# 1ac – Becoming Minoritarian

#### <insert “I DON’T CARE ABOUT THE PRESENTS ALL I WANT FOR CHRISTMAS IS A BID”>

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#### We are stuck in the middle. In the middle of becoming, living, becoming corpses. Reality should not be understood as static, but rather as a fluid, rhizomatic structure.

**Mark 98** (John, Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity, p. 29-33) SJCP//JG

It's organisms that die, not life. Any work of art points a way through for life, finds a way through the cracks. Everything I've written is vitalistic, at least I hope it is, and amounts to a theory of signs and events. (N, 143) In thefinalpiece ofwork published before his death, a short article entitled "Immanence: a life ...'23 Deleuze presents a concise statement of his philosophical concerns. Although he does not use the word Vitalism', the ideas presented here are undoubtedly vitalist in inspiration. The article begins by defining a transcendental field. That is to say the field which constitutes the basis of his philsophy: transcendental empiricism. This field is defined as \*[...] a pure a-subjective current of consciousness, an impersonal prereflexive consciousness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without self.24 Obviously, this 'pure' current of consciousness has links with the notions of impersonal, indefinite discourse dealt with above. Pure immanence exists in opposition to the world represented and mediated through theframeworkof the subject and the object. The notion of immanence goes to the heart of Deleuze's transcendental empiricism which embraces both vitalism and multiplicity: Pure immanence is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanence which is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is sheer power, utter beatitude. Insofar as he overcomes the aporias of the subject and the object Fichte, in his later philosophy, presents the transcendental field as a life which does not depend on a Being and is not subjected to an Act: an absolute immediate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers back to a being but ceaselessly posits itself in a life.25 To illustrate what he means by this use of the definite article, a life, Deleuze describes a scene in Dickens' Our Mutual Friend, in which \*a universally scorned rogue\* is brought back to life. Those working to bring him out of his coma respond not to the individual, but to a pre-individual power of life which is 'impersonal but singular nevertheless'. Deleuze also perceives the pre-individual nature of life in young children: Very young children, for example, all resemble each other and have barely any individuality; but they have singularities, a smile, a gesture, a grimace - events which are not subjective char- acteristics. They are traversed by an immanent life that is pure power and even beatitude through the sufferings and weaknesses.26 Deleuze's problematising approach to the question of life and work derives in part from his vitalist perspective. The act of writing itself is an attempt to make of life something more than personal, '[.\*\*] to free life from what imprisons it' (N, 143). One of the aims of philosophy and art is to render visible the forces that have captured life. Artists and philosophers may be frail individuals, but they are literally Vital' personalities by virtue of the excess of life that they have seen, experienced or thought about: 'There's a profound link between signs, events, life and vitalism: the power of nonorganic life that can be found in a line that's drawn, a line of writing, a line of music. It's organisms that die, not life' (N, 143). The writer comes into contact with things that threaten to overwhelm the individual: [...] he possesses irresistible and delicate health that stems from what he has seen and heard of things too big for him, too strong for him, suffocating things whose passage exhausts him while\* nonetheless giving him the becomings that dominant and substantial health would render impossible. The writer returns from what he has seen and heard with red eyes and pierced eardrums.27 Deleuze's vitalism is in this way linked to his 'anti-humanism'. A sign is created when thought encounters 'non-organic life', the 'outside' as Deleuze sometimes calls it. Signs are also an expression of the flux and indeterminacy of life. The sign is an expression of the pre-individual, of the flux of life where the constraints of identity have yet to be applied. Philip Goodchild has argued that Deleuze's project represents a 'practical vitalism', which enables thought to come into contact with the power of life.28 The theme of vitalism in Deleuze's work has also been taken up in some detail recently by Mireille Buydens in Sahara: Vesthitique de Gilles Deleuze (1990).29 Buydens argues that Deleuze's 'tran- scendental' field is constituted by a 'swarm' of pre-individual singularities. This fluid structure is that of the rhizome or the multiplicity. Vitalism is a way of connecting with, of being in the presence of, this pre-individual world of flux and becoming. Deleuze's vitalism is expressed in his preference for verbs, particularly in the infinitive form, over nouns: 'Infinitives express becomings or events that transcend mood and tense' (N, 34). For Buydens, the theme of vitalism comes first and foremost from Bergson. She draws attention in particular to Bergson's Creative Evolution (1911), where the '£lan vital' is described as a form of becoming, which 30 eludes analysis and the material forms in which it can be perceived. Buydens also points to Nietzsche and Spinoza as thinkers who influence Deleuze in his development of vitalism. Ofcourse, the theme of vitalism requires a discussion of Deleuze's reading of Bergson, and this will be dealt with in the following chapter. However, it is important to understand that other thinkers, such as Nietzsche and Spinoza, help Deleuze to develop the question of vitalism. For example, Petra Perry claims that Deleuze's innovative reading of Nietzsche in the 1960s enabled Deleuze, in his subsequent work, to reactivate some of the debates generated by turn-of-the-century vitalism in France.31 Also, in the introductory chapter, 'The Life of Spinoza', in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (Spinoza: Philosophic pratique 1981) Deleuze presents a portrait of a frail individual whose very individuality is the product of powerful lines of force. Spinoza's life was on one level startlingly ascetic, undermined as it was by illness and characterised by a nomadic, property less existence. However, Spinoza was able to embrace an affirmative, joyous conception of life. He pre-empts Nietzsche's distaste for resentment and bad conscience, the tendency to turn against life and to fight for one's own enslavement. It is this latter tendency that marks Spinoza out as pre-empting the 'modern' question of fascism. In his Theological Treatise Spinoza is preoccupied with the question of why people are apparently so willing to be separated from the positive force of life. Why do they submit so willingly to the forces that imprison life? Why are the people so deeply irrational? Why are they proud of their own enslavement? Why do they fight'for\* their bondage as if it were their freedom? Why is it so difficult not to win but to bear freedom? Why does a religion that invokes love and joy inspire war, intolerance, hatred, malevolence, and remorse? (S:PP, 10) Ultimately, as Todd May claims, this is the question which makes all of Deleuze's work political.32 Theories of ideology and false consciousness only recognise the injustices and oppressions we suffer against our will or because we are somehow duped into believing that they are good for us. Deleuze, however, poses a question which is both much more direct and more subtle: why do we desire what oppresses us? This is one of the aspects of Anti-Oedipus that Foucault so admires, when he talks of Deleuze and Guattari's attempt to tackle the problem of fascism: '[...] the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire die very thing that dominates and exploits us\* (AO, xiii). One never commences; one never has a tabula rasa; one slips in, enters in the middle; one takes up or lays down rhythms. (S:PP, 123) It is never the beginning or the end which are interesting; the beginning and end are points. What is interesting is the middle. (D, 39) The 'indefinite life\* that Deleuze talks of in his very last article Immanence: a life...' takes place 'in the middle': 'This indefinite \^Jllft does not have moments, however close they might be, but only meantimes [des entretemps]y between-moments.'33 Starting in the middle, becoming, constitutes a guiding principle in Deleuze's work: 'being is becoming\*. As Bergson points out, die intellect tends to spatialise, to immobilise the flux of life which is being. In this way, perception of being is reduced and impoverished. For this reason, Bergson promotes the development of a philosophical intuition. This is a problematising method which attempts to come to terms with the irreducible flux of being. In developing this Bergsonian perspective Deleuze goes some way to creating an image of thought which is subde enough to seize theflowof life.34 This is also a question of the indirect, impersonal 'style\* that Deleuze develops: Tour writing has to be liquid or gaseous simply because normal perception and opinion are solid, geometric1 (N, 133). Deleuze also admits that the middle is the most comfortable place for him to be. It corresponds to his 'habit' of thinking of things in terms of lines rather than points (N, 161). For Deleuze, the 'English' have a particular tendency to begin in the middle, whereas the 'French' are obsessed with roots, beginnings and foundations: The English zero is always in the middle. Bottlenecks are always in the middle. Being in the middle of a line is the most uncomfortable position. One begins again through the middle. The French think in terms of trees too much: the tree of knowledge, points of aborescence, the alpha and omega, the roots and the pinnacle. (D, 39) In the later part of his career Deleuze continued to develop the question of that which is in the middle with his work on Leibniz and the Baroque concept of the fold. Leibniz's 'monadic' conception of matter undermines distinctions between organic and inorganic matter, interior and exterior, and bodies and souls. If matter is continuous and endlessly folded, it must express a concept of movement which is always in the middle: Everything moves as if the pleats of matter possessed no reason in themselves. It is because the Fold is always between two folds, and because the between-two-folds seems to move about everywhere: Is it between inorganic bodies and organisms, between organisms and animal souls, between animal souls and reasonable souls, between bodies and souls in general? (LB, 13) The conjunction 'and' helps us to think in terms of the middle, to escape the way is which thought is conventionally modelled on the verb 'to be'. 'And' is a tool for producing a sort of 'stammering' in thought and language: it is the possibility of diversity and the destruction of identity. Multiplicity is not the sum of its terms, but is contained in the 'and': AND is neither one thing nor the other, it's always in between, between two things; it's the borderline, there's always a border, a line of flight or flow, only we don't see it, because it's the least perceptible of things. And yet it's along this line of flight that things come to pass, becomings evolve, revolutions take shape.

#### General understandings of the relation between norms, linguistics, subjects, and the world are insufficient for ethics because there is a gap between discursive regimes and real subjectivity. Only structures of affect distinguish the subject from static concepts of it – it’s cruelly optimistic to think we can fit into stable structures.

Schaefer 13 [Schaefer ’13. Schaefer, D. "The Promise of Affect: The Politics of the Event in Ahmed's The Promise of Happiness and Berlant's Cruel Optimism." Theory & Event 16.2 (2013). Project MUSE. Web. LHP MK]

At a recent talk at the University of Pennsylvania, Lauren Berlant was asked a question about the relationship between her work—she had just finished a lecture on the theme of flat affect in Gregg Araki's 2004 film Mysterious Skin—and the political. "Because I work on affect," she responded, "I think everything is realism" (Berlant: 2012). Like the dense introductory segments of each of her chapters—thick but fast-moving genealogical waterslides—I think that unpacking statements like this from Berlant is best repaid by taking them in a low gear. When Berlant maps her method as affect theory, she is suggesting that the works she examines in her capacity as a scholar of literature cannot be divorced from the political-material contexts out of which they emerge, but at the same time must be recognized as incarnations of aparticular embodied iteration within this field. Texts are produced by bodies that are both enmeshed in their political worlds and trying to negotiate those worlds in their own distinct way. Everything we do is realism: Berlant's textual objects of study are mediations, attempts to work something out, exhibitions of tensed, embodied, affective realities.1 This is the promise of affect theory, the possibility sliding together analytical tools used to pick apart both highly individuated and highly social contact zones—bodies and histories—as incarnated realities. Affect theory wants to maintain the insights of high theory, the doctrinaire approach that says "historicize everything," while at the same time thinking of how bodies inject their own materiality into spaces. This means using language that enters the orbit of the biological. In the introduction to their 1995 edited volume Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader (later reprinted in Sedgwick's Touching Feeling)—one of the earliest manifestoes of contemporary affect theory— Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank acerbically catalog what theory "knows today," first and foremost that 1: The distance of [an] account from a biological basis is assumed to correlate near precisely with its potential for doing justice to difference (individual, historical, and cross-cultural), to contingency, to performative force, and to the possibility of change (Sedgwick: 2003, 93). And 2: Human language is assumed to offer the most productive, if not the only possible, model for understanding representation (Sedgwick: 2003, 93). Affect theory in this vision is designed to explore[s] the "crucial knowledges" of bodies outside a purely theoretical determination, outside the traditional domains of humanist scholarship—reason, cognition, and language (Sedgwick: 2003, 114). Affect, for Lauren Berlant, is thus understandable as "sensual matter that is elsewhere to sovereign consciousness but that has historical significance in domains of subjectivity" (Berlant: 2011, 53). Affect theory is about how systems of forces circulating within bodies—forces not necessarily subsumable or describable by language—interface with histories. It is about how discourses form ligatures with pulsing flesh-and-blood creatures. Two recent texts, Sara Ahmed's The Promise of Happiness (2010) and Berlant's Cruel Optimism (2011), can be seen as developing this strand, and in particular, of indicating new ways of feeling out politics through the membrane of affect theory. Both of these authors suggest that the repertoire of the analytics of power (Foucault: 1990) must be supplemented with resources from the affective turn. Recent critiques of affect theory2 have focused on a branch of affect theory heavily informed by Gilles Deleuze's reading of Spinoza. In this strand, affect is rendered as a set of ontological properties, as an ensemble of mutable attributes.3 Contemporary Deleuzians such as Brian Massumi4 and William Connolly5 have been targeted by these critics for their attempts at absorbing scientific research into the Spinozistic discourse of affect. But Spinoza and Deleuze are second-tier characters in Ahmed and Berlant's work—which is perhaps why Ahmed situates herself in a lineage—stretching back to Sedgwick—that she calls "feminist cultural studies of affect"6 (Ahmed: 2010, 13). Where the Deleuzian strands focuses on affect as the raw material of becoming, as the play of substances, Ahmed and Berlant locate affect theory [is] as a phenomenological, rather than ontological enterprise. It is in the phenomenology of the political that Ahmed and Berlant ground their projects. For Ahmed, this comes in the form of a new attention to happiness as an object of analysis. This does not mean a circumscribed exploration of happiness as a thing, but rather programmatically asking the question "what does happiness do?" (Ahmed: 2010, 2). Happiness is not autonomous, Ahmed argues, but a relationship of evaluation that creates the horizon of the self. For Ahmed, the "near sphere" of the self is constituted by a perimeter studded with "happy objects." This cluster of objects is what gives the field of mobile operations of the self its shape. In this "drama of contingency," we "come to have our likes, which might even establish what we are like" (Ahmed: 2010, 24). But for Ahmed, happiness as an affective field settling in proximity to bodies is not necessarily transparent in its shape or its function to the self. Happiness often takes the form, she suggests, of a promise, of a deferred possibility. Taking the phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl as a springboard for a discussion of time-consciousness, she suggests that happiness as a promise—from the Latin verb promittere, "to let go or send forth"—is an anticipation rather than a felt presence (Ahmed: 2010, 38). Rather than simply an affect that circulates between bodies and objects, happiness is also a promise that is passed around. This analysis of the promise of happiness underpins the genealogy Ahmed organizes in the opening chapter of the book: an exploration of the contemporary "happiness turn" in scholarship and the "happiness industry" emerging in parallel in popular media marketplaces. This discourse, she suggests, moves happiness further away from its etymological origin point—in the Middle English hap or fortune, cognate with "perhaps" and "happenstance"— suggesting chance to a sense of happiness as a scheme, a program that, if followed, leads to ultimate good (Ahmed: 2010, 6). This sense of the promise of happiness is the elimination of contingency by guaranteeing the futurity of happiness: "The promise of happiness takes this form: if you have this or have that, or if you do this or do that, then happiness is what follows" (Ahmed: 2010, 29). Happiness as a guarantee—a promise that circulates through power-knowledge regimes—but one that defers happiness rather than making happiness present, is one of the mechanisms by which happiness is translated into the skin of a political organism, an "affective community"—such as a family or a society. Through the promise of happiness, bodies are brought together by a shared expectation of future comfort. But because this is a promise rather than immediate happiness, an interstice is formed between this promise and individual experiencing bodies— an interstice that can either be full and complete or disconnected. The family, for instance, does not share a happiness, but a happiness deferred, a promise or image of happiness to-come (Ahmed: 2010, 46). It is in this interstice, either blockaded or fluid, that Ahmed articulates the need for a politics of killing joy, of breaking down the promise of happiness as a regime that demands fidelity without recourse. For Ahmed, the discourse of happiness is performative: it produces a politics of promise (or nostalgia) that suffocates alternative promises and alternative explorations. Here Ahmed produces biographies of a range of "affect aliens," bodies that are called on to be silent and accept the happiness that has been promised, while their actual desires and hopes are out of joint with the world around them: feminist killjoys, unhappy queers, melancholic migrants. The promise of happiness, Ahmed suggests, must be interrupted to make room for emancipatory politics. "I am not saying that we have an obligation to be unhappy," she writes, "I am simply suggesting that we need to think about unhappiness as more than a feeling that should be overcome" (Ahmed: 2010, 217). In the closing passage of the book she writes that since "the desire for happiness can cover signs of its negation, a revolutionary politics has to work hard to stay proximate to unhappiness" (Ahmed: 2010, 223). Political change, Ahmed contends, is paralyzed by the imperative to be happy, to stay within the narrow guidelines of happiness's promise. Where Ahmed's background is in a western philosophical lineage that leads up to contemporary questions of affect, the immediate theoretical precursor of Lauren Berlant's Cruel Optimism is Kathleen Stewart's Ordinary Affects (2007), which develops the notion of the "ordinary" as a felt reality. "Ordinary affects," Stewart writes, "are the varied, surging capacities to affect and to be affected that give everyday life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, contingencies, and emergences" (Stewart: 2007, 1f). Berlant is interested in particular in how the ordinary comes to take the form of a sort of affective impasse, a set of felt relationships that cannot be moved through. Cruel Optimism is a focused study of a particular category of impasse, what she calls "cruel optimism." Cruel optimism, she explains at the book's outset, refers to a relation that emerges "when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing. It might involve food, or a kind of love; it might be a fantasy of the good life, or a political project" (Berlant: 2011, 1). Berlant explores a range of situations where these attachments emerge, as a response to trauma or out of the ongoing pressures of the ordinary, in particular through the parameters of what she calls "genres of precarity," a range of aesthetic practices and styles—"mass media, literature, television, film, and video"—that ... emerge during the 1990s to register a shift in how the older state-liberal-capitalist fantasies shape adjustments to the structural pressures of crisis and loss that are wearing out the power of the good life's traditional fantasy bribe without wearing out the need for a good life (Berlant: 2011, 7). Realism: texts always reflect an affective situation, a force field of desires, a labile contact zone between bodies and intersecting historical frames. Framing literary criticism (broadly construed) as a practice of tracing the connective tissue between bodies and situations is what lets Berlant speak to the political uses of affect. She suggests that affect theory is a "another phase in the history of ideology theory," that it "brings us back to the encounter of what is sensed with what is known and what has impact in a new but also recognizable way" (Berlant: 2011, 53). Affect—especially ordinary affect—is the missing link between discursive regimes and bodies, the arterial linkages through which power is disseminated. "The present" is not an assemblage of texts and knowledges, bloodless discursive inscriptions on the body, but a felt sense out of which political circumstances emerge. "We understand nothing about impasses of the political," she writes, "without having an account of the production of the present" (Berlant: 2011, 4). Cruel optimism as a byproduct of political situations colliding with bodies plays out in ongoing, semistable routines, in ordinariness. This focus on the ordinary frames Berlant's conception of the political as a slow-motion reaction rather than a series of staccato punctuations. This comes out, for instance, in her exhortation to move away from trauma theory as a way of "describing what happens to persons and populations as an effect of catastrophic impacts" (Berlant: 2011, 9). Rather, Berlant suggests that trauma is only one facet of the ordinary, a precursory event that yields new historical trajectories lived out in slow-motion. "Trauma," she writes, ... forces its subjects not into mere stuckness but into crisis mode, where they develop some broad, enduring intuitions about the way we live in a now that's emerging without unfolding, and imagining a historicism from within a discontinuous present and ways of being that were never sovereign (Berlant: 2011, 93). Rather than the instantiating event, Berlant is interested in the fallout of politics, the long-running reverberations. It is in these interwoven aftermaths following in the wake of bodies that Berlant locates the tropic of cruel optimism. Optimism, she is careful to point out, can "feel" any number of different ways, can come clothed in any number of affective orientations. "Because optimism is ambitious," she writes, "at any moment it might not feel like anything, including nothing: dread, anxiety, hunger, curiosity, the whole gamut from the sly neutrality of browsing the aisles to excitement at the prospect of 'the change that's gonna come'" (Berlant: 2011, 2). Rather than a singularly identifiable feeling, optimism takes the phenomenological form of a "knotty tethering to objects, scenes, and modes of life that generate so much overwhelming yet sustaining negation" (Berlant: 2011, 52). Optimism binds bodies to "fantasies of the good life," to horizons of possibility that may or may not be defeated by the conditions of their own emergence. Cruel optimism is the outcome of this circumstance of tethering confused by itself, of Möbius-strip cycles of ambition and frustration. The ordinary, precisely because of its complexity, can contain the intransigent contradictions of cruel optimism (Berlant: 2011, 53). It is the space of the rubble, the hovering dust, the shockwaves that follow the event rather than the piercing clarity of the punctum itself. Berlant is interested in the ways that habits form out of situations of impossibility—for instance, in her reading of Gregg Bordowitz's documentary filmHabit (2001), about the body rituals that structure the daily lives of a gay man living with AIDS and his partner in New York City in the 1990s. Bordowitz's work maps a crisis that reflects Berlant's delineation of the field of the political: with the new availability of anti-retroviral drugs in the 1990s, AIDS ceased to be "a death sentence," and thus "turned fated life back into an ellipsis, a time marked by pill- and test-taking, and other things, the usual" (Berlant: 2011, 58). For Berlant, the event is a rarity, and is only secondarily the zone of the political, which is itself constituted by ongoing patterns of response and desire—slow-motion echoes producing new forms as they cross-cut and interfere with one another (Berlant: 2011, 6). In this sense, Berlant explains, her work meshes with Sedgwick's queer reading of affect as the histories that make us desire in unexpected, perverse ways. "The queer tendency of this method," Berlant writes, "is to put one's attachments back into play and into pleasure, into knowledge, into worlds. It is to admit that they matter" (Berlant: 2011, 123). Berlant sees the terrain of the political emerging out of this tissue of affectively-embroidered histories. Although both Ahmed and Berlant write about the uses of affect as a phenomenological bridge to the political, and the slipperiness of happiness or the good life—the way that pleasure can be wrapped up with a strain of unease— there is a distinction between their respective scopes of inquiry. Where Ahmed's book is about frustration/promise/deferral, Berlant's is about addiction. When I asked my students to come up with examples of cruel optimism, they brainstormed the following list: heroin, abusive relationships, candy, horcruxes. Each of these instances suggests a vital but destructive need, an ambivalent compulsion—an addiction, where the tectonic plates of the body's affects shift in friction with one another. Cruel optimism indexes these moments where a body desires and needs an arrangement of the world that is also frustrating or corrosive. Politics is one of these zones of fractious attraction. Berlant writes, for instance, that Intensely political seasons spawn reveries of a different immediacy. People imagine alternative environments where authenticity trumps ideology, truths cannot be concealed, and communication feels intimate, face-to-face" (Berlant: 2011, 223). Politics produces fantasies, tethers that draw us forward to particular attachments in the form of images, narratives, bodily practices. But these fantasies also contain the elements of their own frustration or refusal. President George W. Bush, for example, is able to use the affective elements of statecraft (a practice which, Berlant assures us, is decidedly non-partisan) to create a façade that diverts attention from his flailing foreign and economic policies (Berlant: 2011, 226). Berlant's focus in Cruel Optimism is on politics as a field of attachments, a skein of affectively pulsing tissues linking bodies together. "Pace Žižek," she writes, ... the energy that generates this sustaining commitment to the work of undoing a world while making one requires fantasy to motor programs of action, to distort the present on behalf of what the present can become. It requires a surrealistic affectsphere to counter the one that already exists, enabling a confrontation with the fact that any action of making a claim on the present involves bruising processes of detachment from anchors in the world, along with optimistic projections of a world that is worth our attachment to it (Berlant: 2011, 263). Berlant looks at how politics pulls on bodies using the ligaments of affect, how politics becomes irresistible, even when it is self-frustrating. Ahmed's focus is very different: she is interested in thinking through politics as the space of unhappiness and deferment. In a section of Chapter 5 entitled "The Freedom to Be Unhappy," Ahmed writes that revolutionary practices may need to follow from the willingness to suspend happiness, to dissolve the imbricated promises of happiness that produce hermetically sealed political systems. Affect aliens are forged in the pressure of unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises of happiness, sealed in a relationship of anticipation pinned to the guarantee of ultimate good. Thus Ahmed writes that "any politics of justice will involve causing unhappiness even if that is not the point of our action. So much happiness is premised on, and promised by, the concealment of suffering, the freedom to look away from what compromises one's happiness" (Ahmed: 2010, 196). The revolutionary politics Ahmed wants to advance is willing to put happiness at risk, to dissolve promises of happiness. Ahmed is clear, though, that this is not to make politics about unhappiness: It is not that unhappiness becomes our telos: rather, if we no longer presume happiness is our telos, unhappiness would register as more than what gets in the way. When we are no longer sure of what gets in the way, then 'the way' itself becomes a question (Ahmed: 2010, 195). Neither happiness nor unhappiness is the telos of revolutionary politics. Rather, Ahmed wants to connect the political back to the "hap" of happiness. Rather than a critique of happiness, I would suggest that the broader channel of her project is best understood as a critique ofpromise. Thus she ends Chapter 5 with the later work of Jacques Derrida, indicating the need to keep politics open to the event, to the unexpected possibilities to-come. She proposes a vision of happiness that "would be alive to chance, to chance arrivals, to the perhaps of a happening" (Ahmed: 2010, 198). Where for Berlant the event is in the past, the ancestor of our tensed bodily habits today, for Ahmed, the event is ahead, the always-anticipated but radically unknown future. There is also a complementarity to these books, a sense in which both come at the relationship between affect and the political from different sides of the problem, but are nonetheless hurtling towards a common point of impact. Is Ahmed describing scenes where cruel optimism unravels under the internal pressure of a frustrated promise? Is cruel optimism the deferral of happiness implicit in the temporal structure of the promise? These are not fully resolved or resolvable questions, in part because Ahmed and Berlant roll their theoretical lens over such a wide range of circumstances. I would suggest that deepening the conversation between these approaches will hinge in part on exploring the relationship between affect and time—a question that is surfaced by both of these texts but not resolved. Ahmed wants to play inside the deconstructive thematics of the promise that allows us to view affect as a state of deferral. But Ahmed comes closest to Berlant when she writes that "[i]f we hope for happiness, then we might be happy as long as we can retain this hope (a happiness that paradoxically allows us to be happy with unhappiness)" (Ahmed: 2010, 181). Is deferred happiness really divided from happiness? What if fantasies—what Silvan Tomkins calls "images"7—are so crucial to the production of affect that to save and savor fantasies in one's near sphere is "worth" their eventual frustration? What if a promise deferred is itself a form of happiness—even if the deferral turns out, in retrospect, to have been endless? What happens while we wait? This is in no way to acquiesce to those situations, sketched by Ahmed in the inner chapters of the book, where promises are made that produce affect aliens— investment in a community of promise that will never materialize as happiness. But it is to suggest that the economic flows of affect are more complex than a simple binary of presence/deferment. There may be a clearer divergence in Berlant and Ahmed's respective emphases on the felt temporality of politics. Ahmed suggests that political transformation happens by orienting us to the perhaps, towards an evental horizon constituted by uncertainty, rather than promise. Berlant seems more skeptical about the possibility of untethering ourselves from an orientation to future happiness. As in her response to Žižek, she emphasizes the intransigence of fantasy, especially as a conduit that can produce political energy. I wonder if Berlant's answer here points to a different way of resolving the problem of temporality hovering over Ahmed's work: what if the dissolution of promise did not leave us at the mercy of a pure politics of hap, of chance, but opened us up to new horizons of hope—neither guaranteed nor radically accidental? This dynamic interfaces with an equally provocative question lodged early on and left unresolved in Berlant's book: "I have indeed wondered," she writes in her Introduction, "whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself" (Berlant: 2011, 24). In mapping affectively mediated politics, how do we assess the cruelty of hope? What are the singular psychic costs of disappointment that must be risked or countenanced in the production of a politics without promise? These books are profoundly important contributions advancing the still-new and in some ways still-tentative field of affect theory. They open up two distinct but interrelated methodological templates for thinking through issues of globalization, race, gender and sexuality, media, philosophy, and religion: the thematics of frustration and of addiction in the moving affectsphere of the political. What both Ahmed and Berlant demonstrate is that affect theory offers a crucial set of resources for thinking through the relationship between bodies and discourses. The enterprise of thinking politics, of mapping the enfolding of bodies by power, cannot move forward without affect.

#### Debate operates through codified norms established by majoritarian logic – our affirmative acts as a method of becoming minoritarian through a rejection of the majoritarian – this is not an embrace of groups with less numbers, but is rather an embrace of identities that move away from the standard or ideal proposed by the system – by embracing our difference from the norm on a micro-political level, we come to realize that oppression operates through the in-humanization of those not aligning with the ideal human subject – becoming minoritarian is the only ethical orientation.

Colebrook 1 Claire 2002 (Understanding Deleuze) [a deleuzian feminist and a world renowned Deleuzian author.] 12/3/02 pp. 59-60 //ACCS JM

Minoritarian/Majoritarian Deleuze and Guattari use the terms ‘minor’ and ‘minoritarian’ not to describe groups in terms of their numbers but in terms of the mode of their formation. Women, for example, are a minority. This is not because there are fewer women, but because the standard term is that of ‘man’. Furthermore, a majority has a fixed standard. There is an image or ideal of the human or man which then governs who can or cannot be admitted; we exclude those who are deemed ‘inhuman’. But minoritarian groups have no grounding standard; the identity of the group is mobilised with each new member. The women’s movement, for example, has constantly questioned whether there is any thing such as ‘woman’. Aminor literature, also, does not appeal to a standard but creates and transforms any notion of the standard. If I seek to write a film script that is just like the popular and financially successful Star Wars (appealing to the spirit and tradition of American science fiction), then this is a major work. But if I aim to produce a film that critics may not even recognise as a film, or that will demand a redefinition of cinema, then I produce a minor work. For Deleuze and Guattari all great literature is minor literature, refusing any already given standard of recognition or success. Similarly, all effective politics is a becoming-minoritarian, not appealing to who we are but to what we might become…In contrast to the subjugated group or the extensive multiplicity, where what a member is refers back to a distinct identity or substance, an intensive multiplicity or subject group transforms with each alteration of force; what a member is would also alter with each transformation. Minority groups, for example, are constantly in transformation: they are not governed by an image or identity. For Deleuze and Guattari, a minority is defined not by how many members are in the group but by the nature of the grouping. Although women make up the majority of the population they can be, but not always, thought of as a minority. This is because they do not recognise the dominant standard of ‘man’ or humanity. In theory, we all know what it is to be human; and there are criteria of humanity that allow for inclusion and exclusion, such as whether one is rational, moral or social. We could refer to those who weren’t rational, moral or social as ‘inhuman’. Humanity has a definite standard or measure by which it decides who can be included in its group, and we are all measured by this standard. Not fitting in amounts to being inhuman; there is no other category, no real difference. When the women’s movement started it began as a grouping that refused the recognition of male reason while not yet having some other standard to which it could appeal. We can think of this as a subject group and an intensive multiplicity, where what it is to be a woman was open to question and formation, and varied with each new inclusion. Accordingly, there would be two modes of nationalist political claims. Those that were ‘majoritarian’ would appeal to some finite and perceived unit—national character, birth or spirit—as the basis and reason for grouping together. Those that were ‘minoritarian’ would be an identity constantly transformed by the events of its grouping or assembling.

#### The aff works – don’t just take my word for it – our method is empirically proven to work.

Colebrook 2 Claire 2002 (Understanding Deleuze) [a deleuzian feminist and a world renowned Deleuzian author.] 12/3/02 //ACCS JM

Human freedom became the problem. If human beings are free, does this mean that there is some ultimate ‘man’ who can be liberated from the forces of production; or does radical freedom mean that there is no longer any human essence to which politics can appeal? All this came to a head in the student sit-ins and disruptions of 1968. There were protests throughout Europe in the late 1960s which were random, unthought out, and moti- vated not by the economically defined class of workers so much as by students and intellectuals. In the aftermath of these disrup- tions it was realised that politics was no longer the affair of economic classes and large or ‘molar’ groupings. Local disruptions at the level of knowledge, ideas and identity could transform the political terrain. Deleuze and others opened the politics of the virtual: it was no longer accepted that actual material reality, such as the economy, produced ideas. Many insisted that the virtual (images, desires, concepts) was directly productive of social reality. This overturned the simple idea of ideology, the idea that images and beliefs were produced by the governing classes to deceive us about our real social conditions. We have to do away with the idea that there is some ultimate political reality or actuality which lies behind all our images. Images are not just surface effects of some underlying economic cause; images and the virtual have their own autonomous power. This is where structuralism and post-1968 politics intersected. We need to see our languages and systems of representation not just as masks or signs of the actual, but as fully real powers in their own right. The way we think, speak, desire and see the world is itself political; it produces relations, effects, and organises our bodies.

#### The role of the ballot is to cultivate minoritarian subjectivity – majoritarian stabilized schooling wrecks thought and is unethical.

**Carlin and Wallin 14** Carlin, Matthew. Wallin, Jason. “Deleuze and Guattari, Politics and Education.” Bloomsbury. 2014. Pg. 119-121 MK

As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather, a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank, achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘the subject is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it, such that the subject reproduces the system’ (p. 6). Where education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary molar codes, its modes of production have taken as their teleological goal the production of a ‘majoritarian people’, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the standardization of education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Twisting Deleuze, might we claim that the people are missing in education? That is, where education aspires to invest desire in the production of a ‘majoritarian’ or ‘molar’ public, the prospect of thinking singularities are stayed, not only through the paucity of enunciatory forms and images available for thinking education in the first place, but further, through the organization of the school’s enunciatory machines into vehicles of representation that repeat in molarizing forms of self-reflection, ‘majoritarian’ perspective, and dominant circuits of desiring-investment. Herein, the impulse of standardization obliterates alternative subject formations and the modes of counter-signifying enunciation that might palpate them. Repelling the singular, the ‘majoritarian’ and standardizing impulse of education takes as its ‘fundamental’ mode of production the reification of common sense, or, rather, the territorialization of thought according to that which is given (that which everyone already knows). Figuring in a mode ‘of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same’, common sense functions to stabilize patterns of social production by tethering them to molar orders of meaning and dominant regimes of social signification (Deleuze, 1990, p. 78). As Daignault argues, in so far as it repels the anomalous by reterritorializing it within prior systems of representation, common sense constitutes a significant and lingering problem in contemporary education (Hwu, 2004). Its function, Daignault alludes apropos Serres, is oriented to the annihilation of difference. Hence, where the conceptualization of ‘public’ education is founded in common sense, potentials for political action through tactics of proliferation, disjunction, and singularization are radically delimited and captured within prior territorialities of use (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). The problem of this scenario is clear: common sense has yet to force us to think in a manner capable of subtracting desire from majoritarian thought in lieu of alternative forms of organization and experimental expression. In so far as it functions as a vehicle of ‘molarization’, reifying a common universe of reference for enunciation, the school fails to produce conditions for thinking in a manner that is not already anticipated by such referential ‘possibilities’. Hence, while antithetical to the espoused purpose of schooling, the majoritarian impulse of the school has yet to produce conditions for thinking – at least in the Deleuzian (2000) sense whereupon thought proceeds from a necessary violence to those habits of repetition with which thought becomes contracted.

#### The 1AC deterritorializes educational spaces with our method, we break the rules and attack the stagnation of debate. The role of the judge is to be a rhizomatic educator who endorses our deterritorialization of the debate space – this means breaking rules and refusing binaries as a performative action that instigates becoming and adopts rhizomatic politics.

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Deterritorialization seeks to knock[s] existing understandings and ways of acting into a different orbit or trajectory (Roy, 2004). Its purpose is to undo the ‘processes of continuous control and instantaneous communication’ (Smith, 1998, p. 264)**.** It is a performative breaking of existing codeswhich is also a ‘making’ (Howard, 1998, p. 115). That is, it is an escape, but in a positive sense, so that new intensities open up: The result is a return to a field of forces, transversing the gaps, puncturing the holes, and opening up the new world order to a quite different and new world of the multiple (Howard, 1998, pp. 123–124). Deterritorialization creates ‘chaosmos’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994), a term coined by James Joyce and which Deleuze and Guattari considered an apt account of the effects of deterritorialization: ‘composed chaos, neither forseen nor preconceived’ (p. 204) and precipitating new ways of thinking and acting: ‘once one ventures outside what’s familiar and reassuring, once one has to invent new concepts for unknown lands, then methods and moral systems break down’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 322). The potential areas for deterritorialization cannot be specified; rather it is a case of being alert to opportunities to interrupt: This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum; experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensitities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 161). Deterritorialization has the potential to attack the rigid, striated – or territorialized – spaces of schooling, teacher education and policy, replacing these with ones which are smooth and full of creative possibilities. Within these newly created spaces ‘life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new obstacles, invents new paces, switches adver- saries’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 500). These smooth spaces are depicted by Deleuze and Guattari (ibid) as ‘holey space’ (p. 413), like Swiss cheese. Crucially, deterritorialization takes us from communication – through ‘order-words’ (Deleuze and Parnett, 1987, p. 22), imperatives for others to act – to expression.

#### Prefer our method of education – we foster inclusive norms that promotes better learning and understandings of the world through debate as an activity – our method is not a dogmatic adherence to rules but rather a willingness to break the rules to preserve debate as a space for social change.

Koh 15 HOW DO I REACH THESE KIDS?: AN AFFIRMATION OF POLYVOCAL DEBATE BY BEN KOH & REBAR NIEMI Posted by [NSD\_Update](http://nsdupdate.com/author/nsd_update/) | Sep 15, 2015 <http://nsdupdate.com/2015/how-do-i-reach-these-kids-an-affirmation-of-polyvocal-debate-by-ben-koh-rebar-niemi/>

For as long as there has been debate, there has been the debate about what debate is. We are not against a discussion of what constitutes debate. In fact we are absolutely for it. We argue that this is a crucial debate within debates. The question should not be “what is debate?” The proper question is “what can debate do?” The constitutive feature of debate that we are most abstractly interested in is the precise one that is so often banished by debate pundits – the possibilities of what it can do. We do not yet know what debate can do. All are welcome to accept the challenge of forcing debate into a linear and instrumental framework, but be warned it will certainly fail. Debate is a process and a field, not a mechanism. This is the case for polyvocal debate. Our current definition (which is open to redefinition) is that debate should be thought of as a complex assemblage of voices (the debaters, the judge, audiences, coaches, the authors quoted, and so on), and that it is wrong to limit the possible voices or the possible enunciations of those voices. Debate is always about multiple voices – multiple ways of sensing/expressing. Even non-sense and non-expression have their own voices. This is not a paradigm. It is a hypothesis about the system of relations that co-creates debate. The power and potential of polyvocal debate is not located in some far-off future. It is right here right now, and it is also capable of contact with the outsides of one perspective on time and space. To paraphrase June Tyson – Don’t you know? It’s after the end of the world. Within the system of relations composed by polyvocal debate, we always have the ability to ask “should we believe in something in the first place?” as well as “if we believe it, what are its normative implications?” These questions, in whatever form they take, are some of the most primal elements of debate. Restricting the scope of debate to only some of these questions is a serious loss. More absurd is the justification for restriction based on the value of being able to ask and engage with these questions in the first place. It is wrong to assume that chaos and doubt are bad. It is even worse to argue for a progressive fallacy that chaos and doubt can be removed from debate without debate ceasing to be debate at all. Debate is not soccer, or chess, or playing the trumpet. Perhaps it can do similar things to those activities, but if so it is because it does not feature the limits that define soccer or chess or playing the trumpet. It is apparently very easy to make assumptions about what education is. Most often this is accomplished without citing a single theorist on the subject of education OR a robust understanding of what education could be outside of “commonsensical” assumptions (which are less common and relatable that they initially seem). As we often like to tell our students – read the literature. We call the kind of education that is often assumed “banking-style education” after Paulo Friere. This is the notion that education is about accumulating knowledge. 100 facts are better than 99 facts. People devalue education because they think of it only in these calculated terms. To the banking conception, the end game of education would not be an increase in self-respect, a commitment to social justice, or a development of communication and empathetic powers. It would be the resume statement of “things I’ve learned.” We must not buy into this conception of education. In debate, the collaborative way voices intertwine builds a world of speech and frames it. No debate performance can be perfectly reproduced. The judge’s interpretation and voice are then added. The desire for absolutely objective or procedurally exact judging is a desire for an impossibility. We should not be afraid of the judge’s voice. We recognize it as one among many. Some judges speak loudly and have particular desires. We do not begrudge them this. What is important is that they acknowledge that theirs is only one voice among the many and one way of sensing among all sense and nonsense. It is not a question of excluding the chaos or even controlling it, but understanding the value in hearing the clash of multiple voices. For nowhere else in school are we given the vibrant opportunity to be as real in the academic space as is in debate; where we are able to read multiple arguments from multiple views from multiple bases. We must encourage debate to be an outlet for the chaotic and doubtful elements of our beliefs for it’s an opportunity to bridge debate’s separation from the real world into our own world. Our lives aren’t always smooth unwavering stories. They are often a chaos that is hard to grasp outside the lens of community. Polyvocal debate is inclusive and encouraging of this chaos, of the hard questions and life changing moments of realization. A form of debate that acts as if it can omit doubt is not a true form of debate at all. This isn’t just an argument for “unique educational value” in the banking-sense. Debate should not be thought of as an esoteric extracurricular designed to spice up the resume. Paradigms of debate that stop at the moment of rational justification treat the issue of what world we create for ourselves as an unnecessary step, but this conversation is what must happen in our lives and further what must happen in debate. Polyvocal debate allows for this discussion. We should not just ask “is deontology true” but further “is it good for me to believe in deontology” or util or contractarianism, etc. Rationality cannot be trusted to judge itself, but abandoning logic altogether isn’t necessary just yet. It is too easy to take up one side or the other (only truth matters or only the good matters). Debate is harder. The tenets of logic and justification can create questionable conclusions, and a truly valuable form of debate must allow us to criticize and reevaluate these conclusions to live our lives to the fullest. We must be able to ask if beliefs empower or disempower our lives. We always have the power to ask should we believe it or is it correct, and exercising this capacity is the practice of debate. There are two ways in which we can understand and consider what we ought to believe – what is rationally justifiable, and what is good for us to believe for ourselves. In our lives we cannot just ask “what do I think is true.” We must always end up asking “is it good for me to believe in what I believe?” This is how we must act in our own lives outside of just the debate space. When we are faced with a difficult situation be it in our personal lives, work, etc., we are inevitably going to be confronted with moments of seemingly undeniable hopelessness; where despite our best efforts and our thinking, we cannot justify or rationally see a way to be happy or push ourselves through to the other side. Is it good for me to believe that no matter what I will do, that I will get a bad grade in this class? Is it good for me to believe that I will fail in my work? Is it good for me to believe in hopelessness? Our answer is no. Our answer is that debate helps you learn new questions as well as **new** answers.Again and againwe’ve heard thearticles andarguments that collapseeverything to the old questions**:** education versus fairness,the rules versus innovation and expansion, correct ways of being versus incorrect ones. Bizarrely there are some who like to play with the same questions forever**,** perpetually flipping bits between one and zero, never writing new code. We are tired of these questions. Perhaps they would be enlivened by new voices. Polyvocality is the necessary and explosive generation of new questions. The practice of debate is an educational activity because it is generative and interrogative of voices. Use it for what it’s used for. Education can be praxis – where the abstraction of theory becomes lived abstractness inside the fabric of everyday experience. Where a radical new way of thinking-feeling the world become possible. Where you don’t just learn about quantum physics, but cry at how beautiful the expression of quantum interactions can be and feel blessed to be a part of them, and then teach them to your friends and family. But this is only part of what education is. Education is a becoming that is necessarily political. Often times it is anti-reactionary or anti-conservative, not because it includes some biased political position, but because it is impossible to actually experience learning without it changing you – what you think is right and wrong, what you want to do, and who you think of yourself as. On our view, this makes education necessarily anti-fascist (where fascism is defined as the tendency to over-represent and prefer certain ways of being to others based on normative, intuitive, or ontological claims). No matter your petty political affiliations, too many people in our world must attempt escape everyday, live as targets, suffer, and experience domination. If education is not a force to help us address this, it is not a properly empathetic education. Even if the educational space of debate allows for slightly more opportunities to escape the everyday and find new connections and places to dwell, this is a greater benefit to everyone than any obedience to respectability politics, norms of conduct, or “correct ways of being” could ever achieve. This is how the world works. We should not abandon the cause of empathy just because we can have that elsewhere. It’s not as if we should not care about others at certain times because we do so in others Debate is foundationally about empathy. Arguments are only persuasive in the ability for their to be foster a shared experience of understanding. Judges vote for arguments that have a particular effect on them – the effect of “being convincing.” Arguments that win send the judge on a path of becoming-convinced. In order for this to happen, the debater must actually get through to the judge on some level, whether intuitively, emotively, via rhetoric, the flow, or explanation. The best debating promotes empathy. Not empathy defined by biased terms – empathy defined by actual contact with actual others, perspectives, and ways of expressing oneself. It is not that young people are in need of moral training or must be told what is right and wrong or that debate should erase and conquer disagreement. Rather, it is that we should strive to learn to live with disagreement. For it is too simple and brute to believe in a monovocal system of thought – that your language is the only Rosetta Stone to translate the world through. Debate must be a place to see how to live with ourselves and live among others. If being the better debater means being the worse person, we should NOT endorse this conception of better debating. There is no value to improving a debate related skillset that is not bracketed by being caring and affirming of the world. The argument against education, methodology, and performance debates is that these will somehow sacrifice an essential part of what makes debate debate. This perspective is entirely wrongheaded. What a polyvocal understanding of debate underscores is that what makes debate is multiple voices. Our belief is that it is possible to promote incredible skill, learning, and growth in students and be better debaters while at the same time being better people. Debate is a field where participants of all kinds create real experiences and real change. Students have the ability to speak their individual truths and have real academic and personal conversation about what creates, sustains, and restricts their worlds – and if the current “rules of debate” do not allow for that, we advocate breaking those rules.

#### Strategies of deterritorialization like the aff’s effect on debate space are key to solving capitalism – shown through schizoanalysis as a deterritorialization of normalized forms of critique.

**Deleuze and Guattari 72** (Gilles and Felix, Anti-Oedipus, 1972, p. 244-247) SJCP//JG

Yet it would be a serious error to consider the capitalist flows and the schizophrenic flows as identical, under the general theme of a decoding of the flows of desire. Their affinity is great, to be sure: everywhere capitalism sets in motion schizo-flows that animate "our" arts and "our" sciences, just as they congeal into the production of "our own" sick, the schizophrenics. We have seen that the relationship of schizophrenia to capitalism went far beyond problems of modes of living, environment, ideology, etc., and that it should be examined at the deepest level of one and the same economy, one and the same production process. Our society produces schizos the same way it produces Prell shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that the schizos are not salable. How then does one explain the fact that capitalist production is constantly arresting the schizophrenic process and transforming the subject of the process into a confined clinical entity, as though it saw in this process the image of its own death coming from within? Why does it make the schizophrenic into a sick person not only nominally but in reality? Why does it confine its madmen and madwomen instead of seeing in them its own heroes and heroines, its own fulfillment? And where it can no longer recognize the figure of a simple illness, why does it keep its artists and even its scientists under such close surveillance-as though they risked unleashing flows that would be dangerous for capitalist production and charged with a revolutionary potential, so long as these flows are not co-opted or absorbed by the laws of the market? Why does it form in turn a gigantic machine for social repression-psychic repression, aimed at what nevertheless constitutes its own reality-the decoded flows? The answer-as we have seen-is that capitalism is indeed the limit of all societies, insofar as it brings about the decoding of the flows that the other social formations coded and overcoded. But it is the relative limit of every society; it effects relative breaks, because it substitutes for the codes an extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital as a socius that is deterritorialized, but also a socius that is even more pitiless than any other. Schizophrenia, on the contrary, is indeed the absolute limit that causes the flows to travel in a free state on a desocialized body without organs. Hence one can say that schizophrenia is the exterior limit of capitalism itself or the conclusion of its deepest tendency, but that capitalism only functions on condition that it inhibit this tendency, or that it push back or displace this limit, by substituting for it its own immanent relative limits, which it continually reproduces on a widened scale. It axiomatizes with one hand what it decodes with the other. Such is the way one must reinterpret the Marxist law of the counteracting tendency. With the result that schizophrenia pervades the entire capitalist field from one end to the other. But for capitalism it is a question of binding the schizophrenic charges and energies into a world axiomatic that always opposes the revolutionary potential of decoded flows with new interior limits. And it is impossible in such a regime to distinguish, even in two phases, between decoding and the axiomatization that com es to replace the vanished codes. The flows are decoded and axiomatized by capitalism at the same time. Hence schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its death.

#### Self-continuity is an illusion because our bodies are always already dead and dying. Surrender is key to an embracement of change and becoming.

**Chopra 5** (Deepak, M.D. Chairman and co-founder of the chopra center for wellbeing, The Absolute Break Between Life and Death Is an Illusion, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deepak-chopra/the-absolute-break-betwee_b_4843.html)> SJCP//JG

What bothers people about losing the body is that it seems like a terrible break or interruption. This interruption is imagined as going into the void; it is total personal extinction. Yet that perspective, which arouses huge fears, is limited to the ego. The ego craves continuity; it wants today to feel like an extension of yesterday. Without that thread to cling to, the journey day to day would feel disconnected, or so the ego fears. But how traumatized are you by having a new image come to mind, or a new desire? You dip into the field of infinite possibilities for any new thought, returning with a specific image out of the trillions that could possibly exist. At that moment, you aren’t the person you were a second ago. So, you are clinging to an illusion of continuity. Give it up this moment and you will fulfill St. Paul’s dictum to die unto death. You will realize that you have been discontinuous all along, constantly changing, constantly dipping into the ocean of possibilities to bring forth anything new. Death can be viewed as a total illusion because you are dead already. When you think of who you are in terms of I, me, and mine, you are referring to your past, a time that is dead and gone. Its memories are relics of time passed by. The ego keeps itself intact by repeating what it already knows. Yet life is actually unknown, as it has to be if you are ever to conceive of new thoughts, desires, and experiences. By choosing to repeat the past, you are keeping life from renewing itself. Why wait? You can be as alive as you want to be through a process known as surrender. This is the next step in conquering death. So far the line between life and death has become so blurry that it has almost disappeared. Surrender is the act of erasing the line entirely. When you can see yourself as the total cycle of death within life and the life within death, you have surrendered – the mystic’s most powerful tool against materialism. At the threshold of the one reality, the mystic gives up all need for boundaries and plunges directly into existence. The circle closes, and the mystic experiences himself as the one reality.

#### **Subjectivity is fluid as it forgoes constant differentiation through time which fractures the subject and bases its individuality on affective practice.**

Deleuze 91 (Gilles, “Empiricism and Subjectivity”, p. 17, Translated by Constantin V. Boundas) SJCP//JG

Moreover, the primacy of practice in the correct articulation of the structure-subjectivity resurfaces during Deleuze-Hume's discussion of the actualization of this structure in concrete subjects. The principles of association alone cannot account for the difference between subjects. Only concrete circumstances can explain the facts of differentiation. A differential psychology, as the science of the particular, must therefore reveal these circumstances. Deleuze will then reiterate Hume's position which asserts that subjectivity acquires its form through the principles of association while it is individuated through the principles of passion. Affectivity activates a tendency of the subject making her want to identify with the effects of her actions in all cases where these effects are the result of the means chosen. Once again, therefore, subjectivity is essentially linked with practice, for only a mind endowed with ends, and relations corresponding to these ends, can be a subject. Associationism is the theory of all that is practical, and operates only when harmony between fiction and the principles of passion has been established. It should be obvious, despite the Humean tenor of the discussion, that the stakes are in fact about the practical and speculative interests of human subjects. The intensive, integrative act of the practical interest and its priority over the cognitive-speculative interest make possible the organization of subjectivity. But the peculiarity of the Hume-series is that it posits the subject as an always already "cracked subject." To disclose the cracks in the structure, Deleuze-Hume must direct his attention to the indispensable role that fiction plays in the structuration of the subject and to the constitution of individuality. The subject, as we have seen, is the product of the principles of human nature; but then the mind, or the given, is the product of the powers of nature. Under these terms, the combined labor of passioned intensity and of the extensive use of associative principles would be spent in vain, as long as no firm relation has been established between the principles of human nature and the principles of nature.

#### Impacts – [a] ethics are constrained by subjecthood – all ethical discussions must begin with an assertion of the properties of the subject, thus only an ethic that takes into account the plurality of subjecthood can effectively prescribe action [b] stable subjectivity makes critique impossible since it takes empirical features and treats it as a model, which provides no place for contestation and [c] every negation is just a reconfiguration of a set of relationships of differences. It doesn’t in truth deny those relations, it just affirms them in a different way. There is a multiplicity of “yes’” from which we shape a no, which means even if there is no logical conclusion from this, then only affirmation is true.

#### Affect can be passive or active, and any denial of pursuing affect increases internal ressentiment – that requires an ethical reorientation.

Hardt 14 Michael Hardt, 2014, “the power to be affected,” doi: 10.1007/s10767-014-9191-x //SJBE

All affects can be either active (that is, caused internally) or passive (caused externally). Indeed one advantage of using “affect” instead of the more colloquial “emotion” or “feeling” to translate Spinoza’s Latin term “affectus” is that it highlights the causes and effects of actions by and upon us. Once the causes are revealed, the project becomes to shift from passive to active affections, from external to internal causes. The reason to prefer active over passive does not reside in the experience of the affect, which does not change depending on cause or source. A passive affection, Deleuze explains, “does not express its cause, that is to say, the nature or essence of the external body: rather, it indicates the present constitution of our own body, and so the way in which our power to be affected is filled at that moment” (1992, pp. 219–220, translation modified). Just like passive affections, active affections too indicate the present constitution of our body. The crucial difference is really a temporal one and regards duration and repetition. We need the ability to select, as Nietzsche would say, in order to extend and repeat those encounters and affects that are beneficial and prevent those that are detrimental. The repetition of passive affections is completely out of our control. Some random encounters, of course, do bring us joy, but that passes quickly if we cannot make them last or repeat them. And most random encounters, unfortunately, result in sadness. If we leave this to hazard, we will stay stuck with no way forward. “As long as you don’t know what is the power to be affected of a body, as long as you understand it like that, in chance encounters, you will not have a wise life, you will not have wisdom” (1978 “L’affect et l’idée”). The great advantage of the active over the passive affection is that it is no longer dependent on the vagaries of external forces. Since the body causes itself to be affected, chance is removed and it is able to control the duration and repetition of encounters. The issue, then, is not only understanding and expanding your power to be affected but also augmenting proportion of that power that is filled with active rather than passive affections. This notion of active affection could appear obscure or, worse, moralistic if not linked to Spinoza’s definition of bodies (and, ultimately, subjects). From his perspective, there is no basic or default unitary body. “A body,” Spinoza explains, “is constituted by the relation among its parts” (1985 Ethics, IV P39 dem), and the number and constitution of those parts is changeable. We need to shift perspective so as no longer to consider a body as an entity (or even a cluster of entities) but instead as a relation. When a new relation is added, a larger body is composed, and when a relation is broken, the body diminishes or decomposes. All this simply means that the border between the inside and outside of bodies, and hence between internal and external causes, is fluid and subject to our efforts. In order for a passive affection to become an active one, then, it is not necessary for the body that previously experienced the effect of an external body somehow to cut off that relationship and learn to become itself the cause. The body instead can, under certain conditions, envelop the cause—this is the term Deleuze uses—by creating a relation with it or, really, by expanding the relation that constitutes the body. You only gain the knowledge of when these conditions exist through encounters with others: every encounter reveals the extent to which the relations that constitute your body agree with or are “composable” with those of another. And a joyful encounter always indicates that there is something in common to discover. “We must, then,” Deleuze explains, “by the aid of joyful passions, form the idea of what is common to some external body and our own” (1992, p. 283). Once we recognize those common relations, we can compose a new, greater body, which contains the cause of our joy. The cause, then, does not really change. It simply becomes internal—annexed, as it were, by the affected body. The real change is the border between inside and outside and hence the composition of the body. Once the cause is internal and the affection is active, then you are no longer subject to chance: the affect can be prolonged and repeated as long as it brings you joy.8 The practical project to transform passive into active affections thus ultimately involves a strategy of bonds and relations to maintain or transform the constitution of the body. The advice, if Spinoza were your therapist, could be as simple as this: first, discover your body’s power to be affected and the affects that compose it, and, then, if an encounter with someone or something results in joy, form a relationship with it, make it part of you, and transform the passive affection into an active one so that you can repeat the encounter or make it last until the joy no longer results. You have to recognize that you are not a fixed entity but a bundle of relations and your task is to compose new joyful relations and decompose sad ones. Increasing the proportion of active affections does not primarily mean becoming the cause, at least not in a direct way. The bad therapist is the one who simply berates you to take control of your life as if it were an act of sovereign will. Instead you must discover joyful encounters and then make the passive affection into an active one by forming a consistent relation with the cause, thereby enveloping the cause with a new relation that constitutes us as a new body.