# NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must be topical.

#### “Resolved” denotes a formal resolution.

**AWS ’13** [Army Writing Style; August 24th; Online resource dedicated to all major writing requirements in the Army; Army Writing Style, "Punctuation — The Colon and Semicolon," <https://armywritingstyle.com/punctuation-the-colon-and-semicolon/>]

The colon introduces the following:

a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis.

b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)

c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it?

d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.

e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:". Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### “The member nations of the World Trade Organization” are 164 governments loosely tied by commitment to global trade

CalChamber ND, The CalChamber, in keeping with long-standing policy, enthusiastically supports free trade worldwide, expansion of international trade and investment, fair and equitable market access for California products abroad and elimination of disincentives that impede the international competitiveness of California business. Likely post-2020. “World Trade Organization” <https://advocacy.calchamber.com/international/trade/world-trade-organization/> brett

The WTO and its 164 member nations is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified or approved in their parliaments or legislatures. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters and importers conduct their business.

#### “Reduce” means diminish.

Friedman ’99 [Daniel; February 9th; Senior Circuit Judge; Cuna Mutual Life Insurance Company, “Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES,” https://cite.case.law/f3d/169/737/615055/]

"The amount determined" under § 809, by which the policyholder dividend deduction is to be "reduced," is the "excess" specified in § 809(c)(1). Like the word "excess," the word "reduced" is a common, unambiguous, non-technical term that is given its ordinary meaning. See San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co., 297 U.S. at 499. "Reduce" means "to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number." Webster's Third International Dictionary 1905. Under CUNA's interpretation of "excess" in § 809(c), however, the result of the "amount determination" under § 809 would be not to reduce the policyholder dividends deduction, but to increase it. This would directly contradict the explicit instruction in § 808(c)(2) that the deduction "be reduced." The word "reduce" cannot be interpreted, as CUNA would treat it, to mean "increase."

#### “Intellectual property protections” are legally established rights

Trevor Brewer 19, legal advisor @ BrewerLong Business Law, “WHAT ARE THE FOUR BASIC TYPES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS?” <https://brewerlong.com/information/business-law/four-types-of-intellectual-property/> brett

When a business or an individual has an idea that they want to protect from being used by others without their permission, it is best to seek legal protection of that intellectual property.

By seeking property rights over your intellectual property — property that is a creation of the mind, such as an invention, symbol, or even a name.

You establish rightful ownership and prevent the unlawful use of your property.

What’s more, establishing intellectual property rights can help to fuel the economy and stimulate further innovation.

There are four main types of intellectual property protections, reviewed below. Work with an experienced intellectual property attorney to learn more about steps to take to secure the necessary protection for your intellectual property.

FOUR TYPES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTIONS

There are four types of intellectual property rights and protections (although multiple types of intellectual property itself). Securing the correct protection for your property is important, which is why consulting with a lawyer is a must. The four categories of intellectual property protections include:

TRADE SECRETS

Trade secrets refer to specific, private information that is important to a business because it gives the business a competitive advantage in its marketplace. If a trade secret is acquired by another company, it could harm the original holder.

Examples of trade secrets include recipes for certain foods and beverages (like Mrs. Fields’ cookies or Sprite), new inventions, software, processes, and even different marketing strategies.

When a person or business holds a trade secret protection, others cannot copy or steal the idea. In order to establish information as a “trade secret,” and to incur the legal protections associated with trade secrets, businesses must actively behave in a manner that demonstrates their desire to protect the information.

Trade secrets are protected without official registration; however, an owner of a trade secret whose rights are breached–i.e. someone steals their trade secret–may ask a court to ask against that individual and prevent them from using the trade secret.

PATENTS

As defined by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), a patent is a type of limited-duration protection that can be used to protect inventions (or discoveries) that are new, non-obvious, and useful, such a new process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter.

When a property owner holds a patent, others are prevented, under law, from offering for sale, making, or using the product.

COPYRIGHTS

Copyrights and patents are not the same things, although they are often confused. A copyright is a type of intellectual property protection that protects original works of authorship, which might include literary works, music, art, and more. Today, copyrights also protect computer software and architecture.

Copyright protections are automatic; once you create something, it is yours. However, if your rights under copyright protections are infringed and you wish to file a lawsuit, then registration of your copyright will be necessary.

TRADEMARKS

Finally, the fourth type of intellectual property protection is a trademark protection. Remember, patents are used to protect inventions and discoveries and copyrights are used to protect expressions of ideas and creations, like art and writing.

Trademarks, then, refer to phrases, words, or symbols that distinguish the source of a product or services of one party from another. For example, the Nike symbol–which nearly all could easily recognize and identify–is a type of trademark.

While patents and copyrights can expire, trademark rights come from the use of the trademark, and therefore can be held indefinitely. Like a copyright, registration of a trademark is not required, but registering can offer additional advantages.

#### Violation: “We affirm” is not a stable actor and could be anyone. It isn’t the WTO member nations -- CX proves.

#### That’s necessary for limits and ground -- redefining portions of the resolution permits endless reclarification AND creates incentives to focus 1 part of the library for 4 years -- only aligning pre-round research with agent and mechanism solves.

#### The impact is iterative testing – the process of engaging in research around a limited and predictable topic empirically produces better advocates

**Iverson ’9** [Joel; 2009; Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Montana, Ph.D in Communication from Arizona State University Relations at the University of Sydney; Debate Central, “Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of Debate Research on Personal Advocacy,” <https://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html>] brett

Mitchell (1998) provides a thorough examination of the pedagogical implication for academic debate. Although Mitchell acknowledges that debate provides preparation for participation in democracy, limiting debate to a laboratory where students practice their skill for future participation is criticized. Mitchell contends:

For students and teachers of argumentation, the heightened salience of this question should signal the danger that critical thinking and oral advocacy skills alone may not be sufficient for citizens to assert their voices in public deliberation. (p. 45)

Mitchell contends that the laboratory style setting creates barriers to other spheres, creates a "sense of detachment" and causes debaters to see research from the role of spectators. Mitchell further calls for "argumentative agency [which] involves the capacity to contextualize and employ the skills and strategies of argumentative discourse in fields of social action, especially wider spheres of public deliberation" (p. 45). Although we agree with Mitchell that debate can be an even greater instrument of empowerment for students, we are more interested in examining the impact of the intermediary step of research. In each of Mitchell's examples of debaters finding creative avenues for agency, there had to be a motivation to act. It is our contention that the research conducted for competition is a major catalyst to propel their action, change their opinions, and to provide a greater depth of understanding of the issues involved.

The level of research involved in debate creates an in-depth understanding of issues. The level of research conducted during a year of debate is quite extensive. Goodman (1993) references a Chronicle of Higher Education article that estimated "the level and extent of research required of the average college debater for each topic is equivalent to the amount of research required for a Master's Thesis (cited in Mitchell, 1998, p. 55). With this extensive quantity of research, debaters attain a high level of investigation and (presumably) understanding of a topic. As a result of this level of understanding, debaters become knowledgeable citizens who are further empowered to make informed opinions and energized to take action. Research helps to educate students (and coaches) about the state of the world.

Without the guidance of a debate topic, how many students would do in-depth research on female genital mutilation in Africa, or United Nations sanctions on Iraq? The competitive nature of policy debate provides an impetus for students to research the topics that they are going to debate. This in turn fuels students’ awareness of issues that go beyond their front doors. Advocacy flows from this increased awareness. Reading books and articles about the suffering of people thousands of miles away or right in our own communities drives people to become involved in the community at large.

Research has also focused on how debate prepares us for life in the public sphere. Issues that we discuss in debate have found their way onto the national policy stage, and training in intercollegiate debate makes us good public advocates. The public sphere is the arena in which we all must participate to be active citizens. Even after we leave debate, the skills that we have gained should help us to be better advocates and citizens. Research has looked at how debate impacts education (Matlon and Keele 1984), legal training (Parkinson, Gisler and Pelias 1983, Nobles 19850 and behavioral traits (McGlone 1974, Colbert 1994). These works illustrate the impact that public debate has on students as they prepare to enter the public sphere.

The debaters who take active roles such as protesting sanctions were probably not actively engaged in the issue until their research drew them into the topic. Furthermore, the process of intense research for debate may actually change the positions debaters hold. Since debaters typically enter into a topic with only cursory (if any) knowledge of the issue, the research process provides exposure to issues that were previously unknown. Exposure to the literature on a topic can create, reinforce or alter an individual's opinions. Before learning of the School for the America's, having an opinion of the place is impossible. After hearing about the systematic training of torturers and oppressors in a debate round and reading the research, an opinion of the "school" was developed. In this manner, exposure to debate research as the person finding the evidence, hearing it as the opponent in a debate round (or as judge) acts as an initial spark of awareness on an issue. This process of discovery seems to have a similar impact to watching an investigative news report.

Mitchell claimed that debate could be more than it was traditionally seen as, that it could be a catalyst to empower people to act in the social arena. We surmise that there is a step in between the debate and the action. The intermediary step where people are inspired to agency is based on the research that they do. If students are compelled to act, research is a main factor in compelling them to do so. Even if students are not compelled to take direct action, research still changes opinions and attitudes.

Research often compels students to take action in the social arena. Debate topics guide students in a direction that allows them to explore what is going on in the world. Last year the college policy debate topic was,

Resolved: That the United States Federal Government should adopt a policy of constructive engagement, including the immediate removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions, with the government(s) of one or more of the following nation-states: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea.

This topic spurred quite a bit of activism on the college debate circuit. Many students become actively involved in protesting for the removal of sanctions from at least one of the topic countries. The college listserve was used to rally people in support ofvarious movements to remove sanctions on both Iraq and Cuba. These messages were posted after the research on the topic began. While this topic did not lend itself to activism beyond rallying the government, other topics have allowed students to take their beliefs outside of the laboratory and into action.

In addition to creating awareness, the research process can also reinforce or alter opinions. By discovering new information in the research process, people can question their current assumptions and perhaps formulate a more informed opinion. One example comes from a summer debate class for children of Migrant workers in North Dakota (Iverson, 1999). The Junior High aged students chose to debate the adoption of Spanish as an official language in the U.S. Many students expressed their concern that they could not argue effectively against the proposed change because it was a "truism." They were wholly in favor of Spanish as an official language. After researching the topic throughout their six week course, many realized much more was involved in adopting an official language and that they did not "speak 'pure' Spanish or English, but speak a unique dialect and hybrid" (Iverson, p. 3). At the end of the class many students became opposed to adopting Spanish as an official language, but found other ways Spanish should be integrated into American culture. Without research, these students would have maintained their opinions and not enhanced their knowledge of the issue. The students who maintained support of Spanish as an official language were better informed and thus also more capable of articulating support for their beliefs.

The examples of debate and research impacting the opinions and actions of debaters indicate the strong potential for a direct relationship between debate research and personal advocacy. However, the debate community has not created a new sea of activists immersing this planet in waves of protest and political action. The level of influence debater search has on people needs further exploration. Also, the process of research needs to be more fully explored in order to understand if and why researching for the competitive activity of debate generates more interest than research for other purposes such as classroom projects.

Since parliamentary debate does not involve research into a single topic, it can provide an important reference point for examining the impact of research in other forms of debate. Based upon limited conversations with competitors and coaches as well as some direct coaching and judging experience in parliamentary debate, parliamentary forms of debate has not seen an increase in activism on the part of debaters in the United States. Although some coaches require research in order to find examples and to stay updated on current events, the basic principle of this research is to have a commonsense level of understanding(Venette, 1998). As the NPDA website explains, "the reader is encouraged to be well-read in current events, as well as history, philosophy, etc. Remember: the realm of knowledge is that of a 'well-read college student'" (NPDA Homepage,<http://www.bethel.edu/Majors/Communication/npda/faq2.html>). The focus of research is breadth, not depth. In fact, in-depth research into one topic for parliamentary debate would seem to be counterproductive. Every round has a different resolution and for APDA, at least, those resolutions are generally written so they are open to a wide array of case examples, So, developing too narrow of a focus could be competitively fatal. However, research is apparently increasing for parliamentary teams as reports of "stock cases" used by teams for numerous rounds have recently appeared. One coach did state that a perceived "stock case" by one team pushed his debaters to research the topic of AIDS in Africa in order to be equally knowledgeable in that case. Interestingly, the coach also stated that some of their research in preparation for parliamentary debate was affecting the opinions and attitudes of the debaters on the team.

Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy and challenge peoples' assumptions. Debaters must switch sides, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, supporting and researching both sides of an argument actually created stronger advocates. Not only did debaters learn both sides of an argument, so that they could defend their positions against attack, they also learned the nuances of each position. Learning and the intricate nature of various policy proposals helps debaters to strengthen their own stance on issues.

#### SSD is good – it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism – our argument is that the process of defending and answering proposals is an benefit of engaging the topic.

#### TVA: Read the other AFF on your wiki. The TRIPS waiver challenges neocolonial dynamics and provides space for a conversation on global logistics. All DA’s to the TVA prove there is revolutionary neg ground under our model of debate.

Sharifah Sekalala 21 et al., Warwick Law School, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK. Lisa Forman, Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Timothy Hodgson, International Commission of Jurists, Johannesburg, South Africa. Moses Mulumba, Center for Health, Human Rights and Development, Kampala, Uganda. Hadijah Namyalo-Ganafa, School of Law, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda. Benjamin Mason Meier, Department of Public Policy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA. BMJ Glob Health. 2021; 6(7): e006169. Published online 2021 Jul 12. “Decolonising human rights: how intellectual property laws result in unequal access to the COVID-19 vaccine” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8277484/> brett

The current global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines is largely dictated by power disparities and inequities in financial and other resources, with predominantly high-income countries contracting bilaterally with individual pharmaceutical companies (many in their own countries) for specific vaccines, leaving countries from the Global South facing inequitable vaccine access. Bilateral deals between states and pharmaceutical companies, whether completed by Global North or Global South states, significantly compromise the effectiveness and equity of the COVAX initiative, limited as it already is by the coercive influence, vested interests and participation of pharmaceutical companies and their host nations. The African Union, for example, endorsed the TRIPS waiver to relax WTO rules so that LMICs could create their own COVID-19 vaccines, but this collective effort across African countries faced resistance from Global North countries and pharmaceutical companies.

The IP system appears to have pushed countries in the Global South that may prefer not to be dependent on the charitable model of the COVAX scheme to join high-income countries in engaging directly with manufacturers to purchase COVID-19 vaccines. This has included African countries, despite the African Union’s criticism of the inequities resulting from IP law protections. This process has reproduced colonially entrenched power dynamics, in which poorer countries lack the bargaining power to obtain competitive rates and, consequently, typically end up paying far more than the wealthier, developed countries. More broadly, countries in the Global South are pressured into participating in global systems of trade that result in the exploitation of their own populations by unjust global economic systems and IP laws.39 The high cost of vaccines for countries from the Global South constitutes a large proportion of their health expenditure, and this comes at the expense of other health priorities.

In many cases, the only way in which Global South countries can purchase vaccines is to move themselves further into debt. Given the detrimental neocolonial implications of debt, with a long history of loan conditionalities through structural adjustment programmes, increasing debt to service health needs contributes to the worsening of inequalities between the Global North and Global South.40 These programmes may increase debt and undermine development in ways that limit the realisation of the right to health.41 The World Bank has set aside US$12 billion and has already disbursed loans of US$500 million for vaccines in low-income and middle-income nations;42 poorer nations, instead of servicing already depleted health systems, are forced to divert additional funds to servicing debt.

## 2

#### We affirm a process of hapticality, which Harney and Moten define as “the capacity to feel through others, for others to feel through you, for you to feel them feeling you.”

#### This is the AFF minus the reduction on protections of IPP -- 1AC and 1AR explanations of solvency prove that hapticality overcomes some inclusion of IPP so it solves all their offense while avoiding the DA.

## 3

#### Medical innovation is high now

Kenan 6-9, The Frank Hawkins Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise develops and promotes innovative, market-based solutions to vital economic issues. With the belief that private enterprise is the cornerstone of a prosperous and free society, the institute fosters the entrepreneurial spirit to stimulate economic prosperity and improve the lives of people in North Carolina, across the country and around the world. Kenan Institute, 6-9-21, “Turbocharging Healthcare Innovation” <https://kenaninstitute.unc.edu/kenan-insight/turbocharging-healthcare-innovation/> brett

As COVID-19 began to spread around the globe, companies and entrepreneurs stepped up to develop new technologies and redeploy existing technologies in their portfolio to tackle the disease and cope with the constraints it brought. The pandemic forced telemedicine into the mainstream and brought mRNA vaccine technology to the forefront. At the same time, new technologies such as CRISPR gene editing and artificial intelligence (AI) approaches have been finding their niche for speeding up drug discovery and development.

Healthcare innovation was already on the fast train before the pandemic. Now, it’s been turbocharged. In this Kenan Insight, we explore why the 2021 Trends in Entrepreneurship Report names emerging technology in the healthcare industry as a key trend for entrepreneurship, along with some of the challenges that come with fast-moving technology advances.

A trajectory of explosive growth

The healthcare industry has experienced extraordinary growth over the past four decades. Big pharma is driving much of this boom, accounting for 10% of the U.S. economy’s overall R&D spending at the end of 2020.1 The medical device industry, expected to generate $54.5 billion over the next four years, is another important player.2 This growth is catching the attention of investors. In 2020, health tech startups raised approximately $14 billion in venture capital funding, nearly double that of 2019.3 CB Insights estimates there are now 51 healthcare unicorns, defined as startups valued at $1 billion or more.

Health-tech venture funding reached record levels in 2020

Chart, bar chart, histogram

Description automatically generated

Source: Deloitte analysis of Rock Health’s Digital Health Funding Database

Innovation is a critical driver in the healthcare sector. Increasing rates of innovation can be seen in the sharp rise of U.S. patents granted for pharmaceuticals and medical devices in recent years. Between 2013 and 2019, more than 60,000 pharmaceutical patents and more than 125,000 medical device patents were granted.4 Today, there are more than 18,500 drugs at various stages of the development process worldwide.5

Maturing technologies

The increasing numbers of patent applications, clinical trials and collaborations are leading indicators of a vibrant and growing biopharmaceutical ecosystem. However, the proliferation of innovation tools, rather than just innovative products, is what will allow the next generation of pharmaceutical drugs to be discovered more quickly and more efficiently, to provide more effective treatments and to target diseases that have so far evaded our collective intervention efforts. As scientists learn more about human genes and their connection to diseases, these insights can feed into tools that make drug R&D faster, less expensive and more precise.

AI technology has matured to the point where it can now be used reliably to analyze huge amounts of data and solve extremely complex problems. This has made AI attractive to the pharmaceutical industry as a tool that can enable more efficient identification of new drugs and drug targets. In 2020, drug discovery was the focus area that received the most private AI investment, with more than $13.8 billion invested globally. This was 4.5 times higher than the total for 2019.6

CRISPR gene editing is another hot technology that is enabling the development of more innovative and accurate therapeutic strategies. This tool is making it easier to determine the genes and proteins that cause or prevent disease and thus to identify new targets for potential drugs. As of the second quarter of 2020, there were 724 active companies around the world focused on using or developing CRISPR technology and almost 50 clinical trials involving CRISPR.7

mRNA was certainly one of the brightest technology stars of 2020. After decades of research, mRNA proved to be the ideal solution for developing a highly effective COVID-19 vaccine at record speed. However, this is likely only the beginning of the story for mRNA. Therapies based on mRNA technology are being developed to treat malaria, cancer and multiple sclerosis and we’ll likely see more mRNA-based vaccines designed to fight a host of current and future infectious diseases. As of February 2021, CB Insights reports more than 520 ongoing clinical trials worldwide that were applying mRNA technology to more than 20 disease classes.8

#### IP protections are the foundation of the industry and incentivize innovation

Na 19 Blake Na, 4-19-2019, "Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in the Pharmaceutical Industry," Chicago-Kent | Journal of Intellectual Property, https://studentorgs.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/protecting-intellectual-property-rights-in-the-pharmaceutical-industry/, accessed 7/21/2021 EH

Patents grant an inventor the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling their invention. The public policy behind patenting is to incentivize and reward the inventor, to recoup research and development costs and to encourage new inventions. Thus, patents are considered a significant incentive to stimulate innovation, specifically the development of newly prescribed medicines given the nature of research and development. Why are patents important for the pharmaceutical industry? How is the pharmaceutical industry protecting its intellectual property rights? Here are the answers. The Pharmaceutical Industry Innovation drives the pharmaceutical industry. Innovation also differentiates research-based pharmaceutical companies from generic drug companies. Pharmaceutical companies heavily invest in lengthy and costly research and development processes to remain relevant in the market. The average time it takes for a new drug to come to the marketplace is at least ten years, with clinical trials alone taking about six to seven years.[1] The cost to develop one new drug is about $2.6 billion according to a study by Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development.[2] Furthermore, there is only a 12 percent success rate of bringing a drug through clinical trials.[3] A considerable number of drugs that move to clinical trials never receive government approval. Even if a new drug successfully completes all the necessary steps to get to market, pharmaceutical companies face heavy competition with other pharmaceutical companies. This pressure has led big pharmaceutical companies to spend far more on marketing than on research and development.[4] For example, Johnson & Johnson spent more than twice the development costs on the marketing directed to physicians, who write prescriptions.[5] Accordingly, companies in the pharmaceutical industry usually depend on a period of both (1) market exclusivity derived from patent protection, and; (2) data exclusivity in order to recoup their research and development costs. Data Exclusivity According to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), generic drugs constitute 80 percent of prescription drugs in the United States. [6] Therefore, it is important for companies in the pharmaceutical industry to have the right strategy in utilizing their patent and data exclusivity rights. Patents and data exclusivity are similar in some respects, but can be clearly differentiated from one another. The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) grants patents while the FDA grants data exclusivity rights. Data exclusivity refers to the period where approval of generic drug applications from clinical trial data that has already been approved for a new drug application is prohibited or delayed.[7] That is, it protects the clinical trial data collected and submitted to the federal government for the market approval of a new drug. If a drug is still under the period of data exclusivity, generic entrants must submit complete clinical trial data.[8] Due to the high cost of research and development, this creates a significant barrier to entry for generic companies. [9] As the FDA explains, design exclusivity rights exist to “promote balance between new drug innovation and generic drug competition.”[10] This right can be enjoyed simultaneously with or without a patent.[11] Patent Rights A pharmaceutical company may apply for a patent from the PTO at any time in the development lifetime of a drug.[12] A drug is patentable if it is non-obvious, new, and useful.[13] The drug must be non-obvious when comparing the drug with another previously invented drug, i.e., it does not bring the same type of information as the other drugs. The drug must also not exist, and it must have a purpose. Intellectual property rights, especially patent rights, are the foundation of the pharmaceutical industry. The industry heavily depends on the future profits which innovation (and as a result, exclusivity) enable. Drug patents grant the originator company to market exclusivity for a fixed term of 20 years from the patent’s original filing date. By giving this 20-year patent term in which the government cannot regulate the price, market exclusivity allows pharmaceutical companies to have a monopoly over the market. To maximize their profit, pharmaceutical companies work on extending the exclusivity of a drug. For example, AbbVie extended the manufacturing exclusivity of Humira by delaying generic companies from manufacturing generic entrants until 2023. The market exclusivity can be lengthened anywhere between 180 days to 7 years. Thus, due to efforts to derive profits from patents, pharmaceutical companies’ patents contribute to roughly 70-80 percent of their overalll revenues. Patents in the pharmaceutical industry are normally referred to as their product portfolio and are the most effective method for protecting innovation and creating significant returns on investments. Accordingly, as mentioned above, patents help in recouping costs related to research, development, and marketing of a drug. Patents not only help pharmaceutical companies recoup investments, they can also act as a shield against infringement claims. Strong patent protection can safeguard drugs from potential infringers. Without consent from the patentee, other competing companies cannot use, make, or distribute the invention. However, because a drug can be easily imitated by competitors, bringing an infringement suit can also protect a patentee’s rights. Recently, DUSA Pharmaceuticals, Inc.—an arm of the Indian pharmaceutical company Su Pharma and ranked among the top 50 global Pharma Companies—was recently granted injunctive relief from a U.S. court against Biofrontera Inc. in a patent infringement case[14]. The court’s order prohibited Biofrontera from making use of information, including sales data, marketing data, technical information, and unpublished clinical data, of DUSA Pharmaceuticals[15]. Although bringing an infringement suit is a valuable remedial measure for patentees, pharmaceutical companies often face difficulty with the high costs and uncertainty of litigation.

#### Extinction.

Engelhardt 8 (H. Tristram, doctorate in philosophy (University of Texas at Austin), M.D. (Tulane University), professor of philosophy (Rice University), and professor emeritus at Baylor College of Medicine, “Innovation and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Critical Reflections on the Virtues of Profit,” <https://www.amazon.com/Innovation-Pharmaceutical-Industry-Reflections-Conflicts/dp/0980209447>) (Taiwan)

Many are suspicious of, or indeed jealous of, the good fortune of others. Even when profit is gained in the market without fraud and with the consent of all buying and selling goods and services, there is a sense on the part of some that something is wrong if considerable profit is secured. There is even a sense that good fortune in the market, especially if it is very good fortune, is unfair. One might think of such rhetorically disparaging terms as "wind-fall profits". There is also a suspicion of the pursuit of profit because it is often embraced not just because of the material benefits it sought, but because of the hierarchical satisfaction of being more affluent than others. The pursuit of profit in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries is tor many in particular morally dubious because it is acquired from those who have the bad fortune to be diseased or disabled. Although the suspicion of profit is not well-founded, this suspicion is a major moral and public-policy challenge. Profit in the market for the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries is to be celebrated. This is the case, in that if one is of the view (1) that the presence of additional resources for research and development spurs innovation in the development of pharmaceuticals and med-ical devices (i.e., if one is of the view that the allure of profit is one of the most effective ways not only to acquire resources but productively to direct human energies in their use), (2) that given the limits of altruism and of the willingness of persons to be taxed, the possibility of profits is necessary to secure such resources, (3) that the allure of profits also tends to enhance the creative use of available resources in the pursuit of phar-maceutical and medical-device innovation, and (4) if one judges it to be the case that such innovation is both necessary to maintain the human species in an ever-changing and always dangerous environment in which new microbial and other threats may at any time emerge to threaten human well-being, if not survival (i.e., that such innovation is necessary to prevent increases in morbidity and mortality risks), as well as (5) in order generally to decrease morbidity and mortality risks in the future, it then follows (6) that one should be concerned regarding any policies that decrease the amount of resources and energies available to encourage such innovation. One should indeed be of the view that the possibilities for profit, all things being equal, should be highest in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries. Yet, there is a suspicion regarding the pursuit of profit in medicine and especially in the pharmaceutical and medical-device industries.

# Case

### 1NC – Frontline

#### 1 – Presumption –

#### A – The ballot’s not key – their ev just says indebtedness is good which voting neg doesn’t stop, nor is debate key to.

#### B – Scope – Hapticality alone can’t solve violence of institutions or financialization, which is what their ev and Wall Street examples describe.

#### 2 – Hapticality has practical limitations and obscures material change.

Webb 18 (Darren; PGR Programme Director Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield, “Bolt-Holes and Breathing Spaces in the System: On Forms of Academic Resistance (or, Can the University Be a Site of Utopian Possibility?),” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 03/15/2018, pp. 96–118)

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job. When Moten describes subversion as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically short-lived, and—as Harney and Moten warned—there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you into alternative spaces “because we’ve been inside so much” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more.

**3 – Logistics isn’t a totalizing system and institutional reprogramming can alter it---but counterlogisticality gets co-opted**

**Chua 18 –** Charmaine Chua, Professor of Politics at Oberlin College, PhD from the University of Minnesota, et al., “Introduction: Turbulent Circulation: Building a Critical Engagement with Logistics”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Volume 36, Number 4, p. 622-624

Yet logistical space is also **riven with contradictions** and constantly faced with the real and potential catastrophes posed by “gigantic breakdowns and stoppages” (Mumford, 1961: 544). As Rossiter, 2014 reminds us, the ambitions of logistics are ultimately **“operational fantasies”** (2014: 54) that rely on, even as they aim to contain, a recalcitrant polity through calculative forms of domination and repression. As such, we should be **careful not to reify** logistics as a **seamless** system of instantaneous flow and total functional integration.

By paying attention to the frictions and stoppages that are part and parcel of logistical processes, critical scholars have noted that even as logistics is taken up as a tool of imperial dispossession and capitalist power, it also produces **new sites** of vulnerability and potential emancipation. To this end, logistics has become a growing force not only among states, corporations, military forces, and aid organizations but also within social movements and activist organizations that aim to challenge their practice. Beyond the accidental breakdowns and stoppages that threaten just-in-time supply chains are more deliberate efforts to interrupt the circulation of violence and remake environmentally and socially just forms of provisioning and sustaining.

A critical engagement with logistics is a feature not simply of academic practice but of intellectual, political, and practical organizing across various sectors of work and arenas of contestation. These efforts are clearly not brand new—not only in the transportation sector, where workers have long struggled over their conditions of work, but in myriad movements that have worked to sustain themselves over time, including through uprisings, occupations, and revolutions. As logistics has ascended to a place of prominence in the organization of war and trade globally, it has also become subject to new frequencies and forms of contestation. Alberto Toscano (2014) highlights this shift when he asks, “Can we define or declare a relocation of political and class conflict, in the overdeveloped de-industrializing countries of the ‘Global North,’ from the point of production to the chokepoints of circulation?” Such an approach centers sites of physical circulation as **pressure points** where mass movements can **contest** the violence of state and capital, signaling a shift in tactics from the withdrawal of productive labor power to disruptive blockades and sabotage along the arteries of trade (Clover, 2016; Degenerate Communism, 2014; Oakland Commune, 2011).

A scholarly discourse has emerged under the banner of **“counterlogistics”** that engages labor, anticolonial, and antiracist struggles (Bernes, 2013; Chua et al., 2016; Fox-Hodess, 2017). We might also trace a growing reliance on a critical practice that explicitly names the field: logistics groups, tents, and committees are now a mainstay of radical organizing, pointing to the possible **repurposing** of logistical models as sources of **care** and **social reproduction** (Armstrong, 2015; Cowen, 2014; Crashnburn, 2014). As Attewell (2018) argues in this issue, initiatives like the US Agency for International Development’s Commodity Export Program “contain **within them** the **germ** of a **different kind** of logistics: one that preserves its will to care, while **dispensing with its necropolitical baggage**” (735). In this vein, one fertile arena for future research is to examine more expansive possibilities for counterlogistics—asking, following Toscano (2014), “What happens then if we consider the question of circulation less literally? And what would it mean to struggle not simply against material flows but against the social forms that channel them?” By focusing on the social relations that underpin logistical processes, critical engagements with logistics might be productively **nudged towards more emancipatory political ends** by exploring how counterlogistical contestation is being waged not only in the sectors we might immediately associate with goods circulation but so too in the broader social relations of logistical society.

Yet we should be **careful** not to **fetishize** counterlogistical projects without a firm grasp on how the state and capital are invested in controlling the spaces of stocks and flows. Attempts at resisting or disrupting circulation can be **co-opted**, **contained**, or **absorbed**—in the construction of redundant container shipping networks, for example, which give corporations multiple options for rerouting cargo around traffic bottlenecks or restive labor forces. Further, as Timothy Mitchell (2011: chap. 1) and Dara Orenstein (2018) have shown, tactics of sabotage and disruption have themselves become integral to processes of value realization, where capital’s power rests not only in speeding up circulation but also in the capacity to slow it down. More broadly, while the growing prominence of “circulation struggles” (Clover, 2016) presents rich ground for scholarly exploration and political organizing, there is a danger in fetishizing the tactics of material interruption per se. More important than the form of political resistance are its contents, the concrete social relations in which it is embedded and that it seeks to transform. As Chua (2017: 165) argues, “even if material structures are constitutive of the extant political order,” the act of disrupting or sabotaging material flows alone is **not enough** to reconfigure logistics: “circulation struggles can **only** have revolutionary potential if **collective power** is politically mobilized **across** the supply chain.”

Logistical systems increasingly encroach on everyday life under the justification that rapid, efficient circulation is necessary to the welfare of the economy, the state, and its people. Yet, as both a calculative rationality and a practice of spatial ordering, mainstream iterations of logistics work to promote the accumulation of capital and state power in ways that exacerbate existing inequalities and produce new dispositions of life and death (see Attewell, 2018). The articles collected in this issue point to the myriad ways these apparatuses also distribute inequality, immiseration, and “vulnerability to premature death” (Gilmore, 2007: 28). At the same time, the **gap** between the idealized imagination of logistics and its messy implementation reveals that the project of making the world safe for circulation is **always incomplete**. A critical engagement with logistics attends to the struggles, social conflicts, and tensions that can never be excised from global flows. This liveliness of logistics is one aspect that comes to the fore in this theme issue. Interrogating the multiple, varied, and contested lives of logistics brings into focus the violence committed in its name, the vulnerabilities of its networks, and the political possibilities latent in its present-day forms.

#### 4 -- Using the ballot for solvency zeroes the potential for transformative change -- stats prove.

Ritter 13. (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterize5d as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes

### 1NC – Turn – Haptics bad

#### Haptics are bad –

#### 1---Intimacy thru haptics create coercive touch.

Spillers 17, Hortense. "Shades of Intimacy: Women in the Time of Revolution." NOTE – This was originally transcribed and cut by Greg Zoda, Presentation at the Barnard Center for Research on Women, February 16 (2017). (Professor of English at Vanderbilt University, PhD in English from Brandeis University)//Elmer

This weave of relations is partially shrouded by the public world of profit and production, just as it disappears into the shadowy remoteness of the private world with its masks of affection, sentimentality, and cruelty. The one word that crosses this ambiguous territory of public and private, light and shade, production and reproduction, could be intimacy, intimacy that registers the confusion precisely because it is, in this instance, neither fish nor fowl. What do we call children born of sexual congress between the enslaved and their owners? More precisely, the liaison between the enslaved and their masters? Douglass, in his 1845 narrative, observes a new social fact on the ground of coercive labor. The sexual work engendered in this calculus of relations has produced what Douglass calls there, as you will remember, “new people”, although, such children have appeared in the Virginia colony in the eighteenth century and even before, in the story Ira Berlin tells about communities that spring up along the African literal. Douglass draws out this strand of sociality because he wants to emphasize the other corruption of slavery’s protocols: masters who own their children. As such a subject himself, Douglass was keenly aware of the contradictions of his status—that mixed race standing did not guarantee freedom even as it enhanced the owner’s profit. An investigator is struck by the epiphenomenon of the “new people”, not only because of figures like Frederick Douglass and Sally Hemings, who was the daughter and mother of interracial crossing, but also as these particulars lead us to a broader inquiry about intimate life in a world that allows, indeed enables, both family life, in its juridical privilege and personality, and extra-familial life, as the secret heart of the family’s other. The stuff of novels and film, as for example, William Wells Brown’s Clotel; or, The President’s Daughter will attest, this familial parallelism—the family and the shadow family—is not an exception to the rule, but as it came to me not too long ago, it was as common as grass and appears to be a substantial arrangement of slavery’s generations across the color line. So it’s almost as if saying: not who was involved in such relationships but who was not involved in such relationships. So what I hope to extract from the record eventually is a redefined and refined sense of intimacy in a circumstance where flesh becomes the medium of exchange. The problematic that I am attempting to isolate in this project is how to name what appears at a depth in the century of revolution. We have a fairly good sense of the spatiotemporal sweep of the revolutionary arc, but what I am searching for attempts to evade the archives, to disappear into the world of the everyday. If the shadow families of the master class were defined by their economic relations to the master, then how did this intrusion of money matters reconfigure the whole range of structures of feeling, of intimate relations between husbands and wives, of the sibling relationship? In other words, one even begins to suspect that affection, official affection, is {?} under circumstances that allow slavery. So we are confronted here by two genres of historiography, or the historiographical record. I would call Annette Gordon-Reed’s work on *The Hemingses of Monticello*, for example, a prominent instance of positive assertion. In the triad of texts that I am sure you are familiar with that she has so far produced on Sally Hemings’s liaison with Thomas Jefferson, the overall narrative that she advances pursues the tropological fortunes of what Toni Morrison has referred to as “the American romance of race”. In this instance, Hemings and her relatives are given protective cover and a proximity to Jefferson that spares them the more brutal realities of enslavement. This mode of historiographical reflection resembles a kind of fiction-writing as in the case of Barbara Chase-Riboud’s Hemings novels that posit the seed or the seeds of intimacy between masters and the enslaved. In other words, the enslaved is constituted in those novels, more or less, as sexual objects of desire, so that what we understand as love and intimacy are not only possible between master and slave, but even likely. In the antithetical instance, the historiographical narrative paints a different picture that projects a negative assertion. For example, in a study of intimacy in the Antebellum South, Steven Stowe, author of this study, argues that even the most persistent and intense contact between masters and the bonded—as in the case of enslaved figures who, like the Hemingses, worked as domestic servants in the household of masters—did not yield intimacy between parties. As Stowe describes it, intimacy, in the Antebellum South, was aligned with public forms and perception, as expressed in rituals of courtship. Such rituals assured the acknowledgement of an intimate relation’s unfolding, so that the ritual became a kind of knowledge, we might say, or epistemology distributed to members of a class, or affiliates of a class, which bespeaks a sharing of values. This very private thing, which is a very private thing in our world, between and among lovers, which we relegate, in the sharable imaginary, to the private and public sphere, if those terms still work, is relegated in Stowe’s conceptual narrative to the world of public forms and performance. Why does the difference matter, or how does it matter? If close proximity, or constant contact, does not guarantee intimacy in this social order, then it seems to me that our notions of intimacy and shades of intimacy are thrown into crisis. This is what I mean: if proximity is not reliable as a measure of social cohesion, if sexual partners and their children can be sold off, if shadow families can assert no claim to the human dignity of official families, then sentimentality and feelings of love can be shown to be unstable, and that’s across the social order, it seems to me that we could say that justifiably. Did slavery across the western world rupture ties of kinship and filiation so completely that the eighteenth century, and possibly earlier, demolishes what Constance Classen in The Deepest Sense: A Cultural History of Touch calls a tactile cosmology? When in an earlier piece of writing I saw the distinction between body and flesh, I was attempting to isolate features of citizen belonging from alien bodies and entities. I would associate bodiedness with juridical personality, or the historical actor who has access to what our Fourteenth Amendment would call “due process”. Under its impress, at least in theory, other rights-bearing follows in its wake. Flesh describes an alien intimacy, or an alien entity—a more or less expendable figure. Not only does the alien, by race or language, or culture and custom, not have access to the protocols of due process, but perhaps its most poignant determination is the extent to which such a body cannot prevent or ward off another’s touch. For me, the single most powerful evidence of the loss of freedom is the fact that bodies lose their integrity and may be invaded or entered, so to speak, by coercive power. This touch that we associate with intimacy—the haptic that we associate with intimacy—can, under the right conditions, engender invasion and violence, and in its immediacy, in relationship to the enslaved, robs the *haptic* of its powers to heal, to bind, to cure, and becomes instead the power to wound and violate. As you know, Audre Lorde talks about this in her powerful essays on the erotic. Another note from Classen’s study of this particular sense: “In the sensory scale of ‘races’ created by the natural historian Lorenz Oken, the ‘civilized’ European ‘eye-man,’ who focused on the visual world, was positioned at the top and the African ‘skin-man,’ who used touch as his primary sensory modality, at the bottom.” I am suggesting that, under slavery’s regime, the captive body’s susceptibility to being touched places this body on the side of the flesh, so that touching, here, is not a token of social cohesion, of brotherhood or fellowship or fellow feeling, and certainly it has nothing to do with the erotic, or does it (maybe…it just occurred to me, that maybe that’s the question…okay…), but rather the very depth and breadth **of alienation**, among other things, from the laws, and perhaps even ways of distinguishing human life from bare life or animal life. The leading descriptive features of slavery’s eras tend to be economic in the most pointed sense of the term—balance sheets and accounting procedures, gains and losses, profit margins and the flow of goods—while our most sustained focus on the institution and its practices comes to rest on what Pierre Bourdieu might have called a “general science of the economy of practices”. In other words, the argument based on narrow economic considerations defines the enslaved as a species of property. By contrast, the argument that seeks to mobilize an understanding of the position of the enslaved, and of the world that unmakes him and her [them], as a cumulative instance of a general science of an economy of practices attempts to grasp the circumstance of the bonded as a type of historical subjectivity. In both the species of property and a type of historical subjectivity, we recognize, in their very naming, the ambivalence of status that would prohibit either from standing in as a pure or legible example of property, or a purely unforeclosed instance of the subject of history, which revolutionary movement seeks to create.

### 1NC -- Util

#### Extinction first

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

### 1NC -- Advantage

#### Prefer tactical harm reduction to totalizing theories of logistics.

**Smucker ’14** [Jonathan; 2014; Ph.D in Sociology from UC Berkeley; Wagingnonviolence, “The danger of fetishizing revolution,” wagingnonviolence.org/feature/danger-fetishizing-revolution/]

Perhaps it is a bit unfair. It depends on whether we mean revolution as horizon or revolution as apocalypse. Do we imagine a revolutionary restructuring of power relations in society as an all-or-nothing totalizing moment or as an aspirational horizon, something to always be moving towards? If the former, then what incentive do we have to study the details of the terrain where we are presently situated? Why would we bother to strategize about overcoming the particular obstacles that block our way today, if we believe that the accumulation of all obstacles will ultimately add up to a grand crisis that will somehow magically usher in a new era? Believing that things will “have to get worse before they get better,” we may become disinterested in — perhaps even sabotaging of — efforts to improve real-life conditions in the here and now. After all, why put a band-aid on a gaping wound? Why prolong the life of an oppressive system? With such logic we can excuse ourselves from the trouble of getting to know our political terrain. It is, after all, the very mess we hope to avoid.

If, on the other hand, we imagine revolutionary change as a horizon toward which we orient ourselves, such a vision may be of use, so long as it grounds us in a political struggle in the here and now.

Still, let us further interrogate our attachment to the word revolution — even as a horizon. Many of my friends like to think of themselves and their efforts as revolutionary. I am tempted to fancy myself a revolutionary too — it sounds sexy enough — but what does this label really mean today? In the present context in the United States, the words revolution and revolutionary have been mostly emptied of their contents. Their meanings are more than slightly ambiguous. Proponents of revolution range from radical Leftists to libertarians and members of the Tea Party. What does advocating for revolution mean then? Is it not merely a more extreme and totalizing way of advocating for “change”? The question begs itself: What kind of change? And revolution for what?

Answering these questions will provide us with our political content. Revolution is not itself the content, but (among) the means we might possibly use to deliver the content. If we are to articulate a horizon to guide our day-to-day political struggle, shouldn’t that horizon be the content of a social vision, rather than scenes from the battles we must fight along the way?

Even as a means, revolution is vague and less than instructive. Today in the context of the U.S. Left, the label revolutionary serves largely as a reference to inspirational historical moments — and contemporary moments in other countries — and as a signifier of belonging, or “getting it,” within radical subcultures, more than it suggests an instructive path or framework for social, economic and political change in our context. When we say “revolution” today — if we mean something beyond an empty signifier of subcultural belonging — we are mostly, vaguely, referring to the overthrow of governments in specific historical circumstances. Social justice-directed revolutions have overthrown monarchies, feudal systems and colonial governments, but the “revolutionary” forces that have overthrown democratic elected governmentsin the past century — however much we may critique how democratic they actually are — have by and large been right-wing reactionary forces, usually through military coups.

On the other hand, one could tweak the definition of revolution to make it fit the context of advanced capitalist democracies; one could argue that revolution is about overthrowing the current order. Presently, we are subject to an oppressive capitalist order, and we are working to overthrow that regime. I am fine with the signifying label revolutionary being attributed to me if it is with this intended meaning. But still, what is the point of the label? What is the value added? What does it do for us, besides earning us cool pointsin our little “revolutionary” social clubs? What does it accomplish politically?

What am I getting at here? Why does this matter? It matters because, as an ambiguous signifier of belonging within political groups, the word revolutionary can privilege certain tactics and approaches over others. As a signifying label, revolutionary is meant to distinguish a change agent within a broader field of change agents — to marginally differentiate oneself and one’s group within a broader alignment of groups working for social justice-directed change — perhaps even more than it is meant to distinguish us from all-out defenders of the status quo. As such, the posed opposite of revolutionary is less the status quo or an elite power than it is a reform approach to change. In extreme form, this tendency lumps “reformists” together with the status quo and its defenders into one big impenetrable monolith that we “revolutionaries” are unequivocally against. It sets up a false dichotomy of revolution versus reform — a framework that may sometimes hold merit or useful warnings, but that can be paralyzing without further contextualization, clarification and nuance.

Where revolution serves as an ambiguous signifier of belonging to radical subcultures, group members may be inclined to do things, to say things, even to wear things that seem “revolutionary,” and to distance themselves from whatever reeks of “reformism,” often including the efforts and organizations of key social blocs that any serious “revolutionary” project must ultimately include in its political alignment. It is true that, in today’s landscape, such efforts and organizations tend to have limited goals and to win compromised victories, if they win at all. Dismissing such reform efforts as a general principle, however, does not somehow make one a revolutionary. It is, rather, a sign of purism, fatalism and apocalyptic thinking — and often of an abstract “politics” that emerges from a disconnected social position of relative privilege. This amounts to revolution as apocalypse; what is needed is a cataclysmic, nevermind catastrophic, reset. Any improvement in the situations of real people is dismissed, perhaps even denounced, as prolonging the life of “the system.”

Of course, not everyone who uses the word revolution is guilty of all or any of the above. After all, it is mostly an empty signifier. Advertisers love to brand the shit they’re selling as “revolutionary” too. The point here is that there can be harm in framing our social, economic and political change efforts in the United States today in a term whose applicability is historically contingent — at least if we lack an analysis of this contingency. The word revolution conjures the idea of overthrowing a government, and as such is descriptive of a particular model and moment of transformation that mostly applies to the radical overhaul of particular kinds of governments in particular historical contexts, namely feudalism, monarchies, dictatorships and colonial governments. As such, our attachment to the abstract idea of revolution might be something like holding a hammer and perceiving every problem one encounters as a nail.

Moreover, even in historical revolutionary contexts, revolution has never been a panacea. Problems and injustices still have to be struggled against. “The revolution” is a moment, certainly an important one, but in an ongoing political struggle with no end point. Most of the moments in that struggle are far less spectacular than the moment of dramatic upheaval. In The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, sociologist Daniel Bell describes how “the real problems arise the ‘day after the revolution,’ when the mundane world again intrudes upon consciousness.” Bell argues that “Our fascination with the apocalypse blinds us to the mundane: the relations of exchange, economic and social; the character of work and occupations; the nature of family life; and the traditional modes of conduct which regulate everyday life.” Social change is “much slower, and the processes more complex than the dramaturgic mode of the apocalyptic vision, religious or revolutionary, would have us believe.”

If we project a totalizing imaginary-future moment onto our own situation, we may also fixate on present-day moments that seem to carry the essence of our ideas about such an imagined “revolution.” We may elevate ritualistic signifiers of revolutionary zeal above winning real-world victories and above the patient construction of social bases of collective power that could win bigger, more systemic — we might even say revolutionary — changes.

Revolution as apocalypse or as a totalizing moment is highly related to utopianism. The practical implications of the two concepts are equivalent. With both orientations a post-revolutionary, utopian vision of the future can become the distorted lens through which to view the messy present. Nothing in present society, including stepping-stone victories, can measure up to utopian standards. It is as if the revolutionary or utopian “dreamer” is afraid of contaminating the purity of his or her vision with the grit of real life. In reality, the seeds of society’s “redemption” — the fits and starts of social justice struggles — are always manifest in the fabric of what already exists in society. The job of effective change agents is to identify and encourage these fits and starts; to awaken and empower the “better angels” that we find in our histories and our contemporary cultures; to claim and contest both history and culture, rather than try to build from scratch in the ashes of an imaginary-future apocalypse.

This is not at all to suggest that we give up on big structural changes — even including ultimately ending capitalism. To the extent that “revolutionary” means “big structural changes” I am all for being revolutionary. The problem here is not the radicalness of our end goal; the problem is all-or-nothing apocalyptic thinking about political change in the meantime. If the structures of society were to collapse tomorrow, why would society reconstruct itself in a way that substantially differs from its present structure? A revolutionary social justice movement will not magically ascend in the wake of catastrophe.

### Cap good

#### intrinsic to debate and lets us best export our strategies

#### Capitalism solves war.

Mina E. Tanious 18, General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), Giza, Egypt and Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, Giza, Egypt. REPS 4,1, July 7, 2018. “The impact of economic interdependence on the probability of conflict between states” <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-10-2018-010/full/pdf> brett

Liberals view that increasing ties between countries in some fields encourages them to achieve greater cooperation in other fields. These linkages are supposed to strengthen communication and reduce misunderstandings which may cause tension and creates cultural and institutional mechanisms capable of mediating conflicts that may arise between them. At the same time, mutual recognition of mutual benefits enhances peace.

Liberals believe that economic relations between nations lead to peace, with liberals pointing to three important points (Korbel and Chen, 2009, p. 15):

(1) The costs of waging a war against state’s economic partner are very high because fighting against a partner with which the state trade and invest, the state actually fights against itself because a war between the state and its partner must have a negative effect on the state’s economy.

(2) Economic ties change states’ preferences when economic ties between two states become stronger and these two states become more economically interdependent or even integrated, economic interests – compared with other national interests such as military buildup – become the most important.

(3) Strong economic ties make non-military threats such as economic sanctions credible. Therefore, when there is a conflict between two states that have strong economic ties, a non-military threat is more likely to be the choice.

Liberals, assuming that states seek to maximize absolute welfare, maintain that situations of high trade should continue into the foreseeable future as long as states are rational; such actors have no reason to forsake the benefits from trade, especially defection from the trading arrangement will only lead to retaliation. Liberals can argue that interdependence as reflected in high trade at any particular moment in time-will foster peace, given the benefits of trade over war (Copeland, 1996, p. 16).

The core liberal position is straightforward trade provides valuable benefits, or “gains from trade,” to any particular state. A dependent state should therefore seek to avoid war, as peaceful trading gives it all the benefits of close ties without any of the costs and risks of war. Trade pays more than war, so dependent states should prefer to trade not invade (Copeland, 1996, p. 8).

### No rev

#### The state responds with military crackdowns.

**Flaherty ’5** [Kevin; 2005; B.A. in International Relations from the University of South California; Cryptogon, “Militant Electronic Piracy:  
Non-Violent Insurgency Tactics Against the American Corporate State,” <http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate_insurgency.html/>]

Any violent insurgency against the American Corporate State is sure to fail and will only serve to enhance the state's power. The major flaw of violent insurgencies, both cell based (Weathermen Underground, Black Panthers, Aryan Nations etc.) and leaderless (Earth Liberation Front, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, etc.) is that they are attempting to attack the system using the same tactics the American Corporate State has already mastered: terror and psychological operations. The American Corporate State attained primacy through the effective application of terror and psychological operations. Therefore, it has far more skill and experience in the use of these tactics than any upstart could ever hope to attain. This makes the American Corporate State impervious to traditional insurgency tactics.

- Political Activism and the ACS Counterinsurgency Apparatus

The American Corporate State employs a full-time counterinsurgency infrastructure with resources that are unimaginable to most would be insurgents. Quite simply, violent insurgents have no idea of just how powerful the foe actually is. Violent insurgents typically start out as peaceful, idealistic, political activists. Whether or not political activists know it, even with very mundane levels of political activity, they are engaging in low intensity conflict with the ACS.

The U.S. military classifies political activism as “low intensity conflict.” The scale of warfare (in terms of intensity) begins with individuals distributing anti-government handbills and public gatherings with anti-government/anti-corporate themes. In the middle of the conflict intensity scale are what the military refers to as Operations Other than War; an example would be the situation the U.S. is facing in Iraq. At the upper right hand side of the graph is global thermonuclear war. What is important to remember is that the military is concerned with ALL points along this scale because they represent different types of threats to the ACS.

Making distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military forces, and foreign and domestic intelligence services is no longer necessary. After September 11, 2001, all national security assets would be brought to bear against any U.S. insurgency movement. Additionally, the U.S. military established NORTHCOM which designated the U.S. as an active military operational area. Crimes involving the loss of corporate profits will increasingly be treated as acts of terrorism and could garner anything from a local law enforcement response to activation of regular military forces.

Most of what is commonly referred to as “political activism” is viewed by the corporate state's counterinsurgency apparatus as a useful and necessary component of political control.

Letters-to-the-editor...

Calls-to-elected-representatives...

Waving banners...

“Third” party political activities...

Taking beatings, rubber bullets and tear gas from riot police in free speech zones...

Political activism amounts to an utterly useless waste of time, in terms of tangible power, which is all the ACS understands. Political activism is a cruel guise that is sold to people who are dissatisfied, but who have no concept of the nature of tangible power. Counterinsurgency teams routinely monitor these activities, attend the meetings, join the groups and take on leadership roles in the organizations.

It's only a matter of time before some individuals determine that political activism is a honeypot that accomplishes nothing and wastes their time. The corporate state knows that some small percentage of the peaceful, idealistic, political activists will eventually figure out the game. At this point, the clued-in activists will probably do one of two things; drop out or move to escalate the struggle in other ways.

If the clued-in activist drops his or her political activities, the ACS wins.

But what if the clued-in activist refuses to give up the struggle? Feeling powerless, desperation could set in and these individuals might become increasingly radicalized. Because the corporate state's counterinsurgency operatives have infiltrated most political activism groups, the radicalized members will be easily identified, monitored and eventually compromised/turned, arrested or executed. The ACS wins again.

#### Those overwhelm and turn affirmative solvency.

**DeBoer ’16** [Fredrik; March 15th; Ph.D. from Purdue University; Fredrikdeboer, “c’mon, guys,” http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/03/15/cmon-guys/]

I could be wrong about the short-term dangers, and the stakes are incredibly high. But in the end we’re left with the same old question: what tactics will actually work to secure a better world?

In a sharp, sober piece about the meaning of left-wing political violence in the 1970s, Tim Barker writes “If you can’t acknowledge radical violence, radicals are reduced to mere victims of repression, rather than political actors who made definite tactical choices under given political circumstances.” The problem, as Barker goes on to imply, is those tactical choices: in today’s America they will essentially never break on the side of armed opposition against the state. The government knows everything about you, I’m sorry to say, your movements and your associations and the books you read and the things you buy and what you’re saying to the people you communicate with. That’s simply on the level of information before we even get to the state’s incredible capacity to inflict violence.

Look, the world has changed. The relative military capacity of regular people compared to establishment governments has changed, especially in fully developed, technology-enabled countries like the United States. The Czar had his armies, yes, but the Czar’s armies depended on manpower above and beyond everything else. The fighting was still mostly different groups of people with rifles shooting at each other. If tomorrow you could rally as many people as the Bolsheviks had at their revolutionary peak, you’re still left in a world of F-15s, drones, and cluster bombs. And that’s to say nothing of the fact that establishment governments in the developed world can rely on the numbing agents of capitalist luxuries and the American dream to damper revolutionary enthusiasm even among the many millions who have been marginalized and impoverished. This just isn’t 1950s Cuba, guys. It’s just not. In a very real way, modern technology effectively lowers the odds of armed political revolution in a country like the United States to zero, and so much the worse for us.

This isn’t fatalism. It doesn’t mean there’s no hope. It means that there is little alternative to organization, to changing minds through committed political action and using the available nonviolent means to create change: a concert of grassroots organizing, labor tactics, and partisan politics. Those things aren’t exactly likely to work, either, but they’re a hell of a lot more plausible than us dweebs taking the Pentagon. Bernie Sanders isn’t really a socialist, but he’s a social democrat that moves the conversation to the left, and if people are dedicated and committed to organizing, the local, state, and national candidates he inspires will move it further to the left still. You got any better suggestions?

Listen, commie nerds. My people. I love you guys. I really do. And I want to build a better world. Not incrementally, either, but with the kind of sweeping and transformative change that is required to fix a world of such deep injustice. But seriously: none of us are ever going to take to the barricades. And it’s a good thing, too, because we’d probably find a way to shoot in the wrong direction. I can’t dribble a basketball without falling down. American socialism is largely made up of bookish dreamers. I love those people but they’re not for fighting. And even if you have a particular talent for combat, you’re looking at fighting the combined forces of Google, Goldman Sachs, and the defense industry. Violence is hard. Soldiering is hard. In an era of the NSA and military robots, it’s really, really hard. “Should we condone revolutionary violence?” is dorm room, pass-the-bong conversation fodder, of precisely the moral and intellectual weight of “should we torture a guy if we know there’s a bomb and we know he knows where it is and we know we can stop it if we do?” It’s built on absurd hypotheticals, propped up by the power of anxious machismo, and undertaken to no practical political end. It’s understandable. I get it, I really do. But it’s got nothing to do with us. The only way forward is the grubby, unsexy work of building coalitions and asking people to climb on board.

# 2NR