# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### By means:

Oxford dictionary <https://www.google.com/search?q=by+definition&oq=by+definition&aqs=edge..69i57l2j69i59l2j69i60j69i64j69i60l3.1219j0j1&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

identifying the agent performing an action. 2. indicating the means of achieving something.

#### Countries are not private entities:

#### Lawinsider

[https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/private-entity //](https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/private-entity%20//) ella

**Private entity** means **any entity other than a State,** local government, Indian tribe, or foreign public entity, as those terms are defined in 2 CFR 175.25. Includes:

Entities is plural

https://www.wordhippo.com/what-is/the-plural-of/entity.html

What is the plural of entity? The plural form of entity is entities.

#### Satellite positioning is de facto appropriation, not appropriation proper.

Matignon 19 [Louis de Gouyon Matignon, PhD in space law from Georgetown University, “ORBITAL SLOTS AND SPACE CONGESTION,” 06/03/19, *Space Legal Issues*, https://www.spacelegalissues.com/orbital-slots-and-space-congestion/, EA]

Near-Earth space is formed of different orbital layers. Terrestrial orbits are limited common resources and inherently repugnant to any appropriation: they are not property in the sense of law. Orbits and frequencies are res communis (a Latin term derived from Roman law that preceded today’s concepts of the commons and common heritage of mankind; it has relevance in international law and common law). It’s the first-come, first-served principle that applies to orbital positioning, which without any formal acquisition of sovereignty, records a promptness behaviour to which it grants an exclusive grabbing effect of the space concerned. Geostationary orbit is a limited but permanent resource: this de facto appropriation by the first-comers – the developed countries – of the orbit and the frequencies is protected by Space Law and the International Telecommunications Law. The challenge by developing countries of grabbing these resources is therefore unjustified on the basis of existing law. Denying new entrants geostationary-access or making access more difficult does not constitute appropriation; it simply results from the traditional system of distribution of access rights. The practice of developed States is based on free access and priority given to the first satellites placed in geostationary orbit.

#### Violation: they specify China and defend sats

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Limits and ground – they justify speccing any country in the world like Luxembourg, China, Monaco, Peru, Russia, etc. AND defending anything that’s just in space but is not appropriation i.e. telescopes, the ISS, space exploration, cameras, hotels, etc. infinite permutations of those explodes limits and makes neg prep impossible

#### 2] Precision - topic wording is the basis of all prep since it’s the only thing we have to prep off of pre-round, so jettisoning it creates a lack of stable ground- its also a voter for jurisdiction because judges are constrained by the ballot to vote on the topic

#### Competing interps on T – you can’t be reasonably topical

#### DTD – T indicts the entire aff

#### No RVIs – illogical to win for being fair, encourages baiting and crowds out substance

#### Neg theory 1st – 1AC abuse shaped NC construction so if anything we did was bad it was just to get back in the game.

## 2

#### Xi is tightening control over the PLA but completing goals are critical.

Krishnan 21 – Ananth, 11/18/21, [‘Xi tightened control over the PLA’, TheHindu, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/xi-tightened-control-over-the-pla/article37549460.ece>] Justin

The new resolution on history passed last week by China’s ruling Communist Party has said that President Xi Jinping had tightened control over the military to address the party’s “obviously lacking” leadership of the armed forces under his predecessors.

The full text of the resolution, released on Tuesday evening, listed some of the actions taken by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under Mr. Xi, who is also the chairman of the Central Military Commission. These included what the document described as “major operations related to border defence”.

No specifics

It did not specify what those major operations were. China has unresolved land borders with India and Bhutan. In April 2020, the PLA mobilised two divisions and carried out multiple transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, sparking the worst crisis along the border in many years. Talks to resolve the tensions are still on-going.

“The armed forces have remained committed to carrying out military struggles in a flexible manner to counter military provocations by external forces, and they have created a strong deterrent against separatist activities seeking ‘Taiwan independence,’” the resolution said.

“They have conducted major operations related to border defence, protecting China’s maritime rights, countering terrorism and maintaining stability, disaster rescue and relief, fighting COVID-19, peacekeeping and escort services, humanitarian assistance, and international military cooperation.”

Last week’s resolution on history was only third such document putting forth the official view on party history, following resolutions passed by Mao Zedong in 1945 and Deng Xiaoping in 1981.

The new resolution dealt more with the future than the past. It essentially reaffirmed the official view on history, saying that the “basic points and conclusions” of past resolutions “remain valid to this day.”

It repeated the conclusion reached in 1981 on Mao’s errors noting that “mistakes were made” and that “Mao Zedong’s theoretical and practical errors concerning class struggle in a socialist society became increasingly serious” leading to the disasters of the Cultural Revolution.

Criticism of predecessors

Much of the new resolution focuses on emphasising Mr. Xi’s leadership and calling for the party to support his “core” status. It only briefly mentioned Mr. Xi’s predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and implicitly critcised some aspects of their leadership including on military matters.

“For a period of time, the party’s leadership over the military was obviously lacking,” it noted. “If this problem had not been completely solved, it would not only have diminished the military’s combat capacity, but also undermined the key political principle that the party commands the gun.”

The document said Mr. Xi’s leadership had tightened supervision on the military including boosting “troop training and battle preparedness”, and it repeated China’s stated goals of completing the modernisation of its armed forces by 2035 and building a “world class” military by 2050, which observers see as meaning on par with the U.S.

‘Working vigorously’

“To build strong people’s armed forces, it is of paramount importance to uphold the fundamental principle and system of absolute party leadership over the military, to ensure that supreme leadership and command authority rest with the party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC), and to fully enforce the system of the CMC chairman assuming overall responsibility,” the resolution said, adding that “setting their sights on this problem, the Central Committee and the CMC have worked vigorously to govern the military with strict discipline in every respect.”

#### Their ev proves the link – we read blue

Chow and Kelley 8/21 [(Brian G., policy analyst for the Institute of World Politics, Ph.D in physics from Case Western Reserve University, MBA and Ph.D in finance from the University of Michigan,and Brandon, graduate of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service ) “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons Could Conquer Taiwan—Or Start a War,” National Review, 8/21/2021] JL

If current trends hold, then China’s[Strategic Support Force](https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf) will be capable by the late 2020s of holding key U.S. space assets at risk. [Chinese military doctrine](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/nowhere-earth-will-be-safe-us-china-war-172523), statements by senior officials, and past behavior all suggest that China may well believe threatening such assets to be an effective means of deterring U.S. intervention. If so, then the United States would face a type of “Sophie’s Choice”: decline to intervene, potentially leading allies to follow suit and Taiwan to succumb without a fight, thereby enabling Xi to achieve his goal of “peacefully” snuffing out Taiwanese independence; or start a war that would at best be long and bloody and might well even cross the nuclear threshold.

This emerging crisis has been three decades in the making. In 1991, China watched from afar as the United States used space-enabled capabilities to obliterate the Iraqi military from a distance in the first Gulf War. The People’s Liberation Army quickly set to work developing capabilities targeted at a perceived Achilles’ heel of this new [American way of war](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/secrets-and-lies-role-truth-great-power-information-warfare-170579): reliance on vulnerable space systems.

This project came to fruition with a direct ascent[ASAT weapons test](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22652.pdf) in 2007, but the test was limited in two key respects. First, it only reached low Earth orbit. Second, it generated thousands of pieces of long-lasting space junk, provoking immense[international ire](https://spacenews.com/u-s-official-china-turned-to-debris-free-asat-tests-following-2007-outcry/). This backlash appears to have taken China by surprise, driving it to seek new, more usable ASAT types with minimal debris production. Now, one such ASAT is nearing operational status: spacecraft capable of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs).

Such spacecraft are[inevitable](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-2/Chow.pdf#page=22) and cannot realistically be limited. The United States, European Union, China, and others are developing them to provide a range of satellite services essential to the[new space economy](https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/space-economy-themes-2021), such as in situ repairs and refueling of satellites and active removal of space debris. But RPO capabilities are dual-use: if a satellite can grapple space objects for servicing, then it might well be capable of grappling an adversary’s satellite to move it out of its servicing orbit. Perhaps it could degrade or disable it by bending or disconnecting its solar panels and antennas all while producing minimal debris.

This is [a serious threat](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-america-lose-china-189020), primarily because no international rules presently exist to limit close approaches in space. Left unaddressed, this lacuna in international law and space policy could enable a prospective attacker to pre-position, during peacetime, as many spacecraft as they wish as close as they wish to as many high-value targets as they wish. The result would be an ever-present possibility of sudden, bolt-from-the-blue attacks on vital space assets—and worse, on many of them at once.

China has conducted at least[half a dozen tests of RPO](https://swfound.org/media/207179/swf_chinese_rpo_fact_sheet_apr2021.pdf#page=3) capabilities in space since 2008, two of which went on for years. Influential space experts have noted that these tests have plausible peaceful purposes and are in many cases similar to those conducted by the United States. This, however, does not make it any less important to establish effective legal, policy, and technical counters to their offensive use. Even if it were certain that these capabilities are intended purely for peaceful applications—and it is not at all clear that that is the case—China (or any other country) could at any time decide to repurpose these capabilities for ASAT use.

There is still time to get out ahead of this threat, but likely not for much longer. China’s RPO capabilities have, thus far, lagged about five years behind those of the United States. There are reasons to believe this gap may close, but even assuming that it holds, we should expect to see China demonstrate an operational dual-use rendezvous spacecraft by around 2025. (The first instance of a U.S. commercial satellite docking with another satellite to change its orbit occurred in[February 2020](https://news.northropgrumman.com/news/releases/northrop-grumman-successfully-completes-historic-first-docking-of-mission-extension-vehicle-with-intelsat-901-satellite).)

At the same time, China is expanding its capacity for rapid spacecraft manufacturing. The[Global Times](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213345.shtml) reported in January that China’s first intelligent mass production line is set to produce 240 small satellites per year. In April,[Andrew Jones](https://spacenews.com/china-is-developing-plans-for-a-13000-satellite-communications-megaconstellation/#:~:text=China%20is%20developing%20plans%20for%20a%2013%2C000%2Dsatellite%20megaconstellation,-by%20Andrew%20Jones&text=HELSINKI%20%E2%80%94%20China%20is%20to%20oversee,the%20country's%20major%20space%20actors.) at SpaceNews reported that China is developing plans to quickly produce and loft a thirteen thousand-satellite national internet megaconstellation. It is not unreasonable to assume that China could manufacture two hundred small rendezvous ASAT spacecraft by 2029, possibly more.

If this happens, and Beijing was to decide in 2029 to launch these two hundred small RPO spacecraft and position them in close proximity to strategically vital assets, then China would be able to simultaneously threaten disablement of the entire constellations of U.S. satellites for missile early warning (about a dozen satellites with spares included); communications in a nuclear-disrupted environment (about a dozen); and positioning, navigation, and timing (about three dozen); along with several dozen key communications, imagery, and meteorology satellites. Losing these assets would severely degrade U.S. deterrence and warfighting capabilities, yet once close pre-positioning has occurred such losses become almost impossible to prevent. For this reason, such pre-positioning could conceivably deter the United States from coming to Taiwan’s aid due to the prospect that intervention would spur China to disable these critical space systems. Without their support, the war would be much bloodier and costlier—a daunting proposition for any president.

Should the United States fail to intervene, the consequences would be disastrous for both Washington and its allies in East Asia, and potentially the credibility of U.S. defense commitments around the globe. Worse yet, however, might be what could happen if China believes that such a threat will succeed but proves to be wrong. History is rife with examples of major wars arising from miscalculations such as this, and there are many pathways by which such a situation could easily escalate out of control to a full-scale conventional conflict or even to nuclear use.

#### That triggers backlash – they don’t support restrictions on the space sector and will do everything to convince leaders not to do the plan.

Cheng 14 [Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow in the Asia Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, Former Senior Analyst at the China Studies Division of the Center for Naval Analyses, Former Senior Analyst with Science Applications International Corporation, “Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation”, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 4/9/2014, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/prospects-us-china-space-cooperation]

At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant political support within the Chinese political system. Based on their writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to establish “space dominance,” in order to fight and win “local wars under informationized conditions.”[8] The two SOEs are seen as key parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China’s commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of China’s aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent.[9] From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on preserving its interests. China’s space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in space, these reflect positively on both China’s growing power and respect (internationally) and the CCP’s legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the world’s second-largest economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms. Prospects for Cooperation Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation with the PRC in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited. China’s past experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures (Sino–Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.–China cooperation in the 1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino–European space cooperation on the Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of the joint Russian–Chinese Phobos–Grunt mission is likely seen in Beijing as further evidence that a “go-it-alone” approach is preferable. Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial complex in expanding cooperation.[10] Moreover, as long as China’s economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space expenditures—making international cooperation far less urgent for the PRC than most other spacefaring states. [FOOTNOTE] [10]It is worth noting here that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a part of the CCP Politburo, a key power center in China. Thus, the voice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is muted, at best, in any internal debate on policy. [END FOOTNOTE] If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation in Chinese circles, there should also be skepticism in American ones. China’s space program is arguably one of the most opaque in the world. Even such basic data as China’s annual space expenditures is lacking—with little prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important, China’s decision-making processes are little understood, especially in the context of space. Seven years after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, exactly which organizations were party to that decision, and why it was undertaken, remains unclear. Consequently, any effort at cooperation would raise questions about the identity of the partners and ultimate beneficiaries—with a real likelihood that the PLA would be one of them.

#### An unhinged PLA triggers Himalayan war – goes global

Chellaney 17 [Dr. Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy, PhD in International Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, “Why the Chinese Military’s Rising Clout Troubles Xi Jinping”, The National, 9/9/2017, https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/why-the-chinese-military-s-rising-clout-troubles-xi-jinping-1.626815?videoId=5754807360001]

China’s president Xi Jinping has stepped up his domestic political moves in the run-up to the critical 19th national congress of the Chinese Communist Party next month, but he is still struggling to keep the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in line. China’s political system makes it hard to get a clear picture, yet Mr Xi’s actions underscore the troublesome civil-military relations in the country. Take the recent standoff with India that raised the spectre of a Himalayan war, with China threatening reprisals if New Delhi did not unconditionally withdraw its forces from a small Bhutanese plateau, which Beijing claims is Chinese territory. After 10 weeks, the face-off on the Doklam Plateau ended with both sides pulling back troops and equipment from the site on the same day, signalling that Beijing, not New Delhi, had blinked. The mutual-withdrawal deal was struck just after Mr Xi replaced the chief of the PLA’s joint staff department. This key position, equivalent to the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, was created only last year as part of Mr Xi’s military reforms to turn the PLA into a force “able to fight and win wars”. The Doklam pullback suggests that the removed chief, Gen Fang Fenghui, who has since been detained for alleged corruption, was an obstacle to clinching a deal with India. To be sure, this was not the first time that the PLA’s belligerent actions in the Himalayas imposed diplomatic costs on China. A classic case happened when Mr Xi reached India on a state visit in September 2014. He arrived on Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s birthday with a strange gift for his host, a predawn Chinese military encroachment deep into India’s northern region of Ladakh. The encroachment, the worst in many years in terms of the number of intruding troops, overshadowed Mr Xi’s visit. It appeared bizarre that the military of an important power would seek to mar the visit of its own head of state to a key neighbouring country. Yet Chinese premier Li Keqiang’s earlier visit to New Delhi in 2013 was similarly preceded by a PLA incursion into another part of Ladakh that lasted three weeks. Such provocations might suggest that they are intentional, with the Chinese government in the know, thus reflecting a preference for blending soft and hard tactics. But it is also possible that these actions underscore the continuing “disconnect between the military and the civilian leadership” in China that then US defence secretary Robert Gates warned about in 2011. During his 2014 India trip, Mr Xi appeared embarrassed by the accompanying PLA encroachment and assured Mr Modi that he would sort it out upon his return. Soon after he returned, the Chinese defence ministry quoted Mr Xi as telling a closed-door meeting with PLA commanders that “all PLA forces should follow the president’s instructions” and that the military must display “absolute loyalty and firm faith in the party”. Recently Xi conveyed that same message yet again when he addressed a parade marking the 90th anniversary of the PLA’s creation on August 1, 1927. Donning military fatigues, Mr Xi exhorted members of his 2.3-million-strong armed forces to “unswervingly follow the absolute leadership of the party.” Had civilian control of the PLA been working well, would Mr Xi repeatedly be demanding “absolute loyalty” from the military or asking it to “follow his instructions”? China does not have a national army; rather the party has an army. So the PLA has traditionally sworn fealty to the party, not the nation. Under Mr Xi’s two immediate predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, the PLA gradually became stronger at the expense of the party. The military’s rising clout has troubled Mr Xi because it hampers his larger ambition. As part of his effort to reassert party control over the military, Mr Xi has used his anti-corruption campaign to ensnare a number of top PLA officers. He has also cut the size of the ground force and established a new command-and-control structure. But just as a dog’s tail cannot be straightened, asserting full civil control over a politically ascendant PLA is proving unachievable. After all, the party depends on the PLA to ensure domestic order and sustain its own political monopoly. The regime’s legitimacy increasingly relies on an appeal to nationalism. But the PLA, with its soaring budgets and expanding role to safeguard China’s overseas interests, sees itself as the ultimate arbiter of nationalism. To make matters worse, Mr Xi has made many enemies at home in his effort to concentrate power in himself, including through corruption purges. It is not known whether the PLA’s upper echelon respects him to the extent to be fully guided by his instructions. In the past decade, the PLA’s increasing clout has led China to stake out a more muscular role. This includes resurrecting territorial and maritime disputes, asserting new sovereignty claims, and using construction activity to change the status quo. China’s cut-throat internal politics and troubled civil-military relations clearly have a bearing on its external policy. The risks of China’s rise as a praetorian state are real and carry major implications for international security.

#### Extinction.

Caldicott 17 – Helen, 2017, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility [“The new nuclear danger: George W. Bush's military-industrial complex,” The New Press]//Elmer

The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reac­tion. **Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy, could respond** in kind. China, India's hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear [war] ~~holocaust~~ on the subcontinent. If any of either **Russia** or **America**'s 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either **accidentally** or **purposefully** in response, **nuclear winter** would ensue, meaning the **end of most life on earth**.

## 3

#### CP:

#### Russia ought to become a signatory of the Artemis Accords.

#### China ought to

#### become a signatory of the Artemis Accords,

#### end all space cooperation with Russia, and

#### end all space projects outside the scope of Artemis Accords.

- Both comply with all of the requirements

#### The United States ought to designate an exception to the Wolf Amendment to enable bilateral cooperation on space projects.

David 21 “Can the U.S. and China Cooperate in Space?” LEONARD DAVID AUGUST 02, 2021 <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/can-the-u-s-and-china-cooperate-in-space/> SM

Rather than await a heavy lift from the White House to change the Wolf Amendment, Head suggests it could be more fruitful for scientists to petition Congress for an exception so that they can work bilaterally with their Chinese peers on space projects. A way forward could be through the Inter-Agency Consultative Group for Space Science, an informal collective of researchers from major space agencies that executes interagency coordination on select missions.

Having China become a signatory of the Artemis Accords might be a productive pathway, too, Head adds. Led by the U.S. Department of State and NASA, these accords describe a shared vision for principles, grounded in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, to create a safe and transparent environment that facilitates exploration, science and commercial activities on the moon. As of this writing, a dozen countries have embraced the Artemis Accords: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, South Korea, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the U.K. and the U.S.

#### It’s competitive

Nelson 20 “The Artemis Accords and the Future of International Space Law” Jack Wright Nelson [Jack Wright Nelson is a Research Associate at the Faculty of Law of the National University of Singapore and a Member of the International Institute of Space Law. The author is grateful to the Faculty's Centre for Banking & Finance Law for supporting his ongoing research.], December 10, 2020 <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/31/artemis-accords-and-future-international-space-law> SM

The Artemis Accords

The Accords' ten operative paragraphs can be grouped into three categories. The first category reinforces certain core tenets of international space law. In particular, the Accords emphasize that all space activities must be for "peaceful purposes" and performed "in accordance with relevant international law."[8] The Accords also reaffirm and expand upon astronaut assistance obligations from the Rescue Agreement and registration requirements from the Registration Convention.[9]

The second category of operative paragraphs concerns specific operational issues. To this end, the Accords promote transparency, interoperability, and the sharing of scientific data.[10] On the pressing issue of space debris, the Accords' signatories have committed to engage in mitigation planning.[11]

The first and second categories are unlikely to be controversial: the first restates well-accepted law, while the second codifies nascent best practice. But the third category of operative paragraphs aims to progress international space law by promoting particular interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty concerning lunar heritage protection, space resource extraction, and the "deconfliction"[12] of space activities. Further, there are potential conflicts between the Accords and the most recent treaty to emerge from COPUOS—the Moon Agreement.[13]

The Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement

Regarding lunar heritage protection, the Accords state that signatories:

intend to preserve outer space heritage . . . compris[ing] historically significant human or robotic landing sites, artifacts, spacecraft and other evidence of activity on celestial bodies.[14]

Signatories to the Accords also:

affirm that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.[15]

Reducing the legal uncertainty surrounding space resource extraction was a key impetus for the development of the Accords. They build upon an Executive Order issued in April 2020 by President Trump to internationally promote space resource extraction.[16] But it is a controversial issue. Ultimately, the Accords represent a compromise. They do not expressly state that space resource extraction is legal. Rather, they simply state a negative: that such activity would not in and of itself amount to national appropriation (which Article II of the Outer Space Treaty—as extracted below—expressly prohibits).

Regarding space activities deconfliction, the Accords provide detailed guidance on the establishment and operation of "safety zones" around lunar installations.[17] Safety zones are buffer areas in which lunar activities would be subject to specific notification and coordination procedures in order to reduce the risk of collisions or interference. However, carving out or otherwise demarcating portions of the lunar surface—whether required for lunar heritage protection, space resource extraction, or safety zones—may face legal hurdles.

First, dividing up the lunar surface could breach the fundamental principle of non-appropriation of celestial bodies. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty provides that:

[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

Second, a divided lunar surface could prevent states from exercising their exploration, use, and free access rights. Article I, paragraph 2 of the Outer Space Treaty provides that:

[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

#### Definitely applies to private entities

Davenport 20, Christian. “Seven nations join the U.S. in signing the Artemis Accords, creating a legal framework for behavior in space” WaPo. 10-13-20. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/13/artemis-moon-mining-agreement-signed/> TG

NASA announced Tuesday that seven nations have joined the United States in signing the Artemis Accords, a series of bilateral agreements that would establish rules for the peaceful use of outer space and govern behavior on the surface of the moon.

The rules would allow private companies to extract lunar resources, create safety zones to prevent conflict and ensure that countries act transparently about their plans in space and share their scientific discoveries.

#### Sino Russian absence decks Artemis credibility.

Jhaveri 20 “Launching for Gold: The Artemis Accords and the Legality of Extraterrestrial Mining” KUNAL JHAVERI 2020 <http://www.mjilonline.org/launching-for-gold-the-artemis-accords-and-the-legality-of-extraterrestrial-mining/> SM

The U.S. aims to resolve the interpretative ambiguity of “national appropriation” by attempting to codify American policy on extraterrestrial mining into international customary law. The Artemis Accords arrived after the U.S. Congress passed of the Space Act 2015, which established the right to use and trade space resources into American domestic law.[xvi] Through the Artemis Accords, the U.S. advances the policy articulated by Congress that countries and companies can own the materials they extract from space objects and bodies without claiming ownership over the entirety of the extraterrestrial object or body. According to NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine, the U.S. “believe[s] that, just like in the ocean, you can extract resources from the ocean. But that doesn’t mean you own the ocean. You should be able to extract resources from the Moon. Own the resources but not own the Moon.”[xvii]

While conceding that national appropriation of space, including celestial bodies, is not permitted, the U.S.-led Artemis Accords intends to exploit the absence of a clear prohibition of harvesting space resources in the OST and international customary law frameworks. The Artemis Accords, if adhered to by its signatories and if accepted by a broader contingent of nations, could enable the U.S. interpretation of national appropriation in space, as articulated by Administrator Bridenstine, to prevail and make the U.S., the licensing nation for the majority of the world’s space enterprises, the apparent custodian of the Moon, asteroids, and other celestial bodies.[xviii] As acquiescence is often tantamount to consent in customary international law, the Artemis Accords’ interpretation of OST’s Article II, if not disputed by other nations, would likely strengthen the U.S. interpretation.

Ultimately, the utilization of bilateral agreements that dictate norms of behavior as a condition of involvement in a space program is a significant undertaking in space governance. For now, the Artemis Accords is just a collection of broadly phrased guidelines, without any defined enforcement mechanisms. All seven partnering countries that have agreed to the Accords with the U.S. are expected participants in the Artemis Program and have the potential to adhere to the Accords’ stated principles. In the leadup to the signing, Japan signaled interest in lunar exploration[xix] and Luxembourg adopted domestic legislation that permits space mining.[xx] The UAE and Australia are both actively trying to establish collaborative links with the broader space industry; the Accords represent an attractive opportunity for these countries to bolster their space capacity.[xxi] Further, Italy, the UK, and Canada all have public ambitions to develop their space manufacturing industries and view the Artemis Program as an opening to grow their respective space industries.[xxii]

Nevertheless, significant absences form the signing of the Accords threaten the framework’s legitimacy to define international law on extraterrestrial mining. Russia and China, two of the world’s leading space powers behind the U.S. have not signed the Artemis Accords. Russia has already labeled the Artemis Program as being too “US-centric.”[xxiii] China’s absence is partially explained by the U.S.’ statutory prohibition on NASA’s ability to coordinate any joint scientific activity with the country.[xxiv] Germany, France and India, countries with well-developed space programs, are also notably absent for the Accords. Time will tell how these absentees will react to the Artemis Accords’ interpretation of national appropriation as it relates to extraterrestrial mining. With disagreement likely, the Artemis Accords’ interpretation is unlikely to become the universal standard in the near future.

#### Resolves the Sino-Russia coop advantage and preserves US dominance – functionally surrenders the space race which de-escalates conflict.

Whittington 21 “The new race to the moon: the Artemis Alliance vs. the Sino-Russian Axis” 3/28/21 MARK WHITTINGTON <https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/545280-the-new-race-to-the-moon-the-artemis-alliance-vs-the-sino-russian-axis> SM

The new race to the moon: the Artemis Alliance vs. the Sino-Russian Axis

Space News recently reported that China and Russia have signed a memorandum of understanding to build what the two countries call an “International Lunar Research Station” (ILRS). The facility would conduct a number of activities either on the lunar surface or lunar orbit and would be “open to all interested countries and international partners.”

Whether deliberate or not, the two countries have formed an axis against what has come to be known as the Artemis Alliance being formed by NASA with a number of countries and commercial partners. In effect, China and Russia have challenged the United States and the rest of the world to a new race to the moon.

With the Biden administration having endorsed the Trump-era Artemis program, it looks like two credible, rival return-to-the-moon programs are now ongoing. Since one of those programs is run by two authoritarian nations and the other is led by NASA and consists of what many would consider the civilized world, the very definition of a race to the moon has developed, without fanfare, without brave speeches throwing down gauntlets.

Is this a good thing or a bad thing?

On the positive side, nothing like competition with a hostile power or two focuses the mind and ensures that the Artemis program remains on track and on a sensible schedule. The Apollo program succeeded because the winner of the race to the moon would have bragging rights for being the more technologically adept superpower.

On the negative side, what happens to determine which side “wins” the modern space race? During the Apollo-era, the answer was easy. President John F. Kennedy declared the goal of sending a man to the moon and returning him safely to the Earth before the end of the 1960s. In July 1969, the mission was accomplished. Indeed, the Apollo program had enough momentum for six more manned lunar missions before the United States stopped going to the moon and turned to other priorities.

What must happen for the winner to be declared in the new moon race? Who is first to return to the moon is not as important as what happens next.

The south pole of the moon is replete with water ice in shadowed craters, Water can be used to help sustain a lunar base. Water can be refined into rocket propellent, making the moon a refueling stop for spacecraft headed to other destinations in the solar system, such as Mars.

The moon also has a number of other resources ranging from rare earths, to platinum-group metals, to industrial metals such as titanium, iron and aluminum. Helium-3, an isotope embedded in lunar soil, could serve as fuel for future fusion power plants.

In short, the side that first exploits lunar resources effectively will be the side that creates a space-based industrial revolution enabled by lunar resources. Either the Sino-Russian Axis or the Artemis Alliance will own the future.

A few years ago, according to Space.com, Ian Crawford, a professor of planetary science and astrobiology at Birkbeck College in the UK, suggested that an economic case could be made for prospecting and mining lunar resources as a way to enable a near-Earth industrial infrastructure. He was skeptical about helium-3, which he regarded as a kind of “fossil fuel.” However, he concluded that in aggregate, the variety of resources on the moon could be exploited in an economical manner.

The other question is, who can own space resources? The Outer Space Treaty prohibits any assertion of sovereignty on the moon or any other celestial body. However, Congress passed a law a few years ago called the U.S. Space Launch Competitiveness Act that asserts that American citizens who mine space resources, including on the moon, own those resources. The fact that the United States owns the moon rocks that the Apollo astronauts gathered is seen as a precedent. On the other hand, some suggest that since the act can be seen as an assertion of sovereignty, it violates the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty. The governments of China and Russia might be expected to support the latter view.

In order to avoid conflict over resources on the moon or anywhere else in space, some kind of agreement, perhaps based on the Artemis Accords, needs to be struck between the Artemis Alliance and the Sino-Russian Axis. The first side to exploit a deposit of minerals should own it. Otherwise, we might expect the possibility that the Third World War might start on the moon with catastrophic consequences.

#### Artemis Accords establish Lunar Governance which stops resource conflicts.

Elvis et al 21 Elvis, Martin, Alanna Krolikowski, and Tony Milligan. "Concentrated lunar resources: imminent implications for governance and justice." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 379.2188 (2021): 20190563. //Elmer

3. Disputes over ‘potentially harmful interference’ If conflicts over lunar resources arise in the coming decade, as seems probable, they will incentivize searches for creative interpretations of the only applicable treaty with broad international recognition, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) [47]. More specifically, they may invite creative interpretations of Article II’s explicit statement that ‘Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means’. While the letter and the spirit of the Treaty prohibit formal appropriation, some of its provisions may in fact enable unexpected forms of de facto appropriation. In particular, Article IX introduces the principle of parties’ ‘due regard’ for the activities of other parties. The Treaty also states that, if a party’s activity could cause ‘potentially harmful interference with activities of other States’, parties can enter in consultations to address the matter. These concepts have enduring relevance. A statement of principles for the Artemis Accords, an architecture of bilateral agreements for lunar cooperation proposed by the United States in 2020, reaffirms commitment to Article IX and emphasizes a duty for parties to coordinate with and notify each in order to prevent interference [48]. These provisions in view, we recognize that parties could invoke their research activities to seek the exclusion from nearby areas of others whose activities present interference risks. At minimum, where significant resources are at stake, it seems likely that disputes over expectations and the practical meaning of ‘due regard’ will arise and require resolution. No mechanism for resolving such disputes currently exists. We argue here that our previous work on the Peaks of Eternal Light [3], identifying the likelihood of competition for this limited resource, is not a special case. Disputes over entitlements to access and entitlements to exclude, in order to prevent ‘potentially harmful interference,’ will apply in many cases, independent of the local resources or the lack thereof. But they are especially likely to occur at, or near to, the strategically valuable locations where lunar resources happen to be concentrated.

#### Military escalation from Lunar Conflicts – draw-in now due to Military interests.

David 21 Leonard David 12-6-2021 "Military interest in the moon is ramping up" <https://www.space.com/military-interest-moon-cislunar-space> (Leonard David is an award-winning space journalist who has been reporting on space activities for more than 50 years. Currently writing as Space.com's Space Insider Columnist among his other projects, Leonard has authored numerous books on space exploration, Mars missions and more, with his latest being "Moon Rush: The New Space Race" published in 2019 by National Geographic.)//Elmer

There is growing interest in protecting strategic assets in cislunar space, the realm between Earth and the moon. The U.S. Space Force is not the only entity engaged in reflecting on the topic of how best to extend military presence far from Earth. Other nations such as China are doing so as well. Parallel to air, land and sea skirmishes between nations here on Earth, is cislunar space, and perhaps the moon itself, an emerging military "high ground" and new territory for conflict? There’s a variance of views, according to experts Space.com talked to. Cislunar primer Earlier this year, the Air Force Research Laboratory distributed "A Primer on Cislunar Space," a document targeted at military space professionals who will answer the call to develop plans, capabilities, expertise and operational concepts for the region. "Cislunar space has recently become prominent in the space community and warrants attention," the document explains. As the U.S. Space Force "organizes, trains, and equips to provide the resources necessary to protect and defend vital U.S. interests in and beyond Earth orbit," the primer also underscores that new collaborations will be key to "operating safely and securely on these distant frontiers." Visionary wish list In the interim, the Defense Sciences Office at the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has blueprinted a wish list of new research to enable the fabrication of future space structures — including the use of lunar resources to enable those structures. Some of that research will be performed by the Novel Orbital and Moon Manufacturing, Materials and Mass-efficient Design program, or NOM4D. NOM4D aims to develop new materials, manufacturing, and design technologies to enable future structures to be built in Earth orbit or on the moon's surface. For instance, large solar arrays, large radio frequency reflector antennas and segmented infrared reflective optics are visualized. Building a precision structure while minimizing the required mass fraction brought from Earth will enable a spectrum of Department of Defense systems to be built using lunar-derived materials, DARPA officials say. "For the purposes of understanding the hypothetical use case, proposers may consider fabrication of structures on orbit or on the lunar surface for relaunch back into orbit as long as the proposed system is consistent with the Outer Space Treaty," NOM4D documentation explains. Contract negotiations are currently underway, with the selection of NOM4D winners soon to be announced, DARPA has advised Space.com. Military moon Advertisement The U.S. military has eyed the moon before. As far back as 1959, when NASA was still picking its first astronauts, the U.S. Army was concocting plans for a moon base, under the title of Project Horizon, explained Robert Godwin, a space historian and owner of Apogee Books, a Canadian publishing house that examines a variety of space history topics. Some details of the U.S. military's past interest in the moon remain classified to this day, Godwin said. In particular, there were looks at a nuclear bomb detonation in orbit around the moon that would empower "the weapon" — an X-ray laser that would take out enemy satellites and spacecraft, he told Space.com. That was then. But valuable U.S. assets on the moon, such as planned commercial ventures there, will make "the military presence to ensure their safety," Godwin said, "almost inevitable." "Back in 1959, the U.S. military was fretting over whether they could get supplies of toilet paper up there," he added. Looking back, he said those working on Project Horizon were coming out of World War II, practiced in moving hundreds of thousands of tons of heavy equipment around the world. "The fact they were going to have to make that equipment 'go up' instead of 'sideways' seemed to be secondary to their thinking," Godwin said. To that end, things have progressed. For example, scientists now believe that there's a lot of water on the moon. "But at the end of the day, you still go skin the cat. The way to do that could be more affordable now," Godwin said.

#### Space war goes nuclear.

Johnson-Freese 17 Joan Johnson-Freese, Professor and chair of space science and technology @ Naval War College, 17, Space Warfare in the 21st Century, Routledge, ISBN 978131552917, p 18-20.

Space warfare runs two untenable risks: the creation of destructive debris and escalation to terrestrial, even nuclear, warfare. Kinetic warfare in space creates debris traveling at a speed of more than 17,000 miles per hour, which then in itself becomes a destructive weapon if it hits another object—even potentially triggering the so-called Kessler Syndrome,86 exaggerated for dramatic effect in the movie Gravity. Ironically, both China and the United States learned the negative lessons of debris creation the hard way. In 1985, the United States tested a miniature homing vehicle (MHV) ASAT launched from an F-15 aircraft. The MHV intercepted and destroyed a defunct US satellite at an altitude of approximately 250 miles. It took almost 17 years for the debris resulting from that test to be fully eliminated by conflagration re-entering the Earth’s atmosphere or being consumed by frictional forces, though no fragment had any adverse consequences to another satellite—in particular, no collisions. China irresponsibly tested a direct-ascent ASAT in 2007, destroying one if its defunct satellites. That test was at an altitude almost twice that of the 1985 US test. The debris created by the impact added 25 percent to the debris total in low Earth orbit87 and will dissipate through the low Earth orbit, heavily populated with satellites, for decades, perhaps centuries, to come. Perhaps most ironically, because of superior US debris-tracking capabilities, the United States—even though not required to do so—has on more than one occasion warned China that it needed to maneuver one of its satellites to avoid a collision with debris China itself had likely created.88 In 2013, a piece of Chinese space junk from the 2007 ASAT test collided with a Russian laser ranging nanosatellite called BLITS, creating still more debris.89 The broader point is that all nations have a compelling common interest in avoiding the massive increase in space debris that would be created by a substantial ASAT conflict. Gen. Hyten has said that not creating debris is “the one limiting factor” to space war. “Whatever you do,” he warns, “don’t create debris.”90 While that might appear an obvious “limiting factor,” preparing to fight its way through a debris cloud had been a Pentagon consideration in the past. Now, however, sustaining the space environment has been incorporated into Pentagon space goals. Beyond debris creation, MacDonald points out that as China becomes more militarily capable in space and there is more symmetry between the countries, other risks are created – specifically, escalation. That is, the United States could threaten to attack not just Chinese space assets, but also ground-based assets, including ASAT command-and-control centers and other military capabilities. But such actions, which would involve attacking Chinese soil and likely causing substantial direct casualties, would politically weigh much heavier than the U.S. loss of space hardware, and thus might climb the escalatory ladder to a more damaging war that both sides would probably want to avoid.91 MacDonald isn’t alone in concerns about escalation. Secure World Foundation analyst Victoria Samson has also voiced apprehension regarding US rhetoric that does not distinguish between actions against unclassified and classified US satellites, stating that “things can escalate pretty quickly should we come into a time of hostility.”92 Theresa Hitchens explained the most frightening, but not implausible, risk of space war escalation in a 2012 Time magazine interview. Say you have a crisis between two nuclear-armed, space-faring countries, Nation A and Nation B, which have a long-standing border dispute. Nation A, with its satellite capability, sees that Nation B is mobilizing troops and opening up military depots in a region where things are very tense already, on the tipping point. Nation A thinks: “That’s it, they’re going to attack.” So it might decide to pre-emptively strike the communications satellite used by Nation B to slow down its ability to move toward the border and give itself time to fortify. Say this happens and Nation B has no use of satellites for 12 hours, the time it takes it to get another satellite into position. What does Nation B do? It’s blind, it’s deaf, it’s thinking all this time that it’s about to be overwhelmed by an invasion or even nuked. This is possibly a real crisis escalation situation; something similar has been played out in U.S. Air Force war games, a scenario-planning exercise practiced by the U.S. military. The first game involving anti-satellite weapons stopped in five minutes because it went nuclear – bam. Nation B nuked Nation A. This is not a far-out, “The sky’s falling in!” concern, it is something that has been played out over and over again in the gaming of these things, and I have real fears about it.93 While escalation to a nuclear exchange may seem unthinkable, in war games conducted by the military, nuclear weapons are treated as just another warfighting weapon. Morgan also voiced concerns about escalation generally and nuclear escalation specifically in the 2010 RAND report, stating: The adversary would also likely be deterred from damaging U.S. satellite early-warning system (SEWS) assets to avoid risking inadvertent escalation to the nuclear threshold, but that firebreak would almost certainly collapse with the conclusion that such escalation is inevitable and that it is in the adversary’s interest to launch a preemptive nuclear strike.94

# Case

### Inherency

#### They have a singular uniqueness card from over a year ago – prefer ours on recency

- Politically incentivized – Kennedy proves

- US 7x as many sats as China

- Last year China funding reduced

Grieco 1-19 Kelly A. Grieco, a senior fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She received her PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology., 1-19-2022, "The China-US Space Race Is a Myth," The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/the-china-us-space-race-is-a-myth/> // ella

The United States is not falling behind China in space – quite the contrary. The politics of fear sells. In his successful 1960 campaign for president, then Senator John F. Kennedy seized on the dangers of the missile gap – a presumed Soviet superiority in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Kennedy exploited anxiety all the way to the White House. Yet the missile gap was a myth. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara admitted as much to Kennedy in 1962, claiming “emotionally guided but nonetheless patriotic individuals in the Pentagon” were responsible. McNamara then warned Kennedy, “There are still people of that kind in the Pentagon. I wouldn’t give them any foundation for creating another myth.” Seventy years later, it is happening again. Pundits, politicians, and senior military officers alike now warn the United States is losing a space race to China. “We are absolutely in a strategic competition with China and space is a part of that,” Gen. David D. Thompson, vice chief of space operations for the U.S. Space Force, warned recently. “The fact, that in essence, on average, they are building and fielding and updating their space capabilities at twice the rate we are means that very soon, if we don’t start accelerating our development and delivery capabilities, they will exceed us.” Space alarmism makes great headlines. But the United States is not falling behind China in space – quite the contrary. The United States remains the most advanced space power in the world. Of the more than 4,500 satellites in orbit today, the United States accounts for more than half of them, some 2,700 satellites and nearly seven times as many as the next competitor, China. True, the Chinese hold the record for the most space launches in 2021 – a total of 55 launches to the United States’ 51. But the number of launches only tells part of the story, because the United States has more powerful rockets, able to deliver more payloads – satellites, space probes, and spacecraft – into orbit. China’s space funding has increased markedly in recent years, to $8.9 billion in 2020, but it still spent a mere fraction of the United States’ $48 billion. The U.S. also boasts a booming commercial space industry, with hundreds of startups joining leading firms like Blue Origin and SpaceX, and investors pouring billions of dollars into the U.S. space economy. Meanwhile, China’s private space industry lags behind American companies and, last year, funding trended in the wrong direction. China’s space program has made significant advances in recent years, from completing its own global satellite navigation system and collecting lunar samples to landing a spacecraft on Mars and sending astronauts to its own space station. But these milestones should serve as a reality check: The United States is not falling behind in the space race, so much as China is steadily catching up after having started so far behind. Likewise, China’s space ambitions are impressive, with plans to develop satellite mega-constellations and further explore the moon and deep space, but each of these Chinese space endeavors will need to first clear significant technical and other obstacles. For example, in June, Beijing released a roadmap for an International Lunar Research Station to be developed jointly with Russia. This plan requires China to field the Long March 9, a super heavy-lift rocket that has been in the research-and-development phase since 2011. The Chinese expect it to make its first test flight around 2030, but their troubles with other heavy rockets suggest that ambitious goal could well be pushed back. Even then, China landing its astronauts on the moon hardly constitutes a great victory. After all, the United States won that race back in 1969. Still, the China space-race narrative has helped to stoke fears in Washington. The alarm associated with “falling behind” in the space race is invariably paired with calls for the U.S. to spend more on new space military capabilities, space exploration, and the commercial space industry. Steve Kwast, a retired Air Force lieutenant general, warns “there won’t be many prizes for second place” and urges Washington to act with greater “urgency and excitement.” But much like the missile gap of the late 1950s, such “calls to arms” encourage a massive militarization of space and risk misallocating limited defense resources.

### AT: Space militarization

#### No war.

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester; ELN; 20 Februrary 2018; “The Art of Space Deterrence,” <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/>] brett

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.

### AT: Taiwan war

#### No ASATs – we read blue

1AC Chow and Kelley 8/21 [(Brian G., policy analyst for the Institute of World Politics, Ph.D in physics from Case Western Reserve University, MBA and Ph.D in finance from the University of Michigan,and Brandon, graduate of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service ) “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapons Could Conquer Taiwan—Or Start a War,” National Review, 8/21/2021] JL

If current trends hold, then China’s[Strategic Support Force](https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf) will be capable by the late 2020s of holding key U.S. space assets at risk. [Chinese military doctrine](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/nowhere-earth-will-be-safe-us-china-war-172523), statements by senior officials, and past behavior all suggest that China may well believe threatening such assets to be an effective means of deterring U.S. intervention. If so, then the United States would face a type of “Sophie’s Choice”: decline to intervene, potentially leading allies to follow suit and Taiwan to succumb without a fight, thereby enabling Xi to achieve his goal of “peacefully” snuffing out Taiwanese independence; or start a war that would at best be long and bloody and might well even cross the nuclear threshold.

This emerging crisis has been three decades in the making. In 1991, China watched from afar as the United States used space-enabled capabilities to obliterate the Iraqi military from a distance in the first Gulf War. The People’s Liberation Army quickly set to work developing capabilities targeted at a perceived Achilles’ heel of this new [American way of war](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/secrets-and-lies-role-truth-great-power-information-warfare-170579): reliance on vulnerable space systems.

This project came to fruition with a direct ascent[ASAT weapons test](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22652.pdf) in 2007, but the test was limited in two key respects. First, it only reached low Earth orbit. Second, it generated thousands of pieces of long-lasting space junk, provoking immense[international ire](https://spacenews.com/u-s-official-china-turned-to-debris-free-asat-tests-following-2007-outcry/). This backlash appears to have taken China by surprise, driving it to seek new, more usable ASAT types with minimal debris production. Now, one such ASAT is nearing operational status: spacecraft capable of rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs).

Such spacecraft are[inevitable](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-2/Chow.pdf#page=22) and cannot realistically be limited. The United States, European Union, China, and others are developing them to provide a range of satellite services essential to the[new space economy](https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/space-economy-themes-2021), such as in situ repairs and refueling of satellites and active removal of space debris. But RPO capabilities are dual-use: if a satellite can grapple space objects for servicing, then it might well be capable of grappling an adversary’s satellite to move it out of its servicing orbit. Perhaps it could degrade or disable it by bending or disconnecting its solar panels and antennas all while producing minimal debris.

This is [a serious threat](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-america-lose-china-189020), primarily because no international rules presently exist to limit close approaches in space. Left unaddressed, this lacuna in international law and space policy could enable a prospective attacker to pre-position, during peacetime, as many spacecraft as they wish as close as they wish to as many high-value targets as they wish. The result would be an ever-present possibility of sudden, bolt-from-the-blue attacks on vital space assets—and worse, on many of them at once.

China has conducted at least[half a dozen tests of RPO](https://swfound.org/media/207179/swf_chinese_rpo_fact_sheet_apr2021.pdf#page=3) capabilities in space since 2008, two of which went on for years. Influential space experts have noted that these tests have plausible peaceful purposes and are in many cases similar to those conducted by the United States. This, however, does not make it any less important to establish effective legal, policy, and technical counters to their offensive use. Even if it were certain that these capabilities are intended purely for peaceful applications—and it is not at all clear that that is the case—China (or any other country) could at any time decide to repurpose these capabilities for ASAT use.

There is still time to get out ahead of this threat, but likely not for much longer. China’s RPO capabilities have, thus far, lagged about five years behind those of the United States. There are reasons to believe this gap may close, but even assuming that it holds, we should expect to see China demonstrate an operational dual-use rendezvous spacecraft by around 2025. (The first instance of a U.S. commercial satellite docking with another satellite to change its orbit occurred in[February 2020](https://news.northropgrumman.com/news/releases/northrop-grumman-successfully-completes-historic-first-docking-of-mission-extension-vehicle-with-intelsat-901-satellite).)

At the same time, China is expanding its capacity for rapid spacecraft manufacturing. The[Global Times](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213345.shtml) reported in January that China’s first intelligent mass production line is set to produce 240 small satellites per year. In April,[Andrew Jones](https://spacenews.com/china-is-developing-plans-for-a-13000-satellite-communications-megaconstellation/#:~:text=China%20is%20developing%20plans%20for%20a%2013%2C000%2Dsatellite%20megaconstellation,-by%20Andrew%20Jones&text=HELSINKI%20%E2%80%94%20China%20is%20to%20oversee,the%20country's%20major%20space%20actors.) at SpaceNews reported that China is developing plans to quickly produce and loft a thirteen thousand-satellite national internet megaconstellation. It is not unreasonable to assume that China could manufacture two hundred small rendezvous ASAT spacecraft by 2029, possibly more.

If this happens, and Beijing was to decide in 2029 to launch these two hundred small RPO spacecraft and position them in close proximity to strategically vital assets, then China would be able to simultaneously threaten disablement of the entire constellations of U.S. satellites for missile early warning (about a dozen satellites with spares included); communications in a nuclear-disrupted environment (about a dozen); and positioning, navigation, and timing (about three dozen); along with several dozen key communications, imagery, and meteorology satellites. Losing these assets would severely degrade U.S. deterrence and warfighting capabilities, yet once close pre-positioning has occurred such losses become almost impossible to prevent. For this reason, such pre-positioning could conceivably deter the United States from coming to Taiwan’s aid due to the prospect that intervention would spur China to disable these critical space systems. Without their support, the war would be much bloodier and costlier—a daunting proposition for any president.

Should the United States fail to intervene, the consequences would be disastrous for both Washington and its allies in East Asia, and potentially the credibility of U.S. defense commitments around the globe. Worse yet, however, might be what could happen if China believes that such a threat will succeed but proves to be wrong. History is rife with examples of major wars arising from miscalculations such as this, and there are many pathways by which such a situation could easily escalate out of control to a full-scale conventional conflict or even to nuclear use.

#### China won’t attack Taiwan. They perceive deterrence, intervention, geography, readiness, and economic factors as too big to risk.

- China military weak

- Even if it succeeds, China will spend trillions rebuilding and unifying Taiwan

- US and other country intervention solves

- China not preparing

- Taiwan geography – 14 small beaches and cliffs

- Assumptions wrong – deterrence solves

- Failed invasion turns econ

Cohen 21 Michael A. Cohen, a columnist for MSNBC. He writes a newsletter on American politics and foreign policy called Truth and Consequences, 11-19-2021, “No, Neocons, China Is Not About to Invade Taiwan”, [https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan //](https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan%20//) ella

More than two months after U.S. combat troops formally withdrew from Afghanistan, ending a disastrous and failed 20-year war, one might expect that the war drums of U.S. foreign policy commentators would be getting a rest. Instead, a new potential target has been identified: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Ever since the Communists seized control of China in 1949 and the Nationalist government, led by Chiang-Kai-shek, fled across the Taiwan Straits, China has repeatedly called for the reunification of Taiwan and China. These demands have generally emphasized a desire for “peaceful reunification,” but Beijing has also warned that a Taiwanese declaration of independence would lead to war. The United States has long played a key role in the territorial dispute. It initially signed a bilateral defense agreement with Taiwan in 1954 and over the years supplied the island with armaments. Even after recognizing the Chinese Communist government in Beijing in 1979, the U.S. has adhered to position of “strategic ambiguity” when it comes to the question of an American response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. The flames have been fanned by a host of military figures and foreign policy pundits. But today, with U.S.-Chinese relations at one of the lowest points in recent memory—and as the Chinese military takes increasingly provocative military actions toward Taiwan—the fears of war have increased. So, too, have the calls for the U.S. to ratchet up its efforts to defend Taiwan, including the potential use of military force. The flames have been fanned by a host of military figures and foreign policy pundits. Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific, got the party started last March when he warned a Senate committee that China could invade Taiwan “in the next six years.” Writing in The Wall Street Journal, former Trump Defense official Elbridge Colby ramped up the threat-mongering by declaring, “Beijing has made clear it is willing to use force to take Taiwan.… And this isn’t mere talk. The Chinese military has rehearsed amphibious attacks, and commercial satellite imagery shows that China practices large-scale attacks on U.S. forces in the region.” In the Bible of the foreign policy establishment, Foreign Affairs, Orianna Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, warned that “whereas Chinese leaders used to view a military campaign to take the island as a fantasy, now they consider it a real possibility.” Yes, China could invade Taiwan, says the Heritage Foundation. And Taiwan’s top defense official—perhaps not surprisingly—warned recently that China will be able to mount a “full-scale” invasion of Taiwan by 2025. Some U.S. policymakers have taken these warnings to heart. Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton has called for the U.S. to end its policy of “strategic ambiguity” and make clear its willingness to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley warned recently that “if China takes control of Taiwan, Beijing will be emboldened to seize other territories around the globe” and called on the U.S. to increase pressure on China, including a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics scheduled to be held in Beijing. But how legitimate are these fears? Is the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan a serious and urgent concern? The answer is “not very.” And it’s a view, ironically, endorsed by the Pentagon. Earlier this month, the Defense Department released its annual report to Congress on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” While the report lays out the ways in which China’s “People’s Liberation Army” is seeking to modernize its forces, the threat to Taiwan of armed invasion is still minimal at best: Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the PRC’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. One might expect that a country intent on launching the largest and most difficult amphibious invasion in history would be making intense preparations. That’s not happening. As the Pentagon report notes, Chinese naval investments have focused on building up the capacity to launch “regional and eventually global expeditionary missions rather than the large number of landing ship transports and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault.” The Pentagon also finds that while China is focusing on conducting joint operations that involve forces from the army, navy, and air force, as of present it currently lacks such capabilities. The soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience. That the Chinese military enjoys vast military superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan is not in doubt. But that such resources can be used to mount an amphibious assault is something else altogether. The Chinese military last fought a war in 1979 against Vietnam, and the PLA was badly bloodied. That means that the soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience. China’s own media outlets have, according to the Pentagon, noted the PLA’s shortcomings, which include that “commanders cannot (1) judge situations; (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions; (3) make operational decisions; (4) deploy forces; and, (5) manage unexpected situations.” These problems would be challenging enough in a conventional conflict. For a complex invasion of Taiwan, they would render such efforts virtually impossible. One big reason is that Taiwan is about as inhospitable an environment as can be imagined for an amphibious invasion. Ian Easton, a defense expert who has written extensively about Taiwan defense strategy, wrote earlier this year that the country’s “coastal terrain … is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles.” Easton also notes that “many of Taiwan’s outer islands bristle with missiles, rockets, and artillery guns. Their granite hills have been honeycombed with tunnels and bunker systems.” A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would look more like the World War II Marine assaults on the rough and unforgiving terrain of Pacific islands than it would D-Day (which was no walk in the park, either) but against an exponentially more competent and technologically advanced military. Even if somehow China were successful in invading Taiwan and occupying the island, it would then find itself in the position of having to pacify and potentially rebuild an advanced nation of 23 million people (two million of whom are members of the nation’s military reserves). Putting aside the virtually insurmountable military obstacles, there’s the larger issue of how the U.S. and other nations in the region would respond (in recent weeks, Japanese leaders have made clear their determination to help Taiwan in the wake of Chinese invasion). The U.S. could play a decisive role, even without boots on the ground in Taiwan. For example, American naval and air forces could wreak havoc on Chinese supply lines. As Rachel Esplin Odell and Eric Heginbotham wrote recently in Foreign Affairs (in response to Skylar Mastro): “To seize control of the island, China would need to keep its fleet off Taiwan’s coast for weeks, creating easy targets for antiship cruise missiles launched from Taiwan or from U.S. bombers, fighter aircraft, and submarines.” Ultimately, no one knows what the U.S. would do in response to a Chinese attack. In recent months, President Biden has twice publicly stated that the U.S. will defend Taiwan, which rhetorically goes so beyond the long-held policy of “strategic ambiguity” that the White House has been forced to walk back his comments. But even if Biden got too far out on his skis, his misstatements create even further confusion for China about U.S. intentions. Those who are argue that China could invade Taiwan are assuming that Beijing would willingly initiate a conflict that could lead, potentially, to the involvement of the world’s strongest military, backed by thousands of nuclear weapons. Such assumptions throw the entire notion of deterrence on its head. Lastly, there are the political and financial costs. If China were to attack Taiwan, it would require the mobilization of millions of its citizens and billions, or even trillions, in spending simply to prepare for war. Success would bring with it an even larger price tag for rebuilding Taiwan and integrating the island into China. Anything other than complete military success and acquiescence by the international community would reap an ill wind for Chinese leaders. Economic isolation; interruption of trade ties that have been essential to China’s economic growth over the past two decades; and a generation, if not more, of mistrust and hostility from the U.S., China’s Asian neighbors, and likely the international community would almost certainly be the result. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan that was anything but a success would likely leave the nation politically isolated, economically damaged, and reputationally ~~crippled~~. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan that was anything but a success would likely leave the nation politically isolated, economically damaged, and reputationally crippled. And ironically, a failed attack could lead to a Taiwanese declaration of independence—one that China would be incapable of stopping. All that, at a time when the Chinese economy is facing a collection of economic headwinds—from an energy crunch and a growing real estate crisis to slowing economic growth. There are other force options available to China’s leaders. The aforementioned Pentagon report notes the potential for an “Air and Maritime Blockade,” “Limited Force or Coercive Options,” and an “Air and Missile Campaign.” But all of these bring with them similar negative political and economic consequences. China could also ramp up the military provocations that have been increasing since 2020, moves that have included Chinese aircraft repeatedly violating Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone and have refuted the existence of a so-called “median line” in the Taiwan Strait. But these moves should be seen in more straightforward terms: an effort to deter Taiwan from taking further steps toward declaring independence. Those warning of a Chinese invasion would be wise to consider Xi Jingping’s most recent statements about Taiwan. In Beijing’s readout of the meeting this week between Biden and Xi, it states, in regard to Taiwan, “We have patience and will strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with utmost sincerity and efforts.” At the same time, the statement makes clear, “Should the separatist forces for Taiwan independence provoke us, force our hands, or even cross the red line, we will be compelled to take resolute measures.” As M. Taylor Fravel, a professor of political science and director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, notes, this is consistent with Beijing’s long-standing political-military strategy for Taiwan. “In the simplest terms,” says Fravel, China “seeks to deter Taiwan from declaring independence (and perhaps the U.S. from supporting it), and use military threats toward this end, but not compel unification by force. Military power and interdependence are part of the equation, but they are not the core of the policy that China is now pursuing.” In Fravel’s view, not only are the costs of invading Taiwan high, it’s not Beijing’s “preferred approach for achieving unification.” After all, Fravel notes, “the people of Taiwan are described as ‘compatriots’ and not enemies.” The U.S. can play a useful role in maintaining the ambiguous status quo. Since 1979, the U.S. has adhered to a “one China” policy, which views Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China. The U.S. would do well to make clear that this policy remains in place, while at the same time maintaining its position of “strategic ambiguity” and discouraging any provocative moves by Taiwan toward independence. But above all, the Biden administration needs to ignore the alarmist rhetoric of those warning that a Chinese invasion is imminent or even reading too much into China’s provocations. Even if it wanted to, China is not about to invade Taiwan.

### AT Sino-Russia coop

#### Russia and China will never fully cooperate

- want the same regions

- fine now, gets worse over time

Beckley 18 Michael Beckley, associate professor of political science at Tufts University. He has held positions at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and is currently a Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. His research focuses on great power politics, and his 2018 book, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower, offered an alternative view to the overpowering idea that the United States was in decline and would be overtaken by a rising China. Beckley serves as an advisor to the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense, “Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World's Sole Superpower”, pg 98-109, 2018 // ella

Russia and China currently maintain a "strategic partnership," but this relationship is unlikely to become a genuine alliance, because the two coun- tries share a 2,600-mile border and a desire to dominate Eurasia--a goal that one side can accomplish only by subjugating the other. Perhaps a shared hatred of the United States will bring Russia and China together, but history suggests otherwise.'5 At the start of the Cold War, China initially aligned with the Soviet Union, but by the 1960s the two Communist powers were literally at war with each other, and in the 1970s China offi- cially switched sides and aligned with the United States.26 Today, many Russian and Chinese strategists warn their respective gov- ernments not to place too much faith in a sustainable partnership. 77 Foreign analysts come to similar conclusions. As one study explains: "[Sino- Russian] cooperation is limited to areas where their interests already over- lap, like bolstering trade. In the parts of the world that matter most to them, Russia and China are more rivals than allies."38 For every example of Sino-Russian cooperation, there is a counterexample of competition. For instance, Russia sells weapons to China, but it recently reduced sales to China while increasing sales to China's rivals, most notably India and Vietnam." Russia and China conduct joint military exercises, but they also train with each other's enemies and conduct unilateral exercises simulating a Sino-Russian war.40 The two countries share an interest in devel- oping Central Asia, but Russia wants to tether the region to Moscow via the Eurasian Economic Union whereas China wants to reconstitute the Silk Road and link China to the Middle East and Europe while bypassing Russia." Col- lectively, these conflicting interests have placed Russia and China "on a trajectory toward intensifying competition from latent to emergent rivalry."12 What of the EU, the other potential anti-U.S. coalition? Since 1998, EU member states have developed a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and raised a "rapid reaction force" of 60,000 troops and eigh- teen 1,500-troop "battle groups." Some scholars characterize these develop. ments as balancing against the United States.13 But EU nations have devoted less than 1 percent of their military manpower to the CSDP, far less than they contribute to the U.S-led NATO alliance; the EU battle groups have never been deployed; and all of the missions undertaken under the CSDP frye been small peacekeeping missions involving an average of 3,000 troops. fi In 2017, the EU announced a new initiative the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)-that committed members to increase defense spending and improve the bloc's ability to project power in hot spots near Europe. The initiative, however, is unlikely to offset the damage done by Britain's exit from the EU, given that Britain accounted for a quarter of EU defense spending and half of EU military R&D spending. 15

#### Limited Russia/China co-op is inevitable, but have no impact.

Dr. James Jay Carafano 19, PhD from Georgetown University, Master of Arts Degree in Strategy from the U.S. Army War College, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University, Former Director of Military Studies at the Army’s Center of Military History, Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security at the Heritage Foundation, “Why the China-Russia Alliance Won't Last”, The National Interest, 8/5/2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-china-russia-alliance-wont-last-71556

So, now everybody wants to be Bismarck. They see themselves shaping history by artfully moving big pieces on the geostrategic chessboard. And one gambit they just can’t resist is moving to snip the growing bonds of Sino-Russian cooperation.

My advice to them: Just stop.

Fears of an allied China and Russia running amok around the world are overblown. Indeed, there is so much friction between these “friends,” any attempt to team up would likely give both countries heat rash.

Siren’s Cat Call

Here’s the lame narrative that’s animating the Bismarck wannabes: The United States is pushing back against Moscow and pressing Beijing. This is driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. Beijing and Moscow will then gang-up on the United States. To prevent this, the United States should make nice with Moscow (undermining the incipient Sino-Russian détente) and then focus on beating back against China.

Yes, China and Russia are going to work together to some degree. They have important things in common. For example, both are unaccountable authoritarian regimes that share the Eurasian continent. Other indicators of compatibility: they like doing business with each other, and both like to make up their own rules. Heck, they don’t even have to pretend the liberal world order is a speed-bump in their joint ventures. Both happily engage with the world’s most odious regimes, from Syria to Venezuela. And, of course, neither has any compunction about playing dirty when it serves their interests.

They already play off of each other to frustrate foreign-policy initiatives from Washington. For example, if the United States pressures Russia to vote a certain way on a measure before the UN Security Council, Russia will often don the white hat and vote as we desire, knowing that Beijing will veto the measure for them. Similarly, if the United States leans on Beijing stop giving North Korea some form of aid and comfort, Beijing can go along with the request, knowing that Moscow will pick up the baton for them.

What the neo-Bismarcks need to ask themselves is: Why would Russia or China ever consider giving up these practices? Why would they make the ongoing great power competition easier for the United States? That makes no sense. That is not in their self-interest.

Any notion that the United States could somehow seduce Russian president Vladimir Putin from playing house with Beijing is fanciful. Putin doesn’t do something for nothing; his price would be quite high. He could demand a free hand in Ukraine, or lifting sanctions, or squelching opposition to Nordstream II, or giving Russia free rein in the Middle East. Any of these “deals” would greatly compromise American interests. Why would we do that? And what, exactly, is Putin going to deliver in return? What leverage does Russia have on Beijing? The answer is not near enough to justify any of these concessions.

On the other hand, what leverage would a Russia-China alliance have on the United States? They wouldn’t jointly threaten Washington with military action. A central element of both their strategies is that they want to win against the United States “without fighting.”

Moscow might be happy if the United States got distracted in a military mix-up with China. Conversely, Beijing could okay with the Americans have an armed confrontation with the Russians. But, neither of them will be volunteering to go first anytime soon.

Even if they linked arms to threaten the United States in tandem, the pain would not be worth the gain. As long as America maintains a credible global and strategic deterrent, a Sino-Russian military one-two punch is pretty much checkmated. Peace through strength really works.

If direct military confrontation is out of bounds, then what can Beijing and Moscow do using economic, political, and diplomatic power or tools of hybrid warfare? The answer to that question is easy: exactly what they are already doing.

We have plenty of evidence of on-going political warfare aimed at the United States, its friends, allies, and interests. Some of these activities are conducted in tandem; some are instances of copy-catism; and some are independent and original.

The political warfare takes many forms—ranging from corrosive economic behavior to aggressive diplomacy to military expansionism and more.

All these malicious efforts are a problem. What they don’t add up to is an existential threat to vital U.S. interests. In other words, we can handle this without sucking up to Putin and undermining our own interests. In fact, we already have a national-security strategy that adequately addresses these concerns.

One more thing inhibiting a Sino-Russian hookup. Russian and Chinese power is largely asymmetrical. They have very different strengths and weaknesses. In coordinating their malicious activities against the United States, they don’t line out very well. China, for example, can’t really do anything substantive to help Russia in Syria. Putin doesn’t have much to offer in the South China Seas or in brokering a U.S.-China trade agreement.

There are also limits to the Sino-Russia era of good feelings. Other than trying to take America down a notch, their global goals are not well aligned. Indeed, the more they try to cooperate, the more their disparate interests will grate on the relationship.

For example, China is meddling more in Central Asia and the Arctic—spaces where Russia was dominant. Moscow has to ask itself: Why is Beijing elbowing in? There is an argument that rather than looking for a strategic partnership, China is just biding its time till Russia implodes, and Beijing steps in and sweeps up the choice pieces.

And, as much as Putin likes to tweak Trump about Moscow’s ties with Beijing, it is becoming more apparent to Washington that Russia is ever more the junior partner. Can Putin really continue to play Robin to a Chinese Batman? As for China, they have to ask: What does Robin really bring to the dynamic-duo?

### AT: Revisionist

#### Russia and China are not revisionist – Middle East proves

Hoffman 21 Jon Hoffman, Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University specializing in Middle East geopolitics and political Islam, 9-15-2021, "Neither Russia Nor China Could Fill A U.S. Void In The Middle East Nor Would They Desire To.," Foreign Policy, [https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/15/neither-russia-nor-china-could-fill-a-u-s-void-in-the-middle-east/ //](https://outline.com/eX7Bvy%20//) ella

The 20th anniversary of 9/11 and America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan have renewed debate over whether the United States should remain so deeply engaged militarily in the broader Middle East. These debates typically center on whether such a presence is needed to ensure the safe transit of oil out of the Persian Gulf, prevent terrorist attacks, or prevent a single power from dominating the region. More recently, however, the topic of great-power competition among the United States, Russia, and China in the Middle East has increasingly moved to the forefront of such debates, and U.S. officials and policy analysts have begun raising the alarm over the possibility of Moscow or Beijing filling the void if Washington were to withdraw militarily from the region. But such concerns are misguided. Neither Russia nor China is capable of filling a supposed U.S. void in the Middle East, nor do they desire to. Moscow and Beijing have not outright challenged the U.S.-led security order in the region, because they benefit from it: It has provided the security umbrella for them to become more involved in the region without having to assume the costs of physically protecting their interests. Indeed, their ability to continue their low-cost maneuvering in the region would be undermined by a U.S. absence. In the Middle East, Russia and China are opportunists, not revisionists. Russia and China have certainly sought to exploit U.S. exhaustion in the region, as well as the heightened regional tensions following the 2011 Arab uprisings. Russia intervened militarily in Syria to save Bashar al-Assad in 2015, and that country is now home to Moscow’s only naval base in the Mediterranean Sea. Moscow involved itself in Libya’s ongoing civil war, supporting the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar with airstrikes, weapons, private military contractors, and Russian special forces. It has deployed private military contractors to Sudan to support the Transitional Military Council that assumed power following the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir, and it has inked a deal with the council to build a Russian naval base off the coast of Sudan in the Red Sea. It has also considerably increased its arms sales throughout the Middle East. China, meanwhile, has become the region’s largest oil consumer, largest trade partner, and largest investor, with Beijing seeking to merge its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative with the national economic reform and development programs being pursued by numerous states in the region. China’s arms sales to the region have also increased significantly. Some see these developments as evidence that the only thing standing in the way of Russia or China further expanding their influence and strategic position within the Middle East is the commanding military presence of the United States. Of particular concern would be Moscow or Beijing coming to dominate the critical trade and oil routes in the region, such as the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Eastern Mediterranean. This is particularly the case with China; the fear is that Beijing would be able to complete the midsection of its Belt and Road Initiative, due to no longer having to circumvent U.S. military dominance of these critical trade routes, thereby dominating the most critical trade and oil routes in greater Eurasia. Another fear is that regional powers—including not only U.S. adversaries such as Iran but also U.S. partners such as Israel and Saudi Arabia—would turn toward Moscow and Beijing as their new great-power benefactor if the United States were to abdicate, tilting the global balance of power further east. But these doomsday predictions fail to account for the serious limitations both Russia and China would face in the Middle East should the United States withdraw. Russia and China would have to assume a far more direct presence to secure their respective interests in the region. Yet both countries would be highly averse to creating and upholding such a security order. First, the Middle East does not represent an existential interest to either Beijing or Moscow. Not only are both far more concerned with competition with Washington in their own immediate neighborhoods, but also both Russia and China are facing serious economic troubles in addition to highly contentious domestic environments, making power projection into the Middle East without a U.S. security guarantee very unlikely and highly risky. Moreover, pulling back from the Middle East would provide Washington with more resources that can be directed toward strategic competition with Moscow and Beijing, an outcome that neither Russia nor China would welcome. Both countries would also have to set about creating and upholding a new political order in the region. Russia and China have been able to make inroads in the region primarily by compartmentalizing their foreign policies in the Middle East. They have largely refrained from taking sides in the region’s greatest geopolitical competitions—the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the rift among the Gulf Arab countries, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—and thereby avoided being dragged into these disputes. They have been able to do so because the United States, as the region’s predominant power, has built a political order in the region that relies on specific client states to reinforce the U.S. power and sideline adversaries.

### AT: Disease

#### No extinction

Owen Cotton-**Barratt 17**, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are **very unlikely to cause human extinction**. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, **less than 4%** (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is **very numerous**, **globally dispersed**, and capable of a rational **response to problems**, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic.

One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a **selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal**. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

### AT: Heg

#### Alt causes to China heg -

Sullivan and Brands 20 Jake Sullivan, a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Geoeconomics and Strategy Program and also Magro Family Distinguished Fellow at Dartmouth College, Hal Brands, Jake Sullivan was a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Geoeconomics and Strategy Program and also Magro Family Distinguished Fellow at Dartmouth College,5-22-2020, “China has two paths to global domination”, [https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/22/china-has-two-paths-to-global-domination-pub-81908 //](https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/22/china-has-two-paths-to-global-domination-pub-81908%20//) ella

If true superpower status is China’s desired destination, there are two roads it might take to try to get there. The first is the one American strategists have until now emphasized (to the extent they acknowledged China’s global ambitions). This road runs through China’s home region, specifically the Western Pacific. It focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power, and it looks quite familiar to the road the United States itself once traveled. The second road is very different because it seems to defy the historical laws of strategy and geopolitics. This approach focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale.