# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: affirmatives must defend that in a democracy, the free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy

#### Two violations:

#### 1] “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “democracy” in the res – means that you have to prove the resolution true as a whole, not in a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. *A beagle* makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) *refers to all members of that class*

#### 2] Poland is not a democracy

Vock 21 Ido Vock, Europe correspondent at the New Statesman, 11-5-2021, "Dispatch: Poland is no longer a democracy, claim rule of law activists," New Statesman, [https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2021/11/dispatch-polands-rule-of-law-crisis-deepens-with-fears-for-its-democracy //](https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2021/11/dispatch-polands-rule-of-law-crisis-deepens-with-fears-for-its-democracy%20//) ella

“Poland is no longer a constitutional democracy,” said Bodnar, the former ombudsman. “Elections still take place, but like in other countries in the region, it is now clear that democracy is not just about the holding of elections, but also about what happens before and after them.”

#### Violation: they spec Poland

#### Standards:

#### [1] precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks neg ground and prep because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### [2] limits – there are over 150 coutnries in the world and [75 democracies](https://www.thestreet.com/personal-finance/state-of-democracy-world-most-democratic-countries-2021) alone, explodes limits since there are tons of independent affs plus functionally infinite combinations, all with different advantages in different political situations like the US, Nauru, Tuvalu, Chagos Islands, SoKo, Norway, etc. - Kills neg prep and debatability since there are no DAs that apply to every aff - key to fairness because if there are infinite limits for the aff I can never predict what they’ll advocate for.

#### DTD to deter future abuse

#### CI cause reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention

#### No RVIs – a] illogical to win for being fair b] forces us into theory debates which kills substance c] theory is chilled which kills norms

#### Neg theory first because AFF abuse made it impossible to engage so any neg abuse was to get back in the game.

## 2

#### CP Text: the European Union should grant Ukraine membership.

#### Solves EU legitimacy and war

Kuleba 3-9 Dmytro Kuleba, Ukrainian politician, diplomat, and communications specialist, currently serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is also concurrently a member of the National Defense and Security Council of Ukraine. Kuleba is one of the youngest senior-diplomats in Ukraine's history, 3-9-2022, "Dmytro Kuleba: the EU must grant Ukraine membership now," Financial Times, [https://www.ft.com/content/16f6b1f2-4019-4c1b-82a2-a18594932038 //](https://www.ft.com/content/16f6b1f2-4019-4c1b-82a2-a18594932038%20//) ella

For two weeks now, Ukraine, a European country, has been defending itself against brutal aggression by Russia. The people of Ukraine are heroically fighting for their homeland, their identity, their freedom and their right to exist. Today, our country leads the whole of Europe and the free world. We were not afraid to take up the fight against one of the largest armies in existence. The Russians have struck us with all the power they can muster from every direction in the hope that they would eliminate independent Ukraine in just a few days. Yet we have not faltered. In two weeks, despite using all of his military might to destroy our country, Vladimir Putin has not been able to achieve any of the strategic goals of his invasion. Neither Kyiv, our capital city, nor Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro or almost any other major city has been captured. Ukraine is bleeding, but it has not fallen and it will not fall. I am confident that our country will prevail, thanks in part to the support of our international partners. We will be able to defend ourselves. The question is: at what cost? What Ukrainians safeguard today is not only our land, but also the values we stand for. Even as we defend the vision of Europe as whole, free and at peace, we reject the vision of it as a cold war battleground of ideologies partitioned into various spheres of influence. These times are truly dark and historic. The actions we take now will be remembered forever, one way or another. Future generations will judge all of us — every politician, every leader, every nation. Names will be indelibly associated with the deeds done and the words said at this critical juncture. This is why we need to seek big, historic solutions. Ukraine, its president Volodymyr Zelensky and its people have already made their choice to fight for good against evil, no matter how difficult, bloody and scary this struggle may be. This is what we stand for and we will not abandon our core values. Ukraine has now applied for swift membership of the EU and I am grateful to the European Parliament for supporting our candidacy. Standing ovations for Zelensky on that day provided a moment of unity, solidarity and moral uplift for the Ukrainian people, as well as a boost to the European spirit. Yes, we are in an extremely difficult situation right now. This is clearly not the classic EU accession process, which typically lasts for years and focuses on technical and economic details. But the decision to grant Ukraine EU membership could be a defining victory for Europe and all of its nations, all of its leaders. After they take such a decision, all Europeans will feel proud of it — proud of standing on the right side of history and of making a moral choice for the ages. I now want to address those sceptics who still think that Ukraine’s EU membership is a matter that should have anything to do with Russia. In fact, Putin himself is fixated on our Nato aspirations, not on our accession to the EU. The idea that granting Ukraine membership of the bloc now will aggravate the current situation is unpersuasive. I urge those who have held this view to abandon it. The proposal to provide Ukraine with EU membership is before us and I strongly urge my colleagues in European capitals to give it the green light. This step would provide an enormous injection of hope to the Ukrainian people. In these dark times, we need this hope more than ever. Opinion polls suggest that the move is supported by a majority of EU citizens. EU leaders are able to make it happen. Our membership would significantly fortify the EU. Today, Ukraine is a strong force for good, a brave and intelligent nation which will contribute greatly to the political, economic, cultural and social strength of the EU after this war is over. It will be a matter of prestige, as well as strength, for the EU to have a member like us. The time to make decisions is now. We have made ours. Leaders of the EU, it is your turn to make history.

## 3

#### CP Text: the Civic Platform in the Peoples Republic of Poland should create a new welfare state model.

#### Examples include: UBIs, child subsidies, taxing the Catholic Church, greater education access, etc.

#### Independently proves objectivity fails but the squo solves and the PiS will never take over

Sierakowski 19 Slawomir Sierakowski is the founder of the Krytyka Polityczna movement and a senior fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, 10-9-2019, “Why Poland’s Populists Keep Winning”, Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/09/polands-populism-winning-welfare-state/> // ella

Multiple studies have shown that the rise of populism is directly correlated with increased antagonism between provincial and metropolitan areas. It’s something that populist leaders seem to understand instinctively. Politicians like Donald Trump, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, and Poland’s Jaroslaw Kaczynski win first in the provinces and are only later able to attract support in urban areas. In order to maintain power, they have to manage antagonism between urban and rural areas. Roberto Stefan Foa and Jonathan Wilmot recently argued in Foreign Policy that “the gap between the cosmopolitan city and the economic periphery has become the new social class divide across the West.” Most scholars tend to focus on two diametrically opposed poles. But it is not the extremes that are most interesting but the gray area in between: those swing voters in provincial areas who are not hard-line populists but are attracted to populist parties despite many reservations about their illiberalism. This gray area does exist, as becomes apparent if you scratch the surface in a place like Poland, where the governing Law and Justice (PiS) party is very popular. Foa and Wilmot assume the economic collapse of provincial areas is fueling populist backlash. But Poland provides an important counterexample, where there has not been an economic collapse of the periphery. In the 1990s, Poland recovered from the economic crisis that came after the introduction of martial law in 1981 and subsequent Western sanctions, followed by neoliberal “shock therapy” after 1989, which led to the collapse of large communist-era enterprises and massive unemployment that remained at about 20 percent for 15 years. It’s true that large cities fared better, but Polish villages and small towns, which form the backbone of PiS support today, are hardly in the midst of an economic crisis.Polish villages and small towns, which form the backbone of PiS support today, are hardly in the midst of an economic crisis. Indeed, the opposite is true. Thanks to European funds (but not only to them), the periphery is enjoying growth and development, with low unemployment and abundant new infrastructure. Nevertheless, one can see in Poland the same antagonism between the center and the periphery that is now common in the United States and Britain. The underlying factors are a lack of cultural rather than economic capital, conservative attitudes, and lower levels of trust in institutions, which lead to an understanding of the welfare state as responsible for providing direct social transfers rather than good public services. Former Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform party, whose term in power coincided with significant economic growth from 2007 to 2015, concentrated on building roads, stadiums, and high-speed rail and reforming the retirement system (by raising the retirement age, among other factors). Despite all that development, the PiS slogan of “Poland in ruins” won out. It may have sounded absurd in the cities, but it seemed credible to people in provincial areas because of their low levels of income and social transfers. The PiS-implemented subsidy of 500 zloty (about $130) monthly per child has changed the political paradigm in Poland. Now, no electoral promise that is not formulated as a direct offer of cash can have any hope of appealing to voters. PiS recently won big in the European Parliament elections thanks to its promise of paying out a 13th month of retirement benefits, which was made a week before voters went to the polls. Now, the party is running on a promise of almost doubling the minimum wage. An activist holds a copy of the Polish Constitution during a march against Polish state television (TVP), protesting media manipulation and creation of a propaganda machine accused of favoring the Law and Justice (PiS) ruling party, in Warsaw on Feb. 17. An activist holds a copy of the Polish Constitution during a march against the Polish state broadcaster TVP protesting media manipulation and the creation of a propaganda machine accused of favoring PiS in Warsaw on Feb. 17. ARTUR WIDAK/NURPHOTO VIA GETTY IMAGES Przemyslaw Sadura from the University of Warsaw and I carried out quantitative and qualitative research of Poland’s electorate in order to understand as much as possible about the motivations of voters before the upcoming Oct. 13 parliamentary elections. The goal was to learn what attracts voters to PiS and what media they consume, as well as how they react to politicians’ actions, social programs, and multiple scandals caused by PiS. The study divided PiS voters into the electoral base—those who have been voting for the party for a long time and those who have begun supporting the party since it came to power. The picture that emerges from this analysis is not one of voters naively following the dictates of party communiqués, church sermons, or TV propaganda. Polish voters are well aware of what they are doing. They are rational actors with a good grasp of politics, at least as far as they think it concerns them. Instead, a new phenomenon has come to dominate Polish politics: the conscious and open acceptance by voters of pathological behavior on the part of political parties. Political cynicism is being displayed by voters on all sides. It functions as a kind of co-participation in politics, which is why political involvement is on the rise, as evidenced by the doubling in turnout in the most recent European elections. When they are asked about politics, voters begin to sound like politicians, calculating the plays necessary to win and openly accepting underhanded moves.When they are asked about politics, voters begin to sound like politicians, calculating the plays necessary to win and openly accepting underhanded moves. They consider what they should say, whom they should seek accommodations with, and what to promise to whom. Just like politicians, they do not pretend to believe the things they say about the other side. New PiS voters often demonstrated some disagreement with PiS—or even embarrassment. They gave one general reason for their support: the financial assistance they receive from the state. As one respondent put it, “That 500 zloty, even though I am against that kind of government spending, I think it is sometimes helpful.” The cynicism on the side of Civic Platform voters is clear from their conviction that the opposition cannot afford to openly call for the repeal of PiS’s social programs, although that is something that Civic Platform voters often expect the party to enact. That is why, in the view of some of those surveyed, Civic Platform should declare that nothing that has been given will be taken away and indeed make additional promises—but then find a pretext for cutting the child subsidy once the party is in power. One of the consequences of political cynicism that demonstrates the strength of voters’ identification with political parties is the dual attitude of Polish voters when it comes to corruption. Evidence shows that Poles disapprove of theft to benefit an individual, but they see nothing wrong with stealing in order to benefit the party.Evidence shows that Poles disapprove of theft to benefit an individual, but they see nothing wrong with stealing in order to benefit the party. They see this as necessary in order for their party to stay in power. This kind of corruption is seen as acceptable in service to the greater good. A politician will not lose the confidence of voters for breaking the law in a way that benefits the party. This may explain the ruling party’s resilience in the face of numerous scandals. When Kaczynski, the leader of PiS, accepts rent-seeking behavior by PiS politicians on behalf of their party and its institutional affiliates (the placement of many PiS politicians in high-paying positions in state-owned companies, for instance) on the one hand while sometimes reacting very sharply to private corruption by members of his party (such as the scandal concerning the payment of large bonuses to government ministers under Prime Minister Beata Szydlo), the seeming contradiction in behavior is illusory. The phenomenon of “legitimation through scandal” plays a significant role in attracting new voters. Going after elites, humiliating them, creating distance from them by provoking controversy, and spurring outrage in the media have become a standard tactic for politicians such as Trump, Nigel Farage, and Matteo Salvini, who use this as a means of not only gaining popularity but also earning the trust of voters who feel that they have been harmed by the elite. This makes PiS immune to the political costs of the scandals uncovered by the mainstream media. Scandals involving a party that is a priori controversial and from the outset criticized by the media (including foreign media) do not move voters. The PiS electorate is not as deluded by propaganda from the public broadcaster TVP as supporters of the opposition assume. The PiS electorate is not as deluded by propaganda from the public broadcaster TVP as supporters of the opposition assume. As shown by our qualitative research and confirmed by the quantitative results of our survey, political preferences are clearly correlated with the level of diversity of sources of information on politics. But the direction of that relationship is completely different than the stereotypical image of the electorate would suggest. In fact, hard-line Civic Platform voters have the least diversified news sources—they reject TVP and consider the major private TVN network (owned by the U.S.-based media company Discovery) to be the only objective and trustworthy station. By contrast, the landscape of news programming consumed by PiS voters is much broader, and they have few illusions about its biases. Among hard-line PiS voters, 30 percent say they perceive the bias of Wiadomosci, TVP’s flagship news program, and 16 percent say the same is true of all news programing on public television and on private channels. Some PiS voters, especially those with higher cultural capital, see “pushy propaganda” as embarrassing. Indeed, the majority of our respondents from among hard-line supporters of the ruling party have clear problems with public television (a point that is supported by survey data), which is why they seek out a wider range of news sources than do supporters of the opposition. Hard-line PiS voters repeatedly admitted it in focus group interviews: “God, they are, forgive me, so far up PiS’s ass, it really irritates me,” said one PiS supporter in Pulawy, a city of 50,000 people in eastern Poland. “Let the government’s news programing be a shill but not to the extent that they’re doing it,” another said. “It shouldn’t be so fawning. … There should be more objectivity. They should include other viewpoints.” This is why when they want to know what is really going on, they change channels to watch media critical of the government. Youth attend a Rosary Procession celebrating “traditional family values” in Nowy Sacz, Poland, on Oct. 6. The march, the first of its kind to take place in the town, was originally banned by the mayor, but the decision was quashed by a local court allowing it to occur. Women take part in the National Rosary March organized by the Catholic Church and PiS in Warsaw on Oct. 5. The party has used LGBTQ rights as a key campaign issue, claiming it as a threat to Polish Catholic values. The parties’ old and new supporters are also very different. The loyalty of the old PiS electorate is older than the party’s social promises. The strongest motivation for them is their distaste for, and even hatred of, Civic Platform and leftist parties as representatives of urban elites. This electorate is clearly much more conservative and traditional and attached to religious and national values. This is evident in voters’ homophobic, anti-refugee, and racist statements. Support for PiS among new voters is conditional, even instrumental. These voters primarily live in villages and small towns. They are moderately conservative, but it is not primarily their worldview that attracts them to PiS. In cultural terms, these voters do not differ significantly from potential Civic Platform voters. Despite the constant assurances of Civic Platform politicians, these voters believe that the party will cut social assistance programs implemented by PiS. Support for PiS is also conditional in an additional sense: PiS voters do not want their party to have a total monopoly Support for PiS is also conditional in an additional sense: PiS voters do not want their party to have a total monopoly. Most of them, even among the most hard-line PiS supporters, are skeptical and reluctant to support a constitutional majority for PiS. They feel safer when Kaczynski’s party has some competition. “I would like there to be some kind of counterbalance,” said one new PiS supporter in Torun, a city of 200,000 people in northern Poland. “I am a PiS supporter, but I don’t trust them to the extent that I would want them to have complete control and do whatever they want,” another added. Even with such doubts among PiS voters, the opposition is having trouble making inroads. By far the strongest sentiment among Civic Platform voters—and the only factor that unifies the party’s electorate—is an anti-PiS stance. The pro-Civic Platform attitude is weak. It’s harder for Civic Platform to establish an emotional bond with its voters and to motivate them because its electorate is generally relatively satisfied with its standard of living. Despite the PiS government, Civic Platform voters do not feel that they have lost out in any concrete way. In order to understand the difference between a typical Civic Platform voter and a PiS voter, it is worth juxtaposing two diametrically opposed (in class terms) responses: A loyal urban Civic Platform voter in Warsaw said: “I want all this roadwork to end. I want us to have highways. I want us to live in a modern country. … I just want our quality of life to be stabilized.” In Torun, a new PiS voter addressed the same issue from a very different perspective: “They build highways that are free for a year, and then they cost a ton of money. They should do something for the people and specifically for me. I don’t care about having a nice road. I might not have a car. I have no use for a highway. What matters to me is the promise that I will have a pension, that I will have social support, that my children will be able to raise their children, because they’ll be able to stay at home for five years.” It clearly shows the class difference between the voters in major cities—who are satisfied with their living standards and expect the government to build a liberal welfare state with infrastructure modernization while helping people who cannot help themselves—and the provincial voters who expect a conservative welfare state: one big Polish family, a warm community that cares about everybody. The greater the mutual dislike between these two groups, the more fractured the potential Civic Platform electorate becomes. Antagonizing both is a means of dividing existing Civic Platform voters, making it impossible for the party to formulate a coherent message. As a result, the party’s program is shaky: Civic Platform sometimes tries to prove its progressive credentials, while other times it attempts to shore up its “right flank.” A float in the Dusseldorf Rose Monday Carnival parade features an effigy of Jaroslaw Kaczynski, leader of Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) ruling political party, displaying the words “The liberal Poland"' in Germany on March 4. The parade is known for its satirical political floats. A float in the Düsseldorf Rose Monday carnival parade features an effigy of Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of PiS, displaying the words “The liberal Poland”‘ in Germany on March 4. The parade is known for its satirical political floats.LUKAS SCHULZE/GETTY IMAGES Depending on the posturing of the country’s major political forces, there are three possible scenarios: The Hungarian Scenario. PiS is on the verge of achieving a level of political power that is unprecedented in Poland’s post-1989 history, resembling that of Fidesz in Hungary or the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. Through its promises of social programs, PiS may win over a large number of voters from Civic Platform and the Polish People’s Party, especially in the provinces. Poles are sending a clear message: They expect a welfare state whether it is part of a liberal or illiberal order—something that still seems to come as a surprise to the majority of Poland’s opposition and media. Our study shows that voters (even PiS voters) are not in favor of the Hungarian scenario, but an effective campaign by the ruling party, combined with ineffective action on the part of the opposition, could easily lead to a “social trap,” in which individual intentions yield the opposite result at the collective level. The Slovak Scenario. If PiS were to buckle, either because of outside factors or due to a crisis of leadership (it is unlikely that the party would be brought down by scandal), that might lead to the emergence of left-wing populism. Voters will not give up their expectations when it comes to social programs. The crisis of Civic Platform could lead to the creation of a coalition of the left that could outbid PiS and propose a new welfare state model.The crisis of Civic Platform could lead to the creation of a coalition of the left that could outbid PiS and propose a new welfare state model. Proposing new solutions would be crucial in order to appeal to voters beyond full-time salaried employees. This includes measures such as universal basic income. (The child subsidy program already plays a similar role.) The Bavarian Scenario. Our research clearly shows that Poles are eager to accept a conservative welfare state, one in which entitlement to benefits is dependent on the presence of a breadwinner in the family (at least one spouse must be employed). Support for this approach is evident in the universal opinion that the 500 zloty child subsidy should not be paid out to families who do not work and live off public assistance or the very rich. Combining this kind of welfare state with a platform composed of positions that are relatively uncontroversial in Poland—such as imposing taxes on the Catholic Church, promoting equality for women, guaranteeing the so-called abortion compromise while ensuring access to sexual education and contraceptives, and combating homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation—Civic Platform could count on the support of a majority of voters and present a democratic alternative to PiS.

## 4

#### Poland climate advocacy key to activism that drastically changes policies – it’s too late for education and squo policies are not enuogh

- objectivity makes it impossible bc media is upheld by the rich

Broszkowski 19 Roman Broszkowski,freelancing journalist as well as a communications staffer for political campaigns. He has a BA in Politics from Oberlin College, 11-21-2019, "Poland’S Changing Climate Activists," Political Critique, <http://politicalcritique.org/cee/poland/2019/polands-changing-climate-activists/> // ella [brackets in original article]

In the summer, Poland’s countryside is covered in beautiful pastels and the sun glints off marshy rivers that criss-cross the landscape. But for the 60 percent of Poles who live in urban areas, the summer means the return of stifling heat waves and a clear reminder that their homes remain year-round under a suffocating blanket of smog. Polish air is incredibly polluted. In Warsaw, the capital, drivers can look up and see a thick, cloudy haze grow in size as they enter the city through one of its many highways. And as bad as it is in the summer, Poland’s smog problem really hits its stride during the country’s cold winter. In areas where smog is particularly bad, like the historic city of Krakow in Southern Poland, people joke that the air is so dense you can bite it. In total, Poland is home to 33 of the 50 most polluted cities in Europe despite having only 5 percent of the continent’s population. While Poland has always had an environmentalist movement, these groups have traditionally been small and possessed relatively little power compared to other NGOs, Urszula Zielińska, a recently elected Green Party member of the Polish Parliament, points out. But in recent years, the state of Polish climate activism has completely and rapidly changed. New groups like Extinction Rebellion Poland and the Youth Climate Strike have exploded onto the Polish political scene, shocking those in power — and even veteran eco-activists — with their ability to organize large, popular mobilizations. And yet, at the same time Polish climate activists, environmentalist NGOs, scientists find themselves on the crest of a wave of public concern around the environment, Poland’s conservative government continues to frustrate moves towards decarbonization — setting up a political fight over Poland’s environmental and economic future. “[The government] is changing literally nothing. [Their proposed environmental policies are] just like moving chairs on the sinking Titanic,” Zielińska explains. “Literally, that’s how their policies will look when implemented.” Poland’s environment has long been in crisis. The European Environment Agency estimated that around 45,000 Poles died prematurely from air pollution-related complications in 2015. In 2019, the Polish Supreme Audit Office issued a report titled, “Poland, European Desert” which warned that the country’s available water resources were comparable to Egypt’s. Deforestation and logging have even created a man-made desert — the Błędów — that can no longer support large amounts of plant life due to the water table dropping precipitously since the Middle Ages. Climate change has simply exacerbated these problems — such as droughts which are increasingly common and severe in Poland. Critics argue that past and present governments have done little to address the growing ecological problems the country faces. But for many environmentalists, the current Law and Justice party government has pursued policies that actively make fighting climate change harder. These include pushing to open more coal mines in Silesia, logging in the Białowieża Forest — Europe’s last virgin forest — and strict regulations around land-based wind farms that some analysts have said are aimed at slowing the growth of renewable energy in order to maintain the party’s support among miners and the fossil fuel industry. In addition to current policies, the Law and Justice party has proposed several large infrastructure projects that environmentalists say will be extremely detrimental to the environment. One project — a canal through the narrow Vistula Spit — has raised concerns and objections from both the EU and locals who worry that the kilometer-long trench will damage wildlife habitats and hurt tourism. Taken together, the government’s environmental strategy will have a severely negative impact on the country, opponents warn. “The long term impact of [government policy] is very clear: it’s over 50,000 premature deaths a year in Poland,” Zielińska says. “Our health system is under huge pressure and this is obviously adding to it, but also economically — The World Health Organization has estimated that just alone due to the lost days of work from those over 50,000 premature deaths, we’re losing about 12% of our gross domestic product as a country per year.” Yet these statistics have been around for years, while many members of organizations like Extinction Rebellion or the Youth Climate Strike are young and often engaging seriously with environmentalism for the first time. This new generation of environmentalists says it is instead motivated by the growing evidence of the immediacy of climate change. “I personally started to act in the movement [a month ago], so I’m kind of fresh,” says 29-year-old Przemek Siewior, an activist with Extinction Rebellion Poland. “I was concerned about climate change a lot, but a lot of it was like intellectually and there is a big difference between understanding something with your mind and understanding something with your heart. I know it’s like, sounds very stupid, it’s cliche, but if you really think about climate change, it makes you cry.” Other activists — like those affiliated with the Youth Climate Strike — are even younger. Ania Pawlowska, 16, has spent much of the past year organizing in Warsaw with other high school students around combating climate change. “I’m not really proud of it, but I wasn’t entirely aware of the [scope of the] problem until March,” Pawlowska says. “I became aware of the problem after the [Global Climate Strike for Future] on [March] 15th, which is really weird because I kind of went there more because I don’t like plastic and stuff, so things that were not really exactly the aim of the protest. And then I actually educated myself the same day and I was terrified. I remember sitting that evening — it was the 15th of March — I remember that was the day I was born as a climate activist. I was just really frustrated that I didn’t know [about the scale of climate change] before and I felt kind of really weird because I was thinking that [if] this is so big, why is nothing going on and why don’t I know this from school?” These new activists repeatedly speak about a sense of shock and disappointment with the current environmental situation; many feel betrayed by their governments. This may explain why they tend to be more open to confrontation — by for example using forms of civil disobedience — in order to force change. “To me personally, it made sense,” says Siewior. “When you look at the climate change discussion and what we are doing as humanity — it is a pretty sad picture. From like the nineties, we are declaring that we will try and reduce our emissions year to year, but they are growing and growing still. So I thought, ‘okay so probably what the governments are doing is not very honest. On the other hand, what the activists are doing is not very effective.’ So yeah, to me it was like this strategy — civil disobedience — could actually work.” Even outside of these new groups, climate change has become a pressing concern. During the recent October parliamentary elections, 64 percent of Polish voters, said that ‘climate change should be central to the campaign,’. Part of the rise in public attention has come from the growingly obvious effects of climate change in Poland — such as recent escalating food prices as a result of worsening droughts. Food prices have risen 6 percent in Poland, compared to the same time last year, while the European Union as a whole only saw a 2 percent increase. In addition to the financial impacts of climate change, frequent protests have also played an important role in raising public consciousness. “People are starting to talk about [climate change for a few reasons],” says Pawlowska. “I would say that it’s directly because of young people — I think that it’s like one of the first times that young people in Poland have started organizing themselves and building something together like a movement — and also because of the kind of natural catastrophes going on … we had this huge drought and it cost us like a billion złoty ($260 million) or something. And prices are actually going up and everything is starting to be really expensive.” According to Eurostat, Poles spend about 23 percent of their monthly income on food and alcoholic drinks compared to the EU average of 16 percent making Poles and the country’s nationalist government sensitive to increases in food prices and raises to the cost of living. Another contributing factor for the movement’s growth: Greta Thunberg. “Greta and her mobilization of youngsters really helped in getting the topic to the mainstream,” says Bartłomiej Kozek, a sustainable development specialist in the UNEP/GRID-Warsaw Centre, a long-running environmentalist NGO in Poland. “The amount of articles connected to the climate in the mainstream media in recent months has gone through the roof.” Since Thunberg spoke at the COP24 UN Climate Conference in Katowice, Poland last December, student climate movements have spread at a break-neck pace around the world, including in Poland where Youth Climate Strike groups now exist in various cities and towns. A year later, in September 2019, close to 6 million people participated in two global climate protests on September 20 and 27 — including multiple marches in Polish cities. This new wave of climate activism is not, however, a monolith. While there is a general agreement that drastic change needs to happen in order to mitigate climate change, there is a dispute between groups over how to enact such a transformation. Extinction Rebellion and the Youth Climate Strike emphasis direct action such as protests and student strikes, while the newly resurgent Polish Green Party, which recently gained three seats in the country’s parliament, seeks to enact policies through the country’s legislative institutions — although members have said that they are open to working with the more protest-oriented groups. “I just love the fact that [these activist movements] are growing and I want to also as an MP — they’re very close to my heart as a Green MP — I want to support them as much as I can,” says Zielińska. “I think we’re just about on the verge of a change of political generations in Poland. And I cannot wait until they can vote. And they can also hopefully, hopefully, want to get involved in politics and I’ll be doing everything to convince them to go and change politics from within cause right now they’re completely disgusted by politics and they want to stay away from it.” Yet, even within the protest groups who advocate for change outside the established political system, there is a diversity of tactics. “I think that the biggest difference [between the Youth Climate Strike and Extinction Rebellion] is the fact that Extinction Rebellion really hits on civil disobedience,” Pawlowska explains. “To really force change we have to fight in many different ways and although I’m personally not ready for action that could get me in trouble in the face of the law, — mainly because I’m a minor and my parents would probably be held account somehow as well — I do admire what they do. I just believe that I’m more effective as part of a group that uses different tactics.” While the Youth Climate Strike looks to mobilize young people to pressure their governments to act in accordance with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s report and to raise the level of environmental education, Extinction Rebellion argues this is not enough for the current moment. “Like for example, the youth climate strikes are very good in what they are doing and they are creating a lot of publicity and people are starting to think and talk about [climate change] and that’s great,” says Siewior. “But it just not the level that we are in [right now]. So if we were in the nineties, I would be fine because the knowledge is growing and then in 15 or 20 years you would just start to make good decisions. We, unfortunately, don’t have time to start to educate people. And I hate this. I mean, it’s a very good demand when people say we have to start to educate people about climate change in schools. And I agree completely with it. But on the other hand, it doesn’t make a difference because if you educate a 12-year-old, you still have to wait six years until they can vote for example, and it’s too late.” Instead, Extinction Rebellion believes disruptive action is needed to highlight the social tension of climate change. Rebellion aligned protesters have blocked roads in Poland and their demands revolve around the creation of an appointed citizen’s assembly that would have the final say over how to implement climate policy — although there is some vaguery if such a body would be given proposal- versus decision-making power. “I can only speak for myself,” writes Siewior. “There is no line of argument from the whole XR as a movement. There are a few reasons why I think citizens assembly on climate catastrophe should have more deliberative power. The issue we are dealing with is quite complex and the solutions will inevitably transform a lot in our societies. Giving the issue back to the party politics would mean to start the war on the issue all over again. There are political parties deliberately misleading people on the issue of climate change because they reflect special interests. Let for example say that the citizen’s assembly decided to finance the transition [away from fossil fuels] by imposing more taxation on corporations and the rich. Since the media, and a lot of our political life, is in hand of the rich we should expect a big backlash on the proposals from citizens assembly. This, in turn, would once again put our very existence in jeopardy.” Regardless of their internal disagreements, these campaigns have already made a tangible impact on wider society. Not only has the frequency of climate change discussions risen, but, almost overnight, public attitudes about the imminent danger climate change represents have changed.

#### Objectivity isn’t enough and has no impact -- everyone already knows.

Salvesen 19 [Ingerid; Masters degree from the Centre for Development and the Environment at the University of Oslo and a bachelor degree in Journalism from Oslo and Akershus University College and Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile in Santiago, Chile. Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper @ University of Oxford; “Should journalists campaign on climate change?” <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-01/Paper%2C%20Salvesen%20-%20RISJ%20FINAL_0.pdf>] brett

Indeed, surveys show that when it comes to climate change, the problem is not any more lack of information or knowledge about the issue: 85% of the public worldwide thinks climate change is a serious problem (Spring 2015 Global Attitude Survey, Pew Research Center). 80% agrees that climate change is largely a result of human activity (2016 Ipsos Global Trends). Which begs the question: If we know, then why are we not acting on it to the extent that the science tells us we must?

#### Extinction.

Dr. Yew-Kwang Ng 19, Winsemius Professor of Economics at Nanyang Technological University, Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and Member of Advisory Board at the Global Priorities Institute at Oxford University, PhD in Economics from Sydney University, “Keynote: Global Extinction and Animal Welfare: Two Priorities for Effective Altruism”, Global Policy, Volume 10, Number 2, May 2019, pp. 258–266

Catastrophic climate change

Though by no means certain, CCC causing global extinction is possible due to interrelated factors of non-linearity, cascading effects, positive feedbacks, multiplicative factors, critical thresholds and tipping points (e.g. Barnosky and Hadly, 2016; Belaia et al., 2017; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Grainger, 2017; Hansen and Sato, 2012; IPCC 2014; Kareiva and Carranza, 2018; Osmond and Klausmeier, 2017; Rothman, 2017; Schuur et al., 2015; Sims and Finnoff, 2016; Van Aalst, 2006).7

A possibly imminent tipping point could be in the form of ‘an abrupt ice sheet collapse [that] could cause a rapid sea level rise’ (Baum et al., 2011, p. 399). There are many avenues for positive feedback in global warming, including:

• the replacement of an ice sea by a liquid ocean surface from melting reduces the reflection and increases the absorption of sunlight, leading to faster warming;

• the drying of forests from warming increases forest fires and the release of more carbon; and

• higher ocean temperatures may lead to the release of methane trapped under the ocean floor, producing runaway global warming.

Though there are also avenues for negative feedback, the scientific consensus is for an overall net positive feedback (Roe and Baker, 2007). Thus, the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 25) concludes, ‘The world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of CCC’.

The threat of sea-level rising from global warming is well known, but there are also other likely and more imminent threats to the survivability of mankind and other living things. For example, Sherwood and Huber (2010) emphasize the adaptability limit to climate change due to heat stress from high environmental wet-bulb temperature. They show that ‘even modest global warming could ... expose large fractions of the [world] population to unprecedented heat stress’ p. 9552 and that with substantial global warming, ‘the area of land rendered uninhabitable by heat stress would dwarf that affected by rising sea level’ p. 9555, making extinction much more likely and the relatively moderate damages estimated by most integrated assessment models unreliably low.

While imminent extinction is very unlikely and may not come for a long time even under business as usual, the main point is that we cannot rule it out. Annan and Hargreaves (2011, pp. 434–435) may be right that there is ‘an upper 95 per cent probability limit for S [temperature increase] ... to lie close to 4°C, and certainly well below 6°C’. However, probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5 per cent, 0.05 per cent or even 0.005 per cent of excessive warming and the resulting extinction probabilities cannot be ruled out and are unacceptable. Even if there is only a 1 per cent probability that there is a time bomb in the airplane, you probably want to change your flight. Extinction of the whole world is more important to avoid by literally a trillion times.

#### Warming is a threat multiplier that encompasses all impacts.

Dr. Michael T. Klare 20, Five Colleges Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, Ph.D. from the Graduate School of the Union Institute, BA and MA from Columbia University, Member of the Board of Director at the Arms Control Association, Defense Correspondent for The Nation, “How Rising Temperatures Increase the Likelihood of Nuclear War”, The Nation, 1/13/2020, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/nuclear-defense-climate-change/

Climbing world temperatures and rising sea levels will diminish the supply of food and water in many resource-deprived areas, increasing the risk of widespread starvation, social unrest, and human flight. Global corn production, for example, is projected to fall by as much as 14 percent in a 2°C warmer world, according to research cited in a 2018 special report by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Food scarcity and crop failures risk pushing hundreds of millions of people into overcrowded cities, where the likelihood of pandemics, ethnic strife, and severe storm damage is bound to increase. All of this will impose an immense burden on human institutions. Some states may collapse or break up into a collection of warring chiefdoms—all fighting over sources of water and other vital resources.

A similar momentum is now evident in the emerging nuclear arms race, with all three major powers—China, Russia, and the United States—rushing to deploy a host of new munitions. This dangerous process commenced a decade ago, when Russian and Chinese leaders sought improvements to their nuclear arsenals and President Barack Obama, in order to secure Senate approval of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 2010, agreed to initial funding for the modernization of all three legs of America’s strategic triad, which encompasses submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and bombers. (New START, which mandated significant reductions in US and Russian arsenals, will expire in February 2021 unless renewed by the two countries.) Although Obama initiated the modernization of the nuclear triad, the Trump administration has sought funds to proceed with their full-scale production, at an estimated initial installment of $500 billion over 10 years.

Even during the initial modernization program of the Obama era, Russian and Chinese leaders were sufficiently alarmed to hasten their own nuclear acquisitions. Both countries were already in the process of modernizing their stockpiles—Russia to replace Cold War–era systems that had become unreliable, China to provide its relatively small arsenal with enhanced capabilities. Trump’s decision to acquire a whole new suite of ICBMs, nuclear-armed submarines, and bombers has added momentum to these efforts. And with all three major powers upgrading their arsenals, the other nuclear-weapon states—led by India, Pakistan, and North Korea—have been expanding their stockpiles as well. Moreover, with Trump’s recent decision to abandon the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, all major powers are developing missile delivery systems for a regional nuclear war such as might erupt in Europe, South Asia, or the western Pacific.

# Case

## Adv

### Inherency

#### The PiS is already losing support – they don’t even have enough to win the next election – our ev is 10 months more recent

- also proves the aff takes forever (next election is 2023)

Szczerbiak 21 Aleks Szczerbiak, professor of politics at the University of Sussex, 8-16-2021, "Law and Justice’s grip on Poland is faltering," Financial Times, [https://www.ft.com/content/aa3e38c6-ced3-480a-92e7-0ceb6e1848e7 //](https://www.ft.com/content/aa3e38c6-ced3-480a-92e7-0ceb6e1848e7%20//) ella

PiS remains Poland’s most popular party, but it has lost support in recent months. From about 40 per cent last summer, its poll ratings now fluctuate between 30 and 35 per cent. In an election, this level of support would leave it short of a parliamentary majority. The waning fortunes of PiS follow criticisms of its handling of the pandemic, a controversial abortion ruling by Poland’s constitutional tribunal and tensions within the governing camp that have damaged its cohesion and unity of purpose. These tensions came to a head last week when Jarosław Gowin, deputy premier and economy minister, was fired from the government. Gowin leads the liberal-conservative Agreement party, PiS’s junior coalition partner. Together with some of his closest allies, Gowin left the government camp, depriving PiS of its legislative majority. The government now depends on the votes of a small caucus led by Pawel Kukiz, a rightwing, anti-establishment rock star-turned-politician, and various non-aligned deputies. The precarious situation of PiS is exacerbated by the opposition’s control of the Senate, Poland’s upper house. To overturn amendments passed by the Senate, the government needs an absolute majority of all parliamentarians, because abstentions count as votes against. The next parliamentary election is scheduled for autumn 2023. At present the government appears reluctant to call an early election, partly because it is technically difficult to do so without opposition support, but also because it would almost certainly lose. PiS is instead pinning its hopes on its “Polish Deal” post-pandemic recovery plan. Partly funded by the EU, this includes a wide range of ambitious policies to boost economic growth and living standards. PiS hopes it will be a political game-changer. So far, the “Polish Deal” has made little impact on voters. The ruling party believes that the public associates it with the increased state health insurance premiums that are required to help finance it, rather than with tax cuts and social spending measures from which the vast majority of Poles will benefit. Furthermore, PiS feels the voters’ doubts reflect criticisms of the plan’s fiscal elements by Gowin and his allies. This is why the party has decided to risk losing its formal parliamentary majority. It sees this as a lesser evil than having a prominent minister constantly undermining the plan’s main elements.

### AT EU

#### No internal link or warrant in the Economist card - Control F PiS – it’s not in it a single time besides the tag

#### No uniqueness – the EU is strong now – our ev is 3 months more recent

EC 22 European Commission, The European Commission publishes two comprehensive forecasts (spring and autumn) and two interim forecasts (winter and summer) each year. The interim forecasts cover annual and quarterly GDP and inflation for the current and following year for all Member States, as well as EU and euro area aggregates, 2-10-2022, "Winter 2022 Economic Forecast: Growth Expected To Regain Traction After Winter Slowdown," Economic Commission[https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\_22\_926 //](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_926%20//) ella

Members of the College said: Valdis Dombrovskis, Executive Vice-President for an Economy that Works for People said: “The EU economy has now regained all the ground it lost during the height of the crisis, thanks to successful vaccination campaigns and coordinated economic policy support. Unemployment has reached a record low. These are major achievements. As the pandemic is still ongoing, our immediate challenge is to keep the recovery well on track. The significant rise in inflation and energy prices, along with supply chain and labour market bottlenecks, are holding back growth. Looking ahead, however, we expect to switch back into high gear later this year as some of these bottlenecks ease. The EU's fundamentals remain strong and will be boosted further as countries start to put their Recovery and Resilience Plans into full effect.”

### AT Draw in (Russia-Ukraine war)

#### No great power war – our ev is 7 days ago, theirs is 5 years ago

Beauchamp 3-3 Zack Beauchamp, a senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on foreign policy and international relations. His work focuses on the rise of the populist right across the West, the role of identity in American politics, and how fringe ideologies shape the mainstream. Before coming to Vox, he edited TP Ideas, a section of Think Progress devoted to the ideas shaping our political world. He has an MSc from the London School of Economics in International Relations and grew up in Washington, DC, 3-3-2022, "How the US and its allies can help Ukraine without starting World War III," Vox, [https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/22958725/ukraine-russia-us-nato-sanctions-military-aid-protest //](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/22958725/ukraine-russia-us-nato-sanctions-military-aid-protest%20/) ella

Across the world, political leaders and ordinary citizens have condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, there seems to be basically no chance that the United States or any other major world power would send its troops to fight on the Ukrainians’ behalf — for the simple reason that doing so could plausibly lead to a wider war, and even nuclear conflict. The question then becomes: What can America and its allies do if they continue to rule out direct intervention? The answer is quite a lot, much of which — though by no means all — is being done already. The basic Western strategy has been to make the war more painful for Putin: Supply the Ukrainians with weapons while imposing crippling sanctions on the Russian economy. These measures are designed to shift Putin’s cost-benefit analysis, making the war costly enough that he’ll look for some kind of exit. In broad strokes, experts say, it’s a sound strategy — one that can still be escalated, albeit within certain bounds. “The West has to keep going full speed in the current direction,” says Yoshiko Herrera, a political scientist who studies Russia at the University of Wisconsin Madison. “Right now is not the time to let up on pressure.” At the same time, Washington and its allies need to think more carefully about their endgame. Military aid and sanctions are powerful tools, but neither of them is likely to cause Putin to give up on his designs on Ukraine wholesale. Instead, the West needs to develop a clearer strategy for ensuring that its efforts have the desired political effect in Moscow — which starts by openly laying out the conditions under which the sanctions will be removed. It could not be more important for Washington to get this right. On the one hand, the war in Ukraine is already causing massive suffering; a successful Russian invasion could destabilize Europe for a generation. On the other, an overly aggressive response like a “no-fly zone” would be nearly certain to trigger a broader war between the US and Russia. Threading the policy needle here will be hard. It means punishing Russia while simultaneously talking with it directly, both to insure against accidental escalation and to clearly communicate the aim of Western sanctions. The US and its allies have to try to strike this balance. The alternatives are too ghastly to contemplate. The US can help save Ukraine without sending its own troops So far, the West’s anti-Russia efforts have proven strikingly effective. On the military side, weapons systems manufactured and provided by the US and Europe have played a vital role in blunting Russia’s advance. The Javelin anti-tank missile system, for example, is a lightweight American-made launcher that allows one or two Ukrainian infantry soldiers to take out a Russian tank. Javelins have given the outgunned Ukrainians a fighting chance against Russian armor, becoming a popular symbol in the process. A figure called St. Javelin — a woman depicted in the style of an Eastern Orthodox icon carrying a missile launcher — has become an image of resistance among some Ukrainians. Sanctions have proven similarly devastating in the economic realm. The international financial punishments have been extremely broad, ranging from removing key Russian banks from the SWIFT trading system to restrictions on doing business with particular members of the Russian elite. Freezing the assets of Russia’s central bank has proven to be a particularly damaging tool, wrecking Russia’s ability to deal with the collapse in the value of the ruble, Russia’s currency. Elina Ribakova, the deputy chief economist at the Institute of International Finance, told my colleague Emily Stewart that Russians “are looking at a double-digit economic contraction already.” Mass unemployment and hyperinflation loom. Yet the West’s tools, potent as they are, are unlikely to turn the tide of the war. No amount of Javelins can make up for all of the military advantages Russia possesses; Russian tanks can still roll toward Kyiv amid an economic meltdown in Moscow. Instead, these efforts are designed to raise costs on Russia — to make the invasion so painful that Moscow starts thinking about abandoning it. Already, Russia’s military advance has been far slower and more difficult than the Kremlin expected. The longer the war goes on, the more Russian soldiers die and the weaker the Russian economy gets — potentially galvanizing anti-war sentiment among the Russian elite and population. Ukraine doesn’t have to win outright; it just has to hold out long enough for Russia to be convinced to change course. To help the Ukrainians further, then, the United States and its allies can simply build on what they’re already doing.

### Democracy bad

#### Transition away from democracy is now and inevitable

Kamusella 21 Tomasz Kamusella, University of St Andrews, 10-26-2021, "How China combined authoritarianism with capitalism to create a new communism," Conversation, [https://theconversation.com/how-china-combined-authoritarianism-with-capitalism-to-create-a-new-communism-167586 //](https://theconversation.com/how-china-combined-authoritarianism-with-capitalism-to-create-a-new-communism-167586%20//) ella

China leads the autocracies With the economic and political demise of Soviet-style communism, most of the communist regimes supported by the Soviet Union across the world, like Ethiopia, Afghanistan and South Yemen also collapsed. Communist Cuba is a lone exception to this trend. The Caribbean island has been a permanent thorn in the side of the US since 1961. Present-day communism, then, is led by China – the world’s second largest economy. Beijing has been proudly communist since 1949 and is now taking on the US, which still leads – though falteringly – the globe’s shrinking camp of democracies. Since 2010, an increasing number of states have parted with democracy. Over the past decade, democracy has been quickly reversed in post-genocide Rwanda. The same also happened in Ethiopia after the civil war in Tigray (2020-present day), while the Arab Spring’s democratic gains have been squashed across the Middle East. As in Putin’s Russia, electoral autocracies were installed in Bulgaria (2009), Hungary (2010), Serbia (2014), Turkey (2015), Poland (2016) and Slovenia (2020). China’s population of 1.4 billion means that a fifth of all humankind lives under its communist regime. The other three self-declared communist states – Laos, North Korea and Vietnam – all border China. A new communist – and Sinic (Chinese influenced) – bloc, indeed. So, after the two decades of decline in the wake of the 1989 collapse of the Soviet bloc, is the turbocharged Chinese-style communism 2.0 – which embraces capitalism – going to take over? The rise and fall of democracy The looser post-cold war definition of communism marries capitalism with socialism, as understood in the former Soviet Union. The overarching principle of socialism (seen as communism in the west) says: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his contribution.” In practice, this unorthodox mix of Soviet-style socialism and capitalism means an authoritarian, or even totalitarian, regime under a single party’s full and (these days) AI-enhanced control. This control extends over the now capitalist-style economy, too. Through this mono-party, the invariably male leader single-handedly rules. Often a cult of personality is developed for him and the deal is sweetened with a modicum of a welfare state. In most cases these states advertise themselves as being communist. Others, like Belarus and Venezuela may not actually call it “communism” and a different name may be given to this ideology. For example Bolivarianism in Venezuela, national unity in Belarus or Juche in North Korea. The mono-party political system makes the Communist Party into the state and its leader into the de-facto dictator. Unchecked collectivism, or the ruling dictator’s self-serving and populist rhetoric of prioritising masses (referred to as “nation or people”) over individuals, “justifies” his rule and the system. In places like Belarus and China, this has led to dissenters being repressed and concentration camps being built to remove them from “healthy society”. Like the pre-1989 communist states, all these countries’ ruling regimes are anti-western in their official rhetoric, and often in their actions too. This anti-western aggression was another important defining feature of the communist states of the 20th century. But will this number rise or fall in the 21st century? During the two decades following the fall of communism in Europe, democracy as the doctrine of human and political rights steadily spread across the world. Dictators felt pressured to keep up at least the appearance of working electoral democracy in their countries. Amnesty International and Freedom House successfully shamed autocrats into mending their notorious ways and freeing political prisoners. But after 2010, this trend was incrementally reversed. Symbolically, in this year the Chinese writer and pro-democracy dissident Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Beijing felt offended by the west and took steps to suppress Liu, his family and friends. The authorities denied Liu cancer treatment and he died prematurely seven years later. Liu’s ashes were scattered in the sea to prevent the establishment of a grave for a person many saw as a democratic hero and martyr. That would have been a focal point for China’s democrats, who might have gone on pilgrimages to pay respect to Liu’s unwavering loyalty to liberty and democracy. Then, in 2020, the pandemic created an ideal opportunity for Beijing to dismantle democracy in Hong Kong, and a place that was once a beacon of political and economic freedom fell. Autocrats of all stripes took note. ‘To get rich is glorious’ But isn’t the whole idea of capitalism and profit anathema to the central tenets of communism? And if so, how did these two opposites attract? In the wake of then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms, a great discovery of applied politics was made in China: that you can have capitalism without democracy. Spotting a gap in the market of ideas, Deng decreed that “to get rich is glorious”, meaning that capitalism was ideologically neutral and could serve the needs of a communist regime. The current marriage of capitalism and communism is a lesson for democrats not to trust in their wishful thinking. Instead, the often touted hypothesis about capitalism’s democratising effects must be put to the test. It is clear that capitalism does not make authoritarian or totalitarian Belarus, China, Laos or Vietnam any less authoritarian or more pro-democratic or pro-western. Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela ditched capitalism once before, when they became communist, in 1948 and 1959 and 1999 respectively, and they are reluctant to re-embrace it. But China’s enthusiasm for undemocratic capitalism since 2004 – known as the Beijing consensus in the west – may compel them to follow suit soon. China’s economic success, if it lasts for several generations, may lead to the fortification of nascent communism 2.0, with capitalism as an integral part of this ideology. Communist-capitalism is not an oxymoron any more, as long as the ruling communist party keeps entrepreneurs subservient to its ideology and governance. So what are the specific characteristics of the new communist 2.0 state? Perhaps, the self-declaration of being a communist state is the most obvious and that this features in the constitution. Even if some states give it a different name. Civic and human rights are seriously limited and often denounced as a “western ploy”. For instance, no individual right to vote exists in China, while the state actually owns citizens’ bodies to do with them as it pleases. A similar level of abuse is observed in North Korea and Vietnam. And growing repression has also been observed in Belarus and Cuba. Recently, the west woke up to the dangers that its liberal and democratic values may face and the fact that capitalism alone cannot guarantee freedom and human rights. The fear that the age of communist China’s imperialism has already arrived motivated Australia, the UK and the US, for example, to form a new military pact. Imperfectly – and probably to Beijing’s delight – AUKUS agreement excludes the EU. Technological totalitarianism In China, the traditional features of totalitarianism have become irretrievably combined with the system’s appetite for hi-tech conditioning and surveillance. For example, the total control of Xinjiang’s Muslims is made possible through the region’s mass database of the population’s DNA and irises. Technology and AI are communism 2.0’s largely bloodless methods for extending total control over the population, making sure that every individual toes the party’s line. This compliance is also enabled by the emerging military surveillance industrial complex, which is going to be at the core of successful communist-capitalism. More control means more job openings in this complex, directly translating into economic growth, that in turn will go back into financing that control – totalitarianism’s perfect feedback loop, with no way out. And so repression becomes recognised as the engine of the economy; a guarantee of prosperity for most (though not all). The seismic shift from Soviet-style communism 1.0, based on heavy industry, to China’s AI-supported communism 2.0 can be observed to different degrees across those seven communist states. North Korea remains an outlier and a squarely communism 1.0 state. To this day, Pyongyang refuses to follow the communism 2.0 path, despite Beijing’s quiet nudges in that direction (although there are signs that could be changing). Cuba and Venezuela, meanwhile, are also closer to communism 1.0, still making non-pragmatic choices informed by idealism and ideology. At the other end of the spectrum, Belarus, Laos and Vietnam are using whatever works economically (as long as the ruling party controls production and profits). They are China’s conscientious pupils, bent on implementing communism 2.0. Democratic alternatives Unless the world’s democracies come up with attractive and effective solutions to socioeconomic ills such as unemployment, falling living standards and income, and inaccessible medical care, then I am afraid that communism 2.0 is going to win hands down. In this scenario, the number of communist states is bound to grow and individual and political freedoms will diminish. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is exactly the type of ambitious project that the world’s democracies acutely lack at this moment in time. The plan is to link and build a coordinated network of railway, road and maritime corridors to span all of Africa, Asia and Europe for the seamless export of products from China and the easy import of raw materials to this communist powerhouse. Not only does the BRI already facilitate China’s exploitation of Eurasia and Africa, but it also functions as the main conveyor belt for spreading communism 2.0 globally. Adoptions of the Chinese model’s signature mix of welfare state policies with growing authoritarian tendencies and a single party’s aspiration to seize all power have been observed in present-day Europe since 2015, be it in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland or Serbia. Unsurprisingly, these countries’ pro-authoritarian leaders are enamoured with Chinese economic and political success. They hope to establish privileged links and collaboration with the communist superpower and they may not be the last western states to fall under its spell. To curry favour with Beijing, Europe’s aspiring autocracies are busy dismantling democracy and putting curbs on political rights and freedoms at home. Since 2015, Poland has repeatedly been risking tens of billions of Euros in developmental aid from the EU by rejecting the basic principle of EU legal primacy. Facing growing censure, in 2017, incredulously, the Polish prime minister said that it did not matter, because in such a case China would offer Poland more money than Brussels.

#### Intervention and doomed diplomacy stemming from liberal democracies cause an endless cycle of war

- seen as enemies

Mearsheimer 18 John J. Mearsheimer, American political scientist and international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago. He has been described as the most influential realist of his generation, 2018, “The Great Delusion”, Yale University Press, // ella

THE COSTS OF LIBERAL HEGEMONY BEGIN with the endless wars a liberal state ends up fighting to protect human rights and spread liberal democracy around the world. Once unleashed on the world stage, a liberal unipole soon becomes addicted to war. This militarism arises from five factors. First, democratizing the globe is a vast mission that provides abundant opportunities to fight. Second, liberal policymakers believe they have the right, the responsibility, and the knowhow to use military force to achieve their goals. Third, they often approach their task with missionary zeal. Fourth, pursuing liberal hegemony undercuts diplomacy, making it harder to settle disputes with other countries peacefully. Fifth, that ambitious strategy also undermines the notion of sovereignty, a core norm of international politics that is intended to limit interstate war. The presence of a powerful state prone to fighting war after war increases the amount of conflict in the international system, creating instability. These armed conflicts usually end up failing, sometimes disastrously, and mainly at the expense of the state purportedly being rescued by the liberal goliath. One might think liberal elites would learn from their failures and become averse to using military force abroad, but that seldom happens. Liberal hegemony promotes instability in other ways as well. Formidable liberal democracies also tend to embrace ambitious policies short of war that often backfire and poison relations between them and the target countries. For example, they often interfere in the politics of other countries. They are also inclined when engaging diplomatically with an authoritarian country to disregard its interests and think they know what is best for it. Finally, liberalism abroad tends to undermine liberalism at home, because a militaristic foreign policy invariably fosters a powerful national security state prone to violating its citizens’ civil liberties. My argument is that a country that embraces liberal hegemony ends up doing more harm than good to itself as well as other countries, especially those it intends to help. I will illustrate this argument by focusing on American foreign policy since Bill Clinton was elected to the White House in November 1992. With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States emerged as by far the most powerful country on the planet. Unsurprisingly, the Clinton administration embraced liberal hegemony from the start, and the policy remained firmly intact through the Bush and Obama administrations. Not surprisingly, the United States has been involved in numerous wars during this period and has failed to achieve meaningful success in almost all of those conflicts. Washington has also played a central role in destabilizing the greater Middle East, to the great detriment of the people living there. Liberal Britain, which has acted as Washington’s faithful sidekick in these wars, also bears some share of the blame for the trouble the United States has helped cause. American policymakers also played the key role in producing a major crisis with Russia over Ukraine. At this writing, that crisis shows no signs of abating and is hardly in America’s interest, let alone Ukraine’s. Back in the United States, Americans’ civil liberties have been eroded by an increasingly powerful national security state. Liberal Militarism Because liberals so often speak about the evils of war and the importance of moving beyond power politics to create a peaceful world, it might seem odd to describe them as militarists. But many are militarists, deeply committed to a remarkably ambitious foreign policy agenda and not shy about using military force to advance it.1 One of liberalism’s core missions is to protect people whose rights are being seriously violated. The urge to intervene in other countries is especially powerful when large numbers of those foreigners are being killed. This undertaking is clearly reflected in Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a norm that grew out of the failure of the so-called international community to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995.2 R2P mandates that states have a responsibility not only to protect their own populations from serious human rights violations like ethnic cleansing and mass murder, but also to protect people in other countries from these crimes. In essence, nations are told to be on the lookout for major human rights abuses around the globe and, when they arise, to move quickly to stop them. A powerful liberal state with the military wherewithal to intervene in such circumstances is strongly encouraged to go to war to protect the victims. This task of defending individual rights easily morphs into the more ambitious strategy of removing the source of the problem by actively promoting liberal democracy in other countries. Liberal states, by definition, are committed to protecting their citizens’ rights, and this strategy, so the argument goes, will also lead to a more peaceful world and help protect liberal democracy from its internal enemies. Liberalism is also said to facilitate economic prosperity, which not only is a positive end in itself but also contributes to peace. In short, spreading liberalism is thought to make the world safer, more peaceful, and more prosperous. As we can see from countless comments by American liberals, proponents of this worldview tend to be deeply committed to it. In the midst of World War I, for example, Elihu Root, who had been both secretary of state and secretary of war under President Theodore Roosevelt, stated, “To be safe democracy must kill its enemy when it can and where it can. The world cannot be half democratic and half autocratic.” In the midst of the Vietnam War, Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared that the “United States cannot be secure until the total international environment is ideologically safe.” As Christopher Layne notes, “These are not isolated comments. . . . American statesmen have frequently expressed this view.”3 This missionary zeal is hardly limited to policymakers. John Rawls, for example, writes, “It is characteristic of liberal and decent peoples that they seek a world in which all peoples have a well-ordered regime. . . . Their long-range aim is to bring all societies eventually to honor the Law of Peoples and to become full members in good standing of the society of well-ordered peoples.”4 This ambitious agenda does not axiomatically lead to war, and Rawls is careful to make clear that he is not advocating armed crusades to spread liberal democracy across the planet.5 Still, there is no question that war is often seen as a viable and even attractive option for promoting liberalism. This penchant for employing force to achieve liberal goals is reflected in the writings of John Owen, a prominent liberal interventionist, who comments that “liberal ideas cause liberal democracies to tend away from war with one another, and . . . the same ideas prod these states into war with illiberal states.” Moreover, he writes, “all individuals share an interest in peace, and should want war only as an instrument to bring about peace.”6 The Bush Doctrine, developed during 2002 and used to justify the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, is probably the best example of this kind of liberal interventionism. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration concluded that to win what it termed the “global war on terror” it must not only defeat al Qaeda but also confront Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The regimes in these so-called rogue states were assumed to be closely tied to terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and were bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, which they might even give to terrorists.7 In short, they were mortal enemies of the United States. Bush proposed to use military might to turn those countries and others across the Middle East into liberal democracies. He put the point succinctly in early 2003, just before the United States attacked Iraq: “By the resolve and purpose of America, and of our friends and allies, we will make this an age of progress and liberty. Free people will set the course of history, and free people will keep the peace of the world.”8 There is no question that President Bush and his lieutenants were also motivated to topple Saddam Hussein from power because he was a brutal dictator who trampled on the rights of his citizens. But that was a longstanding problem that, by itself, could not cause the United States to get rid of Hussein and replace him with a democratically elected leader. What drove the United States to invade Iraq was the perceived need to deal with the proliferation and terrorism. And the best way to do that, the Bush team thought, was to turn all the countries in the greater Middle East into liberal democracies. This would make the region a giant zone of peace and take both problems off the table. “The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values,” the president said, “because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life.”9 These actions show all the earmarks of liberal hegemony. Liberals with a formidable military at their disposal are strongly inclined to fight wars not only to protect individual rights in other countries but also to spread liberal democracy, which they see as the best way to safeguard rights and protect against important security threats. Given that our planet has no shortage of autocracies, serious human rights violators, or countries that present a military threat, a powerful country like the United States, left free to pursue liberal hegemony, is likely to end up in a perpetual state of war. Liberalism Makes Diplomacy Harder Another factor that helps militarize the liberal unipole is that liberal hegemony makes diplomacy with authoritarian states more difficult, further increasing the likelihood of war. Diplomacy is a bargaining process between two or more states that have conflicting views on an issue that matters to all of them. The aim is to produce an agreement that settles the dispute peacefully. To achieve success, each party must make some concessions, although they need not be symmetrical. This is why Henry Kissinger maintains that diplomacy “is the art of restraining the exercise of power.”10 It is not necessary that each side treat the other as an equal. But for diplomacy to work, even bitter foes have to show some respect for each other. War and diplomacy are distinct instruments of statecraft—each is an alternative to the other. One relies on dialogue and negotiations to settle disputes, while the other employs military force. Diplomacy is generally considered the safer and less expensive option: as Winston Churchill said at the White House in 1954, “Jaw-jaw is always better than war-war.”11 Nevertheless, diplomacy and war often work in tandem. For example, diplomacy is usually more effective when backed up by the threat of military force. And it is often employed during wars to find a way of ending the fighting. Still, the aim of “big stick diplomacy” is to either avoid or terminate a war. If a state facing a hostile rival abjures diplomacy, war becomes more likely and harder to terminate once it starts. Liberal democracies have little difficulty conducting diplomacy with illiberal states when they are acting according to realist dictates, which is most of the time. In those circumstances, liberal democracies do whatever is necessary to maximize their survival prospects, and that includes negotiating with authoritarian leaders. They sometimes even support or form alliances with murderous dictators, as the United Stated did in World War II when it worked with Joseph Stalin to defeat Nazi Germany, or when it cooperated with Mao Zedong after 1972 to contain the Soviet Union. Occasionally they even overthrow democratic regimes they perceive as hostile. Liberal democracies go to great lengths to disguise such behavior with liberal rhetoric, but in fact they are acting contrary to their own principles. Such is the influence of realpolitik. Diplomacy gets shortchanged, however, when a unipolar state is able to push aside balance-of-power logic and adopt a liberal foreign policy. Such a state is strongly inclined to eschew diplomacy with its illiberal foes, for reasons that by now should be familiar. Although tolerance is a core principle of liberalism, it tends to get pushed aside when a liberal state confronts a rival that violates its citizens’ rights. After all, rights are inalienable. Since authoritarian states regularly shortchange—and sometimes trample on—the rights of their people, liberal states freed from the shackles of realism are likely to treat them as deeply flawed polities not worthy of diplomatic engagement. Countries pursuing liberal hegemony often develop a deep-seated antipathy toward illiberal states. They tend to see the international system as consisting of good and evil states, with little room for compromise between the two sides. This view creates a powerful incentive to eliminate authoritarian states by whatever means necessary whenever the opportunity presents itself. One consequence of this loathing is that liberal states find it hard to engage in limited wars with illiberal foes and instead are inclined to pursue decisive victories against them. Unconditional surrender becomes the order of the day, as it is virtually impossible to countenance compromising with evil.12 Of course, nationalism, which usually generates hatred between states at war with each other, reinforces this tendency for wars to escalate to their extreme. This eliminationist mentality is perhaps best reflected in Woodrow Wilson’s thinking about how to deal with Germany and the other defeated powers after World War I. Since peace could not be achieved by an “arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests,” he argued, there could not be “any kind of bargain or compromise with the governments of the Central Empires.” Wilson associated compromise with balance-ofpower politics, what he contemptuously called the “old order of international politics,” and which he felt had to be “utterly destroyed.” The goal had to be “the overcoming of evil, by the defeat once [and] for all of the sinister forces that interrupt peace and render it impossible.” In late 1919 he said of the Treaty of Versailles, “I hear that this treaty is very hard on Germany. When an individual has committed a criminal act, the punishment is hard, but the punishment is not unjust. This nation permitted itself, through unscrupulous governors, to commit a criminal act against mankind, and it is to undergo the punishment.”13 The bottom line is that when a liberal democracy is free to act abroad according to its foundational principles, it finds it difficult to engage in diplomacy with an illiberal opponent, increasing the likelihood that the two sides will attempt to settle their differences violently. Liberal intolerance, sometimes accompanied by liberal loathing, leads a liberal unipole freed from balance-of-power politics into endless wars.

#### Democracies necessitate too many compromises that jeopardize effective climate reforms – US and Germany prove

- Paris fails bc no punishment

Abadi 1-7 Cameron Abadi, deputy editor at Foreign Policy., 1-7-2022, "What if Democracy and Climate Mitigation Are Incompatible?," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/07/climate-change-democracy/> // ella

In the past 14 months, the United States and Germany both held national elections that placed climate change policy squarely at the center of national debate. The fact that two of the world’s five largest economies committed to addressing the world’s most pressing crisis through public discourse followed by public voting was an unprecedented democratic experiment. It did not work out as optimists hoped. On the one hand, the victorious parties in both countries vowed to achieve what was necessary to prevent the worst effects of climate change from occurring, in accordance with the international climate agreement unanimously approved in Paris in 2015. But on the other hand, in neither country can the resulting policies be described as fulfilling that promise. All the major German parties (except for the far-right Alternative for Germany) said they would work to limit climate change to the 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels stipulated in the Paris Agreement; the Greens claimed, plausibly, that only their platform contained ideas sufficient to fulfill the promise. But even as the Greens succeeded at joining the national government (having earned a record-breaking 15 percent at the polls), few of the policy specifics found their way into the governing agenda for the next four years. The Greens claimed a higher carbon price was necessary; no mention of any such increase made it into the coalition agreement. The Greens argued that ending the domestic excavation of coal by 2030 was nonnegotiable; the government has failed to make a firm commitment to do that. The Greens claimed the country would need to invest an extra 50 billion euros ($56 billion) per year in renewable energy infrastructure; the new government has vowed instead to maintain a balanced budget. A similar slippage between campaign ambition and watered-down governance has occurred in the United States. Democrat Joe Biden’s election platform vowed that the country’s electricity sector would be carbon-free by 2035 and that the entire U.S. economy would achieve full carbon neutrality by 2050—promises that the Biden administration has never disavowed. But the central policies intended to achieve those timelines have no realistic chance of passing Congress. The administration will receive nowhere close to the $2 trillion that Biden said would be necessary to fund renewable energy infrastructure. Meanwhile, Sen. Joe Manchin from the coal-producing state of West Virginia has refused to pass any law that explicitly disincentivizes the energy sector’s use of fossil fuels, as the Biden campaign had envisioned. At the same time, the Biden administration has openly lobbied the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries of OPEC to increase production, in hopes of lowering the price of gasoline for domestic drivers. The climate agendas of the current U.S. and German governments—from the Biden administration’s use of tax incentives to encourage the expansion of renewable energy to the new German government’s vow to devote 2 percent of the country’s land to the generation of wind power—are not actively harmful. In sum, they will almost certainly accelerate both countries’ reduction of carbon emissions. But by any fair accounting, they are inadequate to solving climate change on the timeline implied by the Paris Agreement’s 1.5-degree commitment—namely, a 50 percent reduction of emissions by 2035 and complete global carbon neutrality by 2050. “The problem with the climate measures of this new government is the speed,” said Pauline Brünger, a spokesperson for Germany’s Fridays for Future activist group. Representatives from the U.S. and German governments say their policies are the result of the necessary compromises demanded by the democratic process. But it’s fair to wonder whether that’s just another way of restating the problem. According to the climate science, the timelines to limit warming aren’t an expression of subjectively perceived urgency but objective measures defined by the boundary of a catastrophic climate tipping point. In a 2018 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a U.N. group of climate scientists, declared that achieving carbon neutrality by midcentury was the only way to prevent global temperatures from rising above 1.5 degrees—beyond which, Arctic ice would melt (and ocean levels would rise) far more quickly, humans would more frequently suffer heat death, and vast numbers of species, from insects to sea coral, would end up on the verge of extinction. In other words: Democracy works by compromise, but climate change is precisely the type of problem that seems not to allow for it. As the clock on those climate timelines continues to tick, this structural mismatch is becoming increasingly exposed. And as a result, those concerned by climate change—some already with political power, others grasping for it—are now searching for, and finding, new ways of closing the gap between politics and science, by any means necessary. The tensions between existing methods of democracy and the problem posed by climate change are perfectly legible in domestic politics but most evident in international politics. In one sense, it would be tempting to say that international politics is not yet democratic enough for the purposes of combating climate change. Historically, it’s undeniable that the Western countries that were the earliest to industrialize are responsible for the majority of carbon that has already been deposited in the atmosphere. A majority of ongoing emissions today are likewise created by a minority of the global population, namely in the world’s most developed economies—a group that heavily overlaps with the first. If the basic principle of democracy is that each person (or each country) has equal voice, then it seems obvious that the majority of the world—the portion of the global population that contributes least to carbon emissions and stands to suffer the most from their effects—should be able to hold the minority accountable. That is, they should be able to compel the developed world to pay whatever it takes to transition to renewable energy at a speed consistent with maintaining the critical 1.5-degree threshold (and to assist poorer countries with any damages that nevertheless result from that mitigated climate change). The reality, of course, is that there is no global government that can organize democratic government, and grant democratic rights, on a global scale. The international community must instead rely on existing national governments—the sovereign actors in the international system—to organize global collective action. Many of those governments, of course, are themselves democratic. And they have plenty of incentive to create an international framework that invites equal participation from the countries of the world and seems to enjoy democratic legitimacy; plenty of their own constituents would demand as much. The annual U.N. climate change meetings, known as COP, which produced the Paris Agreement and continue to monitor its progress and in which nearly all the countries of the world participate, are an example of just such a framework. Unlike other environmental problems, the effects of climate change are not immediate, which makes it even harder to form a democratic consensus. But the example also cuts the other way: The COP framework is ill-matched to solving climate change in a timely fashion because it doesn’t solve the international governance dilemma at its heart. Climate change, in economic terms, is a commons management issue. The goal is to create a stable ecosystem, but every country has an incentive to free ride and let others swallow the costs of providing it. It’s in nobody’s immediate self-interest to go first and bear the costs of mitigating carbon emissions: Why commit to something if others won’t? That’s especially so since early movers on climate policy only earn a small share of the global benefits while paying a disproportionate share of the costs. For an international climate agreement to be successful, in the sense of persuading powerful countries to participate to their fullest capacity, it needs to do two things: It has to have a mechanism for monitoring the commitments that every country makes, and it has to be explicit about the punishment for cheating. States must know whether others comply with their obligations, and if they don’t, then a mechanism must exist to compel them so. But that’s not easy, of course, because the above-stated collective action problems impede creating such an agreement. There’s no clear path offered by the current democratic political system to get from here to there. The Paris Agreement—which offers no method of punishing countries for failing to meet their climate commitments aside from peer pressure and embarrassment at future COP meetings—might mark the height of what’s achievable. And so it should come as no surprise that almost none of the world’s countries are on pace to keep their Paris commitments. The agreement’s lack of any supervisory authority—countries have been left to pursue their goals on their own—constrained it from the start. Countries that couldn’t trust one another’s good faith (both in the creation of the climate goals and the pursuit of them) had incentive to free ride on the sacrifices made by others. Meanwhile, rich countries had little incentive to prevent damage that would disproportionately affect many of the world’s poorest. Compared with the problems of international governance, the structural impediments posed by domestic democratic politics are no less daunting. The essence of the democratic process in any nation-state is elections, a form of governance that focuses attention on immediate problems, holds national leaders accountable for solving them, subjects those solutions to revision within a few years’ time, and invites public involvement. The nature of climate change as a political problem stands in contradiction to all those attributes. It occurs over very long time frames, extends beyond all political boundaries, is both irreversible and highly urgent, and is exceedingly complex to understand in its full scope. Unlike other environmental problems—such as air and water pollution—the effects of climate change are not immediate, which makes it even harder to form a democratic consensus. We should not be surprised if political processes that evolved to solve very different problems have trouble coping. But the biggest failures of the domestic democratic process center on the constant threat of capture of the political process by special interests with the most to lose from stringent reforms. Climate policy always involves the creation of new winners and losers in a given economy. Politics thus becomes a distributive struggle, with those less attached to the economic status quo pushing for a dramatic renegotiation of economic and social structures while facing resistance from interest groups that stand to lose out from such change. The latter group typically has advantages in any such struggle, especially in liberal democracies that invite interest group participation in the political process. As the economic beneficiaries of the current system, they start out by enjoying advantages in terms of their access to the political process and even to political veto points. By influencing politicians and the general political debate, they can help block policies such as carbon taxes or massive public investments to transform energy and transportation systems. But even if those in favor of far-reaching climate policies organize themselves in response and succeed in making a strong showing in a national election, the opposing side won’t have disappeared: It will still be exerting its influence in society. The democratic process steers distributional disagreements of this sort toward compromise. That is precisely what happened after the German and U.S. elections: If one side of an argument runs up against resistance from an opposing side, it’s good democratic practice to split the difference. The result is moderate, rather than sufficient, climate policies: less public money for an energy transition, extended timelines for exiting fossil fuels. And all the while, the clock, counting down toward climate catastrophe, ticks in the background. As government fails to meet the task of stopping climate change, other players, beyond the typical boundaries of politics, are naturally stepping into their place. Precisely to the extent that democratic politics poses barriers to solving climate change, it has increased the appeal of radical politics as an alternative. If special interests have captured the democratic process, radicals propose to break the impasse in two ways: by giving the broader public greater incentive to themselves steer policymaking and by curtailing that process altogether in a way that keeps it in the hands of technocratic elites, including central bankers and constitutional judges. In the former case, consider Fridays for Future, the global movement that was inspired by the Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg. Just as Thunberg ceased going to school to register a moral objection to her country’s inaction on climate policy, groups of schoolchildren around the world now refuse to attend classes on Fridays, choosing instead to peacefully protest in the streets. One international day of protest in 2019 attracted the participation of more than a million people in 125 countries. This movement, however, is being outpaced in countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany by more radical actors, including Extinction Rebellion. Unlike Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion does not presume the government’s good faith, nor do its members believe entirely that peaceful demonstrations are adequate to the present moment. They aim to coerce political change by making the status quo unsustainable, including by organizing debt strikes against major banks that help finance the carbon economy. Meanwhile, activist writers such as Andreas Malm favor even more extreme measures, advocating openly in favor of violent sabotage of carbon-economy infrastructure. But it’s not only bottom-up activists who are engaging in politics outside the normal channels of electoral democracy. Germany’s constitutional court is a case in point. In a surprise ruling in April 2021, the judges on the court declared that the climate policies passed by the government of then-Chancellor Angela Merkel were insufficient on the basis of the rights of young people to live their future lives in an undamaged environment. This was not a right that anyone in the German government had previously believed was anchored in the constitution—but the ruling left them no choice but to pass a law accelerating their existing climate plans. In recent years, courts from Australia to Pakistan and across the entirety of Europe have issued similar judgments in favor of climate policy, forcing their respective governments to act. Technology is also increasingly intersecting with political radicalism outside the channels of normal democratic politics. At the same time, the arcane world of central banking is also turning to radical means to stem the effects of climate change. There’s a growing recognition among policymakers that the businesses resisting climate policy are ultimately subordinate to the economic rules set by the policymakers themselves—whether or not they’re given a mandate by the public to use the fullest extent of their power. Among these figures is Mark Carney, former governor of the Bank of England and head of the global Financial Stability Board, where he established the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, which has set the terms for green finance now accepted by many of the world’s leading banks and asset managers. In 2017, Carney helped found the Network for Greening the Financial System, which aims to throw the weight of key financial institutions behind the goals of the Paris Agreement. Last year, the group announced that participating banks would commit to spending $130 trillion on green investments. . But it’s not clear whether this existing green agenda is adequate to the climate challenge. Some critics believe the banks have been too defensive, mostly focusing on managing financial risks and maintaining financial stability. These policymakers—including Isabel Schnabel, a German member of the European Central Bank’s executive board—are now discussing moving into a more active mode, using central banks’ administrative powers to speed along the global economy’s rapid decarbonization. They would amplify the volume of so-called green bonds privileged by the central bank and use new rules to increase the risk of investing in the carbon economy. Technology is also increasingly intersecting with political radicalism outside the channels of normal democratic politics. The 2018 report issued by the IPCC has raised the possibility of deploying various technological fixes to slow the global warming that more straightforward democratic politics has failed to manage. Deep in the report is a startling line: “There is robust evidence but medium agreement for unilateral action potentially becoming a serious SRM governance issue.” SRM refers to “solar radiation modification,” the most frequently discussed form of geoengineering, which involves injecting aerosols into the atmosphere to cool the planet, just as major volcanic eruptions do naturally. The key term from the IPCC report, however, is “unilateral action.” It refers to the possibility that someone might simply take matters into his or her own hands. Indeed, what’s clear is that a single billionaire might be able to finance such a venture without other political actors being able to do much about it. That the world’s democracies are witnessing a growing spectrum of climate radicalism, both from the bottom up and the top down, is not to suggest that authoritarian systems would do any better in solving the relevant political and economic issues involved in moving beyond the carbon economy. But it is a sign that democracy, in its current form, is not necessarily the path to a solution. It might, instead, be part of the problem.

#### DPT is wrong – 4 wars and other empirics prove

- WWI (Germany vs. Britain, France, Italy, US), Boer War (Britain vs. South Africa and Orange Free State), Spanish-American War, Kargil War (India and Pakistan), also civil war

- sure democracies are peaceful to each other but not non-democracies

- 1 war is enough to disprove the whole theory bc there’s so few examples in the first place

Mearsheimer 18 John J. Mearsheimer, American political scientist and international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago. He has been described as the most influential realist of his generation, 2018, “The Great Delusion”, Yale University Press, // ella

Democratic Peace Theory The words democratic peace theory imply that it offers a story about how democracy, not liberalism, brings peace. But the title is a misnomer, because the arguments underpinning democratic peace theory emphasize liberalism as well as democracy. A number of scholars in this tradition even refer to “liberal peace.” It would be more accurate to call it liberal democratic peace theory. Moreover, liberal states are almost always democratic as well, mainly because the centrality of freedom and inalienable rights clearly implies that all citizens have the right to determine who governs them. As I emphasized in the introduction, this is why I focus on liberal democracies, not simply liberal states. Hence, I will examine both the democracy-based and liberalism-based logics behind democratic peace theory. Democratic peace theory was remarkably popular in the two decades after the Cold War ended. Michael Doyle introduced it to the academic and policy worlds in a pair of seminal articles published in 1983.9 When the superpower rivalry ended in 1989, it was widely believed that liberal democracy would steadily sweep across the globe, spreading peace everywhere. This perspective, of course, is the central theme in Fukuyama’s “The End of History?” But time has not been kind to Fukuyama’s argument. Authoritarianism has become a viable alternative, and there are few signs that liberal democracy will conquer the globe anytime soon. Freedom House maintains that the world’s share of democracies actually declined between 2006 and 2016, which naturally reduces the scope of the theory. 10 Even if liberal democracy were on the march, however, it would not enhance the prospects for peace, because the theory is seriously flawed. Consider its central finding. Some of its proponents argue that there has never been a war between two democracies. But this is wrong: there are at least four cases in the modern era where democracies waged war against each other. Contrary to what democratic peace theorists say, Germany was a liberal democracy during World War I (1914–18), and it fought against four other liberal democracies: Britain, France, Italy, and the United States.11 In the Boer War (1899–1902) Britain fought against the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, both of which were democracies.12 The Spanish-American War (1898) and the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan are also cases of democracies fighting each other. 13 Other cases come close to qualifying as wars between democracies.14 The American Civil War is usually not counted because it is considered a civil war rather than an interstate war. One might argue, however, that the distinction is not meaningful here. The Confederacy was established on February 4, 1861, but the war did not begin until April, by which time the Confederacy was effectively a sovereign state. It is also worth noting that there have been a host of militarized disputes between democracies, including some cases where fighting broke out and people died, but that fell short of actual war. 15 There are also many cases of democracies, especially the United States, overthrowing democratically elected leaders in other countries, a behavior that seems at odds with the claim that democracies behave peacefully toward one another. But let us get back to my four cases of actual wars between democracies. One might concede that I am right yet still argue that this tiny number of wars does not substantially challenge the theory. This conclusion would be wrong, however, for reasons clearly laid out by the democratic peace theorist James L. Ray: “Since wars between states are so rare statistically . . . the existence of even a few wars between democratic states would wipe out entirely the statistical and therefore arguably the substantive significance of the difference in the historical rates of warfare between pairs of democratic states, on the one hand, and pairs of states in general, on the other.”16 Those four wars between democracies, in other words, undermine the central claim of democratic peace theorists. The second major problem with democratic peace theory is that it offers no good explanation for why liberal democracies should not fight each other. Democratic peace theorists have put forward various explanations, some of which focus on democratic institutions and norms and others that emphasize liberal norms. But none are compelling. Democratic Institutions and Peace There are three institutional explanations for why liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. The first emphasizes that publics are pacific by nature, and if asked whether to initiate a war they will almost certainly say no. Kant articulates this argument in Perpetual Peace: “If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared . . . nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.”17 This argument was popular during the Cold War among neoconservatives, who believed that liberal democracies were inclined to appease authoritarian states because democratic peoples were not only soft but influential, because they could vote.18 The fatal flaw in this argument is that it proves too much. If the citizens of a liberal democracy were so averse to war, they would be disinclined to fight against non-democracies as well as democracies. They would not want to fight any wars at all. It is clear from the historical record, however, that this is not the case. The United States, for instance, has fought seven wars since the Cold War ended, and it initiated all seven. During that period it has been at war for two out of every three years. It is no exaggeration to say that the United States is addicted to war. Moreover, Britain, another liberal democracy, has been at America’s side throughout those wars. This helps explain why democratic peace theorists do not argue that democracies are generally more peaceful than non-democracies. Several factors explain why democratic peoples sometimes favor starting wars. For one, there are sometimes good strategic reasons for war and most citizens will recognize them. Furthermore, democratic leaders are often adept at convincing reticent publics that war is necessary, even when it is not.19 Sometimes not much convincing is necessary, because the people’s nationalist fervor is so great that, if anything, they are pushing their leaders to go to war, whether necessary or not.20 Finally, it is wrong to assume that the public axiomatically pays a big price when its country goes to war. Wealthy countries often have a highly capitalized military, which means that only a small slice of the population actually serves. Moreover, liberal democracies are often adept at finding ways to minimize their casualties— for example, by using drones against an adversary. As for the financial costs, a state has many ways to pay for a war without seriously burdening its public.21 The second institutional explanation is that it is more difficult for government leaders to mobilize a democracy to start a war. This cumbersome decision making is partly a function of the need to get public permission, which is time-consuming given the public’s natural reluctance to fight wars and risk death. The institutional obstacles built into democracies, like checks and balances, slow down the process. These problems make it difficult not only to start a war but also to formulate and execute a smart foreign policy. If these claims were true, again, democracies would not initiate wars against non-democracies. But they do. There may be instances where democratic inefficiencies prevent governing elites from taking their country to war, although as I noted above, that will happen infrequently. Moreover, the institutional impediments that might thwart leaders bent on starting a war usually count for little, because the decision to start a war is often made during a serious crisis, in which the executive takes charge and checks and balances, as well as individual rights, are subordinated to national security concerns. In an extreme emergency, liberal democracies are fully capable of reacting swiftly and decisively, and initiating a war if necessary. Finally, some argue that “audience costs” are the key to explaining the democratic peace.22 This claim rests on the belief that democratically elected leaders are especially good at signaling their resolve in crises because they can make public commitments to act in particular circumstances, which they are then obligated to follow through on. In other words, they can tie their own hands. If they renege on their commitments, the public will punish them by voting them out of office. Once a leader draws a red line, the argument goes, his audience will hold his feet to the fire. Two democracies can thus make it clear to each other what exactly they would fight over, which allows them to avoid miscalculation and negotiate a settlement. The audience-costs story is intuitively attractive, but empirical studies have shown that it has little explanatory power. 23 There is hardly any evidence that audience costs have worked as advertised in actual crises. Moreover, there are many reasons to question the theory’s underlying logic. For example, leaders are usually wary about drawing red lines, preferring instead to keep their threats vague so as to maximize their bargaining space. In such cases, audience-costs logic does not even come into play. But even if a leader draws a red line and then fails to follow through, the public is unlikely to punish her if she ends the crisis on favorable terms. Moreover, one should never underestimate political leaders’ ability to spin a story so that it appears they did not renege on a commitment when they actually did. And even if a leader gives a signal, there is no guarantee the other side will read it correctly. In sum, none of the mechanisms involving democratic institutions provides a satisfactory explanation for why democracies rarely fight wars with each other. 24 Some prominent democratic peace theorists recognize the limits of these institutional explanations and instead rely on normative arguments linked to democracy and liberalism.25