicity at the time, and remains largely unknown today outside the expert communities in both countries.” The Barack Obama-era Nuclear Safety Summits might be viewed through a similar lens. Another tangible success has been the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), created by the Bush administration in 2003. It was announced at a time when the HIV epidemic was lowering life spans in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the program’s website, the U.S. government has since invested some $85 billion in the global HIV/AIDS response, saving more than 18 million lives. This is a rare case of the United States doing well by doing good. Global surveys of public attitudes toward the United States since PEPFAR was launched consistently show that recipient countries display more positive attitudes toward America. As infectious disease prevention moves to the top of the global policy queue, the United States should learn from PEPFAR’s success. A final example is the 2014 bilateral climate deal between the United States and China. This might seem like an odd inclusion, since it was soon supplanted by the 2015 Paris climate change accords, which the Trump administration abandoned. But the earlier bilateral deal played a crucial role in paving the way for a more wide-ranging agreement. By getting Beijing to formally pledge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the 2014 deal reversed China’s long-standing position that, as a developing country, it should not bear any responsibility to reduce climate change. Once China shifted its approach, it became far easier to cajole developing countries into an international agreement. The takeaway from all this is clear: To stand out, future foreign-