# 1NC

### 1NC – T

**The topic should define the division of affirmative and negative ground**

#### Resolved means a legislative policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964. ED

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### WTO member nations are all except 14 countries.

Amadeo 20 Kimberly Amadeo, 2020, “How Does a Country Become a WTO Member?,” The Balance, [Kimberly Amadeo is president of World Money Watch, where she shares her expertise on U.S. and world economies, as well as investing. The company produces publications about the global economy that are easy to understand, succinct, and full of practical information. Examples include "[The Ultimate Obamacare Handbook](https://www.amazon.com/Ultimate-Obamacare-Handbook-2015%C2%962016-Responsibilities/dp/1634505611/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1441059391&sr=1-1&keywords=the+ultimate+obamacare+handbook&pebp=1441059373218&perid=0DKBJYZ6ZR5WD40EFJF8)" published in 2015, and "[Beyond the Great Recession](https://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Great-Recession-Happened-Prosper/dp/0984532706/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1333307640&sr=1-1)" published in 2010. Prior to reaching a milestone of 20 years of experience in economic analysis and business strategy, Kimberly received her master's in business administration from MIT's Sloan School of Management. Kimberly has been featured as an expert on the PBS program "[To the Contrary](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6eS1y22i88o&feature=youtu.be)" discussing unemployment, as well as Varney & Co., a news talk show on the Fox Business Network, NBC News, and CCTV America. Other features where Kimberly can be heard discussing the state of the economy include U.S. News and World Report, The Dallas Morning News, Forbes, Industry Week, and the Washington Post.] <https://www.thebalance.com/how-does-a-country-become-a-wto-member-3306362>, //SLCAMRRK

Only 14 countries are not WTO members. These nations do not wish to become members. They are Aruba, Eritrea, Kiribati, Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, North Korea, Palau, the Palestinian Territories, San Marino, Sint Maarten, and Tuvalu.

#### Reductions are down to smaller amounts.

Court of Appeals of Oregon 06. Robert A. FOLKERS, Jr., Petitioner-Cross-Respondent, v. LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent-Cross-Petitioner. FDA-01-09; A123667. <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/or-court-of-appeals/1490635.html>

Petitioner seeks judicial review of the decision of the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board (the board) dismissing his appeal.   After respondent Lincoln County School District (the district) unilaterally amended his employment contract by increasing the number of days of work without increasing his pay, petitioner appealed to the board.   The board concluded that the district's action was not a “reduction in pay” and, hence, not an action over which the board had subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

The pertinent facts are undisputed.   Petitioner was a licensed school administrator.   From 1993 to 1998, he was principal of a kindergarten-through-12th-grade school in the district.   In 1998, the district reassigned him to be assistant principal at a high school.   In 2000, petitioner signed a three-year contract with the district that set his monthly salary for the contract year and required 220 work days for the year.   During the first year of that contract, however, the district adopted a new employee compensation plan covering the period from July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2006.   Pursuant to that plan, the district set petitioner's salary at essentially the same amount for the 2001-02 contract year as for the previous year 1 but increased the number of work days for the contract year from 220 to 230.   The district sent petitioner a document informing him of the contract action.   Petitioner signed the document but inserted a statement that he objected to the listed salary and reserved his right to appeal.

Petitioner then filed an appeal with the board contesting the district's action, alleging that it amounted to an unauthorized “reduction in pay.”   In his notice of appeal, petitioner asserted that the district's action constituted a “reduction in pay” within the meaning of ORS 342.845(5)(a), which authorizes administrators to appeal such reductions to the board, and that the reduction was unauthorized because the district had neither “established nor otherwise attempted to establish any grounds for the action.”   The district moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that the appeal was untimely  and that, because the district's action was not a “reduction in pay,” the board lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

The board rejected the district's timeliness argument but agreed that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   The board determined that, under ORS 342.845(5),2 administrators may appeal only two types of actions:  reductions in pay and dismissals.   It rejected petitioner's contention that the district reduced his pay by holding his salary constant but increasing his work year by 10 days.   The board reasoned:

“The statute addresses reductions in pay.   We do not have jurisdiction to consider appeals of changes in other working conditions, whether they be changes in length of day, number of days, duties, location of work, or size of school.   If the legislature wanted us to solve such a complex equation, it would have set forth additional factors for our consideration in the statute.   It did not.   The statute directs us to consider only reductions in pay.   As we said in [McNair v. Springfield School District, FDA 01-06 (2003)], ‘A reduction in pay, using the natural and ordinary meaning of the terms “reduce” and “reduction,” means pay that has been brought down to a smaller amount.’  \* \* \* As in [McNair, petitioner] here did not receive a reduction in pay.   He received the same compensation he had received the prior year.”

#### Intellectual property includes four things

Brewer 19 [(Trevor, advises clients on business structuring and sale transactions, regulatory compliance, third-party contracts, liability protection and general matters facing small business owners. His focus extends beyond legal advice and includes business strategy and wealth preservation.) “WHAT ARE THE FOUR BASIC TYPES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS?” Brewer Long, 5/16/19. <https://brewerlong.com/information/business-law/four-types-of-intellectual-property/>] RR

There are four types of intellectual property rights and protections (although multiple types of intellectual property itself). Securing the correct protection for your property is important, which is why consulting with a lawyer is a must. The four categories of intellectual property protections include:

TRADE SECRETS

Trade secrets refer to specific, private information that is important to a business because it gives the business a competitive advantage in its marketplace. If a trade secret is acquired by another company, it could harm the original holder.

Examples of trade secrets include recipes for certain foods and beverages (like Mrs. Fields’ cookies or Sprite), new inventions, software, processes, and even different marketing strategies.

When a person or business holds a trade secret protection, others cannot copy or steal the idea. In order to establish information as a “trade secret,” and to incur the legal protections associated with trade secrets, businesses must actively behave in a manner that demonstrates their desire to protect the information.

Trade secrets are protected without official registration; however, an owner of a trade secret whose rights are breached–i.e. someone steals their trade secret–may ask a court to ask against that individual and prevent them from using the trade secret.

PATENTS

As defined by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), a patent is a type of limited-duration protection that can be used to protect inventions (or discoveries) that are new, non-obvious, and useful, such a new process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter.

When a property owner holds a patent, others are prevented, under law, from offering for sale, making, or using the product.

COPYRIGHTS

Copyrights and patents are not the same things, although they are often confused. A copyright is a type of intellectual property protection that protects original works of authorship, which might include literary works, music, art, and more. Today, copyrights also protect computer software and architecture.

Copyright protections are automatic; once you create something, it is yours. However, if your rights under copyright protections are infringed and you wish to file a lawsuit, then registration of your copyright will be necessary.

TRADEMARKS

Finally, the fourth type of intellectual property protection is a trademark protection. Remember, patents are used to protect inventions and discoveries and copyrights are used to protect expressions of ideas and creations, like art and writing.

Trademarks, then, refer to phrases, words, or symbols that distinguish the source of a product or services of one party from another. For example, the Nike symbol–which nearly all could easily recognize and identify–is a type of trademark.

While patents and copyrights can expire, trademark rights come from the use of the trademark, and therefore can be held indefinitely. Like a copyright, registration of a trademark is not required, but registering can offer additional advantages.

#### Medicines prevent, diagnose, or treat harms

**MRS 20** [(MAINE REVENUE SERVICE SALES, FUEL & SPECIAL TAX DIVISION) “A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE SALES AND USE TAX LAW” <https://www.maine.gov/revenue/sites/maine.gov.revenue/files/inline-files/Reference%20Guide%202020.pdf> December 2020] SS

[Medicines](https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/medicines) means antibiotics, analgesics, antipyretics, stimulants, sedatives, antitoxins, anesthetics, antipruritics, hormones, antihistamines, certain “dermal fillers” (such as BoTox®), injectable contrast agents, vitamins, oxygen, vaccines and other substances that are used in the prevention, diagnosis or treatment of disease or injury and that either (1) require a prescription in order to be purchased or administered to the retail consumer or patient; or (2) are sold in packaging.

#### Topicality as a procedural constraint is necessary for effective debate

#### They destroy engagement – predictable stasis ensures research accessibility and negative ground. Even if public policy isn’t the best focus for activism, it’s crucial for dialogue because it’s grounded in consistent reporting and academic work.

#### Two impacts -

#### 1) Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by manipulating balance of prep – vote neg b/c debate is a competitive game that’s meaningless without substantive constraints.

#### 2) Also key to have well-prepared opponents. They transform debate into a monologue which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subjected to well researched scrutiny.

#### Also destroys mechanism education—their model creates a structural disincentive to substantial research. Failure to defend the actor and mechanism of the resolution allows them to shift their advocacy to the terms most favorable to them – causes dogmatism and forces the neg into generics at the margins of the literature – destroys good scholarship.

#### Reject the team—T is question of models of debate and the damage to our strategy was already done

#### Competing interps—they have to proactively to justify their model and reasonability links to our offense

#### No RVI’s – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) chilling effect – forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory

### 1NC – K

#### Their basic frame for politics reconfirms the failures of the Left, turning debate into a Vampires’ Castle where the propagation of guilt and cycles of pseudo-activity overcome meaningful theorizing and political change – this destroys resistance to capitalism.

Fisher 13 (Mark Fisher, commissioning editor at Zer0 Books, programme Leader of the MA in Aural and Visual Cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, lecturer at the University of East London, “Exiting the Vampire Castle,” The North Star, November 22, 2013)

Inside the Vampires’ Castle The first configuration is what I came to call the Vampires’ Castle. The Vampires’ Castle specialises in propagating guilt. It is driven by a priest’s desire to excommunicate and condemn, an academic-pedant’s desire to be the first to be seen to spot a mistake, and a hipster’s desire to be one of the in-crowd. The danger in attacking the Vampires’ Castle is that it can look as if – and it will do everything it can to reinforce this thought – that one is also attacking the struggles against racism, sexism, heterosexism. But, far from being the only legitimate expression of such struggles, the Vampires’ Castle is best understood as a bourgeois-liberal perversion and appropriation of the energy of these movements. The Vampires’ Castle was born the moment when the struggle not to be defined by identitarian categories became the quest to have ‘identities’ recognised by a bourgeois big Other. The privilege I certainly enjoy as a white male consists in part in my not being aware of my ethnicity and my gender, and it is a sobering and revelatory experience to occasionally be made aware of these blind-spots. But, rather than seeking a world in which everyone achieves freedom from identitarian classification, the Vampires’ Castle seeks to corral people back into identi-camps, where they are forever defined in the terms set by dominant power, crippled by self-consciousness and isolated by a logic of solipsism which insists that we cannot understand one another unless we belong to the same identity group. I’ve noticed a fascinating magical inversion projection-disavowal mechanism whereby the sheer mention of class is now automatically treated as if that means one is trying to downgrade the importance of race and gender. In fact, the exact opposite is the case, as the Vampires’ Castle uses an ultimately liberal understanding of race and gender to obfuscate class. In all of the absurd and traumatic twitterstorms about privilege earlier this year it was noticeable that the discussion of class privilege was entirely absent. The task, as ever, remains the articulation of class, gender and race – but the founding move of the Vampires’ Castle is the dis-articulation of class from other categories. The problem that the Vampires’ Castle was set up to solve is this: how do you hold immense wealth and power while also appearing as a victim, marginal and oppositional? The solution was already there – in the Christian Church. So the VC has recourse to all the infernal strategies, dark pathologies and psychological torture instruments Christianity invented, and which Nietzsche described in The Genealogy of Morals. This priesthood of bad conscience, this nest of pious guilt-mongers, is exactly what Nietzsche predicted when he said that something worse than Christianity was already on the way. Now, here it is … The Vampires’ Castle feeds on the energy and anxieties and vulnerabilities of young students, but most of all it lives by converting the suffering of particular groups – the more ‘marginal’ the better – into academic capital. The most lauded figures in the Vampires’ Castle are those who have spotted a new market in suffering – those who can find a group more oppressed and subjugated than any previously exploited will find themselves promoted through the ranks very quickly. The first law of the Vampires’ Castle is: individualise and privatise everything. While in theory it claims to be in favour of structural critique, in practice it never focuses on anything except individual behaviour. Some of these working class types are not terribly well brought up, and can be very rude at times. Remember: condemning individuals is always more important than paying attention to impersonal structures. The actual ruling class propagates ideologies of individualism, while tending to act as a class. (Many of what we call ‘conspiracies’ are the ruling class showing class solidarity.) The VC, as dupe-servants of the ruling class, does the opposite: it pays lip service to ‘solidarity’ and ‘collectivity’, while always acting as if the individualist categories imposed by power really hold. Because they are petit-bourgeois to the core, the members of the Vampires’ Castle are intensely competitive, but this is repressed in the passive aggressive manner typical of the bourgeoisie. What holds them together is not solidarity, but mutual fear – the fear that they will be the next one to be outed, exposed, condemned. The second law of the Vampires’ Castle is: make thought and action appear very, very difficult. There must be no lightness, and certainly no humour. Humour isn’t serious, by definition, right? Thought is hard work, for people with posh voices and furrowed brows. Where there is confidence, introduce scepticism. Say: don’t be hasty, we have to think more deeply about this. Remember: having convictions is oppressive, and might lead to gulags. The third law of the Vampires’ Castle is: propagate as much guilt as you can. The more guilt the better. People must feel bad: it is a sign that they understand the gravity of things. It’s OK to be class-privileged if you feel guilty about privilege and make others in a subordinate class position to you feel guilty too. You do some good works for the poor, too, right? The fourth law of the Vampires’ Castle is: essentialize. While fluidity of identity, pluarity and multiplicity are always claimed on behalf of the VC members – partly to cover up their own invariably wealthy, privileged or bourgeois-assimilationist background – the enemy is always to be essentialized. Since the desires animating the VC are in large part priests’ desires to excommunicate and condemn, there has to be a strong distinction between Good and Evil, with the latter essentialized. Notice the tactics. X has made a remark/ has behaved in a particular way – these remarks/ this behaviour might be construed as transphobic/ sexist etc. So far, OK. But it’s the next move which is the kicker. X then becomes defined as a transphobe/ sexist etc. Their whole identity becomes defined by one ill-judged remark or behavioural slip. Once the VC has mustered its witch-hunt, the victim (often from a working class background, and not schooled in the passive aggressive etiquette of the bourgeoisie) can reliably be goaded into losing their temper, further securing their position as pariah/ latest to be consumed in feeding frenzy. The fifth law of the Vampires’ Castle: think like a liberal (because you are one). The VC’s work of constantly stoking up reactive outrage consists of endlessly pointing out the screamingly obvious: capital behaves like capital (it’s not very nice!), repressive state apparatuses are repressive. We must protest! Neo-anarchy in the UK The second libidinal formation is neo-anarchism. By neo-anarchists I definitely do not mean anarchists or syndicalists involved in actual workplace organisation, such as the Solidarity Federation. I mean, rather, those who identify as anarchists but whose involvement in politics extends little beyond student protests and occupations, and commenting on Twitter. Like the denizens of the Vampires’ Castle, neo-anarchists usually come from a petit-bourgeois background, if not from somewhere even more class-privileged. They are also overwhelmingly young: in their twenties or at most their early thirties, and what informs the neo-anarchist position is a narrow historical horizon. Neo-anarchists have experienced nothing but capitalist realism. By the time the neo-anarchists had come to political consciousness – and many of them have come to political consciousness remarkably recently, given the level of bullish swagger they sometimes display – the Labour Party had become a Blairite shell, implementing neo-liberalism with a small dose of social justice on the side. But the problem with neo-anarchism is that it unthinkingly reflects this historical moment rather than offering any escape from it. It forgets, or perhaps is genuinely unaware of, the Labour Party’s role in nationalising major industries and utilities or founding the National Health Service. Neo-anarchists will assert that ‘parliamentary politics never changed anything’, or the ‘Labour Party was always useless’ while attending protests about the NHS, or retweeting complaints about the dismantling of what remains of the welfare state. There’s a strange implicit rule here: it’s OK to protest against what parliament has done, but it’s not alright to enter into parliament or the mass media to attempt to engineer change from there. Mainstream media is to be disdained, but BBC Question Time is to be watched and moaned about on Twitter. Purism shades into fatalism; better not to be in any way tainted by the corruption of the mainstream, better to uselessly ‘resist’ than to risk getting your hands dirty. It’s not surprising, then, that so many neo-anarchists come across as depressed. This depression is no doubt reinforced by the anxieties of postgraduate life, since, like the Vampires’ Castle, neo-anarchism has its natural home in universities, and is usually propagated by those studying for postgraduate qualifications, or those who have recently graduated from such study. What is to be done? Why have these two configurations come to the fore? The first reason is that they have been allowed to prosper by capital because they serve its interests. Capital subdued the organised working class by decomposing class consciousness, viciously subjugating trade unions while seducing ‘hard working families’ into identifying with their own narrowly defined interests instead of the interests of the wider class; but why would capital be concerned about a ‘left’ that replaces class politics with a moralising individualism, and that, far from building solidarity, spreads fear and insecurity? The second reason is what Jodi Dean has called communicative capitalism. It might have been possible to ignore the Vampires’ Castle and the neo-anarchists if it weren’t for capitalist cyberspace. The VC’s pious moralising has been a feature of a certain ‘left’ for many years – but, if one wasn’t a member of this particular church, its sermons could be avoided. Social media means that this is no longer the case, and there is little protection from the psychic pathologies propagated by these discourses. So what can we do now? First of all, it is imperative to reject identitarianism, and to recognise that there are no identities, only desires, interests and identifications. Part of the importance of the British Cultural Studies project – as revealed so powerfully and so movingly in John Akomfrah’s installation The Unfinished Conversation (currently in Tate Britain) and his film The Stuart Hall Project – was to have resisted identitarian essentialism. Instead of freezing people into chains of already-existing equivalences, the point was to treat any articulation as provisional and plastic. New articulations can always be created. No-one is essentially anything. Sadly, the right act on this insight more effectively than the left does. The bourgeois-identitarian left knows how to propagate guilt and conduct a witch hunt, but it doesn’t know how to make converts. But that, after all, is not the point. The aim is not to popularise a leftist position, or to win people over to it, but to remain in a position of elite superiority, but now with class superiority redoubled by moral superiority too. ‘How dare you talk – it’s we who speak for those who suffer!’ But the rejection of identitarianism can only be achieved by the re-assertion of class. A left that does not have class at its core can only be a liberal pressure group. Class consciousness is always double: it involves a simultaneous knowledge of the way in which class frames and shapes all experience, and a knowledge of the particular position that we occupy in the class structure. It must be remembered that the aim of our struggle is not recognition by the bourgeoisie, nor even the destruction of the bourgeoisie itself. It is the class structure – a structure that wounds everyone, even those who materially profit from it – that must be destroyed. The interests of the working class are the interests of all; the interests of the bourgeoisie are the interests of capital, which are the interests of no-one. Our struggle must be towards the construction of a new and surprising world, not the preservation of identities shaped and distorted by capital. If this seems like a forbidding and daunting task, it is. But we can start to engage in many prefigurative activities right now. Actually, such activities would go beyond pre-figuration – they could start a virtuous cycle, a self-fulfilling prophecy in which bourgeois modes of subjectivity are dismantled and a new universality starts to build itself. We need to learn, or re-learn, how to build comradeship and solidarity instead of doing capital’s work for it by condemning and abusing each other. This doesn’t mean, of course, that we must always agree – on the contrary, we must create conditions where disagreement can take place without fear of exclusion and excommunication. We need to think very strategically about how to use social media – always remembering that, despite the egalitarianism claimed for social media by capital’s libidinal engineers, that this is currently an enemy territory, dedicated to the reproduction of capital. But this doesn’t mean that we can’t occupy the terrain and start to use it for the purposes of producing class consciousness. We must break out of the ‘debate’ that communicative capitalism in which capital is endlessly cajoling us to participate in, and remember that we are involved in a class struggle. The goal is not to ‘be’ an activist, but to aid the working class to activate – and transform – itself. Outside the Vampires’ Castle, anything is possible.

#### They don’t create a space of resistance – they instead carve out a pseudo-radical space in an activity that remains funded by white elites and sustained through labor exploitation. Capitalism thrives on exactly this sort of politics – the simulation of agency allows people to pretend there’s an outside to the system. It’s that rush of agency that allows us to simulate the reclamation of the subject.

Bluhdorn 07 – (May 2007, Ingolfur, PhD, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology, University of Bath, “Self-description, Self-deception, Simulation: A Systems-theoretical Perspective on Contemporary Discourses of Radical Change,” Social Movement Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1–20, May 2007, google scholar)

Yet the **established patterns of self-construction, which** thus **have to be defended and** further **developed** at any price, **have fundamental problems** attached to them: ﬁrstly, **the attempt to constitute, on the basis of** product choices and acts of **consumption, a Self and identity** that are **distinct from and autonomous vis-a`-vis the market is a contradiction in terms**. Secondly, **late-modern society’s established patterns of consumption are known to be socially exclusive and environmentally destructive**. Despite all hopes for ecological modernization and revolutionary improvements in resource efﬁciency (e.g. Weizsa¨cker et al., 1998; Hawkenet al., 1999; Lomborg, 2001), **physical environmental limits imply that the lifestyles and established patterns of consumption** cherished by advanced modern societies **cannot even be extended to all residents of the richest countries**, let alone to the populations of the developing world. For the sake of the (re)construction of an ever elusive Self, **in their struggle against self-referentiality** and in pursuit of the regeneration of difference, **late-modern societies are** thus **locked into the imperative of maintaining** and further developing the principle of **exclusion** (Blu¨hdorn, 2002, 2003). At any price they have to, and indeed do, defend **a lifestyle that requires ever increasing social inequality, environmental degradation, predatory resource wars, and the tight policing of potential internal and external enemies**.14 For this effort, **military and surveillance technology provide ever more sophisticated and efﬁcient means**. Nevertheless, the principle of **exclusion is ultimately still unsustainable, not only because of spiralling ‘security’ expenses but also because it** directly **contradicts the** modernist **notion of the free and autonomous individual** that late-modern society desperately aims to sustain. For this reason, late-modern society is confronted with the task of having to sustain both the late-modern principle of exclusion as well as its opposite, i.e. the modernist principle of inclusion. Very importantly, the conﬂict between the principles of exclusion and inclusion is not simply one between different individuals, political actors or sections of society. Instead, it is a politically irresolvable conﬂict that resides right within the late-modern individual, the late-modern economy and late-modern politics. And if, as Touraine notes, late-modern society no longer believes in nor even desires political transcendence, the particular challenge is that the two principles can also no longer be attributed to different dimensions of time, i.e. the former to the present, and the latter to some future society. Instead, late-modern society needs to represent and reproduce itself and its opposite at the same time. If considered **within this framework** of this analysis, the function of Luhmann’s system of protest communication, or in the terms of this article, **the signiﬁcance of** late-modern societies’ **discourses of radical change becomes immediately evident**. **At a stage when the possibility** and desirability **of transcending** the principle of **exclusion has been pulled into** radical **doubt but when**, at the same time, the principle of **inclusion is vitally important**, **these discourses simulate the validity of the latter as a social ideal**. In other words, **latemodern society reconciles the tension between the** cherished but exclusive **status quo** – for which there is no alternative – **and the non-existent** inclusive **alternative** – on whose existence it depends – **by means of simulation**. The analysis of Luhmann’s work has demonstrated how the societal self-descriptions produced by the system of protest communication, or late-modern society’s discourses of radical change, fulﬁl this function exactly. **They are** an **indispensable** function system not so much because they help to resolve late-modern society’s problems of mal-coordination, but because by performing the possibility of the alternative they help to cope with the fundamental problem of self-referentiality. In this sense, late-modern society’s discourses of sustainability, democratic renewal, social inclusion or global justice, to name but a few, suggest that advanced modern society is working towards an environmentally and socially inclusive alternative – genuinely modern – society, but they do not deny the fact that the big utopia and project of late-modern society is the reproduction and further enhancement of the status quo, i.e. the sustainability of the principle of exclusion. Protest movements as networks of physical actors and actions complement the purely communicative **discourses of radical change** in that they bring their narrative and societal selfdescription to life. Whilst the declarations of institutionalized mainstream politics cannot escape the generalized suspicion that they are purely rhetorical, social movements **provide an arena for** the physical expression and **experience of the authenticity and reality of the alternative**, or at least of the reality of its possibility and the authenticity of the commitment to its realization. For late-modern individuals who seek to find their elusive identity in ever new acts of consumption, protest movements offer an opportunity to experience themselves as autonomous, as subjects, as actors, as distinct from and opposed to the all-embracing market. Social movements and the more or less institutionalized discourses of radical change thus transmute from germ cells of the alternative society into reserves of alterity, or theme-parks for simulated alterity (Blu¨hdorn, 2005a). This interpretation reflects Luhmann’s suggestion that contemporary discourses of radical change are not so much about the actual implementation of radical social change as about the ‘symbolism of the alternative’. And it nowappears that the societal self-descriptions they generate fulfil a vital function not in so far as they increase the reflexivity of late-modern society but in so far as they are arenas for the experience of simulated subjectivity, duality and modernity. They provide an opportunity to reconcile the cherished but exclusive status quo with the equally cherished but unsustainable belief in the inclusive alternative. Protest movements and discourses of radical change are the implantation of the alternative into the system itself, or the simulated reproduction of alterity fromthe system’s own resources. As the real alternatives to the system are utterly unattractive, disappearing fast, and indeed resisted and annihilated at any price, this internal simulation of alterity is becoming late-modern society’s only remaining way of coping with the threat of self-referentiality.

#### Cap causes extinction – war, disease, climate, inequality, and econ

* human rights, healthcare crises, climate change, structural racism, econ, vtl

Ahmed 20 (Nafeez Ahmed -- Visiting Research Fellow at the Global Sustainability Institute at Anglia Ruskin University's Faculty of Science & Technology + M.A. in contemporary war & peace studies + DPhil (April 2009) in international relations from the School of Global Studies @ Sussex University, “Capitalism is Destroying ‘Safe Operating Space’ for Humanity, Warn Scientists”, https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-06-24/capitalism-is-destroying-safe-operating-space-for-humanity-warn-scientists/, 24 June 2020, EmmieeM)

The COVID19 pandemic has exposed a strange anomaly in the global economy. If it doesn’t keep growing endlessly, it just breaks. Grow, or die.

But there’s a deeper problem. New scientific research confirms that capitalism’s structural obsession with endless growth is destroying the very conditions for human survival on planet Earth.

A landmark study in the journal Nature Communications, “Scientists’ warning on affluence” — by scientists in Australia, Switzerland and the UK — concludes that the most fundamental driver of environmental destruction is the overconsumption of the super-rich.

This factor lies over and above other factors like fossil fuel consumption, industrial agriculture and deforestation: because it is overconsumption by the super-rich which is the chief driver of these other factors breaching key planetary boundaries.

The paper notes that the richest 10 percent of people are responsible for up to 43 percent of destructive global environmental impacts.

In contrast, the poorest 10 percent in the world are responsible just around 5 percent of these environmental impacts:

The new paper is authored by Thomas Wiedmann of UNSW Sydney’s School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Manfred Lenzen of the University of Sydney’s School of Physics, Lorenz T. Keysser of ETH Zürich’s Department of Environmental Systems Science, and Julia K. Steinberger of Leeds University’s School of Earth and Environment.

It confirms that global structural inequalities in the distribution of wealth are intimately related to an escalating environmental crisis threatening the very existence of human societies.

Synthesising knowledge from across the scientific community, the paper identifies capitalism as the main cause behind “alarming trends of environmental degradation” which now pose “existential threats to natural systems, economies and societies.” The paper concludes:

“It is clear that prevailing capitalist, growth-driven economic systems have not only increased affluence since World War II, but have led to enormous increases in inequality, financial instability, resource consumption and environmental pressures on vital earth support systems.”

Capitalism and the pandemic

Thanks to the way capitalism works, the paper shows, the super-rich are incentivised to keep getting richer — at the expense of the health of our societies and the planet overall.

The research provides an important scientific context for how we can understand many earlier scientific studies revealing that industrial expansion has hugely increased the risks of new disease outbreaks.

Just last April, a paper in Landscape Ecology found that deforestation driven by increased demand for consumption of agricultural commodities or beef have increased the probability of ‘zoonotic’ diseases (exotic diseases circulating amongst animals) jumping to humans. This is because industrial expansion, driven by capitalist pressures, has intensified the encroachment of human activities on wildlife and natural ecosystems.

Two years ago, another study in Frontiers of Microbiology concluded presciently that accelerating deforestation due to “demographic growth” and the associated expansion of “farming, logging, and hunting”, is dangerously transforming rural environments. More bat species carrying exotic viruses have ended up next to human dwellings, the study said. This is increasing “the risk of transmission of viruses through direct contact, domestic animal infection, or contamination by urine or faeces.”

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the COVID19 pandemic thus emerged directly from these rapidly growing impacts of human activities. As the new paper in Nature Communications confirms, these impacts have accelerated in the context of the fundamental operations of industrial capitalism.

Eroding the ‘safe operating space’

The result is that capitalism is causing human societies to increasingly breach key planetary boundaries, such as land-use change, biosphere integrity and climate change.

Remaining within these boundaries is essential to maintain what scientists describe as a “safe operating space” for human civilization. If those key ecosystems are disrupted, that “safe operating space” will begin to erode. The global impacts of the COVID19 pandemic are yet another clear indication that this process of erosion has already begun.

“The evidence is clear,” write Weidmann and his co-authors.

“Long-term and concurrent human and planetary wellbeing will not be achieved in the Anthropocene if affluent overconsumption continues, spurred by economic systems that exploit nature and humans. We find that, to a large extent, the affluent lifestyles of the world’s rich determine and drive global environmental and social impact. Moreover, international trade mechanisms allow the rich world to displace its impact to the global poor.”

The new scientific research thus confirms that the normal functioning of capitalism is eroding the ‘safe space’ by which human civilisation is able to survive.

The structures

The paper also sets out how this is happening in some detail. The super-rich basically end up driving this destructive system forward in three key ways.

Firstly, they are directly responsible for “biophysical resource use… through high consumption.”

Secondly, they are “members of powerful factions of the capitalist class.”

Thirdly, due to that positioning, they end up “driving consumption norms across the population.”

But perhaps the most important insight of the paper is not that this is purely because the super-rich are especially evil or terrible compared to the rest of the population — but because of the systemic pressures produced by capitalist structures.

The authors point out that: “Growth imperatives are active at multiple levels, making the pursuit of economic growth (net investment, i.e. investment above depreciation) a necessity for different actors and leading to social and economic instability in the absence of it.”

At the core of capitalism, the paper observes, is a fundamental social relationship defining the way working people are systemically marginalised from access to the productive resources of the earth, along with the mechanisms used to extract these resources and produce goods and services.

This means that to survive economically in this system, certain behavioural patterns become not just normalised, but seemingly entirely rational — at least from a limited perspective that ignores wider societal and environmental consequences. In the words of the authors:

“In capitalism, workers are separated from the means of production, implying that they must compete in labour markets to sell their labour power to capitalists in order to earn a living.”

Meanwhile, firms which own and control these means of production “need to compete in the market, leading to a necessity to reinvest profits into more efficient production processes to minimise costs (e.g. through replacing human labour power with machines and positive returns to scale), innovation of new products and/or advertising to convince consumers to buy more.”

If a firm fails to remain competitive through such behaviours, “it either goes bankrupt or is taken over by a more successful business. Under normal economic conditions, this capitalist competition is expected to lead to aggregate growth dynamics.”

The irony is that, as the paper also shows, the “affluence” accumulated by the super-rich isn’t correlated with happiness or well-being.

Restructure

The “hegemonic” dominance of global capitalism, then, is the principal obstacle to the systemic transformation needed to reduce overconsumption. So it’s not enough to simply try to “green” current consumption through technologies like renewable energy — we need to actually reduce our environmental impacts by changing our behaviours with a focus on cutting back our use of planetary resources:

“Not only can a sufficient decoupling of environmental and detrimental social impacts from economic growth not be achieved by technological innovation alone, but also the profit-driven mechanism of prevailing economic systems prevents the necessary reduction of impacts and resource utilisation per se.”

The good news is that it doesn’t have to be this way.

The paper reviews a range of “bottom-up studies” showing that dramatic reductions in our material footprint are perfectly possible while still maintaining good material living standards.

In India, Brazil and South Africa, “decent living standards” can be supported “with around 90 percent less per-capita energy use than currently consumed in affluent countries.” Similar possible reductions are feasible for modern industrial economies such as Australia and the US.

By becoming aware of how the wider economic system incentivises behaviour that is destructive of human societies and planetary ecosystems critical for human survival, both ordinary workers and more wealthy sectors — including the super-rich — can work toward rewriting the global economic operating system.

This can be done by restructuring ownership in firms, equalising relations with workers, and intentionally reorganising the way decisions are made about investment priorities.

The paper points out that citizens and communities have a crucial role to play in getting organised, upgrading efforts for public education about these key issues, and experimenting with new ways to work together in bringing about “social tipping points” — points at which social action can catalyse mass change.

While a sense of doom and apathy about the prospects for such change is understandable, mounting evidence based on systems science suggests that global capitalism as we know it is in a state of protracted crisis and collapse that began some decades ago. This research strongly supports the view that as industrial civilization reaches the last stages of its systemic life-cycle, there is unprecedented and increasing opportunity for small-scale actions and efforts to have large system-wide impacts.

The new paper shows that the need for joined-up action is paramount: structural racism, environmental crisis, global inequalities are not really separate crises — but different facets of human civilization’s broken relationship with nature.

Yet, of course, the biggest takeaway is that those who bear most responsibility for environmental destruction — those who hold the most wealth in our societies — urgently need to wake up to how their narrow models of life are, quite literally, destroying the foundations for human survival over the coming decades.

#### The alternative is to affirm the form of the party—against the subjective atomization of contemporary politics, only a vertical form of organization aimed at transformation of constituted structures of power can actualize change

Dean and Mertz ‘16 (Jodi and Chuck, Donald R. Harter ’39 Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences @ Hobart and William Smith Colleges and Host at This is Hell!, “The JFRP: For a New Communist Party,” aNtiDoTe Zine 1/23/16, https://antidotezine.com/2016/01/23/for-a-new-communist-party/)

CM: Great to have you on the show.¶ Let’s start with Occupy. What, to you, explains the impact that the Tea Party had on Republicans, relative to the impact that Occupy seems to have had on the Democratic Party? All of the sudden there were “Tea Party Republicans.” There weren’t “Occupy Democrats.”¶ JD: That’s a good point. The Tea Party took the Republican Party as its target. They decided that their goal was going to be to influence the political system by getting people elected and basically by trying to take over part of government. That’s why they were able to have good effects. They didn’t regard the mainstream political process as something irrelevant to their concerns. They thought of it as something to seize.¶ The problem with many—but not all—leftists in the US is that they think the political process is so corrupted that we have to completely refuse it, and leave it altogether. The Tea Party decided to act as an organized militant force, and too much of the US left (we saw this in the wake of Occupy) has thought that to be “militant” means to refuse and disperse and become fragmented.¶ CM: So what explains the left turning its back on the collective action of a political party? It would seem like a political party would fit into what the left would historically want: an apparatus that can organize collective action.¶ JD: There are multiple things. First, the fear of success: the left has learned from the excesses of the twentieth century. Where Communist and socialist parties “succeeded,” there was violence and purges and repression. One reason the left has turned its back is because of this historical experience of state socialism. And we have taken that to mean that we should not ever have a state. I think that’s the wrong answer. That we—as the left—made a mistake with some regimes does not have to mean that we can never learn.¶ Another reason that the left has turned its back on the party form has been the important criticism of twentieth century parties that have been too white, too masculine, potentially homophobic; parties that have operated in intensely hierarchical fashion. Those criticisms are real. But rather than saying we can’t have a party form because that’s just what a party does, why not make a party that is not repressive and does not exclude or diminish people on the basis of sex, race, or sexuality?¶ So we’ve got at least two historical problems that have made people very reluctant to use the party. I also think that, whether or not you mark it as 1968 or 1989, the left’s embrace of cultural individualism and the free flow of personal experimentation has made it critical of discipline and critical of collectivity. But I think that’s just a capitalist sellout. Saying everybody should just “do their own thing” is just going in the direction of the dominant culture. That is actually not a left position at all.¶ CM: So does identity politics undermine collectivism? And did that end up leading to fragmentation and a weakening of the left? Because there are a lot of people we’ve had on the show—and one person in particular, Thomas Frank—who say that there is no left in the United States.¶ JD: First I want to say that I disagree with the claim that there is no left. In fact, I think that “the left” is that group that keeps denying its own existence. We’re always saying that we’re the ones who don’t exist. But the right thinks that we exist. That’s what is so fantastic, actually. Did you see the New York Post screaming that Bernie Sanders is really a communist? Great! They’re really still afraid of communists! And it’s people on the left who say, “Oh, no, we’re not here at all!”¶ The left denies its own existence and it denies its own collectivity. Now, is identity politics to blame? Maybe it’s better to say that identity politics has been a symptom of the pressure of capitalism. Capitalism has operated in the US by exacerbating racial differences. That has to be addressed on the left, and the left has been addressing that. But we haven’t been addressing it in a way that recognizes how racism operates to support capitalism. Instead, we’ve made it too much about identity rather than as an element in building collective solidarity.¶ I’m trying to find a way around this to express that identity politics has been important but it’s reached its limits. Identity politics can’t go any further insofar as it denies the impact of capitalism. An identity politics that just rests on itself is nothing but liberalism. Like all of the sudden everything will be better if black people and white people are equally exploited? What if black people and white people say, “No, we don’t want to live in a society based on exploitation?”¶ CM: You were saying that the left denies its own collectivity. Is that only in the US? Is that unique to the US culture of the left?¶ JD: That’s a really important question, and I’m not sure. Traveling in Europe, I see two different things. On the one hand I see a broad left discussion that is, in part, mediated through social media and is pretty generational—people in their twenties and thirties or younger—and that there’s a general feeling about the problem of collectivity, the problem of building something with cohesion, and a temptation to just emphasize multiplicity. You see this everywhere. Everybody worries about this, as far as what I’ve seen.¶ On the other hand, there are countries whose political culture has embraced parties much more, and fights politically through parties. Like Greece, for example—and we’ve seen the ups and downs with Syriza over the last two years. And Spain also. Because they have a parliamentary system where small parties can actually get in the mix and have a political effect—in ways that our two-party system excludes—the European context allows for more enthusiasm for the party as a form for politics.¶ But there’s still a lot of disagreement on the far left about whether or not the party form is useful, and shouldn’t we in fact retreat and have multiple actions and artistic events—you know, the whole alter-globalization framework. That’s still alive in a lot of places. CM: You mentioned the structure of the US electoral system doesn’t allow for a political party to necessarily be the solution for a group like Occupy. Is that one of the reasons that activists dismiss the party structure as something that could help move their agenda forward?¶ JD: We can think about the Black Panther Party as a neat example in the US context: A party which was operating not primarily to win elections but to galvanize social power. That’s an interesting way of thinking about what else parties can do in the US.¶ Or we can think about parties in terms of local elections. Socialist Alternative has been doing really neat work all over the country, organizing around local elections with people running as socialist candidates not within a mainstream party. I think that even as we come up against the limits of a two-party system, we can also begin to think better about local and regional elections.¶ The left really likes that old saw: “Think Globally, Act Locally.” And then it rejects parties—even though political parties are, historically, forms that do that, that actually scale, that operate on multiple levels as organizations.¶ That we have a two-party system makes sense as an excuse why people haven’t used left parties very well in the US, but that doesn’t have to be the case.¶ And one more thing: there is a ton of sectarianism in the far left parties that exist. Many still fight battles that go back to the twenties, thirties, forties, fifties, and haven’t let that go. That has to change. We don’t need that kind of sectarian purity right now.¶ CM: You ask the question, “How do we move from the inert mass to organized activists?” You mention how you were at Occupy Wall Street; you write about being there on 15 October 2011 as the massive crowd filled New York’s Times Square. And you mention this one young speaker, and he addresses the crowd; they’re deciding if they should move on to Washington Square Park or not, because they need to go somewhere where there are better facilities. You then quote the speaker saying, “We can take this park. We can take this park tonight. We can also take this park another night. Not everyone may be ready tonight. Each person has to make their own autonomous decision. No one can decide for you. You have to decide for yourself. Everyone is an autonomous individual.”¶ Did that kind of individualism kill Occupy Wall Street from the start?¶ JD: Yeah, I think so. A lot of times I blame the rhetorics of consensus and horizontalism, but both of those are rooted in an individualism that says politics must begin with each individual, their interests, their experience, their positions, and so on. As collectivity forms—which is not easy when everyone’s beginning from their individual position—what starts to happen is that people start looking for how their exact experiences and interests are not being recognized.¶ I think that the left has given in too much to this assumption that politics begins with an individual. That’s a liberal assumption. Leftists, historically, begin with the assumption that politics begins in groups. And for the left in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the operative group is class. Class is what determines where our political interests come from.¶ I try to do everything I can in the book to dismantle the assumption that politics, particularly left politics, should begin with the individual. Instead I want people thinking about how the individual is a fiction, and a really oppressive fiction at that. And one that’s actually, conveniently, falling apart.¶ CM: You write about Occupy Wall Street having been an opening but having had no continuing momentum. You mention that the party could add that needed momentum. That’s one of the things that parties can do. The structure of the party can continue momentum and keep the opening alive.¶ When you say that a party could be a solution for a movement like Occupy, you don’t mean the Democratic Party, do you?¶ JD: I’ve got a lot of layers on this question. My first answer is that no, I really mean the Communist Party. My friends call this “Jodi’s Fantasy Revolutionary Party” as a joke, because the kind of Communist Party I take as my model may not be real, or may have only existed for a year and a half in Brooklyn in the thirties. And I don’t mean the real-existing Communist Party in the US now, which still exists and basically endorses Democrats.¶ My idea is to think in terms of how we can imagine the Communist Party again as a force—what it could be like if all of our left activist groups and small sectarian parties decided to come together in a new radical left party.¶ So no, I don’t envision the Democratic Party as being that. That’s not at all what I have in mind. I’m thinking of a radical left party to which elections are incidental. Elections might be means for organizing, but the goal isn’t just being elected. The goal is overthrowing capitalism. The goal is being able to build a communist society as capitalism crumbles.¶ Second, it could be the case—as a matter of tactics on the ground in particular contexts—that working for a Democratic candidate might be useful. It could be the case that trying to take over a local Democratic committee in order to get communist/socialist/radical left candidates elected could also be useful. But I don’t see the goal as taking over the Democratic Party. That’s way too limited a goal, and it’s a goal that presupposes the continuation of the system we have, rather than its overthrow.¶ CM: But how difficult would it be for a Communist Party to emerge free of its past associations with the Soviet Union? Can we even use the word “communist” or is it impossibly taboo?¶ JD: We have to recognize that the right is still scared of communism. That means the term is still powerful. That means it still has the ability to instill fear in its enemies. I think that’s an argument for keeping the word “communism.”¶ It’s also amazing that close to half of Iowa participants in the caucuses say that they are socialist. Four or five years ago, people were saying socialism is dead in the US. No one could even say the word. So I actually think holding on to the word “communism” is useful not only because our enemies are worried about communism, but also because it helps make the socialists seem really, really mainstream, and that’s good. We don’t want socialism to seem like something that only happens in Sweden. We want it to seem like that’s what America should have at a bare minimum.¶ One last thing about the history of communism: every political ideology that has infused a state form has done awful things. For the most part, if people like the ideology, they either let the awful things slide, or they use the ideology to criticize the awful things that the state does. We can do the same thing with communism. It’s helpful to recognize that the countries we understand to have been ruled by Communist Parties were never really communist—they didn’t even claim to have achieved communism themselves. We can say that state socialism made these mistakes, and in so doing was betraying communist ideals.¶ I don’t think we need to abandon these terms or come up with new ones. I think we need to use the power that they have. And people recognize this, which is what makes it exciting.¶ CM: You write, “Some contemporary crowd observers claim the crowd for democracy. They see in the amassing of thousands a democratic insistence, a demand to be heard and included. In the context of communicative capitalism, however, the crowd exceeds democracy.¶ “In the 21st century, dominant nation-states exercise power as democracies. They bomb and invade as democracies, ‘for democracy’s sake.’ International political bodies legitimize themselves as democratic, as do the contradictory and tangled media practices of communicative capitalism. When crowds amass in opposition, they pose themselves against democratic practices, systems, and bodies. To claim the crowd for democracy fails to register this change in the political setting of the crowd.”¶ So are crowds today, the protesters today, opposed to democracy? Or are they opposed to the current state of, let’s say, representative democracy?¶ JD: Let’s think about our basic environment. By “our,” now, I mean basically English-speaking people who use the internet and are listening to the radio and live in societies like the United States. In our environment, what we hear is that we live in democracy. We hear this all the time. We hear that the network media makes democratic exchange possible, that a free press is democracy, that we’ve got elections and that’s democracy.¶ When crowds amass in this setting, if they are just at a football game, it’s not a political statement. Even at a march (fully permitted) that’s registering opposition to the invasion of Iraq, for example, or concern about the climate—all of those things are within the general environment of “democracy,” and they don’t oppose the system. They don’t register as opposition to the system. They’re just saying that we want our view on this or that issue to count.¶ But the way that crowds have been amassing over the last four or five years—Occupy Wall Street is one example, but the Red Square debt movement in Canada is another; some of the more militant strikes of nurses and teachers are too—has been to say, “Look, the process that we have that’s been called democratic? It is not. We want to change that.”¶ It’s not that we are anti-democratic. It’s that democracy is too limiting a term to register our opposition. We want something more. We want actual equality. Democracy is too limiting. The reason it’s too limiting is we live in a context that understands itself as “democratic.” So democracy as a political claim, in my language, can’t “register the gap that the crowd is inscribing.” It can’t register real division or opposition. Democracy is just more of what we have.¶ CM: We are so dependent. We use social media so much, we use Facebook so much, we use so many of these avenues of what you call communicative capitalism so much. How can we oppose or reject this system without hurting ourselves and our ability to communicate our message to each other? Can we just go on strike? Can we become the owners of the means of communicative production?¶ JD: One of the ways that Marxism historically has understood the political problems faced by workers is our total entrapment and embeddedness in the capitalist system. What makes a strike so courageous is that workers are shooting themselves in the foot. They’re not earning their wage for a time, as a way to put pressure on the capitalist owner of the workplace.¶ What does that mean under communicative capitalism? Does it mean that we have to shoot ourselves in the foot by completely extracting ourselves from all of the instruments of communication? Or does it mean that we change our attitude towards communication? Or does it mean that we develop our own means of communication?¶ There’s a whole range here. I’m not a Luddite. I don’t think the way we’re going to bring down capitalism is by quitting Facebook. I think that’s a little bit absurd. I think what makes more sense is to think of how we could use the tools we have to bring down the master’s house. We can consolidate our message together. We can get a better sense of how many we are. We can develop common modes of thinking. We can distribute organizing materials for the revolutionary party.¶ I don’t think that an extractive approach to our situation in communicative media is the right one. I think it’s got to be more tactical. How do we use the tools we have, and how do we find ways to seize the means of communication? This would mean the collectivization of Google, Facebook, Amazon, and using those apparatuses. But that would probably have to be day two of the revolution.¶ CM: Jodi, I’ve got one last question for you, and it’s the Question from Hell, the question we might hate to ask, you might hate to answer, or our audience is going to hate the response.¶ How much did the narrative that Occupy created, of the 99% and the 1%, undermine a of collectivity? Because it doesn’t include everyone…¶ JD: Division is crucial. Collectivity is never everyone. What this narrative did was produce the divided collectivity that we need. It’s great to undermine the ~~stupid~~ myth of American unity, “The country has to pull together” and all that crap. It’s fantastic that Occupy Wall Street asserted collectivity through division. This is class conflict. This says there is not a unified society. Collectivity is the collectivity of us against them. It produced the proper collectivity: an antagonistic one.

#### Understanding the fight against Asian-American oppression as mediated by class and institutions that must be challenged through egalitarian political projects, rather than individual consciousness-raising, is necessary to have any political potential

Pan 15 [Jennifer Pan (Jennifer Pan is a contributor to Jacobin, Dissent, the Margins, and other publications.); 07.14.2015; “Beyond the Model Minority Myth”; <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/07/chua-changelab-nakagawa-model-minority>; //BWSWJ]

The criticism of Asian Americans’ complicity in a power structure that disregards black life has emerged as a significant theme among young activists eager to ally with the Black Lives Matter movement. Underlying this turn seems to be the desire to expose the shortcomings of what scholar Jared Sexton has called “people of color blindness,” or the tendency among progressives to flatten or elide the experiences of all non-white people under one umbrella. As Sexton notes, this move may obscure or appropriate the specificities of black suffering. Claiming that police violence and mass incarceration affect “people of color,” for example, diminishes the fact that blacks remain the primary and most disadvantaged targets of both — Latinos on average receive shorter sentences than blacks, even as their rates of imprisonment steadily climb, and Asians have the lowest incarceration rates of any group, whites included. In other words, declaring “my experience is not like yours” may occasionally serve as a necessary intervention into too-simplistic readings of racism in the US that collapse the experiences of different racial groups. In the words of Rinku Sen, “As people of color, we are not all in the same boat.” But if the recent calls to question complicity have been useful in highlighting the disparities in power and access to resources that exist between different subordinated groups in the US, they have also tended to function as inward-looking moral strictures, rather than explanations for how such disparities came into being. For example, following the death of twenty-five-year-old Freddie Gray at the hands of Baltimore police, Asian-American rapper Jason Chu released a short spoken-word video titled “They Won’t Shoot Me.” In the video, Chu, clad in a military-style tee proclaiming “ASIAN,” rapped a list of his economic and social comforts, concluding with the line “that’s privilege” as “I am not Freddie Gray” flashed across the screen. Like 2014’s much-shared We Are NOT Trayvon Martin, a Tumblr of mostly white people cataloguing the injustices that white privilege had allowed them to avoid, Chu’s public display of privilege-checking was well-intentioned, but at times blurred into a kind of solipsism — was he speaking out against police repression or simply talking about his own life? Similarly, at the end of 2014, Hyphen magazine published “An Apology to Black Folks,” in which Taiwanese-American author Kai-Ming Ko excoriated both himself and his fellow Asian Americans for acts of state violence against black communities, including the failures to indict the policemen who had murdered Eric Garner and Michael Brown. Lamented Ko, “We messed up.” He went on to cite the ways in which he believed Asian Americans had bolstered a system of white supremacy, including “pay[ing] taxes which support mass incarceration” and making the choice to “eat, shop, work, own businesses, study, and live in communities where white supremacy is the dominant operating racial framework.” Indeed, global capitalism induces Americans to participate in one unjust system or another — buying sweatshop-manufactured clothes or eating produce harvested by poorly paid migrants comes to mind — which largely rely on the exploitation of non-white workers. However, like appeals to ethical consumerism, Ko’s condemnation of “complicit” everyday actions such as eating and shopping places its emphasis on individual behaviors, offering little in the way of suggesting how Asian Americans might collectively mobilize to confront and attack racism and inequality. Historically, the term “Asian American” didn’t emerge until the 1960s, and since then, has been an extremely fluid category — shifting from narrow to capacious in line with political and economic trends. As a Census designation, “Asian” accounts for less than 5 percent of the US population, but currently encompasses individuals from over forty-five national origins, speaking over a hundred languages and dialects. According to a recent report from Third Way, the rate of Asian political participation in the US remains relatively low, though the fever pitch of Republicans’ xenophobic rhetoric around immigration over the last few decades has swayed them somewhat toward the Democrats. While Asians tend to support a range of progressive causes like health care and (contrary to popular perception) affirmative action, they currently hold limited political power and are the targets of little campaigning outreach. What, then, has given rise among progressives to the idea of Asians as unique collaborators in the state oppression of the black population? One potent source is the model minority narrative, which is precisely what groups like ChangeLab are criticizing and hoping to overturn. Founder Scot Nakagawa, who calls the model minority myth one of the many “levers” of white supremacy, notes that a number of Asians “have internalized the myth, and along with it, negative stereotypes about Black people, making the case through their experiences that the model-minority myth is the flip side of anti-blackness.” Inflamed in the twenty-first century by cultural commentators like Amy Chua (of Tiger Mom and Triple Package fame), the idea that Asians’ rigid cultural values have enabled them to bootstrap their way out of hardship has been in circulation at least since the end of World War II. The Color of Success, a recent book by historian Ellen D. Wu, locates the roots of this insidious mythology in the postwar rise of racial liberalism as the dominant framework for addressing matters of race in the United States. The United States’s struggle for global ascendency after World War II and through the Cold War prompted liberals to argue for the loosening of racial restrictions on Asian Americans in order to better forge ties with Asian nations and model the kind of egalitarian democracy they claimed to promote overseas. Following the internment of Japanese citizens during the war and the Red Scare of the 1950s that cast Chinese immigrants as potential communists, liberal Chinese- and Japanese-American groups fought hard to combat the “yellow peril” stereotype that branded Asians as perpetual foreigners and subjected them to violence and exclusion from jobs and neighborhoods. Groups like the Japanese American Citizens League encouraged their constituents to participate in actions that would reinforce the idea of Asians as assimilable model citizens, including enlisting in the military and suppressing youth delinquency. Such groups pressed for positive representations of Asians by releasing texts that extolled the virtues of Asian culture and trotting out respectable spokespeople to serve as ambassadors of the race. By the 1960s, the state was eager to contain the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement and, among other tactics, found a racial foil in the “successful” Asian immigrant, a trope that could be brandished to discredit the movement and attribute blacks’ disenfranchisement to a “culture of poverty.” The infamous Moynihan Report, for instance, credited the “close-knit family structure” of the Japanese and Chinese with their uplift in society, and juxtaposed this with “black matriarchy,” arguing that the latter had been responsible for the entrenchment of blacks in poverty. In addition to providing crude justification for anti-black racism, such narratives also made it possible for liberals to conveniently dismiss the horrors of internment and Chinese Exclusion. As Wu notes, “Japanese American ‘success stories’ of the mid- to late 1950s redeemed the nation’s missteps and reinforced liberalism’s tenets, especially state management of the racial order.” Thus, the overlapping desires of both the government and liberal Asian-American advocacy groups to incorporate Asians (albeit in a regulated way) into the body politic produced the narrative of immigrant success that became the model minority myth. Wu’s book is notable in that it foregrounds the specific ways in which Asian groups actively participated in the construction of the fateful mythology, a piece of history heretofore largely ignored. However, Wu is also careful to note that “model minority status was, for the most part an unintended consequence that sprung from many concurrent imperatives in American life.” In other words, discussing certain Asian groups’ material advantages today as a type of transhistorical “privilege” or “complicity” with power — rather than the result of a specific set of immigration and domestic policies that have aligned with shifting national attitudes — mystifies the mechanisms of capitalism rather than elucidating them. To better explain the position occupied by Asians in the current hierarchy of power, more useful questions to ask might include: Which political structures have enabled certain Asian-American communities to flourish economically, and in which instances has this occurred at the expense of other ethnic and racial groups? How does the “model minority” narrative operate as part of the legacies of colonization, slavery, and immigration that have shaped the racial hierarchy in the US? And how are race and class boundaries in the US currently enforced and upheld? The contemporary iteration of the model-minority stereotype was sealed into place following the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act, which abolished strict national-origin quotas and instead prioritized family unification, education, and professional skills. Sociologist Jennifer Lee — whose new book The Asian American Achievement Paradox examines this phenomenon in detail — argued recently in Contexts that the Asian immigrants who enter the US are “highly selected, meaning that they are more highly educated than their ethnic counterparts who did not immigrate.” According to Lee, this hyperselectivity also means that those who are admitted to the US have the capital to create “ethnic institutions such as after-school academies and SAT prep courses” that then become available to working-class co-ethnics, boosting rates of education for the entire group. Other scholars, such as Tamara Nopper, have focused their attention on how domestic policies, rather than immigration provisions, have aided Asian-origin groups. In an article for Everyday Sociology, Nopper argues that numerous domestic initiatives, such as the White House Commission on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, have provided financial support to Asian immigrant communities that have not been as readily available to other communities of color. As a result of both the immigrant selection process and domestic policies, Asian Americans currently hold the highest median income and education levels of any race today, with climbing wealth levels projected by the Federal Reserve of St. Louis to overtake those of whites within two decades. However, to interpret this data as evidence that “race” has caused Asian success, or that Asians have somehow accessed the spoils of white supremacy, is to elide racism and class in a way that misunderstands how the particular racialization of Asians in America augments capitalist restructuring that demands increasing numbers of both knowledge workers and service workers while simultaneously attempting to press the wage floor lower for all. Terms like “model minority” and even the awkward “honorary whites” by definition construct Asian Americans as “not (quite) white” even as they position the group on the advantaged end of people of color. Therefore, it is not that Asians are being assimilated into whiteness — as various commentators have argued for years — but rather, that they are being assimilated into an evolving formulation of “not black”-ness. As Nopper has provocatively put it, “Asian Americans and Latinos don’t need to be assimilated (according to most traditional measures), be phenotypically white, be accepted by white people, like white people, or be free from white violence and racism, to have structural power in comparison to, and over African Americans.” We might further investigate how the racialization of Asians between two color lines — white/non-white and black/non-black — reproduces discrete labor forces in the US today. On one hand, middle- to upper-class Asian Americans have largely escaped being marked as part of what Salar Mohandesi has described as a disenfranchised “surplus” population vulnerable to police violence and incarceration. The entry of these Asians into elite universities and high-paying industries such as tech is often used to prove that capitalism functions as a meritocracy. Yet even in tech and other fields in which they are purported to “dominate,” Asians consistently make less than their white counterparts. A 2012 report from the Economic Policy Institute found that they were also more likely to be laid off during the recession and slower to find jobs than whites in comparable positions. In other words, being racialized as non-black allows Asian Americans to access certain top-tier positions, while being non-white consolidates them as discounted, expendable labor within a number of rapidly growing industries. At the other end of the socioeconomic spectrum, low-income Asian groups (Hmong, Cambodian, Bangladeshi, Laotian, and Fujian Chinese, among others) populate the service sector and the informal economy, where, like other groups that struggle to get by on low-wage work, they suffer from high rates of poverty, job precarity and may be subject to state surveillance (such as police raids on massage parlors in Queens.) A 2014 report by Asian Americans Advancing Justice LA found that Asians were overrepresented not just in STEM fields, but also in “personal care and service occupations,” including nail salons, garment production, and taxi and livery drivers. That these roles sound like stereotypes indicates how business continues to use powerful racist stereotypes to segment and exploit workers and how sweeping categories like “Asian” hide deep class divisions. As the evolution of capitalism continues to reset color lines in the US, fighting inequality will entail not simply challenging stereotypes and unlearning racism at the individual and community level, but attacking the economic system that requires racist civic hierarchies to construct and maintain divisions of labor. Asian American support for broad programs of economic redistribution will go much further than consciousness-raising to overturn the “model minority” myth. Such redistributive initiatives would not only benefit the Asian groups that currently experience high poverty rates and diminished life chances, but would also dramatically lessen the longstanding material inequalities between blacks and non-blacks more broadly. While campaigns like #Asians4BlackLives and #ModelMinorityMutiny ostensibly extend a hand of solidarity to other racial groups, they also run the risk of falling into a certain kind of “good ally” model whereby they divert focus from the cause they support (“black lives”) back onto themselves (“Asians”). Such campaigns may also implicitly suggest that those not organizing under their specific banners are necessarily opposed to struggle for racial justice, when in reality, many could simply lack adequate information on the issue. Recent media coverage of the Peter Liang indictment, for example, has suggested that Chinese Americans in New York have been sharply divided over the case, with conservative elements demanding Liang’s acquittal and progressive groups rallying behind the Gurley family. But perhaps an even greater number of working-class Chinese immigrants are disconnected from politics altogether. Reporter Vivian Yee, who covered the Chinese community’s rift over Liang, noted of her interview subjects, “As garment factory workers, appliance salesmen and waitresses [in Sunset Park] reached the end of the workday one evening last week, many said they had not followed the case. Most who were familiar with it declined to attach any political significance to the officer’s indictment, insisting it was not their place to do so.” Furthermore, a report from the New York City Campaign Finance Board found that in the 2008 New York City election, “tracts with higher percentages of Asians had lower voter participation rates, even when all other factors (most notably language and naturalization status) were taken into account.” Though voting is not the sole metric by which one can gauge a group’s political participation, such a statistic nevertheless suggests that Asian Americans have yet to galvanize as a meaningful force in New York City politics, though the city is home to over a million Asians — more than any other US city. As the number of Asian immigrants to the US continues to climb, Asian-American identity — as fraught as it has been historically — may serve as a necessary strategic essentialism in the struggle for equality. But utilizing that identity to build much-needed political power among disparate communities will require the understanding that simply refashioning the public perception of Asian Americans will not be sufficient to challenge the existing social order. Our decades-long struggle to control our image — including contemporary efforts to quash the model-minority stereotype — will be toothless without a politics of radical wealth redistribution to attack the economic system that exploits and oppresses all workers.

### 1NC – K

#### The role of the ballot is to determine if the aff’s a good idea—anything else is self-serving, arbitrary and begs the question of the rest of the debate. Solves their offense since they can weigh the aff. Evaluate consequences

Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### Biological death is the ultimate evil – it obliterates metaphysics and ontology

Paterson 3 - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, SAGE

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather**,** death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclu sion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state thatany intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility**.**

#### Presumption:

#### A – Systems – the 1AC argues that material events and institutions create the social realities that replicate violence but ceding the state refuses to alter these conditions.

#### B – Competition – debate is not the forum for social change or revolutionary movements – its competitive nature swallows aff movements since teams ally themselves with people who vote for them and read their arguments, but alienate those who are forced to debate them – this proves their model forwards exclusion and their movements fail due to creating allies based on competition rather than those who genuinely support your project

#### There’s nothing about the psyche that hardwires antiblackness which disproves libidinal economy– prefer neuroscience to misreading of history

Sapolsky 19

Robert Sapolsky, American neuroendocrinologist and author, currently a professor of biology, and professor of neurology and neurological sciences and, by courtesy, neurosurgery, at Stanford University, “This Is Your Brain on Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs. March/April 2019.

--Tendency towards in group bias exists but is value neutral – outsider status is not fixed

--Researchers used fMRIs to analyze brains – found people put in teams based on uniform were sorted more saliently than based on race or that people felt more kinship towards those on arbitrary teams

--Arbitrary markers are more salient than phenotypical onnes

--Proves that drives are malleable and were constructed, and can also be deconstructed

TURBANS TO HIPSTER BEARDS

For all this pessimism, there is a crucial difference between humans and those warring chimps. The human tendency toward in-group bias runs deep, but it is relatively value-neutral. Although human biology makes the rapid, implicit formation of us-them dichotomies virtually inevitable, who counts as an outsider is not fixed. In fact, it can change in an instant.

For one, humans belong to multiple, overlapping in-groups at once, each with its own catalog of outsiders—those of a different religion, ethnicity, or race; those who root for a different sports team; those who work for a rival company; or simply those have a different preference for, say, Coke or Pepsi. Crucially, the salience of these various group identities changes all the time. Walk down a dark street at night, see one of “them” approaching, and your amygdala screams its head off. But sit next to that person in a sports stadium, chanting in unison in support of the same team, and your amygdala stays asleep. Similarly, researchers at the University of California, Santa Barbara, have shown that subjects tend to quickly and automatically categorize pictures of people by race. Yet if the researchers showed their subjects photos of both black and white people wearing two different colored uniforms, the subjects automatically began to categorize the people by their uniforms instead, paying far less attention to race. Much of humans’ tendency toward in-group out-group thinking, in other words, is not permanently tied to specific human attributes, such as race. Instead, this cognitive architecture evolved to detect any potential cues about social coalitions and alliances—to increase one’s chance of survival by telling friend from foe. The specific features that humans focus on to make this determination vary depending on the social context and can be easily manipulated.

Even when group boundaries remain fixed, the traits people implicitly associate with “them” can change—think, for instance, about how U.S. perceptions of different immigrant groups have shifted over time. Whether a dividing line is even drawn at all varies from place to place. I grew up in a neighborhood in New York with deep ethnic tensions, only to discover later that Middle America barely distinguishes between my old neighborhood’s “us” and “them.” In fact, some actors spend their entire careers alternating between portraying characters of one group and then the other.

This fluidity and situational dependence is uniquely human. In other species, in-group/out-group distinctions reflect degrees of biological relatedness, or what evolutionary biologists call “kin selection.” Rodents distinguish between a sibling, a cousin, and a stranger by smell—fixed, genetically determined pheromonal signatures—and adapt their cooperation accordingly. Those murderous groups of chimps are largely made up of brothers or cousins who grew up together and predominantly harm outsiders.

Humans are plenty capable of kinselective violence themselves, yet human group mentality is often utterly independent of such instinctual familial bonds. Most modern human societies rely instead on cultural kin selection, a process allowing people to feel closely related to what are, in a biological sense, total strangers. Often, this requires a highly active process of inculcation, with its attendant rituals and vocabularies. Consider military drills producing “bands of brothers,” unrelated college freshmen becoming sorority “sisters,” or the bygone value of welcoming immigrants into “the American family.” This malleable, rather than genetically fixed, path of identity formation also drives people to adopt arbitrary markers that enable them to spot their cultural kin in an ocean of strangers—hence the importance various communities attach to flags, dress, or facial hair. The hipster beard, the turban, and the “Make America Great Again” hat all fulfill this role by sending strong signals of tribal belonging.

Moreover, these cultural communities are arbitrary when compared to the relatively fixed logic of biological kin selection. Few things show this arbitrariness better than the experience of immigrant families, where the randomness of a visa lottery can radically reshuffle a child’s education, career opportunities, and cultural predilections. Had my grandparents and father missed the train out of Moscow that they instead barely made, maybe I’d be a chain-smoking Russian academic rather than a Birkenstockwearing American one, moved to tears by the heroism during the Battle of Stalingrad rather than that at Pearl Harbor. Scaled up from the level of individual family histories, our bigpicture group identities—the national identities and cultural principles that structure our lives—are just as arbitrary and subject to the vagaries of history.