# 1NC

### 1NC – T

#### **Interp – “medicines” treat or cure, whereas vaccines prevent – o/w on specificity since it’s about the COVID vaccine**

Vecchio 7/22 (Christopher Vecchio, [CFA, Senior Strategist,], 7-22-2021, “Delta Variant Concerns Won't Cripple Markets, US Economy“, DailyFX, accessed: 8-9-2021, https://www.dailyfx.com/forex/video/daily\_news\_report/2021/07/22/market-minutes-delta-variant-concerns-wont-cripple-markets-us-economy.html) ajs

Let’s stick to the facts. The COVID-19 vaccines are not medicines, which by definition “treat or cure diseases.” Vaccines “help prevent diseases,” an important distinction. Why does this matter? Because data coming out of some of the world’s developed economies with high adult vaccination rates suggest that the vaccines are working as intended: tail-risks have been reduced, with hospitalizations and deaths falling relative to the recent spike in infections (which have been occurring primarily among the unvaccinated at this point). Put another way, vaccines are like a Kevlar vest for the immune system; while they don’t make you bulletproof, they dramatically increase the odds of surviving an adverse event.

#### Vaccines are medical interventions – not medicines

Elbe 10 (Stefan Elbe, [director of the Centre for Global Health Policy and a professor of international relations at the University of Sussex. He is the author of Strategic Implications of HIV/AIDS, Security and Global Health, and Virus Alert: Security, Governmentality, and the AIDS Pandemic.], 5-3-2010, “Security and Global Health” Polity Press, accessed: 8-9-2021, https://books.google.com/books?id=PKMoMJrSsksC) ajs

Yet here too we must be careful not to overlook other types of medical intervention simultaneously pursued by the 'social' arm of modern medicine at the population level. Vaccines in particular continue to be particularly important medical interventions that repeatedly surface in a variety of different health security delib- erations. Strictly speaking, vaccines are not medicines because they consist of small concentrations of disease-causing microbes (or their derivatives) used to enhance a person's immuno-response to a future infection. As a public health measure, vaccines have therefore also been largely sidelined in the existing medicalization literature. Yet, generally speaking, vaccines too can be considered as medical inter- ventions. That is certainly how the World Health Organization views them, pointing out that 'vaccines are among the most important medical interventions for reducing illness and deaths' available today (WHO 2009a). Whereas pills and other therapies mark the tools of clinical medicine, vaccines play a crucial part in the arsenal of 'social' medicine and public health. Developing and rolling out of new vaccines against a range of current (and future) diseases therefore represents further evidence of how the rise of health security is also encouraging security to be practised through the introduction of new medical interventions in society.

#### Violation – The aff defends vaccines—every card in their aff and their solvency advocate specifically calls for their patents to be waived. If they win plan text in a vacuum vote neg on presumption since they can’t solve any of their internal links about vaccine access.

#### Vote neg for limits – expanding the topic to preventative treatment or medical interventions allows anything from surgery to medical devices to education strategies or mosquito repellent to prevent malaria. Destroys core generics like innovation which are exclusive to disease curing – core of the topic is about proprietary information. Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interps—it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. Reasonability is arbitrary and unpredictable, inviting a race to the bottom and we’ll win it links to our offense.

### 1NC – CP

#### CP: The People’s Republic of China should:

#### - substantially increase innovation funding, production and global distribution of COVID-19 Vaccines for all current and future waves of the pandemic

- includes Sinovac, sionpharm, and any future vaccines

#### - cooperate with allies to achieve increased production and global distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccine.

#### Solves case – China vaccinates the world.

* Quantity

Mallapaty 6-9 Smriti Mallapaty 6-9-2021 "China is vaccinating a staggering 20 million people a day" <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01545-3> (She has a master of science degree in environmental technology from Imperial College London.)//Elmer

For more than a week, an average of about **20 million people** have been vaccinated against COVID-19 **every day in China**. At this rate, the nation would have fully vaccinated the entire UK population in **little more than six days**. China now accounts for more than half of the 35 million or so people around the world receiving a COVID-19 shot each day. Zoltán Kis, a chemical engineer in the Future Vaccine Manufacturing Research Hub at Imperial College London, doesn’t know of “anything **even close to those production scales**” for a vaccine. “The manufacturing efforts required in China to reach this high production throughput are tremendous,” he says. The majority of doses are of one of two vaccines, both of which have been approved for emergency use worldwide by the World Health Organization (WHO). CoronaVac — produced by Beijing-based company Sinovac — showed an efficacy of 51% against symptoms of COVID-19 in clinical trials, and much higher protection against severe disease and death. The second jab was developed in Beijing by state-owned firm Sinopharm and has demonstrated an efficacy of 79% against symptomatic disease and hospitalization. Supplying vaccines to the world China’s current vaccine production rate could potentially **make a significant dent in global demand**, says Kis; that would be “**a huge step in reducing the health-care and economic burden of the COVID-19 pandemic**”. China has already supplied 350 million doses of the two vaccines to more than 75 nations, and WHO approval should now trigger the further distribution of both vaccines to low-income countries. “China’s vaccination campaign got off to a slow start, but has rapidly picked up pace,” says Rongjun Chen, a biomaterials scientist also at the Future Vaccine Manufacturing Research Hub. As recently as mid-April, China was administering only about five million doses a day. According to an official at China’s National Health Commission, the nation aims to produce some three billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines in 2021 — and up to **five billion per year after that**. To achieve such high production rates, many things need to go according to plan across the entire production and distribution chain, from sourcing raw materials to manufacturing active ingredients, filling vials and distributing doses to vaccination centres, says Kis. “It is crucial that everything arrives at the right location at the right time.”

### 1NC – DA

#### China’s using absence of vaccine alternates to assert influence.

Zhao 4-29 Suisheng Zhao 4-29-2021 "Why China’s vaccine diplomacy is winning" <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/04/29/why-chinas-vaccine-diplomacy-is-winning/> (Professor and Director of the Center for China–US Cooperation at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver)//Elmer

Chinese COVID-19 vaccines have been shipped to more than **80 countries** for market or emergency use. Among them, 53 countries received vaccines for free (including developing countries in Africa and some strategically important Asian countries such as the Philippines and Pakistan) and 27 middle-income countries paid for doses. Rolling out of vaccines to developing countries, Beijing has framed itself as **a solution to the pandemic** rather than the origin of the coronavirus. China’s advanced vaccine diplomacy stands in contrast **to the ‘me first policies’** of the **United States and the European Union**. With a shortfall in supplies, US and EU leaders have faced high infection rates and death tolls at home and feel the need to inoculate their domestic populations first. This has left the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people without vaccine supply and at risk. China has not faced these problems and can afford to send vaccines abroad. Just by showing up and helping plug gaps in the global supply of vaccines, China has g**ained ground** in vaccine diplomacy. President Xi Jinping pledged that Chinese vaccines would be provided as a global public good. But a large portion of Chinese vaccines are not free — some countries have paid Chinese vaccine makers. Still the absence of the United States and European Union from vaccine diplomacy **is not lost** on countries struggling to put shots in people’s arms. Many countries would prefer US or EU-made Pfizer and Moderna vaccines over China’s vaccines if given the choice, **yet they cannot access them**. These countries are desperate and have jumped at the opportunity to receive Chinese vaccines. Chinese companies are also more willing than their western counterparts **to strike licensing deals** to produce vaccines in foreign countries. For example, Indonesia has become a regional hub for Sinovac’s CoronaVac through its state pharmaceuticals company Bio Farma. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) chose Sinopharm because it was willing to conduct phase three clinical trials in the UAE and build native vaccine production capabilities. Sinopharm also arranged to manufacture its vaccine in the UAE for regional distribution. Beijing’s vaccine diplomacy involves propaganda to boost **perceptions of China as a generous and responsible power**. Chinese media has covered every delivery of vaccine shipment. The scene is set by a standard script. When a cargo plane lands, it is greeted by senior local leaders accompanied by Chinese ambassadors fawning over the vaccine cargo. Vaccine diplomacy has helped **increase China’s influence** and enabled it to capitalise **on new opportunities**. China has rolled vaccines out to participants of its Belt and Road Initiative (**BRI**) **and enhanced preferential access to jabs alongside investments in infrastructure and connectivity projects**. According to an April Think Global Health report, of the 56 countries to which China pledged doses, all but one were participants in its BRI. Naming it the Health Silk Road, vaccine diplomacy has provided a foothold for China’s pharmaceutical industry that has been plagued by scandals and low levels of trust at home and abroad. Making Sinovac and Sinopharm household names in foreign countries, China may change these perceptions. Although Chinese vaccine makers were among the earliest in the world to begin clinical trials and self-reported some key results, many have not published complete data in peer-reviewed journals. This has fuelled scepticism about their safety and effectiveness. Gao Fu, director of China’s Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, noted in April that Chinese vaccines were not as effective as hoped and mixing them was among the strategies being considered to boost their effectiveness. Some countries have been reluctant to greenlight Chinese vaccines. Singapore received its first shipment of Sinovac vaccines in February, but Singaporean regulators have not approved its use, moving ahead with using Pfizer and Moderna vaccines. Polish President Andrzej Duda spoke with President Xi about buying Chinese jabs in March. Yet Poland’s health authorities have recommended against using Chinese vaccines because of a lack of data. Concerns have also arisen about whether China’s production capacity is able to keep pace with an ever-expanding list of overseas customers and its domestic vaccination campaign. The Turkish government ordered 20 million doses of China’s Sinovac vaccine. But delayed shipments forced the government to repeatedly revise its vaccination timetable. Egypt purchased a total of 40 million doses of the vaccine from Sinopharm in January but had received only a tiny percentage of its vaccine order from China by the middle of April. This tension will intensify as China’s domestic demand for vaccines increases. China has continued with vaccine diplomacy in the absence of the United States and other Western countries. These countries should compete and cooperate with China to overcome bottlenecks in the global distribution of vaccines and ensure that all nations, particularly developing countries, receive the vaccines they need to finally beat COVID-19.

#### Waivers are a critical issue in the perceptual ineptness of America and the West.

Pratt and Levin 4-29 Simon Frankel Pratt and Jamie Levin 4-29-2021 "Vaccines Will Shape the New Geopolitical Order" <https://archive.is/OgDcA#selection-847.23-857.11> (Simon Frankel Pratt is a lecturer in the School of Sociology, Politics, and International Studies at the University of Bristol. Jamie Levin is an assistant professor of political science at St. Francis Xavier University in Canada.)//Elmer

While home to vaccines produced by the likes of Pfizer, Moderna, AstraZeneca, and Johnson & Johnson—all now household names and whose vaccines are considered more efficacious—governments of these states have demonstrated a **reluctance to supply doses** to much of the rest of the world at the expense of domestic vaccination rates. The United States and the U.K. have exported almost none, and the EU is clamping down. They have similarly been **unwilling to waive patents**, allowing for production of these vaccines where they are most needed. This suggests that the United States and the EU are **slow to fully exploit the geopolitical opportunities** of vaccine diplomacy or at least are not willing to do so with the same alacrity and **enthusiasm as other states**. That may change as time goes on, however, and the result will be worsened inequities within already inequitable trade relationships between these countries and the global south.

#### Chinese leadership solves existential threats.

Yamei 18 Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, <http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491>

As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced*.* The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance. Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous statein such key areas as global economic governance and climate change*.* Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics*.* The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily*.* All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other *civilizations.* So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations. Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced**.** China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.

#### China multilateralism is based on win win deals instead of coercion which makes it more sustainable long term.

Zhimin Chen 17, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, “Facilitative Leadership and China’s New Role in the World,” Chinese Political Science Review, 3.1, 10-27

Facilitative international leadership emphasizes that key actors should lead collectively in a cooperative way. In the past, there were cases when one country led a country bloc. For example, during the Cold War, the two superpowers had dominance in their blocs, respectively. After the end of the Cold War, the US and its allies regarded the world as a unipolar system and could pursue a US-centric international leadership. However, US international leadership is losing its power base in politics and economy as well as its legitimacy. The world needs cooperative leadership. The G20 is a new institution that contrasts to unilateral leadership. Facilitative leadership demands plural leaders and tries to have collective leadership. With the rise of the emerging countries, the international system is becoming multipolarized or de-centered to such an extent that any attempt to restore unilateral leadership will be dampened, and stronger collective leadership will be demanded to address the risks and challenges in this transitional period. As a signatory state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), China has made substantial contributions to nuclear non-proliferation and to dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue along with other major powers such as the US, Russia and Germany (Pang 2012, 210). In global economic governance, faced with economic stagnation, rising protectionism, and a wider gap between rich and poor, China has promoted inclusive development through the G20 summit in Hangzhou in 2016. Facilitative leadership is win–win leadership to promote common goals of the international community. In the past, international leadership usually served the leader’s own national interest, especially its pursuit of power. Even when a country tries to get recognition as leader by providing international public goods, this leadership is still a solipsistic leadership if the country’s purpose is to establish its powerful status. This kind of solipsistic leadership’s sustainability and legitimacy remain uncertain. Unlike solipsistic leadership, win–win leadership is more sustainable and legitimate, which can assist other countries’ development. Chinese President Xi Jinping said at his speech when he visited the Parliament of Mongolia in 2014 that ‘‘you can take a ride on our express train or just make a hitchhike, all are welcome’’ and ‘‘we will never do things that could result in ‘one wins and the other loses’ or ‘one wins more and the other gets less’. We will take into consideration the other side’s interests in some specific projects’’.8 Under the facilitative leadership, the establishment of a leader is based on the promotion of the win–win development of the leading country and all other countries. In an ideal situation, the leader will also update international norms and each and every country’s interest. For example, the ideas of ‘‘a community of common destiny’’ and ‘‘inclusive growth’’ proposed by China focus on a higher level of cooperation to achieve win–win development. Facilitative leadership mainly uses attraction to influence and lead. Economic attraction constitutes the main source of China’s global attraction. China can use its enormous domestic market to provide opportunities for others’ exports and investment via mutually beneficial cooperation. It can also use China’s capital and technology to help others develop and, at the same time, promote its own development. Based on this idea, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been welcomed by more and more countries, which shows China’s economic attractive leadership. China should also pay attention to its institutional leadership. In the past few years, China has helped to establish the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, both of them having their headquarters in China. It has played a key role in the Paris agreement on climate change and the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. China has sent most military personnel to UN peacekeeping as a permanent member of UN Security Council, and is the third largest financial contributor to the UN regular budget and the second largest donor to the UN peace-keeping budget. Being actively involved in these institutions can strengthen China’s institutional leadership in international affairs. In addition, China should be an important leader in providing solutions. In the G20 China Summit and International Economic Forum in Davos, China has demonstrated that it could and does want to assume that role. As for leadership style, China should be an empowering leader, not a hierarchical patronal leader. A hierarchical patronal leader not only establishes new common goals for the others, but also believes that they have the solutions to all problems. In the post-Cold War period, western countries claimed that domestic problems could be easily solved by adopting the western economic and political system. When such a system is not working, western countries propose global governance to replace national governance. In the 21st century, western interventions have brought chaos to a number of developing countries. The results prove that a hierarchical patronal leadership cannot really solve the problems. China should be an empowering leader and recognize the differences among countries. A foreign country cannot impose its solutions onto other countries, and should respect the primary role of other countries in managing their own problems. Therefore, an empowering leader respects others’ sovereignty, supports capability building in other countries and helps other countries to develop problem-solving solutions of their own. Through empowering and providing support, such a facilitative leadership will be much easier for others to accept. Facilitative international leadership needs legitimacy to ensure its effectiveness. A legitimate leader should have more or less voluntary endorsement from others. A country that aspires to lead will lose legitimacy if it only forces others to follow, since this kind of followership is forced, and does not represent a willing choice. Once the coercion is weakened, the coercive leadership can neither sustain nor achieve its goals.

### CASE – Solvency

#### TRIPs waiver doesn’t solve- it doesn’t obligate countries to do anything, just makes it legal.

Mercurio 21 [Bryan; Professor of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; "The IP Waiver for COVID-19: Bad Policy, Bad Precedent," 2021; 1-6. International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law.] Justin

It is not only the length of time which is an issue but also the ultimate impact of the waiver. A waiver simply means that a WTO Member would not be in violation of its WTO obligations if it does not protect and enforce the COVID-19-related IPRs for the duration of the waiver. The waiver would thus allow Members to deviate from their international obligations but not obligate Members to suspend protection and enforcement of the IPRs. Members like the US who support the waiver may not implement the necessary domestic legislation to waive IPRs within the jurisdiction. It is questionable whether the US could even legally implement the waiver given that IPRs are a matter of constitutional law.17

#### The WTO can’t enforce the aff- causes circumvention

Hillman and Tippett 21 [Jennifer A; Senior fellow for trade and international political economy; Alex; Research associate for international economics, at the Council on Foreign Relations; “Europe and the Prospects for WTO Reform,” CFR; 3/10/21; <https://www.cfr.org/blog/europe-and-prospects-wto-reform>] Justin

The WTO has been in the clutches of a slow-moving crisis for years. At its heart are a series of disputes about the role of the WTO’s Appellate Body, the final arbiter in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System. Today, the Appellate Body sits empty, severely undermining the capacity of the WTO to resolve trade disputes.

Since the start of the Trump administration, the United States has refused to appoint any new members to the body, effectively allowing countries to avoid compliance with WTO rulings. The primary driver of this drastic action has been American frustration at perceived judicial overreach. U.S. policymakers, starting with the George W. Bush administration, have repeatedly voiced their displeasure with Appellate Body decisions, contending that certain decisions have reached beyond the text of existing WTO agreements.

#### Patent waiver is extra topical – voting issue for limits – allows them to tack on infinite unpredictable planks to the resolution to spike out of negative ground

Tom Lee 21 (Data and Policy Analyst at the American Action Forum) And Christopher Holt (the Director of Health Care Policy at the American Action Forum), 5/10/21, Intellectual Property, COVID-19 Vaccines, and the Proposed TRIPS Waiver, <https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/intellectual-property-covid-19-vaccines-and-the-proposed-trips-waiver/#ixzz75KTH1nPx> SJEP

**Under the broad language of the proposed TRIPS waiver, any drugs that have use for patients with COVID-19, including those that predate the pandemic, could lose patent protection**. Thus, a foreign company could produce a specific drug under the auspices of COVID-19 but sell it for another disease. Moreover, the foreign company would not have to provide any financial compensation to the company from whom they took the IP. **The proposal’s language is so broad that other patented medical products beyond pharmaceutical drugs such as masks, non-pharmaceutical chemical compounds, and respirators would also be subject to the waiver.**

### CASE – Pandemics

#### Squo solves – plan increases price of scarce materials and results in costly, ineffective facilities

Mcmurry-Heath 8/18 (Michelle Mcmurry-Heath, [physician-scientist and president and CEO of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization.], 8-18-2021, “Waiving intellectual property rights would harm global vaccination“, STAT, accessed: 8-19-2021, https://www.statnews.com/2021/08/18/waiving-intellectual-property-rights-compromise-global-vaccination-efforts/) ajs

Covid-19 vaccines are already remarkably cheap, and companies are offering them at low or no cost to low-income countries. Poor access to clinics and transportation are barriers in some countries, but the expense of the shot itself is not. In fact, if the World Trade Organization grants the IP waiver, it could make these vaccines more expensive.

Here’s why. Before Covid-19 emerged, the world produced at most [5.5 billion doses](https://www.barrons.com/articles/a-plan-to-break-the-vaccine-manufacturing-bottleneck-51621952245) of various vaccines every year. Now the world needs an additional [11 billion doses](https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-g7-summit---12-june-2021) — including billions of doses of mRNA vaccines that no one had ever mass-manufactured before — to fully vaccinate every eligible person on the planet against the new disease.

Even as Covid-19 vaccines were still being developed, pharmaceutical companies began retrofitting and upgrading existing facilities to produce Covid-19 vaccines, at a cost of $40 to $100 million each. Vaccine developers also licensed their technologies to well-established manufacturers, like the Serum Institute of India, to further increase production. As a result, almost every facility in the world that can quickly and safely make Covid-19 vaccines is already doing so, or will be in the next few months.

The cutting-edge mRNA vaccines from Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech face an even bigger capacity issue. Since the underlying technology is new, there are no mRNA manufacturing facilities sitting idle with operators just waiting for licensing agreements to turn on the machines. Nor are there trained personnel to run them or ensure safety and quality control. Embedding delicate mRNA vaccine molecules inside lipid nanoparticle shells at temperatures colder than Antarctica isn’t as easy as following a recipe from Bon Appetit.

Another big barrier to producing more shots is a shortage of raw materials. Suspending intellectual property protections and allowing any manufacturer to try to produce these vaccines, regardless of preparedness or experience, would increase the demand for scarce raw materials, driving up prices and impeding production.

Nor could all companies that suddenly get a green light due to suspended intellectual property rights produce vaccines as cheaply or quickly as existing manufacturers. Building a new vaccine manufacturing facility costs about $700 million, takes many months — if not years — to build and, once opened, requires another [four to six months](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2020/07/28/488196/comprehensive-covid-19-vaccine-plan/) to start producing vaccine doses. And because negotiations surrounding the WTO waiver, which began this summer, could take until December before they are completed, it wouldn’t be until well into 2023 or later that any additional doses would become available.

That’s slower than our current production rate. According to a report from Duke University’s [Global Health Innovation Center](https://launchandscalefaster.org/covid-19/vaccinemanufacturing), companies are on track to manufacture enough shots in 2021 to fully vaccinate at least 70% of the global population against Covid-19 — the level required to achieve herd immunity.

Covid-19 vaccines are saving millions of lives and protecting trillions of dollars of economic activity for an exceptionally low cost. Israel, for example, which has one of the world’s highest vaccination rates, paid [$23.50 per dose](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-said-to-be-paying-average-of-47-per-person-for-pfizer-moderna-vaccines/) for early shipments, for a total of about $315 million. That’s approximately equal to the gross domestic productivity losses incurred during [just two days of shutdowns](https://www.bmj.com/content/372/bmj.n281) in the country.

Many countries are buying shots for under $10 per dose. India and South Africa — the two countries leading the petition to gut IP rights — are paying just $8 and $5.25 per dose, respectively. For reference, a regular flu shot costs about $14 in the United States, and pediatric vaccines average about $55 per dose.

Meanwhile, low-income countries that can’t afford even modest prices are getting their vaccines at no charge. [COVAX](https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax), the international nonprofit vaccine distributor, aims to deliver 2 billion doses to developing nations by the end of the year.

President Biden vowed to make America the world’s [“arsenal of vaccines.”](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/05/17/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-covid-19-response-and-the-vaccination-program-4/) The U.S. has already committed $4 billion to COVAX, has donated more than 100 million vaccine doses abroad, and is on track to donate [500 million more](https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/08/03/1023822839/biden-is-sending-110-million-vaccines-to-nations-in-need-thats-just-a-first-step) by the end of summer. Other countries are following the administration’s leadership and ramping up their donations.

#### Skill Disparities and Trade Secrets – Moderna proves IP isn’t the root cause.

Silverman 3-15 Rachel Silverman 3-15-2021 "Waiving vaccine patents won’t help inoculate poorer nations" <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/03/15/vaccine-coronavirus-patents-waive-global-equity/> (Rachel Silverman is a policy fellow at the Center for Global Development)//Duong

Reality is more complicated, however. Because of the technical complexity of manufacturing coronavirus vaccines, waiving intellectual-property rights, by itself, would have **little effect**. It could even backfire, with companies using the move as an excuse to disengage from global access efforts. There are more effective ways to entice — and to pressure — companies to license and share their intellectual property and the associated know-how, without broadly nullifying patents. The Moderna vaccine illustrates the limits of freeing up intellectual property. Moderna announced in October that it would **not enforce IP rights** on its coronavirus vaccine — and yet it has **taken no steps to share information** about the vaccine’s design or manufacture, citing commercial interests in the underlying technology. Five months later, production of the Moderna vaccine remains entirely under the **company’s direct control** within its owned and contracted facilities. Notably, Moderna is also the only manufacturer of a U.S.- or British-approved vaccine not yet participating in Covax, a global-aid-funded effort (including a pledged $4 billion from the United States) to purchase vaccines for use in low- and middle-income countries. It is true, however, that activist pressure — including threats to infringe upon IP rights — can encourage originators to enter into voluntary licensing arrangements. So the global movement to liberate the vaccine patents may be useful, even if some advocates make exaggerated claims about the effects of waivers on their own. We focused on covid. Now our other patients are suffering. One reason patent waivers are unlikely to help much in this case is that vaccines are harder to make than ordinary drugs. Because most drugs are simple chemical compounds, and because the composition of the compounds is easily analyzable, competent chemists can usually reverse-engineer a production process with relative ease. When a drug patent expires, therefore — or is waived — generic companies can readily enter the market and produce competitive products, lowering prices dramatically. Vaccines, in contrast, are complex biological products. Observing their contents is insufficient to allow for imitation. Instead, to produce the vaccine, manufacturers need access to the developer’s “soft” IP — the proprietary recipe, cell lines, manufacturing processes and so forth. While some of this information is confidentially submitted to regulators and might theoretically be released in an extraordinary situation (though not without legal challenge), manufacturers are at an enormous disadvantage without the originator’s cooperation to help them set up their process and kick-start production. Even with the nonconsensual release of the soft IP held by the regulator, the process of trial and error would cause long delays in a best-case scenario. Most likely, the effort would end in expensive failure. Manufacturers also need certain raw ingredients and other materials, like glass vials and filtration equipment; overwhelming demand, paired with disruptive export restrictions, has constricted the global availability of some of these items.

#### The impact—

#### 1] Be extremely skeptical of the brink or uniqueness for this – COVID has happened for nearly two years and we have yet to see a great power conflict.

#### 2] No Correlation and best studies show COVID decreases Conflict.

Salemi 20 Colette Salemi 10-15-2020 "Does COVID-19 raise the risk of violent conflict? Not everywhere" <https://archive.is/h591O#selection-309.0-312.0> (Colette Salemi is a PhD student in applied economics at the University of Minnesota. Her research focuses on conflict, forced displacement, environmental degradation and their intersections.)//Elmer

How we did our research We **used** the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (**ACLED**), a **database** **that counts** the **number of conflict events daily around the world**. For 2019 and 2020, ACLED includes more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe — and tracks three categories of violent conflict: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence. We examine trends in the number of conflict events over time. To see whether the trend changes in response to covid-19, we look at what happened after the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic (March 11) or the country declared a lockdown. [Don’t miss any of TMC’s smart analysis! Sign up here for our newsletter.] The **relationship between pandemics and conflict is theoretically unclear.** In some countries, job losses from the covid-19 pandemic mean people have fewer income-generating options — that can make participation in violence seem a more viable alternative. But if **market disruptions** and reduced global demand are **driving down** the **value of natural resources** such as oil wells, then **we** may **see less conflict** over control of such resources. We then **conducted** case **studies** based **on** our knowledge of countries with high rates of violent conflict before **covid**-19. These include countries with active civil wars (such as Syria) as well as countries with violent militia groups (such as the Philippines). Conflict during the coronavirus pandemic varies greatly **Worldwide**, **we didn’t observe an increase in violent conflict**. **If anything, conflict has decreased**, as the figure below shows. **Violent conflict** between March and August 2020 **was 23 percent lower** than violent conflict during the same period in 2019. Comparing these time periods, battles are down 20 percent and remote violence and bombings are down 40 percent. But violence against civilians — the deliberate attack of unarmed noncombatants by armed groups — continued at similar rates globally.

Chart, histogram

Description automatically generated

#### 3] No disease can cause extinction

Adalja 16 [Amesh Adalja is an infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh. Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race? June 17, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/]

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained.

I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience.

For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived.

Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like.

So what would it take for a disease to wipe out humanity now?

In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely.

Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians.

The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies.

HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk.

Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care.

Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions.

### CASE – WTO

#### We’ll concede credibility—1AC Meyer says collapse happens in the squo absent the plan but that’s good—

#### First no impact—

#### 1] No Brink Scenario – no explanations of conflicts/tensions that are escalating now.

#### 2] Trade wars don’t go to hot wars

**Dayen 17**, New Republic contributor (David “Trump Is Signaling a Trade War, but It’s Not as Disastrous as You May Think”, https://www.thenation.com/article/trump-is-signaling-a-trade-war-but-its-not-as-disastrous-as-you-may-think/)

Can Trump enact tariffs on his own? Though it would appear to contradict the Origination Clause of the Constitution, Congress has delegated that authority in enough pieces of legislation that Trump could probably raise import duties unilaterally. But what would be the practical effect? Hard-core free traders paint a picture of cataclysm. Tariffs will launch trade wars, increase prices, and destroy the economy. This is all hard-wired into the pro-globalization worldview. Thomas Friedman once famously admitted that he wrote a column supporting a free-trade agreement with Central America without knowing a thing about it: “I just knew two words: free trade,” he told an audience. Presumably the opposite is true for Friedman: He sees one word, “tariff,” and immediately screams in horror. Oddly, many of those same proponents of free trade favor a policy that looks very much like a tariff. The Republican corporate-tax revamp includes something called a border-adjustment tax, which would impose a 20 percent tax on imports while eliminating a tax on exports. Like with tariffs, the goal appears to be to encourage domestic production. In fact, the tax would be much higher than the 5-10 percent tariff being floated. (It also might be illegal under the current global trade regime.) Supporters of border adjustment, particularly economists, argue that it will end up trade neutral, because the exchange rate will fluctuate in response to the tax. In other words, though the tax would make American-made goods more attractive, the value of the dollar would increase, leveling that out. Few of these economists seem to carry over the same analysis to the effects of a tariff. I don’t understand why. There’s no reason to doubt the fact that, if Trump imposed an across-the-board tariff, the dollar would strengthen, thus nullifying the desired effect. Indeed, before Trump has even taken office, the dollar has risen to a 14-year high, in anticipation of a more protectionist stance. Incidentally, for all the one-off announcements by Trump (however factually challenged) about hundreds of jobs he has allegedly rescued here or there, this one development—the rise in the dollar—has likely caused the loss of hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs, under standard economic theory. Looked at this way, higher tariffs wouldn’t cause a recession (as Paul Krugman has acknowledged), but would be somewhat pointless, with currency exchanges shifting to account for any changes. Trade wars might temporarily reduce efficiency, as domestic supply chains would have to be rebuilt, but they’re unlikely to radically alter the balance of trade on their own. There are other variables here. Importers and exporters who have lived in a world of floating exchange rates for decades may be fairly nimble in adjusting to them. On the downside, Krugman explains that raising tariffs could inhibit capital flows, meaning that investors will place less money into US markets. You can see how that might reduce economic growth. But Jeff Spross points out that America currently has a problem with too much foreign money flowing in; reducing the flow could arguably make the economy more stable. Trump could also seek to prevent unlawful currency manipulation (not necessarily from China, but from other Asian nations) that artificially disadvantages US manufacturing. The real unknown here is what Trump would do with all that tariff revenue. The border adjustment tax at 20 percent is assumed to bring in $1 trillion over the 10-year budget window. So a tariff of even one-quarter or one-half that size would draw significant funds. What’s the plan for it? Would it get plowed into job-creating investments? Tax cuts for the wealthy? That’s a significant variable as well. We do know that the same pundits who confidently predicted that globalization would be a win-win policy for America repeatedly got it wrong. Those on the losing side saw their jobs shipped out and factories closed down, and weren’t given the kind of assistance needed to offset the disruption. So it’s worth being a little skeptical of the warnings coming from the same corners now. I don’t have a ton of faith in the Trump team to necessarily make their trade agenda work (especially as corporate interests will seek to co-opt the redesigned policies in ways even friendlier to their bottom line). And I think there are smarter ways to balance our trade deficit than a tariff strategy which will just run up against currency exchange rates. But the hysteria accompanying these tariffs (which wasn’t at all present when President Obama imposed his own tariffs on Chinese tires and steel) seems far beyond what little we can assume about the actual results of such a strategy.

#### 3] No DSB usage even if it’s credible.

Alavi 7 Amin Alavi 2007 “African Countries and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism” <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/alaviafrica.pdf> (PhD Researcher @ Danish Institute for International Studies)//Elmer

The passing of time has modified most observers’ earlier enthusiasm about the DSM.3 It has become clear that **the DSM has shortcomings**. These include some **conflicting deadlines** (better known as sequencing), a **weak enforcement mechanism**, **questionable quality of some of its rulings**, and the **possibility of prolonging disputes** (see, for example, Mavroidis et al., 1998). Increasingly too, the absence from the scene of a majority of developing countries, including the SSA ones, has also been acknowledged.4 One question that is now raised is whether or not the DSM has in fact been a success, and especially whether it represents a gain for developing countries. But this latter discussion is only now emerging and only a few observers have taken part in it. Furthermore, it does not yet constitute a distinct field of debate. The prime focus of academic commentary on the DSM remains on how it has been used, rather than why it has not been used. A majority of researchers working on the DSM do so from within the legal tradition and have studied it as a litigation process by analysing case law and the rulings. They implicitly regard the system as a success in allowing countries to settle their disagreements. However, the DSM is also a political process, and cases have important economic impacts. Recently, lawyers have been joined by economists and political scientists in analysing the DSM. Unlike the lawyers, these last two groups are interested in determining the conditions under which countries participate in the DSM, and the costs and benefits of this participation. A first set of observations from this source concerns possible relations between countries’ levels of engagement in the DSM, their shares and patterns of trade, and the retaliation opportunities that these provide (Bown and Hoekman, 2005; Horn et al., 1999; Nordstrom, 2005). The authors cited consider countries’ shares of world trade, numbers of traded products and numbers of trading partners as determinants of their participation. Their hypothesis is that ‘the probability of encountering disputable trade measures is proportional to the diversity of a country’s exports over products and partners, which means that larger and more diversified exporters would be expected to bring more complaints than smaller and less diversified exporters’ (Horn et al., 1999: ii). They find that the hypothesis ‘goes quite far toward predicting the actual pattern of complaints across countries’ (ibid.),5 especially when the cost of litigation is controlled for. However, they also find that the **G4 countries**6 are **overrepresented** **in the DSM**, relative to their positions with regard to these attributes.7 A second, related set of observations regards the negative consequences a case may have as a reason why small developing countries especially have not been active in the DSM. Examples of this are provided by Bown (2005), who develops a model to analyse a subset of disputes, namely, those dealing with issues of market access. He finds that lost market access and economic losses determine countries’ decisions to initiate cases. However, ‘several other **political** economy **factors affect the decision not to litigate** ... Other things being equal, adversely affected exporters are less likely to participate when they are involved in a preferential trade agreement with the respondent, when they **lack the capacity to retaliate** against the respondent by withdrawing trade concessions, **when they are poor or small**, and when they are particularly reliant on the respondent for bilateral assistance’ (ibid.: 291). Bown’s arguments partly recapitulate those of Hoekman and Mavroidis (2000) whose list of countries’ reasons for not initiating cases includes practising policies similar to those that a case tries to change, and fear of the political as well as economic impact of a case on bilateral relations with another state. A final set of observations from this literature focuses on biases and inequalities within and between institutions managing trade, including the WTO in general and the DSM in particular (Busch and Reinhardt, 2003; Shaffer, 2003). Here, the main problem identified is that the **DSM** (and the WTO) has **become too technically complex and demanding for** most **developing countries** to use effectively in the absence of adequate assistance. Underlying this is the observation that there is too much law and too little politics in the system. Proponents of this position link these observations to others concerning developing countries’ typically weak trade-policy infrastructures, their shortage of trained personnel, and their lack of knowledge about the system. This view is systematically elaborated by Hoekman and Mavroidis (2000), who present the overall dispute process in two stages – ‘upstream’, which is that part of the process before a case is officially brought before the DSM, and ‘downstream’, which is after a case has been officially initiated. During the first stage, a country’s trade-policy infrastructure plays the central role. It is here that information is gathered, analysed and transferred to the government, which then decides whether to pursue a case or not. Not only the existence but also the functioning of trade-policy infrastructures is critical for countries’ engagement in the system, according to Shaffer (2003). His study of the infrastructures of the US and the EU finds that an institutionalised linkage between private companies and officials is a key characteristic of the major users of the system. While under existing WTO rules only member states may initiate a case, this generally occurs on the basis of persuasion from private companies. This is facilitated where local private companies are strong and where the established infrastructure gives private companies a voice and the chance to lead their case informally through the initial stage.

#### 4] Zero historic compliance

Lida 4, Keisuke. "Is WTO Dispute Settlement Effective?." global governance 10.2 (2004): 207-225. (Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Aoyama Gakuin U)//Elmer

What is the overall track record of dispute resolution? This question, while simple, is not so easy to answer. It depends on the analyst's judgment as to what counts as a "satisfactory" outcome. I have tried to rely on the parties' assessment as much as possible. There aretwo main categories of satisfactory outcome: (1) the parties have implemented the WTO rulings, and (2) the parties have settled the dispute between themselves, with or without WTO adjudication. While the first type is relatively easy to track, the second category is not. Therefore, I have relied on the parties' notification to the WTO as to whether or not they have reached a mutually agreed solution. A third "possibly satisfactory" category is one in which the WTO found no wrongdoing on the part of the defendants, and hence no action was required. This could be considered a "successful" dispute outcome, at least from a legal point of view. All of these cases are classified as "resolved" in Figure 1. There are two classes of pending cases. One is the class of cases that are still going through the adjudication procedures or have gone through adjudication and are in the implementation stage. The WTO allows a "reasonable period of time" for implementation, which ranges from several months to a maximum of fifteen months. Anumber of cases are at this stage. This class is named "ongoing" in Figure 1. The second class of pending cases (denoted as "pending" in Figure 1) comprises those cases on which consultations have been heldwithout reaching concrete agreement. It is possible that some of these cases have actually been settled, but the parties have not notified the WTO of that fact, thereby making the interpretation of this class of cases difficult. Finally, there are a few cases for which the final result is not known. Figure 1 shows the classification of disputes according to these criteria. (10) The complaints are divided according to the year in which they were initially filed. This shows that during the first two to three years of dispute settlement, the WTO had a good track record, but from 1998 on, the number of possibly unsatisfactory outcomes increased. This may be partly due to the fact that not enough time has elapsed since the inception of disputes. This can be seen in the numberof "ongoing" cases since 1998. However, a majority of unresolved cases are so-called pending consultations cases, as seen in Figure 1. For this class of cases, especially those on which consultations were held in 1998 or 1999, it is hard to argue that the parties have not had enough time. I suspect that for a large proportion of cases in thiscategory, the complainants have all but abandoned the complaint, forone reason or another, but have not made this fact public. Based on this analysis, we could tentatively conclude that in the first few years of dispute settlement, the WTO performed well, whereas since 1998, it has not been working as smoothly.

#### 5] Davis says nothing—it says there have been less complaints filed but 1] that does not at all signal that it works, just that countries don’t want to file with the WTO anymore and 2] the conflicts it’s talking about are legal conflicts not wars which means this isn’t an impact, it’s just mistagged.

#### Now the impact turn—

#### The aff causes the WTO to attract jurisdiction which trades off with the efficacy and legitimacy of regional trade agreements.

Kwak and Marceau 16 “Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the World Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreements,” Kyung Kwak [Kyung Kwak is an associate of a law firm, Ashurst, in Brussel] and Gabrielle Marceau [Gabrielle Marceau, Ph.D., is counsellor in the Légal Affairs Division of the Secretariat to the World Trade Organization] Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 March 2016 <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-yearbook-of-international-law-annuaire-canadien-de-droit-international/article/abs/overlaps-and-conflicts-of-jurisdiction-between-the-world-trade-organization-and-regional-trade-agreements/6C0C9CA77BED3390A38226F9E01EB44D> SM

The relationship between the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and that of regional trade agreements (RTAs) demonstrates the difficulties surrounding the issues of overlaps/conflicts of Jurisdiction and of hierarchy of norms in international law.1 Jurisdiction is often defined in terms of either legislative or judicial Jurisdiction — that is, the authority to legislate or to adjudicate on a matter. Jurisdiction may be analyzed from horizontal points of view (the allocation of Jurisdiction among states or among international organizations) and from a vertical point of view (the allocation of jurisdiction between states and international organizations) . 2

This article addresses the issue of horizontal allocation of judicial jurisdiction between RTAs and the WTO, as expressed in the dispute settlement provisions of each treaty. The choice of a dispute settlement forum is often an expression of the importance that states give to the System of norms that may be enforced by the related dispute settlement mechanism. For instance, if the same states — which are parties to two treaties A and B that contain similar obligations — provide that priority or exclusivity is given to the dispute settlement mechanism of A over that of B, it may be that the states are expressing their choice to favour the enforcement of treaty A over treaty B.

In the case of RTAs, the situation is further complicated because the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)3 authorizes WTO members to form regional trade agreements. The WTO jurisprudence has made it clear that members have a "right" to form preferential trade agreements. This right is however conditional. In the context of an RTA, Article XXIV may justify a measure that is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions. However, in a case involving the formation of a customs union, this RTA "defence" is available only when two conditions are fulfilled. First, the party claiming the benefit of this defence must demonstrate that the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8 (a) and 5 (a) of Article XXIV. Second, this party must demonstrate that the formation of the customs union would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue. Again, both of these conditions must be met to have the benefit of the defence under Article XXIV of GATT.4

Many RTAs include (substantive) rights and obligations that are parallel to those of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement).5 Generally, these RTAs may provide for their own dispute settlement mechanism, which makes it possible for the states to resort to different but parallel dispute settlement mechanisms for parallel or even similar obligations. This situation is not unique as states are often bound by multiple treaties, and the dispute settlement Systems of these treaties operate in a parallel manner.6 At the same time, the WTO dispute settlement System claims to be compulsory and exclusive. Article 23 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)7 mandates exclusive jurisdiction in favour of the DSU for WTO violations. By simply alleging that a measure affects or impairs its trade benefits, a WTO member is entitled to trigger the quasi-automatic, rapid, and powerful WTO dispute settlement mechanism, excluding thereby the competence of any other mechanism to examine WTO law violations. The challenging member does not need to prove any specific economic or legal interest nor provide any evidence of the trade impact of the challenged measure in order to initiale the DSU mechanism.8 The WTO will thus often "attract" jurisdiction over disputes with (potential) trade effects even if such disputes could also be handled in fora other than that of the WTO.

OVERLAPS OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN RTAs AND THE WTO

Overlaps of jurisdiction in dispute settlement can be defined as situations where the same dispute or related aspects of the same dispute could be brought to two distinct institutions or two different dispute settlement Systems. Under certain circumstances, this occurrence may lead to difficulties relating to "forum-shopping," whereby disputing entities would have a choice between two adjudicating bodies or between two different jurisdictions for the same facts. When the dispute settlement mechanisms of two agreements are triggered in parallel or in sequence, there are problems on two levels: first, the two tribunals may claim final jurisdiction (supremacy) over the matter and, second, they may reach different, or even opposite, results.9

Various types of overlaps of jurisdiction may occur. For the purpose of the present discussion, an overlap of jurisdiction occurs: ( i ) when two fora claim to have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter; (2) when one forum claims to have exclusive jurisdiction and the other one offers jurisdiction, on a permissive basis, for dealing with the same matter or a related one; or (3) when the dispute settlement mechanisms of two different fora are available (on a non-mandatory basis) to examine the same or similar matters. Conflicts are possible in any of these three situations. All of the RTAs examined in Table i at the end of this article have dispute settlement mechanisms with jurisdiction that may potentially overlap with that of the WTO Agreement.

#### Revitalizing the WTO is bad – regional trade integration is key to the African economy.

Gammadigbe 21 IMF Working Paper Strategy, Policy, & Review “Is Regional Trade Integration a Growth and Convergence Engine in Africa?” Prepared by Vigninou Gammadigbe [Research Fellow at Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest Authorized for distribution by Johannes Wiegand January 2021 <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/01/29/Is-Regional-Trade-Integration-a-Growth-and-Convergence-Engine-in-Africa-50040> SM

\*REC = Regional Economic Communities (for example, FTAs, unions, etc.)

It has been argued in the literature that regional integration promotes shared economic growth and income convergence among member countries through direct and indirect channels of increased intra-regional trade, economies of scale, dissemination of knowledge and technology, and structural transformation. This paper contributes to this literature in Africa and African RECs. Its main objective was to analyses the effects of RTI on growth and income convergence in Africa and its different RECs. The study examines whether regional integration has played an important role in economic growth and income convergence of member countries in African major RECs in order to draw lessons for the process of establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). To this end, the study estimated two models, one for economic growth and the other for income convergence in the African sample and in the African major RECs over the period 1989 to 2018 using the instrumental variable method and the panel fixed-effects model.

The baseline results as well as the results of the multiple robustness tests indicate that RTI promotes economic growth in the participating countries. However, econometric evidence shows that it fuels divergence rather than income convergence across the continent implying that the positive effect on economic growth is mostly captured by the relatively more developed economies on the continent. These results are robust to the use of alternative indicators of trade integration, to the time frame of the analysis and to the estimation method particularly for the sample of Africa and in large RECs

including COMESA, SADC, ECOWAS, WAEMU and SADC. For these RECs and in the context of the African continental free trade project, these results show how necessary it is to design specific programs (social programs and training programs) to support the most vulnerable economies in order to protect their sectors that will suffer negative shocks when the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will be in force. The results also show that regional integration offers substantial gains, whose full absorption is conditional on the implementation of comprehensive structural reforms aimed at diversifying economies and increasing their productivity. The positive effect of regional integration on growth suggests that the process of African trade integration would be beneficial to the continent’s economic growth. Therefore, the study recommends the elimination of non-tariff barriers in order to increase its effectiveness. Furthermore, regarding the positive effect on income divergence, the study recommends that RTI, beyond its traditional role as an instrument for trade promotion, should also be used as an instrument for providing essential infrastructure, improving the quality of institutions, building human capacity and strengthening the physical capital stock.

#### That’s key to preventing terror.

Ray 1/11 “Does Africa Matter to the United States?” Charles A. Ray [a member of the Board of Trustees and Chair of the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, served as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe] January 11, 2021 <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/does-africa-matter-to-the-united-states/> SM

The population of African countries is also overwhelmingly young. Approximately 40% of Africans are under 15, and, in some countries, over 50% is under 25. By 2050, two of every five children born in the world will be in Africa, and the continent’s population is expected to triple. These developments have positive and negative potential impacts on the United States and the rest of the world. Young Africans have, for the most part, completely skipped the analog age and gone directly digital. Comfortable with technology, they form a huge potential consumer and labor market. If, on the other hand, the countries of Africa fail to develop economically and do not create gainful employment for this young population, then there is the risk that they will become a huge potential source of recruits to extremist and terrorist movements, which currently target disadvantaged and disenchanted youth.

Lack of economic opportunity, increased urbanization, and climate-fueled disasters will also contribute to movement of people seeking better lives, which will impact economies and security not only on the continent of Africa, but also the economic and security situations around the world. Nations, lacking adequate critical infrastructure, education, and job opportunities are ripe for internal unrest and radicalization. In particular, inadequate health delivery systems, when coupled with natural disasters, such as droughts or floods that limit food production, cause famine and mass movements of populations.

The Challenges for U.S. Policy

Prior to World War II, the U.S. policy towards Africa was not as active as it was toward Europe, Asia, or Latin America. During the Cold War, Africa policy was primarily viewed from a perspective of super-power competition. The end of the Cold War and the rise of international terrorism introduced this as a major component in U.S. Africa policy along with competition with a rising China and increased Chinese engagement in Africa.

Before his first official trip to Kenya, U.S. President Barack Obama said, “Africa had become an idea more than an actual place . . . with the benefit of distance, we engaged Africa in a selective embrace.” This is probably an apt description of U.S. policy towards African nations despite the bipartisan nature of that policy. The United States, with the many domestic and international issues it has to cope with, can ill afford to continue to ignore Africa. Going forward, U.S. policy must include a hard-headed look at where Africa fits in policy priorities.

The incoming Biden administration will face a number of important issues and challenges as it develops its Africa policy. The most pressing issues are the following:

Climate Change: Climate change is an existential problem that affects the entire globe, but Africa has probably suffered more from the effects of climate change than other continents—and the problem will only get worse with time. In an October 2020 article, World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Secretary-General Petteri Taalas said,

Climate change is having a growing impact on the African continent, hitting the most vulnerable hardest, and contributing to food insecurity, population displacement and stress on water resources. In recent months we have seen devastating floods, an invasion of desert locusts and now face the looming specter of drought because of a La Nina event. The human and economic toll has been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Climate change impacts water quality and availability, and millions in Africa will likely face persistent increased water stress due to these impacts. A multi-year drought in parts of South Africa, for instance, threatened total water failure in several small towns and had livestock farmers facing financial ruin. Another pressing climate-change issue is the need for protection of the Congo Basin rainforest. This 178-million-hectare rainforest is the world’s second largest after the Amazon and is currently threatened by agricultural activities in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Countries in the Congo Basin need to address the preservation issue, while also enabling sustainable agricultural activities to ensure food security for the region’s population. In addition to the impact on global climate caused by destruction of the rainforest, such destruction also brings human populations into closer contact with the region’s animals, creating the risk of future animal-to-human transmission of new and possibly more virulent viruses similar to COVID-19, which will have a global impact. In a January 2021 CNN report, Dr. Jean-Jacques Muyembe Tamfum, who as a researcher helped discover the Ebola virus in 1976, warned of possible new pathogens that could be as infectious as COVID-19 and as virulent as Ebola.

Rule of Law/Mitigation of Corruption: A key to African development, given the increasing urbanization, population increases, and youthfulness of the continent’s population, will be an increase in domestic and international investment to build the industries that can provide meaningful employment and improved standards of living. In order for this to be successful, African nations will need to address the issues of rule of law and corruption. Investors will not risk money if the business climate comes with a level of political risk that is too high. Government leaders throughout Africa need to establish legislation that provides an acceptable level of security for investments and take action to curb the endemic corruption that currently discourages investment. Corruption in Africa ranges from wholesale political corruption on the scale of General Sani Abachi’s looting of $3-5 billion of state money during his five years as Nigeria’s military ruler to the bribes paid by businessmen to police and customs officials. The “tradition” of having to pay bribes, or “sweeteners,” drives away domestic investment and scares away foreign investment, leaving many countries mired in poverty.

Violent Extremism and Terrorism: A number of African nations are currently plagued with rising extremist movements. While primarily a domestic issue, the mass movement of people fleeing violence and the disruption of economic activity have the potential to negatively impact the rest of the world. African nations need regional responses to curb extremist and terrorist organizations, many of which are supported by international terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda. In addition, the underlying conditions that helped to create these movements must be addressed. Terrorist groups in Africa range from relatively large and dangerous groups, such as Boko Haram, a group in Nigeria that has received support from al Qaeda and that aims to implement sharia law in the country; Al-Shabab, an al Qaeda affiliate aiming to overthrow the government in Somalia and to punish neighboring countries for their support of the Somali regime; and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army, a fundamentalist Christian group. Terrorist groups in the fragile political climate of Libya also pose a threat to sub-Saharan Africa.

#### Causes terrorist CBW usage.

Fyanka 20 Bernard B. Fyanka (epartment of History and International Studies, Redeemer’s University) (2020): Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism: Rethinking Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy, African Security Review, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2019.1698441 (SGK)

The most commonly used non-conventional weapons are chemical or biological in nature. The long history of chemical and biological weapons usage dates as far back as 600 BC when, during a siege, Solon of Athens poisoned the drinking water of the city of Kirrha.44 More recently – starting with the use of mustard gas during the First World War – nations have acquired chemical and biological weapons easily, deploying them against enemies and their own citizens alike. For terrorist groups like Boko Haram, chemical and biological weapons are uniquely suited to their agenda and as such present very attractive alternatives to nuclear; they are extremely difficult to detect, cost effective and easy to deploy. Aerosols of biological agents are invisible to the naked eye, silent, odourless, tasteless and relatively easily dispersed. Most importantly they are 600 to 2000 times cheaper than other WMDs. Recent esti- mates place the cost of biological weapons at about 0.05% of the cost of a conventional weapon which could produce similar numbers of mass casualties per square kilometre. 45 The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons has proved to be very fluid over the past century due to advancements in technology. Production is comparatively easy via the commonplace technology that is used in the manufacturing of antibiotics, vaccines, foods and beverages, while delivery systems such as spray devices deployed from airplane, boat or car are widely available. Another advantage of biological agents is the natural lead time pro- vided by the organism’s incubation period (three to seven days in most cases), allowing the ter- rorists to deploy the agent and then escape before an investigation

by law enforcement and intelligence agencies can even begin. Furthermore, not only would the use of an endemic infec- tious agent likely cause initial confusion because of the difficulty of differentiating between a biological warfare attack and a natural epidemic, but with some agents the potential also exists 46 for secondary or tertiary transmission from person to person or via natural vectors. Unlike their nuclear and radiological counterparts, biological and chemical weapons have been used for terrorism by both state and non-state actors. The challenges faced in preventing the use of these weapons through international control mechanisms include the increasing availability of larger quantities of substances, ease of use and most especially advanced tech- nological deployment facilities that portend a high risk factor to larger populations. Table 1 catalogues the use of biochemical weapons in warfare and by terrorists and other groups or individuals over the past century, offering concrete historical precedent and empirical grounds for the potential future actions of Boko Haram. The data shows consistent recourse to the use of these weapons, in spite of the chemical and biological weapons conventions out- lawing them. It can be seen that from the 1970s onwards there has been an increase in the use of biochemical weapons by religious cults and terrorist groups in pursuit of their agendas. The rise of Boko Haram and its ISIS affiliation could lead to a future where the use of biochemical weapons is the norm rather than the exception.

#### COVID incentivizes engineered bioterror- extinction

Walsh, 20 -- Axios Future correspondent [Bryan Walsh, "The coronavirus pandemic reawakens bioweapon fears," Axios, 5-14-2020, https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-pandemic-pathogen-bioweapon-45417c86-52aa-41b1-8a99-44a6e597d3a8.html, accessed 9-7-2020]

The coronavirus pandemic reawakens bioweapon fears

The immense human and economic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic only underscores the threat posed by pathogens that could be deliberately engineered and released.

Why it matters: New technology like gene editing and DNA synthesis has made the creation of more virulent pathogens easier. Yet security and regulation efforts haven't kept pace with the science.

What's happening: Despite some claims by the White House, overwhelming scientific evidence indicates that the novel coronavirus was not accidentally released from a lab or deliberately engineered, but naturally spilled over from an animal source.

That doesn't mean the threat from bioweapons isn't dire. Along with AI, engineered pandemics are widely considered the biggest existential risk facing humanity.

That's in part because a pathogen could be engineered in a lab for maximum contagiousness and virulence, well beyond what would arise through natural selection.

Case in point: a 2018 pandemic simulation put on by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security featured a fictional engineered virus called Clade X that combined the contagiousness of the common cold with the virulence of the real-life Nipah virus, which has a mortality rate of 40-75%. The resulting simulated global outbreak killed 150 million people.

COVID-19 isn't anywhere near that fatal, but the pandemic has shown the vulnerability of the U.S. and the world to biological threats both natural and manmade.

"Potential adversaries are of course seeing the same things we’re seeing," says Richard Pilch of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. "Anyone looking for a radical leveling approach — whether a state actor like North Korea or a motivated terrorist organization — may be influenced by COVID-19 to consider pursuing a biological weapons capability."

Background: Bioweapons were officially banned by the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975, though North Korea is suspected of maintaining an offensive bioweapons program.

A particular concern about biowarfare and bioterror, though, is that many of the tools and methods that could be used to create a weaponized virus are largely indistinguishable from those used in the course of legitimate scientific research. This makes biotechnology "dual-use" — and that much more difficult to safely regulate without cutting off research that could be vitally important.

While earlier bioweapons fears focused on the possibility that a state or terror group could try to weaponize a known dangerous agent like smallpox — which would require somehow obtaining restricted pathogens — new technology means that someone could obtain the genetic sequence of a germ online and synthesize it in the lab.

"If you've been trained in a relevant technical discipline, that means you can make almost any potentially harmful agent that you're aware of," says Kevin Esvelt, a biologist at the MIT Media Lab and a member of the CDC's Biological Agent Containment Working Group. That would include the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19, which was recently synthesized from its genetic sequence in a study published in Nature.

How it works: Currently, synthetic DNA is ordered through commercial suppliers. But while most suppliers screen DNA orders for the sequences of dangerous pathogens, they're not required to — and not all do, which means safety efforts are "incomplete, inaccurate, and insecure," says Esvelt.

Screening efforts that look for the genetic sequences of known pathogens also wouldn't necessarily be able to detect when synthetic DNA was being used to make something entirely novel and dangerous.

In the near future, desktop DNA synthesizers may be able to generate synthetic DNA in the lab, cutting out the need for commercial suppliers — and potential security screenings.

The democratization of biotechnology could unleash a wave of creativity and innovation,

just as the democratization of personal computing did. But it also increases the number of people who could potentially make a dangerous engineered virus, whether deliberately or by accident.