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#### Capitalism causes massive violence and inevitable extinction – the role of the ballot is to endorse the best organizational tactics.

Escalante 19 [Alyson Escalante, M.A., Department of Philosophy @ University of Oregon, “Truth and Practice: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge,” 09/08/19, tinyurl.com/8jksnexs] pat

The world we live in today is in a dire state. Climate destruction continues at a fast pace, and every with every passing day, capitalism proves itself to be incapable of addressing this. Capitalist production and its endless drive for resources to match artificial market demands has created a climate crisis that leaves us on the brink of potential extinction.

Governments around the world are turning to far right and fascist leaders to assuage their fears of an uncertain future, and the most marginalized and oppressed suffer because of it. Fascism is on the rise, and history tells us very clearly what that can result in without opposition.

The decaying US empire continues to lash out in violence across the globe in a desperate attempt to re-assert its power and hegemony. Whole countries are destroyed in its desperate bids for more fossil fuels. The world burns from America’s white phosphorus weaponry.

The need for a revolutionary movement capable of replacing capitalism with something better has never been so clear. The choice between socialism or barbarism has never been so stark. More and more people are starting to realize that reform cannot save us, that capitalism and imperialism themselves are the problem, and that we must unite and band together to fight for a better world.

The question then is: how will we know what strategies, what tactics, and what ideas to unite around? If the skeptics and postmodernists are correct that knowledge is always relative and localized, then we cannot built a global and universal strategy to unite around. If they are correct then we are doomed to small acts of localized or individual resistance in the face of apocalypse. To embrace such a vision of the world (with its accompanying epistemological skepticism) is to embrace defeat.

The masses do not want to embrace defeat, they want to know how to fight back. Marxism can provide the tools necessary to engage in that fight.

Marxism, with its self criticism and its insistence on incorporating the valuable ideas of its critics has created a means for unifying workers across the globe with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. The Marxist belief in the possibility of true ideas, tested and verified in practice, creates the possibility for unity on a global scale. The scientific status of Marxism means that as our climate changes, as our world looks more and more grim, Marxism will adapt through struggle and practice; it will provide us with the ideas and tools we need to fight and win.

There will be no victory for the workers of the world without the ability to wield a revolutionary science. What is at stake in questions of Marxist epistemology is the very possibility of creating a philosophical and scientific basis for revolution. We must defend this possibility. We must defend the scientific status of Marxism, and must insist on the possibility of victory.

#### Objectivity only reifies capitalism through constant reproduction of itself – only advocacy journalism solves

Gonzalez 13 Christine LeFevere-Gonzalez, B.S. University of Texas at Austin and M.A. University of Colorado at Boulder, A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Journalism and Mass Communication, 2013, “Rewriting the Rulebook, Revamping an Industry: Objectivity and Professional Journalism in Transition in the Modern Media Ecology” <https://scholar.colorado.edu/downloads/n870zr01k>// ella [brackets in original text]

Jensen sees this definition as meritorious as well, because he respects good scientific work and believes that this use of objectivity possesses a moral and practical value. However, he believes that neither of these two definitions of objectivity--its everyday and scientific uses-mirrors what journalists practice within the newsroom. Like Hedges, Jensen believes that objectivity in the newsroom refers to its reliance on official corporate and government sources. A similar perspective exists as one of the filters within Herman and Chomsky's "propaganda model" in which business and government powers shape the day. to-day "provision" of news by shaping the supply of experts (Herman and Chomsky, 1991, p. 23). These experts typically express pro-establishment opinions, and their media dominance on major news outlets marginalizes dissident views. Jensen, too, believes that quoting elite information sources only serves to uphold a dominant ideology in which America's perceived capitalistic and global prowess faces few questions. So what does objectivity in journalism mean? What it means is a set of practices that a contemporary, professional journalism has developed. Now, what are those practices? Well, they focus mostly on who is and who is not considered a credible source. Most of what we call objectivity in journalism is really about practices around sources. And my own experience as a journalist, my own experience as a political activist interacting with journalists, and all of the research that's been done makes it very clear that in mainstream corporate commercial journalism, the practices around sources are creating a category that we typically call "official sources," mostly people from government and government-related institutions and from corporate and corporate-related institutions. To a lesser degree, think tanks and universities. These are places that journalists give credibility to sources, and those sources therefore take a primary role not just in commenting about the news but in defining what is news. Instead of relying on the ritual of objective journalism, Jensen believes that reporters need to recognize that there is no "view from nowhere." "The first and most crucial step is to develop the capacity of self-reflection," he maintains, "not just individually but as a profession and as an institution." Like Ward's pragmatic approach to objectivity, Jensen calls for greater introspection in journalism, except Jensen believes that reporters should focus that reflexivity in a counter-hegemonic way, wresting their precepts of American journalism out of the capitalist ideology that entraps them. McChesney (1993) explains that "the U.S. political culture does not permit any discussion of fundamental weaknesses in capitalism" (p. 262). Additionally, Clarke (2005) argues that the development of "corporate convergence" in the form of chain ownership compelled newsrooms to abandon partisan journalism for the more mass market-friendly objective format (p. 168). Together, these thinkers craft a great hegemon from which no newsroom that relies on a market-based model can hope to escape, unless journalists realize their predicament and approach their work with a more critical understanding of the capitalist forces affecting them. Furthermore, Jensen criticizes "fairness" as the gold standard of ethical journalism. Now that objectivity has come under attack, particularly in the last ten years, he believes that "mainstream journalists who used to sell the objectivity story can't sell that story anymore" because of the commercial success of overtly politicize news sources such as The Fox News Channel and MSNBC. He continues, So if journalists say, "Well, we're not claiming to be objective anymore, we're striving forfairness," but when they report about the most important story of the last ten years they fall into the same patterns, which again just demonstrates that it's not about what you call it, it's about how you understand what you're doing. And most mainstream corporate commercial journalists understand what they're doing within these traditional, very ideologically-limited ways of understanding. He also argues that a commitment to fairness does little to curb the impact of mainstream journalism's reliance on "elite" sources. So imagine that the sourcing practices I described are unchanged, but instead of calling it "objectivity" you call it "a struggle for fairness," but the underlying practices are the same. Well, and it doesn't matter what you call it. The problem is the practices... They have not reflected on the underlying structure of the industry and the reporting practices. They've simply tried to find a new name for it.Jensen's cynicism about fairness stands in striking opposition to the manner by which the reporters in Part 1 describe how the concept functions as a practical goal in their daily routines. The reporters interviewed almost universally maintain that they strive to be "fair," and that "fairness" describes the subjective, reflexive aspects of their work in a way in which objectivity falls short. Many of the reporters believe that objectivity never materialized as a part of professional journalism practice although the concept remains an abstraction with potent symbolic power in the minds of many journalists. So Jensen's cynicism is not entirely without cause: Journalists indeed have made a rhetorical adjustment in how they describe their work without actually changing their newsgathering routines: however, their decision reflects less a market-based reaction to what "sells" to their audiences, and more reflects a maturing profession seeking to specify the type of jargon that better fits what they actually do day to day on the job Jensen also expressed skepticism about Rosenstiel's push for transparency as a primary journalistic value. I think that people like Kovach and Rosenstiel are the most sane voices within mainstream journalism, but because they are still trapped within that ideology, I think in the end tneir project is a failed project, because they don't step back and say the fundamental question is whether or not good newsreporting can be done by reporters working for a capitalist institution within capitalism-that's the first and most obvious question. So Jensen believes that no construction of professional standards--no establishment of universal ethical concepts such as objectivity, fairness, or transparency-can improve journalism's quality or how it serves the American public without journalists first adopting a critical stance of hegemonic precepts such as capitalism and American global dominance. Isabel McDonald (2006) also argues for a critical journalism stance, and hence, the establishment of a critical journalism pedagogy in educational programs. She labels effortsby ethics reformers to establish professional standards as "overly idealistic." She quotes Herbert Gans' critique of Kovach and Rosenstiel's The Elements of Journalism, in which he wrote that "the authors view the ideals as, among other things, a weapon with which to fight the commercial and other forces threatening the profession, but whether any ideal has sufficient fire power to overcome a powerful reality is doubtful" (Gans, 2003, p. 36, as quoted in McDonald, 2006, p. 755). MacDonald argues that the goal for journalists should instead be to challenge the corporate logic that undermines a public interest focus to their work. If a critical journalism education "succeeds in encouraging students to develop an analysis of the constraints of the commercial media, as well as exploring diverse journalistic practices, these students are arguably better positioned to rise to the challenge of promoting a journalism that better serves the public" (McDonald, p. 758). lensen and McDonald, and other media scholars who work within the critical political-economist framework, focus on the modern media ecology with a strident, macro- level perspective. Large, faceless institutional forces (the "MSM"; the "MIC") conspire to reinforce dominant ideologies that control the lives of "the masses" (see Herman and Chomsky, 1991; Bagdikian, 1983, 2000, 2004). In a sense, they observe the media environment as if they are watching great gods in the midst of battle, with the oppressed forces of public good falling prey to monolithic, capitalist deities that seek"to undermine the will of the people, operating as faceless masses engaged in a kind of groupthink. Little of this framework offers room for subtlety or nuance in understanding the current condition of journalism. As Chris Hedges demonstrates earlier in this writing, the debate about the current state of objectivity is no exception. "The Media" adopted objectivity because of its market-friendly application. "The Media" then abandoned objectivity because "The Publicno longer bought what "The Media" were selling. After much flak, "The Media" adopted fairness as their new standard because "they" could sell it better to "The Public." The political-economist perspective has defined much of the debate surrounding American journalism ethics since the 1990s and has shaped our understanding of topics such as objectivity with a narrow, economistic focus. Michael Schudson writes, Some scholars persist in emphasizing the media's uniformity, which derives from its role as a necessary component of advancing the interests of corporate capitalism. Popular in some quarters of the left, this approach sees capitalist self-interest at every turn, as each cover of Time, each episode of 60 Minutes, and every New York Times front page shores up a capitalist system. To these critics, every apparent sign of debate or controversy merely covers up a deeper uniformity of views (Schudson, 2011, p. 31). Despite all of this, however, they are correct to a degree. Market forces have undermined the quality of journalism, especially when accounting for budgetary cuts to investigative and science journalism, and mainstream cable news continues to provide almost nauseating displays of he said/she said reporting and tit-for-tat public debate that appeal to the lowest common denominator. The problem with the political-economist perspective of journalism does not lie in the problems it identifies, but in how it frames those problems, failing to account for other ideological forces in American society that could, in smaller spaces of the American discursive environment, also shape the modern news ecology. American journalism is not merely an economic product, but a social construction based on blend of cultural, economic, political, and historical forces. Our understanding of the condition of journalistic objectivity should account for all of these factors. Conclusions The fox hunt for a new universal journalism ethic to replace the much maligned and discredited notion of objectivity continues. Media scholars have clamored in recent yearsto locate the key value that better instructs modern journalism. Whether fairness, pragmatic objectivity, or transparency becomes the new term of art remains to be seen. Critical political economists also pursue a new universal for objectivity, but only with the intention of criticizing a media system that they see as fraught with a capitalist ideology that undermines journalism's moral responsibility to the public. Their condemnation of objectivity ideologically maps to the work of Jay Rosen, Clay Shirky, and others who support the establishment of more avenues for citizen and public forms of journalism. They believe firmly that the establishment of alternative forms of journalism will improve how news addresses the public interest. They also believe that encouraging journalists to adopt a more critical perspective of their newsrooms will improve journalistic accountability to the public. Both are noble and worthwhile pursuits, albeit incomplete. All three alternative conceptualizations place newsrooms closer to public debate and incorporate subjective reasoning, introspection, and reflexivity into their models, which better fits the more fluid modern news ecology. Mill's embracing of human fallibility in his construction of public debate has reflected the American conception of free expression and the pursuit of truth. Perhaps these more subjective approaches to newsgathering will better suit that tradition.

#### Democracy sustains capitalism in a way that only advocacy can overcome

Singh 89 Rustam Singh, Panjab University, Department of Political Science, 1-28-1989, “Status of Violence in Marx's Theory of Revolution”, Economic and Political Weekly, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4394305.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A18f2ce3b0e46ab2a827fbbac9dc397bc&ab_segments=&origin=> // ella

Thirdly, Marx and Engels were frequently advocating, during this very period, the workers' right to come to power through violent means. And the platform for this advocacy was often the International itself. They would have refrained from indulging in these exercises had the security of the members of the International been their prime concern. Miller forgets that it was during these very years that Marx lauded and defended the failed Paris Commune which had given a demonstration of a violent revolution in its more bloodier form. Summing up his argument, Miller says: the primary claim in Marx's mature political theory is that organised large scale violence is necessary to end bourgeois dominance... An electoral triumph may, atypically, precede violent class struggle, but it never supplants it. Surely, it is not seriously misleading to summarise this position as "the necessity of revolution..." 1 We have seen, during the course of this paper, that by early 1870s Marx and Engels no longer retained their faith in the necessity and inevitability of a violent revolution. They had now come to believe that the nature and the form of tlhe revolution will be determined by the particular set of circumstances prevailing at a given historical juncture. Accordingly, the revolution could be either violent or peaceful. It is difficult to agree with Miller, therefore, that the "primary" claim in Marx's "mature" political theory was that violence was "necessary" to end bourgeois rule, Miller presents Marx's argument in a way that makes it look as if Marx emphasised the primacy of violence even though he admitted the possibility of a peaceful change. As a matter of fact, however, Marx does not talk in terms of the 'primary' and the 'secondary' while referring to violent and peaceful means, respectively. According to him, violence will be necessary only at those places where the means for effecting peaceful transition do not exist, or they do exist but are made inaccessible by the ruling classes when the transition looks possible. Marx nowhere specifically says that the ruling .classes -will take this action, an implication inherent in Miller's argument. Citing the example of Allende's Chile, Miller pontificates: "It is one thing for a movement with a programme threatening dominant social groups to win an election. It is another thing for it to change society... A workers' movement whose practice is con- fined to electoral agitation will hardly be able to put down a "pro-slavery rebellion", with the bulk of material and professional military expertise on the other side"'01 All this may be true-and Chile's example shows that it can turn out to be true-but this is Miller's position, and not that of Marx.

#### Capitalism is unsustainable and plunging the world into over-accumulation, extinction through nuclear war, climate change, super-viruses, fascism, and rampant inequality.

Robinson, 21

[William I., prof. sociology and global studies @ UCSB: "What are the real reasons behind the New Cold War?" ROAR Magazine, published 5-6-21, https://roarmag.org/essays/new-cold-war-crisis-capitalism/?fbclid=IwAR2RzXn0SMlPSiLfXcXNtTcDIybQa6GxH\_eodUmyEww2i59lh5qHpZpcwhk]//AD

The US is launching a New Cold War against Russia and China in an attempt to deflect our attention from the escalating crisis of global capitalism.

The announcement on April 15 by President Biden that this administration was expelling 10 Kremlin diplomats and imposing new sanctions for alleged Russian interference in the 2020 US elections — to which Russia replied with a tit for tat — came just days after the Pentagon conducted military drills in the South China Sea. These actions were but the latest escalation of aggressive posturing as Washington ramps up its “New Cold War” against Russia and China, pushing the world dangerously towards international political and military conflagration.

Most observers attribute this US-instigated war to rivalry and competition over hegemony and international economic control. These factors are important, but there is a bigger picture that has been largely overlooked of what is driving this process: the crisis of global capitalism.

This crisis is economic, or structural. One of chronic stagnation in the global economy. But it is also political: a crisis of state legitimacy and capitalist hegemony. The system is moving towards what we call “a general crisis of capitalist rule” as billions of people around the world face uncertain struggles for survival and question a system they no longer see as legitimate.

In the United States, the ruling groups must channel fear over tenuous survival away from the system and towards scapegoated communities, such as immigrants or Asians blamed for the pandemic, and towards external enemies such as China and Russia. At the same time, rising international tensions legitimate expanding military and security budgets and open up new opportunities for profit making through war, political conflict and repression in the face of stagnation in the civilian economy.

All around the world a “people’s spring” has taken off. From Chile to Lebanon, Iraq to India, France to the United States, Haiti to Nigeria and South Africa to Colombia, waves of strikes and mass protests have proliferated and, in many instances, appear to be acquiring a radical anti-capitalist character. The ruling groups cannot but be frightened by the rumbling from below. If left unchallenged, the New Cold War will become a cornerstone in the arsenal of US rulers and transnational elites to maintain a grip on power as the crisis deepens.

THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM

Economically, global capitalism faces what is known in technical language as “overaccumulation”: a situation in which the economy has produced — or has the capacity to produce — great quantities of wealth but the market cannot absorb this wealth because of escalating inequality. Capitalism by its very nature will produce abundant wealth yet polarize that wealth and generate ever greater levels of social inequality unless offset by redistributive policies. The level of global social polarization and inequality now experienced is without precedent. In 2018, the richest one percent of humanity controlled more than half of the world’s wealth while the bottom 80 percent had to make do with just five percent.

Such inequalities end up undermining the stability of the system as the gap grows between what is — or could be — produced and what the market can absorb. The extreme concentration of the planet’s wealth in the hands of the few and the accelerated impoverishment and dispossession of the majority means that the transnational capitalist class, or TCC, has increasing difficulty in finding productive outlets to unload enormous amounts of surplus it accumulated.

The more global inequalities expand, the more constricted the world market becomes and the more the system faces a structural crisis of overaccumulation. If left unchecked, expanding social polarization results in crisis — in stagnation, recessions, depressions, social upheavals and war — just what we are experiencing right now.

Contrary to mainstream accounts, the coronavirus pandemic did not cause the crisis of global capitalism, for this was already upon us. On the eve of the pandemic, growth in the EU countries had already shrunk to zero, much of Latin America and sub-Sahara Africa was in recession, growth rates in Asia were steadily declining, and North America faced a slowdown. The writing was on the wall. The contagion was but the spark that ignited the combustible of a global economy that never fully recovered from the 2008 financial collapse and had been teetering on the brink of renewed crisis ever since.

Even if there is a momentary recovery as the world slowly emerges from the pandemic, global capitalism will remain mired in this structural crisis of overaccumulation. In the years leading up to the pandemic there was a steady rise in underutilized capacity and a slowdown in industrial production around the world. The surplus of accumulated capital with nowhere to go expanded rapidly. Transnational corporations recorded record profits during the 2010s at the same time that corporate investment declined.

The total cash held in reserves of the world’s 2,000 biggest non-financial corporations increased from $6.6 trillion in 2010 to $14.2 trillion in 2020 — considerably more than the foreign exchange reserves of the world’s central governments — as the global economy stagnated. Wild financial speculation and mounting government corporate, and consumer debt drove growth in the first two decades of the 21st century, but these are temporary and unsustainable solutions to long-term stagnation.

THE GLOBAL WAR ECONOMY

As I showed in my 2020 book, The Global Police State, the global economy has become ever more dependent on the development and deployment of systems of warfare, social control and repression simply as a means of making profit and continuing to accumulate capital in the face of chronic stagnation and saturation of global markets. This is known as “militarized accumulation” and refers to a situation in which a global war economy relies on perpetual state organized war making, social control and repression — driven now by new digital technologies — in order to sustain the process of capital accumulation.

The events of September 11, 2001 marked the start of an era of a permanent global war in which logistics, warfare, intelligence, repression, surveillance and even military personnel are more and more the privatized domain of transnational capital. The Pentagon budget increased 91 percent in real terms between 1998 and 2011, while worldwide, total state military budgets outlays grew by 50 percent from 2006 to 2015, from $1.4 trillion to more than $2 trillion, although this figure did not take into account the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on intelligence, contingency operations, policing, bogus wars against immigrants, terrorism and drugs, and “homeland security.” During this time, military-industrial complex profits quadrupled.

But focusing just on state military budgets only gives us a part of the picture of the global war economy. The various wars, conflicts and campaigns of social control and repression around the world involve the fusion of private accumulation with state militarization. In this relationship, the state facilitates the expansion of opportunities for private capital to accumulate through militarization, such as by facilitating global weapons sales by military-industrial-security firms, the amounts of which have reached unprecedented levels. Global weapons sales by the top 100 weapons manufacturers and military service companies increased by 38 percent between 2002 and 2016.

By 2018, private for-profit military companies employed some 15 million people around the world, while another 20 million people worked in private security worldwide. The private security (policing) business is one of the fastest growing economic sectors in many countries and has come to dwarf public security around the world. The amount spent on private security in 2003, the year of the invasion of Iraq, was 73 percent higher than that spent in the public sphere, and three times as many persons were employed in private forces as in official law enforcement agencies. In half of the world’s countries, private security agents outnumber police officers.

These corporate soldiers and police were deployed to guard corporate property, provide personal security for TCC executives and their families, collect data, conduct police, paramilitary, counterinsurgency and surveillance operations, carry out mass crowd control and repression of protesters, run private detention and interrogation facilities, manage prisons and participate in outright warfare.

In 2018, President Trump announced with much fanfare the creation of a sixth military service, the “space force.” The corporate media duly towed the official line that this force was needed to face expanding threats to the United States. What went less reported is that a small group of former government officials with deep ties to the aerospace industry had pushed behind the scenes for its creation as a way to hype military spending on satellites and other space systems.

In February of this year, the Federation of American Scientists reported that military-industrial complex lobbying is responsible for the decision by the US government to invest at least $100 billion to beef up its nuclear stockpile. The Biden administration announced in early April to much acclaim that it would pull all US troops out of Afghanistan. While US service troops in that country number 2,500, these pale in comparison with the more than 18,000 contractors that US government has hired to do its bidding in the country, including at least 5,000 corporate soldiers that will remain.

The so-called wars on drugs and terrorism, the undeclared wars on immigrants, refugees and gangs — and poor, dark-skinned and working-class youth more generally — the construction of border walls, immigrant detention centers, prison-industrial complexes, systems of mass surveillance and the spread of private security guard and mercenary companies, have all become major sources of profit-making and they will become more important to the system as stagnation becomes the new normal. In sum, the global police state is big business at a time when other opportunities for transnational corporate profit-making are limited.

But if corporate profit, and not an external threat, is the reason for expanding the US state and corporate war machine and the global police state, this must still be justified to the public. The official state propaganda narrative about the “New Cold War” serves this purpose.

CONJURING UP EXTERNAL ENEMIES

There is another dynamic at work in explaining the New Cold War: the crisis of state legitimacy and capitalist hegemony. International tensions derive from the acute political contradiction in global capitalism in which economic globalization takes places within a nation-state-based system of political authority. To put this in technical terms, there is a contradiction between the accumulation function and the legitimacy function of states. That is, states face a contradiction between the need to promote transnational capital accumulation in their individual national territories and their need to achieve political legitimacy and stabilize the domestic social order.

Attracting transnational corporate and financial investments to the national territory requires providing capital with all the incentives associated with neoliberalism, such as downward pressure on wages, union busting, deregulation, low or no taxes, privatization, investment subsidies, fiscal austerity and on so. The result is rising inequality, impoverishment and insecurity for working and popular classes; precisely the conditions that throw states into crises of legitimacy, destabilize national political systems and jeopardize elite control.

International frictions escalate as states, in their efforts to retain legitimacy, seek to sublimate social and political tensions and to keep the social order from fracturing. In the US, this sublimation has involved channeling social unrest towards scapegoated communities such as immigrants — this is one key function of racism and was a core component of the Trump government’s political strategy — or towards an external enemy such as China or Russia, which is clearly becoming a cornerstone of the Biden government’s strategy.

While the Chinese and Russian ruling classes must also face the economic and political fallout of global crisis, their national economies are less dependent on militarized accumulation and their mechanisms of legitimization rest elsewhere — not on conflict with the US. It is Washington that is conjuring up the New Cold War, based not on any political or military threat from China and Russia, much less from economic competition, as US- and Chinese-based transnational corporations are deeply cross-invested, but on the imperative of managing and sublimating the crisis.

The drive by the capitalist state to externalize the political fallout of the crisis increases the danger that international tensions will lead to war. Historically wars have pulled the capitalist system out of crisis while they serve to deflect attention from political tensions and problems of legitimacy. The so-called “peace dividend” that was to result in demilitarization when the original Cold War ended with the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union evaporated almost overnight with the events of September 2001, which legitimated the sham “War on Terror” as a new pretext for militarization and reactionary nationalism. US presidents historically reach their highest approval ratings when they launch wars. George W. Bush reached an all-time-high of 90 percent in 2001 as his administration geared up to invade Afghanistan, and his father George H. W. Bush achieved an 89 percent approval rating in 1991, right as the US declared the end of its (first) invasion of Iraq and the “liberation of Kuwait.”

THE BATTLE FOR THE POST-PANDEMIC WORLD

We are currently witnessing a radical restructuring and transformation of global capitalism based on a much more advanced digitalization of the entire global economy and society. This process is driven by so-called fourth industrial revolution technologies, including artificial intelligence and machine learning, Big Data, autonomously driven land, air and sea vehicles, quantum and cloud computing, 5G bandwidth, bio- and nanotechnology and the Internet of Things, or IoT.

The crisis is not only economic and political, but also existential because of the threats of ecological collapse and nuclear war, to which we must add the danger of future pandemics that may involve much deadlier microbes than coronaviruses. The pandemic lockdowns served as dry runs for how digitalization may allow the dominant groups to step up restructuring time and space and to exercise greater control over the global working class. The system is now pushing towards expansion through militarization, wars and conflicts, through a new round of violent dispossession and through further plunder of the state.

The ruling classes are also using the health emergency to legitimate tighter control over restive populations. The changing social and economic conditions brought about by the pandemic and its aftermath are accelerating the process. These conditions have helped a new bloc of transnational capital, led by the giant tech companies, interwoven as they are with finance, pharmaceuticals and the military-industrial complex, to amass ever greater power and to consolidate its control over the commanding heights of the global economy. As restructuring proceeds, it heightens the concentration of capital worldwide, worsens social inequality and also aggravates international tensions and the dangers of military conflagration.

In 2018, just seventeen global financial conglomerates collectively managed $41.1 trillion dollars — more than half the GDP of the entire planet. That same year, to reiterate, the richest one percent of humanity led by 36 million millionaires and 2,400 billionaires controlled more than half of the world’s wealth while the bottom 80 percent — nearly six billion people — had to make do with just five percent of this wealth. The result is devastation for the poor majority of humanity.

Worldwide, 50 percent of all people live on less than $2.50 a day and a full 80 percent live on less than $10 per day. One in three people on the planet suffer from some form of malnutrition, nearly a billion go to bed hungry each night and another two billion suffer from food insecurity. Refugees from war, climate change, political repression and economic collapse already number into the hundreds of millions. The New Cold War will further immiserate this mass of humanity.

Capitalist crises are times of intense social and class struggles. There has been a rapid political polarization in global society since 2008 between an insurgent far-right and an insurgent left. The ongoing crisis has incited popular revolts. Workers, farmers and poor people have engaged in a wave of strikes and protests around the world. From Sudan to Chile, France to Thailand, South Africa to the United States, a “people’s spring” is breaking out everywhere. But the crisis also animates far-right and neofascist forces that have surged in many countries around the world and that sought to capitalize politically on the health calamity and its aftermath. Neofascist movements and authoritarian and dictatorial regimes have proliferated around the world as democracy breaks down.

Such ~~savage~~ inequalities are explosive. They fuel mass protest by the oppressed and lead the ruling groups to deploy an ever more omnipresent global police state to contain the rebellion of the global working and popular classes. Global capitalism is emerging from the pandemic in a dangerous new phase. The contradictions of this crisis-ridden system have reached the breaking point, placing the world into a perilous situation that borders on global civil war.

The stakes could not be higher. The battle for the post-pandemic world is now being waged. Part of that battle is to expose the New Cold War as a ruse by the dominant groups to deflect our attention from the escalating crisis of global capitalism. The US is launching a New Cold War against Russia and China in an attempt to deflect our attention from the escalating crisis of global capitalism.

#### Vote neg to join the party – dual power organizing is the only path to revolutionary change.

Escalante ‘18

[Alyson, philosophy at U of Oregon. 08/24/2018. “Against Electoralism, For Dual Power!” <https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/>] pat

I am sure that at this point, the opportunists reading this have already begun to type out their typical objection: the world is different than it was in 1917, and the conditions of the United States in no way echo the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve revolutionary success.

To this tried and true objection, there is one simple answer: you are entirely correct, and that is why we need to abandon electoralism and working within the bourgeois state.

What were the conditions which allowed the Bolsheviks to successfully revolt? The conditions were that of Dual Power. Alongside the capitalist state, there existed a whole set of institutions and councils which met the needs of the workers. The soviets, a parallel socialist government made up of individual councils, successfully took over many governmental responsibilities in some parts of Petrograd. In the radical Viborg district, the Bolshevik controlled soviets provided government services like mail, alongside programs that could meet the needs of workers. When a far right coup was attempted against the provisional government, it was troops loyal to the Bolshevik factions within the soviet who repelled the coup plotters, proving concretely to the workers of Petrograd that the socialists could not only provide for their needs, but also for their defense.

In short: the Bolsheviks recognized that instead of integrating into the bourgeois state, they could operate outside of it to build dual power. They could establish programs of elected representatives who would serve the workers. They would not bolster the capitalist state in the name of socialism, they would offer an alternative to it.

And so, when the time came for revolt, the masses were already to loyal to the Bolsheviks. The only party who had never compromised, who had denounced the unpopular imperialist wars, who had rejected the provisional government entirely, was the party who successfully gained the support of the workers.

And so, many of us on the more radical fringes of the socialist movement wonder why it is the the DSA and other socialist opportunists seem to think that we can win by bolstering the capitalist state? We wonder, given this powerful historical precedent, why they devote their energy to getting more Ocasios elected; what good does one more left democrat who will abandon the workers do for us?

The answer we receive in return is always the same: we want to win small changes that will make life for the workers easier; we want to protect food stamps and healthcare.

And do this, we reply: what makes you think reformism is the only way to do this. When the bourgeois state in California was happy to let black children go to school unfed, the Black Panthers didn’t rally around democratic candidates, they became militant and fed the children themselves. In the 40s and 50s, socialists in New York saw people going without healthcare and instead of rallying behind democratic candidates, they built the IWO to provide healthcare directly. Both these groups took up our pressing revolutionary task: building dual power.

Imagine if all those hours the DSA poured into electing Ocasio were instead used to feed the people of New York, to provide them with medical care, to ensure their needs were met. Imagine the masses seeing socialism not as a pipe dream we might achieve through electing more imperialists, but as a concrete movement which is currently meeting their needs?

The fact is, we are not nearly ready for revolution. Socialists in the United States have failed to meet the needs of the people, and as long as their only concrete interaction with the masses is handing them a voter registration form, they will continue to fail the people. Our task now is not to elect representatives to advocate for the people; it is much more gruelingly laborious than that. Our task is to serve the people. Our task is to build dual power.

The movement to do this is underway. Members of the DSA refoundation caucus have begun to move the left of the DSA in this direct, socialist groups like Philly Socialists have begun to build dual power through GED programs and tenants unions, many branches of the Party For Socialism and Liberation have begun to feed the people and provide for their concrete needs, and Red Guard collectives in Los Angeles have built serve the people programs and taken on a stance of militant resistance to gentrification. The movement is growing, its time is coming, and dual power is achievable within our life time.

The opportunists are, in a sense, correct. We are not where we were in 1917, but we can begin to move in that direction and dual power can take us there. In order to achieve dual power we have to recognize that Lenin was right: there will be no socialist gains by working within state institutions designed to crush socialism. Furthermore, we must recognize that the strategies of the electoral opportunists trade off with dual power. Electing candidates drains resources, time, and energy away from actually serving the people.

And so, we should commit to undertake the difficult and dangerous task of building dual power. We must reject opportunism, we must name the democratic party as our enemy, we must rally around power directly in the hands of the socialist movement. We do not have a parallel system of soviets in the United States. We can change that. Someday the cry “all power to the soviets” will be heard again. Lets make it happen.

# Case

## Democracy

### Turn – democracy bad

#### We’ll concede the aff solves for democracy but we’ll impact turn that

#### Transition away from democracy is now and inevitable just like the Patriots after Brady left (speaks)

Kamusella 21 Tomasz Kamusella, University of St Andrews, 10-26-2021, "How China combined authoritarianism with capitalism to create a new communism," Conversation, [https://theconversation.com/how-china-combined-authoritarianism-with-capitalism-to-create-a-new-communism-167586 //](https://theconversation.com/how-china-combined-authoritarianism-with-capitalism-to-create-a-new-communism-167586%20//) ella

China leads the autocracies With the economic and political demise of Soviet-style communism, most of the communist regimes supported by the Soviet Union across the world, like Ethiopia, Afghanistan and South Yemen also collapsed. Communist Cuba is a lone exception to this trend. The Caribbean island has been a permanent thorn in the side of the US since 1961. Present-day communism, then, is led by China – the world’s second largest economy. Beijing has been proudly communist since 1949 and is now taking on the US, which still leads – though falteringly – the globe’s shrinking camp of democracies. Since 2010, an increasing number of states have parted with democracy. Over the past decade, democracy has been quickly reversed in post-genocide Rwanda. The same also happened in Ethiopia after the civil war in Tigray (2020-present day), while the Arab Spring’s democratic gains have been squashed across the Middle East. As in Putin’s Russia, electoral autocracies were installed in Bulgaria (2009), Hungary (2010), Serbia (2014), Turkey (2015), Poland (2016) and Slovenia (2020). China’s population of 1.4 billion means that a fifth of all humankind lives under its communist regime. The other three self-declared communist states – Laos, North Korea and Vietnam – all border China. A new communist – and Sinic (Chinese influenced) – bloc, indeed. So, after the two decades of decline in the wake of the 1989 collapse of the Soviet bloc, is the turbocharged Chinese-style communism 2.0 – which embraces capitalism – going to take over? The rise and fall of democracy The looser post-cold war definition of communism marries capitalism with socialism, as understood in the former Soviet Union. The overarching principle of socialism (seen as communism in the west) says: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his contribution.” In practice, this unorthodox mix of Soviet-style socialism and capitalism means an authoritarian, or even totalitarian, regime under a single party’s full and (these days) AI-enhanced control. This control extends over the now capitalist-style economy, too. Through this mono-party, the invariably male leader single-handedly rules. Often a cult of personality is developed for him and the deal is sweetened with a modicum of a welfare state. In most cases these states advertise themselves as being communist. Others, like Belarus and Venezuela may not actually call it “communism” and a different name may be given to this ideology. For example Bolivarianism in Venezuela, national unity in Belarus or Juche in North Korea. The mono-party political system makes the Communist Party into the state and its leader into the de-facto dictator. Unchecked collectivism, or the ruling dictator’s self-serving and populist rhetoric of prioritising masses (referred to as “nation or people”) over individuals, “justifies” his rule and the system. In places like Belarus and China, this has led to dissenters being repressed and concentration camps being built to remove them from “healthy society”. Like the pre-1989 communist states, all these countries’ ruling regimes are anti-western in their official rhetoric, and often in their actions too. This anti-western aggression was another important defining feature of the communist states of the 20th century. But will this number rise or fall in the 21st century? During the two decades following the fall of communism in Europe, democracy as the doctrine of human and political rights steadily spread across the world. Dictators felt pressured to keep up at least the appearance of working electoral democracy in their countries. Amnesty International and Freedom House successfully shamed autocrats into mending their notorious ways and freeing political prisoners. But after 2010, this trend was incrementally reversed. Symbolically, in this year the Chinese writer and pro-democracy dissident Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Beijing felt offended by the west and took steps to suppress Liu, his family and friends. The authorities denied Liu cancer treatment and he died prematurely seven years later. Liu’s ashes were scattered in the sea to prevent the establishment of a grave for a person many saw as a democratic hero and martyr. That would have been a focal point for China’s democrats, who might have gone on pilgrimages to pay respect to Liu’s unwavering loyalty to liberty and democracy. Then, in 2020, the pandemic created an ideal opportunity for Beijing to dismantle democracy in Hong Kong, and a place that was once a beacon of political and economic freedom fell. Autocrats of all stripes took note. ‘To get rich is glorious’ But isn’t the whole idea of capitalism and profit anathema to the central tenets of communism? And if so, how did these two opposites attract? In the wake of then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reforms, a great discovery of applied politics was made in China: that you can have capitalism without democracy. Spotting a gap in the market of ideas, Deng decreed that “to get rich is glorious”, meaning that capitalism was ideologically neutral and could serve the needs of a communist regime. The current marriage of capitalism and communism is a lesson for democrats not to trust in their wishful thinking. Instead, the often touted hypothesis about capitalism’s democratising effects must be put to the test. It is clear that capitalism does not make authoritarian or totalitarian Belarus, China, Laos or Vietnam any less authoritarian or more pro-democratic or pro-western. Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela ditched capitalism once before, when they became communist, in 1948 and 1959 and 1999 respectively, and they are reluctant to re-embrace it. But China’s enthusiasm for undemocratic capitalism since 2004 – known as the Beijing consensus in the west – may compel them to follow suit soon. China’s economic success, if it lasts for several generations, may lead to the fortification of nascent communism 2.0, with capitalism as an integral part of this ideology. Communist-capitalism is not an oxymoron any more, as long as the ruling communist party keeps entrepreneurs subservient to its ideology and governance. So what are the specific characteristics of the new communist 2.0 state? Perhaps, the self-declaration of being a communist state is the most obvious and that this features in the constitution. Even if some states give it a different name. Civic and human rights are seriously limited and often denounced as a “western ploy”. For instance, no individual right to vote exists in China, while the state actually owns citizens’ bodies to do with them as it pleases. A similar level of abuse is observed in North Korea and Vietnam. And growing repression has also been observed in Belarus and Cuba. Recently, the west woke up to the dangers that its liberal and democratic values may face and the fact that capitalism alone cannot guarantee freedom and human rights. The fear that the age of communist China’s imperialism has already arrived motivated Australia, the UK and the US, for example, to form a new military pact. Imperfectly – and probably to Beijing’s delight – AUKUS agreement excludes the EU. Technological totalitarianism In China, the traditional features of totalitarianism have become irretrievably combined with the system’s appetite for hi-tech conditioning and surveillance. For example, the total control of Xinjiang’s Muslims is made possible through the region’s mass database of the population’s DNA and irises. Technology and AI are communism 2.0’s largely bloodless methods for extending total control over the population, making sure that every individual toes the party’s line. This compliance is also enabled by the emerging military surveillance industrial complex, which is going to be at the core of successful communist-capitalism. More control means more job openings in this complex, directly translating into economic growth, that in turn will go back into financing that control – totalitarianism’s perfect feedback loop, with no way out. And so repression becomes recognised as the engine of the economy; a guarantee of prosperity for most (though not all). The seismic shift from Soviet-style communism 1.0, based on heavy industry, to China’s AI-supported communism 2.0 can be observed to different degrees across those seven communist states. North Korea remains an outlier and a squarely communism 1.0 state. To this day, Pyongyang refuses to follow the communism 2.0 path, despite Beijing’s quiet nudges in that direction (although there are signs that could be changing). Cuba and Venezuela, meanwhile, are also closer to communism 1.0, still making non-pragmatic choices informed by idealism and ideology. At the other end of the spectrum, Belarus, Laos and Vietnam are using whatever works economically (as long as the ruling party controls production and profits). They are China’s conscientious pupils, bent on implementing communism 2.0. Democratic alternatives Unless the world’s democracies come up with attractive and effective solutions to socioeconomic ills such as unemployment, falling living standards and income, and inaccessible medical care, then I am afraid that communism 2.0 is going to win hands down. In this scenario, the number of communist states is bound to grow and individual and political freedoms will diminish. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is exactly the type of ambitious project that the world’s democracies acutely lack at this moment in time. The plan is to link and build a coordinated network of railway, road and maritime corridors to span all of Africa, Asia and Europe for the seamless export of products from China and the easy import of raw materials to this communist powerhouse. Not only does the BRI already facilitate China’s exploitation of Eurasia and Africa, but it also functions as the main conveyor belt for spreading communism 2.0 globally. Adoptions of the Chinese model’s signature mix of welfare state policies with growing authoritarian tendencies and a single party’s aspiration to seize all power have been observed in present-day Europe since 2015, be it in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland or Serbia. Unsurprisingly, these countries’ pro-authoritarian leaders are enamoured with Chinese economic and political success. They hope to establish privileged links and collaboration with the communist superpower and they may not be the last western states to fall under its spell. To curry favour with Beijing, Europe’s aspiring autocracies are busy dismantling democracy and putting curbs on political rights and freedoms at home. Since 2015, Poland has repeatedly been risking tens of billions of Euros in developmental aid from the EU by rejecting the basic principle of EU legal primacy. Facing growing censure, in 2017, incredulously, the Polish prime minister said that it did not matter, because in such a case China would offer Poland more money than Brussels.

#### Intervention and doomed diplomacy stemming from liberal democracies cause an endless cycle of war

- seen as enemies

Mearsheimer 18 John J. Mearsheimer, American political scientist and international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago. He has been described as the most influential realist of his generation, 2018, “The Great Delusion”, Yale University Press, // ella

THE COSTS OF LIBERAL HEGEMONY BEGIN with the endless wars a liberal state ends up fighting to protect human rights and spread liberal democracy around the world. Once unleashed on the world stage, a liberal unipole soon becomes addicted to war. This militarism arises from five factors. First, democratizing the globe is a vast mission that provides abundant opportunities to fight. Second, liberal policymakers believe they have the right, the responsibility, and the knowhow to use military force to achieve their goals. Third, they often approach their task with missionary zeal. Fourth, pursuing liberal hegemony undercuts diplomacy, making it harder to settle disputes with other countries peacefully. Fifth, that ambitious strategy also undermines the notion of sovereignty, a core norm of international politics that is intended to limit interstate war. The presence of a powerful state prone to fighting war after war increases the amount of conflict in the international system, creating instability. These armed conflicts usually end up failing, sometimes disastrously, and mainly at the expense of the state purportedly being rescued by the liberal goliath. One might think liberal elites would learn from their failures and become averse to using military force abroad, but that seldom happens. Liberal hegemony promotes instability in other ways as well. Formidable liberal democracies also tend to embrace ambitious policies short of war that often backfire and poison relations between them and the target countries. For example, they often interfere in the politics of other countries. They are also inclined when engaging diplomatically with an authoritarian country to disregard its interests and think they know what is best for it. Finally, liberalism abroad tends to undermine liberalism at home, because a militaristic foreign policy invariably fosters a powerful national security state prone to violating its citizens’ civil liberties. My argument is that a country that embraces liberal hegemony ends up doing more harm than good to itself as well as other countries, especially those it intends to help. I will illustrate this argument by focusing on American foreign policy since Bill Clinton was elected to the White House in November 1992. With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States emerged as by far the most powerful country on the planet. Unsurprisingly, the Clinton administration embraced liberal hegemony from the start, and the policy remained firmly intact through the Bush and Obama administrations. Not surprisingly, the United States has been involved in numerous wars during this period and has failed to achieve meaningful success in almost all of those conflicts. Washington has also played a central role in destabilizing the greater Middle East, to the great detriment of the people living there. Liberal Britain, which has acted as Washington’s faithful sidekick in these wars, also bears some share of the blame for the trouble the United States has helped cause. American policymakers also played the key role in producing a major crisis with Russia over Ukraine. At this writing, that crisis shows no signs of abating and is hardly in America’s interest, let alone Ukraine’s. Back in the United States, Americans’ civil liberties have been eroded by an increasingly powerful national security state. Liberal Militarism Because liberals so often speak about the evils of war and the importance of moving beyond power politics to create a peaceful world, it might seem odd to describe them as militarists. But many are militarists, deeply committed to a remarkably ambitious foreign policy agenda and not shy about using military force to advance it.1 One of liberalism’s core missions is to protect people whose rights are being seriously violated. The urge to intervene in other countries is especially powerful when large numbers of those foreigners are being killed. This undertaking is clearly reflected in Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a norm that grew out of the failure of the so-called international community to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995.2 R2P mandates that states have a responsibility not only to protect their own populations from serious human rights violations like ethnic cleansing and mass murder, but also to protect people in other countries from these crimes. In essence, nations are told to be on the lookout for major human rights abuses around the globe and, when they arise, to move quickly to stop them. A powerful liberal state with the military wherewithal to intervene in such circumstances is strongly encouraged to go to war to protect the victims. This task of defending individual rights easily morphs into the more ambitious strategy of removing the source of the problem by actively promoting liberal democracy in other countries. Liberal states, by definition, are committed to protecting their citizens’ rights, and this strategy, so the argument goes, will also lead to a more peaceful world and help protect liberal democracy from its internal enemies. Liberalism is also said to facilitate economic prosperity, which not only is a positive end in itself but also contributes to peace. In short, spreading liberalism is thought to make the world safer, more peaceful, and more prosperous. As we can see from countless comments by American liberals, proponents of this worldview tend to be deeply committed to it. In the midst of World War I, for example, Elihu Root, who had been both secretary of state and secretary of war under President Theodore Roosevelt, stated, “To be safe democracy must kill its enemy when it can and where it can. The world cannot be half democratic and half autocratic.” In the midst of the Vietnam War, Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared that the “United States cannot be secure until the total international environment is ideologically safe.” As Christopher Layne notes, “These are not isolated comments. . . . American statesmen have frequently expressed this view.”3 This missionary zeal is hardly limited to policymakers. John Rawls, for example, writes, “It is characteristic of liberal and decent peoples that they seek a world in which all peoples have a well-ordered regime. . . . Their long-range aim is to bring all societies eventually to honor the Law of Peoples and to become full members in good standing of the society of well-ordered peoples.”4 This ambitious agenda does not axiomatically lead to war, and Rawls is careful to make clear that he is not advocating armed crusades to spread liberal democracy across the planet.5 Still, there is no question that war is often seen as a viable and even attractive option for promoting liberalism. This penchant for employing force to achieve liberal goals is reflected in the writings of John Owen, a prominent liberal interventionist, who comments that “liberal ideas cause liberal democracies to tend away from war with one another, and . . . the same ideas prod these states into war with illiberal states.” Moreover, he writes, “all individuals share an interest in peace, and should want war only as an instrument to bring about peace.”6 The Bush Doctrine, developed during 2002 and used to justify the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, is probably the best example of this kind of liberal interventionism. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration concluded that to win what it termed the “global war on terror” it must not only defeat al Qaeda but also confront Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The regimes in these so-called rogue states were assumed to be closely tied to terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and were bent on acquiring nuclear weapons, which they might even give to terrorists.7 In short, they were mortal enemies of the United States. Bush proposed to use military might to turn those countries and others across the Middle East into liberal democracies. He put the point succinctly in early 2003, just before the United States attacked Iraq: “By the resolve and purpose of America, and of our friends and allies, we will make this an age of progress and liberty. Free people will set the course of history, and free people will keep the peace of the world.”8 There is no question that President Bush and his lieutenants were also motivated to topple Saddam Hussein from power because he was a brutal dictator who trampled on the rights of his citizens. But that was a longstanding problem that, by itself, could not cause the United States to get rid of Hussein and replace him with a democratically elected leader. What drove the United States to invade Iraq was the perceived need to deal with the proliferation and terrorism. And the best way to do that, the Bush team thought, was to turn all the countries in the greater Middle East into liberal democracies. This would make the region a giant zone of peace and take both problems off the table. “The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values,” the president said, “because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life.”9 These actions show all the earmarks of liberal hegemony. Liberals with a formidable military at their disposal are strongly inclined to fight wars not only to protect individual rights in other countries but also to spread liberal democracy, which they see as the best way to safeguard rights and protect against important security threats. Given that our planet has no shortage of autocracies, serious human rights violators, or countries that present a military threat, a powerful country like the United States, left free to pursue liberal hegemony, is likely to end up in a perpetual state of war. Liberalism Makes Diplomacy Harder Another factor that helps militarize the liberal unipole is that liberal hegemony makes diplomacy with authoritarian states more difficult, further increasing the likelihood of war. Diplomacy is a bargaining process between two or more states that have conflicting views on an issue that matters to all of them. The aim is to produce an agreement that settles the dispute peacefully. To achieve success, each party must make some concessions, although they need not be symmetrical. This is why Henry Kissinger maintains that diplomacy “is the art of restraining the exercise of power.”10 It is not necessary that each side treat the other as an equal. But for diplomacy to work, even bitter foes have to show some respect for each other. War and diplomacy are distinct instruments of statecraft—each is an alternative to the other. One relies on dialogue and negotiations to settle disputes, while the other employs military force. Diplomacy is generally considered the safer and less expensive option: as Winston Churchill said at the White House in 1954, “Jaw-jaw is always better than war-war.”11 Nevertheless, diplomacy and war often work in tandem. For example, diplomacy is usually more effective when backed up by the threat of military force. And it is often employed during wars to find a way of ending the fighting. Still, the aim of “big stick diplomacy” is to either avoid or terminate a war. If a state facing a hostile rival abjures diplomacy, war becomes more likely and harder to terminate once it starts. Liberal democracies have little difficulty conducting diplomacy with illiberal states when they are acting according to realist dictates, which is most of the time. In those circumstances, liberal democracies do whatever is necessary to maximize their survival prospects, and that includes negotiating with authoritarian leaders. They sometimes even support or form alliances with murderous dictators, as the United Stated did in World War II when it worked with Joseph Stalin to defeat Nazi Germany, or when it cooperated with Mao Zedong after 1972 to contain the Soviet Union. Occasionally they even overthrow democratic regimes they perceive as hostile. Liberal democracies go to great lengths to disguise such behavior with liberal rhetoric, but in fact they are acting contrary to their own principles. Such is the influence of realpolitik. Diplomacy gets shortchanged, however, when a unipolar state is able to push aside balance-of-power logic and adopt a liberal foreign policy. Such a state is strongly inclined to eschew diplomacy with its illiberal foes, for reasons that by now should be familiar. Although tolerance is a core principle of liberalism, it tends to get pushed aside when a liberal state confronts a rival that violates its citizens’ rights. After all, rights are inalienable. Since authoritarian states regularly shortchange—and sometimes trample on—the rights of their people, liberal states freed from the shackles of realism are likely to treat them as deeply flawed polities not worthy of diplomatic engagement. Countries pursuing liberal hegemony often develop a deep-seated antipathy toward illiberal states. They tend to see the international system as consisting of good and evil states, with little room for compromise between the two sides. This view creates a powerful incentive to eliminate authoritarian states by whatever means necessary whenever the opportunity presents itself. One consequence of this loathing is that liberal states find it hard to engage in limited wars with illiberal foes and instead are inclined to pursue decisive victories against them. Unconditional surrender becomes the order of the day, as it is virtually impossible to countenance compromising with evil.12 Of course, nationalism, which usually generates hatred between states at war with each other, reinforces this tendency for wars to escalate to their extreme. This eliminationist mentality is perhaps best reflected in Woodrow Wilson’s thinking about how to deal with Germany and the other defeated powers after World War I. Since peace could not be achieved by an “arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests,” he argued, there could not be “any kind of bargain or compromise with the governments of the Central Empires.” Wilson associated compromise with balance-ofpower politics, what he contemptuously called the “old order of international politics,” and which he felt had to be “utterly destroyed.” The goal had to be “the overcoming of evil, by the defeat once [and] for all of the sinister forces that interrupt peace and render it impossible.” In late 1919 he said of the Treaty of Versailles, “I hear that this treaty is very hard on Germany. When an individual has committed a criminal act, the punishment is hard, but the punishment is not unjust. This nation permitted itself, through unscrupulous governors, to commit a criminal act against mankind, and it is to undergo the punishment.”13 The bottom line is that when a liberal democracy is free to act abroad according to its foundational principles, it finds it difficult to engage in diplomacy with an illiberal opponent, increasing the likelihood that the two sides will attempt to settle their differences violently. Liberal intolerance, sometimes accompanied by liberal loathing, leads a liberal unipole freed from balance-of-power politics into endless wars.

#### Democracies necessitate too many compromises that jeopardize effective climate reforms – US and Germany prove – CA 1AC Spratt for extinction

- Paris fails bc no punishment

Abadi 1-7 Cameron Abadi, deputy editor at Foreign Policy., 1-7-2022, "What if Democracy and Climate Mitigation Are Incompatible?," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/07/climate-change-democracy/> // ella

In the past 14 months, the United States and Germany both held national elections that placed climate change policy squarely at the center of national debate. The fact that two of the world’s five largest economies committed to addressing the world’s most pressing crisis through public discourse followed by public voting was an unprecedented democratic experiment. It did not work out as optimists hoped. On the one hand, the victorious parties in both countries vowed to achieve what was necessary to prevent the worst effects of climate change from occurring, in accordance with the international climate agreement unanimously approved in Paris in 2015. But on the other hand, in neither country can the resulting policies be described as fulfilling that promise. All the major German parties (except for the far-right Alternative for Germany) said they would work to limit climate change to the 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels stipulated in the Paris Agreement; the Greens claimed, plausibly, that only their platform contained ideas sufficient to fulfill the promise. But even as the Greens succeeded at joining the national government (having earned a record-breaking 15 percent at the polls), few of the policy specifics found their way into the governing agenda for the next four years. The Greens claimed a higher carbon price was necessary; no mention of any such increase made it into the coalition agreement. The Greens argued that ending the domestic excavation of coal by 2030 was nonnegotiable; the government has failed to make a firm commitment to do that. The Greens claimed the country would need to invest an extra 50 billion euros ($56 billion) per year in renewable energy infrastructure; the new government has vowed instead to maintain a balanced budget. A similar slippage between campaign ambition and watered-down governance has occurred in the United States. Democrat Joe Biden’s election platform vowed that the country’s electricity sector would be carbon-free by 2035 and that the entire U.S. economy would achieve full carbon neutrality by 2050—promises that the Biden administration has never disavowed. But the central policies intended to achieve those timelines have no realistic chance of passing Congress. The administration will receive nowhere close to the $2 trillion that Biden said would be necessary to fund renewable energy infrastructure. Meanwhile, Sen. Joe Manchin from the coal-producing state of West Virginia has refused to pass any law that explicitly disincentivizes the energy sector’s use of fossil fuels, as the Biden campaign had envisioned. At the same time, the Biden administration has openly lobbied the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries of OPEC to increase production, in hopes of lowering the price of gasoline for domestic drivers. The climate agendas of the current U.S. and German governments—from the Biden administration’s use of tax incentives to encourage the expansion of renewable energy to the new German government’s vow to devote 2 percent of the country’s land to the generation of wind power—are not actively harmful. In sum, they will almost certainly accelerate both countries’ reduction of carbon emissions. But by any fair accounting, they are inadequate to solving climate change on the timeline implied by the Paris Agreement’s 1.5-degree commitment—namely, a 50 percent reduction of emissions by 2035 and complete global carbon neutrality by 2050. “The problem with the climate measures of this new government is the speed,” said Pauline Brünger, a spokesperson for Germany’s Fridays for Future activist group. Representatives from the U.S. and German governments say their policies are the result of the necessary compromises demanded by the democratic process. But it’s fair to wonder whether that’s just another way of restating the problem. According to the climate science, the timelines to limit warming aren’t an expression of subjectively perceived urgency but objective measures defined by the boundary of a catastrophic climate tipping point. In a 2018 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a U.N. group of climate scientists, declared that achieving carbon neutrality by midcentury was the only way to prevent global temperatures from rising above 1.5 degrees—beyond which, Arctic ice would melt (and ocean levels would rise) far more quickly, humans would more frequently suffer heat death, and vast numbers of species, from insects to sea coral, would end up on the verge of extinction. In other words: Democracy works by compromise, but climate change is precisely the type of problem that seems not to allow for it. As the clock on those climate timelines continues to tick, this structural mismatch is becoming increasingly exposed. And as a result, those concerned by climate change—some already with political power, others grasping for it—are now searching for, and finding, new ways of closing the gap between politics and science, by any means necessary. The tensions between existing methods of democracy and the problem posed by climate change are perfectly legible in domestic politics but most evident in international politics. In one sense, it would be tempting to say that international politics is not yet democratic enough for the purposes of combating climate change. Historically, it’s undeniable that the Western countries that were the earliest to industrialize are responsible for the majority of carbon that has already been deposited in the atmosphere. A majority of ongoing emissions today are likewise created by a minority of the global population, namely in the world’s most developed economies—a group that heavily overlaps with the first. If the basic principle of democracy is that each person (or each country) has equal voice, then it seems obvious that the majority of the world—the portion of the global population that contributes least to carbon emissions and stands to suffer the most from their effects—should be able to hold the minority accountable. That is, they should be able to compel the developed world to pay whatever it takes to transition to renewable energy at a speed consistent with maintaining the critical 1.5-degree threshold (and to assist poorer countries with any damages that nevertheless result from that mitigated climate change). The reality, of course, is that there is no global government that can organize democratic government, and grant democratic rights, on a global scale. The international community must instead rely on existing national governments—the sovereign actors in the international system—to organize global collective action. Many of those governments, of course, are themselves democratic. And they have plenty of incentive to create an international framework that invites equal participation from the countries of the world and seems to enjoy democratic legitimacy; plenty of their own constituents would demand as much. The annual U.N. climate change meetings, known as COP, which produced the Paris Agreement and continue to monitor its progress and in which nearly all the countries of the world participate, are an example of just such a framework. Unlike other environmental problems, the effects of climate change are not immediate, which makes it even harder to form a democratic consensus. But the example also cuts the other way: The COP framework is ill-matched to solving climate change in a timely fashion because it doesn’t solve the international governance dilemma at its heart. Climate change, in economic terms, is a commons management issue. The goal is to create a stable ecosystem, but every country has an incentive to free ride and let others swallow the costs of providing it. It’s in nobody’s immediate self-interest to go first and bear the costs of mitigating carbon emissions: Why commit to something if others won’t? That’s especially so since early movers on climate policy only earn a small share of the global benefits while paying a disproportionate share of the costs. For an international climate agreement to be successful, in the sense of persuading powerful countries to participate to their fullest capacity, it needs to do two things: It has to have a mechanism for monitoring the commitments that every country makes, and it has to be explicit about the punishment for cheating. States must know whether others comply with their obligations, and if they don’t, then a mechanism must exist to compel them so. But that’s not easy, of course, because the above-stated collective action problems impede creating such an agreement. There’s no clear path offered by the current democratic political system to get from here to there. The Paris Agreement—which offers no method of punishing countries for failing to meet their climate commitments aside from peer pressure and embarrassment at future COP meetings—might mark the height of what’s achievable. And so it should come as no surprise that almost none of the world’s countries are on pace to keep their Paris commitments. The agreement’s lack of any supervisory authority—countries have been left to pursue their goals on their own—constrained it from the start. Countries that couldn’t trust one another’s good faith (both in the creation of the climate goals and the pursuit of them) had incentive to free ride on the sacrifices made by others. Meanwhile, rich countries had little incentive to prevent damage that would disproportionately affect many of the world’s poorest. Compared with the problems of international governance, the structural impediments posed by domestic democratic politics are no less daunting. The essence of the democratic process in any nation-state is elections, a form of governance that focuses attention on immediate problems, holds national leaders accountable for solving them, subjects those solutions to revision within a few years’ time, and invites public involvement. The nature of climate change as a political problem stands in contradiction to all those attributes. It occurs over very long time frames, extends beyond all political boundaries, is both irreversible and highly urgent, and is exceedingly complex to understand in its full scope. Unlike other environmental problems—such as air and water pollution—the effects of climate change are not immediate, which makes it even harder to form a democratic consensus. We should not be surprised if political processes that evolved to solve very different problems have trouble coping. But the biggest failures of the domestic democratic process center on the constant threat of capture of the political process by special interests with the most to lose from stringent reforms. Climate policy always involves the creation of new winners and losers in a given economy. Politics thus becomes a distributive struggle, with those less attached to the economic status quo pushing for a dramatic renegotiation of economic and social structures while facing resistance from interest groups that stand to lose out from such change. The latter group typically has advantages in any such struggle, especially in liberal democracies that invite interest group participation in the political process. As the economic beneficiaries of the current system, they start out by enjoying advantages in terms of their access to the political process and even to political veto points. By influencing politicians and the general political debate, they can help block policies such as carbon taxes or massive public investments to transform energy and transportation systems. But even if those in favor of far-reaching climate policies organize themselves in response and succeed in making a strong showing in a national election, the opposing side won’t have disappeared: It will still be exerting its influence in society. The democratic process steers distributional disagreements of this sort toward compromise. That is precisely what happened after the German and U.S. elections: If one side of an argument runs up against resistance from an opposing side, it’s good democratic practice to split the difference. The result is moderate, rather than sufficient, climate policies: less public money for an energy transition, extended timelines for exiting fossil fuels. And all the while, the clock, counting down toward climate catastrophe, ticks in the background. As government fails to meet the task of stopping climate change, other players, beyond the typical boundaries of politics, are naturally stepping into their place. Precisely to the extent that democratic politics poses barriers to solving climate change, it has increased the appeal of radical politics as an alternative. If special interests have captured the democratic process, radicals propose to break the impasse in two ways: by giving the broader public greater incentive to themselves steer policymaking and by curtailing that process altogether in a way that keeps it in the hands of technocratic elites, including central bankers and constitutional judges. In the former case, consider Fridays for Future, the global movement that was inspired by the Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg. Just as Thunberg ceased going to school to register a moral objection to her country’s inaction on climate policy, groups of schoolchildren around the world now refuse to attend classes on Fridays, choosing instead to peacefully protest in the streets. One international day of protest in 2019 attracted the participation of more than a million people in 125 countries. This movement, however, is being outpaced in countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany by more radical actors, including Extinction Rebellion. Unlike Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion does not presume the government’s good faith, nor do its members believe entirely that peaceful demonstrations are adequate to the present moment. They aim to coerce political change by making the status quo unsustainable, including by organizing debt strikes against major banks that help finance the carbon economy. Meanwhile, activist writers such as Andreas Malm favor even more extreme measures, advocating openly in favor of violent sabotage of carbon-economy infrastructure. But it’s not only bottom-up activists who are engaging in politics outside the normal channels of electoral democracy. Germany’s constitutional court is a case in point. In a surprise ruling in April 2021, the judges on the court declared that the climate policies passed by the government of then-Chancellor Angela Merkel were insufficient on the basis of the rights of young people to live their future lives in an undamaged environment. This was not a right that anyone in the German government had previously believed was anchored in the constitution—but the ruling left them no choice but to pass a law accelerating their existing climate plans. In recent years, courts from Australia to Pakistan and across the entirety of Europe have issued similar judgments in favor of climate policy, forcing their respective governments to act. Technology is also increasingly intersecting with political radicalism outside the channels of normal democratic politics. At the same time, the arcane world of central banking is also turning to radical means to stem the effects of climate change. There’s a growing recognition among policymakers that the businesses resisting climate policy are ultimately subordinate to the economic rules set by the policymakers themselves—whether or not they’re given a mandate by the public to use the fullest extent of their power. Among these figures is Mark Carney, former governor of the Bank of England and head of the global Financial Stability Board, where he established the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, which has set the terms for green finance now accepted by many of the world’s leading banks and asset managers. In 2017, Carney helped found the Network for Greening the Financial System, which aims to throw the weight of key financial institutions behind the goals of the Paris Agreement. Last year, the group announced that participating banks would commit to spending $130 trillion on green investments. . But it’s not clear whether this existing green agenda is adequate to the climate challenge. Some critics believe the banks have been too defensive, mostly focusing on managing financial risks and maintaining financial stability. These policymakers—including Isabel Schnabel, a German member of the European Central Bank’s executive board—are now discussing moving into a more active mode, using central banks’ administrative powers to speed along the global economy’s rapid decarbonization. They would amplify the volume of so-called green bonds privileged by the central bank and use new rules to increase the risk of investing in the carbon economy. Technology is also increasingly intersecting with political radicalism outside the channels of normal democratic politics. The 2018 report issued by the IPCC has raised the possibility of deploying various technological fixes to slow the global warming that more straightforward democratic politics has failed to manage. Deep in the report is a startling line: “There is robust evidence but medium agreement for unilateral action potentially becoming a serious SRM governance issue.” SRM refers to “solar radiation modification,” the most frequently discussed form of geoengineering, which involves injecting aerosols into the atmosphere to cool the planet, just as major volcanic eruptions do naturally. The key term from the IPCC report, however, is “unilateral action.” It refers to the possibility that someone might simply take matters into his or her own hands. Indeed, what’s clear is that a single billionaire might be able to finance such a venture without other political actors being able to do much about it. That the world’s democracies are witnessing a growing spectrum of climate radicalism, both from the bottom up and the top down, is not to suggest that authoritarian systems would do any better in solving the relevant political and economic issues involved in moving beyond the carbon economy. But it is a sign that democracy, in its current form, is not necessarily the path to a solution. It might, instead, be part of the problem.

#### Multiple warrants and empirics prove democracy increases terrorism

Piazza 14 (James, an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University, “Democracy and Terrorism: A Complex Relationship”, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=179658)> //BS 12-18-2017

Democracies may be less susceptible to violence and conflict than other forms of government, but does that also include terrorism? Not according to James Piazza. Democratic states are more likely to experience this type of violence even though they have attributes that are well-suited to combat it. By James Piazza for ISN Democracy, as a system of government, is widely lauded by political scientists for its ‘pacific effects.’ Experts have produced some good evidence that democratic regimes rarely go to war with one another and have also observed that democracies are much less susceptible to civil wars and internal armed conflicts than nondemocratic regimes. These pacific effects are typically explained as the product of norms and decision-making procedures within democracies that reinforce the peaceful and orderly resolution of disputes. But is it also true that democratic rule reduces terrorism and terrorist activity? The answer to this question is complex, conditional and nuanced – a reflection of the supporting evidence. While key qualities of democracies do make them more likely to experience terrorism than authoritarian regimes, some characteristic features of democratic governance have also been found to reduce terrorism. This disparate conclusion – that democracy might be a panacea for the scourges of inter- and intra-state war but not for terrorism – is likely due to the fact that terrorism is a distinct manifestation of political violence. To start with, terrorism is much lower in intensity than inter- or intra-state war. It is a tactic used by political actors or individuals characterized by conventional weakness and, often, political marginality. As opposed to conventional military force, terrorism typically involves the use of violence or the threat of violence, often against civilians, in order to influence a wider audience and to prompt a much stronger opponent to offer concessions. It is therefore most frequently deployed in situations where the opponent – usually a state – is much stronger and has ample capacity, such as through a free media, to project influence. Democracy and terrorism: The evidence According to the Global Terrorism Database, regimes of all types in the post-Cold War period (1991-2012) experienced an average of about 18 terrorist attacks (both domestic and transnational) per year**.** Democratic regimes, however, experienced 62% more terrorism than did nondemocratic regimes – 21.3 attacks per year as opposed to 13.2 attacks for nondemocracies. This pattern holds regardless of the region of the world the countries are located in, the type of terrorist threat they face, and other factors such as population size and level of economic development. What accounts for this disparity? Answers to this question are best understood in terms of 1) the structural factors that make a country an attractive setting for terrorist attacks and 2) the factors that impel individuals and groups to engage in terrorism in the first place. We might expect democracies to produce fewer aggrieved individuals and groups than authoritarian regimes, because, in comparison to authoritarian systems, democracies are more responsive to public demands and tend to provide more avenues for the peaceful and orderly redress of grievances. The reality, however, is that democracies are both more attractive and more vulnerable to terrorism than nondemocracies. Democracies afford political dissidents the right to engage in autonomous political behavior. While this maximizes opportunities for peaceful legal and political activism, it also facilitates illegal and violent activities, terrorism included**.** Democratic institutions preserve the rights of the accused and place restrictions on the police and authorities to a far greater degree than do nondemocratic regimes. This, of course, complicates counterterrorism in the areas of surveillance, interrogation and prosecution of terrorists and their supporters. Even more importantly, democracies encourage a free media that will report on terrorist atrocities, giving terrorists the opportunity to influence a much wider audience than would be the case in countries where the media is controlled by the government. These commonly-cited features make democracies especially vulnerable to terrorism and less well equipped to engage in counterterrorism. Scholars of terrorism, however, have also identified less obvious factors endemic to democracies that may actually encourage terrorism. For example, democracies tend to be wealthier and better developed than authoritarian regimes, rendering them more “target rich” for terrorist groups. Democracies are also more likely to be prominent countries on the world stage and symbols of the political status quo, making them more likely to be opposed by terrorists, who are quintessential anti-status-quo actors. Cross-national empirical research on transnational terrorism conducted by Burcu Savun and Brian Phillips suggests that because democracies are more likely to pursue active, interventionist foreign policies than nondemocratic states, they are more likely to become embroiled in foreign controversies that earn the ire of terrorists. Another interesting study by Erica Chenoweth finds empirical evidence that, by tolerating a larger volume and a wider range of political activities – such as forming political organizations, lobbying, protesting, etc. – democracies have more competitive political environments, which perversely increases returns to terrorist attacks by political actors interested in “doing something drastic” to gain attention. In contrast, although nondemocracies might produce more angry and aggrieved citizens that, lacking a nonviolent means to meaningfully participate in politics, might be prompted to support terrorist and extremist movements, authoritarian regimes can more easily repress political dissent and manage and control the activities of their citizens. Most importantly, authoritarian regimes muzzle and control the media, reducing the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy. One might expect that, in nondemocratic regimes, the combination of heightened political frustrations and state-controlled media would lead to higher rates of transnational terrorism. A case in point here would be the 1969 kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Charles Burke Elbrick by the leftist Revolutionary Movement 8th October (MR-8). The MR-8 militants hoped that, by kidnapping

#### DPT is wrong – 4 wars and other empirics prove

- WWI (Germany vs. Britain, France, Italy, US), Boer War (Britain vs. South Africa and Orange Free State), Spanish-American War, Kargil War (India and Pakistan), also civil war

- sure democracies are peaceful to each other but not non-democracies

- 1 war is enough to disprove the whole theory bc there’s so few examples in the first place

Mearsheimer 18 John J. Mearsheimer, American political scientist and international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought. He is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago. He has been described as the most influential realist of his generation, 2018, “The Great Delusion”, Yale University Press, // ella

Democratic Peace Theory The words democratic peace theory imply that it offers a story about how democracy, not liberalism, brings peace. But the title is a misnomer, because the arguments underpinning democratic peace theory emphasize liberalism as well as democracy. A number of scholars in this tradition even refer to “liberal peace.” It would be more accurate to call it liberal democratic peace theory. Moreover, liberal states are almost always democratic as well, mainly because the centrality of freedom and inalienable rights clearly implies that all citizens have the right to determine who governs them. As I emphasized in the introduction, this is why I focus on liberal democracies, not simply liberal states. Hence, I will examine both the democracy-based and liberalism-based logics behind democratic peace theory. Democratic peace theory was remarkably popular in the two decades after the Cold War ended. Michael Doyle introduced it to the academic and policy worlds in a pair of seminal articles published in 1983.9 When the superpower rivalry ended in 1989, it was widely believed that liberal democracy would steadily sweep across the globe, spreading peace everywhere. This perspective, of course, is the central theme in Fukuyama’s “The End of History?” But time has not been kind to Fukuyama’s argument. Authoritarianism has become a viable alternative, and there are few signs that liberal democracy will conquer the globe anytime soon. Freedom House maintains that the world’s share of democracies actually declined between 2006 and 2016, which naturally reduces the scope of the theory. 10 Even if liberal democracy were on the march, however, it would not enhance the prospects for peace, because the theory is seriously flawed. Consider its central finding. Some of its proponents argue that there has never been a war between two democracies. But this is wrong: there are at least four cases in the modern era where democracies waged war against each other. Contrary to what democratic peace theorists say, Germany was a liberal democracy during World War I (1914–18), and it fought against four other liberal democracies: Britain, France, Italy, and the United States.11 In the Boer War (1899–1902) Britain fought against the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, both of which were democracies.12 The Spanish-American War (1898) and the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan are also cases of democracies fighting each other. 13 Other cases come close to qualifying as wars between democracies.14 The American Civil War is usually not counted because it is considered a civil war rather than an interstate war. One might argue, however, that the distinction is not meaningful here. The Confederacy was established on February 4, 1861, but the war did not begin until April, by which time the Confederacy was effectively a sovereign state. It is also worth noting that there have been a host of militarized disputes between democracies, including some cases where fighting broke out and people died, but that fell short of actual war. 15 There are also many cases of democracies, especially the United States, overthrowing democratically elected leaders in other countries, a behavior that seems at odds with the claim that democracies behave peacefully toward one another. But let us get back to my four cases of actual wars between democracies. One might concede that I am right yet still argue that this tiny number of wars does not substantially challenge the theory. This conclusion would be wrong, however, for reasons clearly laid out by the democratic peace theorist James L. Ray: “Since wars between states are so rare statistically . . . the existence of even a few wars between democratic states would wipe out entirely the statistical and therefore arguably the substantive significance of the difference in the historical rates of warfare between pairs of democratic states, on the one hand, and pairs of states in general, on the other.”16 Those four wars between democracies, in other words, undermine the central claim of democratic peace theorists. The second major problem with democratic peace theory is that it offers no good explanation for why liberal democracies should not fight each other. Democratic peace theorists have put forward various explanations, some of which focus on democratic institutions and norms and others that emphasize liberal norms. But none are compelling. Democratic Institutions and Peace There are three institutional explanations for why liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. The first emphasizes that publics are pacific by nature, and if asked whether to initiate a war they will almost certainly say no. Kant articulates this argument in Perpetual Peace: “If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared . . . nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.”17 This argument was popular during the Cold War among neoconservatives, who believed that liberal democracies were inclined to appease authoritarian states because democratic peoples were not only soft but influential, because they could vote.18 The fatal flaw in this argument is that it proves too much. If the citizens of a liberal democracy were so averse to war, they would be disinclined to fight against non-democracies as well as democracies. They would not want to fight any wars at all. It is clear from the historical record, however, that this is not the case. The United States, for instance, has fought seven wars since the Cold War ended, and it initiated all seven. During that period it has been at war for two out of every three years. It is no exaggeration to say that the United States is addicted to war. Moreover, Britain, another liberal democracy, has been at America’s side throughout those wars. This helps explain why democratic peace theorists do not argue that democracies are generally more peaceful than non-democracies. Several factors explain why democratic peoples sometimes favor starting wars. For one, there are sometimes good strategic reasons for war and most citizens will recognize them. Furthermore, democratic leaders are often adept at convincing reticent publics that war is necessary, even when it is not.19 Sometimes not much convincing is necessary, because the people’s nationalist fervor is so great that, if anything, they are pushing their leaders to go to war, whether necessary or not.20 Finally, it is wrong to assume that the public axiomatically pays a big price when its country goes to war. Wealthy countries often have a highly capitalized military, which means that only a small slice of the population actually serves. Moreover, liberal democracies are often adept at finding ways to minimize their casualties— for example, by using drones against an adversary. As for the financial costs, a state has many ways to pay for a war without seriously burdening its public.21 The second institutional explanation is that it is more difficult for government leaders to mobilize a democracy to start a war. This cumbersome decision making is partly a function of the need to get public permission, which is time-consuming given the public’s natural reluctance to fight wars and risk death. The institutional obstacles built into democracies, like checks and balances, slow down the process. These problems make it difficult not only to start a war but also to formulate and execute a smart foreign policy. If these claims were true, again, democracies would not initiate wars against non-democracies. But they do. There may be instances where democratic inefficiencies prevent governing elites from taking their country to war, although as I noted above, that will happen infrequently. Moreover, the institutional impediments that might thwart leaders bent on starting a war usually count for little, because the decision to start a war is often made during a serious crisis, in which the executive takes charge and checks and balances, as well as individual rights, are subordinated to national security concerns. In an extreme emergency, liberal democracies are fully capable of reacting swiftly and decisively, and initiating a war if necessary. Finally, some argue that “audience costs” are the key to explaining the democratic peace.22 This claim rests on the belief that democratically elected leaders are especially good at signaling their resolve in crises because they can make public commitments to act in particular circumstances, which they are then obligated to follow through on. In other words, they can tie their own hands. If they renege on their commitments, the public will punish them by voting them out of office. Once a leader draws a red line, the argument goes, his audience will hold his feet to the fire. Two democracies can thus make it clear to each other what exactly they would fight over, which allows them to avoid miscalculation and negotiate a settlement. The audience-costs story is intuitively attractive, but empirical studies have shown that it has little explanatory power. 23 There is hardly any evidence that audience costs have worked as advertised in actual crises. Moreover, there are many reasons to question the theory’s underlying logic. For example, leaders are usually wary about drawing red lines, preferring instead to keep their threats vague so as to maximize their bargaining space. In such cases, audience-costs logic does not even come into play. But even if a leader draws a red line and then fails to follow through, the public is unlikely to punish her if she ends the crisis on favorable terms. Moreover, one should never underestimate political leaders’ ability to spin a story so that it appears they did not renege on a commitment when they actually did. And even if a leader gives a signal, there is no guarantee the other side will read it correctly. In sum, none of the mechanisms involving democratic institutions provides a satisfactory explanation for why democracies rarely fight wars with each other. 24 Some prominent democratic peace theorists recognize the limits of these institutional explanations and instead rely on normative arguments linked to democracy and liberalism.25

#### Kasparov is a chess master – he’s not qualified

## Corruption

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Clary 15 – Christopher Clary, PhD in Political Science from MIT, M.A. in National Security Affairs, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2015 (“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 25th, Available Online via SSRN Subscription, AIvackovic)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict?

Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 19i9 50, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.

Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

#### Weber says econ decline is worse in democracies – proves democracies are bad

#### Liu is not about nuke war – no link to Starr

### Terror impact

#### Escalates to great power war.

Kegl and Virtue ’15 both are journalists in London (\*Agnes Kegl, \*\*Rob Virtue, 9/23/15, “Migrant crisis and Euro tensions threaten to trigger catastrophic conflict claim experts,” <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/607158/World-War-3-Experts-raise-fears-migrant-crisis-could-lead-to-catastrophic-scenario>, fg; Accessed late 2015) \*\*citing a US economist and former William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy in the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown (Dr. Paul Roberts) and a renowned American trend forecaster and publisher of an internationally distributed quarterly Trends Journal (Gerald Celente)

Both the Hungarian and Italian prime ministers have spoken of huge dangers of unchecked floods of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East which have set **previously peacable EU nations** against each other. The scenario - especially the one currently being played out in Serbia and Hungary - is hauntingly similar to that which triggered the First World War. The problem has manifesting itself in central Europe where Hungary is besieged by growing numbers of refugees passing through from Serbia and Croatia, forcing its government to build fences to **stem the influx**. Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán warned European life and its established laws were under threat from huge numbers of people heading through the continent from war-torn states in the Middle East. In a defence against criticism of the aggressive stance against refugees taken by the country , he said yesterday: "Our borders are in danger. Our way of life where we respect the law is in danger. "The whole of Hungary and Europe is in danger. "The migrants are **blitzing us."** Hungary and Serbia have constantly been **at each others' throats** over the issue, with Budapest urging its non-EU neighbours to do more to help tackle the growing neighbours migrants. It is now sending troops armed with rubber bullets and tear gas to the border with Serbia to protect the country's frontier. Pinter Bence, a Hungarian political journalist for the mandiner.hu website said the situation with **growing tensions between nations** was reminiscent of the international scenario from just over 100 years ago. He said: "This is how the eve of the First World War could have looked like: complete hesitancy, the termination of the usual channels of diplomacy, the lack of solidarity, pressure to take a step and the countries issuing threats to each other are all reminding us of that. It definitely doesn't look like a cooperating Europe. "Mr Orban is right in stating that it would only worth to talk about quotas if we can control the registration of the migrants coming to Europe. And so far no country has any idea how to do that. "That's what the Hungarian Government has done, though it risks projecting an image of inhumanity." He said reports of a Croatian train filled with 1,000 migrants illegally entering Hungary last week, could easily be the sort of act that escalates the currently fraught situation. Politicians in Budapest described the train's unannounced arrival as a "major, major incident". Mr Pinter said: "What did the Croatian government think when they sent a train with 40 fully armed police officers on it, crossing the border at a red signal? In the worse cases an affair like this can lead to an outbreak of a war." The escalating situation on the continent has also drawn interest across the Atlantic Ocean. Like Mr Pinter, Gerald Celente, who is a trend forecaster in the United States, said the current crisis draws huge parallels with a previous global conflict - in this case the Second World War. He blames America's attacks on Libya, Iraq and most recently Syria, for bringing "refugees of war" to Europe. Mr Celente said this is going hand in hand with trade wars, with China devaluing its currency to **gain a global advantage**, similar to what happened prior to the Second World War. Considering the current situation in Syria, where **America is bombing** president Bashar al-Assad's regime while Vladimir Putin's Russia is **defending him by attacking ISIS,** his warnings are **all too clear**. He said: "We're on the march to war. History is repeating itself. "It's a repeat of the 1930s. The crash of 1929, the Great Depression, currency wars, trade wars, world war. "We've got the panic of '08, the Great Recession, currency wars, trade wars and now we're seeing the refugees of war sweeping on the shores of Europe." He said another **big terror attack** on society will see an **emotional outpouring across the Western world** that will then transform into a **catastrophic thirst for revenge**. Mr Celente said: "They are leading us to the next great war. All it is going to take is a terror attack and people will be tying yellow ribbons around everything that doesn't move, waving American flags and we're off to what Einstein called the whole war scenario." US economist Dr Paul Craig Roberts, who served in the Reagan administration, is another who predicts doom on the horizon. He spoke at an Occupy Peace event organised by Mr Celente at the weekend about rising tensions. Dr Roberts remarked on the **impact of a nuclear war** under the currently tense climate, if countries such as **Russia and China are involved**. He said the **effects would be devastating**, as there would be a "**first-strike, pre-emptive force**". He added: "Armageddon could be at hand. "This is chilling. People should be scared to death." Running alongside the rising tension between global superpowers is the **threat emanating** from Islamic State. Just weeks ago Italian prime minister Sergio Mattarella said the seeds of a major conflict were being planted across the region, with religious-based terrorism at the root of it. Speaking at a meeting of world leaders in Rimini, he said: "Terrorism, energised by a fanatical belief in God, **aims to start a third world war** in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa. Our duty is to stop it. "It is our responsibility to defuse the threat, because peace in the world will depend on the ability of the monotheistic religions to talk with each other and to understand each other." He called for "intelligence" in dealing with migration to help tackle radicalism. But he also called for refugees to be welcomed in Europe, which is at odds with many across continent, who fear ISIS is looking to exploit the migrant crisis by sneaking jihadis into Europe with them.