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### ADV – COVID

#### The time to expand vaccination on a global level is now---highly contagious mutations facilitate continued spread which render current vaccines ineffective.

Kumar 7-12 Rajeesh Kumar, Rajeesh Kumar is Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi., 7-12-2021, "WTO TRIPS Waiver and COVID-19 Vaccine Equity," Manohar Paprikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/wto-trips-waiver-covid-vaccine-rkumar-120721>, EH and brett

Two significant factors rekindled the debate on TRIPS waiver for essential medical products—first, vaccine inequity, and second, the insufficiency of existing waiver provisions in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 is an exceptional circumstance, and equitable global access to the vaccine is necessary to bring the pandemic under control. However, the world is witnessing quite the reverse, i.e., vaccine nationalism. Vaccine nationalism is “my nation first” approach to securing and stockpiling vaccines before making them available in other countries. A TRIPS waiver would be instrumental in addressing the growing inequality in the production, distribution, and pricing of the COVID-19 vaccines.

Vaccine Inequity

According to Duke Global Health Innovation Center, which monitors COVID-19 vaccine purchases, rich nations representing just 14 per cent of the world population have bought up to 53 per cent of the most promising vaccines so far. As of 4 July 2021, the high-income countries (HICs) purchased more than half (6.16 billion) vaccine doses sold globally. At the same time, the low-income countries (LICs) received only 0.3 per cent of the vaccines produced. The low and middle-income countries (LMICs), which account for 81 per cent of the global adult population, purchased 33 per cent, and COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) has received 13 per cent.10 Many HICs bought enough doses to vaccinate their populations several times over. For instance, Canada procured 10.45 doses per person, while the UK, EU and the US procured 8.18, 6.89, and 4.60 doses per inhabitant, respectively.11

Source:“Tracking COVID-19 Vaccine Purchases Across the Globe”, Duke Global Health Innovation Center, Updated 9 July 2021.

Consequently, there is a significant disparity between HICs and LICs in vaccine administration as well. As of 8 July 2021, 3.32 billion vaccine doses had been administered globally.12 Nonetheless, only one per cent of people in LICs have been given at least one dose. While in HICs almost one in four people have received the vaccine, in LICs, it is one in more than 500. The World Health Organization (WHO) notes that about 90 per cent of African countries will miss the September target to vaccinate at least 10 per cent of their populations as a third wave looms on the continent.13 South Africa, the most affected African country, for instance, has vaccinated less than two per cent of its population of about 59 million. This is in contrast with the US where almost 47.5 per cent of the population of more than 330 million has been fully vaccinated. In Sub-Saharan Africa, vaccine rollout remains the slowest in the world. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), at current rates, by the end of 2021, a massive global inequity will continue to exist, with Africa still experiencing meagre vaccination rates while other parts of the world move much closer to complete vaccination.14

This vaccine inequity is not only morally indefensible but also clinically counter-productive. If this situation prevails, LICs could be waiting until 2025 for vaccinating half of their people. Allowing most of the world’s population to go unvaccinated will also spawn new virus mutations, more contagious viruses leading to a steep rise in COVID-19 cases. Such a scenario could cause twice as many deaths as against distributing them globally, on a priority basis. Preventing this humanitarian catastrophe requires removing all barriers to the production and distribution of vaccines. TRIPS is one such barrier that prevents vaccine production in LMICs and hence its equitable distribution.

#### Waiving IP protections is essential to expand manufacturing and global exports. A litany of countries possess capacity but lack know-how -- the plan is key.

Kumar 7-12 Rajeesh Kumar, Rajeesh Kumar is Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi., 7-12-2021, "WTO TRIPS Waiver and COVID-19 Vaccine Equity," Manohar Paprikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/wto-trips-waiver-covid-vaccine-rkumar-120721>, brett

Another argument against the proposed TRIPS waiver is that a waiver would not increase the manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines. Indeed, one of the significant factors contributing to vaccine inequity is the lack of manufacturing capacity in the global south. Further, a TRIPS waiver will not automatically translate into improved manufacturing capacity. However, a waiver would be the first but essential step to increase manufacturing capacity worldwide. For instance, to export COVID-19 vaccine-related products, countries need to ensure that there are no IP restrictions at both ends – exporting and importing. The market for vaccine materials includes consumables, single-use reactors bags, filters, culture media, and vaccine ingredients. Export blockages on raw materials, equipment and finished products harm the overall output of the vaccine supply chain. If there is no TRIPS restriction, more governments and companies will invest in repurposing their facilities.

Similarly, the arguments such as that no other manufacturers can carry out the complex manufacturing process of COVID-19 vaccines and generic manufacturing as that would jeopardise quality, have also been proven wrong in the past. For instance, in the early 1990s, when Indian company Shantha Biotechnics approached a Western firm for a technology transfer of Hepatitis B vaccine, the firm responded that “India cannot afford such high technology vaccines… And even if you can afford to buy the technology, your scientists cannot understand recombinant technology in the least.”25 Later, Shantha Biotechnics developed its own vaccine at $1 per dose, and the UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund) mass inoculation programme uses this vaccine against Hepatitis B. In 2009, Shantha sold over 120 million doses of vaccines globally.

India also produces high-quality generic drugs for HIV/AIDS and cancer treatment and markets them across the globe. Now, a couple of Indian companies are in the last stage of producing mRNA (Messenger RNA) vaccines.26 Similarly, Bangladesh and Indonesia claimed that they could manufacture millions of COVID-19 vaccine doses a year if pharmaceutical companies share the know-how.27 Recently, Vietnam also said that the country could satisfy COVID-19 vaccine production requirements once it obtains vaccine patents.28 Countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina and South Korea have the capacity to produce high-quality vaccines but lack technologies and know-how. However, Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia have limited manufacturing capacities, which could also produce COVID-19 vaccines after repurposing.

Moreover, COVID-19 vaccine IPR runs across the entire value chain – vaccine development, production, use, etc. A mere patent waiver may not be enough to address the issues related to its production and distribution. What is more important here is to share the technical know-how and information such as trade secrets. Therefore, the existing TRIPS flexibilities, such as compulsory and voluntary licensing, are insufficient to address this crisis. Further, compulsory licensing and the domestic legal procedures it requires is cumbersome and not expedient in a public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic.

#### Boosting manufacturing capacity is critical to a timely response to COVID AND ensures preparedness for future pandemics.

Jecker & Atuire 21, Dr Nancy S Jecker, Department of Bioethics & Humanities, University of Washington School of Medicine. Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park, Gauteng, South Africa. Caesar A Atuire, Department of Philosophy and Classics, University of Ghana, Accra, Accra, Ghana. All Souls College, University of Oxford, Oxford, Oxfordshire, UK. Journal of Medical Ethics 2021;47:595-598. “What’s yours is ours: waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines.” <https://jme.bmj.com/content/47/9/595> brett

Since consequentialist justifications treat the value of IP as purely instrumental, they are also vulnerable to counterarguments showing that a sought-after goal is not the sole or most important end. During the COVID-19 pandemic, we submit that the vaccinating the world is an overriding goal. With existing IP protections intact, the world has fallen well short of this goal. Current forecasts show that at the current pace, there will not be enough vaccines to cover the world’s population until 2023 or 2024.15 IP protections further frustrate the goal of universal access to vaccines by limiting who can manufacturer them. The WHO reports that 80% of global sales for COVID-19 vaccines come from five large multinational corporations.16 Increasing the number of manufacturers globally would not only increase supply, but reduce prices, making vaccines more affordable to LMICs. It would stabilise supply, minimising disruptions of the kind that occurred when India halted vaccine exports amidst a surge of COVID-19 cases.

It might be objected that waiving IP protections will not increase supply, because it takes years to establish manufacturing capacity. However, since the pandemic began, we have learnt it takes less time. Repurposing facilities and vetting them for safety and quality can often happen in 6 or 7 months, about half the time previously thought.17 Since COVID-19 will not be the last pandemic humanity faces, expanding manufacturing capacity is also necessary preparation for future pandemics. Nkengasong, Director of the African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, put the point bluntly, ‘Can a continent of 1.2 billion people—projected to be 2.4 billion in 30 years, where one in four people in the world will be African—continue to import 99% of its vaccine?’18

#### COVID escalates every hotspot---extinction.

RECNA et al. 21, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), Asia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN), and the Nautilus Institute. Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament Volume 4, 2021. “Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks: The Nagasaki 75th Anniversary pandemic-nuclear nexus scenarios final report” <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2021.1890867> brett

The relationship between pandemics and war is as long as human history. Past pandemics have set the scene for wars by weakening societies, undermining resilience, and exacerbating civil and inter-state conflict. Other disease outbreaks have erupted during wars, in part due to the appalling public health and battlefield conditions resulting from war, in turn sowing the seeds for new conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, pandemics have spread with unprecedented speed due to increased mobility created by globalization, especially between urbanized areas. Although there are positive signs that scientific advances and rapid innovation can help us manage pandemics, it is likely that deadly infectious viruses will be a challenge for years to come.

The COVID-19 is the most demonic pandemic threat in modern history. It has erupted at a juncture of other existential global threats, most importantly, accelerating climate change and resurgent nuclear threat-making. The most important issue, therefore, is how the coronavirus (and future pandemics) will increase or decrease the risks associated with these twin threats, climate change effects, and the next use of nuclear weapons in war.5

Today, the nine nuclear weapons arsenals not only can annihilate hundreds of cities, but also cause nuclear winter and mass starvation of a billion or more people, if not the entire human species. Concurrently, climate change is enveloping the planet with more frequent and intense storms, accelerating sea level rise, and advancing rapid ecological change, expressed in unprecedented forest fires across the world. Already stretched to a breaking point in many countries, the current pandemic may overcome resilience to the point of near or actual collapse of social, economic, and political order.

In this extraordinary moment, it is timely to reflect on the existence and possible uses of weapons of mass destruction under pandemic conditions – most importantly, nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons. Moments of extreme crisis and vulnerability can prompt aggressive and counterintuitive actions that in turn may destabilize already precariously balanced threat systems, underpinned by conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of weaponized chemical and biological technologies. Consequently, the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, increases at such times, possibly sharply.

The COVID-19 pandemic is clearly driving massive, rapid, and unpredictable changes that will redefine every aspect of the human condition, including WMD – just as the world wars of the first half of the 20th century led to a revolution in international affairs and entirely new ways of organizing societies, economies, and international relations, in part based on nuclear weapons and their threatened use. In a world reshaped by pandemics, nuclear weapons – as well as correlated non-nuclear WMD, nuclear alliances, “deterrence” doctrines, operational and declaratory policies, nuclear extended deterrence, organizational practices, and the existential risks posed by retaining these capabilities – are all up for redefinition.

A pandemic has potential to destabilize a nuclear-prone conflict by incapacitating the supreme nuclear commander or commanders who have to issue nuclear strike orders, creating uncertainty as to who is in charge, how to handle nuclear mistakes (such as errors, accidents, technological failures, and entanglement with conventional operations gone awry), and opening a brief opportunity for a first strike at a time when the COVID-infected state may not be able to retaliate efficiently – or at all – due to leadership confusion. In some nuclear-laden conflicts, a state might use a pandemic as a cover for political or military provocations in the belief that the adversary is distracted and partly disabled by the pandemic, increasing the risk of war in a nuclear-prone conflict. At the same time, a pandemic may lead nuclear armed states to increase the isolation and sanctions against a nuclear adversary, making it even harder to stop the spread of the disease, in turn creating a pandemic reservoir and transmission risk back to the nuclear armed state or its allies.

In principle, the common threat of the pandemic might induce nuclear-armed states to reduce the tension in a nuclear-prone conflict and thereby the risk of nuclear war. It may cause nuclear adversaries or their umbrella states to seek to resolve conflicts in a cooperative and collaborative manner by creating habits of communication, engagement, and mutual learning that come into play in the nuclear-military sphere. For example, militaries may cooperate to control pandemic transmission, including by working together against criminal-terrorist non-state actors that are trafficking people or by joining forces to ensure that a new pathogen is not developed as a bioweapon.

To date, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the isolation of some nuclear-armed states and provided a textbook case of the failure of states to cooperate to overcome the pandemic. Borders have slammed shut, trade shut down, and budgets blown out, creating enormous pressure to focus on immediate domestic priorities. Foreign policies have become markedly more nationalistic. Dependence on nuclear weapons may increase as states seek to buttress a global re-spatialization6 of all dimensions of human interaction at all levels to manage pandemics. The effect of nuclear threats on leaders may make it less likely – or even impossible – to achieve the kind of concert at a global level needed to respond to and administer an effective vaccine, making it harder and even impossible to revert to pre-pandemic international relations. The result is that some states may proliferate their own nuclear weapons, further reinforcing the spiral of conflicts contained by nuclear threat, with cascading effects on the risk of nuclear war.

### ADV – Legitimacy

#### The WTO is on the brink -- the TRIPS waiver is the critical factor determining the survival of multilateral trade AND creates momentum for structural reforms

Meyer 6-18 David Meyer, 6-18-2021, "The WTO’s survival hinges on the COVID-19 vaccine patent debate, waiver advocates warn – Fortune," Fortune, https://fortune.com/2021/06/18/wto-covid-vaccines-patents-waiver-south-africa-trips/amp/, EH and brett

The World Trade Organization knows all about crises. Former U.S. President Donald Trump threw a wrench into its core function of resolving trade disputes—a blocker that President Joe Biden has not yet removed—and there is widespread dissatisfaction over the fairness of the global trade rulebook. The 164-country organization, under the fresh leadership of Nigeria’s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, has a lot to fix. However, one crisis is more pressing than the others: the battle over COVID-19 vaccines, and whether the protection of their patents and other intellectual property should be temporarily lifted to boost production and end the pandemic sooner rather than later. According to some of those pushing for the waiver—which was originally proposed last year by India and South Africa—the WTO’s future rests on what happens next. “The credibility of the WTO will depend on its ability to find a meaningful outcome on this issue that truly ramps-up and diversifies production,” says Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, South Africa’s ambassador to the WTO. “Final nail in the coffin” The Geneva-based WTO isn’t an organization with power, as such—it’s a framework within which countries make big decisions about trade, generally by consensus. It’s supposed to be the forum where disputes get settled, because all its members have signed up to the same rules. And one of its most important rulebooks is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, which sprang to life alongside the WTO in 1995. The WTO’s founding agreement allows for rules to be waived in exceptional circumstances, and indeed this has happened before: its members agreed in 2003 to waive TRIPS obligations that were blocking the importation of cheap, generic drugs into developing countries that lack manufacturing capacity. (That waiver was effectively made permanent in 2017.) Consensus is the key here. Although the failure to reach consensus on a waiver could be overcome with a 75% supermajority vote by the WTO’s membership, this would be an unprecedented and seismic event. In the case of the COVID-19 vaccine IP waiver, it would mean standing up to the European Union, and Germany in particular, as well as countries such as Canada and the U.K.—the U.S. recently flipped from opposing the idea of a waiver to supporting it, as did France. It’s a dispute between countries, but the result will be on the WTO as a whole, say waiver advocates. “If, in the face of one of humanity’s greatest challenges in a century, the WTO functionally becomes an obstacle as in contrast to part of the solution, I think it could be the final nail in the coffin” for the organization, says Lori Wallach, the founder of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, a U.S. campaigning group that focuses on the WTO and trade agreements. “If the TRIPS waiver is successful, and people see the WTO as being part of the solution—saving lives and livelihoods—it could create goodwill and momentum to address what are still daunting structural problems.” Those problems are legion.

#### HIV/AIDS prove legitimacy damage from patent controversy---every bit of delay saps credibility---now is key

Bacchus 20 James Bacchus [member of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida. He was a founding judge and was twice the chairman—the chief judge—of the highest court of world trade, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland. ], 12-16-2020, "An Unnecessary Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiver-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines accessed 7/20/2021 EH

Balancing IP Rights and Access to Medicines Not New to WTOThis waiver controversy comes nearly two decades after the end of the long battle in the multilateral trading system over access to HIV/AIDS drugs. At the height of the HIV/AIDS crisis at the turn of the century, numerous countries, including especially those from sub‐​Saharan Africa, could not afford the high‐​priced HIV/AIDS drugs patented by pharmaceutical companies in developed countries. Having spent billions of dollars on developing the drugs, the patent holders resisted lowering their prices. The credibility of the companies, the countries that supported them, and the WTO itselfwere all damaged byanextended controversy over whether patent rights should take precedence over providing affordable medicines for people afflicted by a lethal disease.

#### Perception alone solves, regardless of success, issuing the waiver is a sign of goodwill that shores up legitimacy

Winslett 5-27, Gary Winslett is an associate fellow for finance and trade at the R Street Institute. He is also an assistant professor of political science at Middlebury College. May 27, 2021. National Interest, “The Political Significance of the TRIPS Waiver” <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/political-significance-trips-waiver-186246> brett

Fourth, the U.S. government supporting a limited TRIPS waiver is a massive step toward rebuilding the perceived legitimacy of the WTO. The perception that the WTO was slowing the global response to the coronavirus, however oversimplified and unfair, would have been a potentially devastating blow to an institution that has already been under attack. A TRIPS waiver buys considerable goodwill from developing countries. It also buys goodwill from Democrats. That could help the whole party take a more trade-friendly stance on everything from an Environmental Goods Agreement to an e-commerce trade deal, to say nothing of the broader benefit of convincing Democrats to like trade even more than they already do—79 percent of Democrats view trade as more of an opportunity than a threat versus only 44 percent of Republicans who say the same.

#### The new Director General is focusing on sustainable development -- COVID response provides an early win that builds momentum.

Ossa & Blange-Gubbay 21, Michael Blange-Gubbay, Senior Research Fellow at the Kühne Center for Sustainable Globalization at the University of Zurich. Ralph Ossa Director of the Kühne Center for Sustainable Globalization at the University of Zurich; Kühne Foundation Professor of International Trade. IM­PACT SE­RIES: 02–21. “A New Hope for the WTO?” <https://www.kuehnecenter.uzh.ch/impact_series/2021_03_17-02-21-a_new_hope_for_the_wto.html> brett

A new hope

In the midst of the pan­dem­ic, on May 14, 2020, the WTO Di­rec­tor-Gen­er­al (DG) Rober­to Azevê­do an­nounced that he would step down, cut­ting his sec­ond term short by one year and leav­ing the dam­aged or­ga­ni­za­tion lead­er­less. The ap­point­ment of the new DG re­quired a con­sen­sus of the 164 mem­ber coun­tries; that was not reached un­til Biden be­came US Pres­i­dent, and Yoo Myung-hee – the can­di­date backed by the US – an­nounced her with­draw­al from the race. Ngozi Okon­jo-Iweala was then ap­point­ed DG, mak­ing his­to­ry as first woman and first African at the head of the WTO.

DG Okon­jo-Iweala faces a mon­u­men­tal task. In her first pub­lic state­ment, she out­lined her po­lit­i­cal agen­da and vi­sion for the WTO for the months and years to come, in or­der to “re­store and re­brand the WTO as a key pil­lar of glob­al eco­nom­ic gov­er­nance, a force for a strong, trans­par­ent, and fair mul­ti­lat­er­al trad­ing sys­tem, and an in­stru­ment for in­clu­sive eco­nom­ic growth and sus­tain­able de­vel­op­ment”.[3](https://www.kuehnecenter.uzh.ch/impact_series/2021_03_17-02-21-a_new_hope_for_the_wto.html#note-3)

WTO Director-General Okonjo-Iweala faces a monumental task.

Her first point is to tack­le the pan­dem­ic by in­ten­si­fy­ing in­ter­na­tion­al co­op­er­a­tion to fight COVID-19. The WTO should play a more force­ful role in ex­er­cis­ing its mon­i­tor­ing func­tion and en­cour­ag­ing mem­bers to min­i­mize and re­move ex­port re­stric­tions and pro­hi­bi­tions that hin­der sup­ply chains for med­ical goods and equip­ment (ac­cord­ing to the In­ter­na­tion­al Trade Cen­tre, 100 coun­tries still main­tain ex­port re­stric­tions and pro­hi­bi­tions on this front).

Her sec­ond ob­jec­tive is to dis­cuss the struc­tur­al re­forms that the WTO needs. In or­der to re­store cred­i­bil­i­ty in the or­ga­ni­za­tion, the new­ly ap­point­ed DG wants to de­liv­er ear­ly suc­cess­es and re­sults. DG Okon­jo-Iweala hopes to fi­nal­ize the fish­eries sub­si­dies ne­go­ti­a­tions ahead of the 12th Min­is­te­r­i­al Con­fer­ence. She could cap­i­tal­ize on an “easy” win and get mo­men­tum for the more chal­leng­ing re­forms that the WTO needs. In her state­ment, she high­light­ed the need of re­in­stat­ing and re­form­ing the dis­pute set­tle­ment mech­a­nism, cre­at­ing a sys­tem that “can gar­ner the con­fi­dence of all, in­clud­ing small de­vel­op­ing and least de­vel­oped coun­tries who have found it chal­leng­ing to uti­lize”.[4](https://www.kuehnecenter.uzh.ch/impact_series/2021_03_17-02-21-a_new_hope_for_the_wto.html#note-4)

An­oth­er point of her agen­da is to up­date the WTO rule­book. The rules lag be­hind those of sev­er­al RTAs, which con­tributes to coun­tries’ pref­er­ence for RTAs in the first place. The start­ing point will be to take ac­count of 21st cen­tu­ry re­al­i­ties such as e-com­merce and the dig­i­tal econ­o­my.

A fi­nal im­por­tant point high­light­ed in her speech re­lates to the en­vi­ron­ment. DG Ngozi Okon­jo-Iweala plans to di­rect the WTO in sup­port­ing the green and cir­cu­lar econ­o­my, in re­ac­ti­vat­ing the ne­go­ti­a­tions on en­vi­ron­men­tal goods and ser­vices, and ad­dress­ing more broad­ly the nexus be­tween trade and cli­mate change. The fo­cus on cli­mate change is quite new with­in the WTO, but it is less sur­pris­ing that she men­tioned it in her first re­marks as DG. Among all the can­di­dates for the po­si­tion, Dr. Okon­jo-Iweala was the most out­spo­ken about the en­vi­ron­ment, even though it is not a promi­nent area of on­go­ing WTO ne­go­ti­a­tions.[5](https://www.kuehnecenter.uzh.ch/impact_series/2021_03_17-02-21-a_new_hope_for_the_wto.html#note-5) One might ex­pect that she will be fa­vor­able to the EU’s pro­posed car­bon tax as well as tar­iffs re­moval on re­new­able en­er­gy tech­nol­o­gy and ser­vices, also in light of the fact that the EU was a strong sup­port­er of her can­di­da­cy.

#### That’s key to protect global supply chains AND offset the costs of globalization -- getting the ball rolling on cooperation is key -- independently solves extinction from warming.

Sutton & Green 20, Trevor Sutton is a fellow for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress. Andy Green is managing director of Economic Policy at the Center for American Progress. Center for American Progress, July 29, 2020, 12:01 am. “WTO Reform Must Start at the Top” <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2020/07/29/488261/wto-reform-must-start-top/> brett

This is not to say a new WTO director general should embrace protectionism or isolationism. But if the next director general is to be effective, they will need a healthy pragmatism about the past failures and future promise of the WTO. With this vision, the next director general could help create an equitable economic order that distributes the benefits of trade broadly—not just among countries but also across socioeconomic groups. In more precise terms, the WTO’s membership needs to find a leader who is candid about the enormous blind spots and gaps in the current WTO system regarding the well-being of workers; the existential threat of climate change; excessive concentration of economic power; and the extreme fragility of global supply chains. Acknowledging these shortcomings is not the same as knowing exactly how to redress them—which will ultimately depend in large measure on the WTO members themselves—but it is an essential first step.

It should not be beyond imagination for a WTO director general to acknowledge that the WTO rules have chilled and obstructed the implementation of regulations of indisputable environmental value—for example, to admit that trade agreements lacking enforceable labor and environmental standards undermine inclusive prosperity in advanced economies or that the WTO has failed to address the undermining of fair competition arising from both China’s state capitalism as well as growing monopoly power in the West. Such an openness to revisiting the ideological underpinnings of globalization will have greater bearing on the long-run survival of the WTO than the handful of short-term fixes currently being put forward as a reform agenda for the body. That agenda, which includes changes to Appellate Body procedure limiting the discretion of judges and the creation of an alternative dispute resolution body on an opt-in basis runs the risk of entrenching the WTO’s shift away from a negotiating forum toward a kind of quasi-judicial body that produces more litigation than cooperation.

Instead, a wide range of ideas should be on the table. The incorporation of labor, environmental, and certain other fair competition standards into anti-dumping calculations represents a simple and targeted fix, as would the creation of a new “nonsustainable economies” designation that would penalize failure to maintain certain standards. A wider ranging approach, modeled on the Havana Charter that the New Dealers crafted after World War II, would link WTO preferences to the enforcement of separate international labor, environmental, currency, and other relevant standards.

#### Integrated supply chains stop war.

Tønnesson ‘15 [Stein; 2015; Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University; International Area Studies Review; “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” vol. 18, no. 3, p. 297-311]

Lampton (2014: 3, 7, 122, 136) holds that peace is enhanced by ‘the idea of global interdependence’, and puts forward an ‘interdependence theory’: institutional and economic interdependence dampens impulses toward conflict. While it does not make conflict impossible, and makes war even more destructive should it occur, it provides ‘incentives to keep conflict with major partners manageable’. There is now a ‘struggle for the soul of Chinese foreign policy between the realities of interdependence and the impulses of assertive nationalism’. Lampton does not go into detail about the question of when interdependence precludes war and when it does not. Christensen (2015: 41–46), however, is more specific as to why global interdependence today is of a different kind than in the past, and more likely to hinder war: trans-national production chains make it necessary for an aggressor state to ‘persuade a diverse set of foreign investors, suppliers of key components, and logistics companies to continue doing business’ after it has invaded a territory, and it is easy to see how difficult this may be.1 Thus it is less tempting than in the past to go to war: ‘While transnational production and interdependence is certainly no guarantee against war’, says Christensen, ‘it is still a major force for peace’ (Christenen, 2015: 46). The Russian invasions of Georgia and the Crimea, and the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq prove Christensen’s point about how difficult and costly it is to reconstitute a functioning economy after invading a territory, but show also that some governments disregard the costs when they see weighty geopolitical reasons for resorting to force against an inferior country with no nuclear arms.

#### Unsustainable globalization causes rising inequality and right-wing populism – that causes slow growth, polarization, and war

Flaherty & Rogowski 21 [Thomas M. Flaherty is a PhD candidate and NSF Graduate Fellow at the University of California, San Diego. He can be reached at t1flaher@ucsd.edu. Ronald Rogowski is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Weatherhead Scholar at Harvard University (2019–2021). "Rising Inequality As a Threat to the Liberal International Order." https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/rising-inequality-as-a-threat-to-the-liberal-international-order/4CDE05DEB3AB076CE338E1AA4A9C8087]

The openness to trade in goods, services, and factors of production the LIO has so effectively advanced over decades has concentrated real income growth in a very thin layer of workers. While this rise in top-heavy inequality doubtless has other causes, chief among them skill-biased technological innovation, trade openness has contributed mightily, particularly since the “China shock” of 2001;96 and certainly the populist movements that reject the LIO cast openness to trade and migration as the chief villain.

The ways in which rising inequality has threatened the LIO expose lacunae in international political economy's intellectual apparatus—“blind spots” that require remediation. Most importantly, our basic economics are, if not wrong, at least outdated. The field's adherence to classical trade models blinds us to the distributional effects revealed by top-heavy inequality: far more people lost from globalization, and fewer gained, than traditional theories (factor proportions and specific factors) suggested. While economists rapidly updated their trade models to account for the emerging reality of extreme inequality, political science largely stayed the course—and ran the danger, now realized, of misapprehending the domestic politics of globalization.

The trade literature offers three explanations for top-heavy inequality. The “enriched” Heckscher-Ohlin model of Haskel and colleagues shows how only a thin layer of extraordinarily talented individuals within the larger set of high-skill workers unambiguously benefits from a rise in the relative price of a skill-intensive product; the wages of both the less talented high-skill and the low-skill workers stagnate or fall.97 New new trade theory shows how a similarly narrow subset of very large and productive firms, and their employees, absorb the bulk of trade's gains at the expense of all other firms. Finally, economic geography suggests that trade concentrates economic growth in a few large metropolitan regions while inflicting stagnation and decline elsewhere. Each offers a pessimistic view of the politics of globalization in which variously defined superstars gain a far larger share than the society at large.

We validate these theories of top-heavy inequality with data on local election outcomes from as many as twenty-eight countries over twenty-six years. We find that public support for right-populist parties rises dramatically with exposure to imports and immigration, but only in those countries with high top-heavy inequality. The fact that the huge gains from trade and technology have flowed to such a small elite, while earnings in other categories have stagnated, may go far to explain why the antiglobalization movements blame not only crucial elements of the LIO, but increasingly a small and nefarious global elite, for what one politician luridly portrayed as the “carnage” among many regions and sectors of the advanced economies.

That these movements, with rare exceptions, seek relief in restrictions on trade and migration from populist movements of the Right, rather than in redistribution or training, probably owes much to the failure of the political Left to redistribute sufficiently.98 That so much of these parties’ electoral support, both in Europe and in the US, comes from manual workers and former supporters of the political Left lends credence to this conjecture.

The ill effects of rising inequality, however, extend well beyond the rising tide of antiglobalization movements and politicians. They extend to slower economic growth (bound to exacerbate existing resentments), increased political polarization, and even a heightened risk of international conflict.

#### WTO credibility de-escalates every conflict -- loss of credibility tips every flashpoint.

GEORGIA L. Hamann 9, associate in Lewis, Roca, Rothberger’s Litigation Practice Group, J.D. from Vanderbilt University Law School. May 2009, “Replacing Slingshots with Swords: Implications of the Antigua-Gambling 22.6 Panel Report for Developing Countries and the World Trading System”, <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/hamann-cr_final_final.pdf> brett

Voluntary compliance with WTO rules and procedures is of the utmost importance to the international trading system.100 Given the increasingly globalized market, the coming years will see an increase in the importance of the WTO as a cohesive force and arbiter of disputes that likely will become more frequent and injurious.101 The work of the WTO cannot be overstated in a nuclear-armed world, as the body continues to promote respect and even amity among nations with opposing philosophical goals or modes of governance.102 Demagogues in the Unites States may decry the rise of China as a geopolitical threat,103 and extremists in Russia may play dangerous games of brinksmanship with other great powers, but trade keeps politicians’ fingers off “the button.”104 The WTO offers an astounding rate of compliance for an organization with no standing army and no real power to enforce its decisions, suggesting that governments recognize the value of maintaining the international construct of the WTO.105 In order to promote voluntary compliance, the WTO must maintain a high level of credibility.106

\*\*\*start footnote 6\*\*\*

See Rufus Yerxa, supra note 100, at 4 ("The WTO System works only to the extent Members want it to work, and only if they decide that compliance is in their overall economic interest. It therefore rests on the credibility of the rules, and also on the credibility of the dispute settlement decisions."); see also Debra P. Steger, Peace Through Trade: Building the WTO 290-91 (2004) (linking issues of the WTO's "external legitimacy" to the effectiveness of the institutional decision).

\*\*\*end footnote 106\*\*\*

Nations must perceive the WTO as the most reasonable option for dispute resolution or fear that the WTO wields enough influence to enforce sanctions.

\*\*\*Start footnote 107\*\*\*

The goal of the WTO is to prevent unilateral decisions as to the justifiability of trade retaliation, a goal which can only be upheld by global adherence to the WTO and condemnation of unilateral retaliation outside it. See Gabrielle Marceau, Consultations and the Panel Process in the WTO, in Key Issues In WTO Dispute Settlement: The First Ten Years, supra note 17, at 29, 30-31; see also Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, Trade in Manufactures: The Outcome of the Uruguay Round and Developing Country Interests, in The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries, supra note 12, at 59, 69 (discussing the importance of "the WTO's capacity to create a level playing field among contracting parties of different sizes and heterogeneous bargaining power").

\*\*\*end footnote 107\*\*\*

The arbitrators charged with performing the substantive work of the WTO by negotiating, compromising, and issuing judgments are keenly aware of the responsibility they have to uphold the organization’s credibility.108

### Solvency

#### Plan: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines related to the prevention, containment, and treatment of COVID-19.

#### Enforcement is done through waiving TRIPS protections and modifying relevant domestic law to ensure patent protections are reduced---spec is delineated in the card.

Jones et al. 21, Mike Jones, J.D., cum laude, Brooklyn Law School, 2014. Sean McConnell, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, J.D., 2002. Lauren Giambalvo, University of Georgia School of Law, J.D., magna cum laude, Order of the Coif, 2019; Georgia Law Review. Emily Harmon, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law, J.D., 2020. Ipwatchdog, August 9, 2021. “What is a ‘Patent Waiver’ Anyway? Zooming Out on the TRIPS COVID IP Waiver Debate” <https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/08/09/patent-waiver-anyway-zooming-trips-covid-ipwaiver-debate/id=136381/> brett

Scientists, engineers, and everyday people have developed solutions for testing, preventing, and treating the COVID-19 disease. Ordinarily, we wouldn’t think twice about granting patents on these inventions. But, today, when COVID-19 is spreading all over the world and killing millions of people, some world leaders are questioning whether we should be granting the exclusionary rights of patent protection on inventions that help respond to the pandemic. Included in that group is the Biden-Harris Administration, which, in May, announced their support of an “IP waiver” on COVID 19 vaccines.

Patent Waiver

The “patent waiver” is a proposal to waive certain provisions of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement for three years. The TRIPS Agreement requires certain member countries (“Members”), including the United States, to have certain minimum intellectual property protections. While this proposal is often referred to as a “patent waiver,” the proposal would also waive sections associated with copyright, industrial designs, and undisclosed information.

The proposal seeks to waive Part II, Section 5 Patents of the TRIPS Agreement and the associated enforcement sections only with respect to “health products and technologies including diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines, medical devices, personal protective equipment, their materials or components, and their methods and means of manufacture for the prevention, treatment or containment of COVID-19” for a period of three years. Article 27 of Section 5 requires that certain Members issue patents to inventions that “are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.” However, Members have the option to refuse to grant patents to certain categories of inventions, including, “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals.” Article 28 explains that an owner of a patent can prevent others from “making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing” (“infringing”) the patented inventions. Finally, Part III of the TRIPS Agreement explains the potential consequences of infringing a patent. Among other things, the infringer can be liable for money damages and the judicial authority of the Member may order injunctions.

Therefore, as the TRIPS Agreement currently stands, each Member must have patent laws that give patents to inventions that meet certain requirements, and each must provide avenues for patent holders to enforce its patent rights. As applied to the current situation, Members are required to grant patents to qualifying inventions related to “the prevention, containment and treatment of COVID-19” (with exceptions for pharmaceuticals if the Member does not allow pharmaceutical patents). Infringers could be liable for money damages and the judicial authority of the Member may order injunctions.

If provisions in Part II, Section 5 and the associated enforcement sections are waived, Members would no longer be required to issue patents or provide avenues for patent holders to enforce patent rights. The proposal does not, however, require Members to waive their own domestic patent rights. In other words, the proposal to waive certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, the “patent waiver,” does not directly waive any patent protections. Rather, the patent waiver grants to Members permission to waive their own domestic patent protections.

Patent laws are geographically limited; they only protect an invention in the country that issued the patent. For example, one cannot make, use, offer to sell, sell, or import an invention protected only by a U.S. patent in the U.S; however, one may do those things in another country where corresponding patent protection does not exist. Therefore, in order to waive patent protections worldwide, each Member subject the TRIPS Agreement’s requirement to have certain minimum intellectual property protection would have to waive its own domestic patent protections.

The United States patent laws are codified in Title 35 to the U.S. Code. It provides that inventors may obtain patents for their new and useful inventions and infringers are liable for making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing into the U.S. patented inventions without the patent holders consent. Because the power to enact patent laws lies with Congress, Congress would likely have to waive these laws. If Congress chooses not to waive the U.S.’s patent laws, patent holders will continue to be able to enforce their U.S. patent rights in the U.S.

#### Public funding and massive pre-purchases are superior incentives to patents in a pandemic.

Lindsey 21, Brink Lindsey, Vice President @ Niskanen Center “Why intellectual property and pandemics don’t mix,” Brookings Institution, June 3, 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/06/03/why-intellectual-property-and-pandemics-dont-mix/> brett

What approach to encouraging innovation should we take instead? How do we incentivize drug makers to undertake the hefty R&D costs to develop new vaccines without giving them exclusive rights over their production and sale? The most effective approach during a public health crisis is direct government support: public funding of R&D, advance purchase commitments by the government to buy large numbers of doses at set prices, and other, related payouts. And when we pay drug makers, we should not hesitate to pay generously, even extravagantly: we want to offer drug companies big profits so that they prioritize this work above everything else, and so that they are ready and eager to come to the rescue again the next time there’s a crisis.

It was direct support via Operation Warp Speed that made possible the astonishingly rapid development of COVID-19 vaccines and then facilitated a relatively rapid rollout of vaccine distribution (relative, that is, to most of the rest of the world). And it’s worth noting that a major reason for the faster rollout here and in the United Kingdom compared to the European Union was the latter’s misguided penny-pinching. The EU bargained hard with firms to keep vaccine prices low, and as a result their citizens ended up in the back of the queue as various supply line kinks were being ironed out. This is particularly ironic since the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine was developed in Germany. As this fact underscores, the chief advantage of direct support isn’t to “get tough” with drug firms and keep a lid on their profits. Instead, it is to accelerate the end of the public health emergency by making sure drug makers profit handsomely from doing the right thing.

Patent law and direct support should be seen not as either-or alternatives but as complements that apply different incentives to different circumstances and time horizons. Patent law provides a decentralized system for encouraging innovation. The government doesn’t presume to tell the industry which new drugs are needed; it simply incentivizes the development of whatever new drugs that pharmaceutical firms can come up with by offering them a temporary monopoly. It is important to note that patent law’s incentives offer no commercial guarantees. Yes, you can block other competitors for a number of years, but that still doesn’t ensure enough consumer demand for the new product to make it profitable.

DIRECT SUPPORT MAKES PATENTS REDUNDANT

The situation is different in a pandemic. Here the government knows exactly what it wants to incentivize: the creation of vaccines to prevent the spread of a specific virus and other drugs to treat that virus. Under these circumstances, the decentralized approach isn’t good enough. There is no time to sit back and let drug makers take the initiative on their own timeline. Instead, the government needs to be more involved to incentivize specific innovations now. As recompense for letting it call the shots (pardon the pun), the government sweetens the deal for drug companies by insulating them from commercial risk. If pharmaceutical firms develop effective vaccines and therapies, the government will buy large, predetermined quantities at prices set high enough to guarantee a healthy return.

For the pharmaceutical industry, it is useful to conceive of patent law as the default regime for innovation promotion. It improves pharmaceutical companies’ incentives to develop new drugs while leaving them free to decide which new drugs to pursue – and also leaving them to bear all commercial risk. In a pandemic or other emergency, however, it is appropriate to shift to the direct support regime, in which the government focuses efforts on one disease. In this regime, it is important to note, the government provides qualitatively superior incentives to those offered under patent law. Not only does it offer public funding to cover the up-front costs of drug development, but it also provides advance purchase commitments that guarantee a healthy return.

It should therefore be clear that the pharmaceutical industry has no legitimate basis for objecting to a TRIPS waiver. Since, because of the public health crisis, drug makers now qualify for the superior benefits of direct government support, they no longer need the default benefits of patent support. Arguments that a TRIPS waiver would deprive drug makers of the incentives they need to keep developing new drugs, when they are presently receiving the most favorable incentives available, can be dismissed as the worst sort of special pleading.

That said, it is a serious mistake to try to cast the current crisis as a morality play in which drug makers wear the black hats and the choice at hand is between private profits and public health. We would have no chance of beating this virus without the formidable organizational capabilities of the pharmaceutical industry, and providing the appropriate incentives is essential to ensure that the industry plays its necessary and vital role. It is misguided to lament that private companies are profiting in the current crisis: those profits are a drop in the bucket compared to the staggering cost of this pandemic in lives and economic damage.

### Framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing, or hedonistic act utilitarianism

#### 1] Bindingness -- if I put my hand on a hot stove I’d automatically pull it back before a signal is sent to my brain -- proves Util is intrinsic to action

#### 2] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### 3] Extinction first:

#### A] Future lives -- trillions of future lives are lost. They are just as valuable as current ones – anything else says some lives are worth less than others which is a slippery slope to genocide.

### Underview

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater – 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR can brute force me every time.