### 1NC – T

#### Interpretation: Appropriation is permanent and exclusive

Babcock 19 Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Cente. Babcock, Hope M. "The Public Trust Doctrine, Outer Space, and the Global Commons: Time to Call Home ET." Syracuse L. Rev. 69 (2019): 191.

Article II is one of those succeeding provisions that curtails “the freedom of use outlined in Article [I] by declaring that outer space, including the [m]oon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation.”147 It flatly prohibits national appropriation of any celestial body in outer space “by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”148 However, “many types of ‘use’ or ‘exploitation’. . . are inconceivable without appropriation of some degree at least of any materials taken,” like ore or water.149 If this view of Article II’s prohibitory language is correct, then “it is not at all farfetched to say that the OST actually installs a blanket prohibition on many beneficial forms of development.”150 However, the OST only prohibits an appropriation that constitutes a “long-term use and permanent occupation, to the exclusion of all others.”151

#### Even if it seems like appropriation because they occupy space exclusively, debris and nonfunctional objects are temporary, forfeitable, and non-exclusive in international law

Blodger 16 {JD Candidate, 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; BA Hillsdale College, 2013. I would like to thank Professor Carbone and the MJLST editors and staff for their feedback, edits, and guidance throughout this process. "Reclassifying Geostationary Earth Orbit as Private Property: Why Natural Law and Utilitarian Theories of Property Demand Privatization." <https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=mjlst>]

This does not preclude the extension of a countrys legal jurisdiction into the sea, but only precludes the state and private individuals from exercising an ownership interest in the sea.80 This limitation is expressed in the Outer Space Treaty.81 The non-appropriation principles of the treaty are based on the theory that space, like the sea, is a potential medium of transport, and that the occupation of one small part of the area will not foreclose anothers use of the remaining portions of space.82 The current GEO regulation regime also follows the exception proposed by Grotius, that a person may use a common area he occupies for as long as the occupation lasts, as shown by the fact that the ITU only grants temporary, forfeitable licenses to use areas of GEO.83 While these licenses do not confer a property right, they do purport to confer a right to use an area of space; and, even though the ITU likely has no authority to exclude others from operating in the same space, the mere presence of the satellite would deter and likely prevent others from attempting to occupy the same location.84 Thus, the Outer Space Treaty not only relies on Grotius theory as an initial basis for preventing private ownership, but also employs the exceptions Grotius identifies.

#### Occupation is de facto appropriation, not appropriation proper.

Matignon 19 [Louis de Gouyon Matignon, PhD in space law from Georgetown University, “ORBITAL SLOTS AND SPACE CONGESTION,” 06/03/19, *Space Legal Issues*, https://www.spacelegalissues.com/orbital-slots-and-space-congestion/, EA]

Near-Earth space is formed of different orbital layers. Terrestrial orbits are limited common resources and inherently repugnant to any appropriation: they are not property in the sense of law. Orbits and frequencies are res communis (a Latin term derived from Roman law that preceded today’s concepts of the commons and common heritage of mankind; it has relevance in international law and common law). It’s the first-come, first-served principle that applies to orbital positioning, which without any formal acquisition of sovereignty, records a promptness behaviour to which it grants an exclusive grabbing effect of the space concerned. Geostationary orbit is a limited but permanent resource: this de facto appropriation by the first-comers – the developed countries – of the orbit and the frequencies is protected by Space Law and the International Telecommunications Law. The challenge by developing countries of grabbing these resources is therefore unjustified on the basis of existing law. Denying new entrants geostationary-access or making access more difficult does not constitute appropriation; it simply results from the traditional system of distribution of access rights. The practice of developed States is based on free access and priority given to the first satellites placed in geostationary orbit.

#### Vote neg for predictable limits—including temporary occupation is a limits disaster—any aff about a single spaceship, satellite, or weapon would be T because they temporarily occupy space. Unlimited topics explode neg prep and draw unreciprocal lines of debate.

No plan text in a vacuum but if so negate on presumption.

#### Fairness is a voter—it’s a gateway issue to the ballot.

#### Drop the debater to deter future abuse.

#### CI- Reasonability is arbitrary and we don’t know the brightline while prepping. Collapses since it uses an offense/defense paradigm to win it.

#### No RVIs- A] Illogical- you don’t win for being fair B] Encourages baiting theory which proliferates abuse C] Chills checking abuse for fear of the RVI D] Norming – we cant concede the ci which forces us to argue for bad norms

### 1NC – T

#### **Interp: On the NSDA 2022 January-February resolution, Affirmatives must not defend the hypothetical implementation of an explicit actor or action.**

#### Resolved in LD means statement of values

UPitt ND University Of Pittsburgh Communications Services Webteam, copyright 2015-21, "Basic Definitions," Department of Communication , <https://www.comm.pitt.edu/basic-definitions> CHO

Affirmative/Pro. The side that “affirms” the resolution (is “pro” the issue). For example, the affirmative side in a debate using the resolution of policy, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens, would advocate for federal government implementation of a poverty reduction program. Argument. A statement, or claim, followed by a justification, or warrant. Justifications are responses to challenges, often linked by the word “because.” Example: The sun helps people, because the sun activates photosynthesis in plants, which produce oxygen so people can breathe. Constructive Speech. The first speeches in a debate, where the debaters “construct” their cases by presenting initial positions and arguments. Cross-examination. Question and answer sessions between debaters. Debate. A deliberative exercise characterized by formal procedures of argumentation, involving a set resolution to be debated, distinct times for debaters to speak, and a regulated order of speeches given. Evidence. Supporting materials for arguments. Standards for evidence are field-specific. Evidence can range from personal testimony, statistical evidence, research findings, to other published sources. Quotations drawn from journals, books, newspapers, and other audio-visuals sources are rather common. Negative/Con. The side that “negates” the resolution (is “con” the issue). For example, the negative side in a debate using the resolution of fact, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production, would argue that global warming does not threaten agricultural production. Preparation Time. Debates often necessitate time between speeches for students to gather their thoughts and consider their opponent's arguments. This preparation is generally a set period of time and can be used at any time by either side at the conclusion of a speech. Rebuttal Speech. The last speeches in a debate, where debaters summarize arguments and draw conclusions about the debate. Resolution. A specific statement or question up for debate. Resolutions usually appear as statements of policy, fact or value. Statement of policy. Involves an actor (local, national, or global) with power to decide a course of action. For example, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens. Statement of fact. Involves a dispute about empirical phenomenon. For example, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production. Statement of value. Involves conflicting moral dilemmas. For example, Resolved: The death penalty is a justified method of punishment. Topic. A general issue to debate. Topics could be “The Civil War,” “genetic engineering,” or “Great Books.”

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE **dialectal present tense** first-person and third-person singular **of BE** dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which implies no implementation

Your Dictionary ND, "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### “BE” is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent

Grammar Monster ND "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)



#### Violation: They defend “\_\_\_\_\_\_\_” as the actor and implement an \_\_\_\_\_\_ which isn’t resolutional OR they are extra T

#### 1] Limits and Ground - justifies infinite unpredictable aff advantage ground and extra topical enforcement mechanisms which wreck research burdens while spiking core generics.

#### 2] Semantics o/w –

#### a] Precision – they can arbitrarily jettison words which decks ground and preparation because there is no stasis point

#### b] Jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the authority to vote aff if it wasn’t legitimate

#### c] Durability – grammatical correctness makes debaters effective academics and professionals

#### 3] Phil Ed – creates better ethical subjectivity and critical thinking that o/ws on uniqueness to LD, switch to policy and LARP on the water topic – solves all your offense

#### TVA: Read a phil aff that affirms that private appropriation is unjust with a util FW and don’t defend implementation

### 1NC – NC

#### The standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Theoretical justifications outweigh – 1] Frameworks are essentially T debates about the word ought which proves the better model of debate is what matters. 2] Turns substance – it doesn’t matter how true a philosophy is if it can’t be engaged or is impossible to learn from – even if Kant was correct, we shouldn’t use his philosophy in debate specifically. 3] Exclusionary rule – we’ve won Agonism is unfair which means all their substantive arguments should be presumed false

#### Prefer non extinction intent based frameworks

#### 1] Predictability – every individual engages within freedom and twhen going to school or using public infrastructure which means it’s the one political engagement everyone is aware of.

#### 2] Political Education – politicians have to understand the categorical imperative and the process of deontology in order to know what powers they have and what they have to provide citizens. E.g. german governments prove

#### 4] Resource disparities- Our framework ensures big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity - their model crowds out small schools because they have to prep for every unique advantage under each aff, every counterplan, and every disad with carded responses to each of them

#### Offense

#### 1] Libertarianism mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates

Broker 20 [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, 1-14-20, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system. In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.

### 1NC – Case

#### Cyberwar stops conventional escalation---that outweighs.

Arquilla 12 John Arquilla earned his degrees in international relations from Rosary College (BA 1975) and Stanford University (MA 1989, PhD 1991). He has been teaching in the special operations program at the United States Naval Postgraduate School since 1993. He also serves as chairman of the Defense Analysis department. Author of: Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat and the International System (1992); From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient & Modern Times (1996); In Athena’s Camp (1997); Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (2001); The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in American Foreign Policy from the Collapse of Communism to the War on Terror (2006); Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (2008); Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World (2011); and Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America’s Longest War (2012); 6-15-12; Cool War Could the age of cyberwarfare lead us to a brighter future?; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/15/cool-war/ - BS

But now, somehow, it seems that war may no longer seem so terrible.

How has this come to pass? The culprit is the bits and bytes that are the principal weapons of cyberwar. It is now possible to intervene swiftly and secretly anywhere in the world, riding the rails of the global information infrastructure to strike at one’s enemies. Such attacks can be mounted with little risk of discovery, as the veil of anonymity that cloaks the virtual domain is hard to pierce. And even when "outed," a lack of convincing forensic evidence to finger the perpetrator makes heated denials hard to disprove.

Beyond secrecy, there is also great economy. The most sophisticated cyber weaponry can be crafted and deployed at a tiny fraction of the cost of other forms of intervention. No aircraft carriers needed, no "boots on the ground" to be shot at or blown up by IEDs. Instead, there is just a dimly lit war room where hacker-soldiers click for their country, and the hum of air conditioners keeping powerful computers from overheating. Cool room, cool war.

The early returns seem to suggest the great efficacy of this new mode of conflict. For example, the Stuxnet worm, a complex program of ones and zeros, infected a sizeable proportion of Iran’s several thousand centrifuges, commanding them to run at higher and higher speeds until they broke. All this went on while Iranian technicians tried fruitlessly to stop the attack. The result: a serious disruption of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities — and possibly of a secret proliferation program.

The sabotage occurred without any missile strikes or commando raids. And, for now, without any open acknowledgment of responsibility, although reporters and others have pointed their fingers at the United States and Israel. It is loose lips in high places, not sophisticated "back hacking," that seem to have divulged the secret of Stuxnet.

Another example of the looming cool war is the malicious software known as Flame, which sought information via cyber snooping from target countries in the Middle East. The code that comprises it seems to make the point that we no longer need physical agents in place if we can now rely on artificially intelligent agents to dredge up the deepest secrets. There will be no new John le Carré to chronicle this era’s spies. Not when the closest thing to George Smiley is a few lines of source code.

Beyond Stuxnet-like "cybotage" and software-driven spying, the coming cool war might also influence whether some traditional wars are even going to break out. The good news is that a preemptive cyber attack on the military command-and-control systems of two countries getting ready to fight a "real war" might give each side pause before going into the fight. In this instance, the hackers mounting such attacks should probably publicize their actions — perhaps even under U.N. auspices — lest the disputants think it was the enemy who had crippled their forces, deepening their mutual antagonism. There are no doubt some risks in having a third party mount a preemptive cyberattack of this sort — but the risks are acceptable when weighed against the chance of averting a bloody war.

The other potential upside of cool war capabilities, in addition to tamping down military crises between nations, would lie in multilateral tracking of transnational criminal and terrorist networks. These villains thrive in the virtual wilderness of cyberspace, and it is about time that they were detected, tracked, and disrupted. Think of Interpol, or an international intelligence alliance, using something like Flame to get inside a drug cartel’s communications network. Or al Qaeda’s. The potential for illuminating these dark networks — and bringing them to justice — is great and should not be forgone.

On balance, it seems that cyberwar capabilities have real potential to deal with some of the world’s more pernicious problems, from crime and terrorism to nuclear proliferation. In stark contrast to pitched battles that would regularly claim thousands of young soldiers’ lives during Robert E. Lee’s time, the very nature of conflict may come to be reshaped along more humane lines of operations. War, in this sense, might be "made better" — think disruption rather than destruction. More decisive, but at the same time less lethal.

Against these potential benefits, one must also weigh the key downside of an era of cyber conflict: the outbreak of a Hobbesian "war of all against all." This possibility was first considered back in 1979 by the great science fiction writer Frederik Pohl, whose dystopian The Cool War — a descriptor that might end up fitting our world all too well — envisioned a time when virtually every nation fielded small teams of hit men and women. Their repertoires included launching computer viruses to crash stock markets and other nefarious, disruptive capabilities.

In Pohl’s novel, the world system is battered by waves of social distrust, economic malaise and environmental degradation. Only the rebellion of a few cool warriors – some, but not all, were hacker types — at the end, offers a glimmer of hope for a way out and a way ahead.

The question that confronts us today is whether to yield to the attractions of cyberwar. We have come out of one of mankind’s bloodiest centuries, and are already in an era in which wars are smaller — if still quite nasty. Now we have the chance to make even these conflicts less lethal. And in reality, there may be no option. Once the first network or nation takes this path — as some observers believe the United States is doing — others will surely follow, starting a new arms race, this time not in weaponry, but in clandestine and devastating programs like Stuxnet and the Flame virus.

It is a curious irony that the United States, a power traditionally reluctant to go to war but furious in its waging, is now seemingly shifting gears. It is becoming a nation with the capability to go to war easily, while at the same time far less ferociously. Is this an improvement? Perhaps. Delaying Iranian proliferation with bits and bytes seems far superior to the costs and risks that would be incurred, and the human suffering inflicted, by trying to achieve such effects with bombs and bullets.

But looking ahead, how will Americans respond when others begin to employ cyber means to achieve their ends, perhaps even by attacking us? After all, Stuxnet escaped from that Iranian facility into the wild, and is certainly being studied, reverse engineered and tweaked by many around the world. No country may be foolish enough to engage the incomparable U.S. military in open battle, but we seem like fairly easy pickings to the computer mice that may soon roar.

Despite all these concerns, though, a cool war world will be a better place to live in than its Cold War predecessor. Yes, conflict will continue in the years to come, but it will morph in ways that make our self-destruction as a civilization less likely — even if it means living with occasional disruptions to vulnerable high-tech systems.

The bargain made when "cyber" and "war" came together need not turn out to be Faustian. This story can still have a happy ending: As war becomes "cooler," mankind’s future may edge a bit closer to the utopian end that all of us, secretly or not so secretly, truly desire.

#### Only conventional war causes nuclear miscalculation.

Jennifer Bradley 15. Analyst, Deterrence Analysis Plans Support group, United States Strategic Command in the Plans and Policy Directorate; Analyst, National Institute for Public Policy. “Increasing Uncertainty: The Dangers of Relying on Conventional Forces for Nuclear Deterrence.” Air & Space Power Journal, July-August. https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-29\_Issue-4/V-Bradley.pdf

How then did China react to the NPR’s call to reduce US reliance on nuclear weapons and invest in conventional capabilities to bridge that gap in America’s security needs? Chinese civilian and military strategists have regularly and consistently communicated their concern about a US conventional attack negating China’s strategic deterrent prior to the US release of the NPR in 2010.37 After publication of that document, Chinese analysts suggested that the US decision to invest in conventional capabilities such as CPGS was part of the United States’ desire to seek “absolute security” and maintain its military supremacy. Chinese analysts fear that these advanced conventional capabilities designed by the United States to meet its nuclear deterrence needs are not constrained by the “nuclear taboo” and, in fact, are more usable.38 The Chinese believe that the very usability of advanced conventional weapons designed to perform a deterrence role actually undermines nuclear deterrence and causes other nations to rely more on their nuclear weapons arsenals because they cannot compete with the United States conventionally. Chinese analysts also fear a global conventional-weapons arms race, and some analysts warn that “a world free of nuclear weapons may open the door to the resumption of a large-scale conventional war.”39 The most worrisome development from China comes from The Science of Military Strategy (December 2013), published to inform Chinese military professionals of how the “People’s Liberation Army (PLA) perceives military development in China and around the world” and to offer a framework for the PLA to address them.40 In that publication, the authors outline China’s concern that its limited nuclear force is vulnerable to a first strike that would negate any ability to execute a retaliatory strike. To address this issue, the authors suggest that China may decide to launch on warning of an impending nuclear attack.41 Such a decision increases the possibility of an accidental nuclear launch, given the difficulties in characterizing the type of incoming attack or the dangers of a malfunction in the early warning system. Finally, the NPR repeatedly calls for the need to promote strategic stability with China. However, although that concept has been used in the context of nuclear relations for decades, it has no common, universally accepted definition.42 Further, it also means that China’s concept of what constitutes strategic stability may be different than that of the United States, possibly leading to a misunderstanding. Chinese scholars have recognized this disconnect, noting that US “experts have not given serious consideration to what the true meaning of strategic stability is, and have not adequately prepared to achieve strategic stability with China.”43 Although it is not the only component of strategic stability, the Chinese perceive changes in the US nuclear posture as a threat to that stability.44 Specifically, Chinese analysts have repeatedly insisted that US advanced conventional capabilities, including CPGS coupled with ballistic missile defense, represent a direct threat to China’s secure second-strike capabilities. Therefore, Chinese analysts perceive a major contradiction in the NPR. “Advocacy for military capabilities that are seen to be detrimental to strategic stability in the same document that promotes strategic stability ultimately represents a circular logic” that if not addressed will make it difficult for China to participate in talks meant to promote strategic stability.45 Implications for Nuclear Deterrence A gulf exists between how the United States and Russia/China view the value of nuclear weapons. These adversarial perceptions are well documented, predating the development and release of the NPR, but were not taken into account during drafting of the new policy. The US decision to rely less on nuclear weapons to meet its national security needs, instead bridging the gap with advanced conventional capabilities, did not have the desired effect on our adversaries. Instead of inspiring confidence, it reinforced some of their worst fears. The NPR overstated the improvement in US-Russia relations, and the US declaration that Russia was not an enemy did not consider how Russia viewed the relationship. Failure to take into account that country’s deep-seated suspicion of the United States invalidated the NPR’s assumption that improved ties would allow the United States to rely less on nuclear weapons. Further, US policy and Russian policy do not agree on the usability of nuclear weapons. The US desire to decrease the role of nuclear weapons and compensate with conventional weapons suggests that US policy makers do not feel that nuclear weapons are usable. However, this perception contrasts with Russia’s nuclear doctrine and statements, which have been consistent for well over a decade, that these weapons are quite usable. These differences are further emphasized as the United States debates unilateral reduction in nuclear capabilities while Russia violates a landmark arms-control treaty to increase the types and capabilities of its nuclear arsenal to gain a strategic advantage.46 This situation creates a dangerous divide that has the potential for miscalculation and deterrence failure. Both Russia and China are concerned with US use of advanced conventional capabilities in a strategic manner to negate their nuclear deterrent. According to the NPR, the United States has the strongest conventional capabilities in the world and an alliance system that further augments those capabilities. America has also demonstrated its willingness to use conventional power repeatedly over the last 25 years. The very usability of conventional precision-strike weapons capable of creating effects once reserved only for nuclear forces undermines deterrence by creating or reinforcing perceptions in our adversaries that their nuclear forces are vulnerable and that the United States may have an incentive to strike them. Both China and Russia are reevaluating their nuclear doctrines and relying more on nuclear weapons to counter this perceived threat. Conclusion From nuclear weapons’ pinnacle of importance at the end of the Cold War to today, the United States has steadily decreased the attention paid to its nuclear arsenal and strategy, but nuclear deterrence has not decreased in its overall importance. It is clear that our adversaries place much more value in their nuclear arsenals than does the United States, precisely to deter America’s unmatched conventional power. The US decision to rely more on conventional weapons to achieve nuclear deterrence has created dangerous potential for miscalculation in its deterrent relationships with Russia and China. The United States has fallen into a “mirror imaging” trap by assuming that other nations place the same low value on nuclear weapons that it does and that they have the same priority of reaching “Global Zero.” The Obama administration has even gone so far as to recommend unilateral nuclear reductions, which were made outside arms-control negotiations with Russia.47 Part of this policy is that other nuclear-armed nations will follow the US example and choose to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenal. This assumption does not take into account how our opponents interpret their security environment and the role that nuclear weapons play in safeguarding their interests. Relations with other nuclear powers have been fairly cooperative and benign since the end of the Cold War. Crises that arose were managed, and peaceful solutions have been negotiated, contributing to the mistaken belief that nuclear weapons are no longer relevant. However, could it be that those weapons encourage leaders to be benign and cooperative?48 In 1946 J. Robert Oppenheimer reflected that “it did not take atomic weapons to make man want peace. But the atomic bomb was the turn of the screw. It has made the prospect of war unendurable.”49 That is, far from being unusable, nuclear weapons are used every day to encourage compromise in international relations because failure to compromise may lead to the unthinkable. In drafting the NPR, the US government failed to consider the perceptions of our adversaries or to tailor strategy to the unique threat that each poses. As we have pointed out, deterrence is a psychological function in the mind of the adversary. Failure to acknowledge and account for how our enemies view their security environment, their relationship with the United States, their unique history and culture, or the value they place on nuclear weapons to meet their security needs has made our deterrence relationships potentially less stable. Increasing our emphasis on conventional weapons that adversaries view as more usable and a threat to their nuclear arsenals has caused them to feel insecure. To counter this trend, they have modernized and increased the size of their arsenals and rely more on nuclear weapons to meet their security needs. Nuclear deterrence has always been a risky proposition, and the fact that it has not failed in the past 70 years may have as much to do with our deterrence strategy as plain luck. But as risky as relying on nuclear deterrence is, it is still the “least bad” option and has not lost its relevance. Therefore, it is important that we strive to understand our adversaries as we develop and implement our nuclear-deterrent strategies so that we do not undermine its effectiveness. Nuclear deterrence may be much more fragile than any of us realize. It is imperative that we do not take the “nuclear taboo” for granted by assuming that our adversaries place the same value on the relevance of nuclear weapons that we do.

#### Cyber-attacks are good---key to enhanced precision in crisis bargaining.

Rabkin, 17 — \*Jeremy A. Rabkin; PhD, Harvard University; Professor of Law at the Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. Professor Rabkin serves on the Board of Directors of the U.S. Institute of Peace (originally appointed by President George W. Bush in 2007, then appointed for a second term by President Barack Obama and reconfirmed by the Senate in 2011). He also serves on the Board of Academic Advisers of the American Enterprise Institute and on the Board of Directors of the Center for Individual Rights, a public interest law firm based in Washington, D.C. \*\*John Yoo; Emanuel Heller Professor of Law and director of the Korea Law Center, the California Constitution Center, and the Law School’s Program in Public Law and Policy. (2017; “Striking Power: How Cyber, Robots, and Space Weapons Change the Rules for War;” Ch. 1—We Must Think Anew; //GrRv)

Instead, we question the idea that nations should look to formal treaties and rules to produce lasting limits on war. Despite the recent deterioration in the Syrian civil war, nation-states have generally refrained from the use of chemical weapons against each other since the end of World War I. They have followed the Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war, though not consistently. Nations have observed other norms in the breach, chief among them the immunity of the civilian population and resources from attack. World War Il not only saw the aerial bombing of cities and the nuclear attacks on Japan, but the years since have seen precision targeting of terrorists off the battlefield, attacks on urban infrastructure, and the acceptance of high levels of collateral damage among civilians. International lawyers and diplomats may proclaim that nations follow universal rules, either because of morality or a sense of legal obligation, but the record of practice tells a far different story. Efforts to impose more specific and demanding rules, such as limiting targeted drone attacks, banning cyber attacks, or requiring human control of robotic weapons, will similarly fail because they cannot take into account unforeseen circumstances, new weapons and military situations, and the immediate exigencies of war. Just as new technology led to increases in economic productivity, so too has it allowed nations to make war more effectively.

Nations will readily adhere to humanitarian standards when they gain a benefit that outweighs the cost, as when protecting enemy prisoners of war secures reciprocal protection for a nation's own soldiers taken captive by the enemy. Limitations on the use of weapons will follow a similar logic. Nations will be most inclined to respect legal restraints on new weapons when their use by both sides would leave no one better off or would provide little advantage. Cyber and robotic weapons do not bear the same features as the weapons where legal bans have succeeded, as with use of poison gas on the battlefield. Cyber and robotic weapons need not inflict unnecessary suffering out of proportion to their military advantages, as do poisoned bullets or blinding lasers. Rather, these weapons improve the precision of force and thereby reduce human death and destruction in war.

Nor have these new weapons technologies yet sparked a useless arms race. Nuclear weapons eventually became opportune for arms control because larger stockpiles provided marginal, if any, benefits due to the destructive potential of each weapon and the deterrence provided by even a modest arsenal. Mutual reductions could leave both sides in the same position as they were before the agreement. Today, the marginal cost of nuclear weapons for the U.S. and Russia so outweighs their marginal benefit that it is not even clear that a binding international agreement is needed to reduce their arsenals. Russia, for example, reduced its arsenal below New START's ceilings of 1,550 nuclear warheads and 700 strategic launchers even before the U.S. approved the deal. 45 The United States likely would have reduced its forces to those levels even if the Senate had refused to consent to the treaty, a position the executive branch also took in 2002 with the Treaty of Moscow's deep reduction in nuclear weapons. Today's new weapons do not yet bear these characteristics. The marginal gains in deploying these weapons will likely be asymmetric across nations insofar as some nations will experience much greater gains in military capability by developing cyber and drone technology. Put differently, prohibition or regulation of these new weapons will not have equal impacts on rival nations. Indeed, we do not even now have enough information to understand which nations will benefit and which will not, which makes any form of international ban even less likely.

#### Won’t go nuclear.

Fung, 16 — Brian Fung; Reporter focusing on telecommunications, media, and competition—MSc, international relations. Citing Maj. General Jack Weinstein. (5-26-2016; "The real reason America controls its nukes with ancient floppy disks;" *Washington Post*; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/05/26/the-real-reason-america-controls-its-nukes-with-ancient-floppy-disks/; //GrRv)

As it happens, a similar logic underpins the U.S. military’s continued use of floppy disks. The fact that America’s nuclear forces are disconnected from digital networks actually acts as a buffer against hackers. As Maj. General Jack Weinstein told CBS’s “60 Minutes” in 2014: Jack Weinstein: I'll tell you, those older systems provide us some -- I will say huge safety when it comes to some cyber issues that we currently have in the world. Lesley Stahl: Now, explain that. Weinstein: A few years ago we did a complete analysis of our entire network. Cyber engineers found out that the system is extremely safe and extremely secure on the way it's developed. Stahl: Meaning that you're not up on the Internet kind of thing? Weinstein: We're not up on the Internet. Stahl: So did the cyber people recommend you keep it the way it is? Weinstein: For right now, yes. In other words, the rise of hackers and cyberwarfare is exactly why even technologically obsolete systems can still serve a valuable purpose.

#### Unrestrained cyber-attacks key to North Korean revenue.

Mathews, 19 — Lee Mathews; Writer for Forbes, citing a U.N. Security Council report. (3-11-2019; "North Korean Hackers Have Raked in $670 Million Via Cyberattacks;" *Forbes*; https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2019/03/11/north-korean-hackers-have-raked-in-670-million-via-cyberattacks/; //GrRv)

Some of the most infamous cyberattacks in the past 5 years have been linked to North Korea's state-sponsored hackers. They're a highly-skilled group and their operations have proven to be extremely lucrative. A recent report commissioned by the U.N. Security Council has put an approximate figure on their ill-gotten gains. The expert panel assembled by the United Nations asserts that Pyongyang's hackers have hauled in around $670 million in foreign currency and cryptocurrency. The 2015 attack on the Central Bank of Bangladesh that was one of the most sensational attacks linked to North Korean hackers, who made off with $81 million. In 2018 India's Cosmos Bank was hacked to the tune of $13.5 million. Earlier this year those same hackers infiltrated the Bank of Chile's ATM network and siphoned off $10 million. North Korea's hackers have successfully attacked numerous cryptocurrency exchanges, too. Cybersecurity experts at Group-IB estimated last year that they were responsible for around 65% of all crypto exchange hacks. Between January 2017 and September 2018 it's believed that those attacks resulted in more than $570 million in losses. Clearly hacking provides Kim Jong-un's regime with a vital stream of revenue. Tough international sanctions make it difficult for North Korea to bring in legitimate funds from outside its borders. That's one key reason that the widespread adoption of cryptocurrencies has been such a boon for Pyongyang. Sanctions aren't an effective blocking tool because cryptocurrency transactions aren't processed by regulated financial institutions (at least in most countries). Another is that crypto transactions can e incredibly difficult to trace. It's not an impossible task, but the process can be very complex and time consuming. That helps rogue nations and cybercriminals alike keep their financial moves hidden from law enforcement agencies. Shadowy operations are nothing new in North Korea. Criminal activity has been part of the government's playbook for several decades.

#### Revenue shortfalls cause Kim to sell bioweapons.

Jang, 18 — Sungku Jang is an ASAN fellow at the Center for the National Interest. (11-1-2018; *The Diplomat*:https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/beyond-denuclearization-dealing-with-north-koreas-other-wmds/ The Proliferation Challenge; //GrRv)

There is also a proliferation challenge associated with North Korea’s WMD capabilities. If it so chooses, Pyongyang can sell its BW and CW to a rogue state or terrorist group. International sanctions against North Korea have starved the country of cash, making illicit arms sales attractive to Pyongyang. Indeed, North Korea has supplied Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s regime with parts and technical assistance for its chemical weapons program, which it has used to attack opposition forces repeatedly throughout the Syrian Civil War. Furthermore, given that North Korea and Iran already cooperate militarily and many North Korean arms dealers live in Tehran, it is possible that North Korea could help Iran obtain or improve BW and CW capabilities. If North Korea helps Iran develop an emerging biochemical ability, denuclearization negotiations with Tehran will become more complex and costly than before.

#### Bioweapon proliferation causes extinction.

Millett, 17 — Piers Millett; PhD, Senior Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, where he focuses on pandemic and deliberate disease and the implications of biotechnology. Andrew Snyder-Beattie; Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. (August 1, 2017; "Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity;" *PubMed Central*; https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5576214/; //GrRv)

How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives.

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21

Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27

Non-state actors may also pose a risk, especially those with explicitly omnicidal aims. While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction.28 Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that “we can ensure Gaia's survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species … we now have the specific technology for doing the job … several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released”(quoted in ref. 29). Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons.30 Fortunately, to date, non-state actors have lacked the capabilities needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this could change in future decades as biotechnology becomes more accessible and the pool of experienced users grows.31,32

#### Non-uq cyberattacks on U.S. sats high now – Space Force General

Trevithick ’21 [Joseph, “U.S. Satellites Are Being Attacked Every Day According To Space Force General”, 11-30-2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43328/u-s-satellites-are-being-attacked-everyday-according-to-space-force-general]//pranav

S. Space Force's General David Thompson, the service's second in command, said last week that Russia and China are launching "reversible attacks," such as electronic warfare jamming, temporarily blinding optics with lasers, and cyber attacks, on U.S. satellites "every single day." He also disclosed that a small Russian satellite used to conduct an on-orbit anti-satellite weapon test back in 2019 had first gotten so close to an American one that there were concerns an actual attack was imminent.

Thompson, who is Vice Chief of Space Operations, disclosed these details to The Washington Post's Josh Rogin in an interview on the sidelines of the Halifax International Security Forum, which ran from Nov. 19 to 21 in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in Canada. The forum opened just four days after a Russian anti-satellite weapon test involving a ground-launched interceptor, which destroyed a defunct Soviet-era electronic intelligence satellite and created a cloud of debris that presents a risk to the International Space Station (ISS). That test drew widespread condemnation, including from the U.S. government, and prompted renewed discussion about potential future conflicts in space.

“The threats are really growing and expanding every single day. And it’s really an evolution of activity that’s been happening for a long time,” Thompson, told Rogin. “We’re really at a point now where there’s a whole host of ways that our space systems can be threatened.”

"Right now, Space Force is dealing with what Thompson calls 'reversible attacks' on U.S. government satellites (meaning attacks that don’t permanently damage the satellites) 'every single day,'" according to Rogin. "Both China and Russia are regularly attacking U.S. satellites with non-kinetic means, including lasers, radio frequency jammers, and cyber attacks, he said."

#### Cyber-attacks won’t escalate---collateral damage, international blowback, reciprocal use, and empirics---robust quantitative data proves

Gudgel 16---Ph.D. Candidate in Public Policy with a Focus on U.S. Cybersecurity Policy at George Mason Universty [John E. Gudgel, “Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Taylor and Francis Group, Date Accessed: 4-16-17]

Valeriano and Maness view cyber conflict through the lens of international relations and primarily focus on cyber interactions among states and directed towards states in the realm of foreign policy. They argue: ‘while cyberspace is a separate domain, it is not unconnected from the normal political domain that is the genesis of conflicts’ (p. 15). Following an introductory chapter outlining the contours of the cyber conflict world, eight subsequent chapters build and defend their theoretical framework for the analysis and prediction of cyber conflict in the international system. One of their major conclusions is that ‘cyber conflict has not changed how states operate, it has not led to a revolution in military affairs, and the fears associated with the tactic are overblown’ (p. 209).

A key component of the authors’ framework described in Chapter 3 is their Theory of Cyber Restraint that holds that due to fears of collateral damage, blowback, and replication states will restrain themselves from unleashing the full weight of their cyber capabilities. In delineating this theory, Valeriano and Maness stake out a clear middle path between authors such as Richard Clarke and Robert Knake who believe that cyber war has already begun,2 and Thomas Rid who contends that cyber war will never take place.3 They frame their approach as cyber moderation: the concept that cyber conflict will occur, but that the conflicts themselves will be trivial and will not significantly change state behavior (p. 39). From their theory and approach, they then propose nine hypotheses on interstate cyber interactions.

One of the primary contributions of the authors’ research is the construction of an open source and peer-vetted database of cyber incidents and disputes between countries called the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset (DCID). The 1.0 version of the dataset currently contains 111 cyber incidents (defined as short-term isolated cyber operations) and 45 cyber disputes (defined as longer-term operations that can contain several incidents) between state-to-state rivals over an 11-year period (2001 to 2011) including 21 cyber incidents and 5 cyber disputes between China and the United States. In creating this dataset, the authors recognized the attribution problem and only included incidents and disputes where state-based involvement was explicit and evident (p. 84).

Using this dataset, Valeriano and Maness in Chapters 4 and 5 quantitatively analyze interstate cyber actions including the ‘scope, length, and damage inflicted by cyber disputes among rival states’ (p. 78) from 2001 to 2011. Some of the research questions they address include: What factors might predict the occurrence, targets, and level of severity in cyber conflict between states? What are the foreign policy implications of cyber conflict? Do cyber incidents influence and lead to more conflictual relations?

What they found was ‘that the actual magnitude and pace of cyber disputes among rivals do not match popular perception; only 20 of 126 active rivals have engaged in cyber conflict, and their interactions have been limited in terms of magnitude and frequency’ (p. 18). Further, they found that most cyber incidents are regional (e.g. India–Pakistan), focused predominately on espionage and low-level DDoS attacks, and were largely ineffective in getting states to change behavior. There was also little evidence of state-supported or sponsored groups utilizing cyber terrorism. They back up their quantitative data with a series of case studies looking at the most significant recent cyber conflicts involving state (Chapter 6) and non-state (Chapter 7) actors. They then propose a system of rules and norms in cyberspace based on the Just War tradition (Chapter 8).

#### Strategic ambiguity is stabilizing.

Burton 18 – Dr. Joe Burton, Visiting Researcher, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, “Cyber Deterrence: A Comprehensive Approach?” April 2018, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/BURTON\_Cyber\_Deterrence\_paper\_April2018.pdf

The ability to craft a proportional cyber response to an attack is also problematic. A cyber response or retaliation at a low threshold is unlikely to be effective in deterring attacks. This has led some authors to argue for a form of cross-domain deterrence, in which states respond in the other operational domains of land, sea, air and space.23But it is hard to see what threshold an attack would need to reach to be met with a kinetic military response. Defining and signalling a threshold also creates the problem that hackers may feel they have a licence to conduct attacks below that threshold. This relates to the idea of strategic ambiguity; the US strategy for the defence of Taiwan, for example, hinges on China’s uncertainty about whether and how the US will respond to an attack or occupation. The argument here is that keeping an attacker in the dark about the response threshold creates a deterrent in itself. A state that fails to strike back may also lose stature in the eyes of the attackers, and this may undermine the credibility of deterrence based on ambiguity of response. As Martin Libicki explains, ‘If a state leans too far forward in promising reprisals in response to cyber attacks and cannot deliver, its ability to deliver against all other threats may be further doubted’. 24

#### Sat attacks don’t cause nuke war

Zarybnisky 18 [Eric J. Zarybnisky, MA in National Security Studies from the Naval War College, PhD in Operations Research from the MIT Sloan School of Management, Lt Col, USAF. Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space. March 28, 2018. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1062004.pdf>]

PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE

While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F 6 Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military satellites as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war.7F 7 In today’s more nuanced world, attacking satellites, including military satellites, does not necessarily result in nuclear war. For instance, foreign countries have used highpowered lasers against American intelligence-gathering satellites8F 8 and the United States has been reluctant to respond, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone operations, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space.

#### Collapse doesn’t cause war

Clary 15 – Christopher Clary, former International Affairs Fellow in India at the Council on Foreign Relations, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Watson Institute at Brown University, Adjunct Staff Member @ RAND Corporation, Security Studies Program @ MIT, country director for South Asian affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, former Research Fellow @ the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former research associate in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, BA from Wichita State University and an MA from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2015 (“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2015-­‐8, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712>)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5 Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination? Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

#### Economic interdependence can’t solve war, because history proves the restraining factor is all about the expectation of future trade – security crises and Trump both moot that

Fay 17 Matthew Fay, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies—Niskanen Center, Fellow—GMU Center for Security Policy Studies, PhD—GMU Schar School of Policy and Government, bachelor’s degree in political science from Saint Xavier University and has two master’s degrees, one in international relations from American Military University and one in diplomatic history from Temple University, TRUMP, TRADE, AND GREAT POWER WAR, MARCH 20, 2017, <https://niskanencenter.org/blog/trump-trade-great-power-war/>

One of the signature features of President Donald Trump’s campaign was his hostility to free trade. Then-candidate Trump repeatedly denigrated various multilateral trade pacts as bad deals for the United States. Pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, appointing opponents of free trade—such as Steve Bannon and Peter Navarro—into key positions, and promises of tariffs that are likely to produce retaliatory measures, all demonstrated that Trump was planning on following through on his protectionist campaign rhetoric. While Trump’s attack on free trade has important implications for American and global economies, it will also have an impact on the likelihood of war between the great powers. As discussed here previously, President Trump sees the world in zero sum terms. Absent disproportionate economic gains for the United States, international agreements cannot be considered successful. However beneficial such arrangements prove to be for all involved, Trump’s mercantilist outlook sees them as a raw deal for Americans. It is not surprising therefore, that U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin nixed attempts to include language supporting free trade in a statement from a G-20 meeting in Baden-Baden, Germany. As CNN reported, while the statement included some positive words on trade, “conspicuous by its absence was the phrase ‘we will resist all forms of protectionism’ that was contained in the communiqué from the last meeting of the group in China, July 2016.” Mnuchin rejected the idea that the omission was meaningful, but the unwillingness to reaffirm American opposition to protectionism ignores that trade provides benefits beyond the global economy. Specifically, the expectation of future trade affects the likelihood of war and peace. The connection between trade and conflict has never been as simple as early liberal theorists suggested. The idea, wrongly attributed to the nineteenth century French economist Frederic Bastiat, that “when goods don’t cross borders, soldiers will” still offers a good summation of the longstanding position that trade has pacifying effects on international politics. The logic behind the argument is compelling: the greater the extent of commercial relations between states, the less likely there will be conflict because the economic cost of war (and the lost benefits of trade) will be too high. However, history has shown that states still sometimes go to war despite high levels of economic interdependence at the time of the conflict. In his book Economic Interdependence and War, political scientist Dale Copeland explained that it is not the current level of trade that is important to the likelihood of conflict. Rather, Copeland argues, it is the expectation of future trade that determines a state’s willingness to go to war. He writes, In a very real way, it does not matter in the least whether past and current levels of trade and investment have been low, as long as leaders have strongly positive expectations of for the future. It is their future orientation and expectations of a future stream of benefits that will likely make the leaders incline to peace. Likewise, it does not matter whether past and current levels of commerce have been high if leaders believe they are going to be cut off tomorrow or in the near future. It is their pessimism about the future that will probably drive these leaders to consider hard-line measures and even war to safeguard the long-term security of the state. Multilateral trade has been a feature of the liberal international order developed after World War II for a reason. Postwar policymakers feared a return to the closed economic blocs of the 1930s that helped drive the world to war. It is entirely possible that the norms in favor of free trade are robust enough to withstand the absence of routine language from a statement by a meeting of the world’s finance ministers. But groups like the G-20 help set expectations about the future. Given the connection between those expectations and conflict, failing to reaffirm America’s opposition to protectionism could put the world on a dangerous path.

#### No impact to economic decline – prefer new data

Daniel Drezner 14, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

#### Even if conflicts occur they won’t escalate.

Bennett & Nordstrom 2k [D. Scott Bennett and Timothy Nordstrom, February 2000. Department of Political Science Professors at Pennsylvania State. “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Ebsco, CMR]

#### When engaging in diversionary actions in response to economic problems, leaders will be most interested in a cheap, quick victory that gives them the benefit of a rally effect without suffering the long-term costs (in both economic and popularity terms) of an extended confrontation or war. This makes weak states particularly inviting targets for diversionary action since they may be less likely to respond than strong states and because any response they make will be less costly to the initiator. Following Blainey (1973),a state facing poor economic conditions may in fact be the target of an attack rather than the initiator. This may be even more likely in the context of a rivalry because rival states are likely to be looking for any advantage over their rivais. Leaders may hope to catch an economically challenged rival looking inward in response to a slowing economy. Following the strategic application of diversionary conflict theory and states' desire to engage in only cheap conflicts for diversionary purposes, states should avoid conflict initiation against target states experiencing economic problems.

#### No nuke terror.

Mueller ’18 (John Mueller – PhD in Political Science @ UCLA, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at Ohio State University and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, “Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter,” 15 October 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter?fa\_package=1123220)

As for nuclear terrorism, ever since al Qaeda operatives used box cutters so effectively to hijack commercial airplanes, alarmists have warned that radical Islamist terrorists would soon apply equal talents in science and engineering to make and deliver nuclear weapons so as to destroy various so-called infidels. In practice, however, terrorist groups have exhibited only a limited desire to go nuclear and even less progress in doing so. Why? Probably because developing one’s own bomb from scratch requires a series of risky actions, all of which have to go right for the scheme to work. This includes trusting foreign collaborators and other criminals; acquiring and transporting highly guarded fissile material; establishing a sophisticated, professional machine shop; and moving a cumbersome, untested weapon into position for detonation. And all of this has to be done while hiding from a vast global surveillance net looking for and trying to disrupt such activities.

Terrorists are unlikely to get a bomb from a generous, like-minded nuclear patron, because no country wants to run the risk of being blamed (and punished) for a terrorist’s nuclear crimes. Nor are they likely to be able to steal one. Notes Stephen Younger, the former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory: “All nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.”

The grand mistake of the Cold War was to infer desperate intent from apparent capacity. For the war on terrorism, it has been to infer desperate capacity from apparent intent.

#### No risk of nuclear terrorism

Mearsheimer 14—John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago [“America Unhinged,” January 2, nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show]

Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.

What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.

Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.