# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: the affirmative may not specify a specific country

#### By means:

Oxford dictionary <https://www.google.com/search?q=by+definition&oq=by+definition&aqs=edge..69i57l2j69i59l2j69i60j69i64j69i60l3.1219j0j1&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

identifying the agent performing an action. 2. indicating the means of achieving something.

#### Countries are not private entities:

[https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/private-entity //](https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/private-entity%20//) ella

**Private entity** means **any entity other than a State,** local government, Indian tribe, or foreign public entity, as those terms are defined in 2 CFR 175.25. Includes:

Entities is plural

https://www.wordhippo.com/what-is/the-plural-of/entity.html

What is the plural of entity? The plural form of entity is entities.

#### Violation: they specify China

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Limits and ground – they justify speccing any country in the world like Luxembourg, China, Monaco, Peru, Russia, etc. exploding limits and making neg prep impossible

#### 2] Precision - topic wording is the basis of all prep since it’s the only thing we have to prep off of pre-round, so jettisoning it creates a lack of stable ground- its also a voter for jurisdiction because judges are constrained by the ballot to vote on the topic

#### Competing interps on T – you can’t be reasonably topical

#### DTD – T indicts the entire aff

#### No RVIs - 1] encourages good theory debaters to bait theory and always go for it 2] illogical you don’t win for being fair 3] education – forces me to go all in on T in the 2n which kills the only portable impact to debate

#### Neg theory 1st – 1AC abuse shaped NC construction so if anything we did was bad it was just to get back in the game.

## 2

#### Private space mining is on the rise now – investors, profitability, market demand.

Krishnan 20 [C A Krishnan, 8-6-2020, "Space mining: Just around the corner?," Week, <https://www.theweek.in/news/sci-tech/2020/08/06/Space-mining-Just-around-the-corner.html> [accessed 12-6-21] lydia

A Mars mission carrying 100 metric tons cargo in 2022 followed by a manned mission by 2024 are the immediate milestones of Elon Musk’s SpaceX plan which aims to create a self sustaining Mars city by 2050. Just a few decades back this would have sounded as fantasy, but today it looks as if this time frame may actually be bettered. Space missions are set to undergo revolutionary changes and Elon Musk’s vision and timelines are indicators of this. Space is increasingly being seen as a treasure trove of precious minerals and also a place for future human habitation beyond the earth. Global private space industry investors believe that space mining has the potential to shape and define the 21st Century. NASA estimates that the 'Asteroid belt’ holds minerals worth quintillion of dollars. American astrophysicist Neil Degrasse Tyson believes, “The first trillioners will be those who mine asteroids”. The “Main Asteroid Belt” is located between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter, about 450 to 650 million Kilometers from earth, with million asteroids in it. Over the decades, apart from Moon and Mars, governments and private agencies have been carrying out extensive research and studying asteroids for their composition, possibility of mining them and their mining value —Asteriod ‘Bennu’ has been assessed at $670 million and asteroid ‘2011 UW158’ at $ 5.7 trillion. Transportation of the mined resources for utilisation, however, poses major hurdles. A ‘BBC Future’ report by Sarah Cruddas puts the cost of shipping a ton of water into space at about $ 50 million. As per Chris Lewicki, president of Planetary Resources, an asteroid mining company, it takes more energy to escape the first 300 kilometers from the Earth than the next 300 million kilometers. Similarly, bringing back anything more than a few kilograms of samples from space to the Earth would be even more complex in terms of logistics. To start with, therefore, global space industry investors are focusing on keeping mined space resources in space itself for ‘in situ resource utilisation’. Availability of water on the Moon, Mars and asteroids offer very attractive prospects; apart from being crucial for supporting life and growing food, it also opens the possibility of using its constituents, hydrogen and oxygen, for making rocket fuel. Today, the possibility of manufacturing tools and even building habitats on Moon or Mars with the help of 3D printers using iron, nickel, cobalt, gold, platinum, and iridium etc which are available on the Moon, Mars and asteroids seem within reach. Researchers are working on using regolith, the weathered rock particles found on lunar surface for making moon bricks using 3D printers. These bricks will form the basic construction material for the first moon station and even the first moon hotel. Space industry players believe that an investment of $ 4 billion in water mining in space can generate annual revenue worth about $2.4 billion. Similarly, there is a new community of customers who are already looking for buying propellant in space. American space launch provider, United Launch Alliance (ULA), a Lockheed Martin and Boeing joint venture that provides launch rockets, has made it known that, ULA is willing to pay about $ 3000 a Kg for propellant in low earth orbit. Fast paced developments are taking place in the field of space mining technology with private players in the lead. Optical mining using concentrated sunlight, robotics, automated mining applications, advanced drilling machines etc are just a few examples. Participation of private players has reduced the investment burden and greatly enhanced the width and pace of innovation. It is believed that launch of the first asteroid mining vehicle as well as setting up of the first fuelling stations on the Moon and in low earth orbit could become a reality within a decade. Japanese mission ‘Hayabusa’ was the first to bring samples from an asteroid to earth in 2010. ‘Hayabusa - 2’ made its rendezvous with the near earth asteroid ‘162173 RYUGU’ in June 2018, left the asteroid after collecting samples in November 2019 and will be back on earth on December 6, 2020. Similarly the NASA mission OSIRIS-REx, costing about $ 1 billion, launched in 2016 is due to return to earth with samples of asteroid ‘101955 Bennu’ on September 24, 2023. The latest US space mission, ‘Perseverance’ launched on July 30, 2020 will land on Mars on February 18, 2021. It will be using a helicopter on Mars, set to be the first use of a helicopter outside the earth. Apart from collecting samples from Mars and search for signs of habitable conditions on Mars, it will also test the possibility of manufacturing molecular oxygen from the carbon dioxide-rich Mars atmosphere. Beyond the technological capability, there are, however, complex legal issues. While making fuel and water in space and its ‘in situ resource utilisation’ may pass the scrutiny, commercial exploitation of space through minerals mining, tourism, real estate etc may prove hugely contentious in terms of international legal framework for space. The current legal frameworks were adopted when space activities were entirely within the domain of national governments and were confined to research alone. But with the nature of space activities moving from purely research activities to military applications to commercial activities and with the entry of private players and a new community of consumers in space, the vintage outer space treaty has been rendered grossly inadequate; vagueness of the treaty does not cater for the ‘new types of uses’ or the ‘new users’ of space. Louis de Gouyon Matignon, in a thesis on the subject observed that “some states have already taken the absence of express prohibition as a sign that the utilisation of space resources is permissible, and both the USA and Luxembourg recently adopted national legislations expressly allowing it”. This has, however, triggered a response from the international community denouncing such unilateral initiatives and recommending a collective approach on the lines of the laws for high seas and deep sea bed. Whether a widely acceptable new space treaty comes through or not, Space mining is a reality and the early entrants are likely to retain monopoly and huge economic advantages for a very long time.

#### Terrestrial mining causes environmental destruction and inevitable resource shortages, but space mining solves.

MacWhorter 16 [Kevin; J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, "Sustainable Mining: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining in the Name of Environmentalism", William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Vol 40, Issue 2, Article 11, <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1653&context=wmelpr>] brett

A. Rare Element Mining on Earth

In the next sixty years, scientists predict that certain elements crucial to modern industry such as platinum, zinc, copper, phosphorous, lead, gold, and indium could be exhausted on Earth. 12 Many of these have no synthetic alternative, unlike chemical elements such as oil or diamonds.13 Liquid-crystal display (LCD) televisions, cellphones, and laptops are among the various consumer technologies that use precious metals.14Further, green technologies including wind turbines, solar panels, and catalytic converters require these rare elements. 15 As demand rises for both types of technologies, and as reserves of rare metals fall, prices skyrocket.16 Demand for nonrenewable resources creates conflict, and consumerism in rich countries results in harsh labor treatment for poorer countries.17

In general, the mining industry is extremely destructive to Earth’s environment.18 In fact, depending on the method employed, mining can destroy entire ecosystems by polluting water sources and contributing to deforestation.19 It is by its nature an unsustainable practice, because it involves the extraction of a finite and non-renewable resource.20 Moreover, by extracting tiny amounts of metals from relatively large quantities of ore, the mining industry contributes the largest portion of solid wastes in the world.21 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) describes the industry as the source of more toxic and hazardous waste than any other industrial sector [in the United States], costing billions of dollars to address the public health and environmental threats to communities. 22 Poor regulations and oxymoronic corporate definitions of sustainability, however, make it unclear as to just how much waste the industry actually produces.23

Platinum provides an excellent case study of the issue, because it is an extremely rare and expensive metal—an ore expected to exist in vast quantities in asteroids.24 Further, production of platinum has increased sharply in the past sixty years in order to keep up with growing demand for use in new technologies.25 In fact, despite their high costs, platinum group metals are so useful that [one] of [four] industrial goods on Earth require them in production. 26 Scholars do not expect demand to slow any time soon.27 Among other technologies, industries use platinum in products such as catalytic converters, jewelry production, various catalysts for chemical processing, and hydrogen fuel cells.28 While there is no consensus on how far the Earth’s reserves of platinum will take humanity, many scientists agree that platinum ore reserves will deplete in a relatively short amount of time.29

With the rate of mining at an all-time high,30 it is increasingly clear that historical patterns of mineral resources and development cannot simply be assumed to continue unaltered into the future. 31 The platinum mining industry, however, has a strong incentive to increase its rate of extraction as profits grow with the rate of demand. Without any alternative, this destructive practice will continue into the future.32

So-called platinum-group metal (PGM) ores are mined through underground or open cut techniques.33 Due to these practices, all but a very small fraction of the mined platinum ore is disposed of as solid waste.34 The environmental consequences of platinum production are thus quite significant, but like the mining industry in general, the amount of waste is typically under-reported.35

While this is due to high production levels at the moment, those levels will only increase given the estimated future demand of platinum.36 In spite of the negative consequences, mining continues unabated because it is economically important to many areas.37 The future environmental costs provide a major challenge in creating a sustainable system. Relegating at least some mining companies to near-Earth asteroids would reduce the negative effects of future mining levels on Earth. The economic benefits of mining need not be sacrificed for the sake of the environment.38

#### Chinese environmental destruction spills over

Larson-Robin, 2016 Leah, Dissertation for acquiring a Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science), “Risking Poison to Quench a Thirst: Political Engagement Choices for Citizens and the State in China’s Environmental Crisis” University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2016.

China’s environmental and political future are significant for the world: simply as a matter of scale, the state’s ability to control, halt or reduce pollution will affect climate change, air quality, and ecological balance in the Pacific and South China Sea. Therefore, understanding the motivations, policies and functional effectiveness of those efforts must be better understood. This project seeks to make contributions to our knowledge of these dynamics. First, this project demonstrates the need to look more closely at the role of individual decision-making and its impact on politics and governance present even in the authoritarian context. Second, it raises questions about the relationship between the expansion and reform of regulatory institutions, specifically the legal system, and the impact those changes can have on politically and economically vulnerable groups. Third, it highlights how environmental policy theory can be informed by the failures and successes of environmental governance in China. The uncertainties of environmental policy are extensive as a result of unknown dynamics within and among whole ecosystems. Then there are the structural uncertainties intrinsic to both the complexity of the science-policy theory hybridization, and to coordinating among institutions and actors involved in implementing even the most effectively designed policy. The risk of failure is high, and risk from failure and success is unpredictable. Nevertheless, the state of the environment globally, and within China is bad and growing worse. These chapters explore the political and environmental dimensions of public participation through the perspective of villagers, the role of legal institutions in supporting and shaping environmental governance, and implications of political trust and institutional confidence for environmental policy efficacy. On the whole, China’s environment is in dire straits. It is not clear if it is irrecoverable, but at this time, there exist no magic pills, no advanced technological fixes that can pull the environment back from the brink. In theory, preventing further pollution might allow the ecological systems to recover themselves, but not enough is understood about environmental science, even among the experts, to determine this probability. In the meantime, China continues to pollute, even as the government pours billions of dollars into remedies. As examined here, China’s environmental challenges are largely a story of politics, but also one of environmental policy and the role of legal development as an institutional tool. As such, the questions posed require an interdisciplinary analysis and the contributions are similarly interdisciplinary. The human and institutional behaviors we study as political scientists are not governed by the limits we place on academic disciplines; this project is therefore designed as an argument for greater flexibility across disciplines so as better to tell the stories meant to contribute to knowledge.

#### That spirals globally and causes extinction

Dr. Glen Barry 13, Ph.D. in "Land Resources" and Masters of Science in "Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development” from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, “ECOLOGY SCIENCE: Terrestrial Ecosystem Loss and Biosphere Collapse,” Forests.org, February 4, 2013, pg. http://forests.org/blog/2013/02/ecology-science-terrestrial-ec.asp

Blunt, Biocentric Discussion on Avoiding Global Ecosystem Collapse and Achieving Global Ecological Sustainability Science needs to do a better job of considering worst-case scenarios regarding continental- and global-scale ecological collapse. The loss of biodiversity, ecosystems, and landscape connectivity reviewed here shows clearly that ecological collapse is occurring at spatially extensive scales. The collapse of the biosphere and complex life, or eventually even all life, is a possibility that needs to be better understood and mitigated against. A tentative case has been presented here that terrestrial ecosystem loss is at or near a planetary boundary. It is suggested that a 66% of Earth's land mass must be maintained in terrestrial ecosystems, to maintain critical connectivity necessary for ecosystem services across scales to continue, including the biosphere. Yet various indicators show that around 50% of Earth's terrestrial ecosystems have been lost and their services usurped by humans. Humanity may have already destroyed more terrestrial ecosystems than the biosphere can bear. There exists a major need for further research into how much land must be maintained in a natural and agroecological state to meet landscape and bioregional sustainable development goals while maintaining an operable biosphere. It is proposed that a critical element in determining the threshold where terrestrial ecosystem loss becomes problematic is where landscape connectivity of intact terrestrial ecosystems erodes to the point where habitat patches exist only in a human context. Based upon an understanding of how landscapes percolate across scale, it is recommended that 66% of Earth's surface be maintained as ecosystems; 44% as natural intact ecosystems (2/3 of 2/3) and 22% as agroecological buffer zones. Thus nearly half of Earth must remain as large, connected, intact, and naturally evolving ecosystems, including old-growth forests, to provide the context and top-down ecological regulation of both human agroecological, and reduced impact and appropriately scaled industrial activities. Given the stakes, it is proper for political ecologists and other Earth scientists to willingly speak bluntly if we are to have any chance of averting global ecosystem collapse. A case has been presented that Earth is already well beyond carrying capacity in terms of amount of natural ecosystem habitat that can be lost before the continued existence of healthy regional ecosystems and the global biosphere itself may not be possible. Cautious and justifiably conservative science must still be able to rise to the occasion of global ecological emergencies that may threaten our very survival as a species and planet. Those knowledgeable about planetary boundaries—and abrupt climate change and terrestrial ecosystem loss in particular—must be more bold and insistent in conveying the range and possible severity of threats of global ecosystem collapse, while proposing sufficient solutions. It is not possible to do controlled experiments on the Earth system; all we have is observation based upon science and trained intuition to diagnose the state of Earth's biosphere and suggest sufficient ecological science–based remedies. If Gaia is alive, she can die. Given the strength of life-reducing trends across biological systems and scales, there is a need for a rigorous research agenda to understand at what point the biosphere may perish and Earth die, and to learn what configuration of ecosystems and other boundary conditions may prevent her from doing so. We see death of cells, organisms, plant communities, wildlife populations, and whole ecosystems all the time in nature—extreme cases being desertification and ocean dead zones. There is no reason to dismiss out of hand that the Earth System could die if critical thresholds are crossed. We need as Earth scientists to better understand how this may occur and bring knowledge to bear to avoid global ecosystem and biosphere collapse or more extreme outcomes such as biological homogenization and the loss of most or even all life. To what extent can a homogenized Earth of dandelions, rats, and extremophiles be said to be alive, can it ever recover, and how long can it last? The risks of global ecosystem collapse and the need for strong response to achieve global ecological sustainability have been understated for decades. If indeed there is some possibility that our shared biosphere could be collapsing, there needs to be further investigation of what sorts of sociopolitical responses are valid in such a situation. Dry, unemotional scientific inquiry into such matters is necessary—yet more proactive and evocative political ecological language may be justified as well. We must remember we are speaking of the potential for a period of great dying in species, ecosystems, humans, and perhaps all being. It is not clear whether this global ecological emergency is avoidable or recoverable. It may not be. But we must follow and seek truth wherever it leads us. Planetary boundaries have been quite anthropocentric, focusing upon human safety and giving relatively little attention to other species and the biosphere's needs other than serving humans. Planetary boundaries need to be set that, while including human needs, go beyond them to meet the needs of ecosystems and all their constituent species and their aggregation into a living biosphere. Planetary boundary thinking needs to be more biocentric. I concur with Williams (2000) that what is needed is an Earth System–based conservation ethic—based upon an "Earth narrative" of natural and human history—which seeks as its objective the "complete preservation of the Earth's biotic inheritance." Humans are in no position to be indicating which species and ecosystems can be lost without harm to their own intrinsic right to exist, as well as the needs of the biosphere. For us to survive as a species, logic and reason must prevail (Williams 2000). Those who deny limits to growth are unaware of biological realities (Vitousek 1986). There are strong indications humanity may undergo societal collapse and pull down the biosphere with it. The longer dramatic reductions in fossil fuel emissions and a halt to old-growth logging are put off, the worse the risk of abrupt and irreversible climate change becomes, and the less likely we are to survive and thrive as a species. Human survival—entirely dependent upon the natural world—depends critically upon both keeping carbon emissions below 350 ppm and maintaining at least 66% of the landscape as natural ecological core areas and agroecological transitions and buffers. Much of the world has already fallen below this proportion, and in sum the biosphere's terrestrial ecosystem loss almost certainly has been surpassed, yet it must be the goal for habitat transition in remaining relatively wild lands undergoing development such as the Amazon, and for habitat restoration and protection in severely fragmented natural habitat areas such as the Western Ghats. The human family faces an unprecedented global ecological emergency as reckless growth destroys the ecosystems and the biosphere on which all life depends. Where is the sense of urgency, and what are proper scientific responses if in fact Earth is dying? Not speaking of worst-case scenarios—the collapse of the biosphere and loss of a living Earth, and mass ecosystem collapse and death in places like Kerala—is intellectually dishonest. We must consider the real possibility that we are pulling the biosphere down with us, setting back or eliminating complex life. The 66% / 44% / 22% threshold of terrestrial ecosystems in total, natural core areas, and agroecological buffers gets at the critical need to maintain large and expansive ecosystems across at least 50% of the land so as to keep nature connected and fully functional. We need an approach to planetary boundaries that is more sensitive to deep ecology to ensure that habitable conditions for all life and natural evolutionary change continue. A terrestrial ecosystem boundary which protects primary forests and seeks to recover old-growth forests elsewhere is critical in this regard. In old forests and all their life lie both the history of Earth's life, and the hope for its future. The end of their industrial destruction is a global ecological imperative. Much-needed dialogue is beginning to focus on how humanity may face systematic social and ecological collapse and what sort of community resilience is possible. There have been ecologically mediated periods of societal collapse from human damage to ecosystems in the past (Kuecker and Hall 2011). What makes it different this time is that the human species may have the scale and prowess to pull down the biosphere with them. It is fitting at this juncture for political ecologists to concern themselves with both legal regulatory measures, as well as revolutionary processes of social change, which may bring about the social norms necessary to maintain the biosphere. Rockström and colleagues (2009b) refer to the need for "novel and adaptive governance" without using the word revolution. Scientists need to take greater latitude in proposing solutions that lie outside the current political paradigms and sovereign powers. Even the Blue Planet Laureates' remarkable analysis (Brundtland et al. 2012), which notes the potential for climate change, ecosystem loss, and inequitable development patterns neither directly states nor investigates in depth the potential for global ecosystem collapse, or discusses revolutionary responses. UNEP (2012) notes abrupt and irreversible ecological change, which they say may impact life-support systems, but are not more explicit regarding the profound human and ecological implications of biosphere collapse, or the full range of sociopolitical responses to such predictions. More scientific investigations are needed regarding alternative governing structures optimal for pursuit and achievement of bioregional, continental, and global sustainability if we are maintain a fully operable biosphere forever. An economic system based upon endless growth that views ecosystems necessary for planetary habitability primarily as resources to be consumed cannot exist for long. Planetary boundaries offer a profoundly difficult challenge for global governance, particularly as increased scientific salience does not appear to be sufficient to trigger international action to sustain ecosystems (Galaz et al. 2012). If indeed the safe operating space for humanity is closing, or the biosphere even collapsing and dying, might not discussion of revolutionary social change be acceptable? Particularly, if there is a lack of consensus by atomized actors, who are unable to legislate the required social change within the current socioeconomic system. By not even speaking of revolutionary action, we dismiss any means outside the dominant growth-based oligarchies. In the author's opinion, it is shockingly irresponsible for Earth System scientists to speak of geoengineering a climate without being willing to academically investigate revolutionary social and economic change as well. It is desirable that the current political and economic systems should reform themselves to be ecologically sustainable, establishing laws and institutions for doing so. Yet there is nothing sacrosanct about current political economy arrangements, particularly if they are collapsing the biosphere. Earth requires all enlightened and knowledgeable voices to consider the full range of possible responses now more than ever. One possible solution to the critical issues of terrestrial ecosystem loss and abrupt climate change is a massive and global, natural ecosystem protection and restoration program—funded by a carbon tax—to further establish protected large and connected core ecological sustainability areas, buffers, and agro-ecological transition zones throughout all of Earth's bioregions. Fossil fuel emission reductions must also be a priority. It is critical that humanity both stop burning fossil fuels and destroying natural ecosystems, as fast as possible, to avoid surpassing nearly all the planetary boundaries. In summation, we are witnessing the collective dismantling of the biosphere and its constituent ecosystems which can be described as ecocidal. The loss of a species is tragic, of an ecosystem widely impactful, yet with the loss of the biosphere all life may be gone. Global ecosystems when connected for life's material flows provide the all-encompassing context within which life is possible. The miracle of life is that life begets life, and the tragedy is that across scales when enough life is lost beyond thresholds, living systems die.

#### Mineral scarcity turns every war scenario---we outweigh on timeframe, just the prospect of shortages triggers escalation.

---ev literally cites China, talks about expansion in SCS and ECS

Klare 13 [Michael T., The Nation’s defense correspondent, is professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C. His newest book, All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change, will be published this fall. 2013. “How Resource Scarcity and Climate Change Could Produce a Global Explosion,” <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-resource-scarcity-and-climate-change-could-produce-global-explosion/>] brett

Brace yourself. You may not be able to tell yet, but according to global experts and the US intelligence community, the earth is already shifting under you. Whether you know it or not, you’re on a new planet, a resource-shock world of a sort humanity has never before experienced.

Two nightmare scenarios—a global scarcity of vital resources and the onset of extreme climate change—are already beginning to converge and in the coming decades are likely to produce a tidal wave of unrest, rebellion, competition and conflict. Just what this tsunami of disaster will look like may, as yet, be hard to discern, but experts warn of “water wars” over contested river systems, global food riots sparked by soaring prices for life’s basics, mass migrations of climate refugees (with resulting anti-migrant violence) and the breakdown of social order or the collapse of states. At first, such mayhem is likely to arise largely in Africa, Central Asia and other areas of the underdeveloped South, but in time, all regions of the planet will be affected.

To appreciate the power of this encroaching catastrophe, it’s necessary to examine each of the forces that are combining to produce this future cataclysm.

Resource Shortages and Resource Wars

Start with one simple given: the prospect of future scarcities of vital natural resources, including energy, water, land, food and critical minerals. This in itself would guarantee social unrest, geopolitical friction and war.

It is important to note that absolute scarcity doesn’t have to be on the horizon in any given resource category for this scenario to kick in. A lack of adequate supplies to meet the needs of a growing, ever more urbanized and industrialized global population is enough. Given the wave of extinctions that scientists are recording, some resources—particular species of fish, animals and trees, for example—will become less abundant in the decades to come, and may even disappear altogether. But key materials for modern civilization like oil, uranium and copper will simply prove harder and more costly to acquire, leading to supply bottlenecks and periodic shortages.

Oil—the single most important commodity in the international economy—provides an apt example. Although global oil supplies may actually grow in the coming decades, many experts doubt that they can be expanded sufficiently to meet the needs of a rising global middle class that is, for instance, expected to buy millions of new cars in the near future. In its 2011 World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency claimed that an anticipated global oil demand of 104 million barrels per day in 2035 will be satisfied. This, the report suggested, would be thanks in large part to additional supplies of “unconventional oil” (Canadian tar sands, shale oil and so on), as well as 55 million barrels of new oil from fields “yet to be found” and “yet to be developed.”

However, many analysts scoff at this optimistic assessment, arguing that rising production costs (for energy that will be ever more difficult and costly to extract), environmental opposition, warfare, corruption and other impediments will make it extremely difficult to achieve increases of this magnitude. In other words, even if production manages for a time to top the 2010 level of 87 million barrels per day, the goal of 104 million barrels will never be reached and the world’s major consumers will face virtual, if not absolute, scarcity.

Water provides another potent example. On an annual basis, the supply of drinking water provided by natural precipitation remains more or less constant: about 40,000 cubic kilometers. But much of this precipitation lands on Greenland, Antarctica, Siberia and inner Amazonia where there are very few people, so the supply available to major concentrations of humanity is often surprisingly limited. In many regions with high population levels, water supplies are already relatively sparse. This is especially true of North Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East, where the demand for water continues to grow as a result of rising populations, urbanization and the emergence of new water-intensive industries. The result, even when the supply remains constant, is an environment of increasing scarcity.

Wherever you look, the picture is roughly the same: supplies of critical resources may be rising or falling, but rarely do they appear to be outpacing demand, producing a sense of widespread and systemic scarcity. However generated, a perception of scarcity—or imminent scarcity—regularly leads to anxiety, resentment, hostility and contentiousness. This pattern is very well understood, and has been evident throughout human history.

In his book Constant Battles, for example, Steven LeBlanc, director of collections for Harvard’s Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, notes that many ancient civilizations experienced higher levels of warfare when faced with resource shortages brought about by population growth, crop failures or persistent drought. Jared Diamond, author of the bestseller Collapse, has detected a similar pattern in Mayan civilization and the Anasazi culture of New Mexico’s Chaco Canyon. More recently, concern over adequate food for the home population was a significant factor in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Germany’s invasions of Poland in 1939 and the Soviet Union in 1941, according to Lizzie Collingham, author of The Taste of War.

Although the global supply of most basic commodities has grown enormously since the end of World War II, analysts see the persistence of resource-related conflict in areas where materials remain scarce or there is anxiety about the future reliability of supplies. Many experts believe, for example, that the fighting in Darfur and other war-ravaged areas of North Africa has been driven, at least in part, by competition among desert tribes for access to scarce water supplies, exacerbated in some cases by rising population levels.

“In Darfur,” says a 2009 report from the UN Environment Programme on the role of natural resources in the conflict, “recurrent drought, increasing demographic pressures, and political marginalization are among the forces that have pushed the region into a spiral of lawlessness and violence that has led to 300,000 deaths and the displacement of more than two million people since 2003.”

Anxiety over future supplies is often also a factor in conflicts that break out over access to oil or control of contested undersea reserves of oil and natural gas. In 1979, for instance, when the Islamic revolution in Iran overthrew the Shah and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Washington began to fear that someday it might be denied access to Persian Gulf oil. At that point, President Jimmy Carter promptly announced what came to be called the Carter Doctrine. In his 1980 State of the Union Address, Carter affirmed that any move to impede the flow of oil from the Gulf would be viewed as a threat to America’s “vital interests” and would be repelled by “any means necessary, including military force.”

In 1990, this principle was invoked by President George H.W. Bush to justify intervention in the first Persian Gulf War, just as his son would use it, in part, to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Today, it remains the basis for US plans to employ force to stop the Iranians from closing the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean through which about 35 percent of the world’s seaborne oil commerce passes.

Recently, a set of resource conflicts have been rising toward the boiling point between China and its neighbors in Southeast Asia when it comes to control of offshore oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea. Although the resulting naval clashes have yet to result in a loss of life, a strong possibility of military escalation exists. A similar situation has also arisen in the East China Sea, where China and Japan are jousting for control over similarly valuable undersea reserves. Meanwhile, in the South Atlantic Ocean, Argentina and Britain are once again squabbling over the Falkland Islands (called Las Malvinas by the Argentinians) because oil has been discovered in surrounding waters.

By all accounts, resource-driven potential conflicts like these will only multiply in the years ahead as demand rises, supplies dwindle and more of what remains will be found in disputed areas. In a 2012 study titled Resources Futures, the respected British think-tank Chatham House expressed particular concern about possible resource wars over water, especially in areas like the Nile and Jordan River basins where several groups or countries must share the same river for the majority of their water supplies and few possess the wherewithal to develop alternatives. “Against this backdrop of tight supplies and competition, issues related to water rights, prices, and pollution are becoming contentious,” the report noted. “In areas with limited capacity to govern shared resources, balance competing demands, and mobilize new investments, tensions over water may erupt into more open confrontations.”

## 3

#### CP Text:

#### ---The People’s Republic of China should ratify and enact into all relevant domestic legislation the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects.

#### ---The People’s Republic of China should establish a treaty banning ASAT testing.

#### ---The People’s Republic of China should end the policy of Civil-Military-Fusion.

#### Plank 1 bans weaponization and ensures China can’t develop dominance thru space leadership.

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The existing legal regime that tackles the potential weaponization of outer space is outdated, inadequate, and insufficient. Moreover, the rapidity with which space-related technologies are being developed seems to be widening the gap between military applications that may affect space assets and the precarious normative architecture that should regulate them. The fact that space will inevitably become more complex and congested each year underscores the need for a comprehensive space security treaty that builds on what little international law exists in this realm and not only reflects current threats to space security, but also tackles the emerging legal questions that inevitably arise as space becomes a more convoluted domain.

The PPWT—while not perfect and subject to revisions—represents what is undoubtedly the most substantive effort thus far to embed the oft-expressed desire to maintain a weapons-free outer space in international treaty law. It is true that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty specifically bans signatory states from placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit and calls for the peaceful exploration of outer space. However, it does not explicitly refer to the placement or use of other types of weapons in outer space or the use of earth-based weapons against space targets—activities which clearly need regulation, if not outright prohibition.

It is often said that the perils inherent to the indiscriminate weaponization of space are perhaps only comparable to those posed by nuclear weapons, although much of this assessment rests on speculation, since outer space has not yet seen a scenario of direct military confrontation. Indeed, it is assumed that there have been no weapons placed in space to date as there have been neither claims nor denunciations of such behaviour by any state, and considerable efforts are being made in diverse governmental and nongovernmental circles to ensure that this delicate threshold is preserved. To be sure, a distinction must be made between militarization and weaponization: while the former has arguably already happened, given the widespread use of satellites for military applications such as reconnaissance and intelligence, it is the latter that is the primary focus of proponents of a space security treaty.

Not surprisingly, a resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) has been introduced at both the CD and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly and has garnered near-unanimous support year after year—with the notable exception of the United States and Israel.1 In this context, the PPWT draft treaty introduced at the CD in February 2008 has been touted as a practical way to “nip the problem of PAROS in the bud” (UNIDIR 2008, p. 147). If there is a ban on space weapons, the rationale goes, there will be no arms race to prevent.

The PPWT draft treaty

What, then, makes the PPWT proposal worthy of serious consideration by the international community? In other words, why is it an appealing alternative to the status quo? The PPWT is the first draft treaty on outer space ever presented at the UN Conference on Disarmament, which is the quintessential international forum for addressing multilateral disarmament agreements. In fact, the PPWT builds upon elements contained in a 2002 Working Paper presented at the CD by a group of countries that also included Russia and China. Technically speaking, though, the PPWT Treaty focuses not on disarmament but prevention, as outer space is currently considered to be weapons-free and, thus, there is nothing to disarm. Still, the CD seems to be the obvious repository for such a proposal and most member states have welcomed its introduction.

Specifically, as implied in the name of the treaty, the PPWT seeks to ban two different yet interrelated conducts:

the placement of weapons in outer space and

the threat or use of force against outer space objects.

The first initiative sensibly eliminates the fundamental prerequisite for the actual utilization of space weapons: their placement in space. The PPWT treaty defines weapon in outer space in a thorough and comprehensive manner as:

Any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which has been specially produced or converted to destroy, damage, or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or to inflict damage on them. (Article 1C)

Clearly, if the Treaty enters into force, such a broad definition would contribute decisively to the goals of PAROS and preventing space from becoming an arena of military confrontation. Notably, it encompasses weapons placed in space that can be used not only against other space objects, but also against Earth-based objects. Thus, it seems apparent that the framers of the PPWT strove to minimize the room for ambiguity and interpretation with regard to the conditions under which a device in space can be considered a weapon. Again, a weapon in space need not be used against an adversary for there to be a violation of the treaty, as its mere placement in space would be considered a breach of the treaty.

Similarly, the second focal point of this treaty, against the threat or use of force against outer space objects, provides a comprehensive ban on any aggressive action against objects in space, defined as:

Any hostile actions against outer space objects including, inter alia, actions aimed at destroying them, damaging them, temporarily or permanently disrupting their normal functioning or deliberately changing their orbit parameters or the threat of such actions. (Article 1E)

#### ASAT ban specifically accesses their internal links.

Forden 20 Geoffrey Forden, a research associate with the Science, Technology, and Society Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as chief of the multidisciplinary analysis section of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)., 8-9-2020, "After China's Test: Time For A Limited Ban On Anti-Satellite Weapons," Arms Control Association, [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-04/features/after-chinas-test-time-limited-ban-anti-satellite-weapons //](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-04/features/after-chinas-test-time-limited-ban-anti-satellite-weapons%20//) ella

A Treaty Banning ASAT Testing Other analysts have attempted to make progress with proposals banning the testing, development, and deployment of ASAT systems above some threshold altitude.[19] Such methods certainly avoid the missile defense problems that have stymied previous treaty attempts, but they also leave open the development of these weapons at lower altitudes, even if combined with a code of conduct for lower altitudes. It would, unfortunately, be a relatively minor step to move an ASAT weapon that had been developed for lower altitudes and mount it on a more powerful rocket, especially for countries such as China or India that have already orbited geostationary satellites. A better approach might be simply to ban one spacecraft from approaching another orbiting spacecraft[20] at excessive speeds. A technical annex to the treaty, one that could be adjusted by a standing committee of experts, might define these as closing speeds greater than 100 meters per second if they are within 100 kilometers of each other. These speeds and distances are great enough not to interfere with much of the normal operating procedures in space and yet would still obstruct the development of the tracking, guidance, and control of any ASAT weapon. At the same time, they do not prevent the testing and deployment of ground-based missile defenses because the target is not in orbit. Space is far from empty, however. For instance, within a single 100-minute orbit, an equatorial satellite “violated” the proposed treaty limits several times by passing closer than 100 kilometers (at closing speeds of more than 100 meters per second) to 18 cataloged space objects, including two functioning satellites. Of the 16 pieces of debris, six were from the satellite destroyed in China 's ASAT weapons test, which, for this orbit, increased by 50 percent the risk of collision with a large piece of debris. To prevent such false violations, the treaty should be limited to cases where spacecraft were maneuvering within this region, which is the essence of the tracking-guidance-control system. Thus, although it would still be possible to develop individual components of an ASAT system such as the optical tracker with in-orbit tests under this proposed treaty, it would not be possible to gain enough confidence in the complete system to deploy a weapon. Space-based satellite surveillance, which has already been implemented on a single satellite, could be used to detect spacecraft maneuvering in close proximity to other satellites by observing the exhaust plumes from the interceptor's jets.[21] The satellite tracking system at present, however, could not verify this ban because it does not have the space-based surveillance assets necessary for such continuous coverage. The United States would need to implement a complete constellation of satellites dedicated to tracking other satellites, as proposed by the Congressional Budget Office in 2000.[22]

#### Ending Civil-Military-Fusion ensures space tech isn’t developed for militaristic or revisionist aims but rather towards private development -- solves militarization and heg.

1AC Curcio 8/24 [(Blaine, an Affiliate Senior Consultant for Euroconsult, based in Hong Kong. Since joining Euroconsult in 2018, he has contributed to a wide range of consulting missions and research reports, primarily covering the satcom sector globally, and broader space industry in China.) “Developments in China's Commercial Space Sector” The National Bureau of Asian Research, 8/24/2021. https://www.nbr.org/publication/developments-in-chinas-commercial-space-sector/] BC recut BC

The second type is the broader policy impact. Because the central government makes Military-Civil Fusion a significant policy objective, there will be industrial bases that are built to support related technologies. More money and resources will be available for a startup that will support China’s strategic and tech ambitions. Because of the money and resources that are available, the development of the space industry will change as companies adapt their activities to what the government is emphasizing and to what kind of support they can get from different stakeholders in order to survive.

China does not currently have a huge commercial space sector. The only real way that these companies can grow is either by selling products to the existing space sector—which is not particularly easy at this stage—or by raising money from existing shareholders and trying to guess where the market is moving.

# Case

### Inherency

#### They have a singular uniqueness card from over a year ago – prefer ours on recency

- Politically incentivized – Kennedy proves

- US 7x as many sats as China

- Last year China funding reduced

Grieco 1-19 Kelly A. Grieco, a senior fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She received her PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology., 1-19-2022, "The China-US Space Race Is a Myth," The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/the-china-us-space-race-is-a-myth/> // ella

The United States is not falling behind China in space – quite the contrary. The politics of fear sells. In his successful 1960 campaign for president, then Senator John F. Kennedy seized on the dangers of the missile gap – a presumed Soviet superiority in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Kennedy exploited anxiety all the way to the White House. Yet the missile gap was a myth. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara admitted as much to Kennedy in 1962, claiming “emotionally guided but nonetheless patriotic individuals in the Pentagon” were responsible. McNamara then warned Kennedy, “There are still people of that kind in the Pentagon. I wouldn’t give them any foundation for creating another myth.” Seventy years later, it is happening again. Pundits, politicians, and senior military officers alike now warn the United States is losing a space race to China. “We are absolutely in a strategic competition with China and space is a part of that,” Gen. David D. Thompson, vice chief of space operations for the U.S. Space Force, warned recently. “The fact, that in essence, on average, they are building and fielding and updating their space capabilities at twice the rate we are means that very soon, if we don’t start accelerating our development and delivery capabilities, they will exceed us.” Space alarmism makes great headlines. But the United States is not falling behind China in space – quite the contrary. The United States remains the most advanced space power in the world. Of the more than 4,500 satellites in orbit today, the United States accounts for more than half of them, some 2,700 satellites and nearly seven times as many as the next competitor, China. True, the Chinese hold the record for the most space launches in 2021 – a total of 55 launches to the United States’ 51. But the number of launches only tells part of the story, because the United States has more powerful rockets, able to deliver more payloads – satellites, space probes, and spacecraft – into orbit. China’s space funding has increased markedly in recent years, to $8.9 billion in 2020, but it still spent a mere fraction of the United States’ $48 billion. The U.S. also boasts a booming commercial space industry, with hundreds of startups joining leading firms like Blue Origin and SpaceX, and investors pouring billions of dollars into the U.S. space economy. Meanwhile, China’s private space industry lags behind American companies and, last year, funding trended in the wrong direction. China’s space program has made significant advances in recent years, from completing its own global satellite navigation system and collecting lunar samples to landing a spacecraft on Mars and sending astronauts to its own space station. But these milestones should serve as a reality check: The United States is not falling behind in the space race, so much as China is steadily catching up after having started so far behind. Likewise, China’s space ambitions are impressive, with plans to develop satellite mega-constellations and further explore the moon and deep space, but each of these Chinese space endeavors will need to first clear significant technical and other obstacles. For example, in June, Beijing released a roadmap for an International Lunar Research Station to be developed jointly with Russia. This plan requires China to field the Long March 9, a super heavy-lift rocket that has been in the research-and-development phase since 2011. The Chinese expect it to make its first test flight around 2030, but their troubles with other heavy rockets suggest that ambitious goal could well be pushed back. Even then, China landing its astronauts on the moon hardly constitutes a great victory. After all, the United States won that race back in 1969. Still, the China space-race narrative has helped to stoke fears in Washington. The alarm associated with “falling behind” in the space race is invariably paired with calls for the U.S. to spend more on new space military capabilities, space exploration, and the commercial space industry. Steve Kwast, a retired Air Force lieutenant general, warns “there won’t be many prizes for second place” and urges Washington to act with greater “urgency and excitement.” But much like the missile gap of the late 1950s, such “calls to arms” encourage a massive militarization of space and risk misallocating limited defense resources.

## Scenario 1

### T/L

#### Their link card is incoherent – its extremely speculative and just says “weaponry may eventually be deployed” and assumes armament that their own ev says is non unique – we read blue

1AC Chow and Kelley 8/21 [(Brian G., policy analyst for the Institute of World Politics, Ph.D in physics from Case Western Reserve University, MBA and Ph.D in finance from the University of Michigan,and Brandon, graduate of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service ) “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons Could Conquer Taiwan—Or Start a War,” National Review, 8/21/2021] JL

If current trends hold, then China’s[Strategic Support Force](https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf) will be capable by the late 2020s of holding key U.S. space assets at risk. [Chinese military doctrine](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/nowhere-earth-will-be-safe-us-china-war-172523), statements by senior officials, and past behavior all suggest that China may well believe threatening such assets to be an effective means of deterring U.S. intervention. If so, then the United States would face a type of “Sophie’s Choice”: decline to intervene, potentially leading allies to follow suit and Taiwan to succumb without a fight, thereby enabling Xi to achieve his goal of “peacefully” snuffing out Taiwanese independence; or start a war that would at best be long and bloody and might well even cross the nuclear threshold.

This emerging crisis has been three decades in the making. In 1991, China watched from afar as the United States used space-enabled capabilities to obliterate the Iraqi military from a distance in the first Gulf War. The People’s Liberation Army quickly set to work developing capabilities targeted at a perceived Achilles’ heel of this new [American way of war](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/secrets-and-lies-role-truth-great-power-information-warfare-170579): reliance on vulnerable space systems.

This project came to fruition with a direct ascent[ASAT weapons test](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22652.pdf) in 2007, but the test was limited in two key respects. First, it only reached low Earth orbit. Second, it generated thousands of pieces of long-lasting space junk, provoking immense[international ire](https://spacenews.com/u-s-official-china-turned-to-debris-free-asat-tests-following-2007-outcry/). This backlash appears to have taken China by surprise, driving it to seek new, more usable ASAT types with minimal debris production. Now, one such ASAT is nearing operational status: spacecraft capable of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs).

Such spacecraft are[inevitable](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-2/Chow.pdf#page=22) and cannot realistically be limited. The United States, European Union, China, and others are developing them to provide a range of satellite services essential to the[new space economy](https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/space-economy-themes-2021), such as in situ repairs and refueling of satellites and active removal of space debris. But RPO capabilities are dual-use: if a satellite can grapple space objects for servicing, then it might well be capable of grappling an adversary’s satellite to move it out of its servicing orbit. Perhaps it could degrade or disable it by bending or disconnecting its solar panels and antennas all while producing minimal debris.

This is [a serious threat](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-america-lose-china-189020), primarily because no international rules presently exist to limit close approaches in space. Left unaddressed, this lacuna in international law and space policy could enable a prospective attacker to pre-position, during peacetime, as many spacecraft as they wish as close as they wish to as many high-value targets as they wish. The result would be an ever-present possibility of sudden, bolt-from-the-blue attacks on vital space assets—and worse, on many of them at once.

China has conducted at least[half a dozen tests of RPO](https://swfound.org/media/207179/swf_chinese_rpo_fact_sheet_apr2021.pdf#page=3) capabilities in space since 2008, two of which went on for years. Influential space experts have noted that these tests have plausible peaceful purposes and are in many cases similar to those conducted by the United States. This, however, does not make it any less important to establish effective legal, policy, and technical counters to their offensive use. Even if it were certain that these capabilities are intended purely for peaceful applications—and it is not at all clear that that is the case—China (or any other country) could at any time decide to repurpose these capabilities for ASAT use.

There is still time to get out ahead of this threat, but likely not for much longer. China’s RPO capabilities have, thus far, lagged about five years behind those of the United States. There are reasons to believe this gap may close, but even assuming that it holds, we should expect to see China demonstrate an operational dual-use rendezvous spacecraft by around 2025. (The first instance of a U.S. commercial satellite docking with another satellite to change its orbit occurred in[February 2020](https://news.northropgrumman.com/news/releases/northrop-grumman-successfully-completes-historic-first-docking-of-mission-extension-vehicle-with-intelsat-901-satellite).)

At the same time, China is expanding its capacity for rapid spacecraft manufacturing. The[Global Times](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213345.shtml) reported in January that China’s first intelligent mass production line is set to produce 240 small satellites per year. In April,[Andrew Jones](https://spacenews.com/china-is-developing-plans-for-a-13000-satellite-communications-megaconstellation/#:~:text=China%20is%20developing%20plans%20for%20a%2013%2C000%2Dsatellite%20megaconstellation,-by%20Andrew%20Jones&text=HELSINKI%20%E2%80%94%20China%20is%20to%20oversee,the%20country's%20major%20space%20actors.) at SpaceNews reported that China is developing plans to quickly produce and loft a thirteen thousand-satellite national internet megaconstellation. It is not unreasonable to assume that China could manufacture two hundred small rendezvous ASAT spacecraft by 2029, possibly more.

If this happens, and Beijing was to decide in 2029 to launch these two hundred small RPO spacecraft and position them in close proximity to strategically vital assets, then China would be able to simultaneously threaten disablement of the entire constellations of U.S. satellites for missile early warning (about a dozen satellites with spares included); communications in a nuclear-disrupted environment (about a dozen); and positioning, navigation, and timing (about three dozen); along with several dozen key communications, imagery, and meteorology satellites. Losing these assets would severely degrade U.S. deterrence and warfighting capabilities, yet once close pre-positioning has occurred such losses become almost impossible to prevent. For this reason, such pre-positioning could conceivably deter the United States from coming to Taiwan’s aid due to the prospect that intervention would spur China to disable these critical space systems. Without their support, the war would be much bloodier and costlier—a daunting proposition for any president.

Should the United States fail to intervene, the consequences would be disastrous for both Washington and its allies in East Asia, and potentially the credibility of U.S. defense commitments around the globe. Worse yet, however, might be what could happen if China believes that such a threat will succeed but proves to be wrong. History is rife with examples of major wars arising from miscalculations such as this, and there are many pathways by which such a situation could easily escalate out of control to a full-scale conventional conflict or even to nuclear use.

### AT Sino-Russia coop

#### Limited Russia/China co-op is inevitable, but have no impact.

Dr. James Jay Carafano 19, PhD from Georgetown University, Master of Arts Degree in Strategy from the U.S. Army War College, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University, Former Director of Military Studies at the Army’s Center of Military History, Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security at the Heritage Foundation, “Why the China-Russia Alliance Won't Last”, The National Interest, 8/5/2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-china-russia-alliance-wont-last-71556

So, now everybody wants to be Bismarck. They see themselves shaping history by artfully moving big pieces on the geostrategic chessboard. And one gambit they just can’t resist is moving to snip the growing bonds of Sino-Russian cooperation.

My advice to them: Just stop.

Fears of an allied China and Russia running amok around the world are overblown. Indeed, there is so much friction between these “friends,” any attempt to team up would likely give both countries heat rash.

Siren’s Cat Call

Here’s the lame narrative that’s animating the Bismarck wannabes: The United States is pushing back against Moscow and pressing Beijing. This is driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. Beijing and Moscow will then gang-up on the United States. To prevent this, the United States should make nice with Moscow (undermining the incipient Sino-Russian détente) and then focus on beating back against China.

Yes, China and Russia are going to work together to some degree. They have important things in common. For example, both are unaccountable authoritarian regimes that share the Eurasian continent. Other indicators of compatibility: they like doing business with each other, and both like to make up their own rules. Heck, they don’t even have to pretend the liberal world order is a speed-bump in their joint ventures. Both happily engage with the world’s most odious regimes, from Syria to Venezuela. And, of course, neither has any compunction about playing dirty when it serves their interests.

They already play off of each other to frustrate foreign-policy initiatives from Washington. For example, if the United States pressures Russia to vote a certain way on a measure before the UN Security Council, Russia will often don the white hat and vote as we desire, knowing that Beijing will veto the measure for them. Similarly, if the United States leans on Beijing stop giving North Korea some form of aid and comfort, Beijing can go along with the request, knowing that Moscow will pick up the baton for them.

What the neo-Bismarcks need to ask themselves is: Why would Russia or China ever consider giving up these practices? Why would they make the ongoing great power competition easier for the United States? That makes no sense. That is not in their self-interest.

Any notion that the United States could somehow seduce Russian president Vladimir Putin from playing house with Beijing is fanciful. Putin doesn’t do something for nothing; his price would be quite high. He could demand a free hand in Ukraine, or lifting sanctions, or squelching opposition to Nordstream II, or giving Russia free rein in the Middle East. Any of these “deals” would greatly compromise American interests. Why would we do that? And what, exactly, is Putin going to deliver in return? What leverage does Russia have on Beijing? The answer is not near enough to justify any of these concessions.

On the other hand, what leverage would a Russia-China alliance have on the United States? They wouldn’t jointly threaten Washington with military action. A central element of both their strategies is that they want to win against the United States “without fighting.”

Moscow might be happy if the United States got distracted in a military mix-up with China. Conversely, Beijing could okay with the Americans have an armed confrontation with the Russians. But, neither of them will be volunteering to go first anytime soon.

Even if they linked arms to threaten the United States in tandem, the pain would not be worth the gain. As long as America maintains a credible global and strategic deterrent, a Sino-Russian military one-two punch is pretty much checkmated. Peace through strength really works.

If direct military confrontation is out of bounds, then what can Beijing and Moscow do using economic, political, and diplomatic power or tools of hybrid warfare? The answer to that question is easy: exactly what they are already doing.

We have plenty of evidence of on-going political warfare aimed at the United States, its friends, allies, and interests. Some of these activities are conducted in tandem; some are instances of copy-catism; and some are independent and original.

The political warfare takes many forms—ranging from corrosive economic behavior to aggressive diplomacy to military expansionism and more.

All these malicious efforts are a problem. What they don’t add up to is an existential threat to vital U.S. interests. In other words, we can handle this without sucking up to Putin and undermining our own interests. In fact, we already have a national-security strategy that adequately addresses these concerns.

One more thing inhibiting a Sino-Russian hookup. Russian and Chinese power is largely asymmetrical. They have very different strengths and weaknesses. In coordinating their malicious activities against the United States, they don’t line out very well. China, for example, can’t really do anything substantive to help Russia in Syria. Putin doesn’t have much to offer in the South China Seas or in brokering a U.S.-China trade agreement.

There are also limits to the Sino-Russia era of good feelings. Other than trying to take America down a notch, their global goals are not well aligned. Indeed, the more they try to cooperate, the more their disparate interests will grate on the relationship.

For example, China is meddling more in Central Asia and the Arctic—spaces where Russia was dominant. Moscow has to ask itself: Why is Beijing elbowing in? There is an argument that rather than looking for a strategic partnership, China is just biding its time till Russia implodes, and Beijing steps in and sweeps up the choice pieces.

And, as much as Putin likes to tweak Trump about Moscow’s ties with Beijing, it is becoming more apparent to Washington that Russia is ever more the junior partner. Can Putin really continue to play Robin to a Chinese Batman? As for China, they have to ask: What does Robin really bring to the dynamic-duo?

### Sino-Russia coop good

#### Sino-Russian alliance is key to solve NoKo prolif and war.

Choo ’19 (Jaewoo, Professor of Foreign Policy in the Department of Chinese Studies at Kyng Hee University, Korea, “The China-Russia Entente and the Korean Peninsula”, the National Bureau of Asian Research, <https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr78_china_russia_entente_march2019.pdf>)

Beijing sees rapprochement between the United States and North Korea as an opportunity to advance its interests on both the Indochina Peninsula and Taiwan. Previously critical and non-negotiable interests are now expendable and negotiable. At the first summit in Singapore, Trump agreed to suspend all joint military exercises with South Korea due to his distrust in the efficacy of extended deterrence. He is also reportedly contemplating the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea because of economic reasons.11 However coincidental it may be, Trump’s plan offers China an opportunity to pursue its long-sought goal of neutralization of the Korean Peninsula through a perpetual peace settlement facilitated by the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces and the dissolution of the U.S.-ROK alliance. At this critical juncture, China needs Russia’s political and diplomatic support more than ever. Since its participation in the six-party talks, Russia has been accommodating of China’s efforts to work toward North Korea’s denuclearization. China needs Russia’s continued support for three reasons. First, their cooperation is needed to press North Korea to denuclearize. Second, policy coordination with Russia is vital for not only sustaining sanctions on North Korea but also keeping the country from collapsing. Third, Russia’s political support is critical to the realization of both a perpetual peace settlement founded on a peace treaty and the neutralization of the peninsula. Hence, it would be a mistake to view cooperation between China and Russia from any rationale other than a geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic one. Their cooperative relationship is not bound or driven by ideology. Instead, their interests converge from a shared outlook on world affairs and common concerns about the governance structure and practices of the current U.S.-led liberal international order. At the regional level, the two countries’ interests converge for the same reasons. At the national level, since 2000, Russia has worked to regain the influence and status in Korean affairs that it lost when it adopted a “two-Koreas policy” in the late 1980s and subsequently as a consequence of the first nuclear crisis in 1993.12 At the time, post-Soviet Russia was struggling to establish a national identity that could fit its geographic stretch from Europe to Asia. The country sought to restore a balance and independence to its foreign policy that had been skewed toward the West. This pursuit of a balanced foreign policy was facilitated by NATO’s eastward expansion. Amid these external developments, the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2003 offered an opportunity for Russia to re-establish its national identity as an eastern power. Ironically, it was at North Korea’s invitation that Russia joined the six-party talks.13 Beijing was cognizant of Moscow’s foreign policy objectives and thus undertook a proactive approach to induce its cooperation in order to counter potential collective pressure from the United States and its allies. In particular, China’s embrace of a security partnership with Russia followed from its recognition of Russia’s aforementioned geopolitical desires and dissatisfaction with the U.S.-led world order and governance. This partnership was heightened by both countries’ concerns about the prospective consequences of the U.S. rebalancing strategy toward Asia under the Obama administration. As a result, Russia’s and China’s relationships with the United States will likely continue to be characterized by mistrust, misperception, and misunderstanding, which could cause a security dilemma to arise.

#### Goes nuclear.

Ward 17 (Alex, associate director of the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he works on US foreign policy, national security strategy, and military affairs, “The North Korean military threat to America and its allies, explained,” 4/19, <http://www.vox.com/world/2017/4/19/15355494/north-korea-nuclear-threat-missiles-weapons>)

First, and most critically, North Korea has nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that when reliably combined could strike US allies in the region, like South Korea and Japan, where US troops are stationed. Thankfully, it still has some work to do before those nuclear-tipped missiles could reach American territory. Second, North Korea has a vast array of artillery — that is, large guns usually used in land warfare — that could be used to attack South Korea. It also has a substantial chemical weapons stockpile, as well as elite special operations forces that could prove challenging for South Korea’s own forces to handle. Finally, if North Korea does decide to use any of those weapons against its enemies, the aftereffects would pose their own significant, worldwide problems. Let’s dig deeper. North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs This is the most obvious threat, but probably the most complicated. Last year, Kim told other North Korean leaders that his country would conduct a nuclear strike if it was threatened by “invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons.” It’s a pretty vague intimidation — nothing new when it comes to the North Korean leadership — but the implication is clear: If North Korea feels like its sovereignty or an important national interest is threatened, it will seriously consider using a nuclear weapon to respond. To do that successfully, North Korea needs two things: a functioning nuclear weapon, and a way to deliver that weapon to a specific location. North Korea has both — but caveats apply. There is currently no evidence that North Korea can place a nuclear warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and reliably hit any part of the US mainland or its territories. So when Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, claims Kim “can press a button and hit Chicago,” he’s jumping the gun. That said, North Korea has the potential to put a nuke on a medium-range missile that could reach South Korea and Japan — two allies that host US military installations. Simply put, if North Korea wanted to strike South Korea and Japan with a nuclear weapon, it could likely do so. Making matters worse, any nuclear strike on those countries would put American troops stationed there directly in harm’s way. This is partially why the United States has decided to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea to defend against certain missile strikes and why America is conducting missile interception tests with Japan. And the situation is likely to get worse. Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia nonproliferation program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told me in an interview that he thinks North Korea will have intermediate- to long-range missiles capable of carrying a nuke to American soil ready for launch in about five years. That will soon put Guam, and potentially Hawaii and other parts of the United States, within North Korea’s nuclear reach. Let’s just stop for a second to let that sink in: Experts believe that in about five years, North Korea will be able to hit US territory with a nuclear weapon. And they think it can probably already hit Japan, South Korea, and US troops stationed there with a nuke right now. That is the core of what we mean when we talk about “the North Korean threat.” It’s why this crisis feels so immediate, and why it seems to have been getting more and more frightening as time goes by. It’s also because North Korea has dramatically ramped up the pace of its missile testing in recent years: In 2017 alone, the country conducted three successful missile tests — count ’em: one, two, three — and suffered two setbacks, including the one over the weekend. That’s on top of the five nuclear tests it’s conducted since October 2006, as the chart from the BBC below shows. The country currently claims to be “primed and ready” to carry out a sixth nuclear test any day now. BBC Despite stiff competition, Kim continues to vie for the title of most bombastic and overly confident world leader. He boasts his country can “wipe out Manhattan” if he so orders. He’s also threatened to reduce the United States “to ashes” if it strikes North Korea first. For now, these are laughably melodramatic statements, but if North Korea’s nuclear and missiles programs continue to improve at the same pace, those proclamations will quickly stop seeming like empty boasts. Many important questions remain. For one, the size of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is a mystery, although estimates put it somewhere between 10 and 16 weapons. Second, it’s unclear if Pyongyang has what is known as a “second-strike capability” — that is, if North Korea were struck by a nuke, could it still retaliate with a powerful nuclear strike of its own? The jury is still out, but it is definitely trying to secure that capability. This matters a lot: If it has that ability, the stakes for any country thinking about attacking the North become exponentially higher, because they would then be susceptible to being hit by a North Korean nuke in response. In other words, it makes North Korea more dangerous and therefore gives them more leverage. Finally, Kim claims he has a hydrogen bomb, a far more powerful type of nuclear weapon than the run-of-the-mill atomic bomb we know he already has. His assertion has not been proven — he more likely has a boosted atom bomb, which uses a radioactive form of hydrogen that makes it more powerful than a normal atom bomb but not nearly as powerful as a true hydrogen bomb. But if he does have a true hydrogen bomb, North Korea’s enemies have an even bigger threat on their hands than previously thought. Artillery, chemical weapons, and special forces While the nuclear and missile programs get all the attention, a seriously underappreciated threat comes from North Korea’s arsenal of conventional weapons, including the world’s largest artillery force. A third danger comes from the country’s elite special operations forces that could magnify the impact of a North Korean strike on South Korea. South Korea’s capital city, Seoul, is a so-called “megacity” with a whopping 25.6 million residents living in the greater metropolitan area. It also happens to be within direct firing range of thousands of pieces of North Korean artillery already lined up along the border, also known as the demilitarized zone. Around 70 percent of North Korea’s ground forces are within 90 miles of the DMZ, presumably ready to move south at a moment’s notice. Simulations of a large-scale artillery fight between the North and South produce pretty bleak results. One war game convened by the Atlantic back in 2005 predicted that a North Korean attack would kill 100,000 people in Seoul in the first few days alone. Others put the estimate even higher. A war game mentioned by the National Interest predicted Seoul could “be hit by over half-a-million shells in under an hour.” Those results don’t bode well for one of Washington’s closest allies, or for the tens of millions of people living in Seoul. And that’s not all. A report from Stratfor, a private intelligence analysis firm, found that a large-scale North Korean artillery attack would likely mean that the northern half of Seoul would get hit the most. Depending on where North Korea placed some of its rocket launchers, southern portions of Seoul — including the Gangnam District of “Gangnam Style” fame — would also be within range. The Stratfor report further notes than just “a single volley” of North Korean artillery could deliver “over 350 metric tons of explosives” into greater Seoul, “roughly the same amount of ordnance dropped by 11 B-52 bombers.” As if that were not enough, North Korea has a robust chemical weapons program. South Korea’s Ministry of Defense estimates that its northern neighbor has between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, including sarin and VX nerve agents. (Sarin is thought to be the chemical agent used in the Assad’s regime’s recent attack in Syria, which killed 72 people and left children gasping for breath as they choked on the poisonous gas.) Should North Korea attack, it might use chemical weapons early on in South Korea’s urban areas to increase the death toll. At the same time, conventional munitions could rain down on the South. After that barrage, North Korea’s 200,000-strong special operations forces should have an easier time arriving via tunnels, mini-submarines, or Russian biplanes. Surely Pyongyang would find a way to employ its growing cyber capabilities, too, because why not? Granted, North Korea is not expected to win a full-blown war with South Korea, should that come to pass. For one, America has the ability to stop a North Korean missile launch before it even happens with cyber capabilities. But even if a launch did take place, the THAAD system being deployed in South Korea should be able to take it down. If that missed, Aegis ships in the Pacific could shoot the missile; and if that failed, Patriot batteries could also stop the flight. And if all that failed … well, you know. The bottom line is that there are lot of defenses in place designed to stop North Korean missiles, but nothing is perfect. North Korea has far more troops than South Korea (1.19 million versus 655,000), but should a conventional fight break out, US and South Korean air power would help balance the scales. But, again, nothing is guaranteed. Either way, North Korea could cause a lot of damage and harm a lot of countries — and people — as it goes down. The aftermath of a conflict with North Korea “would be fundamentally disruptive” to the region — and the world If there is a conflict where North Korea deploys many of its deadly weapons, what happens when the dust settles? Robert Manning, a Koreas expert at the Atlantic Council, said in an interview that a North Korean attack on South Korea or any other of its neighbors “would be fundamentally disruptive” to the region and the world. He’s not kidding. Marine Col. Jeff Vandaveer, who spent a year serving in Asia and was a former faculty member at the Marine Command and Staff College, has thought a lot about the potential regional and global effects of a war with North Korea. In an interview, he told me that such a conflict could lead to a big slump in the global economy, cause humanitarian suffering, and pit great powers against one another. The economic consequences of Japan and/or South Korea, respectively the third and 11th biggest world economies, reeling from a big attack would impact the world’s financial future. The humanitarian consequences would also be dire, Vandaveer said. Millions of hungry, displaced people would be trapped on a small peninsula during a brutal war. Meanwhile, tensions would rise as great powers like China, Russia, and the United States would likely be drawn further into the fray. That’s already happening, in a way, as Russian and Chinese ships tail America’s carrier strike group in the region. They both call for “restraint” in these tense times between America and North Korea.

## Scenario 2

### AT: Taiwan war

#### China won’t attack Taiwan. They perceive deterrence, intervention, geography, readiness, and economic factors as too big to risk.

- China military weak

- Even if it succeeds, China will spend trillions rebuilding and unifying Taiwan

- US and other country intervention solves

- China not preparing

- Taiwan geography – 14 small beaches and cliffs

- Assumptions wrong – deterrence solves

- Failed invasion turns econ

Cohen 21 Michael A. Cohen, a columnist for MSNBC. He writes a newsletter on American politics and foreign policy called Truth and Consequences, 11-19-2021, “No, Neocons, China Is Not About to Invade Taiwan”, [https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan //](https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan%20//) ella

More than two months after U.S. combat troops formally withdrew from Afghanistan, ending a disastrous and failed 20-year war, one might expect that the war drums of U.S. foreign policy commentators would be getting a rest. Instead, a new potential target has been identified: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Ever since the Communists seized control of China in 1949 and the Nationalist government, led by Chiang-Kai-shek, fled across the Taiwan Straits, China has repeatedly called for the reunification of Taiwan and China. These demands have generally emphasized a desire for “peaceful reunification,” but Beijing has also warned that a Taiwanese declaration of independence would lead to war. The United States has long played a key role in the territorial dispute. It initially signed a bilateral defense agreement with Taiwan in 1954 and over the years supplied the island with armaments. Even after recognizing the Chinese Communist government in Beijing in 1979, the U.S. has adhered to position of “strategic ambiguity” when it comes to the question of an American response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. The flames have been fanned by a host of military figures and foreign policy pundits. But today, with U.S.-Chinese relations at one of the lowest points in recent memory—and as the Chinese military takes increasingly provocative military actions toward Taiwan—the fears of war have increased. So, too, have the calls for the U.S. to ratchet up its efforts to defend Taiwan, including the potential use of military force. The flames have been fanned by a host of military figures and foreign policy pundits. Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific, got the party started last March when he warned a Senate committee that China could invade Taiwan “in the next six years.” Writing in The Wall Street Journal, former Trump Defense official Elbridge Colby ramped up the threat-mongering by declaring, “Beijing has made clear it is willing to use force to take Taiwan.… And this isn’t mere talk. The Chinese military has rehearsed amphibious attacks, and commercial satellite imagery shows that China practices large-scale attacks on U.S. forces in the region.” In the Bible of the foreign policy establishment, Foreign Affairs, Orianna Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, warned that “whereas Chinese leaders used to view a military campaign to take the island as a fantasy, now they consider it a real possibility.” Yes, China could invade Taiwan, says the Heritage Foundation. And Taiwan’s top defense official—perhaps not surprisingly—warned recently that China will be able to mount a “full-scale” invasion of Taiwan by 2025. Some U.S. policymakers have taken these warnings to heart. Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton has called for the U.S. to end its policy of “strategic ambiguity” and make clear its willingness to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley warned recently that “if China takes control of Taiwan, Beijing will be emboldened to seize other territories around the globe” and called on the U.S. to increase pressure on China, including a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics scheduled to be held in Beijing. But how legitimate are these fears? Is the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan a serious and urgent concern? The answer is “not very.” And it’s a view, ironically, endorsed by the Pentagon. Earlier this month, the Defense Department released its annual report to Congress on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” While the report lays out the ways in which China’s “People’s Liberation Army” is seeking to modernize its forces, the threat to Taiwan of armed invasion is still minimal at best: Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the PRC’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. One might expect that a country intent on launching the largest and most difficult amphibious invasion in history would be making intense preparations. That’s not happening. As the Pentagon report notes, Chinese naval investments have focused on building up the capacity to launch “regional and eventually global expeditionary missions rather than the large number of landing ship transports and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault.” The Pentagon also finds that while China is focusing on conducting joint operations that involve forces from the army, navy, and air force, as of present it currently lacks such capabilities. The soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience. That the Chinese military enjoys vast military superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan is not in doubt. But that such resources can be used to mount an amphibious assault is something else altogether. The Chinese military last fought a war in 1979 against Vietnam, and the PLA was badly bloodied. That means that the soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience. China’s own media outlets have, according to the Pentagon, noted the PLA’s shortcomings, which include that “commanders cannot (1) judge situations; (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions; (3) make operational decisions; (4) deploy forces; and, (5) manage unexpected situations.” These problems would be challenging enough in a conventional conflict. For a complex invasion of Taiwan, they would render such efforts virtually impossible. One big reason is that Taiwan is about as inhospitable an environment as can be imagined for an amphibious invasion. Ian Easton, a defense expert who has written extensively about Taiwan defense strategy, wrote earlier this year that the country’s “coastal terrain … is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles.” Easton also notes that “many of Taiwan’s outer islands bristle with missiles, rockets, and artillery guns. Their granite hills have been honeycombed with tunnels and bunker systems.” A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would look more like the World War II Marine assaults on the rough and unforgiving terrain of Pacific islands than it would D-Day (which was no walk in the park, either) but against an exponentially more competent and technologically advanced military. Even if somehow China were successful in invading Taiwan and occupying the island, it would then find itself in the position of having to pacify and potentially rebuild an advanced nation of 23 million people (two million of whom are members of the nation’s military reserves). Putting aside the virtually insurmountable military obstacles, there’s the larger issue of how the U.S. and other nations in the region would respond (in recent weeks, Japanese leaders have made clear their determination to help Taiwan in the wake of Chinese invasion). The U.S. could play a decisive role, even without boots on the ground in Taiwan. For example, American naval and air forces could wreak havoc on Chinese supply lines. As Rachel Esplin Odell and Eric Heginbotham wrote recently in Foreign Affairs (in response to Skylar Mastro): “To seize control of the island, China would need to keep its fleet off Taiwan’s coast for weeks, creating easy targets for antiship cruise missiles launched from Taiwan or from U.S. bombers, fighter aircraft, and submarines.” Ultimately, no one knows what the U.S. would do in response to a Chinese attack. In recent months, President Biden has twice publicly stated that the U.S. will defend Taiwan, which rhetorically goes so beyond the long-held policy of “strategic ambiguity” that the White House has been forced to walk back his comments. But even if Biden got too far out on his skis, his misstatements create even further confusion for China about U.S. intentions. Those who are argue that China could invade Taiwan are assuming that Beijing would willingly initiate a conflict that could lead, potentially, to the involvement of the world’s strongest military, backed by thousands of nuclear weapons. Such assumptions throw the entire notion of deterrence on its head. Lastly, there are the political and financial costs. If China were to attack Taiwan, it would require the mobilization of millions of its citizens and billions, or even trillions, in spending simply to prepare for war. Success would bring with it an even larger price tag for rebuilding Taiwan and integrating the island into China. Anything other than complete military success and acquiescence by the international community would reap an ill wind for Chinese leaders. Economic isolation; interruption of trade ties that have been essential to China’s economic growth over the past two decades; and a generation, if not more, of mistrust and hostility from the U.S., China’s Asian neighbors, and likely the international community would almost certainly be the result. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan that was anything but a success would likely leave the nation politically isolated, economically damaged, and reputationally ~~crippled~~. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan that was anything but a success would likely leave the nation politically isolated, economically damaged, and reputationally crippled. And ironically, a failed attack could lead to a Taiwanese declaration of independence—one that China would be incapable of stopping. All that, at a time when the Chinese economy is facing a collection of economic headwinds—from an energy crunch and a growing real estate crisis to slowing economic growth. There are other force options available to China’s leaders. The aforementioned Pentagon report notes the potential for an “Air and Maritime Blockade,” “Limited Force or Coercive Options,” and an “Air and Missile Campaign.” But all of these bring with them similar negative political and economic consequences. China could also ramp up the military provocations that have been increasing since 2020, moves that have included Chinese aircraft repeatedly violating Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone and have refuted the existence of a so-called “median line” in the Taiwan Strait. But these moves should be seen in more straightforward terms: an effort to deter Taiwan from taking further steps toward declaring independence. Those warning of a Chinese invasion would be wise to consider Xi Jingping’s most recent statements about Taiwan. In Beijing’s readout of the meeting this week between Biden and Xi, it states, in regard to Taiwan, “We have patience and will strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with utmost sincerity and efforts.” At the same time, the statement makes clear, “Should the separatist forces for Taiwan independence provoke us, force our hands, or even cross the red line, we will be compelled to take resolute measures.” As M. Taylor Fravel, a professor of political science and director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, notes, this is consistent with Beijing’s long-standing political-military strategy for Taiwan. “In the simplest terms,” says Fravel, China “seeks to deter Taiwan from declaring independence (and perhaps the U.S. from supporting it), and use military threats toward this end, but not compel unification by force. Military power and interdependence are part of the equation, but they are not the core of the policy that China is now pursuing.” In Fravel’s view, not only are the costs of invading Taiwan high, it’s not Beijing’s “preferred approach for achieving unification.” After all, Fravel notes, “the people of Taiwan are described as ‘compatriots’ and not enemies.” The U.S. can play a useful role in maintaining the ambiguous status quo. Since 1979, the U.S. has adhered to a “one China” policy, which views Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China. The U.S. would do well to make clear that this policy remains in place, while at the same time maintaining its position of “strategic ambiguity” and discouraging any provocative moves by Taiwan toward independence. But above all, the Biden administration needs to ignore the alarmist rhetoric of those warning that a Chinese invasion is imminent or even reading too much into China’s provocations. Even if it wanted to, China is not about to invade Taiwan.

#### The US won’t defend Taiwan. History, geography, trade, domestic support, and deterrence.

Roger **Jiang, 17**, "To protect Taiwan, would the United States go to war with China if China were determined to take it back?," Quora, https://www.quora.com/To-protect-Taiwan-would-the-United-States-go-to-war-with-China-if-China-were-determined-to-take-it-back)SEM

If the US didn’t intervene militarily when Russia annexed Crimea, why do people think it will go into war with China over Taiwan? Let us first take a look at war potentials - Russia GDP was 1/5 of the US in 2016 in PPP terms while China’s GDP in PPP was about 10% higher than that of the US, according to IMF data. Moreover, Chinese manufacuring output in value terms is roughly equal to those of the US and Japan, COMBINED. China also controls most of the rare earth in the world, a key ingredient for modern electronics. And China boasts the largest ship building capacity and ouput globally - China is building FOUR 12,000 ton warships simultaneously, and the same shipyards are still working on the commercial orders at the same time, AND that is just the shipyards in Shanghai and Dalian that we are talking about - another major shipyard in Guangzhou is not yet involved. People simply have no idea how massive Chinese industrial capacity is. Lastly, Taiwan is about 200km away from mainland China but about 10,000km away from mainland US. Who do you think has the geographical advantage here? Now let us talk about economics - Russia barely had any trade with the US but China is the largest trading partner with both the US and the EU. China is the largest car market in the world where both European and American car companies have made massive investments. China is also the largest customer of Boeing, Airbus, BMW and Qualcom, etc. GE, Intel, Pfizer etc. are doing billions of business in China. And China buys tons and tons of American agricultural and fishery products. When the economic benefits are large enough, they always trump geo-political considerations - why was UK, the long time ally of the US, the first country to join China’s Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), despite strong US opposition? Didn’t the Europeans know that AIIB is China’s attempt to build another global financial framework in challenge to World Bank and IMF? I am sure the Europeans know it pretty well but they are smart enough not to let ideological difference stop them from making a buck or two. And they also wanna hedge their bets. The Brits are known for stratigic vision and they surely know how to adjust the ship when the tide is changing. Many Taiwanese have this ludicrous belief that Taiwan is of such an importance to the world that the whole world would come to Taiwan’s rescue should China invade Taiwan. But the reality is that most people outside East Asia cannot even find Taiwan on a map and couldn’t care less about a remote island somewhere in the Pacific… Yeah, the West loves talking about democracy, freedom and human rights. But to risk a global economic recession, huge loss of lives and even nuclear holocaust, to rescue some island that has always been officially recognized as a part of China by world governments? Nah… If China invades Taiwan, clearly a small skirmish is simply not enough to stop China. But a large scale fully blown war will have unbearable costs. So when fighting small wont work and fighting big is too costly, what do you do? You do nothing. So, no, the US will not go into war with China over Taiwan.

### AT: China rise

#### China’s a defensive realist in space

Khan and Khan ’15 [Zulfqar and Ahmad; October 29; Department of Strategic and Nuclear Studies at the National Defense University in Islamabad, Pakistan; Astropolitics, “Chinese Capabilities as a Global Space Power,” p. 185-204; RP]

Chinese Space Policy According to Ashley J. Tellis, “China’s space program represents a major investment aimed at enabling Beijing to utilize space in expanding its national power.”32 Today, the security strategy of China is largely drawn on the imperatives of “defensive realism,” while a fundamental shift is taking place in the “grand strategy” of China from offensive to defensive strategy.33 The policies of China rotate around “engagement” and “regional and international cooperation” under the consideration of a “security dilemma.”34 The Chinese are more inclined towards the policies of “self-restraint” and “interdependency.”35 On the other hand, Chinese military strategy aims to conduct “warfare beyond all boundaries and limitations” in any future war.36 In order to achieve this, China calibrated an ambitious space program to enhance the orbit of its military and diplomatic influence by bringing into its range the entire globe. Moreover, it is aware of the growing significance of technological developments with a view to increased precision, writes Robert A. Johnson. Johnson states that “more precise means of war in the future will nevertheless require more technician-warriors, able to wield these devices both in defense and offense, such as new generations of antimissile technology and semi-autonomous vehicles.”37 In this milieu, the U.S. Department of Defense, in its annual report, writes: In the future, China may expand its national early warning network to protect China’s territorial air space and waters farther from the mainland, as well as to provide space defense. This effort would include China’s growing constellations of reconnaissance, data relay, navigation, and communications satellites. China is also improving reconnaissance technologies to include infrared, multiple-spectrum, pulsed doppler, phased array, and passive detection.38 In addition, an elaborative network of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4I 2SR) is being improved to streamline command, communication, and control systems, and to integrate various types of weapon systems to enhance strategic outreach.39 For China to sustain its high “economic growth, preserve internal stability, and neutralize the external threats to its national security,” space technological development is the key factor that strengthens military strategy at regional and international levels.40 A Chinese military space agenda is a vital instrument towards neutralizing external threats and formulating comprehensive space power to defend itself from any type of aggression within the Asia-Pacific region, and from extra-regional powers. China’s space infrastructure is reflected in Table 1. China’s space industrial infrastructure is comprised of conglomerates of science and technology and R&D organizations. In conflicts today and in the future, information technology and the use of space assets are expected to exert significant impact on national security potential. As a result, an increased capacity to collect data, information, intelligence sharing, and their use to robustly reinforce a country’s ability to meet the emerging threats to its security is paramount. This places a maximum premium on space-based sensors and other sensor platforms to facilitate surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance-related information pertaining to areas of national interest.

### AT: Heg

#### Alt causes to China heg -

Sullivan and Brands 20 Jake Sullivan, a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Geoeconomics and Strategy Program and also Magro Family Distinguished Fellow at Dartmouth College, Hal Brands, Jake Sullivan was a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Geoeconomics and Strategy Program and also Magro Family Distinguished Fellow at Dartmouth College,5-22-2020, “China has two paths to global domination”, [https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/22/china-has-two-paths-to-global-domination-pub-81908 //](https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/22/china-has-two-paths-to-global-domination-pub-81908%20//) ella

If true superpower status is China’s desired destination, there are two roads it might take to try to get there. The first is the one American strategists have until now emphasized (to the extent they acknowledged China’s global ambitions). This road runs through China’s home region, specifically the Western Pacific. It focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power, and it looks quite familiar to the road the United States itself once traveled. The second road is very different because it seems to defy the historical laws of strategy and geopolitics. This approach focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale.

#### Heg sucks – their authors are hacks and imperialists, Covid killed it, history concludes neg, they ignore stuff it can’t explain, and overstretch makes it unsustainable – it incentivizes aggressive interventionism and causes, not prevents, rising challengers like China.

**Roussinos ‘21** – Aris Roussinos is a former war reporter and a contributing editor at UnHerd

Aris Roussinos, ”Twilight of the American Empire” Unherd, March 3rd, 2021 <https://unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/> // sam + pat

When Joe Biden announced to the Munich Security Conference last week that “America was back” at the centre of the Atlantic alliance, his European virtual audience responded with a collective shrug. For all their protestations of fealty, Europe’s leaders, defiantly pushing ahead with trade and energy deals with America’s rivals, are not interested in any great ideological crusade on the hegemon’s behalf. As Nathalie Tocci, chief advisor to EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell Fontelles, notes in a recent paper, “the European project developed under… an order made up of international organisations, laws, norms, regimes and practices premised on US power”. Yet today, “that world is fast fading”. While the US remains the only state able to project power globally, it “no longer represents the undisputed hegemon of the international system”. Indeed, as Tocci observes, China’s rise “suggests that we can no longer claim with confidence that economic prosperity and political freedoms can only go hand in hand”. Moreover, our dramatically different experiences of Covid “suggests that the jury is out on which governance system is perceived as best addressing the pandemic crisis, prompting questions about the management of other global challenges too”. To his credit, Biden squarely addressed these pressing questions. Summoning up the ghosts of past confrontations, he declared that “we’re at an inflection point” between those who believe that “autocracy is the best way forward… and those who understand that democracy is essential to meeting those challenges”. For the President, “Democracy will and must prevail… We have to prove that our model isn’t a relic of our history.” Yet this justificatory emphasis on democracy as the foundation of empire is a relic of a very specific moment in world history. As the historian Stephen Wertheim observes in his book Tomorrow the World, following the fall of France in 1940, American foreign policy elites feared that a Nazi victory would see the United States hemmed into the Western Hemisphere. But the British victory in the Battle of Britain opened up a new prospect, hitherto undreamed of by American politicians: first of an Anglo-American imperial condominium, dividing up the post-war world between them; and then, as Britain’s relative decline became apparent, a vision of total global hegemony. “Americans ever since, from experts to ordinary citizens, have considered world dominance to be their nation’s natural role,” Wertheim notes. It is an ideology which “holds that the superior coercive power of the United States is required to underwrite a decent world order” — one which “assumes that in order to prevent the international realm from descending into chaos or despotism, a benign hegemon must act as the world’s ordering agent,” with that onerous burden falling upon themselves. To turn its wary populace into eager participants in this imperial project, American intellectual and foreign policy elites framed global expansion as the establishment of a universal liberal-democratic order, guided and protected rather than ruled by Washington. As Wertheim notes in a passage that is as true of American liberal commentators today as those of the 1940s, “anything less [than global supremacy] would be an abdication, tantamount to inactivity, absence, and head-in-the-sand disregard for the fate of the world.” America’s pursuit of global hegemony was not a sordid, self-aggrandising imperial project like that of the fading European powers; instead, it was a moral duty, a noble sacrifice undertaken for the benefit of the rest of the world. In such a way, Wertheim writes, “the country jumped from ‘isolationism’ to ‘imperialism’, acquiring a taste for unilateral intervention everywhere in order to remake the world in the image of the United States”. In doing so, they constructed the global order whose waning days we now inhabit. Yet by making the Second World War the founding myth of the American-led order, certain pathologies were built into the system which now threaten its survival. As a useful myth became liberal dogma, the neurotic belief that the end of American hegemony would mean the return of dark forces has become so entrenched that it constrains America’s ability to negotiate reality. In the same way US political radicals appear doomed to endlessly replay the ideological battles of 1930s Germany in the streets of America’s cities, it is always 1933 in the world of the D.C. liberal hawk: American hegemony is all that stands between the free world and the rise of new Hitlers, destined to crop up from the blood-soaked soil of the Old World without regular American pruning. The increasing salience since the 1990s of a Hollywood-esque understanding of the Second World War exemplifies this distortion of reality in the pursuit of a grand, moralising origin myth. It is a worldview shorn of moral compromises, such as the necessary alliance with Stalin’s murderous regime, in which every challenger to US hegemony magically becomes a new Hitler. Complex and intractable ethnic, tribal and sectarian conflicts — literally inexplicable in such a moral framework — are either reduced to the evil deeds of individual dictators, whose removal will lead automatically to the flourishing of liberal democracy, or ignored as too difficult to comprehend. The results are plain to see. As Tocci notes, more in sorrow than censure, “the last war which the US led and unequivocally won both militarily and politically was over Kosovo 22 years ago.” In the ever-expanding wars since then, the US has “won militarily, but (abysmally) lost politically.” The result, as she observes, is that “the outcomes of the many wars that have been fought in China’s absence during the decades of its economic rise have been, in one way or another, to China’s strategic advantage.” The danger for America, then, is that its leaders have become high on their own ideological supply, overlaying their fantasy map on the real world. It seems, at times, that by fusing the Realist desire for hegemony with an idealistic mission to remake the world, America’s elites believe they have secured the mandate of heaven for their project. Challengers, from Putin to Gaddafi to Assad, are not merely opponents; they are rebels against the arc of history, individual reincarnations of the 1930s whose very existence, let alone survival, is morally unbearable. Indeed, there are worrying intimations that America’s leaders believe the victory of liberal democracy is predestined, purely through its own perceived moral virtue: as if the victories of the Second World War and the Cold War were won by holding the correct ideology, and not through the possession of stronger industrial bases and amoral political alliances. The rise of China, concomitant with America’s decline, is largely the unintended product of such a dangerously idealistic worldview. Yet like the American millennials role-playing Weimar, their elders continue to re-enact the sacred myth on the global sphere, invoking the litanies of another time, on another continent, for their magical power. By intoning the sacred word democracy over and over again at the Munich conference — including three times in his concluding sentence — Biden echoed the themes of his first domestic foreign policy speech: that he will “host the summit of democracies early in my administration to rally the nations of the world to defend democracy globally” and that “there’s no longer a bright line between foreign and domestic policy”. The riot at the Capitol and the future confrontation in east Asia are now part of the same Manichean struggle, a worldview we could term the true D.C. cinematic universe. Of course, Biden’s framing is not true in a literal sense: the same speech contained a pledge to defend Saudi Arabia — which is not noted for its liberal governance — even as he announced the welcome end of American military support for the Saudi kingdom’s bloody and disastrous war in Yemen. Likewise to confront China, the US will need to enhance alliances with authoritarian or dubiously democratic South East Asian states, with even India’s commitment to “liberal democracy” in the American sense increasingly debatable. Even in Europe, Poland, the most eager cheerleader for America’s continued military dominance on our continent, displays a far more equivocal approach to both liberalism and democracy than Biden’s framing suggests. As in the first Cold War, America can either promote global democracy or preserve its imperial reach, but not both. Nevertheless, the democratic ideal retains immense rhetorical power for defenders of the American-led global order. Thus the openly imperialist writer Robert Kagan argued recently that Americans must “accept the role that fate and their own power have thrust upon them”, because “the only hope for preserving liberalism at home and abroad is the maintenance of a world order conducive to liberalism, and the only power capable of upholding such an order is the United States”. In starker terms than Biden, Kagan argues that the empire is necessary to preserve democracy at home: an America that retreats from global hegemony would no longer be America. But as the Realist professors of International Relations David Blagden and Patrick Porter observe in a recent paper arguing for a strategic withdrawal from the Middle East, the precise opposite case can be made. The pursuit of global hegemony since the end of the Cold War has seen the United States overstretch itself, taken on unsustainable levels of debt to fund its military expansion, eroded the country’s image abroad, militarised policing at home, enabled the rise of China and fostered disillusionment and political radicalism in America. The Trump era, they note, was not so much a threat to America’s global mission as its product, a marker of growing popular dissent to imperial overreach now observable on both the Left and Right of the American political system. As they observe, America’s “position as ‘global leader’ is premised on a set of impermanent and atypical conditions from an earlier post-war era”, but “the days of incontestable unipolarity are over, and cannot be wished back”. The result is that “overextension abroad, exhaustion and fiscal strain at home, and political disorder feed off one another in a downward spiral, cumulatively threatening the survival of the republic”. The US empire is, then, at an impasse. Its moral and political justification of overseeing a global order of universal liberal democracy — the closest real-world equivalent to the Kantian perpetual peace that has both motivated and eluded liberal idealists for the past two centuries — is now beyond its capabilities to maintain. Yet to return to its core imperial concerns of the Western Hemisphere, Europe and Northeast Asia, as Blagden & Porter counsel, would tarnish the imperial crown. Without the idealistic universalism that has justified America’s global mission since the Second World War, the US empire would be an empire like any other: self-interested, amoral, and hostage to the cycle of rise and fall that has seen every other empire pass into history. Kagan is in this sense correct: without the justifying myth to organise the empire around, the moral logic of the entire enterprise falls apart. Even within the heart of the Nato alliance, European strategic autonomy therefore represents a dilemma for America, which, as Blagden & Porter note, has always “displayed a longstanding preference for preventing even its major allies in Europe and Asia from exercising true strategic autonomy”. A more autonomous Europe lessens the strategic burden on the United States, allowing America to refocus its forces on confronting China; yet a more autonomous Europe will also be less constrained by American pressure, and more inclined to pursue its own interests. How does this end for America? Biden and the presidents after him will be forced to make a hard choice: whether to retrench to a smaller and more manageable empire, or to risk a far greater and more dramatic collapse in defence of global hegemony. In the meantime, perhaps our European allies are correct in discerning a greater opportunity to rebalance the Atlantic alliance in our favour for the first time in decades. A more modest American commitment to a limited democratic order, rather than an unsustainable global one, can only enhance European influence, including ours, especially as the bloody distractions of the Middle East, America’s self-defeating imperial burden, fade from prominence. American leaders will soon be forced to choose between realism and idealism; the same is also true of us.

#### The plan gives the US a false sense of power -- clinging causes great power escalation, cyberwar, AND decks cooperation over diseases, warming, arms racing, the middle east AND Korean wars.

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In the decades since the cold war ended, this once-familiar logic has been largely forgotten. When the Soviet Union fell, the specter that haunted Roosevelt and his successors—a hostile power or powers dominating Europe and Asia and setting their sights on the Western Hemisphere—became so remote that it could no longer guide foreign-policy debate. What filled the gap was a bipartisan ethic of “more.” If the Soviet empire had demarcated the limits of American power, then a world without those limits—in which America and Americanism dominated ever larger swaths of the globe—constituted progress. If some American hegemony was good, more American hegemony was better. In the 1940s, foreign-policy elites generally asked: What must America do overseas to ensure its freedom and prosperity at home? Since the 1990s, they have more often asked: What must America do at home to ensure its preeminence overseas? Over the past quarter century, this ethic of “more” has contributed to a vast expansion of America’s international commitments—commitments the American people have repeatedly proved unwilling to bear. The Bush administration greased public support for invading Iraq by insisting that within months the U.S. would withdraw most of its troops. But as those predictions proved untrue—and the war grew ever costlier and bloodier—public opinion soured. George W. Bush held out against the demand to withdraw troops for a few years, even sending reinforcements in the 2007 “surge.” By 2008, however, with violence down but Iraq still extremely fragile, he caved to popular opinion and agreed to withdraw all U.S. troops by the end of 2011. Obama carried out that agreement and Iraq plunged back into civil war. Because Afghanistan was al-Qaeda’s base on 9/11, and because the U.S. has kept its troop levels there comparatively low, popular support for that war has proved easier to sustain. But the Afghan War also underscores America’s solvency problem. It is politically sustainable because the United States currently deploys only 15,000 troops there. However, few military experts believe that is enough to defeat the Taliban or even force them into a political settlement. So the United States can continue fighting in Afghanistan only because America’s leaders do not ask Americans to expend the blood and treasure there necessary to achieve Trump’s stated goal of “creat[ing] the conditions for a political process to achieve a lasting peace.” Still, foreign-policy elites keep proposing interventions that enjoy too little public support to succeed. In 2011, despite polling suggesting public wariness, Obama helped nato facilitate the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi. Libya soon dissolved into chaos. It’s questionable whether any amount of nation building could have stabilized the country after Qaddafi’s fall. But either way, Americans lacked the appetite for it, and so the United States failed to secure Libya, too. The exception to this pattern has been the military campaign America launched in 2014 against isis, which, like the Afghan War, enjoyed public support because Americans viewed it as a response to direct attacks on them. Now that that war is largely over, Trump advisers have proposed keeping U.S. troops in Syria to counter Iran. Trump himself seems skeptical, likely because he grasps what polls show: that absent a direct threat, Americans remain opposed to expanding America’s military footprint in the Middle East. With the war against isis dying down, Defense Secretary James Mattis declared in January that “great-power competition—not terrorism—is now the primary focus of U.S. national security.” But in its relationships with great powers, America’s solvency problems are, if anything, worse. That’s because the United States—in keeping with its general post–Cold War reluctance to grant competitors a sphere of influence—has tried to extend its power right up to the borders of Russia and China. That risks sparking conflict in places that the Russian and Chinese governments consider crucial to their security but the American people do not consider crucial to theirs. Which means yet more promises the American government cannot keep. Consider american policy toward russia. During the Cold War, no American president considered Eastern Europe important enough to American security to risk war over. But in the 1990s, with Russia enfeebled, many policy makers assumed that risk had disappeared. So the Clinton administration moved to admit the former Warsaw Pact countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into nato, thus making their defense an American obligation. When Trump recently questioned America’s obligation to nato’s newest member, Montenegro, he provoked outrage. But it’s worth remembering that in the 1990s, Americans far wiser than Trump considered even Clinton’s nato expansion a dangerous extension of America’s commitments. George Kennan, America’s most famous Cold War strategist, warned that the move would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion.” John Lewis Gaddis, America’s most famous Cold War historian, insisted it was “short-sighted” for Americans to believe that “the Russians have no choice but to accept what nato has decided to do” because Russia “retains a considerable capacity to do harm.” More than 20 years later, nato’s expansion to include Montenegro and the former Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania makes Kennan’s and Gaddis’s concerns all the more relevant. Could an American president rally the American people to defend a country near Russia’s border that some of them may never have heard of? Is that commitment solvent? We simply don’t know. This doesn’t mean Democrats should abrogate America’s nato commitments—or even publicly question them, as Trump has. nato has helped undergird an unprecedented era of European freedom, prosperity, and peace. Reneging on America’s commitment to any member could destroy the alliance as a whole, with consequences no one can foresee. So honoring America’s commitment to its newest members is a risk Democrats must take. But since it is a risk, the post–Cold War pattern of expanding nato with little public discussion—since 1996, the subject has rarely come up in presidential debates—should end. The lesson of the past decade is that pushing nato ever closer to Russia’s borders dangerously exacerbates America’s solvency gap. Consider what has happened in Georgia and Ukraine. In 2008, the Bush administration convinced its European allies to pledge that both countries would eventually enter nato. Enraged, Russian officials threatened to help Georgia’s two autonomous and largely pro-Russian regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, secede. And when Georgia’s pro-American president sent troops into South Ossetia that August, Russia did just that—it recognized Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence, blockaded Georgia’s coast, and bombed its capital. Moscow made the same point, even more harshly, a half-decade later in Ukraine, when protesters helped replace a pro-Russian government with a pro-Western one. The United States celebrated the shift of power. But Vladimir Putin responded by seizing the Crimean peninsula and fomenting an armed secessionist movement in Ukraine’s heavily Russian-speaking east, thus plunging the country into civil war. In 2015, Joe Biden told the Ukrainian Parliament, “We will not recognize any nation having a sphere of influence. Sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances.” That sentiment still governs the attitude of many congressional Democrats today. It’s why they demand that Trump maintain American sanctions until Russia relinquishes Crimea—even though barely anyone believes American sanctions can bring that about. It’s why they support arming Ukraine with lethal weapons. And it’s why they insist on keeping open the possibility of nato expansion into Ukraine even as Russia stations troops on Ukrainian soil. But Biden’s words, while stirring, were delusional. The United States does not oppose spheres of influence. It has had its own in the Western Hemisphere since 1823. It’s called the Monroe Doctrine, which declares that the U.S. will not tolerate military alliances between foreign powers and the countries to America’s south. It’s the reason Mexico cannot enter into a military alliance with Russia. Until today’s Democrats recognize—as Cold War presidents did—that the United States cannot prevent a Russian sphere of influence in those territories in which the Russian government is willing to lose lives but the American people are not, Democratic foreign policy will produce more insolvency, more promises America can’t keep. But the pursuit of unipolarity poses its greatest danger in America’s relations with China. U.S.-Chinese relations are U.S.-Russian relations in reverse. Although geopolitically aggressive, Russia is economically and demographically a declining power. It lost a large sphere of influence, and America is now seeking to deny it a smaller one. China is a rising power. It is trying to establish a sphere of influence, which America opposes. The key difference is that in the case of Russia, America’s solvency problem is static: Because Russia is not gaining economic and military strength relative to the United States and its European allies, America’s solvency problem will not grow unless it incurs new obligations. In East Asia, by contrast, China’s relative power is growing. That means America’s solvency problem—the gap between its commitment to deny China a sphere of influence and its power to do so—is growing, too. The balance of economic power is shifting decisively in China’s favor. When the Soviet Union collapsed, America’s share of the global economy was 15 times as large as China’s. Today, it’s roughly 1.5 times as large. Experts predict that by 2040, China’s economy will be 1.5 times as large as America’s. This economic shift is producing a military shift. Washington still spends far more than Beijing on defense, but over the past two decades the Chinese military has dramatically improved. And while the American military is spread across the world, China focuses on its own neighborhood. Thus, a 2017 Rand Corporation study concluded that “while the United States maintains unparalleled military forces overall, it faces a progressively receding frontier of military dominance in Asia. Chinese military modernization, combined with the advantages conferred by geography, have endowed China with a strong military position vis-à-vis the United States in areas close to its own territory. As a result, the balance of power between the United States and China may be approaching a series of tipping points.” The first tipping point, Rand suggests, will be Taiwan. Taiwan is the most dangerous example of American foreign-policy insolvency in the world. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, signed when China’s economy was smaller than Spain’s, commits the U.S. “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” As Hofstra University’s Julian Ku has observed, the language is almost as strong as the language in America’s treaties with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. This quasi-obligation is insolvent for two reasons. First, the people of mainland China care far more about Taiwan than Americans do. China’s government doesn’t merely consider Taiwan part of its sphere of influence. It considers it part of China, and has since the 17th century. In the centuries that followed, the Western powers and Japan repeatedly invaded and divided China, and many Chinese see the reunification of Taiwan as crucial to overcoming that humiliating history. This creates a vast asymmetry of public will. In 2017, the Committee of 100, a Chinese American group, asked people in both countries to name their “two greatest concerns about the U.S.-China relationship.” Among mainland Chinese, Taiwan came in first. Among Americans, it didn’t make the top seven. In fact, when asked whether the United States should defend Taiwan if it declares independence, Americans consistently, by substantial margins, say no. Alongside this asymmetry of public will is a growing asymmetry of military power. Lyle Goldstein, a China expert at the Naval War College, notes that “China’s military modernization has steadily outstripped Taiwan’s armed forces.” And it’s not just Taiwan that’s increasingly outclassed. The United States is, too. Within 500 miles of Taiwan’s capital, notes the Rand study, China maintains 39 air-force bases. The United States maintains one, which, according to Rand, “even a relatively small number of accurate [Chinese] missiles could shut … at the outset of hostilities.” In the words of the Australian military strategist Hugh White, “America can no longer defend Taiwan from China and a policy towards Taiwan that presumes that it can is unsustainable.” In the years to come, America must either take steps to alter this unsustainable commitment or risk the possibility that China will do so itself. So what might a democratic alternative to both Trump and his hawkish critics—an alternative built upon the sacrifices Americans are actually willing to make rather than the obligations that unipolarity requires—look like? It would start with the question inherent in Walter Lippmann’s phrase: What kind of shield does the American republic require in order to thrive? When Roosevelt and Kennan pondered this question in the 1940s, even America’s most powerful adversaries had trouble reaching the United States directly. The Atlantic and Pacific were formidable moats. That’s why both men worried primarily about a two-step process in which Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union first consolidated power over Eurasia and then crossed the oceans. But since World War II, two technologies have made it easier for adversaries to bypass step one and threaten the United States without first dominating other continents. The first is nuclear weapons. Luckily, since the mid-20th century, America has pursued a strategy that has protected it against nuclear strikes by even its most fearsome foes. That strategy is nuclear deterrence, and it merely requires the United States to possess enough nuclear weapons, and sufficient means to deliver them, to credibly declare that America will destroy any regime that uses nuclear weapons against the United States. The strategy does not require foreign leaders to care about their people’s lives, only their own. Which helps explain why it worked against Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong. And why there is every reason to believe it will work—indeed, has been working in the 12 years since North Korea’s first nuclear test—against Kim Jong Un. Nuclear deterrence is less effective against a terrorist group with no regime or territory to protect, led by people who welcome death. But almost 17 years after September 11, the United States and its allies have proved capable of keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. In fact, the United States has prevented any 9/11-scale terrorist attack on American soil: Since 2001, foreign-born terrorists have killed on average one American a year inside the U.S. Unfortunately, the United States is less shielded from a second, more recent technology that enables direct attack: cyberwarfare. If the 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment that “Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 … to undermine public faith in the US democratic process” is correct, then preventing another such attack—either on America’s elections or America’s critical infrastructure—should be among America’s highest foreign-policy priorities. Roosevelt and Kennan worried that if a hostile power dominated Europe or Asia, it could dominate the great oceans, thus leaving America so insecure that its democracy crumbled or so isolated that its economy did. Now Russia—or another adversary—can threaten American freedom and prosperity by attacking the machinery that undergirds America’s elections, banking system, or electricity grid. Few other threats put the republic itself at such risk. So Democrats are right to blast Trump for not making cyberdefense a priority. They’re right to demand reprisals against Russia in hopes of deterring its government from repeating in 2018 and 2020 what it did in 2016. And they are right to work with America’s allies to try to deter Russia from undermining their democratic systems, too. But in their desire to be tough on Putin, congressional Democrats are conditioning sanctions relief not only on Russia stopping its interference in American elections, but on Russia stopping its interference in Ukraine and even Syria. This combines a subject that is crucial to America’s security with subjects that are not, and defines America’s goals so expansively that they exceed America’s means. Truly guarding against Russia’s threat to the American homeland requires prioritizing it. To protect what matters most—the integrity of its elections and those of its allies—America should compromise where it matters less: in Russia’s backyard. If Russia stops sabotaging elections in nato countries, nato should pledge to push no closer to Russia’s borders. Instead, the United States and its allies should pursue a status for Ukraine and Georgia similar to the status that Austria and Finland enjoyed during the Cold War. Because Soviet troops entered both countries during World War II, the United States could not deny Moscow some influence over them after the war. So each country struck a deal that granted it control over its domestic affairs (both became democracies) in return for not pursuing an anti-Soviet foreign policy. That should be America’s goal for Ukraine and Georgia today. Recognizing that U.S. sanctions almost certainly won’t reverse Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the United States might ultimately accept it as part of a deal that removed Russian troops and weaponry from Ukrainian soil. This would not be another Warsaw Pact. It would be more like the Monroe Doctrine, as America’s leaders interpret it today. Few Americans now claim the Monroe Doctrine gives the United States the right to dictate the internal affairs of America’s neighbors to the south. If the Dominican Republic nationalizes its banks, the U.S. will not send in the Marines. But America will not permit the Dominican Republic to join a military alliance with Moscow or Beijing. America’s goal should be for Russia to follow that same principle when it comes to Georgia and Ukraine. A similar approach should guide America’s relations with China. The U.S. must try to deter China from threatening the American homeland militarily and politically, through cyberattacks or other forms of interference. But it must also prevent China from threatening the homeland through an economic relationship that benefits American elites while weakening the American middle class. In his book The American Way of Strategy, Michael Lind quotes Franklin D. Roosevelt as declaring in 1936 that “the very nature of free government demands that there must be a line of defense held by the yeomanry,” what we would today call the middle class. “Any elemental policy, economic or political, which tends to eliminate these dependable defenders of democratic institutions, and to concentrate control in the hands of a few small, powerful groups is directly opposed … to democratic government itself.” This concentration certainly threatens democratic government today. And preventing it should thus be central not only to American domestic policy, but to American foreign policy as well. Trump won the presidency in part by arguing that American foreign policy focused too much on extending America’s global footprint and not enough on safeguarding America’s middle class. And he was partially right. A “shield of the republic” foreign policy would use America’s limited influence over China to protect, to whatever degree possible, American workers from competing with workers who lack even minimal labor protections. One way to do that would be to adopt a suggestion made by the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik. Rodrik notes that the United States has laws against “dumping”: It imposes tariffs on foreign goods sold in the United States for less than they cost to produce. He suggests extending such tariffs to “social dumping”: goods exported to the United States by workers without basic labor rights. Any tariffs would have to be wielded carefully—not in the rash, jumbled way Trump has deployed them. (And certainly not against democracies whose labor protections are often better than America’s). But, as with Russia, jettisoning the assumption that America must deny China a sphere of influence might help policy makers husband American leverage for the things that matter most. A 1949 State Department planning paper declared that the U.S. should seek to prevent the “domination of Asia by a nation or coalition of nations.” Since such domination could threaten American trade across the Pacific, and even the safety of the Western Hemisphere, precluding it should remain America’s goal. The United States can achieve that goal by maintaining its alliances with Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan and deepening its relationship with India, whose population will soon surpass China’s. America’s commitments to these countries will only grow insolvent if the U.S. defines them as requiring it to defend disputed islands like Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (claimed by both China and the Philippines) or the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea (claimed by both China and Japan)—islands far from the heartlands of both U.S. allies. And that insolvency will grow worse if the United States, in its zeal to deny China a sphere of influence, takes on a new obligation—the East Asian equivalent of Ukraine and Georgia—by agreeing to defend Vietnam. Vietnam has a roughly 800-mile-long land border with China, a bevy of maritime disputes with Beijing, and a tradition of fierce anti-Chinese nationalism. The U.S. is better off helping Hanoi—in the tradition of Austria and Finland vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or, for that matter, Mexico vis-à-vis the United States—accommodate its foreign policy to the giant next door while preserving its right to manage its domestic affairs. The most wrenching element of this strategy involves Taiwan. The island is an extraordinary success story, a powerful testament to the compatibility of democracy and Chinese culture. But the United States probably cannot defend Taiwan today. It almost certainly won’t be able to in a decade or two. If America does not face the insolvency of its current commitment to Taiwan now, it may eventually be made to face it, perhaps through war. If China renounces the use of force, the United States should support its reunification with Taiwan along the principle of “one country, two systems.” The U.S. should ask China to commit publicly not to station troops or Communist Party officials in Taiwan, and to let Taiwan manage its domestic political affairs. Would Beijing adhere to such an agreement once unification occurred? The best precedent is Hong Kong. Two decades after reunification, it remains substantially freer than the rest of China. (Freedom House rates countries on a scale of one to seven, with one being freest and seven being least free. In 2018, Hong Kong received a 3.5 and China got a 6.5.) But Hong Kong would almost certainly be freer were it not under Beijing’s control. It’s likely that under reunification people in Taiwan would lose some of their freedom as well. But, even if Taiwan sunk to Hong Kong’s level, it would remain far freer than Vietnam, a country some Washington hawks are clamoring to ally with in order to contain China. There are two primary arguments against the Democratic foreign policy outlined above. The first involves credibility. If the United States abandons Taiwan, the argument goes, it will undermine the credibility of its commitment to South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. Similarly, if America won’t fight Russia in Ukraine, neither Moscow nor Riga will believe America’s promises to fight Russia in Latvia. During the Vietnam War, this logic was dubbed the “domino theory”: If the United States didn’t defend Vietnam, its credibility would collapse and other anti-communist “dominoes” would soon fall. But the theory is wrong. Decades of academic research show that, in the words of the Dartmouth College political scientists Daryl Press and Jennifer Lind, “there’s little evidence that supports the view that countries’ record for keeping commitments determines their credibility.” The Soviets and West Germans did not conclude that because America would not defend South Vietnam it would not defend West Berlin, because they understood that America cared more about West Berlin than it cared about South Vietnam, and had a greater capacity to defend it. Similarly, when predicting whether the United States will defend Japan, neither Beijing nor Tokyo will look at whether America defends Taiwan. They will look at whether it is in America’s interests, and within America’s power, to defend Japan. Far from bolstering a country’s credibility, insolvent commitments drain its finances, overstretch its military, and undermine its reputation for sound judgment. As Kennan put it, “There is more respect to be won in the opinion of this world by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives.” The other major critique is moral: How can America let authoritarian powers bully their neighbors, especially when those neighbors only want the same freedoms that we prize in the United States? The answer begins with John F. Kennedy’s reminder that peace, too, is “a matter of human rights.” People’s lives don’t generally improve when their country becomes a battlefield. If the United States could actually defend Ukraine, Georgia, or Taiwan, then perhaps the horror of war might be worth it. But America cannot, at least not at a cost the American people would be willing to pay. Morally, therefore, America better serves these countries by helping them reach the best possible accommodation with their great-power neighbors than by encouraging their defiance with promises America can’t keep. Prudence, argued Edmund Burke, is “not only the first in rank of the virtues political and moral but … is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all.” In other words, what truly matters morally is not the purity of America’s rhetoric but the consequences of America’s policies for the people they affect most. Morally, Americans must also consider something else: Risking conflict to deny great powers a sphere of influence in their own neighborhoods undermines the chances of cooperating with them everywhere else. Over the past decade, American cooperation with China and Russia has proved crucial to mitigating some of the world’s greatest threats. In 2010, China, along with Russia, backed the United Nations sanctions that helped pave the way for the Iran nuclear deal. In 2014, Beijing and Washington cooperated to quell the Ebola crisis, which experts warned might infect 1.4 million West Africans. In 2016, U.S.-Chinese cooperation proved crucial to the ratification of the Paris climate-change agreement (from which Trump has subsequently withdrawn). The more America challenges Beijing and Moscow on their borders, the harder it will be to sustain, let alone deepen, this cooperation. Only U.S.-Russian diplomacy can extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expires in 2021, and thus avert a costly and dangerous nuclear-arms race. Only great-power cooperation can end Syria’s monstrous civil war. The United States has some influence over the Kurds and Gulf-backed Sunni Arab rebel groups. But only Moscow, along with Iran, can deliver concessions from Bashar al-Assad’s regime. It’s the same in Afghanistan. The United States enjoys more leverage over the government in Kabul, but Russia enjoys more influence over the Taliban and China wields more influence over Pakistan. Great-power cooperation is also crucial to easing the crisis on the Korean peninsula. No matter what he tells Trump, Kim Jong Un is unlikely to give up his nuclear weapons. But preventing further nuclear and missile tests would reduce the chances of war and facilitate the reconciliation with South Korea that could improve North Korean lives. The U.S. can’t do that alone. It can tempt Kim by promising an end to North Korea’s diplomatic and economic isolation. But it can’t fully reassure him that the United States—which turned on Qaddafi after he abandoned his own nuclear program—won’t do the same to him. Only Beijing—North Korea’s longtime ally—can do that. The more protected North Korea feels by China, the less it may feel the need to advance its nuclear program. The Naval War College’s Lyle Goldstein has suggested that Pyongyang might be more likely to permit inspection of its nuclear program if China takes part. This defies the logic of unipolarity, which mandates that the U.S. try to reduce China’s influence on the Korean peninsula. But here, too, America can better serve the cause of peace and human dignity by cooperating with great powers than seeking to supplant them. What america needs from its foreign policy has not changed since the nation’s founding: to promote the external conditions that give Americans the best chance to become prosperous and free. What has changed, at key moments, is the strategy the United States pursues to realize those goals. In the early-19th century, via the Monroe Doctrine, the United States entered a de facto alliance with Britain—the world’s greatest naval power—to prevent Europe’s land powers from establishing beachheads in the Americas. Beginning in the early-20th century, as Britain’s ability to enforce the Monroe Doctrine waned, the United States entered two European wars, and then fought the Cold War, to prevent adversaries from dominating Europe and Asia. Now, to achieve its enduring goals, America needs to change strategy once again. The unipolar strategy that America has pursued since the Soviet Union’s demise—of preserving if not extending American dominance in every region of the world—is increasingly insolvent. It is insolvent because America lacks the power to quell uprisings in the countries it has invaded. It is insolvent because America lacks the power to deny Russian influence over the countries on its border. It is insolvent because America lacks the power to enforce a status quo in East Asia established when China’s economy was slightly larger than Holland’s. And, above all, it is insolvent because it lacks support from the American people, who for good reason largely do not believe it has served their needs.

#### Decline spurs an effective transition.

Dr. Paul K. MacDonald 18, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, and Dr. Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, PhD in Political Science from the University of Columbia, Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment, p. 1-2

In this book, we argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Specifically, we make three main arguments. First, relative decline causes prompt, proportionate retrenchment because states seek strategic solvency. The international system is a competitive place, and great powers did not get to the top by being imprudent, irrational, or irresponsible. When their fortunes ebb, states tend to retain the virtues that made them great. In the face of decline, great powers have a good sense of their relative capability and tend not to give away more than they must. Expanding or maintaining grand strategic ambitions during decline incurs unsustainable burdens and incites unwinnable fights, so the faster states fall, the more they retrench. Great powers may choose to retrench in other circumstances as well, but they have an overriding incentive to do so when confronted by relative decline. Second, the depth of relative decline shapes not only how much a state retrenches, but also which policies it adopts. The world is complex and cutthroat; leaders cannot glibly pull a policy off the shelf and expect desired outcomes. Because international politics is a self-help system, great powers prefer policies that rely less on the actions of allies and adversaries. For lack of a better term, we refer to these as domestic policies, which include reducing spending, restructuring forces, and reforming institutions—all to reallocate resources for more efficient uses. But international policies may also help, and they include redeploying forces, defusing flashpoints, and redistributing burdens—all to avoid costly conflicts and reinforce core strongpoints. The faster and deeper states fall, the more they are willing to rely on others to cushion their fall. Retrenchment is not a weapon but an arsenal that can be used in different amounts and combinations depending on conditions and the enemies faced. Third, after depth, structural conditions are the most important factors shaping how great powers respond to relative decline. Four conditions catalyze the incentives for declining states to retrench. One is the declining state’s rank. States in the top rungs of the great power hierarchy have more resources and margin for error than those lower down, so there is less urgency for them to retrench. Another is the availability of allies. Where states can shift burdens to capable regional powers with similar preferences, retrenchment is less risky and difficult. Yet another is the interdependence of commitments. When states perceive commitments in one place as tightly linked to commitments elsewhere, pulling back becomes harder and less likely. The last catalyst is the calculus of conquest. If aggression pays, then retrenchment does not, and great powers will be loath to do it. The world is not just complex and cutthroat, it is also dynamic. No set of conditions is everlasting, and leaders must change with the times. Empirically, this work aims to add value by being the first to study systematically all modern shifts in the great power pecking order. We find sixteen cases of relative decline since 1870, when reliable data for the great powers become available, and compare them to their non-declining counterparts across a variety of measures. To preview the findings, retrenchment is by far the most common response to relative decline, and declining powers behave differently from non-declining powers. States in decline are more likely to cut the size of their military forces and budgets and in extreme cases are more likely to form alliances. This does not, however, make them ripe for exploitation; declining states perform comparatively well in militarized disputes. Our headline finding, however, is that states that retrench recover their prior rank with some regularity, but those that fail to retrench never do. These results challenge theories of grand strategy and war, offer guidance to policymakers, and indicate overlooked paths to peace.

#### Income inequality, manufacturing outsourcing, populist backlash, shift to Asia prove it’s too late.

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Donald Trump's election in November 2016 sent a shiver down the collective spines of the foreign policy elites on both sides of the Atlantic, which view him as a dire threat to the durability of the liberal, rules-based international order (LRBIO). The morning after the election, David E. Sanger of the New York Times argued that Trump's victory ‘will plunge the United States into an era of unknowns that has little parallel in the nation's 240-year history’.1 Fearing that Trump's ‘America First’ policy would undo US security alliances in Europe and east Asia, the Washington Post columnist David Ignatius noted that ‘by putting America's interests first so nakedly, he may push many US allies in Europe and Asia to make their own deals with a newly assertive Russia and a rising China’.2 Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, worried that ‘Mr Trump's proposed policies threaten to take an axe to the liberal world order that the US has supported and sustained since 1945’.3 The FT's Philip Stephens stated that ‘“America First” promotes belligerent isolationism—an approach to international order rooted in power rather then a rule of law’. Indeed, Stephens asserted, Trump was ‘repudiating the basic organizing idea of the west: the notion that the world's democracies can oversee a fair and inclusive rules-based system to underwrite global peace and security’.4 As I explain below, the LRBIO actually is the international order—the Pax Americana—that the United States constructed after the Second World War: it is now fraying, but Donald Trump is a symptom of this, not the cause. There are both internal and external factors that explain why the Pax Americana is under stress. Internally, **in**come inequality, stagnant real incomes, the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs and slow productivity growth have hollowed out the middle class.5 These trends have hit the white working class especially hard, and their effect has been amplified by rapid demographic changes taking place in the United States. By artfully employing ‘dog whistle’6 tactics, Trump was able to capitalize on the concern among blue-collar voters about America's changing national identity. The political blowback from these trends helped to fuel Trump's victory—a triumph that can be viewed as a populist backlash against globalization's effects, and against the elites—the ‘One Percent’—who are seen to have profited from it.7 Externally, the Pax Americana is imperilled by the shifting of the world's economic—and geopolitical—centres of gravity from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia, which presages the end of the West's five centuries of global dominance. As Financial Times chief economic commentator Martin Wolf notes, this change really is ‘all about the rise of Asia, and, most importantly, China’.8 To be precise, rather than Donald Trump's election, it is the big, impersonal forces of history—the relative decline of American power, and the emergence of a risen China—that explain why the Pax Americana's days are numbered. For good measure, both the paralysing effects of the US political system's polarization, and America's own policies—the mismanagement of its economy that led to the Great Recession in 2008, and the ‘forever wars’ in which it has become entrapped in the Middle East and Afghanistan—have given these big, impersonal forces of history a powerful shove forward.9

### More AT Taiwan

#### They’re not even allies!

Babones 16 (Salvatore, Associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), 1-12-2016, “One China, One Taiwan” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/taiwan/2016-01-12/one-china-one-taiwan)

Although a Taiwanese declaration of independence would arouse much sympathy in the United States, it would not likely result in American diplomatic recognition. Taiwan may be a fellow democracy with free and vibrant political institutions, but the United States is a [global hegemon](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089) with global responsibilities and a massive stake in the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The United States may [sell weapons](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-arms-idUSKBN0TZ2C520151217) to Taiwan in a tit-for-tat response to [Chinese expansionism](http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/22/china-spratlys-island-building-is-to-protect-reefs-make-civilian-facilities.html) in the South China Sea, but it is not about to start World War III over Taiwanese sovereignty. The real revolution of a DPP victory in Taiwan will be a revolution in identity. There is already a [pitched battle](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/21/taiwan-textbook-controversy-china-independence-history/) in Taiwan over the teaching of history. In the old textbooks, the history of the Chinese people began in the fertile valley of the Yellow River and ended in exile on the rocky island of Taiwan. In the new textbooks, the lush island of Taiwan was buffeted by historical forces beyond its control but ultimately found its way to democracy, prosperity, and independence. The emergence of a distinctively Taiwanese identity is bitterly resisted by the old guard of the KMT, but the people of Taiwan [overwhelmingly identify](https://www.aei.org/publication/chinese-check-forging-new-identities-hong-kong-taiwan-2/) either as Taiwanese or as a mix of Taiwanese and Chinese. Nearly 90 percent of Taiwanese want [equal status](http://www.taiwan.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=13053&ctNode=1937&mp=999) for their country in the international community. While these numbers are somewhat suspect—the questions seem designed in such a way as to elicit a positive response—the [overall trend](http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167) is clear. Although most can trace a Chinese heritage,[very few](http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166) people in Taiwan want to be Chinese. American pundits often discuss whether the United States should accommodate China through the [Finlandization](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2010-01-01/not-so-dire-straits) of Taiwan or even [abandon Taiwan](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2011-03-01/will-chinas-rise-lead-war) to China. Such analyses are at least 30 years too late. Taiwan will never again be part of China. That train has left the station. Taiwan is a [highly successful](https://www.aei.org/publication/why-giving-up-taiwan-will-not-help-us-with-china/) country of more than 23 million people with its own politics and its own place in the world. Admittedly, that place may fall short of what many Taiwanese people want for their country, but it is nonetheless secure. January’s election won’t change that.