### 1NC – T

#### A] Interp - the aff can't defend that a subset of just governments ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### “Government” is a generic indefinite singular.

Leslie 12 Leslie, Sarah-Jane. “Generics.” In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian Russell and Delia Fara, 355–366. Routledge, 2012. <https://www.princeton.edu/~sjleslie/RoutledgeHandbookEntryGenerics.pdf> SM

GENERICS VS. EXISTENTIALS The interpretation of sentences containing bare plurals, indefinite singulars, or definite singulars can be either generic as in (1) respectively or existential/specific as in (2): (1) Tigers are striped A tiger is striped The tiger is striped. (2) Tigers are on the front lawn A tiger is on the front lawn The tiger is on the front lawn. The subjects in (1) are prima facie the same as in (2), yet their interpretations in (1) are intuitively quite different from those in (2). In (2) we are talking about some particular tigers, while in (1) we are saying something about tigers in general. There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. For example, if it is true that tigers are on the lawn, then it will also be true that animals are on the lawn. This is not so if the sentence is interpreted generically. For example, it is true that tigers are striped, but it does not follow that animals are striped (Lawler 1973 Laca 1990; Krifka et al 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification (in the sense of Lewis 1975) with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in (1) (e.g. “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in (2) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g. “tigers are usually on the front lawn). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually”.)

#### This applies to the res – “Just governments ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.” doesn’t imply that “All political regimes ought to recognize a right to strike” because ISIS or the UN might not have an obligation to recognize a right to strike

#### B] Violation – they only defend Brazil -- there are lots of governments -- https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states

#### C] Vote neg—

#### 1] Semantics outweigh -- it’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.

#### 2] Limits –the ability to spec hundreds of affs kills limits – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs, and kill reciprocal prep burdens which are key to well researched clash, especially since there’s no universal DA because each countries politics are different

#### D] Paradigm Issues –

#### 1] T is DTD –their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start and DTA is the same thing.

#### 2] Use competing interps on T – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### 3] No RVIs – A] Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat B] Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

### 1NC – DA

#### Lula wins now but its close---insert chart.

Spigariol 11-3 (, A., 2021. Lula still polling first for 2022, but no longer pulling away. [online] The Brazilian Report. Available at: <https://brazilian.report/liveblog/2021/11/03/lula-polling-first-bolsonaro-2022/> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

Lula still polling first, but no longer pulling away

Lula’s **support** **slipped** by a single point compared with late September, with Mr. **Bolsonaro** polling at a **stable** **28** **percent**. Center left candidate Ciro Gomes is the only “third-way option” above the 10-percent mark, with others at 4 percent or less.

The pollster included a scenario with former Justice Minister Sergio Moro, poised to join the center-right Podemos party, reportedly with presidential ambitions. However, the former federal judge managed no more than 8 percent of support.

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

#### Bolsonaro is making key changes.

AP 11-10 (,Associated Press, 2021. Bolsonaro Joins a Centrist Party in Brazil Ahead of 2022 Re-election Bid. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/10/world/americas/brazil-bolsonaro-liberal-party.html> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

**Bolsonaro** **Joins** a **Centrist** **Party** in Brazil Ahead of 2022 Re-election Bid

President Jair Bolsonaro, who has not belonged to any political party for two years, is joining the centrist Liberals, they said on Wednesday.

BRASILIA, Brazil — After going two years without belonging to a political party, President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil sealed an agreement with the centrist Liberal Party to back his 2022 re-election bid, according to a party statement released on Wednesday.

The decision followed a meeting between Mr. Bolsonaro and the Liberal Party leader, Valdemar Costa Neto, in Brasília, the capital, the statement said. The president’s formal enrollment in the party’s ranks will take place on Nov. 22.

Joining one of the parties that form part of the so-called Cenbtrao **group** seems to signal that Mr. Bolsonaro, a right-wing populist, is shifting course from his 2018 campaign strategy, when he criticized the group’s old-school political practices.

In early polls ahead of the October 2022 vote, Mr. Bolsonaro trails former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the leftist who led Brazil from 2003 to 2010.

The Liberal Party, or P.L., is known along with other Centrao parties for **ideological** **malleability**, often **exchanging** **support** **for** **gov**ernment **appointments** and earmarks. Mr. Bolsonaro was affiliated with such parties during most of his seven terms as a federal lawmaker, but cast himself as a political outsider during his 2018 presidential campaign. He vowed then not to embrace the horse trading that benefited entrenched actors and enabled corruption.

“It is very **symbolic** **how** **Bolsonaro** has **started** **to** **play** the **traditional** game of Brazilian **politics**,” said Maurício Santoro, a political science professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. “The P.L. is helping Bolsonaro survive.”

When Mr. Bolsonaro ran in 2018, it was under the banner of the Social Liberal Party, which he left one year after his election victory amid disagreements with its leadership over funding and regional nominations. He set out to forge his own party, but failed to garner enough signatures and has been without a political home since.

The presidential press office didn’t respond to a request for comment from The Associated Press to confirm the P.L.’s statement. Earlier Wednesday, Mr. Bolsonaro had said in a radio interview that there was a “99.9 percent chance” he would join the P.L.

Reports that Mr. Bolsonaro was seeking a Centrao party to sponsor his re-election bid had already generated commentary from analysts that he was departing from his prior anti-establishment stance. As rumors of his agreement with the P.L. intensified this week, comments criticizing Mr. Costa Neto, the party leader, were deleted from the social media accounts of some of Mr. Bolsonaro’s family members.

Editors’ Picks

‘When Are You Getting Married?’

Taylor Swift’s ‘All Too Well’ and the Weaponization of Memory

The Real Surprise of ‘Passing’: A Focus on Black Women’s Inner Lives

Mr. Bolsonaro himself has previously said that Mr. Costa Neto was corrupt, noted Carlos Melo, a political analyst and professor at Insper University in São Paulo. In 2012, Mr. Costa Neto, then a lawmaker, was convicted of corruption and money laundering in a vast vote-buying scandal that almost brought down Mr. da Silva’s administration. He served time in prison.

Over the past year, Mr. Bolsonaro has turned to the Centrao for political shelter from increasing pressure on his administration, including more than 100 impeachment requests, a Senate investigation into his handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and his plunging popularity. In August, he appointed a senator from the Centrao to be his chief of staff.

“If you take away the Centrao, there’s the left,” the president told a small conservative news outlet, Jornal da Cidade Online, on Tuesday. “So where do I go?”

#### Strike crackdowns is prompting polling for Lula---the plan’s radical change is key to building Bolsonaro voter popularity.

Castanheira 10-14 (, T., 2021. São Paulo teachers and public employees strike against attack on pensions. [online] World Socialist Web Site. Available at: <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/10/15/braz-o15.html> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

The criminal agreement between the Unions’ Forum and the government for the unsafe return to in-person classes included the requirement that educators pay back the hours spent on strike. Therefore, teachers are now working grueling overtime, exposing themselves even more to the risk of infection with the coronavirus in order not to have their salaries cut. This situation, which threatens teachers with having their salaries completely cut off if they join the new strike, is seen by many workers as the opportunity the government saw to advance its attacks. In the face of these threats, the **broad** **participation** of workers **in** the **strike** movement **is** a **direct** **response** **to** the terrible **social** **crisis** **facing** the entire Brazilian **working** **class**. With millions having fallen into poverty in Brazil since last year, workers are seeing their purchasing power violently eroded by high inflation, especially in food and fuel prices. Recently, strikes in defense of wages have broken out at General Motors in São Paulo, at the Jurong shipyard in Espírito Santo, among metalworkers in Paraná, and app delivery workers in several Brazilian cities. The World Socialist Web Site interviewed workers participating in Wednesday’s protest in São Paulo. Leandro, who works at a Child Education Center (CEI), serving children under the age of 2, explained to the WSWS what led him to the demonstration. “We who work double shifts, 12 hours a day, pay the maximum income tax rate of 27.5 percent of our salaries and another 14 percent in pension contributions,” he said. “In other words, almost half of what I earn is only for taxes. They want to raise this even more. And after I retire, even though I would have contributed for more than 40 years, I will continue to pay the same tax rate. Today, this percentage is only charged on [monthly] salaries exceeding 6,433 reais (US$ 1,166). With this new change, it will be charged of everyone who earns more than a minimum wage (US$200).” Leandro’s wife, Kauane, an educator at an Early Childhood Education School (EMEI), serving children from 2 to 6 years old, added that it is inconceivable for “a 60-year-old teacher to remain in an early childhood education classroom, with toddlers [as the new bill imposes]. They won’t have the physical or psychological structure to cope with that.” She also noted that “in the last four years we have been without any wage adjustment, not even for inflation. But our latest struggles have been only against the removal of rights. We are losing right after right. We see all the services being scrapped, there is no investment in health care. We are treated as numbers. If something happens to us, tomorrow they’ll put someone new in our place. We are not seen as human beings, who have families.” Kauane and Leandro have children, one of them with asthma, and are seriously concerned about the unsafe reopening of schools. On Wednesday, hours before the demonstration, São Paulo Governor João Doria (PSDB) announced the mandatory return to in-person classes in state schools with 100 percent occupation of classrooms, eliminating any mandatory distancing between students. Later that day, Mayor Nunes announced the same measure will be followed by municipal schools. “Now we’ve had the news that they’re going to fully open schools and we have a very big concern, especially for the children who have not been vaccinated,” said Kauane. “As long as it is not safe and I can, my children will stay at home. But we know that this is not a reality for everyone. There are younger children whose parents need to work, and there are many parents who have no one to leave their children with.” Sheila, a kindergarten teacher, declared that the strike movement is also “in the name of quality public education.” She and her school colleagues denounced the homicidal operation of schools in São Paulo. “How can we take 1-year-old babies, who are just starting to walk, and have distancing? It was really a reckless act by the mayor,” she declared. “In the beginning there were only a few children, but now it is practically full,” said Sheila. “As soon as he approved 60 percent [of occupancy of the CEIs] several children in our CEI had COVID. Only 10 days went by, and children already started to show basic symptoms like coryza, malaise. Now I ask myself, how could we guarantee the safety of such small children? Infection was inevitable.” Sheila said that “in other CEIs near ours, some teachers died of COVID but were not counted. At no time were infections of teachers and children with COVID mentioned by the media. It was simply, ‘teachers return, the families need it,’ they never worried about infections.” The same situation was denounced by educators in Elementary Schools (EMEFs). Márcia, an art educator on the east side of São Paulo, described the situation as “chaos.” She said: “Every week, in my school two or three people are dismissed because of COVID, employees and children. They dismiss only those in the same classroom, but we, who are ‘specialist teachers’ and teach all the classrooms, are not dismissed. These are super unhealthy conditions.” The demonstration had a significant participation by retired teachers and employees, who will immediately suffer a 14 percent cut in their income with the approval of the bill. Amalia, a retired English teacher, declared: “I’ve been in these movements for 40 years and there are few times I haven’t participated. Municipal teachers are always overwhelmed, for lack of staff in the schools, lack of salaries.” “City councilors should have the role of defending us against authoritarian government projects, but what happens is that we have to fight against both the government and the councilors,” she continued. “The public service is scrapped, everyone says that. In my opinion, the intention of these governments is to privatize them. Meanwhile, we pay absurd taxes that nobody can explain. What I’m looking to learn is what the state is for.” Tatiana, an English teacher working with Márcia, said that “as long as these people are in power, I think it’s very difficult for us to solve these problems. **Until** **we** have a really **popular** **government**, **for** the **workers**, **there** **isn’t** much of **a** **perspective**.” Talking about the latest strikes, she said that “the performance of the union was sad. It is the same thing that I saw [with the São Paulo state teacher’s union, APEOESP] in the 2015 90-day strike. I saw them ending the strike despite the vote to continue it, and here it was the same thing. I think it’s sad, because we don’t know who is really on our side.” The unions and political parties linked to them, principally the PT and the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL), are once again striving to divert workers from confronting the capitalist system which is responsible for the successive attacks on public employees and the working class as a whole. These **political** **forces** **advance** as the only viable strategy for the workers’ movement the pressuring of “indecisive council members” **to** “**flip their vote**.” In their speeches, the union officials claimed that councilors who vote against the workers should face a settling of scores in the next elections: in 2024! This criminal proposition unequivocally exposes the reactionary character of the trade unions and the pseudo-left, who work to disarm the working class in face of the bourgeois state. Other **union leaders** who took the stage also **claimed** that the **election of** a new PT **government headed by** Luiz Inácio **Lula** da Silva **is the real solution to workers’ problems**. This perspective is a complete fraud. Lula is openly working to reestablish his corrupt alliances with the right-wing parties and to present himself to the capitalist class as their best representative to contain an imminent social explosion in Brazil and defend their economic interests against the working class. São Paulo municipal **workers** **can** **advance** **their** **struggle** **only** **by** **breaking** the **political** **control** of their movement by the unions, the PT and its pseudo-left satellites. They cannot accept new betrayals, and having their strikes broken through the same antidemocratic maneuvers used in 2019 and earlier this year!

Workers in São Paulo must orient themselves not to the bourgeois state, but to their fellow workers throughout Brazil and internationally who face the same attacks from the capitalist class.

A rank-and-file workers’ rebellion is already taking place around the world. On October 1, parents and rank-and-file workers called an independent strike against the unsafe reopening of schools, receiving global support. A second strike has been called for October 15. Across the United States, the strongest wave of strikes in decades is erupting, with workers rejecting rotten contracts promoted by the unions and the companies.

Brazilian workers must unite their struggles with this global movement, building independent rank-and-file committees in every workplace and joining the Rank-and-File Committee for Safe Education in Brazil (CBES-BR). The CBES-BR calls upon all workers to participate in the event How to end the pandemic: The case for eradication that will be held October 24 by the International Workers Alliance of Rank-and-File Committees (IWA-RFC) and the WSWS.

#### And, Lula is hope for workers---plan is a 180.

Fogel 21 (, B., 2021. Brazil: Lula’s Return Means There Is Finally Some Hope for Workers. [online] The Wire. Available at: <https://thewire.in/world/brazil-lulas-return-means-there-is-finally-some-hope-for-workers> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

Brazil: **Lula’s** **Return** **Means** There Is Finally Some **Hope** **for** **Workers**

Despite being imprisoned for nearly two years, the centre-left leader enjoys far more popularity than President Jair Bolsonaro, who he could take on in the next elections.

On March 8, Brazilian Supreme Court judge Luiz Edson Fachin ruled to annul all of the former president Lula da Silva’s convictions. Fachin said that the court that convicted Lula in the southern city of Curitiba did not have the legal authority to convict Brazil’s first Workers’ Party (PT) president. As such, he must be retried by a federal court in the capital city of Brasília.

The most important effect of the overturning is that it restores Lula’s political rights, allowing him to run in next year’s presidential election. Under Brazil’s Ficha Limpa (“Clean Slate”) law — ironically passed by the PT government — politicians convicted of crimes or impeached are unable to run for elected office.

Lula was convicted of money laundering and corruption in 2016 for making improvements to a beachfront apartment he never lived in and served 580 days in prison before being released on appeal in November 2019.

The case against Lula was always weak, but it didn’t stop him from getting convicted due to the fact that Sergio Moro, the judge hearing the trial, was illegally colluding with prosecutors to make a case against the former labour leader. His conviction was the crowning achievement of Brazil’s historic Operação Lava Jato (“Operation Car Wash”) investigation, but we now have clear evidence that prosecutors and judges conspired to imprison him explicitly to prevent him from competing in the 2018 elections, which saw the election of the far-right Jair Bolsonaro.

Lula’s legal team declared on Twitter that “The decision that today affirms the incompetence of the Federal Justice of Curitiba is the recognition that we have always been correct in this long legal battle.” Another twist in this saga is possible that is the Supreme Court still has to affirm this ruling, and another court could convict him again. But, for now, the centre-left Lula is back.

Lula versus Bolsonaro

Lula’s return to the political arena has already sent shock waves throughout Brazil, and judging by the latest polling, he is still the most popular politician in Brazil even after being imprisoned and years of media smears. And while he may not have the historic approval ratings he enjoyed after leaving office, his PT is still the largest party in the country.

A recent poll published in the Estado de S. Paulo newspaper found that 50% of those surveyed would definitely or probably vote for Lula as opposed to 38% for Bolsonaro. Lula’s disapproval rate of 44% is also lower than any of the other potential candidates such as right-wing São Paulo governor João Doria and the vacuous TV personality Luciano Huck. In fact, Lula was the only one of the 10 candidates surveyed that outperformed Bolsonaro.

Brazil’s centre-right is also in full-on panic mode as their own electoral chances are going to sink rapidly. Despite their official opposition to Bolsonaro, many of them would prefer a second term of the far-right president to a PT government. The “moderates” have been vainly searching for somebody — a Brazilian Macron — **who can pose as the leader of the broad front for democracy against Bolsonaro**, while pursuing the more or less same economic agenda as Brazil’s president.

For all the moderate opposition’s talk about democracy, it is unlikely that they would back a centre-left candidate in the second round against Bolsonaro. Brazil’s centrists not only removed Dilma Rousseff from office in 2016 but helped elect Bolsonaro in his contest against the PT’s Fernando Haddad. Some of the names being floated as potential candidates like former health minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta served in Bolsonaro’s cabinet and others like Doria and Huck supported Bolsonaro in 2018.

Bolsonaro himself shrugged off the news, claiming that “I believe that the Brazilian people don’t even want to have a candidate like this in 2022, much less think of the possibility of electing him.” The manufactured disasters of the Bolsonaro government could make many who voted against the PT in 2018 or voted null consider Lula as a viable alternative candidate in 2022.

It’s telling, though, that Brazil’s stock market fell by 4%, and the real slipped to record lows against the dollar following the news of the verdict. Investors apparently were not too worried about the apocalyptic COVID-19 death numbers coming out of Brazil — but the return of Lula led to full-on panic.

Last week was the deadliest week for the country since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic with a record 1,910 deaths recorded on Thursday alone. Brazil has recorded over 265,000 deaths and 11 million cases. Intensive care wards across the country are fast running out of space, cities are running out of vaccines, and government appears to be encouraging the virus to rage out of control.

The department of health is warning that Brazil could see as many as three thousand deaths per day in the coming weeks, and the country still lacks a national vaccination campaign. Health experts are warning the effects of letting a pandemic spread uncontained in such a large country could even threaten the global COVID-19 vaccination campaign as the virus mutates and new variants emerge.

Bolsonaro’s latest gambit involves pushing an untested nasal spray as the latest miracle cure. All the while, he continues to attack public health responses and incite his supporters against anyone who tries to control the spread of COVID-19. Congress has so far done almost nothing to hold Bolsonaro and his government accountable for its homicidal response to the pandemic.

Despite Bolsonaro’s murderous response to the COVID-19 crisis, open criminality, and the fact that Lula presided over one of the greatest economic booms in Brazilian history, big capital, much of the mainstream media, and Brazil’s centrists continue to depict Lula and Bolsonaro as two sides of the same coin. This type of mendacious “pox on both sides” type of politics is backed up by the united hostility to the Left among Brazil’s respectable opposition and the forces that back Bolsonaro.

#### American democracy is systematically blamed for liberal erosion under 4 more years of Bolsonaro---spills over and decimates US democratic institutions.

Adler and Long 11-15 (, D. and Long, G., 2021. We need a new observatory of democracy in the Americas | David Adler and Guillaume Long. [online] the Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/15/organization-of-american-states-democracy-observatory> [Accessed 21 November 2021] David Adler is the general coordinator of the Progressive International. Guillaume Long is a senior policy analyst at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and former foreign minister of Ecuador.)-rahulpenu

We need a new observatory of democracy in the Americas

On 20 October, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, traveled to Ecuador to set out a vision for democracy in the Americas. Over the past five years, the **hemisphere** has **suffered** an **assault** **on** its **democratic** **institutions**, as political leaders from Donald Trump to Jair Bolsonaro have adopted a new authoritarian playbook: lies, violence, repression, and more lies. Two-thirds of US citizens now believe that democracy is under threat, while a majority of Brazilians fear a military dictatorship will return to the country. “We find ourselves in a moment of **democratic** **reckoning**,” announced Blinken.

But the Biden administration continues to put the US on the wrong side of this reckoning. Consider Blinken’s recent trip. In Quito, he lavished praise on President Guillermo Lasso in the same week that Lasso declared a nationwide state of emergency to intimidate critics of his government and distract from an investigation into alleged tax fraud following his appearance in the Pandora Papers leak. In Bogotá hours later, Blinken applauded the democratic credentials of the Colombian president, Iván Duque – “We have no better ally on the full range of issues that our democracies face in this hemisphere,” Blinken said – while his government stands accused of targeting protesters and allowing an unprecedented number of assassinations of Indigenous, Black, and peasant leaders to take place under his watch.

The **US** government is **complicit** **in** these **attacks** **on** **democracy**, not only as an “ally” but also **as** a **leading** **member** **of** the Organization of American States (**OAS**). Just two days after Blinken’s South America jaunt, the governments of Bolivia, Argentina, and Mexico held their own event at the Washington DC headquarters of the OAS to discuss the organization’s controversial role in the 2019 Bolivian election. The experts’ findings were clear – and damning: while the OAS found no evidence of fraud in the election of President Evo Morales, it lied to the public and manipulated its own findings to help depose him. “It was later reported that the US representative to the OAS actually pressured and steered the observation mission to reach a determination of fraud,” testified Jake Johnston of the Center for Economic and Policy Research.

Bolivia is not an isolated case. In Haiti, for example, the anti-democratic interventions of the OAS stretch over decades. In 2000, the OAS observer mission concluded that the Haitian election had been a “great success” only to change its position under pressure from Washington to claim it was illegitimate. The goal was evident: “to dislodge the Aristide administration”, as Dr Paul Farmer, deputy special envoy for Haiti at the United Nations, testified to Congress. Then, 10 years later, the OAS intervened again to reverse the result of the 2010 presidential election on the basis of faulty statistical methods. It is difficult to overstate the destabilizing consequences of these interventions. Juan Gabriel Valdés, the former head of the UN in Haiti, recently described the 2010 OAS decision as “the origin of the present tragedy” in the country.

The OAS, then, is **no** **longer** a **credible** observer of democracy in the Americas – particularly under the present **leadership** of Luis Almagro, which has been described as the “**worst** **in** **history**”. In the eyes of several member states, the **institution** **is** **too** **beholden** to **US** **interests** to provide an effective defense of democratic institutions, **leading** some to call for “**autonomous**” **organizations** **to** **contest** **it**. “The world is currently going through a very worrying moment, where attacks on democratic institutions happen with frightening frequency,” said Brazil’s former foreign minister Celso Amorim. “The creation of an international electoral observatory – popular and non-partisan – will fill an important gap in defense of democracy and human rights.”

What would such an observatory do? Three capacities are critical. The first would be to organize delegations to countries where democratic institutions are clearly under threat – both by domestic actors and international observers like the OAS. Bringing together data scientists and parliamentary representatives, these delegations would provide independent analysis of the electoral process and a defense against false narratives that threaten to derail it. The goal is not only to observe how votes are cast and counted; it is also to observe the observers.

The second critical capacity would be to launch investigations of unlawful interventions in the democratic process. Over the course of the last decade, the dominant mechanism of democratic undoing has been legal, namely the weaponization of the judicial system to intimidate, exclude, and even incarcerate political opponents – a tactic known across Latin America as legal warfare, or “lawfare”. Deploying a global network of legal experts, a new observatory could challenge these tactics to help ensure a free and fair democratic process.

The third and final capacity of the new observatory would be communications. In the technological era, bad information often travels faster than good. Big tech platforms such as Facebook not only serve to disseminate false stories and stir civic conflict; evidence suggests that their executives intervene to favor some candidates and ban others from the platform altogether. In the context of such bias, this new observatory would need to build an autonomous communications infrastructure to ensure that the findings of its delegations and investigations are rapidly spread, widely read, and well understood.

The call for a new observatory could not be more urgent. Contentious elections lie just on the horizon in 2022. In May, Colombia will head to the polls after a year of roiling protests against government violence, corruption, and a failed pandemic response. Five months later, Jair **Bolsonaro** will **face** **Lula** da Silva after **profiting** **from** his **flagrant** **persecution** on the road to the presidency in 2018. **Bolsonaro** and his allies in Congress have already pushed a legislative package to **rewrite** **Brazil’s** **electoral** **laws**, while **parroting** **lies** **about** potential **fraud** in the country’s electoral system.

Meanwhile, back in Washington DC, Secretary Blinken is moving ahead with plans for a Summit for Democracy. Convening leaders from “a diverse group of the world’s democracies” in early December, the summit aims to encourage commitments to fight corruption and respect human rights – an opportunity, as the White House press release suggests, to “speak honestly about the challenges facing democracy so as to collectively strengthen the foundation for democratic renewal”.

But the crisis of democracy will not be solved by summitry alone. We cannot delegate “democratic renewal” to our presidents, nor to the OAS that claims to represent them. We need an observatory to defend democracy from the bottom up – an institution with the capacity and credibility to fight authoritarian tactics and even the playing field for democracy to flourish. That fight starts now.

#### Internationalism grounded in democratic norms averts a laundry list of existential catastrophes.

Brooks 14 [Rosa; November 14; Professor of Law at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow with the New America and Arizona State University Future of War Project, former Senior Advisor at the U.S. State Department; Foreign Policy, “Embrace the Chaos,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/14/embrace-the-chaos/; RP] – recut rahulpenu

I. The Character of the Mess

Defining the character of the current mess is the easy part. Briefly:

* The last century’s technological revolutions have made our world more globally interconnected than ever.
* Power (along with access to power) has become more democratized and diffuse in some ways, but more concentrated in other ways.
* For most individuals around the globe, day-to-day life is far less dangerous and brutal than in previous eras; for the species as a whole, however, the risk of future global catastrophe has increased.
* The continuously accelerating rate of technological and social change makes it increasingly difficult to predict the geopolitical future.

Nothing is particularly original about these observations; they’re repeated in some fashion in every major national strategic document produced over the last decade. They probably teach this stuff to kindergarteners now. Indeed, we’ve heard it all so often that it’s tempting to dismiss such claims as meaningless platitudes: Been there; theorized that. Can we get please get back to foreign-policy business as usual?

No, we can’t. Not if we want our children and grandchildren to live decent lives. If we care about the future at all, we need to do more than prattle on at cocktail parties about globalization, interconnectedness, complexity, danger, and uncertainty. We need to feel these seismic changes in our bones.

So bear with me. Let’s try to breathe some life into the clichés.

I’ve written about these issues before (here and here), and at risk of being both a narcissist and a broken record, I’ll quote myself:

The world has grown more complex. Believe it. The world now contains more people living in more states than ever before, and we’re all more interconnected. A hundred years ago, the world population was about 1.8 billion, there were roughly 60 sovereign states in the world, the automobile was still a rarity, and there were no commercial passenger flights and no transcontinental telephone service. Fifty years ago, global population had climbed to more than 3 billion and there were 115 U.N. member states, but air travel was still for the wealthy and the personal computer still lay two decades in the future.

Today? We’ve got 7 billion people living in 192 U.N. member states and a handful of other territories. These 7 billion people take 93,000 commercial flights a day from 9,000 airports, drive 1 billion cars, and carry 7 billion mobile phones around with them.

In numerous ways, life has gotten substantially better in this more crowded and interconnected era. Seventy years ago, global war killed scores of millions, but interstate conflict has declined sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the United Nations ushered in a far more egalitarian and democratic form of international governance than existed in any previous era. Today, militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force to accomplish their aims, and the world now has numerous transnational courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer states a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia, but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars.

In the 50 years that followed World War II, medical and agricultural advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity to most parts of the globe. More recently, the communications revolution has enabled exciting new forms of nongovernmental cross-border alliances to emerge, empowering, for instance, global human rights and environmental movements. In just the last two decades, the near-universal penetration of mobile phones has had a powerful leveling effect: All over the globe, people at every age and income level can use these tiny but powerful computers to learn foreign languages, solve complex mathematical problems, create and share videos, watch the news, move money around, or communicate with far-flung friends.

All this has had a dark side, of course. As access to knowledge has been democratized, so too has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater global interconnectedness enables disease, pollution, and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders. A hundred years ago, no single individual or nonstate actor could do more than cause localized mayhem; today, we have to worry about massive, bioengineered threats created by tiny terrorist cells and globally devastating cyberattacks devised by malevolent teen hackers.

Even as many forms of power have grown more democratized and diffuse, other forms of power have grown more concentrated. A very small number of states control and consume a disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and a very small number of individuals control most of the world’s wealth. (According to a 2014 Oxfam report, the 85 richest individuals on Earth are worth more than the globe’s 3.5 billion poorest people).

Indeed, from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous over the last century. Individual humans live longer than ever before, but a small number of states now possess the unprecedented ability to destroy large chunks of the human race and possibly the Earth itself — all in a matter of days or even hours. What’s more, though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict has greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are now both less controlled and less controllable.

Amid all these changes, our world has also grown far more uncertain. We possess more information than ever before and vastly greater processing power, but the accelerating pace of global change has far exceeded our collective ability to understand it, much less manage it. This makes it increasingly difficult to make predictions or calculate risks. As I’ve written previously:

We literally have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today. Compared to the long, slow sweep of human history, the events of the last century have taken place in the blink of an eye. This should … give us pause when we’re tempted to conclude that today’s trends are likely to continue. Rising life expectancy? That’s great, but if climate change has consequences as nasty as some predict, a century of rising life expectancy could turn out to be a mere blip on the charts. A steep decline in interstate conflicts? Fantastic, but less than 70 years of human history isn’t much to go on….

That’s why one can’t dismiss the risk of catastrophic events [such as disastrous climate change or nuclear conflict] as “high consequence, low probability.” How do we compute the probability of catastrophic events of a type that has never happened? Does 70 years without nuclear annihilation tell us that there’s a low probability of nuclear catastrophe — or just tell us that we haven’t had a nuclear catastrophe yet?…

Lack of catastrophic change might signify a system in stable equilibrium, but sometimes — as with earthquakes — pressure may be building up over time, undetected….

Most analysts assumed the Soviet Union was stable — until it collapsed. Analysts predicted that Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak would retain his firm grip on power — until he was ousted. How much of what we currently file under “Stable” should be recategorized under “Hasn’t Collapsed Yet”?

This, then, is the character of world messiness in this first quarter of the 21st century. So on to the next question: Where, in all this messiness, does the United States find itself?

II. The United States in the Mess: Goodbye, Lake Wobegon?

For Americans, the good news is that the United States remains an extraordinarily powerful nation. The United States has “the most powerful military in history,” Obama declared in a recent speech. Measured by sheer destructive capacity, he is surely right. The United States spends more on its military than China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and India combined. The U.S. military can get to more places, faster, with more lethal and effective weapons, than any military on Earth.

The United States also manages to gobble up a disproportionate share of the world’s wealth and resources. By the year 2000, wrote Betsy Taylor and Dave Tilford, the United States, with “less than 5 percent of the world’s population,” was using “one-third of the world’s paper, a quarter of the world’s oil, 23 percent of the coal, 27 percent of the aluminum, and 19 percent of the copper.” In 2010, Americans possessed 39 percent of the planet’s wealth.

The bad news for Americans? U.S. power and global influence have been declining. In part, this is because various once-weak states have been growing stronger, and in part, it’s because no state can be as autonomous today as it might have been in the past. The United States’ geographical position long helped protect it from external interference, while its strong military and economy enabled it to dominate or control numerous less powerful states. But globalization has reduced every state’s autonomy, creating collective challenges — from climate change to the regulation of capital — that no state can fully address on its own.

U.S. power and global influence have also declined in absolute terms, as America’s own political and economic health has been called into question. The United States now has greater income inequality than almost every other state in the developed world — and most states in the developing world. American life expectancy ranks well below that of other industrialized democracies, and the same is true for infant mortality and elementary school enrollment. Meanwhile, the United States has the world’s highest per capita incarceration rate, and on international health and quality-of-life metrics, the United States has been losing ground for several decades. This domestic decline jeopardizes the country’s continued ability to innovate and prosper; it also makes American values and the American political and economic systems less appealing to others.

Worse, the political system that Americans rely on for reform and repair seems itself to be broken; the federal government shutdown in 2013 offered the world a striking illustration of U.S. political dysfunction. Add to this the divisive national security policies of George W. Bush’s administration — many of which were continued or expanded by the Obama administration — and it’s no surprise that the United States has recently become less admired and less emulated around the globe, reducing American “soft power.”

No matter how you slice it, it comes to the same thing: Compared with 30 years ago, the United States today has a greatly reduced ability to control its own destiny or the destiny of other states. The United States still has unprecedented power to destroy (Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden both discovered this, to their detriment). But the country’s capacity for destruction is not equaled by its capacity to shape the behavior of other states or their populations, and the United States has less and less ability to insulate itself from the world’s woes.

Unfortunately, American political leaders share a bipartisan inclination to deny these realities. Mostly, they succumb to the Lake Wobegon effect: “Declinism” and “declinist” have entered the American political vocabulary, but only as purely pejorative terms.

This is both stupid and dangerous. How can we adapt our global strategy to compensate for the ways in which U.S. power has been declining if we refuse to admit that decline?

Continued U.S. decline is certainly not inevitable, and some argue that the United States is in fact poised for an economic and political resurgence. There is no way to know for sure — but it’s worth recalling that, historically, every significant empire has eventually declined. Are we prepared to bet that the United States will prove an exception?

There is also no way to know for sure what form continued or eventual U.S. decline will take. We don’t know whether it will be fast or slow; we don’t know whether the American Empire is in for a hard landing or a soft one. Will the United States crash, like the former Soviet Union? Or will a slow decline in power leave the country an intact and influential nation, like the United Kingdom? Will America’s future be more like Canada’s present, or more like Brazil’s?

III. Behind the Veil of Ignorance: Uncertainty as Lodestone

We don’t know what America’s future will look like, and we can make fewer and fewer geopolitical predictions with confidence. The world has changed too much and too fast for us to accurately assess the probabilities of many types of future events. Perhaps this is why it’s so tempting for Americans to stay in Lake Wobegon, with eyes closed and fingers crossed. Uncertainty is frightening.

But paradoxically, this very uncertainty should be a lodestone, pointing realists and idealists alike toward a sensible, forward-looking global strategy. In fact, radical uncertainty can be a powerful tool for strategic planning.

That may seem oxymoronic, but consider one of the 20th century’s most influential thought experiments: In his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, philosopher John Rawls famously sought to use a hypothetical situation involving extreme uncertainty to derive optimal principles of justice.

Imagine, said Rawls, rational, free, and equal humans seeking to devise a set of principles to undergird the structure of human society. Imagine further that they must reason from behind what Rawls dubbed a “veil of ignorance,” which hides from them their own future status or attributes. Behind the veil of ignorance, wrote Rawls, people still possess general knowledge of economics, science, and so forth, and they can draw on this knowledge to assist them in designing a future society. Their ignorance is limited to their own future role in the society they are designing: “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.”

If we were collectively designing social structures and rules, but could not know our own individual future positions in that social structure, what structures and rules would we come up with? Applying a version of decision theory, Rawls concluded that in the face of such radical uncertainty, rational, free, and equal beings behind the veil of ignorance would be drawn toward a “maximin” (or “minimax“) rule of decision, in which they would seek to minimize their losses in a worst-case scenario. Since those behind the veil of ignorance don’t know whether they’ll be among the haves or among the have-nots in the society they are designing, they should seek to build a society in which they each will be least badly off — even the luck of the draw leads them to start with the fewest advantages.

Rawls posited that such a rule of decision should lead those behind the veil of ignorance to support two core principles: the first relating to liberty (“each person [should] have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others”), and the second relating to social and economic goods. (Social goods should be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution would serve the common good and be “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” while “offices and positions [should remain] open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”)

This is in some ways intuitive: On a national level, it is the reason Americans across the political spectrum continue to express substantial support for the maintenance of unemployment benefits, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, and so on. Any one of us might someday face a job loss or illness; nearly all of us will eventually face old age. We know we might someday need those benefits ourselves. In the face of uncertainty about the future, we all recognize the value of insurance, savings, and at least some minimal social safety net.

In the international arena, the same is true.

This has obvious implications for global strategy. Empires, like individuals, can sink into poverty, illness, or simple old age — and in an era of uncertainty, empires, like individuals, would do well to hedge against the possibility of future misfortune.

Indeed, two decades after the publication of A Theory of Justice, Rawls sought to apply a form of this thought experiment to derive the core principles that he believed would characterize a just global order. His arguments are complex, and I can’t do justice to them here — but fortunately, unlike Rawls, I am not interested in coming up with abstract principles of global justice. My less lofty agenda is limited to arguing that a crude version of Rawls’s thought experiment can help us delineate the contours of a sensible U.S. global strategy — a “maximin” strategy that is well-suited to protecting the interests of the United States and its people, both in today’s messy world and in a wide range of future messes.

Here’s my thought experiment.

Imagine a crude version of Rawls’s veil of ignorance, with only the United States behind it. This veil of ignorance doesn’t require us to disavow what we know of history (America’s or the world’s), nor does it require us to disavow what we know of recent trends, present global realities, U.S. values, or our current conception of the good. It only hides our future from us: Behind this veil of ignorance, we don’t know whether energy, food, water, and other vital resources will be scarcer or more plentiful in the decades to come; we don’t know whether global power will be more or less centralized; we don’t know whether new technologies and new forms of social organization will make existing technologies and institutions obsolete.

Most of all, we don’t know whether, in the decades to come, the United States will be rich or poor, weak or strong, respected or hated. For that matter, we don’t know whether the United States — or even the form of political organization we call the nation-state — will exist at all a century or two from now. In the face of such radical uncertainty, what kind of grand strategy should a rational United States adopt?

Of course, this shouldn’t really be called a “thought experiment” at all: The United States already operates behind a veil of ignorance, if we could only bring ourselves to admit it. We know the past; we have a reasonable understanding of recent trends; we know that the world is messy and dangerous; we know that the potential for rapid and potentially catastrophic change is real; and we know that our ability to predict future changes and quantify various risks is profoundly limited.

This knowledge is profoundly unsettling. Thus, we try our best to know and not know, at the same time: We speak glibly of complexity, accelerating change, danger, and uncertainty, but then fall back into the comfortable assumption that continued U.S. global dominance is a given and that catastrophic change is unlikely to occur. As long as we remain willfully ignorant of the veil of ignorance that hangs over us, we can avoid asking hard questions and making harder choices.

But this is shortsighted and dangerous. Empires that refuse to accept reality tend to rapidly decline. A clear-eyed acceptance of uncertainty and risk is the surest route to a more secure future. Instead of blinding us or paralyzing us, the uncertainty of our future should motivate us to engage in more responsible strategic planning.

If the United States can manage to be as rational as Rawls’s hypothetical decision-makers, it should adopt a similar maximin rule of decision: It should prefer international rules and institutions that will maximize America’s odds of thriving, even in a worst-case future scenario. In fact, we should wish for international rules and institutions that will be kindest to the individuals living in what is now the United States and their descendants, even if the United States should someday cease to exist entirely.

Could happen, folks. Look around you. Do you see the Roman Empire, or the Aztec Empire, or the Ottoman Empire?

IV. From Messiness to Strategy: A Preliminary Sketch

This has urgent implications for U.S. strategic planning. Precisely because U.S. global power may very well continue to decline, the United States should use the very considerable military, political, cultural, and economic power it still has to foster the international order most likely to benefit the country if it someday loses that power.

The ultimate objective of U.S. grand strategy should be the creation of an equitable and peaceful international order with an effective system of global governance — one that is built upon respect for human dignity, human rights, and the rule of law, with robust mechanisms for resolving thorny collective problems.

We should seek this not because it’s the “morally right” thing for the United States to do, but because a maximin decision rule should lead us to conclude that this will offer the United States and its population the best chance of continuing to thrive, even in the event of a radical future decline in U.S. wealth and power.

But, one might argue, the United States already tries to promote such a global order — right?

Sure it does — but only inconsistently, and generally as something of an afterthought. We pour money into our military and intelligence communities, but starve our diplomats and development agencies. We fixate on the threat du jour, often exaggerating it and allowing it to distort our foreign policy in self-destructive ways (cf. Iraq War), while viewing matters such as United Nations reform or reform of global economic institutions or environmental protection rules as tedious and of low priority. If we take seriously the many potential dangers lurking in the unknowable future, however, fostering a stronger, fairer, and more effective system of international governance would become a matter of urgent national self-interest and our highest strategic priority — something that should be reflected both in our policies and in our budgetary decisions.

An effective global governance system would need to be built upon the recognition that states remain the primary mode of political and social organization in the international sphere, but also upon the recognition that new forms of social organization continue to evolve and may ultimately displace at least some states. An effective and dynamic international system will need to develop innovative ways to bring such new actors and organizations within the ambit of international law and institutions, both as responsible creators of law and institutions and as responsible subjects.

### 1NC – CP

#### CP Text - The Federative Republic of Brazil ought to:

#### recognize an unconditional right of non-Trucker workers to strike.

#### make striking by all Trucker workers a federal crime and implement penalties modelled after New York City Taylor Law including two-for-one fines, lifetime bans from federal jobs, and jail time.

#### Trucker Strikes obliterate Food Security and turns the Economy.

Woody 18 Katherine Woody 7-3-2018 "Economic Impact of the Brazilian Trucker Strike" <https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filename=Economic%20Impact%20of%20the%20Brazilian%20Trucker%20Strike_Brasilia_Brazil_7-3-2018.pdf> (Agricultural Attaché at US Foreign Agriculture Service)//Elmer

Report Highlights: On May 21, 2018, hundreds of thousands of **Brazil’s** nearly 2 million **truck drivers began** an 11-day **strike** to protest high diesel prices, a move that **slowed Brazil’s economy**, **crippled** **transportation-dependent industries**, and **caused** estimated **losses of US$ 1.75 billion to Brazil’s agricultural sector**. **A month after** Brazil’s longest trucker strike (and one of the country’s most effective strikes in history), **transportation and logistics challenges still persist** **for Brazil’s exporters**, as shipments of Brazilian commodities are still delayed, **supply chains are still experiencing bottlenecks**, and debate and **uncertainty about** Brazil’s transportation **policies and prices continue to plague the agricultural sector** Background On May 21, 2018, hundreds of thousands of Brazil’s nearly 2 million truck drivers began an 11-day strike to protest high diesel prices, a move that slowed Brazil’s economy, crippled transportation-dependent industries, and caused estimated losses of US$ 1.75 billion to Brazil’s agricultural sector. Truck drivers parked their rigs along roads across the country, refusing to make deliveries of cargo and creating roadblocks on more than half of Brazil’s 500 busiest highways. Within a few days, the **effects** of the strike were **widespread** and painful, as gas stations ran out of fuel, drivers waited for hours in lines for what small fuel supplies remained, **supermarket shelves began to empty** and some **stores rationed perishable products**, and airports began cancelling flights as fuel supplies dwindled. Virtually **all segments of Brazil’s agricultural sector were affected in some way**, but livestock and poultry operations were particularly hard hit by feed delivery disruptions, idled slaughterhouses, export stoppages, and ultimately the culling of tens of millions of animals. A month after Brazil’s longest trucker strike (and one of the country’s most effective strikes in history), transportation and logistics challenges still persist for Brazil’s exporters, as shipments of Brazilian commodities are still delayed, supply chains are still experiencing bottlenecks, and debate and uncertainty about Brazil’s transportation policies and prices continue to plague the agricultural sector. The truckers’ rebellion was particularly painful for Brazil because the country lacks extensive rail and waterway infrastructure to transport goods, instead relying on trucks to carry more than 90 percent of all freight (excluding crude oil and iron ore). Additionally, Brazil’s limited road infrastructure meant that it was easy for striking truckers to create massive bottlenecks by setting up roadblocks along major roads, many of which are only one lane in each direction. Unlike the United States, where many **agricultural goods** are transported to export terminals by railways or river barges, Brazil’s farmers are **dependent on trucks** to move their goods within the domestic market and to ports for sale to the international market. The effects of the strike were wide-ranging, especially as gas stations ran out of fuel, supermarket shelves began to empty of fresh foods, and ports ran low on commodities to load for export. At the Port of Paranagua in the state of Paraná, one of the main soybean routes was interrupted. At the beginning of the strike, authorities warned that the blockage obstructed the arrival of a thousand soybean trucks per day in the terminal. According to the Sao Paulo State Supermarket Association (APAS), Brazilian retailers lost R$1.3 billion due to shortages of perishable items. In Sao Paulo alone, supermarkets losses were estimated at R$400 million. Causes The strike was spurred by rapidly rising fuel prices (diesel prices were up 43 percent since July 2017), combined with the effects of the Brazil real continuing to weaken against the U.S. dollar. Last year, Brazil’s state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, changed its pricing policies allow daily fluctuations of fuel prices pegged to the international oil market and scrapped subsidies that had kept domestic fuel prices lower. Most Brazilian truck drivers are largely self-employed and daily increases in fuel costs had begun to cut deeply into their incomes. Brazilian citizens of all economic classes supported the truck drivers, and by the eighth day of the strike, 87 percent of the population approved of the strike and sympathized with what many saw as another example of the injustice of government taxes, according to one public opinion poll by Brazilian firm Datafolha. However, the same firm on June 11 published results of a separate opinion poll that showed that 69 percent of Brazilians thought the trucker strike was harmful for the Brazilian economy. The survey also showed that Brazilians want more control of gas and fuel prices. Even before the strike, high fuel prices were affecting the competitiveness of Brazilian agricultural exports. Brazil’s transportation lobby, the National Confederation of Transport, estimated that before the strike Brazilian diesel prices were about 15 higher than in the United States, and argued that diesel fuel in Brazil was more expensive than in similarly developed countries such as Mexico and Russia. Roughly half of the Brazilian fuel price paid by consumers goes to government taxes. A study by the College of Agriculture at the University of Sao Paulo (ESALQ) found that farmers were paying an average of 9.05 reals (US$ 2.42) more per ton than early 2017 to transport oilseeds and grains from Mato Grosso to the Port of Santos in Sao Paulo. ESALQ estimated that in 2017, the cost to move Brazilian agricultural goods around the country reached 120 billion reals, with 87.5 percent going to transportation costs. Diesel prices at the pump in the major agriculture-producing states of Mato Grosso, Sao Paulo, and Paraná increased by 13-15 percent between January 2017 and May 2018, according to the ESALQ study. Resolution As the strike dragged on Brazilian President Michel Temer authorized intervention by military and federal police to clear roadblocks and begin escorting some trucks to their destinations, especially rigs carrying fuel to airports and other strategic locations. Desperate to jumpstart the country’s economy, Brazilian officials met with the leaders of several trucker unions, but a deal with union leaders to temporarily cut fuel prices was rejected by large numbers of independent truckers, who used social media apps to coordinate their response and garner public support for the continued strike. On the ninth day of the strike, the Brazilian government agreed to reduce diesel prices by 0.46 reals per liter, hold prices stable for 60 days, reduce tolls for large trucks, and suspend or eliminate some taxes in an effort to coax drivers back to the roads. The measures largely worked, with most truckers returning to the road and deliveries of food, fuel, and medicine beginning to flow again, albeit at a slower, more unreliable pace. Still, the concessions reportedly cost the Brazilian government 9.5 billion reals (US$ 2.48 billion) and contributed to the resignation of the Petrobras CEO. Market analysts have revised upward Brazil’s budget deficit for the year, now estimated at R$151 billion (US$ 40 billion), up more than R$12.5 billion (US$ 3.3 billion) from the previous month’s estimate due to the increased cost of fuel subsidies agreed to under negotiations to end the strike. Effects Although goods of all kinds, including agricultural products, started flowing again by the beginning of June, the strike left lasting scars on the Brazilian economy. Forecasters are estimating total losses of between US$ 25-30 billion to Brazil’s economy as a result of the strike. Brazil’s National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock (CNA) estimated losses to the agricultural sector due to the trucker strike at 6.6 billion reals (about US$ 1.75 billion). CNA also estimated that it **could take** Brazilian agricultural producers 6 months to **a year to recover fully** from the effects of the strike. Brazil’s central bank released its June report and **cut** **projected** 2018 **GDP** growth **to 1.6 percent**. One of the Brazilian government’s concessions to end the strike, a minimum freight rate guaranteed to truckers, is continuing to wreak havoc on the agricultural industry. The policy, which was implemented by presidential decree on May 30, was immediately criticized by a number of transportation-dependent industries, chief among them agriculture. CNA argued that the policy is unconstitutional and completely **upends** **logistics for agricultural producers**, many of whom have already concluded marketing contracts for 2018 crops. CNA reports that **soy and corn** producers and traders are already **paying** an **additional** R$ 500 million (US**$ 132 million**) for transportation **every day,** for a total of more than R$ 10 billion (US$ 2.65 billion) so far. Analysis by CNA forecasts that the policy is increasing freight rates by approximately 50-150 percent throughout the country, with Brazil’s powerhouse agricultural region in the interior of the country being hit the hardest. CNA and other players in the agricultural sector have challenged the measure in court through more than 50 lawsuits. Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Luiz Fux has been trying to mediate a solution satisfactory to both the transportation sector and the agricultural and industrial sectors dependent on those services. In the meantime, he suspended the pending lawsuits and left in effect the minimum freight rate table published on May 30 by the National Agency for Terrestrial Transportation (ANTT). President Temer has said he will abide by the court’s decision, truck drivers have threatened to strike again if the minimum price policy is invalidated. ANTT has publically estimated that judicial proceedings will continue through at least early August. Count Justice Fux confirmed that a new round of negotiations on this topic is scheduled for August 27, after the Supreme Court recess. The Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) has warned that the lack of certainty over truck freight rates has hindered transportation of commodities to the ports and subsequently caused shipping delays. Nearly two weeks after the end of the strike, MAPA Minister Blairo Maggi told reporters, “There are a lot of products waiting for transportation. We should be moving 450,000 tons of goods to ports every day, but we are not.” He also noted that the situation has affected forward sales of agricultural commodities since traders cannot accurate price the contracts without knowing how much will need to be spent on transportation. CNA argues that since the policy went into effect, **productivity of Brazil’s agricultural sector has slowed by half**, as producers have slowed the volume of shipments they are sending to ports while they wait for a resolution. Meanwhile, the number of ships waiting to load at Brazilian ports has continued to grow. According to shipping agency Williams, the number of ships berthed and loading in mid-June was about 40 percent lower than the same period last year, while the ship line-ups had grown to be about 60 percent larger than 2017, with as many as 70 ships waiting, according to some industry sources. CNA estimated that the shipping delays have cost about R$ 135 million (US$ 36 million) in demurrage charges for ships that have been delayed in loading at Brazilian ports. Moreover, the problems created by continued uncertainty about the policy are expected to worsen as Brazil’s second-crop corn harvest progresses. Brazil’s second-crop corn is currently less than 10 percent harvested, but limited silo capacity in the country means that commodities must generally start flowing to the ports as it comes out of the ground. With a record soybean crop this year and slow delivery to the ports in June, Brazilian corn will be forced to compete with soy for transportation and storage capacity, and freight rates are expected to rise as more Brazilian corn comes onto the market. Impact on the Agricultural Sector Livestock Swine and Poultry: The most significant losses from the strike were born by the chicken and pork production sector. Shortages of fuel and animal feed affected farms and feedlots, while slaughterhouses idled their production lines when transportation to the ports was cut off and refrigerated warehouses filled to capacity. Analysts estimated a loss of R$4 billion (US$ 1.05 billion) in exports, with 120,000 metric tons of chicken and pork meat not exported because of the strike. The Brazilian Association of Animal Protein reported that the strike caused the closure of 137 poultry plants and 30 swine slaughterhouses, forcing 220,000 industry workers to go on temporary leave. As feed rations ran low, some poultry operations were only feeding birds once every 48 hours, considered starvation rations, according to MAPA Minister Maggi. Particularly worrisome for the world’s largest exporter of chicken was the fact that poultry operations were forced to cull an estimated 70 million birds (about 7 percent of Brazil’s flock of 1 billion birds), bringing the level of chicks on breeder farms down to their lowest levels in a decade. Minister Maggi called on President Temer during the strike to ensure security forces were escorting trucks of feed rations to poultry farms. By mid-June, all affected processing plants had resumed operations, according to the Brazilian Association of Animal Protein. However, the disruption in supply was expected to cause a spike in Brazilian chicken prices as the sector could take more than 2 months to fully recover. Wholesale prices for frozen chicken in Brazil were up more than 40 percent. Moreover, Rabobank revised downward their forecast of the Brazilian poultry sector to an estimated 3 percent decline for the year (down from a forecasted 2-percent expansion). Cattle: The trucker strike came at a very unfortunate time for the beef sector. With the beginning of winter in Brazil, cattle on pasture begin to lose weight and needed to be sent to slaughter, but the strike forced the closure of virtually all of Brazil’s more than 100 cattle slaughterhouses. Most of the losses in the beef industry occurred not through the mortality of animals on farm, but rather through estimated lost exports of R$ 620 million (US$ 164 million). More than 40,000 metric tons of beef were unable to reach ports, and the domestic market saw an uncalculated amount of beef spoiled on the road as an estimated 3,750 refrigerated trucks sat idle during the strike, according to meatpacking trade association ABIEC. The industry calculates total losses to the sector could reach R$ 8 billion (US$ 2.1 billion). ABIEC noted that 90 percent of animal protein production was interrupted. On a positive note for beef producers, some analysts expect beef prices to rise in response to lower chicken meat volumes. Dairy Dairy producers across Brazil were severely affected by the transportation paralysis, with news media depicting dire scenes of the disposal of hundreds of millions of liters of milk by farmers who could not store their perishable products. The discarded milk alone was valued at more than R$ 1 billion (US$ 260 million). Milk supply in Brazil is expected to decline 9 percent year over year in the second quarter of 2018 as a consequence of the strike. Moreover, production will take a while to recover and will likely drop 6 percent year-over-year in the third quarter. Market analysts evaluate that milk prices paid to producers are expected to peak in the third quarter of 2018. Following 12 months of low profitability, farmers and processors were forced at a particularly difficult time to absorb the losses caused by the May strike. **Grains** and **Oilseeds** When the strike began in late May, Brazil’s soybean harvest was nearly finished and the harvest for second-crop “safrinha” corn was just beginning. The largest producing area for both of these crops is Brazil’s center-west region in the interior of the country, located very far from points of export in Brazil’s southeast and north arc regions. Loading at some of Brazil’s largest **soybean**-exporting ports, including Santos, Paranagua, Rio Grande, and Santarem, ground to a halt during the strike, as on-port stocks emptied and roadblocks kept trucks from delivering commodities for export. Most export terminals ran out of soybeans for shipment about 8 days into the strike, with soybeans reportedly arriving to the Port of Paranagua in Paraná state on the afternoon of the tenth day when trucks were able to reach the port complex for the first time since the strike had begun. Trucks reportedly unloaded more than 40,000 tons of soybeans at the port in the first 24 hours after the strike concluded. The Port of Santos, Latin America’s largest port, was also idled when trucks could no longer make deliveries. Cargo transported by rail were unaffected by the strike, but this makes up only a small portion of exports from the Port of Santos. Brazil’s soybean crushers association, ABIOVE, reported that all 63 of Brazil’s soy-crushing facilities came to a standstill during the strike due to a lack of supplies. The Mato Grosso Institute for Agricultural Economics (IMEA) reported that the corn harvest stalled out as fuel supplies in the state ran low. The aftermath of the strike and uncertainty about the minimum freight rate have stifled forward sales for soybeans, with traders complaining that they are unable to accurately set prices for futures contracts without a reliable estimate of transportation costs. As of late June, some of the country’s largest grain traders have virtually stopped buying soybeans and **corn** for export, even though IMEA reported that about one-third of Mato Grosso’s safrinha corn is still unsold. Grain and oilseed traders are also reportedly delaying picking up commodities from farmers’ storage facilities while they angle to avoid paying rapidly rising freight rates and wait to see what happens to the government’s minimum transportation price policy. This could be a major problem for a country whose agricultural producers have a lack of on-farm storage and will be faced with tough decisions of where to place safrinha corn. Brazil’s National Association of Cereal Exporters estimated that as of mid-June, about 10 million tons of soybeans were paralyzed in the interior of the country while more than 50 vessels were waiting to be loaded at ports. CNA reported that exports of at least 6.8 million tons of soybeans and soybean meal have been delayed due to surging freight prices under the government’s minimum price policy. Meanwhile, the number of trucks arriving at the Port of Santos was down more than 20 percent from a month earlier, despite abundant soybean supplies in the country ready for export. At the Port of Paranagua, truck volume was down more than 10 percent and while the port has been receiving enough soybean volume to load waiting vessels, it has not been able to begin rebuilding its 1.5 million metric tons of on-port stocks, which were completely depleted during the 11-day strike. This makes the port particularly vulnerable if there is a second truck driver strike if the government’s minimum freight rate policy is rescinded. The backlog of ships at Brazil’s ports are not merely waiting to load commodities for export; they are waiting to unload cargoes of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer needed by Brazil’s farmers for the wheat planting currently underway, as well as preparing fields for soybean planting, which will commence in a few months. CNA estimated that about 35 ships are currently lined up and waiting to unload fertilizer at Brazilian ports, more than half at the Port of Paranagua in the state of Paraná in southern Brazil. According to Brazil’s Fertilizer Blenders Association, 60 percent of fertilizer deliveries have been delayed as a result of the backlog. Sugarcane and Ethanol The strike began just as the harvest kicked off in the world’s largest sugarcane-growing regions, Brazil’s center-south. Progress on the sugarcane harvest slowed as fuel supplies dwindled and at least 220 sugar mills were forced to close, according to trade group Forum National Sucroenergetico. Meanwhile, UNICA, Brazil’s Sugar Growers Association, reported that 150 sugar mills closed in the state of Sao Paulo alone, where 60 percent of Brazil’s sugar and ethanol production occurs. The state of Sao Paulo produces about 150,000 tons of sugar and 100 million liters of ethanol daily, and the sugar industry in that state suffered losses in revenue of about US$ 48 million daily during the strike. The disruption caused international sugar futures to rise as sugar exports were unable to reach the ports. Once fuel supplies began flowing again, harvest and crushing operations were able to quickly get back up to speed. Losses in the sector are calculated at R$ 740 million (US$ 196 million). However, this calculation does not include lost/delayed sales of ethanol stored at the mills for exports or use in the domestic market, as no data of this type has been released. Brazil is the world’s largest exporter of sugar, with more than 20 million tons exported in the previous season. Coffee Brazil is the world’s largest coffee grower and exporter, and the trucker strike hit just as the country’s main Arabica harvest was commencing, which caused international Arabica futures prices to increase by about 2 percent. According to Brazil’s Coffee Exporters Council (CeCafe), the strike affected issuance of export certificates and delayed shipments, but CeCafe noted that most sales were already concluded and overall exports for the season are expected to remain at roughly the same levels estimated before the strike. According to the Brazilian Coffee Industry Association, coffee producers lost an estimated R$ 70 million (US$ 18.5 million) per day during the protests, while CeCafe estimated export losses and extra port costs of R$ 560 million (US$ 148 million). Seafood Brazil’s seafood industry was affected by a disruption of deliveries between producers and processing centers, according to trade group Peixe BR. The state of Paraná is Brazil’s largest producer of fish, raising more than 100,000 tons of tilapia last year, while the state of Sao Paulo has seen rapid growth of the industry, producing more than 65,000 tons of tilapia last year. These two states’ aquaculture sectors were the hardest hit, according to Peixe BR. At one point during the strike, a large, multi-commodity agricultural cooperative in southern Brazil, was forced to halt tilapia processing operations when truck drivers blocked roadways and cut off supplies for processing, as well as the route for distributing the final product. Fruits and Vegetables As a result of the strike, many of Brazil’s wholesale markets saw supplies of fresh products dwindle and spoilage of other products in cases where usual customers were unable to make routine purchases. The Sao Paulo Warehouse Company (CEAGESP), Latin America’s largest and the world’s third-largest wholesale market, reported losses of nearly R$ 100 million (US$ 26 million) of fruits, vegetables, and nuts, including imported products. During a normal day, CEAGESP would normally see about 1,800- 2,000 trucks come and go from the market with fresh and perishable products. However, during the strike this was reduced to less than 100 trucks per day. In addition to losses of perishable products, the prices of remaining products sored because CEAGESP prices serve as a reference for states in Brazil. Supermarkets The Brazilian Supermarket Association (ABRAS) reported total losses of R$ 2.7 billion (US$ 712 million) due to the truckers strike. In addition to losses with fresh, frozen, and perishable products, ABRAS reported shortages of other consumer goods that could not be delivered to stores. According to the Sao Paulo State Supermarket Association, in Sao Paulo alone supermarkets losses reached R$ 400 million (US$ 105 million).

#### The Counterplan shuts down Trucker Strikes.

Bauernschuster et Al 17, Stefan, Timo Hener, and Helmut Rainer. "When labor disputes bring cities to a standstill: The impact of public transit strikes on traffic, accidents, air pollution, and health." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9.1 (2017): 1-37. (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of Passau, Innstra)//Elmer

New York City's **Taylor Law,** which was put into effect **in response to a transit strike** in 1966, represents an example of a particularly draconian measure. Under Section 210, the law **prohibits** any **strike or** other concerted **stoppage** 01 worn or slowdown by public employees (Division of Local Government Services 2009). Instead, it prescribes binding arbitration by a state agency to resolve bargaining deadlocks between unions and employers. **Violations** against the prohibition on strikes are **punishable with hefty penalties**. The fine for an individual worker is **twice** the striking employee's **salary** **for each** **day** the strike lasts. In addition, union leaders face **imprisonment**. Since its inception in 1967, the Taylor Law has generated a lot of controversy. To proponents, it was **successful in averting several potential transit strikes** that would have imposed significant costs on the city and its inhabitants (OECD 2007). Indeed, New York City has only seen two transit strikes over the past four decades—in 1980 and in 2005. In both cases, harsh monetary penalties were imposed on workers and unions. The 2005 transit strike additionally led to the imprisonment of a union leader, and saw the Transport Workers Union (TWU) filing a formal complaint with the ILO. Since then, the ILO has urged the United States government to restore the right of transit workers to strike, arguing that they do not provide essential services justifying a strike ban (Committee on Freedom of Association 2011, 775). So far, the Taylor Law has not been amended in this direction.

#### Brazil key to Global Food Supply

Moreira 21 Assis Moreira 7-5-2021 "Brazil to remain world leader in food supply, OECD and FAO say" <https://valorinternational.globo.com/agribusiness/news/2021/07/05/brazil-to-remain-world-leader-in-food-supply-oecd-and-fao-say.ghtml> (Geneva Correspondent on Agribusiness)//Elmer

**Brazil** will **continue** to increase its **role as a major global food supplier**, including in products such as beef and even with a slower pace of growth in demand from China. These projections are **in the report on agricultural outlook** 2021-2030 released Monday by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). China will continue to have enormous influence on agricultural markets. The Chinese deficit in agricultural trade has grown to $86 billion in 2020 from $2.6 billion in 2000. For the next ten years, Beijing will continue to expand imports, but at a slower pace due to lower population growth, saturation in consumption of some commodities, and efficiency gains in its own production. In addition, the Chinese market will pose tougher competition as trade tensions with the United States ease. The report predicts that China could once again become the main market for U.S. agricultural exports. In this scenario, **abundant land and water** will **make Brazil the dominant producer**, and Latin America as a whole **will see** its **agricultural production grow by 14%** over the next ten years. The **net value of the region’s exports is expected to expand by 31%** — just over half the rate achieved between 2011 and 2020. By 2030, the region will continue to grow its share of global markets for key commodities. It may have 63% of world soybean exports, 56% of sugar exports, 44% of fish, 42% of beef exports, and 33% of chicken shipments.

#### Food insecurity spurs conflict and on face kills millions of innocents.

FDI 12 (Future Directions International, a Research institute providing strategic analysis of Australia’s global interests; citing Lindsay Falvery, PhD in Agricultural Science and former  Professor at the University of Melbourne’s Institute of Land and Environment, “Food and Water Insecurity: International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points,” <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/workshop-papers/537-international-conflict-triggers-and-potential-conflict-points-resulting-from-food-and-water-insecurity.html)//Elmer>

There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources.¶ Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world.¶ In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. .¶ He writes (p.36), “…if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.”¶ “Hunger feeds anarchy.”¶ This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow.” ¶ He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.”¶ As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves.¶ Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry.¶ A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon.¶ The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.

### CASE – Econ

#### Toplevel – Don’t allow new 1AR impact evidence – it opens the door to new internal links, uniqueness, or even whole advantages that the 2NR doesn’t get new arguments to answer – the 1NC strategy was premised off the impact card in the Econ advantage being terrible so allowing new evidence destroys preround prep time.

#### Econ Declines doesn’t cause War – prefer post-COVID evidence.

Walt 20 Stephen M Walt 5-13-2020 "Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?" <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/> (Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.)//Elmer

For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely? One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it **would hammer the last nail** in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after **pose an imminent threat** to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too. Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure. I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is **hard to imagine** any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment **when debt** levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct **ways to stimulate the economy**—**infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments**”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do. Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible. If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished. On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, **there would be a lot more** of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second**, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick** and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, **the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain**. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term. To be sure, I can’t rule out another powerful cause of war—stupidity—especially when it is so much in evidence in some quarters these days. So there is no guarantee that we won’t see misguided leaders stumbling into another foolish bloodletting. But given that it’s hard to find any rays of sunshine at this particular moment in history, I’m going to hope I’m right about this one.

#### Collapse doesn’t cause war

Clary 15 – Christopher Clary, former International Affairs Fellow in India at the Council on Foreign Relations, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Watson Institute at Brown University, Adjunct Staff Member @ RAND Corporation, Security Studies Program @ MIT, country director for South Asian affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, former Research Fellow @ the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former research associate in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, BA from Wichita State University and an MA from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2015 (“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2015-­‐8, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712>)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5 Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination? Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

#### Economic growth guarantees civilizational collapse by 2050 – decoupling is impossible and tech is a pipeline dream

**Kallis et al 18** Giorgos Kallis [ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology, formerly Marie Curie International Fellow at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at Berkeley, PhD in Environmental Policy and Planning from the University of the Aegean in Greece], Vasilis Ragnar [Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology], Steffen Lange [Institute for Ecological Economy Research, Berlin, Germany], Barbara Muraca [College of Liberal Arts, Oregon State University], Susan Paulson [Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida], and Matthias Schmelzer [DFG Research Group, University of Jena], 5-31-2018, "Research On Degrowth," Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 43:291-316,  [https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-environ-102017-025941 //](https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-environ-102017-025941%20//) ash

Although driven by political, institutional, and discursive processes, growth is also biophysical. The economic process converts energy, resources, and matter to goods, services, and waste (34). In theory, it seems possible to decouple material throughput from economic output by improving the resource efficiency of production. Ecological economists, however, argue that in practice absolute decoupling is unlikely, even though relative decoupling is common (34). Efficiency should not be confused with scale (35): The more efficiently we use resources, the lower they cost, and the more of them we end up using (36). This is, in essence, growth. Just as increases in labor productivity lead to growth and new jobs, not to less employment, increases in resource productivity increase output and resource use (37). Capitalist economies grow by using more resources and more people, more intensively. Accelerating this is unlikely to spare resources.

Growth can become “cleaner” or “greener” by substituting, for example, fossil fuels with solar power, or scarce, environmentally intensive metals with more abundant and less intensive metals. But new substitutes have resource requirements, and life-cycle impacts that cross space and time. Energy is a vital source of useful work (38); growth has been possible because fossil fuels did things human labor alone could not do. Ending the use of fossil fuels is likely to reduce labor productivity and limit output (34). Solar and wind power are constrained only by their rate of flow, but unlike fossil fuels, they are diffuse—more like rain than a lake (3). To collect and concentrate a diffuse flow of energy, more energy is necessary and more land is required. The EROIs (energy returns on energy investment) of renewable energies are between 10:1 and 20:1, compared to more than 50:1 for earlier deposits of oil and coal (39). An economy powered by a diffuse energy flow is then likely to be an economy of lower net energy and lower output than one powered by concentrated stocks (3). Land use for solar or wind also competes with the use of land for food production, and rare materials are necessary for infrastructures and batteries that store their intermittent flows, with significant environmental effects.

Historical data corroborate ecological economic theory (40). Ayres & Warr (38) find that the use of net energy after conversion losses explains a big portion of the United States’ total factor productivity and economic growth. At the global level, GDP and material use have increased approximately 1:1. Carbon emissions have increased somewhat slower than GDP, but still have increased (34). This is unlikely to be a coincidence. Exceptions may exist, but cross-panel data analysis shows that overall, 1% growth of a national economy is associated with 0.6% to 0.8% increase in its carbon emissions (41) and 0.8% growth in its resource use (42).

Global resource use follows currently the “collapse by 2050” scenario foreseen in the “Limits to Growth” 1971 report (43–45). Domestic material use in some developed OECD economies has reached a plateau, but this is because of globalization and trade. If we take into account imported goods, then the material requirements of products and services consumed in OECD countries have grown hand in hand with GDP, with no decoupling (46). For water use, the effects of growth overwhelm any realistic savings from technologies and efficiency (47); water footprints have increased even in regions such as California where water withdrawals were stabilized (40).

Carbon emissions in some EU (European Union) countries have been declining, even after trade is taken into account, suggesting some substitution of fossil fuels by cleaner energies. [Although recession also played a role (34).] These declines are nowhere near the 8–10%, year-afteryear reductions in carbon emissions required for developed nations under scenarios compatible with a 50% chance of limiting warming to 2◦C (48). Further reductions will be harder to sustain once one-off substitutions of oil or coal with natural gas are exhausted (34).

Resource use or carbon emissions are a product of the scale of the economy (GDP) times its resource or carbon intensity (kg/GDP or kgCO2/GDP). With 1.5% annual increase in global income per capita, carbon intensity has to decline 4.4% each year for staying within 2◦C; with 0% growth, carbon intensity has to fall 2.9% each year (49). In the period 1970–2013, the average annual reduction rate for carbon intensity was less than 1.5%—and this gets harder to sustain as the share of carbon-intensive economies in global output increases (49). As Jackson (50) showed in his seminal work, it is practically impossible to envisage viable climate mitigation scenarios that involve growth. This calls for research on managing, or prospering, without growth (50, 51).

Some scenarios deem possible meeting climate targets while sustaining growth, but these generally assume after 2050 some sort of “negative emissions technology,” geo-engineering or otherwise. According to a recent Nature editorial, these technologies remain currently “magical thinking” (52). Clean energy investments can stimulate the economy in the short run, but in the long run growth may be limited by their low EROIs. Studies suggest that economic growth requires a minimum EROI of close to 11:1 (53). Less EROI means less labor productivity, and hence less growth. Indeed, “Limits to Growth” scenarios do not predict growth ending when resources are exhausted but, rather, when the quality of resources declines to such an extent that further extraction diverts more and more investment away from productive industry (44).

Degrowth is defined by ecological economists as an equitable downscaling of throughput, with a concomitant securing of wellbeing. If there is a fundamental coupling of economic activity and resource use, as ecological economics suggests there is, then serious environmental or climate policies will slow down the economy. Vice versa, a slower economy will use less resources and emit less carbon (40). This is not the same as saying that the degrowth goal is to reduce GDP (54); slowing down the economy is not an end but a likely outcome in a transition toward equitable wellbeing and environmental sustainability.

#### Stopping growth solves extinction from eco collapse – decoupling is impossible even under perfect conditions, and transition dangers are overhyped

Hickel 18 [Jason Hickel is an anthropologist, author, and a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. Why Growth Can’t Be Green. Foreign Policy Magazine. September 12, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/]

Warnings about ecological breakdown have become ubiquitous. Over the past few years, major newspapers, including the Guardian and the New York Times, have carried alarming stories on soil depletion, deforestation, and the collapse of fish stocks and insect populations. These crises are being driven by global economic growth, and its accompanying consumption, which is destroying the Earth’s biosphere and blowing past key planetary boundaries that scientists say must be respected to avoid triggering collapse.

Many policymakers have responded by pushing for what has come to be called “green growth.” All we need to do, they argue, is invest in more efficient technology and introduce the right incentives, and we’ll be able to keep growing while simultaneously reducing our impact on the natural world, which is already at an unsustainable level. In technical terms, the goal is to achieve “absolute decoupling” of GDP from the total use of natural resources, according to the U.N. definition.

It sounds like an elegant solution to an otherwise catastrophic problem. There’s just one hitch: New evidence suggests that green growth isn’t the panacea everyone has been hoping for. In fact, it isn’t even possible.

Green growth first became a buzz phrase in 2012 at the United Nations Cosnference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. In the run-up to the conference, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the U.N. Environment Program all produced reports promoting green growth. Today, it is a core plank of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals.

But the promise of green growth turns out to have been based more on wishful thinking than on evidence. In the years since the Rio conference, three major empirical studies have arrived at the same rather troubling conclusion: Even under the best conditions, absolute decoupling of GDP from resource use is not possible on a global scale.

A team of scientists led by the German researcher Monika Dittrich first raised doubts in 2012. The group ran a sophisticated computer model that predicted what would happen to global resource use if economic growth continued on its current trajectory, increasing at about 2 to 3 percent per year. It found that human consumption of natural resources (including fish, livestock, forests, metals, minerals, and fossil fuels) would rise from 70 billion metric tons per year in 2012 to 180 billion metric tons per year by 2050. For reference, a sustainable level of resource use is about 50 billion metric tons per year—a boundary we breached back in 2000.

The team then reran the model to see what would happen if every nation on Earth immediately adopted best practice in efficient resource use (an extremely optimistic assumption). The results improved; resource consumption would hit only 93 billion metric tons by 2050. But that is still a lot more than we’re consuming today. Burning through all those resources could hardly be described as absolute decoupling or green growth.

In 2016, a second team of scientists tested a different premise: one in which the world’s nations all agreed to go above and beyond existing best practice. In their best-case scenario, the researchers assumed a tax that would raise the global price of carbon from $50 to $236 per metric ton and imagined technological innovations that would double the efficiency with which we use resources. The results were almost exactly the same as in Dittrich’s study. Under these conditions, if the global economy kept growing by 3 percent each year, we’d still hit about 95 billion metric tons of resource use by 2050. Bottom line: no absolute decoupling.

Finally, last year the U.N. Environment Program—once one of the main cheerleaders of green growth theory—weighed in on the debate. It tested a scenario with carbon priced at a whopping $573 per metric ton, slapped on a resource extraction tax, and assumed rapid technological innovation spurred by strong government support. The result? We hit 132 billion metric tons by 2050. This finding is worse than those of the two previous studies because the researchers accounted for the “rebound effect,” whereby improvements in resource efficiency drive down prices and cause demand to rise—thus canceling out some of the gains.


Study after study shows the same thing. Scientists are beginning to realize that there are physical limits to how efficiently we can use resources. Sure, we might be able to produce cars and iPhones and skyscrapers more efficiently, but we can’t produce them out of thin air. We might shift the economy to services such as education and yoga, but even universities and workout studios require material inputs. Once we reach the limits of efficiency, pursuing any degree of economic growth drives resource use back up.

These problems throw the entire concept of green growth into doubt and necessitate some radical rethinking. Remember that each of the three studies used highly optimistic assumptions. We are nowhere near imposing a global carbon tax today, much less one of nearly $600 per metric ton, and resource efficiency is currently getting worse, not better. Yet the studies suggest that even if we do everything right, decoupling economic growth with resource use will remain elusive and our environmental problems will continue to worsen.

Preventing that outcome will require a whole new paradigm. High taxes and technological innovation will help, but they’re not going to be enough. The only realistic shot humanity has at averting ecological collapse is to impose hard caps on resource use, as the economist Daniel O’Neill recently proposed. Such caps, enforced by national governments or by international treaties, could ensure that we do not extract more from the land and the seas than the Earth can safely regenerate. We could also ditch GDP as an indicator of economic success and adopt a more balanced measure like the genuine progress indicator (GPI), which accounts for pollution and natural asset depletion. Using GPI would help us maximize socially good outcomes while minimizing ecologically bad ones.

But there’s no escaping the obvious conclusion. Ultimately, bringing our civilization back within planetary boundaries is going to require that we liberate ourselves from our dependence on economic growth—starting with rich nations. This might sound scarier than it really is. Ending growth doesn’t mean shutting down economic activity—it simply means that next year we can’t produce and consume more than we are doing this year. It might also mean shrinking certain sectors that are particularly damaging to our ecology and that are unnecessary for human flourishing, such as advertising, commuting, and single-use products.

But ending growth doesn’t mean that living standards need to take a hit. Our planet provides more than enough for all of us; the problem is that its resources are not equally distributed. We can improve people’s lives right now simply by sharing what we already have more fairly, rather than plundering the Earth for more. Maybe this means better public services. Maybe it means basic income. Maybe it means a shorter working week that allows us to scale down production while still delivering full employment. Policies such as these—and countless others—will be crucial to not only surviving the 21st century but also flourishing in it.

  
(none)

The report says the world will need to develop large-scale “negative emissions” programs to remove significant volumes of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Although the basic technologies exist, they have not caught on widely, and scientists have strongly questioned whether such a program can be scaled up in the brief period available.

The bottom line, Sunday’s report found, is that the world is woefully off target.

Current promises made by countries as part of the Paris climate agreement would lead to about 3 degrees Celsius (5.4 degrees Fahrenheit) of warming by the end of the century, and the Trump administration recently released an analysis [assuming about 4 degrees Celsius (7.2 degrees Fahrenheit)](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/trump-administration-sees-a-7-degree-rise-in-global-temperatures-by-2100/2018/09/27/b9c6fada-bb45-11e8-bdc0-90f81cc58c5d_story.html?utm_term=.de105fd573a8)by 2100 if the world takes no action.

The IPCC is considered the definitive source on the state of climate science, but it also tends to be conservative in its conclusions. That’s because it is driven by a consensus-finding process, and its results are the product of not only science, but negotiation with governments over its precise language.

In Sunday’s report, the body detailed the magnitude and unprecedented nature of the changes that would be required to hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, but it held back from taking a specific stand on the feasibility of meeting such an ambitious goal. (An [early draft](http://www.climatechangenews.com/2018/02/13/leaked-draft-summary-un-special-report-1-5c-climate-goal-full/) had cited a “very high risk” of warming exceeding 1.5 degrees Celsius; that language is now gone, even if the basic message is still easily inferred.)

“If you’re expecting IPCC to jump up and down and wave red flags, you’re going to be disappointed,” said Phil Duffy, president of the Woods Hole Research Center. “They’re going to do what they always do, which is to release very cautious reports in extremely dispassionate language.”

Some researchers, including Duffy, are skeptical of the scenarios that the IPCC presents that hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, particularly the reliance on negative-emissions technologies to keep the window open.

“Even if it is technically possible, without aligning the technical, political and social aspects of feasibility, it is not going to happen,” added Glen Peters, research director of the Center for International Climate Research in Oslo. “To limit warming below 1.5 C, or 2 C for that matter, requires all countries and all sectors to act.”

Underscoring the difficulty of interpreting what’s possible, the IPCC gave two separate numbers in the report for Earth’s remaining “carbon budget,” or how much carbon dioxide humans can emit and still have a reasonable chance of remaining below 1.5 degrees Celsius. The upshot is that humans are allowed either 10 or 14 years of current emissions, and no more, for a two-thirds or better chance of avoiding 1.5 degrees Celsius.

The already limited budget would shrink further if other greenhouse gases, such as methane, aren’t controlled or if and when Arctic permafrost becomes a major source of new emissions.

But either way — in a move that may be contested — researchers have somewhat increased the carbon budget in comparison with where the IPCC set it in 2013, giving another reason for hope.

The new approach buys some time and “resets the clock for 1.5 degrees Celsius to ‘five minutes to midnight,’ ” said Oliver Geden, head of the research division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

The report is sure to be the central focus of attention this December in Poland when the next meeting of the parties to the Paris climate agreement is held, and countries begin to contemplate how they can up their ambition levels, as the agreement requires them to do over time.

Meanwhile, the report clearly documents that a warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius would be very damaging and that 2 degrees — which used to be considered a reasonable goal — could approach intolerable in parts of the world.

“1.5 degrees is the new 2 degrees,” said Jennifer Morgan, executive director of Greenpeace International, who was in Incheon for the finalization of the report.

Specifically, the document finds that instabilities in Antarctica and Greenland, which could usher in sea-level rise measured in feet rather than inches, “could be triggered around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming.” Moreover, the total loss of tropical coral reefs is at stake because 70 to 90 percent are expected to vanish at 1.5 degrees Celsius, the report finds. At 2 degrees, that number grows to more than 99 percent.

The report found that holding warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius could save an Alaska-size area of the Arctic from permafrost thaw, muting a feedback loop that could lead to still more global emissions. The occurrence of entirely ice-free summers in the Arctic Ocean goes from one per century to one per decade between 1.5 and 2 degrees, it found — one of many ways in which the mere half a degree has large real-world consequences.

Risks of extreme heat and weather events just rise and rise as temperatures do, meaning these would be worse worldwide the more it warms.

To avoid that, in barely more than 10 years, the world’s percentage of electricity from renewables such as solar and wind power would have to jump from the current 24 percent to something more like 50 or 60 percent. Coal and gas plants that remain in operation would need to be equipped with technologies, collectively called carbon capture and storage (CCS), that prevent them from emitting carbon dioxide into the air and instead funnel it to be buried underground. By 2050, most coal plants would shut down.

Cars and other forms of transportation, meanwhile, would need to be shifting strongly toward being electrified, powered by these same renewable energy sources. At present, transportation is far behind the power sector in the shift to low-carbon fuel sources. Right now,[according to](https://www.iea.org/media/publications/mtrmr/Renewables2017ExecutiveSummary.PDF) the International Energy Agency, only 4 percent of road transportation is powered by renewable fuels, and the agency has projected only a 1 percent increase by 2022.

### CASE – Climate

#### Brazil Elections DA turns 100% of this DA – the internal link is Bolsonaro Bad – only the DA ensures he’s gone since it capitalizes on anti-Bolsonaro momentum that causes a Lula victory.

#### They have zero Internal Link to solving Bolsonaro – the Union Strikes are against Pension Reform and Work Year Length NOT his Climate Agenda – they have no reason why he would listen when he hasn’t in the past. This card also doesn’t mention stopping Climate so you shouldn’t grant them that Internal Link - here’s a re-cutting.

Fox 19 [(Micheal, a freelance reporter and video journalist based in Brazil. He is the former editor of the NACLA Report on the Americas and the author of two books on Latin America.) “Brazil’s Labor Unions Prepare for War with Far-Right President Jair Bolsanaro,” In These Times, 3/19/19. <https://inthesetimes.com/article/jair-bolsonaro-war-on-brazils-unions>] RR //Re-cut by Elmer

FLORIANÓPOLIS, BRAZIL — On a gray afternoon in early February, 60 local leaders from roughly 40 unions meet at the tan, seven-story headquarters of the Santa Catarina State Commerce Workers Federation to discuss how to move forward under Brazil’s new, far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro. They represent metalworkers, teachers and just about everything in between. Similar meetings have been held around the country. “We have to unite, or we will be carried away by a dictatorial government." Since Bolsonaro’s inauguration January 1, he has unleashed an assault on workers and unions. He lowered the minimum wage (despite inflation) and closed the country’s 88-year-old Ministry of Labor. The sign was quickly taken down from the government building in Brasilia. “There is an excess of rights,” Bolsonaro has said of labor. At the Florianópolis meeting, behind a long table hung with red, yellow and white union banners, Anna Julia Rodrigues, state president of the country’s largest labor federation, CUT, calls for unity. ​“We have to unite, or we will be carried away by a dictatorial government,” she says. Ingrid Assis, an indigenous labor leader with CSP-Conlutas, a labor federation that includes unions and grassroots movements, takes the call for unity to another level. She challenges those in the room not to forget that the country’s indigenous peoples — whose sovereignty over their land is under attack by Bolsonaro — are workers, too. “The union movement has to embrace this struggle,” says Assis. Both speakers are greeted with applause. But will unity be enough? Michael Fox reports on Brazilian unions for the Real News Network “Today we are living in the worst moment for the working class in recent history in Brazil,” Rodrigo Britto, the president of the Brasilia branch of CUT, tells In These Times. ​“We are returning to the 19th century.” Workers have been fighting an uphill battle since the 2016 impeachment of Workers’ Party President Dilma Rousseff, a move that many called a congressional coup. In 2017, the conservative Congress passed a labor reform bill that gutted workers’ rights, ended mandatory union contributions, opened the door to outsourcing and allowed bosses to negotiate directly with individuals, side-stepping unions. With Bolsonaro’s election, it got worse. Bolsonaro is a former military captain who promised to fight corruption, violence and Brazil’s Left. He vowed to put guns into people’s hands, end activism and eliminate his political opponents. “You have to do away with unions in Brazil ‚” he told reporters. Labor analysts believe the closure of the Ministry of Labor is a move in that direction. Former Labor Minister Manoel Dias called it a ​“crime.” The Finance Ministry is now in charge of pensions, workplace oversight, health and safety, and guidelines for workers’ salaries. Under the direction of Bolsonaro’s finance minister, Paulo Guedes — one of the ​“Chicago Boys,” neoliberal Latin American economists who studied under Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago — it’s hard to imagine the ministry carrying out workplace inspections. The registration of unions now falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, overseen by Minister Sérgio Moro, the former judge who jailed ex-president Luiz Inacío Lula da Silva on controversial evidence, blocking him from running against Bolsonaro. In January, Moro announced he would choose a Federal Police officer to oversee union registration. “The criminalization of the union movement begins ‚” Workers’ Party president Gleisi Hoffmann responded. Hoffmann and others fear Moro and his people may move to strip the registration of unions as a way to weaken labor organizing in the country, and in the words of Bolsonaro’s philosopher-guru Olavo de Carvalho, ​“break the legs” of the enemies of the government. “Their objective is to silence those that are opposing this policy of privatizations that they are planning,” Jose Maria Rangel, the president of the United Federation of Oil Workers (FUP), told In These Times. Privatization Shortly after his inauguration, Bolsonaro announced plans for a first round of privatizations. “We will quickly attract initial investments worth roughly 7 billion reals, with concessions for railroads, 12 airports and 4 ports,” Bolsonaro wrote on Twitter. His conservative predecessor Michel Temer — who came to power in 2016, with the impeachment of former president Dilma Rousseff — had already begun auctioning off state infrastructure and the private rights for oil production in Brazil’s massive off-shore oil reserves, known as Pre-Salt. But privatizations are expected to take a much more prominent role under Bolsonaro and finance minister Guedes. In late January, the new privatization secretary, businessman Salim Mattar, announced plans to sell off $20 Billion in state shares of public companies, including Brazil’s state-oil giant Petrobras. Petrobras is South America’s largest oil company, producing roughly 2.6 million barrels of oil a day. Petrobras was at the center of the country’s massive Lava Jato corruption scandal. This has been used as an excuse to push for the sell-off of the company’s assets. During a talk in late January, Mattar said that the Brazilian government is looking to auction the majority of Petrobras’s 36 subsidiaries in less than four years. The move would mean big money for Brazil now, but a loss of major government assets, investments, and profit, in the longterm. For oil workers it would be disastrous, with potential layoffs, outsourcing and loss of benefits. “**We have to raise awareness in society about** the importance of **state companies**,” says the FUP’s Rangel. ​“We have to defend our rights. We have to try to stop the privatization of businesses. We have to try and stop the pension reform.” Pensions Bolsonaro and his allies in **Congress** are **looking to slash pension benefits and** drastically **increase the years of work required to earn them**, in the name of staving off financial disaster. **Unions** across the country have **promised to do everything to stop them, including a general strike**, if necessary. Brazil’s unions carried out two general strikes in 2017 against the pension and labor reforms. Bolsonaro’s allies don’t yet have the votes they need, but they have powerful forces on their side, such as the evangelical caucus. Unions, however, believe this is a fight workers can win. On February 20, thousands rallied against the reform in São Paulo and 11 other cities. Thousands more protested again on March 8, International Women’s Day, and another day of rallies is planned for March 22. Unions are laying plans for more protests in the coming months: printing materials, handing out flyers and locking in dates. On top of Bolsonaro’s move to undercut unions and workers’ rights, unemployment in Brazil remains high, at just under 12 percent, double the rate just five years ago under the Workers’ Party. Outsourcing has made the job market more precarious. Informal employment and unemployment are both expected to rise. “This moment is really intense,” Assis tells In These Times. ​“We can’t trust Congress and its corrupt representatives. We have to construct alternatives and these alternatives have to come by the hands of the workers.”

#### Internal link is not reverse causal—they have no reason why just stopping Brazilian pollution scales up to solving global warming.

#### No internal link – Bolsonaro’s fine on climate now

#### A] Emissions pledges and deforestation empirics that postdate their card – most recent UN conferences

UN News 9/21 “Brazilian President commits country to climate neutrality by 2050” UN News, Sept 21, 2021, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100472> TG

“We anticipated, from 2060 to 2050, the goal of achieving climate neutrality. Human and financial resources, destined to the strengthening of environmental agencies, were doubled, with a view to eliminating illegal deforestation,” he [said](https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20210921/AT2JoAvm71nq/1a6r0NkCnoc6_ot2.pdf).

Mr. Bolsonaro was speaking at UN Headquarters at the opening of the high-level week of the [General Assembly.](https://www.un.org/en/ga/76/agenda/) After being held virtually last year due the [coronavirus](https://www.un.org/coronavirus) pandemic, this year’s gathering will feature “hybrid” activities that will include leaders in person along with virtual participants. Brazil has opened the debate since 1955.

For the Brazilian President, the results of this action on climate “have already started to appear.” In the Amazon, he pointed to a 32 per cent reduction in deforestation in the month of August, when compared to the same month last year.

He introduced the country as “an example in energy generation”, with 83 per cent coming from renewable sources, and said he would we will seek consensus on the rules of the global carbon credit market at the [COP26](https://ukcop26.org/), the UN Climate Conference that starts at the end of October in Glasgow.

“We expect industrialized countries to effectively meet their climate finance commitments in relevant volumes,” Mr. Bolsonaro said.

He recalled that his country’s agriculture sector feeds more than 1 billion people in the world, using only 8 per cent of the national territory, and assured that “no country in the world has such complete environmental legislation.”

“Our Forest Code must set an example for other countries,” he said.

He recognized the country faces “great environmental challenges”, being a nation of continental dimensions. The Amazon region alone is equivalent to the area of ​​the whole of Western Europe

For him, “the future of green jobs is in Brazil: renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, low-emission industry, basic sanitation, waste treatment and tourism.”

#### Biomes Resilient

* Permian-Triassic extinction proves resiliency
* No data on tipping points
* Ecosystems never outright collapse
* 600 models prove no ecosystem collapse

Hance 18 [Jeremy Hance, wildlife blogger for the Guardian and a journalist with Mongabay focusing on forests, indigenous people, climate change and more. He is also the author of Life is Good: Conservation in an Age of Mass Extinction. Could biodiversity destruction lead to a global tipping point? Jan 16, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/radical-conservation/2018/jan/16/biodiversity-extinction-tipping-point-planetary-boundary]

Just over 250 million years ago, the planet suffered what may be described as its greatest holocaust: ninety-six percent of marine genera (plural of genus) and seventy percent of land vertebrate vanished for good. Even insects suffered a mass extinction – the only time before or since. Entire classes of animals – like trilobites – went out like a match in the wind. But what’s arguably most fascinating about this event – known as the Permian-Triassic extinction or more poetically, the Great Dying – is the fact that anything survived at all. Life, it seems, is so ridiculously adaptable that not only did thousands of species make it through whatever killed off nearly everything (no one knows for certain though theories abound) but, somehow, after millions of years life even recovered and went on to write new tales. Even as the Permian-Triassic extinction event shows the fragility of life, it also proves its resilience in the long-term. The lessons of such mass extinctions – five to date and arguably a sixth happening as I write – inform science today. Given that extinction levels are currently 1,000 (some even say 10,000) times the background rate, researchers have long worried about our current destruction of biodiversity – and what that may mean for our future Earth and ourselves. In 2009, a group of researchers identified nine global boundaries for the planet that if passed could theoretically push the Earth into an uninhabitable state for our species. These global boundaries include climate change, freshwater use, ocean acidification and, yes, biodiversity loss (among others). The group has since updated the terminology surrounding biodiversity, now calling it “biosphere integrity,” but that hasn’t spared it from critique. A paper last year in Trends in Ecology & Evolution scathingly attacked the idea of any global biodiversity boundary. “It makes no sense that there exists a tipping point of biodiversity loss beyond which the Earth will collapse,” said co-author and ecologist, José Montoya, with Paul Sabatier Univeristy in France. “There is no rationale for this.” Montoya wrote the paper along with Ian Donohue, an ecologist at Trinity College in Ireland and Stuart Pimm, one of the world’s leading experts on extinctions, with Duke University in the US. Montoya, Donohue and Pimm argue that there isn’t evidence of a point at which loss of species leads to ecosystem collapse, globally or even locally. If the planet didn’t collapse after the Permian-Triassic extinction event, it won’t collapse now – though our descendants may well curse us for the damage we’ve done. Instead, according to the researchers, every loss of species counts. But the damage is gradual and incremental, not a sudden plunge. Ecosystems, according to them, slowly degrade but never fail outright. “Of more than 600 experiments of biodiversity effects on various functions, none showed a collapse,” Montoya said. “In general, the loss of species has a detrimental effect on ecosystem functions...We progressively lose pollination services, water quality, plant biomass, and many other important functions as we lose species. But we never observe a critical level of biodiversity over which functions collapse.”