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#### Capitalism causes massive violence and inevitable extinction – the role of the ballot is to endorse the best organizational tactics.

Escalante 19 [Alyson Escalante, M.A., Department of Philosophy @ University of Oregon, “Truth and Practice: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge,” 09/08/19, tinyurl.com/8jksnexs] pat

The world we live in today is in a dire state. Climate destruction continues at a fast pace, and every with every passing day, capitalism proves itself to be incapable of addressing this. Capitalist production and its endless drive for resources to match artificial market demands has created a climate crisis that leaves us on the brink of potential extinction.

Governments around the world are turning to far right and fascist leaders to assuage their fears of an uncertain future, and the most marginalized and oppressed suffer because of it. Fascism is on the rise, and history tells us very clearly what that can result in without opposition.

The decaying US empire continues to lash out in violence across the globe in a desperate attempt to re-assert its power and hegemony. Whole countries are destroyed in its desperate bids for more fossil fuels. The world burns from America’s white phosphorus weaponry.

The need for a revolutionary movement capable of replacing capitalism with something better has never been so clear. The choice between socialism or barbarism has never been so stark. More and more people are starting to realize that reform cannot save us, that capitalism and imperialism themselves are the problem, and that we must unite and band together to fight for a better world.

The question then is: how will we know what strategies, what tactics, and what ideas to unite around? If the skeptics and postmodernists are correct that knowledge is always relative and localized, then we cannot built a global and universal strategy to unite around. If they are correct then we are doomed to small acts of localized or individual resistance in the face of apocalypse. To embrace such a vision of the world (with its accompanying epistemological skepticism) is to embrace defeat.

The masses do not want to embrace defeat, they want to know how to fight back. Marxism can provide the tools necessary to engage in that fight.

Marxism, with its self criticism and its insistence on incorporating the valuable ideas of its critics has created a means for unifying workers across the globe with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. The Marxist belief in the possibility of true ideas, tested and verified in practice, creates the possibility for unity on a global scale. The scientific status of Marxism means that as our climate changes, as our world looks more and more grim, Marxism will adapt through struggle and practice; it will provide us with the ideas and tools we need to fight and win.

There will be no victory for the workers of the world without the ability to wield a revolutionary science. What is at stake in questions of Marxist epistemology is the very possibility of creating a philosophical and scientific basis for revolution. We must defend this possibility. We must defend the scientific status of Marxism, and must insist on the possibility of victory.

#### Economic crises are structurally inevitable because of the contradictions of capitalism—policy responses will inevitably be managed in the interest of capitalists and promote violent interventions overseas

Tozzo ‘11

Brandon Tozzo (Queen’s University, Canada). “Can Theories of Empire Explain the American Political Response to the Financial Crisis?” Critical Sociology, 39(1), 9-20, 2011.

Introduction The 2008 financial crisis led to the largest and deepest global recession in the USA since the 1930s. What began as a downturn in the American housing market cascaded into a structural economic crisis with banks and investment firms failing, credit markets freezing, and unemployment reaching its highest levels since the early 1980s (US Department of Labour Statistics, 2009: 190). Governments across the globe took unprecedented measures to prevent a global depression: banks were given government loans and recapitalized, major industries were partially nationalized, and stimulus measures were introduced to prevent a deflationary spiral. The Bush administration, which at least rhetorically touted fiscal restraint and free market discipline, introduced the Toxic Asset Relief Program (TARP), a US$700b government intervention in the financial sector. Many neo-liberal economic policies that had been adopted since the 1970s were cast aside in the face of a possible global depression. The crisis demonstrates economic vulnerability in the country often conceptualized by critical scholars as the central network in the global capitalist empire. The financial crisis serves as an event where central assumptions about empire can be empirically evaluated, particularly the response of the US government to a major structural threat to the capitalist system. The purpose of this article will be to evaluate three distinct theories of empire that each differ in the way they conceptualize the relationship between capitalism and the American Government: the first is that described by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, the second that of Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, and the third that of David Harvey. I will conclude by arguing that David Harvey’s theory of ‘new imperialism’ offers the most convincing account of the USA’s response to the financial crisis due to the theory’s account of the tensions and contradictions between US politicians and capitalists in the lead up and response to the crisis. I will begin by examining the American Government’s response to the financial crisis, and then I will outline several assumptions of each major theory of empire. Critical theories of empire are methodologically holistic, often examining a wide array of interrelated social phenomena such as production, material and immaterial labor, distribution, and political power. Although each of these is important in the broader theoretical context, it would be beyond the scope of this article to examine the broader theories in detail. Rather, I will place focus on one aspect of empire – the relationship between capitalism as a system and the actions of the US government – though I will at times examine how other factors interrelate. The purpose of this article is not to provide a systematic assessment or rejection, but a critical examination of a key assumption that varies between each theory of empire. The goal of this analysis is not to make a larger generalization about a specific theory of empire, but to elucidate the strengths and weaknesses of a central assumption that differs for each theory when trying to explain the actions of the US government in a time of economic crises. The 2008 Financial Crisis: What Happened? While there is a great deal of debate over the long- and short-term causes of the financial crisis, one of the most important determining factors was the downturn in the American housing market that began in 2007. The long-term causes of the crisis range from the American proclivity towards home ownership and the gradual loosening of regulations over finance and mortgage lending since the 1980s. A key institutional change passed by Congress in 1999, the Financial Services Modernization Act, eliminated the barrier between commercial and investment banks, leading to the securitization of mortgages – bundling together numerous mortgages for investors. The liberalization of mortgage terms led home owners to take out variable-rate interest mortgages in order to finance the purchases of a home; by 2004–5 nearly one third of all homes purchased in the USA had an adjustable-rate mortgage (Bellamy Foster and Magdoff, 2009). The popularity of these loans was mainly due to the availability of cheap credit, the lack of regulation over the term of mortgages and the seemingly endless rise in the value of the housing market. After the dot-com bubble burst in 2001, the American Federal Reserve decided to keep interest rates artificially low in order to prevent a recession, creating a glut of cheap credit. This had a dual effect: it led banks and investment firms to over-leverage, and it created an incentive for individuals to take out mortgages with the knowledge that they would likely be able to sell their home for a substantial profit. However, since profits were so high, it created an incentive for lenders, the government and home owners to expand the housing market by lowering the requirements for a mortgage. These home owners with poor credit were offered mortgages at variable or sub-prime interest rates – that is lending to people who were deemed medium to high risk. In 2002, sub-prime loans made up only 6 percent of overall mortgages; by 2007, nearly 30 percent of mortgages were sub-prime (Economist, 2007). In order to finance these mortgages, banks securitized, or bundled together, mortgages into Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and sold them to investors. From 2002 to 2006, the general value of houses in the USA increased, allowing everyone involved in the mortgage market to make a substantial profit. Beginning in 2006, an increasing number of foreclosures led to a downturn in the value of the housing market, causing a cascade of problems for the overall economy. The decline in the housing market gained speed in 2007 and began to have significant repercussions on the American and global economy. The initial problems started with the investment firms Bear Sterns, which required a bailout in the spring of 2008 and was eventually sold to JP Morgan. The downturn of the financial industry became even more evident when two government-backed institutions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which invested heavily in sub-prime loans, required government intervention in September 2008. By the end of 2008, many home owners that took out sub-prime loans had their interest rates rise, which led to greater difficulty in refinancing and selling, placing further downward pressure on the housing market. Those capable of making their mortgage payments were left with negative equity – the value of their homes were worth less than the mortgage, leading to a substantial loss of savings. As foreclosures increased, banks were left with homes that could not be sold and were steadily decreasing in value. Furthermore, many major financial institutions were over-leveraged in order to sell mortgages, making them even more vulnerable to a decline in the housing market. To make matters worse, investors, often afraid of losing money in an already fragile economic climate, were far less likely to invest in banks and institutions that had sold sub-prime mortgages, making liquidity increasingly scarce. These three factors interrelated with each other, leading what may have started as a downtown in the American economy into a global financial crisis. Although the underlying problems in the housing market may have laid the foundations for a downturn in the US economy, the initiating factor for the global financial crisis was the bankruptcy of the investment firm Lehman Brothers. Like many other firms, Lehman Brothers invested heavily in mortgaged-backed securities. By September 2008, Lehman Brothers had $600b worth of sub-prime mortgages. These ‘toxic assets’ led to a decline in stock value, and the inability to secure private sector loans due to over-leveraging – it became increasingly evident Lehman would need a bailout like Bear Sterns and Frannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Walsh, 2008). As I will examine in detail later, the US government made a key decision that had repercussions for the entire global economy – the Treasury and the US Federal Reserve decided to break the precedent of bailing out institutions and let Lehman Brothers declare bankruptcy. The immediate reactions of both domestic and international markets were severe: credit markets froze as the market for commercial paper dried up (Sorkin, 2008). Banks would no longer risk lending to each other. The crisis went global and by the end of October most major stock markets were down by around 30 percent. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2010), by the end of 2009, 34 million people across the globe had lost their jobs due to the recession that followed the crisis (a statistic which does not include those under-employed or already unemployed). The decline in the US housing market after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers spread to other countries: AIG, a global insurance industry almost went bankrupt due to insuring mortgages with Credit Default Swaps (CDS); Britain’s Northern Rock was nationalized; and the entire country of Iceland had an economic meltdown. These events led Britain’s Economist (2008a) to argue, ‘the world economy is “entering a major downturn” in the face of “the most dangerous shock” to rich-country financial markets since the 1930s.’ The reaction of the US government to the failure of Lehman Brothers and the credit crisis is an important event that will be used to evaluate the explanatory capabilities of the three theories of empire under consideration. Empire and the American Response to the Financial Crisis Though the majority of this analysis will be an assessment of where these theories diverge, the theories of empire under consideration are part of a neo-Marxist epistemological tradition and share many assumptions about capitalism, states, and production. Hardt and Negri, Panitch and Gindin, and Harvey problematize capitalism as an international system of production and accumulation. Capitalism is characterized by an unequal distribution of economic resources that leads to the impoverishment of a vast portion of the world’s population (Callinicos, 2009). Marxist theories of empire recognize there are periodic crises that occur due to the contradictions within capitalism. Imperialism is often used as a way to mitigate crises: to sell excess products on new markets, through the privatization of public goods, and to open up regions for capitalist accumulation (Harvey, 2003). Capitalism requires political force in order to maintain and expand the system; this places pressure on governments to act in the interests of capitalists. At times this can be done through negotiation, as with the opening of China, while at other times it requires the use of military force. This reliance on violence places analytical importance on the USA as central to the global capitalist system. Even Hardt and Negri (2000) who emphasize the deterritorialization of Empire argue ‘the United States certainly occupies a privileged position in the global segmentations and hierarchies of Empire’ (2000: 384). America has been central to the perpetuation of global capitalism throughout the 20th century, using incentives when possible and the US military when necessary to open markets. While there are certain commonalities between each theory, they do differ at how they conceptualize the relationship between the US government and the economic interests of finance capital. As I shall explain, there is sufficient evidence that Harvey’s theory of the new imperialism gives the most insight into the immediate response of the US government to the financial crisis. I will discuss how Harvey’s theory accounts for the initial response to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the introduction of TARP which bought or insured most of the major investment firms. Also, Harvey provides insight into the events since the initial crisis: the conflict over the introduction of the Obama administration’s stimulus package, the underlying economic tension between China and the USA, and the difficulty in instituting international banking reform. While I will elaborate on the strengths of Harvey’s theory in greater detail, I will begin by discussing the deficiencies in alternative theories of empire. Hardt and Negri offer one of the most significant contributions to the critical literature on empire. Their theory of Empire (intentionally capitalized by the authors) brings together Marxism, American constitutionalism, and postmodernism in order to describe the economic and political transformation of states and the capitalist system. The globalization of production has changed the nature of political sovereignty from the nation-state to a transnational juridical-political order. For Hardt and Negri (2000), ‘Empire is characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries: Empire’s rule has no limits. First and foremost, then, the concept of empire posits a regime that effectively encompasses the spatial totality, or really that rules over the entire ‘civilized world’’ (2000: xvi). The development of Empire is an inevitable part of human history – a sentiment lauded by almost all empires – and has expanded into new geographic territories. Empire has transcended the nationstate and is a process of accumulation and biopolitical production – in a synthesis of Marxist and Foucauldian thought (2000: xv). Empire regulates human interactions, the labor process and even social life through national and international institutions, laws and norms in order to control and exploit the labor of the global multitude (2000: xv). The significance of their theory is that Empire is no longer territorialized in a single nation-state; Empire exists in a series of network relations that are no longer limited by geographical and political boundaries.

#### The aff is co-opted by an agenda of EU health diplomacy that only further expands capitalist imperialism

Andrea Patanè 21. Marxist, Published: 15 May 2021. “COVID-19 pandemic: patents and profits” <https://www.marxist.com/covid-19-pandemic-patents-and-profits.htm> brett

Far from an act of ‘international solidarity', this latest move from the US government is a calculated political risk, and will be implemented in the interests of US imperialism. A section of the more serious wing of the bourgeoisie understands that a proper economic recovery can happen only if the pandemic is suppressed worldwide. As we have explained elsewhere, wealthy countries risk losing billions of dollars if the pandemic is brought under control only within their own borders, because new variants (like those in India and Brazil) can always mutate elsewhere and reinfect their populations, causing further economic disruption. Therefore, even on a capitalist basis, it is expedient in the long-term for the rich countries to facilitate a global vaccination campaign. Even Pope Francis anointed the demand from his seat in Rome! Biden’s announcement is also an act of vaccine diplomacy. America’s main rivals, China and Russia, have been shoring up their spheres of influence by distributing their Sinopharm and Sputnik V vaccines to poor countries left out by the vaccine nationalism of the US and Europe. Chinese and Russian vaccines have been exported into countries traditionally under western spheres of influence, including Brazil and Hungary. Pushing to waive IP protections on COVID-19 vaccines is therefore partly an effort to push back against the encroachment of rival imperialist powers, which have so far outcompeted Washington in the global vaccination drive. Biden’s announcement is also an attempt to restore the standing and authority of US imperialism on the world stage, which has been bruised by the ‘America First’ vaccine nationalist policy started by Donald Trump, and continued by Biden. According to the FT, Katherine Tai (top US trade envoy) and Jake Sullivan (national security adviser) made the case to Biden that pushing for the waiver “was a low-risk way to secure a diplomatic victory”, after coming under fire for not “respond[ing] quickly enough to the unfolding COVID-19 crisis in India”. Here you have it, straight from the horse’s mouth. Under capitalism, vaccines – rather than providing a way out of the pandemic – are tools for ‘low-risk diplomatic victories’. As if this was some sort of football match between world leaders! In short, Biden is stepping in to prioritise the interests of US imperialism as a whole over the immediate interests of the Big Pharma capitalists. But we should say clearly: this cynical attempt to claim the moral high ground came only after the US used its massive economic clout to secure enough vaccines to inoculate its own population several times over. And in fact, the wartime Defense Production Act is still in effect, which forces US manufacturers to fulfil domestic demands for medical equipment before exports are permitted. This de facto export ban has created bottlenecks in the supply chain that have already undermined the WHO-led COVAX programme to vaccinate poor countries. Rest assured, Biden’s policy remains ‘America First’, just by somewhat more calculated means than his predecessor.

#### Capitalism is unsustainable and causes extinction -- multiple intertwined crises make collapse inevitable which means its try-or-die -- we got charts.

von Weizsäcker and Wijkman ’17 Ernest Ulrich von Weizsäcker, Professor and Director of the United Nation Centre for Science and Technology for Development, Founder and President of the Wuppertal Institute, Member of the German Bundestag, chairing the Committees on Globalization and the Environment, Dean of the graduate School of Environmental Science and Management at the University of California, appointed Co-Chair of UNEP’s International Resource Panel, Anders Wijkman, chairman of the Swedish Association of Recycling Industries, member of the Board of the Swedish Development Authority (SIDA), appointed chair of the Swedish Cross-Party Committee on Environmental Objectives, member of the European Parliament, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Policy Director of UNDP, Secretary General of the Swedish Red Cross and Director General of the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries, Member of the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences, the World Future Council and the International Resource Panel, 2017 (“Come On! Capitalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet – A Report to the Club”, November 11th, Available Online via Subscription to Springer, Accessed 03-20-2018)

1.1 Introduction: The World in Disarray We all know that the world is in crisis. Science tells us that almost half of the top soils on earth have been depleted in the last 150 years1 ; nearly 90% of fish stocks are either overfished or fully fished.2 Climate stability is in real danger (Sects. 1.5 and 3.7); and the earth is now in the sixth mass extinction period in history.3 Perhaps the most accurate account of the ecological situation is the 2012 ‘Imperative to act’,4 launched by all the 18 recipients (till 2012) of the Blue Planet Prize, including Gro Harlem Brundtland, James Hansen, Amory Lovins, James Lovelock and Susan Solomon. Its key message reads, ‘The human ability to do has vastly outstripped the ability to understand. As a result, civilization is faced with a perfect storm of problems, driven by overpopulation, overconsumption by the rich, the use of environmentally malign technologies and gross inequalities’. And further, ‘The rapidly deteriorating biophysical situation is barely recognized by a global society infected by the irrational belief that physical economies can grow forever’. 1.1.1 Different Types of Crisis and a Feeling of Helplessness The crisis is not cyclical but growing. And it is not limited to the nature around us. There are also a social crisis, a political and a cultural crisis, a moral crisis, as well as a crisis of democracy, of ideologies and of the capitalist system. The crisis also consists of deepened poverty in many countries and the loss of jobs for a considerable part of the population worldwide. Billions of people have reached a state of mind where they don’t trust their government anymore.5 Seen from a geographic point of view, symptoms of crisis are found nearly everywhere. The ‘Arab Spring’ was followed by a series of wars and civil wars, serious human rights violations and many millions of refugees. The internal situation is not better in Eritrea, South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen or Honduras. Venezuela and Argentina, once among the richer states of the world, face huge economic challenges, and neighbouring Brazil has gone through many years of recession and political turmoil. Russia and several East European countries are struggling with major economic and political problems in their post-communist phase. Japan finds it difficult to overcome decadelong stagnation, and to deal with the 2011 tsunami and ensuing nuclear disaster. And the temporary economic upswing several African countries have enjoyed lost its dynamism as soon as the prices of mineral resources collapsed, and partly due to very unusual droughts. Land grabbing is plaguing much of Africa, but also other parts of the world, leading to involuntary dislocations of millions of people and the related problems with refugees both within countries and abroad.6 The response of governments has been concentrated, at worst, on managing their own political image, and at best to treat the symptoms of the crisis, not the cause. The problem is that the political class in the whole world is strongly influenced by investors and by powerful private companies. This indicates that the current crisis is also a crisis of global capitalism. Since the 1980s, capitalism has moved from furthering the economic development of countries, regions and the world towards maximizing profits, and then to a large extent profits from speculation. In addition, the capitalism unleashed since 1980 in the Anglo-Saxon world, and since 1990 worldwide, is mainly financial. This trend was supported by excessive deregulation and liberalization of the economy (see Sect. 2.4). The term ‘shareholder value’ popped up in the business pages of the media worldwide, as if that was now the new epiphany and guardrail for all economic action. In reality, it served to narrow business down to short-term gains, often at the expense of social and ecological values. The myth of shareholder value has been effectively debunked in a recent book by Lynn Stout.7 A different, if related, feature of ‘disarray’ is the rise of aggressive, mostly rightwing movements against globalization in OECD countries, often referred to as populism. These have become overt through Brexit and the Trump victory in the United States. As Fareed Zakaria observes, ‘Trump is part of a broad populist

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upsurge running through the Western world. … In most (countries), populism remains an opposition movement, although one that is growing in strength; in others, such as Hungary, it is now the reigning ideology’.8 This phenomenon of right-wing populism can be explained to an extent by the ‘trunk valley of the elephant curve’ (Fig. 1.1) 9 showing the decline of developed world middle classes, during a 20-year period. While more than half of the world’s population was enjoying over 60% income rises, OECD’s middle classes suffered losses caused mainly by the deindustrialization and job losses in major parts of the United States, Britain and other countries. In the United States, the median income increased by a meagre 1.2% since 1979. The stunning income growth on the left-hand side of the curve, the ‘back of the elephant’, lifting some two billion people out of poverty, was caused mainly by China’s and some other countries’ economic success. What remains invisible on the picture is the far end of ‘the trunk of the elephant’: The richest 1% of the world and, more revolting, the richest eight persons of the world now own as much wealth as the poorest half of the world population combined, a figure publicized by Oxfam during the 2017 World Economic Forum.10 The ‘elephant curve’ gives an incomplete picture for a second reason. The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) has proposed a Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) going beyond just income and including ten indicators around health, education and living standards. Using that MPI, OPHI counts 1.6 billion people living in ‘multidimensional poverty’ in 2016 – nearly twice as many as the number of people living in extreme poverty measured by income alone.11 Thirdly, the interpretation of the curve requires an analysis of the people in each percentile group. In fact, they tend to move. And the curve does not distinguish those in Russia and East European countries who lost much of their income after 1990 from those in Detroit or middle England who, for very different reasons, also were among the losers.12 Another fact cannot be seen in the picture: the massive shift of money and income from the manufacturing and trade sectors to the financial sector.13 Bruce Bartlett, a senior policy advisor to both the Reagan and Bush administrations, argues that this ‘financialization’ of the economy is the cause of income inequality, falling wages and the poor performance. David Stockman, Reagan’s director of the Office of Management and Budget, agrees, describing our current situation as ‘corrosive financialization that has turned the economy into a giant casino since the 1970s’.14 Populist politicians in the OECD countries see themselves as speaking for the forgotten ‘ordinary’ people and for genuine patriotism, but they tend to fight and antagonize the people representing democratic institutions – what an irony! For the European Union (EU), the strongest trigger for populism has been the millions of refugees who came or would like to come to Europe from the Near East, from Afghanistan and from Africa. Even the most generous European countries have reached their own assumed limits for receiving these masses of refugees. The EU institutions were too weak (not too powerful, as they are depicted by the new nationalists) to deal with the ‘refugee crisis’, resulting eventually in an identity crisis in the EU. Once a success story of an entity ensuring peace and economic development, the EU has lost some of its unifying narrative. The populist right-wing movements or parties see and criticize the EU as the culprit for all kinds of undesired events. The irony is that continuing the success story would require more, not less, powers for the Union. The Union should be entrusted with border protection, a well-funded common asylum and refugee policy to deal with the refugee crisis and maintain the advantages of the Schengen agreement. And for the re-stabilization of the Euro, the EU or at least the Euro zone needs a common fiscal policy, as the new French President Emmanuel Macron is proposing. But it is these very measures of which nationalist populists are most afraid. The EU in its present form is not without shortcomings. Free market principles have come to dominate EU policymaking, leading to a subordination of other policies, like environment. Notably the UK wanted that priority, as it preferred to see the EU chiefly as a union for mutual trade. And the austerity policies pursued have blocked many benign investments and led to unnecessary suffering among tens of millions of Europeans. Such shortcomings, however, should never be used to put in question the overall objectives of the EU – a union of peace, the rule of law, human rights, cultural understanding and sustainability. Addressing the global crisis of democracy, the German Bertelsmann Foundation has published a 3000-page empirical report on progress (or lack thereof) on democracy and a social market economy, as measured by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).15 Over the last few years, the report sees a consistent decay of such parameters as civil rights, free and fair elections, freedom of opinion and of press, freedom of assembly and separation of powers. Within the same time frame, the number of countries in which authoritarian, mostly religious, dogmas influence political decision making rose from 22% to 33%. That report was published before the assaults on democracy and civil rights that occurred in summer 2016 in Turkey or the Philippines. Symptoms of tyranny are spreading, including in some of the countries with a solid tradition of freedom and democracy.16 Let us briefly turn to a different kind of crisis. Well, not exactly a crisis but an unpleasant feature in an otherwise fruitful communication tool, the ‘social media’. Aside from being practical and useful for everyday arrangements and exchange of news and reasonable opinions, social media also have become vehicles for enhancing conflicts and vilification of mostly innocent individuals, and for spreading ‘post truth’ nonsense. Much of the contents of social media political conversation is selfenhancing political rubbish, as those media serve as ‘echo chambers’ for networks of like-minded frustrated citizens.17 An empirical study from China found that anger and indignation are the emotions that are most likely to get viral in the social media, meaning they are multiplied faster and stronger than other emotions.18 The Internet and the social media are also vehicles for ‘bots’ (short for robots) that can disrupt or destroy messages, multiply nonsense and create all kinds of mischief. There are dozens of types of malicious bots (and botnets) to harvest email addresses, to grab content of websites and reuse it without permission, to spread viruses and worms, to buy up good seats for entertainment events, to increase views for YouTube videos or to increase traffic counts in order to extract money from advertisers. A more frightening cause of disarray relates to terrorism. In earlier times, humanity’s violent conflicts occurred mostly between different countries. In recent times, systemic and at least partly religious conflicts prevail, using terror attacks with the explicit intention of making people feel insecure. During much of the twentieth century, religions remained quiet, non-aggressive and geographically confined to rather stable territories. This no longer is true. Partly because of globalized populations moving or being forced to leave their home territories, some factions of Islam have expanded geographically and are claiming strong influence over national states, for example, attacking countries like France with its tradition of laicism that does not permit religion to dominate politics. What tends to be underrepresented in the media is the positive role of religions. In Christian-dominated Europe, liberal and tolerant religion became part of the European identity a century after the Enlightenment successfully discredited the earlier doctrinaire, authoritarian and colonialist-missionary manifestations of the faith. During the Cold War, Christian goals of social cohesion helped build the system of ‘Western values’, often described as the social welfare state, or the ‘social market economy’ (for its partial demise, see Sect. 2.4). With a view towards leading Islam into an equally benign and co-operative social role, some Islamic scholars, such as Syrian born Bassam Tibi, call on Muslims in Europe to integrate into democratic society.19 Tibi, however, is not popular among radical Muslims, to put it mildly. But to understand the radicalization of Islam, one must not underestimate the role played by the West, in particular the United States, in interfering with Near Eastern states. Some would say that the troublesome situations mentioned so far, the recurring topics of media headlines, are only the surface of our world’s ‘disarray’. Deeper and more systemic problems include the breath-taking speed of technological development that may very easily run out of control. One trend is digitization that potentially threatens millions of jobs (see Sect. 1.11.4). Another trend or development can be observed in the biological sciences and technologies. The enormous acceleration of genetic engineering through the CRISPR-Cas9 technology20 is causing fears of monster creation or the extinction of species or varieties not seen as valuable under human utilitarian criteria. Generally, a non-specific feeling is spreading that ‘progress’ has scary sides and that the genie may already have left the bottle (see Sect. 1.11.3). No doubt there is a need to analyse and understand the symptoms and roots of the variety of crises, political, economic, social, technological and environmental. It is also important to recognize the extent to which people perceive the various phenomena of disarray and feel disoriented, and to recognize that the reality and the feelings of disarray have a moral and even religious dimension. 1.1.2 Financialization: A Phenomenon of Disarray An important part of the disorientation relates to financial markets. Historians will look back at the last 30 years with concern, when looking at the explosion in bank balance sheets, backed up by declining levels of equity and massive borrowing. One of the results was a temporary private-sector-led boom. The other was a massive increase in the world’s financial sector (finance, insurance, real estate – FIRE), often called financialization, and subsequently the financial crisis of 2008–2009. Excessive risk-taking developed into a crisis that was close to bringing the whole financial system to a halt. When the bubble burst, many governments were forced to step in with broad support programmes. Governments caught by the new mind-set (see Sect. 2.4) were intimately involved in all of this. True, there are many examples of serious malpractices within the private financial sector. But had it not been for the systematic deregulation of the banks by governments, with the purpose of stimulating economic growth by issuing more debt, the situation would have been radically different. The causes behind the crisis were many and varied: – Excessive lending by the banking industry – Lack of action on the part of regulators and central banks to stop (i) excessive lending, (ii) the spread of exotic financial instruments (synthetic assets and bonds, collateralized mortgage obligations/CMOs, structured debt issues, etc.) and (iii) pure speculative transactions – Opaque tax havens, and the absence of a binding legal framework that is accepted and implemented by the international community, in general, and the major jurisdictions and financial centres – Securitization and distribution by investment banks and other financial actors of mortgage-related assets and investment vehicles transferring the credit risk from the original lender to the ultimate bondholders – Failure by some rating agencies and auditing firms to properly assess and report the inherent risks posed by many of the financial products A deeper analysis is presented by economists Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig21 about the main causes behind the financial crisis. Western banks borrowed far too much with far too little equity in their balance sheets to act as a buffer if things went wrong in their business – from trading in the multitrillion-dollar derivatives markets to often reckless lending on real estate. In the decades following the Second World War, banks operated with between 20% and 30% of their liabilities as equity. By 2008, that had shrunk to just 3%. Banks obviously believed that they had invented instruments that removed the risk, allowing them to run their banks with a tenth of the buffer they had before. It proved to be very unrealistic. But they counted with the state to underwrite their risks. Bankers have enriched themselves spectacularly in the process. They made themselves ‘too big to fail’ – and too big to jail. The 2008 financial crisis was mostly caused by that irresponsible greed.22 Yet, in 2009, not only did bankers avoid criminal prosecutions and receive hundreds of billions in government bailouts, but some still paid themselves record bonuses. At the same time, almost nine million households in the United States had to abandon their homes when the value of their houses plummeted and they could no longer service the adjustable-rate mortgages – the so-called foreclosure crisis.23 Financialization refers to the dominance of the financial sector in the global economy and the tendency for accumulated profits (and leverage) to flow into real estate and other speculative investment. Debt is an intrinsic element in this process. In the United States, for example, both household debt and private sector debt more than doubled relative to GDP between 1980 and 2007.24 The same is true for most OECD countries. At the same time, ‘the value of financial assets grew from four times GDP in 1980 to ten times GDP in 2007 and the finance sector’s share of corporate profits grew from about 10% in the early 1980s to almost 40% by 2006’.25 Adair Turner, chair of the UK’s Financial Services Authority in the years following the 2007–2008 crisis, regards unchecked private credit creation as the key system fault that led to that crisis with its devastating consequences.26 From this follows that the financial sector constitutes a significant and increasing risk factor in the economy. The degree of financialization varies from country to country but the increase in the power of finance is general. The current finance sector evolved in the context of the deregulation that gathered pace from the late 1970s and expanded dramatically after the 1999 removal of the separation between commercial and investment banking in the United States.27 This barrier had been put in place in 1933 by the Roosevelt administration in response to the Wall Street Crash of 1929, when a period of rampant credit creation and financial speculation collapsed. Similar speculation preceded the crisis of 2007–2008: The face value of financial products reached US$640 trillion in September 2008, 14 times the GDP of all the countries on earth.28 Lietaer et al.29 compare speculation with ordinary money transfers paying for goods and services: ‘In 2010, the volume of foreign exchange transactions reached $4 trillion per day’, which does not even include derivatives. In comparison, ‘one day’s exports or imports of all goods and services in the world amount to about 2% of those $4 trillion’. Transactions not paying for goods and services, almost by definition are speculative. Such financial products and transactions, the authors continue, lead regularly to monetary crashes, sovereign debt crises and systemic crashes with an average of more than ten countries in crisis every year. One of the consequences of this development is that a significant part of economic growth has been distributed to the wealthy, as mentioned with the new Oxfam figures in the previous subchapter. Practices within the financial sector demonstrate a disregard for the impact they have on both people and the planet. That includes a distinct short-termism, the ratio of banks’ reserves to their loans, the ratio of banks’ lending that support the real economy versus speculation in property and derivatives, unchecked credit creation – in fact money creation – and the failure to account for long-term climate and environmental risks. In the words of Otto Scharmer at MIT,30 ‘We have a system that accumulates oversupply of money in areas that produce high financial and low environmental and social returns, while at the same an undersupply of money in areas that serve important societal investment needs’. The failure to account for environmental risks means that the pressure on already scarce natural resources accelerates – trees are felled, waterways polluted, wetlands drained and the exploitation of oil, gas and coal accelerating, as long as there is demand. It also means that huge savings, among them pension funds, are locked into investments in fossil-based assets. Such assets are increasingly looked upon as high-risk assets (see Sect. 3.4).

#### Vote negative for proletarian internationalism -- only an organized global revolutionary struggle can overcome the destruction of capitalism.

Anastasi et al, 18 (editorial collective of Viewpoint Magazine, a militant research collective working to dialectically bring theory and practice into dialogue by studying cycles of struggle. Alphabetically, members of the editorial collective are as follows: Andrew Anastasi, graduate student in Sociology at CUNY; Cinzia Arruzza, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research; Robert Cavooris, UC Santa Cruz graduate student and union representative, History of Consciousness Department; Maya Andrea Gonzalez, communist and revolutionary feminist in the Bay Area, graduate student in the Department of History of Consciousness at UC Santa Cruz; Asad Haider, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ The New School, founding editor of Viewpoint Magazine, PhD in History of Consciousness Department @ UC Santa Cruz; Shuja Haider, widely-published writer and musician based in Brooklyn; Bue Rübner Hansen, writer and activist researcher in the Britain, Barcelona, and in migrant and refugee solidarity movements, PhD from Queen Mary University; Patrick King, graduate student at UC Santa Cruz; Rosa Lee, communist organizer and member of the Viewpoint editorial collective; Ben Mabie, managing editor at Viewpoint and editorial assistant at Verso Books, UCSC graduate; Sarah Mason, member of the Viewpoint editorial collective; Liz Mason-Deese, Assistant Professor, Department of Geography and Geoinformation Science, George Mason University; Dave Mesing, PhD student in Philosophy @ Villanova University; Magally Miranda-Alcazar, Eugene Cota-Robles Fellow and a Ford Foundation Predoctoral Fellow, PhD student in Chicana/o Studies @ UCLA; B.A. from the University of California, Santa Cruz (magna cum laude) with a double major in Community Studies and Feminist Studies, and has been published in The Nation, Verso and the New Left Review; Salar Mohandesi, Assistant Professor of History @ Bowdoin; Gavin Mueller, Lecturer in Media Studies at the University of Amsterdam, former contributing editor @ Jacobin; Evan Calder Williams, writer, translater, and artist, teaches theory at the Center for Curatorial Studies at Bard College and film production at Cooper Union, PhD in Literature from the University of California Santa Cruz and was a Fulbright Fellow in Italy for his research on cinema, industry, and revolt. “Internationalism against Imperialism,” *Viewpoint Magazine*, Issue 6, February 1, 2018, <https://www.viewpointmag.com/2018/02/01/internationalism-against-imperialism/>)

The challenge of reactivating an effective proletarian internationalism is made even more urgent by the aggressive rise of right-wing nationalisms, which have taken a range of organizational and ideological guises. The clarified ideological form of this rightward shift is an emboldened “possessive nationalism” in the North, which revolves around restrictive immigration and trade policies, as responses to the perceived erosion of territorial logics of sovereignty, and the hybridization of the ethno-national community.10 Any prolonged combat against these nativist impulses – especially as they seep into social-democratic or left-liberal parties in Europe and the United States – will need to reinforce the link between migration and imperialism, the former in many ways constituting the reflux of the latter. Here we might center the rich legacy and actuality of migrant struggles for communist politics, and how questions of mobility, control, and dispossession are now at the core of imperialist dynamics. The political and social, informal and formal spaces of migration remain an open field for investigation. As Etienne Balibar noted over 40 years ago, “the concrete knowledge of the causes and effects of immigration is a two-way guiding thread towards an understanding of imperialism,” a methodological linkage which “renders internationalism, more than ever, the very condition of struggles for workers’ liberation.”11 This raises the practical necessity of reconsidering the tactical repertoire and strategic horizons of anti-imperialism. The nearly two-decades-long “War on Terror” – a euphemism for a war on human welfare in the Middle East and a war against Muslims at home – has proven to be a difficult nub for anti-war and anti-militarist activism in “the belly of the beast,” particularly as U.S. violence, amidst ever-shallower domestic hegemony, takes forms other than that of U.S. boots on the ground. The fading – or destruction – of the anti-war movement after 2005, following massive demonstrations against the invasion of Iraq which featured considerable grassroots mobilization, is a critical episode to reflect upon. The ubiquity of manned and unmanned aerial bombardment, the diffuse and often cloaked nature of counterinsurgency operations, the multiplication of U.S. proxies, and dense financial ties have rendered the military conflicts of U.S. empire, perhaps the most visible manifestation of imperialism, an asymmetrical yet constant presence. Any sustained fight against it must be coordinated around several fronts. Recent experiences of mass protest show that a powerful anti-war movement, if it is to reappear, would do so in an altered shape and in close relation to other insurgent forces in society, an extension of their discursive and strategic reach. The high level of organized resistance to militarized border security and repressive immigration policies, the environmentalist/anti-extractivist campaigns around Standing Rock and elsewhere, and the nascent coalitions and activist milieus that have been fortified through the International Women’s Strike initiatives (resonant with calls from Latin America for a new feminist international) indicate a real potential to build a “popular anti-imperialism” from grounded social struggles, connecting the sites of contestation across neo-colonial and imperial frontiers. One can see how this changes the aims and targets of alter-globalization movements, exemplified in the militancy of summit-hopping demos that directly confront leading economic and financial bodies, or in the parallel institution-building and transnational networking of civil society organizations involved in the World Social Forums.12 A more adequate approach to questions of coordination and solidarity across borders would have to probe how political organization is tied to material practices of translation, and recognize that even localized concerns often involve the commonalities and divisions of the global labor force.13 The mutations of class struggle, where the wage-earning proletariat has given way to more diverse social alliances and associations of what Göran Therborn calls the “plebeian strata” or “popular classes,” has provided glimpses of what anti-imperialist mobilization could look like: new strategies of threading upsurges of disruption, combination, and antagonism as they extend over an unstable terrain.14 Today, it is necessary to re-situate the concept and question of imperialism. We agree with Lenin when we recognize that no revolution, even a national one, is possible without grasping the effects of imperialism on any local articulation of the working class. And we further agree that, of course, no national revolution would be sufficient for the goal of communism. In short, we see imperialism as both an obstacle to and enemy of internationalism and we in turn view internationalism as a position to be composed in working class struggle itself. Thus, at the risk of simplifying our approach, we propose that to examine imperialism today is to bring it into the realm of class composition. This can involve no disavowal of the complicated history of Marxism and popular struggle with regard to imperialism, nor a simple repetition of any one of its moments. In our sixth issue of Viewpoint, we instead seek out the possibility of an encounter, bringing together historical accounts, artefacts of struggle, and theoretical interventions past and present. Thus we neither “endorse” all of the positions represented here nor reject those that might be absent from this issue, which is a situated engagement with the problem of opposing imperialism from within American empire; we are proud to offer these contributions as material for the long-term work of thinking and struggling against imperialism in the 21st century.

## 2

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend all member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicine

#### To clarify: the word “the” means ALL member nations of the WTO—specifying some is nontopical

US District Court of Massachusetts ‘3

Opinion written by Saris, District Judge. 238 F.Supp.2d 347 (2003) VLT CORPORATION and Vicor Corporation, Plaintiffs v. LAMBDA ELECTRONICS, INC., Defendant No. 01-CV-10957-PBS. United States District Court, D. Massachusetts. January 3, 2003.

1. It Depends On What the Word "The" Means

The first skirmish involves the word "the." The claim language states "circuitry for recycling *the* magnetizing energy stored in said transformer to reset it." (Emphasis added). Lambda asserts that the word "the" means all of the magnetizing energy in the transformer. Vicor contends that the claim allows for the possibility that some of the energy may be recycled to reset the core while other energy is delivered to the load. In other words, it argues that the word "the" can mean "some of the," and explains that the word "the" was used to distinguish "the magnetizing" energy from the more general term "energy" that is used earlier in the preamble. Nice linguistic jousting, but the use of the word "magnetizing" alone would have been an adequate adjective to single out the kind of energy intended for recycling. If only some of the transformer's energy needed to be recycled, the word "the" would not have been used.

Lambda's argument that the word "the" connotes all the magnetizing energy is persuasive because it gives ordinary and common sense effect to the word "the" in the claim language. See Merriam-Webster's 352\*352 Collegiate Dictionary 1221 (10th ed.1993) (giving one definition of "the" as: "used as a function word before a noun ... to indicate reference to a group as a whole"). This claim thus describes an invention that recycles all of the magnetizing energy to reset the transformer core.

#### Member nations of the WTO are the following countries:

WTO no date – see the list in the doc https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/tif\_e/org6\_e.htm#collapseI

\*\*NOTE: This list is taken from the WTO’s website linked above

Members Afghanistan Albania Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Belize Benin Bolivia, Plurinational State of Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cabo Verde Cambodia Cameroon Canada Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Congo Costa Rica Côte d’Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Democratic Republic of the Congo Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Estonia Eswatini European Union (formerly EC) Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hong Kong, China Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Korea, Republic of Kuwait, the State of Kyrgyz Republic Lao People’s Democratic Republic Latvia Lesotho Liberia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao, China Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova, Republic of Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria North Macedonia Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia Solomon Islands South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Suriname Sweden Switzerland Chinese Taipei Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Uruguay Vanuatu Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

Map

Description automatically generated

#### Violation: The affirmative only defends member nations of the EU—their plan text

#### 1] Limits-- there are 164 members[[1]](#footnote-1), which means their interp justifies reducing any IP protection in any WTO member, creating hundreds of potential AFFs to prep out. This kills neg ground because different countries can have different economic situations that affect the Innovation debate and we lose all disads to global action. You can pick anything from Israel to India to North Korea or a combo of all of them and there’s no universal DA since each state has a different political situation – it explodes neg prep and leads to random state of the week affs which makes cutting stable neg links impossible – limits key to reciprocal engagement since they create a caselist for neg prep

#### 2] TVA – read the aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff. We don’t prevent new FWs, mechanisms, or advantages. PICs don’t solve – it’s absurd to say neg potential abuse justifies the aff being flat out not T, which leads to a race towards abuse.

#### Two impacts:

#### 1 -- Fairness -- an unlimited topic makes neg engagement impossible because there’d be tons of new AFFs to prep out every tournament. Uniquely kills small schools because they’d be unable to keep up with the prep burden.

#### 2 -- Research -- the neg loses any incentive to do targeted research when the prep burden is so high so debaters would resort to stale generics and lose topic specific education. That outweighs because we only have 2 months to debate the topic and COVID is uniquely important to many debaters’ lives.

#### Drop the debater to deter future abuse.

#### Competing interps because reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

#### No RVIs: 1] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair, 2] baiting – the best theory debaters would read abusive advocacies to go for the RVI, 3] substance – any initiation of theory ensures the 2NR and 2AR are theory, crowding out substance.

#### Neg theory 1st – 1AC abuse shaped NC construction so if anything we did was bad it was just to get back in the game.

## 3

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend that the member nations of the WTO ought to reduce intellectual property protections for all medicines.

#### Violation: The affirmative only defends trade secrets through some process

#### CA Limits and TVA and Fairenss and research impacts and paradigms

# Case

## Adv 1

#### Less IP protection leads to disastrous consequences from disclosure—safety, fakes, herd immunity, bio threats

Mercurio 21 Bryan Mercurio [Chinese University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law], 15 March 2021, “WTO Wavier from Intellectual Property Protection for COVID-19 Vaccines and Treatments: A Critical Review”, https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID= 732088024087092091113064080127110089026050064018017000018 0031221260080940690 05111120099022017 06202305700711703012701708109509505 1090012016041007114071124113127008068012087073001083113027126083074031005 001016117022001025118004082004113091069075097031&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE accessed 7/20/2021 EH

The waiver proposal not only seeks to suspend patent rights, but also rights to “copyrights, industrial designs and undisclosed information”. This may cover information such as the combination and doses of raw materials, test data, medical formulas and other genomic information. The sponsors claim that the information is needed for governments to scale up production or to address aspects such as detection, prevention and control of the virus. However, the operationalisation of the disclosure of trade secrets has not been well thought out – with even the representative of South Africa admitting that there is very little experience in how government measures could be applied to force disclosure of certain types of confidential and proprietary information.67 More specifically, how could a government force the transfer of a “secret” without being aware of the presence or content of the “secret”? What would be the procedure and mechanism of enforcement? Who would be responsible for resolving matters when disputes arise? What is clear is that before making use of a waiver countries would need to amend their own legal framework and to do so within a short period of time. Considering that many of these countries have not put in place ways to take advantage of existing flexibilities within the international IP system despite having more than seventeen years to do so, it seems fanciful that these same countries would rush to implement the necessary framework needed to operationalise and enforce the waiver. In other words, while a waiver would allow Members to escape WTO obligations it would not in any way shift the nature of domestic IP rules and regulations. Accordingly, the waiver will only be in force in jurisdictions that elect to amend their own legislation while IPRs pertaining to COVID-19 vaccines and treatments would remain in force elsewhere.68 Moreover, countries importing generic drugs should be concerned about issues of far greater importance than patent rights. Most notably, countries must ensure the safety and efficacy of the drugs being imported or manufactured locally and offered for sale within their territory. With so much uncertainty and unknowns in the implementation procedures and mechanisms of enforcement, waiving rights for undisclosed information could open a floodgate to undesirable consequences, for instance, potential abuse, fraud and the availability of unsafe treatments and vaccines. That proponents of the waiver point to a lack of legal and regulatory capacity of some developing countries to issue a compulsory licence or take advantage of other TRIPS-flexibilities to further their calls for an IP waiver but remain silent as to how the same countries would be able to safely and efficiently legislate for and operate under an open system is an incomprehensible omission. 6. IP enforcement is of vital importance to maintaining safety standards The protection of IP not only provides incentives to innovators to create, but also plays a crucial role in ensuring the safety of vaccines and helping to prevent the importation of fraudulent and dangerous goods. Unlike the typical pharmaceutical industry, the vaccine market is not a free and open market.69 Vaccines contain biological products made from living organisms and the risk of failure in vaccine development and production is high. 70 Moreover, the manufacturing process for vaccines is much more complex as it requires the use of facilities and equipment with a high degree of specialization.71 The complexity of vaccine products implies that more time and regulatory requirements are needed in order to make or “copy” the vaccine production process. Therefore, the innovator should be expected to make conscious and meticulous decisions as to when and to whom to issue licences, as this is the most responsible way to bring their technologies to the world and safeguard global health. In addition, as the COVID-19 pandemic continues there has been a noticeable increase in the circulation of fake medicines around the world. According to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), organized crime groups have been producing fake drugs and medical products and selling them for lucrative profits in developing countries.72 With the development of COVID-19 vaccines on the market, a rapid rise in the illegal sale of fake items is expected, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).73 Counterfeits of the legitimate products provide false promises of protection and could lead to disastrous consequences, including worsened illness and death for the individual and the retardation of herd immunity for the population at large. Effective and proactive IP procurement is essential and useful in mitigating the risks of counterfeit and substandard medicines. IP enforcement measures play a significant role in preventing these fake and illicit medicines from circulating in the market. While important during normal times, IP enforcement can take on an enhanced role of safeguarding the public during this critical period of time. Waiving all COVID-19 related IPRs raises the risk of unsafe or fake vaccines circulating in supply channels and being sold to unsuspecting governments, putting millions of human lives at risk and reducing trust in vaccines.

#### Biotech misuse is a likelier cause for extinction

Bryce 20 Emma Bryce, 7-27-2020, “What Could Drive Humans to Extinction?”, https://www.realclearscience.com/articles/2020/07/27/what\_could\_drive\_humans\_to\_extinction. html?\_escaped\_fragment\_, EH

Pandemics The scene opens on a sparse, gray landscape, a gnarled tree in the foreground, bits of ash slowly drifting down from the sky. On the horizon, a few huddled figures stumble forward and into a bleak future. If this sounds familiar, it's because it's a common visual trope in many post-apocalyptic films. Usually, these films tell the story of a catastrophe — an asteroid strike perhaps, or a nuclear war — that causes humanity's demise, and then follows the challenges that the remaining humans face as they try to save their species from extinction. Such films grip the public imagination. But what if human extinction was less a cinematic scenario, and instead, a looming reality? That might seem like a sensational question, but in fact, dozens of researchers around the world spend their days grappling with this very possibility, and how we might avoid it. Their task isn't easy. There are multiple theories around what might ultimately cause human extinction — everything from alien invasions to catastrophic asteroid strikes. But among those investigating this question, there's a general consensus that some risks to human life are more plausible than others. In the field, researchers have a name for these: They call them "existential risks." What follows here is just a sampling — a few of the risks that researchers have at the top of their minds. Nuclear war An existential risk is different to what we might think of as a "regular" hazard or threat, explained Luke Kemp, a research associate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at Cambridge University in the United Kingdom. Kemp studies historical civilizational collapse and the risk posed by climate change in the present day. "A risk in the typical terminology is supposed to be composed of a hazard, a vulnerability and an exposure," he told Live Science. "You can think about this in terms of an asteroid strike. So the hazard itself is the asteroid. The vulnerability is our inability to stop it from occurring — the lack of an intervention system. And our exposure is the fact that it actually hits the Earth in some way, shape or form." Take nuclear war, which history and popular culture have etched onto our minds as one of the biggest potential risks to human survival. Our vulnerability to this threat grows if countries produce highly-enriched uranium, and as political tensions between nations escalate. That vulnerability determines our exposure. As is the case for all existential risks, there aren't hard estimates available on how much of Earth's population a nuclear firestorm might eliminate. But it's expected that the effects of a large-scale nuclear winter — the period of freezing temperatures and limited food production that would follow a war, caused by a smoky nuclear haze blocking sunlight from reaching the Earth — would be profound. "From most of the modeling I've seen, it would be absolutely horrendous. It could lead to the death of large swathes of humanity. But it seems unlikely that it by itself would lead to extinction." Kemp said. The misuse of biotechnology is another existential risk that keeps researchers up at night. This is technology that harnesses biology to make new products. One in particular concerns Cassidy Nelson: the abuse of biotechnology to engineer deadly, quick-spreading pathogens. "I worry about a whole range of different pandemic scenarios. But I do think the ones that could be man-made are possibly the greatest threat we could have from biology this century," she said. As acting co-lead of the biosecurity team at the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, Nelson researches biosecurity issues that face humanity, such as new infectious diseases, pandemics and biological weapons. She recognizes that a pathogen that's been specifically engineered to be as contagious and deadly as possible could be far more damaging than a natural pathogen, potentially dispatching large swathes of Earth's population in limited time. "Nature is pretty phenomenal at coming up with pathogens through natural selection. It's terrible when it does. But it doesn't have this kind of direct 'intent,'" Nelson explained. "My concern would be if you had a bad actor who intentionally tried to design a pathogen to have as much negative impact as possible, through how contagious it was, and how deadly it was.”

#### Absolutely no chance of extinction from disease

Adalja 16 [Amesh Adalja, infectious disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh] “Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?” June 17, 2016 (http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/) - MZhu

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained. I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience. For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived. Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like. So what would it take for a disease to wipe out humanity now? In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely. Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians. The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies. HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk. Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care. Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions. While the immune system’s role can never be understated, an even more powerful protector is the faculty of consciousness. Humans are not the most prolific, quickly evolving, or strongest organisms on the planet, but as Aristotle identified, humans are the rational animals—and it is this fundamental distinguishing characteristic that allows humans to form abstractions, think in principles, and plan long-range. These capacities, in turn, allow humans to modify, alter, and improve themselves and their environments. Consciousness equips us, at an individual and a species level, to make nature safe for the species through such technological marvels as antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, and sanitation. When humans began to focus their minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. In many ways, human consciousness became infectious diseases’ worthiest adversary.

## Adv 2

#### Huge alt cause -- their ev on this advantage is about trade secrets in general NOT MEDICINES -- ctrl f “medicines” in the doc -- it doesn’t appear ONCE -- the plan doesn’t solve bc it doesn’t create uniformity across all areas, ONLY medicines.

#### Even if it did -- alternative policies create uniformity.

Nirwan 17 Prajwal Nirwan, 17, Associate, Miller Sturt Kenyon, London, United Kingdom, 12-1-2017, "Trade Secrets: The Hidden IP Right," WIPO Magazine, https://www.wipo.int/wipo\_magazine/en/2017/06/article\_0006.html, accessed 7/26/2021 EH

Our world is becoming ever more open and inclusive. New ideas are widely shared on public platforms and more research is being published than ever before. In this increasingly complex, highly competitive, hyper-connected world, some things that might ordinarily be protected by traditional intellectual property (IP) rights such as patents, trademarks and design rights are best kept secret. The Coca-Cola recipe is one of the world’s most valuable trade secrets (photo: RyanJLane / iStock / Getty Images Plus). Some of the world’s most famous trade secrets – including the Coca-Cola recipe and Google’s search algorithm – have immense value. These companies quickly recognized that the value of these particular intellectual assets lay in their secrecy, and by treating them as trade secrets they could maintain their competitive advantage. What exactly are trade secrets? Trade secrets are secrets that add value to a business. A generally less well-known form of intellectual property right, for many years trade secrets have been in the shadows, but today they are gaining traction as an effective way to protect certain intellectual assets. Any commercially valuable and sensitive information – a business strategy, a new product roadmap, or lists of suppliers and customers – can qualify as a trade secret. And unlike other IP rights, trade secrets can protect a much wider range of subject matter and are not limited to a set term of protection. Trade secrets are not exclusive rights like patents, and therefore cannot be enforced against anyone who independently discovers the secret. However, any unlawful acquisition or misuse of a trade secret either under breach of confidence or theft is actionable. And the proprietor of the trade secret can get compensation and an injunction in respect of such unlawful acts. Trade secret laws around the world Like other IP rights, trade secrets are subject to the national laws of the country in which they are protected. Unlike patents and trademarks, there are no formal requirements to register trade secrets with an official authority, but most countries have laws that deal with the misappropriation or unauthorized acquisition of trade secrets. For example, in the United Kingdom no formal definition of a trade secret exists and there is no restriction as to the type of information that can constitute a trade secret. The legislation around trade secrets is largely drawn from case law relating to breach of confidence, with effective remedies for instances in which trade secrets have been improperly acquired, disclosed or used. In the United States, the policy on trade secrets states that they consist of information that may include a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process. And to qualify as such, a trade secret must be used in business and give an opportunity to obtain an economic advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 strengthens trade secret protection in the United States and offers parties the option of settling disputes under either state or federal laws. While they differ in some respects, there is a great deal of similarity among state laws because almost all of them have adopted some variation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. In Europe, policymakers took a major step forward in codifying trade secret laws in all countries of the European Union (EU) in June 2016 with the adoption of the EU Trade Secrets Directive. The Directive covers the unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure of trade secrets. EU member states are required to bring their domestic laws into line with the objectives of the Directive by mid-2018. According to Article 2(1) of the Directive: “‘trade secret’ means information which meets all of the following requirements: “it is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; “it has commercial value because it is secret; “it has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.” By keeping its search algorithm secret, Google has been able to maintain its competitive advantage (photo: inkit / iStock Unreleased / Getty Images Plus). The recent adoption of policies on trade secrets by the world’s strongest economies underlines the growing significance of trade secrets in the current business climate. Trade secrets and patents When it comes to protecting an intellectual asset, one tough decision businesses have to make is whether to protect it with classical IP rights, for example by filing for patent protection, or to keep it as a trade secret. While in some cases the answer may not be quite so straightforward, in many instances answering the following questions can clarify a company’s thinking on the best way forward. Is the technology in question a patentable invention? Note that most countries do not grant patents for business methods, software (which is typically protected under copyright law), mathematical formulas, presentation of information, and the like. However, any of these assets may be protected as a trade secret! Is the asset in question commercially valuable and worth keeping secret? What are the chances of competitors being able to find out how your asset works by reverse engineering or other means? Is there a high risk of someone else patenting your asset? Is your asset something that could remain valuable for a much longer term of protection than that which is provided by a patent (usually 20 years)? Would the company be able to ensure its secrecy? There are, of course, other considerations that need to be taken into account, such as costs of protection and investor interests. Both patents and trade secrets are effective forms of IP protection, but one may be more suitable than the other depending on the subject matter and circumstances. It is important that those taking decisions about IP strategy are aware that trade secrets can potentially be as valuable as patents (if not more so), if they are protected diligently and used strategically. Trade secrets: a boon for small businesses While most large multinational companies have the resources and funds to invest in the patenting process, which can be costly and time-consuming, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) often struggle with it. Trade secrets, on the other hand, are relatively straightforward, entail no registration costs or lengthy legal processes and can add real value for small businesses. That is why it is so important to raise awareness among SMEs about the value of trade secrets and how to protect them effectively. To benefit directly from trade secrets, an SME may: Consider keeping undetectable manufacturing techniques or hidden components in their products as trade secrets. Consider keeping lists of suppliers and customers as trade secrets, especially if operating in a niche business. Consider keeping patentable inventions as trade secrets if they are short of funds, and only file for patent protection when funding becomes available or a keen investor is identified. Consider licensing their trade secrets, but ensure a confidentiality agreement and enforceable contracts are in place before revealing the secrets to third parties. Educate their employees and decision makers about trade secrets. Various intellectual property authorities and educational institutions around the world are reaching out to the business community to improve awareness of the usefulness and value of trade secrets, but there is still a long way to go to raise their profile and strengthen the laws surrounding them.

#### Downturns don’t cause war – best empirics

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Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry. Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice. Economic Crisis Leads to Austerity Economic crises generate pressure for austerity. Government revenues are a function of national economic production, so that when production diminishes through recession, revenues available for expenditure also diminish. Planning almost invariably assumes growth rather than contraction, so the deviation in available revenues compared to the planned expenditure can be sizable. When growth slowdowns are prolonged, the cumulative departure from planning targets can grow even further, even if no single quarter meets the technical definition of recession. Pressures for austerity are felt most acutely in governments that face difficulty borrowing to finance deficit expenditures. This is especially the case when this borrowing relies on international sources of credit. Even for states that can borrow, however, intellectual attachment to balanced budgets as a means to restore confidence—a belief in what is sometimes called “expansionary austerity”—generates incentives to curtail expenditure. These incentives to cut occur precisely when populations are experiencing economic hardship, making reductions especially painful that target poverty alleviation, welfare programs, or economic subsidies. As a result, mass and elite constituents strongly resist such cuts. Welfare programs and other forms of public spending may be especially susceptible to a policy “ratchet effect,” where people are very reluctant to forego benefits once they have become accustomed to their availability.6 As Paul Pierson has argued, “The politics [of welfare state] retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes tangible losses on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains.”7 Austerity Leads to Cutbacks in Defense Spending At a minimum, the political costs of pursuing austerity through cutbacks in social and economic expenditures alone make such a path unappealing. In practice, this can spur policymakers to curtail national security spending as a way to balance budgets during periods of economic turmoil. There is often more discretion over defense spending than over other areas in the budget, and it is frequently distantly connected to the welfare of the mass public. Many militaries need foreign arms and foreign ammunition for their militaries, so defense expenditures are doubly costly since they both take up valuable defense budget space while also sending hard currency overseas, rather than constituencies at home. Pursuing defense cuts may also conform to the preferences of the financial sector, which shows a strong aversion to military conflict even if that means policies of appeasement and conciliation.8 During periods of economic expansion, the opportunity costs associated with defense expenditure—the requirement for higher taxes or foregone spending in other areas—are real but acceptable. Economic contraction heightens the opportunity costs by forcing a choice between different types of spending. There is a constituency for defense spending in the armed services, intelligence agencies, and arms industries, but even in militarized economies this constituency tends to be numerically much smaller than those that favor social and economic expenditures over military ones. Defense Cutbacks Encourage Rapprochement An interest in defense cutbacks can lead to conciliatory behavior through two paths. First, the cutbacks themselves serve as a concrete signal to adversaries that the military threat posed by the economically distressed state is declining. This permits the other state to halt that portion of defense spending dedicated to keeping up, breaking the back of ongoing arms races through reciprocated, but non-negotiated moves. Unilateral conventional force reductions were a major element of Gorbachev’s foreign policy in the late 1980s, alongside negotiated strategic arms control, and diplomatic efforts to achieve political understandings with the United States.9 Gorbachev similarly used force reductions in Afghanistan, Mongolia, and the Soviet Far East to signal to China in 1987 that he was serious about political negotiations.10 Elsewhere, non-negotiated, tit-for-tat military redeployments facilitated Argentina-Brazil rapprochement.11 Second, leaders may believe cutbacks are necessary, but would be dangerous in the absence of negotiated improvements with traditional foes. Economic downturns can serve as motivation to pursue arms control or political settlement. During periods of normalcy, such outcomes would be positives, but are viewed as “too hard” by political leaders that move from one urgent problem to the next. During periods of economic crisis, however, arms control or political improvements might allow for much needed cuts in defense spending, and are pursued with greater vigor. The Johnson administration attempted both unilateral and negotiated arms limitations because of budgetary concerns as President Johnson and Secretary McNamara struggled to pay for the “Great Society” domestic programs and the increasingly costly Vietnam War. They first attempted unilateral “caps” on costly nuclear forces and anti-ballistic missile defenses and when this failed to lead to a reciprocal Soviet response they engaged in formal arms control talks. Détente continued in the Nixon administration, accelerating in 1971 and 1972, simultaneous with rising budget deficits and inflation so serious that Nixon instituted price controls. Nixon’s decision to sharply limit anti-ballistic missile defenses to enable arms control talks was contrary to his strategic views, but necessitated by a difficult budgetary environment that made paying for more missile defense emplacements unrealistic.12 As Nixon told his national security advisor Kissinger in an April 1972 discussion of ballistic missile and anti-ballistic missile developments: “You know we've got a hell of a budget problem. We've got to cut it down, we've got to cut 5 billion dollars off next year's defense budget. So, I don't want to [inaudible: do it?] unless we've got some settlement with the Russians.”13 In practice, unilateral defense cuts and force reductions are frequently combined with negotiated political agreements in a sequential, iterative fashion, where a unilateral reduction will signal seriousness that opens the way for political agreement, which in turn permits even deeper reductions. Defense cuts and force reductions are not only a means to achieve rivalry termination, but also a goal in and of themselves that rivalry termination helps secure. Leaders are seeking resources from defense they can use elsewhere. Thus when Argentine leader Raul Alfonsín campaigned for the need for drastic budgetary austerity, his specific “platform was the reduction of military spending to use it for the other ministries, connected with the concept of eliminating the hypothesis of conflict” with Argentinian rivals, according to Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini, who served in Alfonsín’s ministry of defense (and later was Argentina’s foreign minister).14 Similarly, Gorbachev was motivated to reduce arms in the late 1980s because he determined it was necessary to cut Soviet defense spending and defense production, and repurpose part of the defense industry to make consumer and civilian capital goods, according to contemporary U.S. Central Intelligence Agency classified assessments.15 Thus the “main reason” why strategic arms control breakthroughs occurred from 1986 to 1988 and the Soviet Afghan intervention concluded in 1989 was a realization within the Politburo of “excessively high expenditures on defense,” according to Nikolai Ryzhkov, Gorbachev’s prime minister.16 Economic Downturns Provoke Strategic Reassessment: Threat Deflation and Prioritization Economic downturns encourage leaders to **seek new ideas** to use to frame their policy problems. During periods of economic difficulty, elites can come to realize that their problems are **not amenable to old solutions**, and search for new ideas.17 During an economic crisis, politics and policy are “more fluid,” as old answers seem stale and insufficient.18 An ideational entrepreneur that can link economic lemons to foreign policy lemonade can find a patron when leaders are casting about for ways to reframe the world in acceptable ways to their peers and publics. The behavior of an old foe is often ambiguous, and can be viewed as either injurious to one’s interests or neutral toward them. During periods of normalcy, the motivation of defense establishments is tilted toward threat and danger. During periods of economic crisis, national leaders have a counteracting motivation to downplay such dangers, so that the threats faced by a nation are manageable through available resources. Economic difficulties provide a motivation for leaders to view equivocal signals from the international system in a way that is benign. To the extent that rivalries are perpetuated because of threat inflation, economic downturns provide incentives to deflate the threat, potentially disrupting cycles of competition and enmity. South Korean president Kim Dae-jong came to power in the aftermath of the 1998 Asian economic crisis, pursued a “sunshine policy” toward the North, cut South Korean defense spending in nominal and real terms, and pursued a policy toward North Korea that political scientist Dong Sun Lee called “threat deflation” despite the growing North Korean nuclear weapons threat.19 Economic crises can also spur strategic reassessment through another channel. If leaders view economic problems as structural, rather than a temporary gale, they may come to question whether available national resources are sufficient to confront all of the national threats identified in the past. This creates incentives to economize threats, seeking political settlements where possible in order to focus remaining resources on competitions that can be won. A concrete example: in 1904, the chancellor to the Exchequer wrote his cabinet colleagues: “[W]e must frankly admit that the financial resources of the United Kingdom are inadequate to do all that we should desire in the matter of Imperial defense.”20 The result was a British decision to minimize political disagreement with the United States and focus on other defense challenges. While such a decision is in line with realist advice, it occurred not when the power trajectories were evident to British decisionmakers but when the budget situation had reached a crisis that could no longer be ignored. Economic Downturns Increase Incentives for International Economic Cooperation Economic downturns not only create incentives to cut spending, they encourage vigorous pursuit of opportunities for economic cooperation. This, too, can engender conciliatory behavior. Economic downturns can increase motives to pursue trade and investment. Rivalries with old foes often directly impinge on trade and investment with the adversary and may indirectly impinge on trade and investment with third parties, especially if the rivalry is viewed as being likely to generate disruptive military conflict. Additionally, economic aid is sometimes used as an inducement for adversaries to set aside a political dispute. This aid can either serve as a side payment from one rival to another, or it can be offered by a third party to one or both rivals as an incentive to set aside lingering disputes. Such aid is more attractive during periods of economic turmoil than during periods of comparative normalcy. In South Asia, India and Pakistan struggled from 1947 to 1960 with how to manage water resources in the Indus Rivers basin, inheriting a canal system meant to service pre-partitioned India. Pakistan, suffering an economic downturn, and India, reliant on foreign aid to avert economic crisis, agreed to an Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 to resolve the lingering dispute, made possible in substantial part because of World Bank financing that was especially attractive to the struggling economies. In the Middle East, **Egypt** and **Israel** made the hard choices necessary for the Camp David accord in 1979 precisely because the Sadat and Begin governments faced difficult economic situations at home that made the U.S. aid guarantee in exchange for a peace agreement especially attractive.21 In 1982, the **Yemen**’s People’s Republic agreed to stop its attempts to destabilize **Oman**, because otherwise Yemen would not receive economic assistance from Arab oil producing states that it desperately needed.22 In the late 1990s, El Niño-induced flooding devastated **Ecuador** and **Peru**, spurring reconciliation as leaders sought to increase trade, secure investment, and slash military expenditures so they could be used at home.23 As one Western diplomat assessed at the time, Ecuador and Peru “have decided it's better to see reason…. They see foreign companies eager to invest in South America, and if Peru and Ecuador are in conflict, it makes them less attractive than, say, Argentina or Brazil or Chile for investment purposes. That's the **last thing either country wants**.”24 Economic Downturns Can Cause Meaningful Leadership Change The above mechanisms have identified how economic difficulties can alter the preferences of an incumbent leader. Additionally, economic crises can **lead to leadership turnover** and, during periods of difficulty, the selection process that determines new leadership can **loosen ideological strictures** that relate to extant rivalries. Leaders may be selected based on judgments about their ability to cope with economic problems, with **greater** elite **acceptance of ideological heterogeneity** in foreign policy beliefs than in periods of normalcy.25 In Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth’s words, “If everything is going well or is stable, then why select leaders who might subvert the triedand-true identity? But if that identity is leading to increased material difficulties, **pressure for change will** likely **mount**. In these circumstances, those who are willing to alter or adjust the hallowed precepts of the existing identity and its associated practices are more likely to assume power.”26 Economic crisis, then, can spur incumbent leaders to either **abandon the “baggage” of rivalry** or facilitate the **select**ion of **new leaders** that do not carry such baggage. The most well-known example of an incumbent selectorate looking for a reformer, even one without much foreign policy experience, involves Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension to the Soviet premiership. In political scientist Jerry Hough’s words, “If the rate of economic growth continued to decline, if administrative and labor efficiency continued to fall, if corruption was not punished, these conditions would have dangerous consequences for the [Soviet Union in the] 1980s and 1990s…. **Gorbachev’s promotion** was an answer to these concerns.”27 Why Austerity and Not Stimulus? An important element in the foregoing discussion was that economic downturns lead to austerity pressures in states that suffer from them. Austerity is not the only policy response that is available for policymakers. Since at least John Maynard Keynes’s 1933 Means of Prosperity and 1936 General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, there has been a convincing theoretical rationale to increase government spending to counteract swings in aggregate demand from the private sector. Using government consumption, investment, and transfers to do so is generally referred to as economic stimulus, and the strategy of using stimulus to counteract economic downturns is referred to as countercyclical fiscal policy. (The cycle being counteracted is the business cycle of expansion and contraction.) Stimulus may well be the “correct” (general welfare-enhancing) governmental response to economic downturns, but it is empirically not the policy followed by most governments.28 Procyclical or acyclical policies are more commonly pursued. That is, governments either spend more when the economy is doing well and spend less when the economy is doing poorly (procyclical) or spending patterns vary little during periods of growth or contraction (acyclical). Nor are all procyclical policies the same. There is strong empirical evidence from Latin America, for instance, that procyclical policies are asymmetric so that government expenditures increase during good times, but decrease more in bad times than they increased in good times. In other words, the pressure to curtail spending during downturns is stronger than the pressure to increase spending during upturns.29 The reason such policies are pursued even when they may lead to suboptimal economic outcomes is still an active area of research. Empirical work and formal modeling has tended to focus on government institutional limitations, the role of interest groups in being able to secure government munificence in good times and avoid taxation in bad times, and constrained access to international finance during economic downturns.30 Most of these problems are more acute in developing countries. Additionally, there may be ideational trends largely exogenous from state characteristics.31 Prior to Keynes’s writings, there was little coherent intellectual justification for stimulus policies, even if occasionally governments pursued stimulus without a coherent conceptual framework.32 In their review of detailed economic data from 1960 to 2006, Ethan Ilzetzki and Carlos A. Vegh found “overwhelming evidence” that developing countries pursue procyclical fiscal policies. Moreover, they find “substantial evidence” of procyclicality in higher-income countries, the evidence muted somewhat since government expenditures as a whole are acyclical, while government consumption habits (such as paying government or military personnel or buying equipment for the government or military) are procyclical.33 The finding in wealthier countries of overall acyclical spending even while consumption is procyclical is likely in substantial part a product of the presence of “automatic stabilizers” in higher-income economies. On the taxation side, since progressivity is common in developed country tax codes, a decrease in national income leads to lower marginal tax rates for business and individuals. Government transfer payments to provide unemployment compensation, medical care, or food and nutrition are often regulated by needs-based criteria, rather than specific outlays. As a result, tax rates decrease and government transfers increase absent any government decision during periods of economic difficulty. Acyclical fiscal policy overall requires cutbacks in discretionary spending, such as in defense, in the presence of automatic stabilizers. Developing economies, as their institutions have improved, are adopting countercyclical (or at least less procyclical) fiscal policies at greater rates, but data from 2000 to 2009 still shows the overwhelming majority of developing countries pursue procyclical fiscal policies. In terms of aggregate trends, any increase in countercyclical policies in the developing world has been offset somewhat by increasingly procyclical fiscal policies in several developed economies, as ideational commitment to austerity has become more popular in the developed world.34 For this positive linkage between downturns and conciliatory outcomes to be correct, one type of countercyclical fiscal policy should be especially rare: military Keynesianism. Such a policy would attempt to increase government consumption during economic downturns by increasing the size of the armed forces or acquisitions of equipment and materiel for the military. Since World War II, it is difficult to identify many examples of military Keynesianism. While associated most closely with U.S. President Harry Truman’s economic advisor Leon Keyserling, the Truman administration rejected military Keynesianism as an intentional stimulus, though it did increase military spending after North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950. Nor did the idea find fertile soil in the United States after Truman. The Eisenhower administration’s attitude toward military Keynesianism more closely accords with the global norm in the post-World War II era. The president and his advisors believed military spending displaced more productive domestic spending and burdened private enterprise. Military Keynesianism, rightly or wrongly, largely lost the battle of ideas to Eisenhower’s sentiment that “every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed...”35 This is not to say there have not been isolated episodes where leaders were attracted to military Keynesian ideas, but they are rare. More common were beliefs that military research and development spending had useful commercial spin-off applications,36 but such beliefs do not imply countercyclical spending and are not a threat to the link between economic downturns and austerity. Why Diversionary Peace and Not Diversionary War? A theory that argues economic crises are likely to generate pressures to improve relations with historic rivals is seemingly at odds with one of the most well-known concepts in security studies: diversionary war. Diversionary war theories suggest that economic downturns or political difficulties lead national leaders to instigate conflict oversees. Two distinct causal logics are often posited: (1) that conflicts with external groups will generate greater feelings of “in-group” loyalty, spurring a “rally around the flag” effect37 or (2) that success in diversionary war could serve as a substitute for failures in domestic policy, so that leaders might opt to “gamble for resurrection” when domestic policies have failed but foreign policies might succeed.38 Given these arguments, why is it more plausible to believe diversionary peace is observed rather than diversionary war? First, the constituent mechanisms that propel the theory were **questionable upon examination**. German theorist Georg Simmel, perhaps the earliest to study “in-group/out-group” behavior, the social psychological foundation of many theories of diversionary war, stressed that **empirically**, “conflict between groups or nations has often **led to anomie rather than** to **an increase in internal cohesion**.”39 Similarly, close examination of U.S. public opinion data has shown **weak support for** consistent **“rally around the flag” effects**, finding overall the rally effect being perhaps a **1 percent increase** in public support.40 In general, the U.S. public appears to be “pretty prudent” in its support for the use of force overseas, rather than blindly patriotic.41 Additionally, it seems odd to assume voters are unaware of the perverse incentives that a[n] blind “rally around the flag” effect would generate. Michael Colaresi has proposed an informational model whereby voters are more likely to increase support to an executive during the use of force only in instances where it is easy for the public to observe post hoc if the rationale for conflict was true. The public knows post hoc they can punish the executive for lying to them, so gives them the “benefit of the doubt” during crisis.42 The further implication of Colaresi’s model being that the rally around the flag effect should be smallest in countries where no such post hoc accountability is possible because of the absence of elections, free media, or external oversight institutions. In other work, Philip Arena has demonstrated formally that so long as voters continue to take into account the state of the economy after a diversionary episode, then a leader is unlikely to benefit any more from diversionary war during downturns than he or she might during normal times.43 Unless the rally affect swamps retrospective economic voting, there should be no behavioral change during downturns. Second, the empirical support in favor of diversionary war during periods of economic or political disturbance is at best unconvincing. M. Taylor Fravel concludes, “[D]espite two decades of renewed research, cumulative knowledge on diversion remains elusive. Quantitative studies contain mixed and often contradictory empirical results regarding the relationship between internal and external conflict. Some studies find a positive relationship between indicators of domestic dissatisfaction and threats or uses of force in analysis of U.S. behavior and in cross-national studies. By contrast, other research identifies a weak or nonexistent relationship between these same variables.”44 Of particular interest, Williams, Brulé, and Koch find evidence in advanced economies that voters punish foreign diversions during economic downturns, and they hypothesize this empirical finding stems from voters preference for marshaling resources at home during periods of economic trouble.45 This empirical finding conforms to Geoffrey Blainey’s more casual observation four decades ago that starting trouble overseas during periods of economic difficulty is irrational since paying for that conflict is more difficult because of those economic hardships at home.46 In addition to null findings in support of diversionary war’s existence, there is limited support for the opposite conclusion that domestic vulnerability might spur reconciliation abroad. Christopher Darnton provided historical, qualitative evidence that economic downturns facilitated rapprochement when rival states in Latin America shared a common enemy.47 M. Taylor Fravel examined China’s willingness to undertake compromise in territorial disputes, drawing on Steven David’s concept of omnibalancing, in which national leaders seek to employ resources to best manage both external and internal threats simultaneously.48 Particularly for developing states, David and others have argued, internal threats may present more acute risks to regime survival.49 Fravel argues that internal threats to territorial integrity or threats to internal political stability can create incentives for states to compromise on disputes in order to free up resources for other tasks or gain new resources as a result of the resolved conflict.50 Finally, Krista Weigand has presented cross-national quantitative evidence that states undergoing periods of domestic political turmoil have been more likely to attempt territorial settlements than those with placid domestic conditions.51 Setting aside the overall levels of empirical support, there is at least one other way to reconcile diversionary war with patterns of diversionary peace. It is possible that if diversionary war does occur it is less likely to occur between rivals. While rivalries have emotional salience because of the enduring conflict, they also involve states that have been unable to resolve the rivalry through military force, as evidenced by the rivalry’s continued existence. A war that a leader expects to lose is unlikely to be an attractive diversion from domestic woes.52 As Amy Oakes notes, many weak states are seeking at most a “diversionary spectacle,” by provoking controversy with a target “unlikely to fight back.”53 The median dyad in the international system is 71 percent more unequal in its distribution of capabilities than the median rival pair.54 Rivals, on average, are less attractive targets for opportunism than other states.

1. World Trade Organization, “Members and Observers” <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> brett [↑](#footnote-ref-1)