## Off

### T

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not advocate for specific governments

#### “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” in the res – means that you have to prove the resolution true as a whole, not in a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. *A beagle* makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) *refers to all members of that class*

#### Violation: they spec China

#### Standards:

#### [1] precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### [2] limits – there are over 150+ governments in the world, explodes limits since there are tons of independent affs plus functionally infinite combinations, all with different advantages in different political situations like Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Holy See, Liechtenstein, Palau, all with less than 100k people-- Kills neg prep and debatability since there are no DAs that apply to every aff. K2 fairness because if there are infinite limits for the aff I can never predict what they’ll advocate for.

**DTD to deter future abuse**

#### CI cause reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge internation

#### No RVIs--- a – illogical you shouldn’t win for being fair b – debates will be forced to go to theory which kills substance if they wanna check abuse or c – theory is chilled which kills norms

#### Neg theory 1st---aff abuse happened first so it’s lexically prior and has more magnitude since it pre-determined my 1nc strat which affects the entire round

## Off

### K—cap

#### Capitalism causes massive violence and inevitable extinction – the role of the ballot is to endorse the best organizational tactics.

Escalante 19 [Alyson Escalante, M.A., Department of Philosophy @ University of Oregon, “Truth and Practice: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge,” 09/08/19, tinyurl.com/8jksnexs] pat

The world we live in today is in a dire state. Climate destruction continues at a fast pace, and every with every passing day, capitalism proves itself to be incapable of addressing this. Capitalist production and its endless drive for resources to match artificial market demands has created a climate crisis that leaves us on the brink of potential extinction.

Governments around the world are turning to far right and fascist leaders to assuage their fears of an uncertain future, and the most marginalized and oppressed suffer because of it. Fascism is on the rise, and history tells us very clearly what that can result in without opposition.

The decaying US empire continues to lash out in violence across the globe in a desperate attempt to re-assert its power and hegemony. Whole countries are destroyed in its desperate bids for more fossil fuels. The world burns from America’s white phosphorus weaponry.

The need for a revolutionary movement capable of replacing capitalism with something better has never been so clear. The choice between socialism or barbarism has never been so stark. More and more people are starting to realize that reform cannot save us, that capitalism and imperialism themselves are the problem, and that we must unite and band together to fight for a better world.

The question then is: how will we know what strategies, what tactics, and what ideas to unite around? If the skeptics and postmodernists are correct that knowledge is always relative and localized, then we cannot built a global and universal strategy to unite around. If they are correct then we are doomed to small acts of localized or individual resistance in the face of apocalypse. To embrace such a vision of the world (with its accompanying epistemological skepticism) is to embrace defeat.

The masses do not want to embrace defeat, they want to know how to fight back. Marxism can provide the tools necessary to engage in that fight.

Marxism, with its self criticism and its insistence on incorporating the valuable ideas of its critics has created a means for unifying workers across the globe with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. The Marxist belief in the possibility of true ideas, tested and verified in practice, creates the possibility for unity on a global scale. The scientific status of Marxism means that as our climate changes, as our world looks more and more grim, Marxism will adapt through struggle and practice; it will provide us with the ideas and tools we need to fight and win.

There will be no victory for the workers of the world without the ability to wield a revolutionary science. What is at stake in questions of Marxist epistemology is the very possibility of creating a philosophical and scientific basis for revolution. We must defend this possibility. We must defend the scientific status of Marxism, and must insist on the possibility of victory.

#### The affirmation of the right to strike as something to be recognized places the energy that drives class struggle into containment, rendering the right conditional.

Marc Crépon & Micol Bez 19; Marc Crépon is a French philosopher and academic who writes on the subject of languages and communities in the French and German philosophies and contemporary political and moral philosophy. Micol Bez @ CPES (Cycle Pluridisciplinaire d’Études Supérieures) at the University of Paris Sciences and Letters. The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin's “Toward the Critique of Violence”. Critical Times 1 August 2019; 2 (2): 252–260. <https://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article/2/2/252/141479/The-Right-to-Strike-and-Legal-War-in-Walter> brett

In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war.

Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles. We might consider this to be the perfect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of questioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider

First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benjamin dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class struggles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The difference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed unconditionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.”

The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to contain class struggles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means. On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, after claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufficient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that justifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) left once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufficient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufficient rationale, allowing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support.

The second conflict of interpretation concerns what is at stake in the strike. For the state, the strike implies a withdrawal or act of defiance vis-à-vis the employer, while for the workers it is a means of pressuring, if not of blackmail or even of “hostage taking.” The diference is thus between an act of suspension (which can be considered nonviolent) and one of extortion (which includes violence). Does this mean that “pure means” are not free of ambiguity, and that there can be no nonviolent action that does not include a residue of violence? It is not clear that Benjamin’s text allows us to go this far. Nevertheless, the problem of pure means, approached through the notion of the right to strike, raises the following question: Could it be that the text “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” which we are accustomed to reading as a text on violence, deals in fact with the possibility and ambiguity of nonviolence?

The opposition between the aforementioned conflicts of interpretation manifests itself in Benjamin’s excursus on the revolutionary strike, and specifically in the opposition between the political strike and the proletarian general strike, and in the meaning we should attribute to the latter. As previously discussed, the state will never admit that the right to strike is a right to violence. Its interpretative strategy consists in denying, as much as possible, the effective exercise of the right that it theoretically grants. Under these conditions, the function of the revolutionary strike is to return the strike to its true meaning; in other words, to return it to its own violence. In this context, the imperative is to move beyond idle words: a call to strike is a call to violence. This is the reason why such a call is regularly met with a violent reaction from the state, because trade unions force the state to recognize what it is trying to ignore, what it pretends to have solved by recognizing the right to strike: the irreducible violence of class struggles. This means that the previously discussed alternative between “suspension” and “extortion” is valid only for the political strike—in other words, for a strike whose primary vocation is not, contrary to that of the proletarian general strike, to revolt against the law itself. Essentially, the idea of a proletarian general strike, its myth (to borrow Sorel’s words), is to escape from this dichotomous alternative that inevitably reproduces and perpetuates the violence of domination.

#### Vote neg to join the party – dual power organizing is the only path to revolutionary change.

Escalante ‘18

[Alyson, philosophy at U of Oregon. 08/24/2018. “Against Electoralism, For Dual Power!” <https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/>] pat

I am sure that at this point, the opportunists reading this have already begun to type out their typical objection: the world is different than it was in 1917, and the conditions of the United States in no way echo the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve revolutionary success.

To this tried and true objection, there is one simple answer: you are entirely correct, and that is why we need to abandon electoralism and working within the bourgeois state.

What were the conditions which allowed the Bolsheviks to successfully revolt? The conditions were that of Dual Power. Alongside the capitalist state, there existed a whole set of institutions and councils which met the needs of the workers. The soviets, a parallel socialist government made up of individual councils, successfully took over many governmental responsibilities in some parts of Petrograd. In the radical Viborg district, the Bolshevik controlled soviets provided government services like mail, alongside programs that could meet the needs of workers. When a far right coup was attempted against the provisional government, it was troops loyal to the Bolshevik factions within the soviet who repelled the coup plotters, proving concretely to the workers of Petrograd that the socialists could not only provide for their needs, but also for their defense.

In short: the Bolsheviks recognized that instead of integrating into the bourgeois state, they could operate outside of it to build dual power. They could establish programs of elected representatives who would serve the workers. They would not bolster the capitalist state in the name of socialism, they would offer an alternative to it.

And so, when the time came for revolt, the masses were already to loyal to the Bolsheviks. The only party who had never compromised, who had denounced the unpopular imperialist wars, who had rejected the provisional government entirely, was the party who successfully gained the support of the workers.

And so, many of us on the more radical fringes of the socialist movement wonder why it is the the DSA and other socialist opportunists seem to think that we can win by bolstering the capitalist state? We wonder, given this powerful historical precedent, why they devote their energy to getting more Ocasios elected; what good does one more left democrat who will abandon the workers do for us?

The answer we receive in return is always the same: we want to win small changes that will make life for the workers easier; we want to protect food stamps and healthcare.

And do this, we reply: what makes you think reformism is the only way to do this. When the bourgeois state in California was happy to let black children go to school unfed, the Black Panthers didn’t rally around democratic candidates, they became militant and fed the children themselves. In the 40s and 50s, socialists in New York saw people going without healthcare and instead of rallying behind democratic candidates, they built the IWO to provide healthcare directly. Both these groups took up our pressing revolutionary task: building dual power.

Imagine if all those hours the DSA poured into electing Ocasio were instead used to feed the people of New York, to provide them with medical care, to ensure their needs were met. Imagine the masses seeing socialism not as a pipe dream we might achieve through electing more imperialists, but as a concrete movement which is currently meeting their needs?

The fact is, we are not nearly ready for revolution. Socialists in the United States have failed to meet the needs of the people, and as long as their only concrete interaction with the masses is handing them a voter registration form, they will continue to fail the people. Our task now is not to elect representatives to advocate for the people; it is much more gruelingly laborious than that. Our task is to serve the people. Our task is to build dual power.

The movement to do this is underway. Members of the DSA refoundation caucus have begun to move the left of the DSA in this direct, socialist groups like Philly Socialists have begun to build dual power through GED programs and tenants unions, many branches of the Party For Socialism and Liberation have begun to feed the people and provide for their concrete needs, and Red Guard collectives in Los Angeles have built serve the people programs and taken on a stance of militant resistance to gentrification. The movement is growing, its time is coming, and dual power is achievable within our life time.

The opportunists are, in a sense, correct. We are not where we were in 1917, but we can begin to move in that direction and dual power can take us there. In order to achieve dual power we have to recognize that Lenin was right: there will be no socialist gains by working within state institutions designed to crush socialism. Furthermore, we must recognize that the strategies of the electoral opportunists trade off with dual power. Electing candidates drains resources, time, and energy away from actually serving the people.

And so, we should commit to undertake the difficult and dangerous task of building dual power. We must reject opportunism, we must name the democratic party as our enemy, we must rally around power directly in the hands of the socialist movement. We do not have a parallel system of soviets in the United States. We can change that. Someday the cry “all power to the soviets” will be heard again. Lets make it happen.

## Case

### No uniqueness

#### China decline inevitable—resource depletion, demographics, mass debt

Brands and Beckley 9-24 Hal Brands [Henry Kissinger distinguished professor of global affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. Henry Kissinger distinguished professor of global affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. ], Michael Beckley [associate professor of political science at Tufts University, a Jeane Kirkpatrick visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and the author of Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower. ], 9-24-2021, "China Is a Declining Power—and That’s the Problem," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great-power-united-states/> // ella

From the 1970s to the 2000s, China was nearly self-sufficient in food, water, and energy resources. It enjoyed the greatest demographic dividend in history, with 10 working-age adults for every senior citizen aged 65 or older. (For most major economies, the average is closer to 5 working-age adults for every senior citizen.) China had a secure geopolitical environment and easy access to foreign markets and technology, all underpinned by friendly relations with the United States. And China’s government skillfully harnessed these advantages by carrying out a process of economic reform and opening while also moving the regime from stifling totalitarianism under former Chinese leader Mao Zedong to a smarter—if still deeply repressive—form of authoritarianism under his successors. China had it all from the 1970s to the early 2010s—just the mix of endowments, environment, people, and policies needed to thrive. Since the late 2000s, however, the drivers of China’s rise have either stalled or turned around entirely. For example, China is running out of resources: Water has become scarce, and the country is importing more energy and food than any other nation, having ravaged its own natural resources. Economic growth is therefore becoming costlier: According to data from DBS Bank, it takes three times as many inputs to produce a unit of growth today as it did in the early 2000s. China is also approaching a demographic precipice: From 2020 to 2050, it will lose an astounding 200 million working-age adults—a population the size of Nigeria—and gain 200 million senior citizens. The fiscal and economic consequences will be devastating: Current projections suggest China’s medical and social security spending will have to triple as a share of GDP, from 10 percent to 30 percent, by 2050 just to prevent millions of seniors from dying of impoverishment and neglect. To make matters worse, China is turning away from the package of policies that promoted rapid growth. Under Xi, Beijing has slid back toward totalitarianism. Xi has appointed himself “chairman of everything,” destroyed any semblance of collective rule, and made adherence to “Xi Jinping thought” the ideological core of an increasingly rigid regime. And he has relentlessly pursued the centralization of power at the expense of economic prosperity. State zombie firms are being propped up while private firms are starved of capital. Objective economic analysis is being replaced by government propaganda. Innovation is becoming more difficult in a climate of stultifying ideological conformity. Meanwhile, Xi’s brutal anti-corruption campaign has deterred entrepreneurship, and a wave of politically driven regulations has erased more than $1 trillion from the market capitalization of China’s leading tech firms. Xi hasn’t simply stopped the process of economic liberalization that powered China’s development: He has thrown it hard into reverse. The economic damage these trends are causing is starting to accumulate—and it is compounding the slowdown that would have occurred anyway as a fast-growing economy matures. The Chinese economy has been losing steam for more than a decade: The country’s official growth rate declined from 14 percent in 2007 to 6 percent in 2019, and rigorous studies suggest the true growth rate is now closer to 2 percent. Worse, most of that growth stems from government stimulus spending. According to data from the Conference Board, total factor productivity declined 1.3 percent every year on average between 2008 and 2019, meaning China is spending more to produce less each year. This has led, in turn, to massive debt: China’s total debt surged eight-fold between 2008 and 2019 and exceeded 300 percent of GDP prior to COVID-19. Any country that has accumulated debt or lost productivity at anything close to China’s current pace has subsequently suffered at least one “lost decade” of near-zero economic growth.

### AT Ministrikes

#### Ministrikes are tolerated by the CCP and are effective.

Dean 7-20 [James Dean, 7-20-2021, "Takeout couriers in China quietly strike ‘under the radar’," Cornell Chronicle, <https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2021/07/takeout-couriers-china-quietly-strike-under-radar> [accessed: 10-30-21] lydia

Small-scale. Short-lived. All digital. Out of public view. That’s how a new form of collective worker resistance is unfolding in a fast-growing segment of China’s gig economy – app-based food delivery – despite setbacks to the broader labor movement resulting from a changing and slowing economy and stepped-up repression, new Cornell research finds. Though highly fragmented and not always successful, “ministrikes” by small groups of food couriers – conducted not with pickets and bullhorns, but quietly via WeChat – reflect a new form of leverage enabled by platform business models, suggest Chuxuan “Victoria” Liu ’21 and [Eli Friedman](https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/people/eli-friedman), associate professor and chair of the Department of International and Comparative Labor in the ILR School. “Food couriers are able to maintain complete physical invisibility, and each individual worker can ‘strike’ from anywhere,” they write in “[Resistance Under the Radar: Organization of Work and Collective Action in China’s Food Delivery Industry](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/714292),” published in the July issue of The China Journal. The scholars interviewed more than 60 couriers, in person and online, who delivered food for Ele.me, an Alibaba-owned company that controlled nearly half the nation’s food-delivery market. Through those workers, she gained access to local and national WeChat groups where food deliverers share information. Platform-based delivery work has grown exponentially over the past decade as China’s economy has undergone a massive reorganization away from manufacturing and toward technology, services and logistics. In 2020, Ele.me and Meituan, a slightly larger competitor, together had more than 8 million registered food-delivery couriers, the result of rapid growth achieved in part through exploitative working conditions, according to the researchers. Amid increasing government crackdowns and online surveillance constraining expressions of labor unrest in recent years, Friedman said, scholars have wondered whether high levels of worker dissatisfaction seen in manufacturing would appear in this new sector. Their research determined that it has – if you know where to look. In addition to crowdsourced freelance couriers who work individually, Ele.me relies on a network of subcontractors that operate “stations” within city districts to provide restaurants with more reliable delivery services. Like the workers themselves, the app rewards or punishes stations financially based on metrics including numbers of deliveries, worker attendance, on-time performance and customer ratings. That pressure on stations creates bargaining power for couriers who may choose to stay offline during peak lunch and dinner times, making themselves unavailable for deliveries, the researchers found. “Simply by refusing to log into the system,” they wrote, “a handful of couriers can cause considerable damage to the station’s statistics.” A ministrike at a Shanghai station illustrates an attempt at such resistance. Just before noon, a food deliverer upset about being fined encouraged colleagues to strike, and eight stayed offline. The courier created a WeChat group where the workers aired complaints and negotiated with several managers, an action that concluded before lunch was over. Though it won only minor concessions, the event showed how quickly workers can organize small strikes through WeChat, the scholars wrote, engaging in a new type of collective action that appears to be widespread and is capable of bigger victories, like pay raises. Crowdsourced couriers not employed by stations may also engage in ministrikes, the research found, but coordination is more difficult because they are so widely dispersed. Significantly, the government is either unable to monitor such small-scale labor resistance or tolerates it, since it causes minimal social disruption and appears apolitical, targeted primarily at platform subcontractors. “We’ve seen in the last few years that any kind of collective, coordinated action in China – for all kinds of activists – is really dangerous,” Friedman said. “This refines our understanding of the way public protest can work in light of that new, highly repressive environment, and the role digital media can play in fomenting that kind of action, even on a small scale.” Food couriers resemble industrial workers in their grievances and their generally defensive posture due to limited contractual and legal protections, according to the researchers. But their strikes, initiated by logging out of an app, are distinctive for their very small numbers, short duration and concealed nature, the authors wrote, revealing “one of the ways that labor unrest has evolved alongside shifting political, economic and technological conditions.”

### AT: Taiwan War

#### No China-Taiwan war—dependency and cost

EIU 6-16, Economic Intelligence [the sister company to The Economist newspaper. Created in 1946, we have over 70 years’ experience in helping businesses, financial firms and governments to navigate the ever-changing global landscape. ], 6-16-2021, “Is war between China and Taiwan inevitable”, <https://www.eiu.com/n/is-war-between-china-and-taiwan-inevitable/> // ella

While tensions across the Taiwan Strait have intensified, a direct Chinese military assault on Taiwan remains very unlikely. The potential cost of any such operation continues to outweigh the benefits for the Chinese leadership. Risk factors that could trigger Chinese military escalation include any perceived steps towards either a declaration of Taiwanese independence or the formalisation of US‑Taiwan ties. There is also a risk of increased Chinese incursion into Taiwan’s claimed territory leading to an accidental clash that proves difficult to defuse. China’s strategy remains one of increasing strategic and economic pressure on Taiwan, with a view to forcing negotiations over unification—but under its terms. With conditions for such an occurrence still far away, the cross-Strait status quo is likely to hold. In early April China dispatched 25 jets into Taiwan’s air-defence identification zone (ADIZ), in its largest incursion in a year. Those drills reflect a sharp deterioration in cross-Strait relations, which have included several years of Chinese punitive economic measures—the latest (in February) being a ban on imported Taiwanese pineapples, over alleged pest concerns. China’s intimidation has come amid a warming of US‑Taiwan ties, raising questions over whether the three sides are spiralling towards conflict. An attempt to take Taiwan by force remains very unlikely We nevertheless continue to expect China to refrain from purposefully initiating a direct conflict with Taiwan. China’s president, Xi Jinping, is sometimes described as seeing cross-Strait unification as a legacy issue, and one to facilitate the indefinite extension of his own term in power. In addition to political factors, Taiwan holds economic assets that could be valuable for China, including its cutting-edge semiconductor production capacity. Capturing such assets could potentially help China to accelerate its chip self-sufficiency goals. However, the potential costs of a move to take Taiwan by military force significantly outweigh the benefits for China. While the cross-Strait balance of military power tilts significantly in favour of China, it would still be a highly risky operation. The US retains a position of strategic ambiguity in relation to Taiwan’s defence, but we believe that it would intervene militarily to support Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression. US regional security partners, such as Japan and Australia, could also have some level of involvement. Alongside Taiwan’s own defence capabilities, this would mean that a Chinese attack would involve significant cost and would risk failure. Even if China took Taiwan militarily, it would subsequently face international isolation as at least Western, democratic countries implemented reprisal measures, including sanctions and (potentially) trade embargos. This would have a significant economic cost for China and upset its development and global leadership plans. The integration of Taiwan into China’s governance structures would also be a daunting task, and Chinese authorities would probably have to contend with a restive and potentially rebellious local population. A devastating military conflict would probably also risk wiping out Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, through either collateral damage or deliberate self-sabotage, thus eliminating the perceived economic or technological benefits of an invasion. At the very least, disruption to Taiwanese manufacturing clusters, infrastructure, logistics networks and talent bases would inevitably shock the island’s industry, while US economic reprisals could include export controls targeting Taiwanese fabrication plants that fall under Chinese control. For such reasons, a direct attack remains a very unlikely course of action, despite the presence of some political and economic drivers.

#### Turn – Growth makes it more likely

**Jones 07** [Alexandra, Master of Strategic Affairs (Distinction) from the Australian National University; “Responding to the Rise of China,” Security Challenges, 3.1 Feb, http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol3no1Jones.pdf]

Although dwarfed by the US defence budget of more than $400 billion and by advanced US military technologies, Chinese military capabilities are growing faster than those of any other Asian nation. Unknown due to the secrecy surrounding China’s military; its defence budget is estimated to be $65 billion, placing China second or third in the world in overall defence spending.44 Western manufacturers have maintained an embargo on military sales to China since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, although some European countries are considering lifting the ban at some point in the future. In the 1990s, China shifted from an emphasis on selfreliance to purchasing large numbers of advanced Russian equipment and technology, to the tune of $2 billion per year, to improve its power-projection capabilities, particularly in the maritime environment.45 China is also modernising and increasing its number of intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs] and developing its own jet fighters and nuclear attack submarines. China’s military modernisation is giving priority to diminishing the American conventional military advantage in Asia and enhancing Chinese options in relation to Taiwan. Much of the modern equipment from Russian as well as Chinese production has been deployed to prevent Taiwanese moves toward independence and to deter the US from intervening. China is also increasing the number and sophistication of its nuclear weapons at a time when US and Russian stockpiles are decreasing. China’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related technologies to countries such as Pakistan, Iran, North Korea and Libya has been a major source of tension between the US and China. While China has made some efforts to combat proliferation, including publishing regulations governing the export of Chinese missile technology, the US has imposed a number of sanctions on state-owned Chinese companies for transferring strategically significant technologies. Finally, China is developing and expanding its space technology. It has become a major political symbol of Chinese nationalism, an important economic sector and an effective dual-use technology for the military.46 The civilian space program, for example, has contributed to improving the ICBM program. This has serious implications for the US since space capabilities play an integral role in almost all aspects of US military operations. Assessments of the dangers posed by the Chinese build-up vary. The US Defense Department is concerned that planning is focused on a surprise attack against Taiwan that would succeed before the US could intervene.47 The Council for Foreign Relations (CFR) predicted that China will probably overtake Japan as the major regional military power in the next decade or two. It also suggested that the Chinese build-up in air and sea power will require a continued robust US naval and air presence to offset the ability of China to leverage future military capabilities into a real advantage against US and allied interests in the Asia Pacific region. The CFR warns that China may use force over Taiwan even if the balance appeared to favour the US and Taiwan. Although US forces would ultimately prevail, Chinese forces “might be able to impose serious risks and costs on the U.S. military.”48 While the US can be relatively confident in its ability to offset China’s rising military power, China’s neighbours such as Taiwan, Japan and India, are concerned about China’s military advances. Smaller neighbours, especially in Southeast Asia, are wary about China’s ambitions and have taken a lowkey approach to avoid antagonising it, while encouraging its economic dynamism and diplomatic innovations. As a hedge, they continue to welcome America’s long-term regional strategic engagement.49 The Future of the US-China Relationship Continued strong economic growth, combined with rising nationalism and confidence, could lead China to **translate its economic weight into military might**. It could use its national power to attempt to dictate the terms of foreign security and economic interactions with its trading partners and neighbours. This **could include coercing Taiwan into reunification** with the mainland. Moreover it could become an open regional rival, challenging the legitimacy of a US-dominated regional system and proposing its own alternative with the support of other states in the region. In response, the US would likely shift from engagement with China to more active confrontation and containment. This could include strengthening bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea and directing them far more explicitly at China.

### AT: Central Asia

### AT: South Asia

#### OBOR fails to solve Indo-Pak war---India thinks it’s a unilateral initiative to bolster Chinese hegemony and also isn’t even in it!

Singh 19 [Kanwal Deepinder Pal; August 20, 2019; Professor & Dean, University School of Law and Legal Studies, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi, India; Journal of National Law University Delhi, “Strength and Challenges of OBOR Initiative: Indian Perspective” <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2277401719857865>] brett

Indian Perspective on OBOR India has stayed away from the OBOR citing sovereignty, procedural and leadership issues. CPEC, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), is the main reason for India’s non-participation. It is felt that China must be sensitive to India’s claims over PoK. India has also expressed concern about agreements on infrastructure projects and debt repayment method that should be transparent. China’s claim to usher ‘new type of international relations’ and build partnerships over alliances opens the door for manoeuvrability. Maritime understanding with Sri Lanka, the sale of eight submarines to Pakistan, increase of facilities at Gwadar port and building of a base in Djibouti in Africa are certain decisions that impact India35 and are interpreted as China’s unconcealed ambition for hegemony. India has doubts regarding an initiative that appears rather glorious on paper. The funding of BRI remains largely undefined, while Chinese foreign banks such as Exim Bank of China and China Development Bank now anticipate default when certain countries have financially overextended themselves. It also appears to be a sort of utopian vision, for it requires cooperation between governments, businesses and civil society. Chinese financial institutions may not want to take a risk, as the rates of return are still unclear. India has two main objections. The first objection is with respect to the CPEC—a flagship project under OBOR between Xinjiang in China and Gwadar in Balochistan that goes through PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan. Second, India looks at it as a unilateral Chinese initiative. India also takes it as an attack on its sovereignty. India supports regional cooperation, but it also has hegemonic ambitions. It fears that Gwadar could become a Chinese naval base. India expects China to promote constructive participation of all countries and organisations. It looks towards an environment-friendly, stable and sustainable global economy. Many in the Indian establishment view OBOR as a unilateral national initiative by China rather than Asian economic development.36 India looks to China to define stakeholders, goals and projects better. Continuity of economic growth is not certain, therefore the investment risks also need to be discussed. India also wants China to resolve existing disputes with neighbours so that economic development can be pursued as a common goal. India wants the pursuance of economic goal with a focus on cooperation.37 India feels that the promise of loans and development partnerships is being used over political independence and sovereignty. India may not succumb to this lure, but many neighbours have bad loans and India fears that it will be used for strategic leverage. India views China’s investments in Kashmir as a violation of its sovereignty and sees other projects as ways to limit India’s rise as a global power. India argues that connectivity in Asia must be consultative, financially transparent and respectful towards sovereignty. It feels that China aims to use trade investments politically and expects that norms of connectivity and security should abide by the well-established principles of international law to promote the free and open Indo-Pacific region.38

### 1NC – China Growth

#### Chinese growth causes massive species extinction in China—it’s a global biodiversity hotspot—extinction

Nagle 9 [John Copeland, prof at Notre Dame Law School, “The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law,” Spring, 24 J. Land Use & Envtl. Law 203]

China offers the best and the worst of biodiversity protection. China is a vast, varied nation that hosts an incredible range of ecosystems and species. "China's biodiversity ranks eighth in the world and first in the northern hemisphere." n67 Over 100,000 species of animals and nearly 33,000 plant species exist in 460 different types of ecosystems. Those ecosystems include forests, grasslands, deserts, wetlands, seas and coastal areas, and agricultural ecosystems. China hosts 212 different types of bamboo forests alone. China also has an unusual number of ancient and relic species because of its protection from historic geologic events such as the movement of glaciers. Most famously, it is the only home of the giant panda, the symbol of many efforts to protect biodiversity throughout the world today. Such species and ecosystem diversity is complemented by an unsurpassed collection of genetic diversity. "The richness of China's cultivated plants and domestic animals are incomparable in the world. Not only did many plants and animals on which human survival depend originate in China, but it also retains large numbers of their wild prototypes and relatives." n68 A 2005 report estimated that China's biodiversity is valued at nearly five hundred billion dollars. n69 China is also the home for more than 1.25 billion people. The rapid economic growth that China has experienced since 1980 strains the nation's ability to preserve ecosystems, species, and genetic resources. But the biodiversity of China has encountered countless threats for thousands of years, including the cultivation of more and more land for agriculture and the consequences of numerous wars. During the Great Leap Forward of 1958 to 1960, [\*216] Mao Zedong targeted the "Four Pests": rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes. The attack on sparrows enlisted schoolchildren to knock down nests and to beat gongs so that the sparrows could not find a place to rest. Only after sparrows were virtually eliminated throughout China did the country's leaders recognize the value of the birds in controlling insects. China faces many of the same threats as biodiversity in other countries, with the notable addition of the country's notorious air pollution. Habitat loss is the biggest threat to biodiversity in China. As in many other countries, rapid economic development and continued population growth exert relentless pressure on previously undeveloped areas that offered habitat to a diversity of wildlife and plants. The overgrazing of rangelands, erosion, and the adverse effects of tourism and mining further compromise the condition of ecosystems and species throughout China.

### AT: Regional Economic Influence

#### Increased influence leads to increased militarization---makes conflict more likely.

**Haass 17**

Richard Haass (President of the Council on Foreign Relations). “Who Will Fill America’s Shoes?” Project Syndicate. June 21st, 2017. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/global-leadership-successor-to-america-by-richard-n--haass-2017-06

Still, a shift away from a US-dominated world of structured relationships and standing institutions and toward something else is under way. What this alternative will be, however, remains largely unknowable. What we do know is that there is no alternative great power willing and able to step in and assume what had been the US role. China is a frequently mentioned candidate, but its leadership is focused mostly on consolidating domestic order and maintaining artificially high economic-growth rates to stave off popular unrest. China’s interest in regional and global institutions seems designed mostly to bolster its economy and geopolitical influence, rather than to help set rules and create broadly beneficial arrangements. Likewise, Russia is a country with a narrowly-based economy led by a government focused on retaining power at home and re-establishing Russian influence in the Middle East and Europe. India is preoccupied with the challenge of economic development and is tied down by its problematic relationship with Pakistan. Japan is held back by its declining population, domestic political and economic constraints, and its neighbors’ suspicions. Europe, for its part, is distracted by questions surrounding the relationship between member states and the European Union. As a result, the whole of the continent is less than the sum of its parts – none of which is large enough to succeed America on the world stage. But the absence of a single successor to the US does not mean that what awaits is chaos. At least in principle, the world’s most powerful countries could come together to fill America’s shoes. In practice, though, this will not happen, as these countries lack the capabilities, experience, and, above all, a consensus on what needs doing and who needs to do it. A more likely development is the emergence of a mix of order and disorder at both the regional and global level. China will promote various trade, infrastructure, and security mechanisms in Asia. The 11 remaining members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership may launch their trade pact without the US. Less clear is whether China is prepared to use its influence to restrain North Korea, how India and Pakistan will avoid conflict, and the resolution of Asia’s many territorial disputes. It is all too easy to imagine an Asian and Pacific future characterized by higher spending on arms of all types – and thus more susceptible to violent conflict. The Middle East is already suffering unprecedented instability, the result of local rivalries and realities, and of 15 years during which the US arguably first did too much and then too little to shape the region’s future. The immediate danger is not just further deterioration in failed states such as Yemen, Syria, and Libya, but also direct conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

### 1NC – Chinese soft power

#### Chinese soft power destroys democracy.

Kurlantzick 06 [Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , June 2006 , " China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power ,", <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf> [accessed 10-30-21] lydia

But in some ways China’s soft power could prove disastrous for Southeast Asia— for democratization, for anticorruption initiatives, and for good governance. China has already begun to export its own poor labor, political, and environmental policies. In northern Burma, Chinese government-linked companies contribute to widespread deforestation, and China has shown little interest in Southeast Asian nations’ concerns about the environmental impact of dams on China’s upper portion of the Mekong River. Instead China has refused to join the Mekong River Commission, the organization monitoring the river. Meanwhile China’s support for authoritarian regimes in Cambodia and Burma forestalls democratization or at least better governance in those nations. In Cambodia opposition politicians complain of Chinese support for the ruling party, and journalists report that when they write about subjects displeasing to China—like Taiwan—the embassy harasses them. In Burma China’s aid packages and frequent state visits have undermined U.S. and Southeast Asian efforts to push the ruling junta into a dialogue with the democratic opposition; instead, China’s actions have encouraged other powers, like India, to move closer to Rangoon. In the Philippines, where international watchdogs have long highlighted government corruption, China has offered some $400 million in aid to a major infrastructure project, the Northrail rail line. Local activists warn that the Chinese aid was provided with no transparency in bidding and with no significant environmental impact assessment. In the worst possible case, China’s success in delivering strong economic growth while retaining political control could serve as an example to some of the more authoritarianminded leaders in the region, like Cambodia’s Hun Sen, who admires China’s economic and political system. In controlling development from the top, of course, Beijing’s model rejects the idea that ordinary citizens should control countries’ destinies. And as China’s power grows around the world, the influence it projects, as in Southeast Asia, could be similarly bad for a range of developing nations. As Elizabeth Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations has noted, the Chinese firm Shougang International Trade and Engineering reportedly has done little to upgrade safety at the Hierro de Peru mine it purchased in Peru in the early 1990s. Peru’s Labor Ministry recorded 170 accidents, including two fatal ones, at the mine in one year alone. When labor unions in Peru protested, Beijing allowed Shougang to bring imported laborers from China to work at the mine. Similarly, in Africa Chinese assistance to authoritarian states like Zimbabwe and Angola has raised concerns. International corruption watchdogs warn that China’s aid package to Angola, reportedly as large as $6 billion and given without pressure for poverty reduction or coordination with international financial organizations, will allow the Angolan government to revert to its old habits, skimming the aid for itself. Nonetheless, even if China’s growing soft power might be negative for Southeast Asia, this does not mean the United States should always try to balance against Chinese soft power. For one, soft power is inherently difficult to define, which makes it hard to determine an exact U.S. policy response. In addition some of China’s soft power may support U.S. interests in the region, and some negative consequences of Chinese soft power must be left to Southeast Asian nations to handle.

#### Backsliding causes global conflict

Andrea Kendall-Taylor 16, Senior Associate (Non-resident) @ CSIS, Human Rights Initiative, How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order, 1-15-16, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order

Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. International relations literature tells us that democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines. Moreover, within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an “authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability. Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way, democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows.

Finally, widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for ~~strongman~~ strong-person tactics.

Since 9/11, and particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Western enthusiasm for democracy support has waned. Rising levels of instability, including in Ukraine and the Middle East, fragile governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sustained threats from terrorist groups such as ISIL have increased Western focus on security and stability. U.S. preoccupation with intelligence sharing, basing and overflight rights, along with the perception that autocracy equates with stability, are trumping democracy and human rights considerations.

While rising levels of global instability explain part of Washington’s shift from an historical commitment to democracy, the nature of the policy process itself is a less appreciated factor. Policy discussions tend to occur on a country-by-country basis—leading to choices that weigh the costs and benefits of democracy support within the confines of a single country. From this perspective, the benefits of counterterrorism cooperation or access to natural resources are regularly judged to outweigh the perceived costs of supporting human rights. A serious problem arises, however, when this process is replicated across countries. The bilateral focus rarely incorporates the risks to the U.S.-led global order that arise from widespread democratic decline across multiple countries.

Many of the threats to the current global order, such as China’s rise or the diffusion of power, are driven by factors that the United States and West more generally have little leverage to influence or control. Democracy, however, is an area where Western actions can affect outcomes. Factoring in the risks that arise from a global democratic decline into policy discussions is a vital step to building a comprehensive approach to democracy support. Bringing this perspective to the table may not lead to dramatic shifts in foreign policy, but it would ensure that we are having the right conversation.

#### And destroys multilateralism

Gordon G. Chang 20, Senior Fellow, Gatestone Institute, 1-14-2020, "China Is Destroying Multilateralism; Trump Is Creating a New Order," Gatestone Institute, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/15439/china-destroying-multilateralism

China, the world's leading cyberattacker and master intellectual property thief, in November nominated one of its nationals to head the UN's World Intellectual Property Organization. If Wang Binyang is selected in March, she will be able to bend international rules to favor her country's assault on others' technology. In any event, her nomination reveals Beijing's brazen ambition to dominate multilateral institutions. Beijing's placement of officials inside multilateral institutions has greatly facilitated its malign activities. Take the case of Fang Liu, the secretary general of the Montreal-based International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Last February, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reported that she hindered the investigation of a November 2016 cyberattack, called the "most serious" in that institution's history. Emissary Panda, a hacker group with ties to the Chinese government, was thought to be behind assaults on the ICAO's network. Dr. Liu came to the UN's ICAO from China's aviation regulator, the Civil Aviation Administration of China. Liu protected, among others, James Wan, the ICAO's deputy director and head of information and communication technology, who repeatedly undermined the probe into the cyberattacks. Wan has current links to two institutions associated with a known hacker, China's People's Liberation Army. China was not always so confident. Once, when it had withdrawn from the world, it shunned multilateral institutions. From 1967 to 1969, Beijing had only one ambassador abroad -- in Egypt -- and even he was almost recalled. After border skirmishes with Moscow's troops in 1969, however, Mao Zedong began to build contacts with foreigners. China, for example, joined the United Nations in 1971 by taking Taiwan's seat and began cooperating with the Nixon administration. Deng Xiaoping, Mao's successor, reoriented the country by establishing relations with other nations, such as the United States in 1979, and joining multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Deng's outreach to global organizations, however, was only tentative: he feared they would restrain his regime. Now, China's audacious officials have taken a more ambitious tack. Foreign Minister Wang Yi in 2018 told the U.N. General Assembly that China remains "a champion of multilateralism." So now Chinese leaders praise multilateralism -- and undermine the multilateral agencies. From its perch on the UN Security Council, for instance, Beijing has placed itself in a position to attack freedom and democracy. It was the force behind a just-passed, Russian-sponsored General Assembly resolution to create a new convention that, many fear, will be used to restrict online expression worldwide. One concern is that Moscow and Beijing are trying to criminalize, among other things, criticisms of governments. Beijing has also been able to block the UN undermining its interests and punishing friends such as North Korea. Along with its hardline allies, it also controls the misnamed UN Human Rights Council. Chinese officials have used the country's growing clout to bar activists, such as a Uighur, Dolkun Isa, from UN premises. Additionally, Chinese officials have, in violation of rules, photographed and filmed critics on UN grounds, and they have, in private settings, intimidated UN staff, experts, and other officials. Beijing's activities are so pervasive that a Human Rights Watch report states they not only call into question the UN's investigation of China's record but "pose a longer-term challenge to the integrity of the system as a whole." Beijing's overreach is also challenging the integrity of both the World Trade Organization, where it has for two decades abused its rules and the body's dispute-resolution mechanism, and Interpol, where it suddenly "disappeared" the institution's chief, Chinese national Meng Hongwei, in September 2018. At the World Bank, Beijing is tarring the image of development lending by misusing loans. China has, for instance, diverted sums earmarked for "vocational education" in its Xinjiang region for barbed wire, body armor, and tear gas, to help it repress minority inhabitants. Chinese officials also unsuccessfully tried to use World Bank loans to buy facial-recognition technology for use in Xinjiang. China was even bold enough to ask for more World Bank money, and won from the Washington-based institution a five-year commitment through June 2025 to extend as much as $7.5 billion in low-interest loans. China's malign activities at the multilateral agencies have meant that these organizations have ceased to function as they should. That fallout has produced grumbling but not effective action -- until the arrival of President Donald J. Trump.

#### Extinction from nuclear war, climate change, and rogue tech development

Yuval Noah Harari 18, Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 9/26/18, “We need a post-liberal order now,” The Economist, <https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now>

The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians.

This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly.

But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?”

Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game.

Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind.

An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.”

Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”.

The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans.

Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world.

This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI.

In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze.

#### Military buildup in the SCS and growing tensions prove China is revisionist in the region.

Cronin and Ha 18 (Patrick, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, Melodie, Graduate student in the Security Studies Program at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, “Toward a New Maritime Strategy in the South China Sea”, The Diplomat, June 22 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/toward-a-new-maritime-strategy-in-the-south-china-sea/>, KC)

China’s attempts at unilaterally changing the status quo in maritime Asia are most visible in the South China Sea, where previously small land features are now burgeoning military outposts. The United States needs to retool its approach to China in the Western Pacific and move toward a new maritime strategy. China’s buildup of armed forces and installations on disputed islands in the South China Sea highlights twin ambitions of solidifying expansive territorial claims and demonstrating Beijing’s growing military reach out to the Second Island Chain and beyond. Landing long-range H-6K bombers on China’s largest outpost in the Paracel archipelago could presage similar moves on the Subi, Mischief, and Fiery Cross Reefs in the Spratly Islands. The fortification of South China Sea installations is both a byproduct of and a means to so-called gray-zone challenges to the existing order. China seeks to change the status quo through incremental actions, mobilizing both military and paramilitary forces, and threats of coercion — but stopping short of steps that might trigger conflict. The United States is pursuing several lines of effort to counter Chinese aggression, including naming and shaming China’s unilateral assertions, bolstering allied and partner capacity, and conducting more frequent but routine freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). In response to China’s destabilizing moves in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, the U.S. disinvited the People’s Liberation Army Navy from the 2018 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise in late July, citing that China’s actions undermine regional security, transparency, and freedom of the seas. Despite this increased effort, there are still key areas lacking in the proposed U.S. maritime strategy. The current U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy espouses the importance of ensuring that the region bridging two major oceans, and where power is likely to predominate for decades to come, remains “free and open.” U.S. strategy that seeks to expand the geographical coverage at a time when the United States needs friends. The Indo-Pacific strategy envisages strengthening cooperation with allies and partners, with members of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remaining at the fulcrum. Xi Jinping’s push to militarize the South China Sea serves to expand Beijing’s control over the vital economic zones in the Indo-Pacific. The South China Sea is a critical trade route for China; nearly 30 percent of the world’s maritime trade (and about 40 percent of China’s) transits the region. The semi-enclosed sea presents a potential anti-area/access-denial (A2/AD) challenge for China in both the First and Second Island Chains due to the narrow chokepoints that are could be controlled by U.S. and allied forces. Many of the disputed land features China lays claim to are in this critical region, and China’s aggressive build-up has turned these previously vulnerable areas (think “Malacca Dilemma“) into zones of control to keep out American and allied powers. As the Chinese continue to bolster their First Island Chain claims, they have steadily expanded toward the Second Island Chain, seeking to tip the maritime balance of power in the South China Sea with a combination of boosted anti-ship and anti-air capabilities. In addition to landing H-6K bombers, China’s artificial islands are now capable of deploying HQ-9B surface-to-air missiles and YJ-12B anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as radar and communications jamming equipment. The anti-ship cruise missiles operating from the Spratly airfields could deny large swaths of the South China Sea to U.S. forces, and the H-6K bomber and the DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile could reach Guam, a critical U.S. territory and strategic military base. The United States needs to urgently consider a serious maritime strategy to counter gray-zone aggression and foster inter-agency cooperation with allies in the region.

### 1NC—idk