#### Communist regimes can’t do shit against disease. Specifically, fuck China.

Burkle 20 – (Frederick Burkle, Senior Fellow & Scientist, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard University & T.H., “Declining Public Health Protections within Autocratic Regimes: Impact on Global Public Health Security, Infectious Disease Outbreaks, Epidemics, and Pandemics,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol 35, Iss 3, June 2020, Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/prehospital-and-disaster-medicine/article/declining-public-health-protections-within-autocratic-regimes-impact-on-global-public-health-security-infectious-disease-outbreaks-epidemics-and-pandemics/8D8927B7B4117E07B666E83D8605D085)

Conclusions Lipsitch predicts that some 40%-70% of the world’s population will be infected this year.78 Despite political claims, a vaccine is more likely seen within a year or two at best.79 It is no longer realistic to expect the management of these gaps in infectious disease outbreaks, especially those that threaten to be epidemics and pandemics, are to be capably managed in their present state of willful denial and offenses by many countries, especially those that are ruled by authoritarian regimes.80 Despite resistance to globalization’s health benefits that would markedly benefit the global community during these crises by authoritarian regimes, in 2015, I called for a new WHO leadership granted by the International Health Regulations Treaty that has consequences if violated. I stated: The intent of a legally binding Treaty to improve the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify, and respond to public health threats are being ignored. While there is a current rush to admonish globalization in favor of populism, epidemic and pandemics deserve better than decisions being made by incapable autocrats. During Ebola, a rush by the Global Health Security Agenda partners to fill critical gaps in administrative and operational areas was crucial in the short term, but questions remain as to the real priorities of the global leadership as time elapses and critical gaps in public health protections and infrastructure take precedence over the economic and security needs of the developed world. The response from the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and foreign medical teams to Ebola proved indispensable to global health security, but both deserve stronger strategic capacity support and institutional status under the WHO leadership granted by the [International Health Regulations] Treaty. Treaties are the most successful means the world has in preventing, preparing for, and controlling epidemics in an increasingly globalized world. Other options are not sustainable. Given the gravity of on-going failed treaty management, the slow and incomplete process of reform, the magnitude and complexity of infectious disease outbreaks, and the rising severity of public health emergencies, a recommitment must be made to complete and restore the original mandates as a collaborative and coordinated global network responsibility, not one left to the actions of individual countries. The bottom line is that the global community can no longer tolerate an ineffectual and passive international response system. As such, this Treaty has the potential to become one of the most effective treaties for crisis response and risk reduction world-wide. Practitioners and health decision-makers world-wide must break their silence and advocate for a stronger Treaty and a return of WHO authority. Health practitioners and health decision-makers world-wide must break their silence and advocate for a stronger Treaty and a return of WHO’s undisputed global authority.81 Will China’s unilateral decisions just be a temporary stay as it was post-SARS, or is China capable of adopting, without conditions, the WHO public health requirements they have so far ignored? Autocratic leaders in history have a direct impact on health security. Dictatorships, with direct knowledge of the negative impact on health, create adverse political and economic conditions that only complicate the problem further. This is more evident in autocratic regimes where health protections have been seriously and purposely curtailed. This summary acknowledges that autocratic regimes are seriously handicapped by sociopathic narcissistic leaders who are incapable of understanding the health consequences of infectious diseases or their impact on their population. They will universally accelerate defenses indigenous to their personality traits when faced with contrary facts, double down against or deny accurate science to the contrary, delay timely precautions, and fail to meet health expectations required of nations under existing International Health Regulations, laws, and Epidemic Control surveillance.82 Kavanaugh’s Lancet editorial initially praised Chinese tactics that reflected a level of control only available to authoritarian regimes. As days and weeks passed, it revealed a government that inherently became victims of their own propaganda based on “need to avoid sharing bad news.” He concluded that authoritarian politics inhibited an effective response, and that openness and competitive politics favor a strategically fair public health strategy.83 Democratic nations in comparison to autocratic regimes recognize that public health fundamentally depends on public trust.84 The WHO’s China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease report has applauded China’s eventual response capability and capacity with strict measures to interrupt or minimize transmission chains with extremely proactive surveillance, rapid diagnosis, isolation tracking, quarantine, and population acceptance of these measures, to implement the measures to contain COVID-19 within the country.85 It must not be forgotten that China’s authoritarian rule “put secrecy and order ahead of openly confronting the growing crisis and risking alarm or political embarrassment,” 86 arrested and compelled Dr. Li Wenliang to sign a statement that his warning constituted “illegal behavior,” all of which delayed a concerted public health offensive that led to his death.86 This was an “issue of inaction” that would have contained COVID-19 within China and remains a potent symbol of China’s failures.86 There is no evidence that the authoritarian regime has or will change to prevent this from happening again.87 I suspect China’s sophisticated censorship and propaganda systems will outlast any public health improvements.

### 1NC—CP

#### Text: In the Peoples Democratic Dictatorship, the red guard ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy unless reporting on violent conflict, in which case they should prioritize peace journalism.

#### Objective journalism causes war – 3 warrants. Peace journalism solves.

McGoldrick 6 (Annabel, PhD in Peace Journalism & psychotherapist, 2006, "War Journalism and Objectivity," Conflict & Communication Online, <https://regener-online.de/journalcco/2006_2/pdf/mcgoldrick.pdf>) AG

Lynch and McGoldrick argue that there are three ways in which news said to be Objective fuels further violence. “Three conventions of Objective reporting, in particular, are predisposed towards War Journalism. Their ‘natural drift’, as it were, is to lead us – or leave us – to over-value violent, reactive responses to conflict, and under-value non-violent, developmental ones: • A bias in favour of official sources • A bias in favour of event over process • A bias in favour of ‘dualism’ in reporting conflicts” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, p. 209). The problem is that news is, by its very nature, preoccupied with change, yet it has a very fixed and one-dimensional understanding of how change comes about. Built into it is an orientation in favour of realism and ignores the insights of Peace and Conflict Studies, which argue that there are many ways to bring about change in a conflict, many ‘levers’ to pull. Later I will suggest that anyone working to intervene in the Cycle of Violence, for example, can be regarded as a ‘change agent’. But the Objectivity conventions mean we hear relatively little about them, compared with official sources – a category topped by leaders of national states. Max Weber provided a well-known definition: the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1946, p.78). Weber’s argument was that a state could only be defined in terms of means rather than ends. States could not be said to be for anything, necessarily; they were better conceived in terms of their observable characteristics than assumptions about their purpose. Weber’s formulation has been seen as neutral, even normative – the word, ‘legitimate’ has seemed, to some, to suggest a benign hand, guaranteeing security for all citizens. But these are concepts later interrogated and revised by researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies. What if the effect of state action favours the interests of some citizens, and not others? In the words of veteran Australian peace researcher, John W Burton, the very notion of ‘conflict resolution’ is only admissible if conflict is understood as attributable not to “inherent human aggressiveness” but to “the emergence of inappropriate social institutions and norms that reasonably would seem to be well within human capacities to alter, to which the person has problems in adjustment” (Burton 1998). Perhaps Burton’s cardinal insight is that there is more to human relations than power – there are also human needs, including the basics of food, drinking water and shelter from the elements, certainly, but also intangibles such as identity, recognition and respect. If the institutions and norms of a state entrench power relations of a kind that deny these human needs to any or all of its citizens, ‘the person’ will inevitably resist them. In those circumstances, what Burton calls the ‘deterrent strategies’ of the state take on an altogether more sinister aspect. Once deterrent strategies – such as the $560bn Pentagon budget – are put in place, they inevitably alter the nature of power relations. Missiles have to be fired and replaced in order to maintain ‘defence capacities’ – rich and powerful interests are not served by allowing military hardware to gather dust. Prisons have to be filled to generate orders for correctional corporations to build more. So norms and institutions come to be influenced in favour of wars overseas and punitive criminal justice policies at home – variants on what President Dwight D Eisenhower called the “military-industrial complex” (Eisenhower, 1960). Then the number of levers under the control of the leaders of national states has diminished in recent times. Industry has globalised, public services have been marketised and/or privatised and economic policy-making has become increasingly contingent on events elsewhere. Hence there may be more emphasis on the levers they do control, including the ability to set the news agenda and also the deployment of armed forces. British Prime Minister Tony Blair has pitched the UK into more armed conflicts than any other – Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan – and is said to admire the armed forces for their “professionalism” (Brogan 2003). Their stock-in-trade being, of course, to follow orders, in marked contrast to Blair’s experience with other areas of the public sector where change has to be negotiated and efforts at reform had left him with “scars on his back” (Watt 1999). It all means that a reliance on official sources may, of necessity, predispose the coverage of conflict towards War Journalism. Military deployment always seems to move, as if by osmosis, on to the news agenda. Calls for collaborative effort to enforce international law, or building solidarity at the level of civil society – even, latterly, accepting as final the will of the UN – always seem to have to be justified afresh from first principles. A bias in favour of event over process A news story is supposed to answer six basic questions: • Who? • What? Annabel McGoldrick conflict & communication online, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006 War Journalism and ‘Objectivity’  2006 by verlag irena regener berlin 4 • When? • Where? • Why? • How? Most stories only deal superficially – if at all – with the ‘why’. Many journalists argue that that it would make the story too long. But people can only begin to think themselves out of a conflict if they understand the underlying issues. The important thing to note here is that without some exploration of underlying causes, violence can be left to appear, by default, as the only response that ‘makes sense’. Wars remain opaque, in the sense that we are given no means to see through the violence to problems that lie beneath. It therefore makes no sense to hear from anyone wanting those problems to be addressed and set right, as a contribution to ending or avoiding violence. A bias in favour of dualism One safe way to insulate oneself against allegations of bias is to ‘hear both sides’. It means the journalist cannot be seen as ‘the voice of any particular party or sect’. By tradition, classic BBC reporting, for instance, is said to adopt the formula: “On the one hand … on the other … in the end, only time will tell” (Kampfner 2003). But this inscribes a paradigm of dualism that frames out multiparty initiatives, complex causes and win-win situations. Dualism is a key part of Objectivity but also, for these reasons, a major contributory factor in the way in which it escalates a conflict, by turning it into a tug of war in which each party faces only two alternatives – victory or defeat. Their words and deeds must be unequivocally ‘winning’ if they are not to risk being reported as ‘losing’, ‘backsliding’ or ‘going soft’. Findings from researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies provide abundant evidence that this dualistic model of conflict is seldom, if ever, the whole picture; there are always third (or more) parties whose involvement may be hidden; and within the parties, there are fault lines and differentiations which open up the scope for more creative conceptualisations of the issues at stake (Francis, 2002). The liberal theory of press freedom Kempf puts his finger on a dilemma facing every journalist covering conflicts – “either to take sides and to incite one party against the other, or to play the role of a moderating third party in order to improve the communication between them and contribute to constructive conflict transformation” (Kempf 2003 p. 83). Failure to adopt a deliberate policy of constructive conflict coverage, he argues, is tantamount to escalating them, because of “the lack of differentiation between traditional conflict coverage and propaganda” (Kempf 2003 p. 83). Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) give the following definitions: “Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them – which create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict. Peace Journalism: • Uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting • Provides a new route map tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their journalism – the ethics of journalistic intervention • Builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005 p. 5).

#### It competes – peace journalism is a form of advocacy. Solves conflict on a massive scale by reorienting knowledge production.

Michelis 18 (Silvia De, PhD Student in Peace Research @ University of Bradford, 12-23-2018, "Peace Journalism in Theory and Practice," E-International Relations, <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/12/23/peace-journalism-in-theory-and-practice/>) AG

This subject is constantly debated, especially in relation to the most frequent critique against peace journalism which considers it as a form of advocacy towards a particular cause: that of peace, in breach of the principle of journalistic objectivity. As a counter-argument to this critique, Christian et al.’s theory of the media proves useful to explain why peace journalism is needed and how it can be operationalised. Within the practice of journalism, they inscribe ‘the social responsibility tradition’, which “retains freedom as the basic principle for organizing public communication, including the media” (Christian, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng and White, 2009: 24), and legitimises the promotion of certain moral givens within the public discourse, such as the protection of air, water and the environment for the future existence of the human race and other living beings. These moral obligations are, in fact, generally accepted within most advanced societies.

Within the field of peace journalism ‘peace’ – intended as an end – and ‘nonviolence’ – intended as a means or practice – are considered as both the organizing principles of news-making and the fundamental moral givens all societies should aim towards, nationally and globally, in line with the view expressed by Christian et al. (ibid.). It is for this reason that peace journalism can be approached as an evolving profession as well as an analytical model for scholarly research of media representations (or mis-representations). It constitutes a medium for exploring the aspects and dynamics of physical, cultural, and structural violence, exploration that is considered vital for the orientation of knowledge and production of actions, which are needed to build more peaceful societies.

Inscribed into news-making are the selectivity and framing of news. In the field of journalism studies “to frame is to select some aspect of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993: 51). Therefore, according to peace journalism scholars (Lynch, 2014; Seaga Shaw, Lynch and Hackett, 2011; Keeble, Tulloch and Zollmann, 2010; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; Dente Ross and Tehranian, 2009; Shinar and Kempf, 2007; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005), nonviolent initiatives need to be reported to foster peaceful solutions of conflict and de-saturate the collective imaginary from the sustained belief that violence and war are the only viable responses to it. Peace scholar John Lederach states in this regard that: “There are people who have a vision for peace, emerging often from their own experience of conflict and pain” which are often unheard “because they do not represent official power … or because they are written off as biased” (1997: 94).

The traditional conceptualisation of journalism considers the world as a set of ready-made facts, whose building up process and meaning are often ignored, or excessively simplified. Instead, within the field of foreign intervention for example, a critical examination of the dominant interpretation of what journalists observe should be reported in a way that takes into consideration the implementation of nonviolent practices for the solution of conflicts. With regards to war reporting, Paul Mason reports in The Guardian:

We are besieged now by images of the dead in conflict, usually published by people who believe it will either deter killing, expose the perpetrators or illustrate war’s futility and brutality. It is an old illusion […]. Many Germans in the 1920s and 30s came to believe, despite the horrific photos, that the war had embodied the noblest and most exhilarating aspects of human life; and that warfare represented the ultimate in technological modernity and moral freedom. This remains a more dangerous myth than the idea that war is harmless, fun or heroic (2014: 5).

#### That outweighs – a laundry list of hotspots are primed to escalate – our authors predicted Ukraine.

Ero and Atwood 21 (Comfort, CEO @ Crisis Group & PhD IR, and Richard, MA IR @ Princeton, 12-17-2021, "10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022," <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2022>) AG

After all, by some measures, war is in retreat. The number of people killed in fighting worldwide has mostly declined since 2014—if you count only those dying directly in combat. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, figures through the end of 2020 show [battle deaths are down](https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/) from seven years ago, mostly because Syria’s terrible slaughter has largely subsided. The number of major wars has also descended from a recent peak. Despite Russian President Vladimir Putin menacing Ukraine, states rarely go to war with one another. More local conflicts rage than ever, but they tend to be of lower intensity. For the most part, 21st-century wars are less lethal than their 20th-century predecessors. A more cautious United States might also have an upside. The 1990s bloodletting in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia; the post-9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq wars; Sri Lanka’s murderous campaign against the Tamils; and the collapse of Libya and South Sudan all happened at a time of—and, in some cases, thanks to—a dominant U.S.-led West. That recent U.S. presidents have refrained from toppling enemies by force is a good thing. Besides, one shouldn’t overstate Washington’s sway even in its post-Cold War heyday; absent an invasion, it has always struggled to bend recalcitrant leaders (former Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, for example) to its will. Still, if these are silver linings, they’re awfully thin. Battle deaths, after all, tell just a fraction of the story. Yemen’s conflict kills more people, mostly women and young children, due to starvation or preventable disease than violence. Millions of Ethiopians suffer acute food insecurity because of the country’s civil war. Fighting involving Islamists elsewhere in Africa often doesn’t entail thousands of deaths but drives millions of people from their homes and causes humanitarian devastation. Afghanistan’s violence levels have sharply dropped since the Taliban seized power in August, but starvation, caused mostly by Western policies, could leave more Afghans dead—including millions of children—than past decades of fighting. Worldwide, the number of displaced people, most due to war, is at a record high. Battle deaths may be down, in other words, but suffering due to conflict is not. Foreign involvement in conflicts creates the risk that local clashes light bigger fires. Moreover, states compete fiercely even when they’re not fighting directly. They do battle with cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, election interference, economic coercion, and by instrumentalizing migrants. Major and regional powers vie for influence, often through local allies, in war zones. Proxy fighting has not so far sparked direct confrontation among meddling states. Indeed, some navigate the danger adeptly: Russia and Turkey maintain cordial relations despite backing competing sides in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts. Still, foreign involvement in conflicts creates the risk that local clashes light bigger fires. Standoffs involving major powers look increasingly dangerous. Putin may gamble on another incursion into Ukraine. A China-U.S. clash over Taiwan is unlikely in 2022, but the Chinese and U.S. militaries increasingly bump up against each another around the island and in the South China Sea, with all the peril of entanglement that entails. If the Iran nuclear deal collapses, which now seems probable, the United States or Israel may attempt—possibly even early in 2022—to knock out Iranian nuclear facilities, likely prompting Tehran to sprint toward weaponization while lashing out across the region. One mishap or miscalculation, in other words, and interstate war could make a comeback. And whatever one thinks of U.S. influence, its decline inevitably brings hazards, given that American might and alliances have structured global affairs for decades. No one should exaggerate the decay: U.S. forces are still deployed around the globe, NATO stands, and Washington’s recent Asia diplomacy shows it can still marshal coalitions like no other power. But with much in flux, Washington’s rivals are probing to see how far they can go. As for COVID-19, the pandemic has exacerbated the world’s worst humanitarian disasters and propelled the impoverishment, rising living costs, inequality, and joblessness that fuel popular anger. It had a hand this past year in a power grab in Tunisia, Sudan’s coup, and protests in Colombia. The economic hurt COVID-19 is unleashing could strain some countries to a breaking point. Although it’s a leap from discontent to protest, from protest to crisis, and from crisis to conflict, the pandemic’s worst symptoms may yet lie ahead. So while today’s troubling undercurrents haven’t yet set battle deaths soaring or the world ablaze, things still look bad. As this year’s list shows all too starkly, they could easily get worse.

### 1NC—T

#### Topical affs may only defend a currently existing free press prioritizing objectivity over advocacy in a currently existing democracy.

#### Ought is immediate

Forero 8 (Senior Member, 4-2, https://forum.wordreference.com/threads/ought-to-vs-should.929356/)

Though, as I said, I often substitute ought to for should, and should for ought, I don't consider should and ought to be exact synonyms.  Ought refers more clearly to immediate obligation, and seems more like a present tense with implications in the future. Should is more conditional, shows more feeling, and more often suggests an imposed "obligation" that we may not agree with.

#### Violation: the aff is predictive of what could happen if the people’s democratic dictatorship is created.

#### Vote neg—infinite potential future democracies that could be created means that there’s no predictable stasis point for prep. Future affs about democracies in space, regimes that could be overthrown etc. explodes the topic and makes neg prep impossible. Our interp allows a robust set of affs like India, U.S.A, etc. Limits key to preserving rigorous engagement with the aff.

#### TVA solves—read an aff about how a free press being objective in a democracy now creates the People’s Democratic Dictatorship.

### 1NC—T

#### Interpretation – Objective Journalism is constituted of three things: factual information, impartial and unbiased viewpoints, and emotional detachment

Calcutt and Hammond 11 Andrew Calcutt and Philip Hammond, 11 [Andrew Calcutt, (Andrew Calcutt is Principal Lecturer in Journalism at the University of East London, where he leads Master courses in journalism and magazines. He is vice-chair of the London East Research Institute and editor of Proof: Reading Journalism and Society (www.proof-reading.org). Previous publications include White Noise: An A–Z of Contradictions in Cyberculture (1999) and Arrested Development: Pop Culture and the Erosion of Adulthood (1998)). Philip Hammond (Philip Hammond is Reader in Media and Communications at London South Bank University. He is the author of Media, War and Postmodernity (2007) and Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts (2007) and is co-editor, with Edward Herman, of Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (2000)).]. "Journalism Studies: A Critical Introduction." Routledge & CRC Press, 3-8-2011, Accessed 3-4-2022. https://www.routledge.com/Journalism-Studies-A-Critical-Introduction/Calcutt-Hammond/p/book/9780415554312 // duongie

Objectivity in journalism is a complex idea, used to refer to at least three distinct, though interrelated, concepts. First, it primarily entails a commitment to truthfulness: reporting factually accurate information. Second, objectivity is often thought to imply neutrality in the sense of fairness and balance: seeking to be impartial and unbiased in the process of reporting and, where there are conflicting interpretations of an event, presenting different viewpoints even-handedly. Third, objectivity is also often understood to imply neutrality in the sense of emotional detachment: a dispassionate approach that separates fact from comment and allows news audiences to make up their minds about events rather than being offered a journalist’s own response. These are interrelated in that – at least in theory – journalists are dispassionate and neutral so as not to let their own emotional responses and political allegiances get in the way of reporting truthfully.

#### Violation is Volland which defines what the aff defends—if they say PT in a vacuum vote neg on presumption because their evidence says objectivity as we define it can’t solve the aff—we inserted rehighlighting in green.

1AC Volland 21 [Nicolai Volland is Associate Professor of Asian Studies and Comparative Literature at the penn state university. His research focuses on modern Chinese literature and culture in its transnational dimensions, including cosmopolitanism, transnationalism, translation and transculturation, as well as reception and cultural consumption, 6-17-2021, The China Quarterly, Volume 246, “Revisiting the Public Sphere in 20th- and 21st-century China”, “[“Liberating the Small Devils”: Red Guard Newspapers and Radical Publics, 1966–1968](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/liberating-the-small-devils-red-guard-newspapers-and-radical-publics-19661968/1B64D41ADF7DC64E7E99543EE55975DC)”, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/liberating-the-small-devils-red-guard-newspapers-and-radical-publics-19661968/1B64D41ADF7DC64E7E99543EE55975DC]//sripad

**The rise of the Red Guard press was a radical break with the institutional conventions of journalism** established after the founding of the People’s Republic.18 Ever since 1949, the socialist Chinese press had been closely intertwined with the political-ideological regulatory structures embodied in the propaganda system. Party papers (dangbao) occupied the apex of this system at the national and provincial levels, and the integration of the press – Party papers and others alike – into the propaganda system had been ensured through Party committees within these work units. The assault on the Central Propaganda Department, declared a “demon’s den” (yanwang dian 阎王殿) by Mao, had rendered this central node of the propaganda system dysfunctional by late 1966. Following Lu Dingyi’s 陆定一 overthrow, the Propaganda Department ceased to function and was not rebuilt until 1977. Without support of the centre, local propaganda bureaus also came under assault and the surviving newspapers were left to figure out by themselves how to engage in journalism amid a disruptive political campaign. The Red Guard papers faced an analogous situation. There was no precedent, no institutional chain of command and no obvious model to follow. They had to reinvent journalism. **Mao had called for “smashing the demon’s den” and “liberating the small devils” ( jiefang xiao gui 解放小鬼).19 Having achieved their freedom, the papers had to figure out what to do next.**

Red Guard newspapers did what they could. In search of legitimacy, they turned to two sources: Chairman Mao and the big papers. From their onset, Red Guard publications generally tried to emulate the big papers and especially the esteemed Renmin ribao 人民日报. This presented a conundrum, as the big papers were the targets of attack and an “old” mode to be overcome. In many respects, however, they were the only model available. Red Guard newspapers adopted standard journalistic practices, publishing founding notices ( fakanci 发刊词), editorials (shelun 社论) and commentator articles (ben bao pinglunyuan 本报评论员). The Red Guard press frequently reprinted articles from People’s Daily, Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun bao 解放军报) and Red Flag (Hongqi 红旗), which was a practice common for provincial-level papers. They also peppered their articles with quotations from Chairman Mao, copying the practice, established by People’s Daily at the start of the Cultural Revolution, of setting these quotations in bold print. Most notably, Red Guard papers imitated the visual appearance and layout of the big papers. They ran quotations from Chairman Mao on the top of the frontpage and invariably chose Mao’s calligraphy for their masthead. All of these practices were designed to bolster their legitimacy and limit their vulnerability in a volatile political environment.

The fortunes of the Red Guard press waxed and waned over the ensuing months, closely tracking the shifts in the Cultural Revolution’s political direction. They thrived with the Red Guard movement in the autumn of 1966 and received a further boost in January 1967 as the Cultural Revolution entered its most radical phase. During another radical phase, in May 1967, the Central Committee issued the first ever circular that officially acknowledged the Red Guard press. **The promulgation of the “Opinions on improving the press and propaganda of revolutionary mass organizations” was an attempt to establish rules for the rapidly proliferating Red Guard press.20 The “Opinions” endorsed the existence and function of the Red Guard press: “In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the papers and leaflets comp iled and printed by revolutionary mass organizations play an important role on the propaganda front.”**21 The document also encouraged these mass organizations to “consult important editorials and commentaries of People’s Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily for their own propaganda.”22 **The effort to more closely integrate the mainstream press with the Red Guard papers and to establish a rule-based system demonstrates an attempt to envision a new structure for the public sphere, a structure with a permanent place for the Red Guard press**.

At other times, attempts to rein in the revolutionary mass organizations, such as in February, June and September 1967, also hurt these organizations’ propaganda organs. A document issued by the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee on 30 June, for instance, called for out-of-town Red Guards to leave the city and ordered local mass organizations to confine their activities to their home units, a measure that affected the burgeoning Red Guard press in the capital.23 The Beijing authorities reiterated these demands in the wake of the Wuhan Incident. A decree issued on 8 September bluntly declared, “Out-of-town people are forbidden to set up liaison stations in universities, schools, organs or work units in Beijing, and they are not allowed to publish newspapers in Beijing.”24 After September 1967, the vast majority of Red Guard papers across the nation were forced to close down. By early 1968, only the most prestigious papers remained – i.e. those published by large umbrella organizations and thus with the strongest claims to legitimacy.

Journalistic Metadiscourses

The proliferation of Red Guard publications at the very moment when the regulatory structures of the propaganda system were disintegrating did not result in the growth of a public sphere in the Habermasian sense. **Neither the numerical explosion of press outlets nor the shrill denunciations dominating their pages make a case for an intermediate sphere of public reasoning**. But how, then, did the Red Guard papers envision their own role and the future of journalistic practice in China? While it is impossible to generalize about such a large and heterogenous body of material, some answers may be gleaned from the more self-consciously reflexive among the Red Guard press. I therefore turn to a special segment within the vast landscape of Red Guard newspapers: publications of mass organizations within the news media themselves. **Just like in other work units, “revolutionary rebels” seized power in newspaper offices across the nation and soon set out to publish their own papers. And, just as elsewhere, these papers provided a platform to denounce the old leadership, detailing its mistakes and misdeeds. They hence offer important insights into the functioning of the press before 1966**. At the same time, these papers contain deliberations about the efforts to move beyond the mistakes of the past and create a genuinely new journalism. In the course of these debates, these papers inevitably reflect on themselves and about the Red Guard press as an institution.

Such metadiscursive publications constitute a small but significant subset of the Red Guard press. A rebel organization of Xinhua News Agency employees, for instance, published the short-lived Xinhua zhanbao 新华战报 (Xinhua Battle Bulletin, four issues, 12 May–15 September 1967).25 Another group, also from Xinhua News Agency, allied with the journalism branch of a larger coalition of rebels to issue Xinwen zhanxian 新闻战线 (News Front).26 Journalists at the prestigious Guangming ribao 光明日报 (Guangming Daily) founded Guangming zhanbao 光明战报 (Guangming Battle Bulletin).27 Likewise, rebels at local newspapers in Guangzhou, Guangxi, Fuzhou and Hunan all produced their own papers.28 Perhaps the most interesting of these self-reflexive publications is Xinwen zhanbao 新闻战报 (News Battle Bulletin).29 Founded by a coalition of rebel groups calling itself the “Capital news criticism liaison station,” Xinwen zhanbao published a total of 19 issues, making it one of the longest lasting publications in the news sector. It boasted extensive ties with other papers and with the leading journalism research institutions, lending it considerable theoretical firepower.30 Through its umbrella organization, Hongdaihui 红代会 (Red Guard Congress), Xinwen zhanbao maintained close relations with the Cultural Revolution Small Group, the radical hardcore clique surrounding Jiang Qing 江青 and Zhang Chunqiao 张春桥. 31 In the six months of its existence, Xinwen zhanbao produced a significant amount of theoretical reflections about the Chinese press. Writing from the apex of the Chinese news sector, **the paper’s authors offered its readers extensive insights into past and current developments of journalism in socialist China, making the paper an essential source for the Cultural Revolution in the news sector.**

The inaugural issue of Xinwen zhanbao, dated 28 April 1967, offers a good overview of the main issues occupying the paper, its general tone and its discursive structure. The front page, apart from an oversized portrait of the Chairman, consists of a collection of Mao quotations related to the press. Page two contains an editorial, a report on the Liaison Station’s founding, and brief news items from the news sector itself. On page three, a lengthy article denounces Liu Shaoqi’s 刘少奇 policies on news and propaganda. Page four, finally, must be read as an inversion of page one: under the title “Liu Shaoqi’s black words in journalistic circles,” readers find extensive quotations on the press from Liu. With Mao’s instructions on the one hand, and Liu’s utterances on the other, the discursive field for the assessment of the Chinese press and the theoretical tenets guiding this field have been staked out. The Cultural Revolution in the news sector, as elsewhere, is presented as the culmination of an extended struggle between two lines represented by Mao and Liu.

The logic of two-line struggle is formulated in one of the quotations gracing Xinwen zhanbao’s front page, which in fact is taken from the 8 August 1966 Central Committee decision: “**To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary, first of all, to create public opinion, to do work in the ideological sphere. This is true for the revolutionary class as well as for the counter-revolutionary class. This thesis of** comrade Mao Zedong’s has been proved entirely correct in practice.”32 **The press, in other words, is a site of acute class struggle and both sides use it for their own political purposes**. Xinwen zhanbao hence sets out to dig up evidence of Liu Shaoqi’s attempts to manipulate the press in order to undermine Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line. An article in issue eight, for example, denounces the “**three black flags**” (san mian heiqi 三面黑旗) of Liu Shaoqi’s press theory: **(1) the allegedly bourgeois concepts of “truthfulness”** (zhenshi 真实), **“impartiality”** (gongzheng 公正) **and “objectivity”** (keguan 客观); (**2) the idea of “press freedom”** (xinwen ziyou 新闻自由); **and (3) the notion of “entertainment”** (quweixing 趣味性).33 **In a** **society where class struggle still exists, so the authors write, there can be no such notions as impartiality and objectivity; any compromise with bourgeois ideas advantages the class enemy and works against the revolutionary proletariat. “The proletarian press is a tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat,” the article declares. “Therefore, it must resolutely stand on the proletariat’s side and make propagating and defending the invincible Mao Zedong Thought its most basic task.”**34 The Chinese press under Liu Shaoqi’s command had erred on this account. The article offers ample “evidence” of perceived mistakes that often went back to the 1950s, and the authors do not hesitate to twist Liu’s words by quoting them out of context.35 **They are unapologetic about these partisan distortions – they are not bound to impartiality and objectivity,** and the article itself is a demonstration of the new journalistic practices proposed by Xinwen zhanbao

Xinwen zhanbao and other papers of the metadiscursive variety thus embarked on a dual mission: to criticize pre-Cultural Revolutionary journalistic practices and to propose new modes of journalism. While both of these tasks were intertwined, the papers tended to dwell on the criticism of the “Liu line,” which apparently was the easier part of their mission. The demand for partiality, in theory as well as practice, was not in fact a new one. Partiinost (dangxing 党性), or partymindedness, had been a crucial requirement of the Communist press in both the Soviet Union and China before and after 1949. Papers such as People’s Daily can hardly be called objective or impartial, nor were they ever supposed to be. What the Red Guard press accuses Liu Shaoqi and the PRC’s propaganda system of, then, is having not lived up to the demands of a proper Communist press. They denounce the Propaganda Department and the papers under its control for having followed the (essentially correct) guidelines of a true Communist press in a half-hearted manner. **What was wrong with the Chinese press before 1966, in other words, was not so much its premises, but rather its failure to reflect these premises in actual journalistic practice**. Far from regarding the public sphere as an autonomous space, then, the journalism promoted by Xinwen zhanbao makes a case for **a battlefield, a site of acute struggle between antagonistic parties. Its position is decidedly praetorian – in a setting without effective hierarchical controls and valid rules of engagement, extreme partisanship prevails.**

There was, however, one problem the paper and its peers had to grapple with: how to ensure the proper direction of the press in such a praetorian public sphere? The Party organization and its surrogates in the editorial rooms of the nation’s press had proven themselves unreliable guardians of the partisan position in the two-line struggle. But if the Party and its official press could not be entrusted with the stewardship of public communication, who else could guarantee that the nation’s press would uphold the correct line? Who would be the stewards and the guardians of the radical public of the future? Deliberations on this most crucial problem, on the central conundrum of the Cultural Revolutionary public sphere, would lead the metadiscursive papers to some surprising conclusions.

The Power of the Masses

Chairman Mao has taught us: “The people, and only the people, are the moving force creating world history.” The mass line is the fundamental line of a proletarian political party. How they treat the masses is the benchmark for revolution, non-revolution and counterrevolution, and it has always been the focus for the proletariat’s revolutionary line and the bourgeoisie’s reactionary line. In the same manner, there exists a fierce two-line struggle on the question of how to run newspapers.

An article signed Lu Qun 路群 (an apparent allusion to qunzhong luxian 群众路线, or mass line, a crucial Maoist concept) in the 30 July issue of Xinwen zhanbao addresses the issue of two-line struggle but shifts the emphasis in a new direction: the role of the masses.37 The problem of a mass line in journalism – how to write for the masses and also give them a voice – had haunted Chinese socialist journalism since the 1940s, a tension that troubled other industries as well and was captured in the formula “both red and expert.”38 Articles in Xinwen zhanbao and other metadiscursive papers routinely accuse Liu Shaoqi of ignoring or circumventing the demands of the mass line. **For a bottom-up revolutionary movement, the question of mass involvement was naturally of crucial importance and the Red Guard papers seemed to propose a solution to the red/expert conundrum.** They themselves represented a genuinely popular form of journalism. Could the emerging Red Guard press effectively do away with the pretentions of a politically suspect, exclusive journalistic professionalism?

The Lu Qun article promises a frontal attack on professionalism in the press. Entitled “Open ferocious fire on Liu Shaoqi’s ‘professional’ journalistic line” (Xiang Liu Shaoqi de “zhuanjia” ban bao luxian menglie kaihuo 向刘少奇的“专 家”办报路线猛烈开火), it presents a sustained argument for **new forms of grassroots journalism**. Sporadic efforts to give the proletariat a voice in the Chinese newspaper system date back to the 1940s. Both in Yan’an and in the early 1950s, the CCP had encouraged the cultivation of “worker-peasant correspondents” (gong-nong tongxunyuan 工农通讯员), an institution originating in the Soviet Union.39 These attempts to involve the proletariat in Chinese socialist journalism, however, had failed to change the basic conventions of CCP newspaper practice. **Journalism, so the article maintains, remained an essentially top down practice controlled by the Party’s propaganda system, which had utterly failed the test of the Cultural Revolution**. “Lu Qun” **demands a new approach to implementing the mass line in journalism: “Without this line, it is impossible to guarantee the correct political direction of the Party papers, impossible to realize the Party’s leadership of the press, impossible to accomplish the political task of the Party papers; without this line, the newspapers cannot become the eyes and ears, the tongue and throat of the Party, cannot become the bridge and the bond between the Party and the masses**.”40 Mass involvement in the entire journalistic process, from news collecting to the writing of articles and editorials, would be essential for both the papers’ success and the proper functioning of the Party itself

But what is the benchmark of mass involvement in journalism? It is in their answer to this crucial question that the article’s author(s) venture onto new terrain:

Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought has always held that **a proletarian party paper must not only rely on the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers for its making, but the judgement and criticism of the papers’ correctness and quality should also be made by the worker-peasant-soldier masses.** Only if a paper is endorsed and approved by the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers can it count as a truly revolutionary newspaper.41

**This proposition, offered in the article’s final sentence, effectively cuts out the Party altogether. It turns a top-down system into a bottom-up system – a radical inversion of existing practices. The ultimate source of a newspaper’s legitimacy is no longer its endorsement by the hierarchical administrative system of the party-state, but rather “approval” from the masses, from the grassroots itself. It is up to them to convey (or withhold) authority to the press**. In a sign of how far the article pushes its argument, “Lu Qun” attributes what is presented as a commonly agreed principle (“has always held”) to “Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought,” but fails to provide a more specific source. In a rhetorical environment ever eager to invoke Chairman Mao’s utterances as a source of support, the article’s failure on this occasion to come up with a suitable quotation indicates that the call for popular legitimacy, and the denial of the Party’s authority, was pushing the boundaries of the discursive terrain. **The article advocates a journalistic landscape without the monitoring framework of the propaganda apparatus, a self-regulatory system of news production originating from the masses and addressed to the masses. How would such a radically new system look in practice?**

The closest equivalent of the media landscape envisioned in the article could be found, in fact, in the wallposters that had provided the model and the source of legitimacy for the earliest xiaobao. The Red Guard papers were clearly aware of this kinship, and the metadiscursive publications contain many reflections on dazibao and their function within the Cultural Revolutionary information ecosystem. Issue 17 (15 September) of Xinwen zhanbao portrays the ideal of mass involvement in this new ecosystem with a set of five illustrations that depict the discursive practice of wallposters (see Figure 1). The illustrations, which take up the top half of the issue’s last page, render with much liveliness all the stages of wallposter production. In the top most picture, workers, a peasant (identified by his straw hat) and soldiers read a denunciation of Liu Shaoqi – his name is crossed out, a common practice in wallposters. The second picture shows what are presumably Red Guards in PLA uniforms pasting new posters to a wall. The central image depicts two Red Guards studying the latest instructions from Chairman Mao and copying them into notebooks, possibly to reprint them in the Red Guard papers. The image to the right shows the masses writing new posters. The grand panorama at the bottom presents the masses, who have acted as writers and producers of wallposters in the pictures above, now in their role of readers. Along a grand avenue that suggests Chang’an Boulevard 长安街 in Beijing, they read and avidly discuss the latest wallposters, whose layout, incidentally, resembles those of the Red Guard papers (note the Mao posters to the left of the “mastheads”). The medium of wallposters, then, signals a route to bridge the gap between writers and readers, between the producers and consumers of journalism. What is notably absent in the collage is any sign of institutional authority, a system of controls or approval, of powers intervening in the masses’ journalistic project.42 The flat hierarchy presented in the idealized depiction of the wallposters levels the field not just by erasing the difference between writers and readers but also by imagining an organic flow of information that is horizontal rather than vertical, as the wide-angled panorama of the final image drives home visually. Yet while wallposters had become an important segment of the Cultural Revolutionary media landscape, they were not mass media. Their mode of dissemination entailed a necessarily limited scope. This is where the crucial difference between wallposters and xiaobao lies.

The quasi-autonomous nature of wallposters, their obvious strength in the Red Guards’ eyes, was checked by their limited reach, a weakness the Red Guard papers compensated for. To justify similarly flat hierarchies and, accordingly, **the journalistic autonomy inherent in a true grassroots press, however, required a more robust legitimation. In spite of the Cultural Revolution’s antiestablishmentarian character, including Mao’s call to “bombard the headquarters,” both Mao and the remnants of the Party apparatus had hesitated to hand over power completely to the radical mass organizations at critical junctions such as the insurrections of the “January storm” that toppled provincial Party committees nationwide. This hesitance had also left the boundaries of the Red Guard papers’ autonomy in a state of flux**

It is in an effort to define the proper scope and the basis of the Red Guard press’s legitimacy that Xinwen zhanbao published, in issue 19 (28 September), an unusually eloquent and boldly argued article with the title “In praise of the Red Guard newspapers” (Zan hongweibing bao 赞红卫兵报).43 Making a case for the Red Guard papers and their permanent place in a post-Cultural Revolutionary PRC, the article is among the most radical proposals emerging from the metadiscursive papers. It begins with a brief history of the Red Guard papers that invests them with the utmost amount of symbolic legitimacy but then quickly turns to the question of mass involvement in journalistic practice by invoking Mao Zedong: “With our newspapers, too, we must rely on everybody, on the masses of the people, on the whole Party to run them, not merely on a few persons behind closed doors.”44 Mao’s call for popular involvement in newspaper making, taken from his widely transmitted 1948 conversations with journalists at Jin-Sui ribao 晋绥日报 (Jin-Sui Daily), is rhetorically juxtaposed to the idea of news professionalism, attributed to Liu Shaoqi. Surveying the history of Party journalism since 1949, the author(s) conclude that the Chinese press has consistently repressed Mao’s demands and favours Liu’s line. Until the appearance of the Red Guard papers, that is:

**The little generals of the Red Guards have never studied the “science” of journalism, they know nothing about the “five Ws” and the “eight factors.”45 But they are warriors in the revolutionary struggle, storm troopers of the Cultural Revolution, each of their pens is a sword directed at the enemy, every single one of their papers is a battleground. The little generals of the Red Guards live among the masses, they have the broadest mass base, their newspapers carry out the mass line in the most thorough way. The major problem that remains unresolved after more than a decade – the detachment of those doing the reporting from those doing practical work – has been finally overcome in the Red Guard newspapers.**

The article effectively links mass involvement in the process of newspaper making – the mass line in journalism – with the specific needs of class struggle. **The Cultural Revolution itself had been defined from the outset as an instance of acute class struggle. Rather than withering away in a socialist nation, the bourgeoisie had regained momentum through “those in authority taking the capitalist road”** (zou zibenzhuyi daolu de dangquan pai 走资本主义道路的当权派).46 The accordingly intensified class struggle was now concentrated in the cultural realm, hence the need for a cultural revolution. In the PRC’s political imaginary, **the press is of course a crucial subsector of the cultural realm, the nation’s newspapers becoming the very battleground on which the struggle between the two lines is waged**. The article highlights this reasoning, noting that the Red Guard papers are not just the “warriors” and “storm troopers” of the Cultural Revolution, but “a battleground.” **The newspapers, journals and pamphlets published by mass organizations all over the country, all hundreds and thousands of them, play a most crucial role at the very centre of the political maelstrom engulfing the nation.**

The big question, then, is: are the Red Guard papers more than a transitional phenomenon, a convenient but momentary tool? In other words, would the Red Guard press have a permanent role to play in the post-Cultural Revolutionary nation? The authors’ answer, in the article’s final paragraph, expands on the line of reasoning outlined above and is clearly in the affirmative. **The Party press had comprehensively failed as a bulwark against attacks from the class enemy, and only the Red Guard papers were able to defeat the enemy**. The Red Guard papers, consequently, would be needed in the future, **for the same reason and purpose: to guard against future threats to the socialist system**. The article concludes with the paean:

With their resolute and courageous action, the Red Guard newspapers have criticized the bourgeois, revisionist news line in a most thorough way. This is a great revolution with mass involvement on a scale unprecedented in the history of the proletarian press; it is a new victory for Chairman Mao’s news line. The Red Guard newspapers have made a tremendously useful and valuable contribution to the experience of the proletarian press, a contribution that deserves to be seriously studied and explored by every revolutionary news worker. Let us loudly and with revolutionary enthusiasm praise this great new thing of historical significance, let us loudly and with revolutionary enthusiasm praise this great innovation in the history of the proletarian press!

#### Prefer –

#### a] Context – The resolution isn’t about just Research, it’s about what a Free Press should do with regards to other reporting which only our Evidence assumes – outweighs – words aren’t intrinsically defined but defined with context.

Cambridge Dictionary No Date "Free Press" <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/free-press> //Elmer

If a country has a free press, its newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations are able to express any opinions they want, even if these criticize the government and other organizations: How can there be democratic elections without a free press?

#### b] Intent to Define – 1NC Calcutt and Hammond are making a holistic description about what Objective Journalist Ethics entail, the Volland evidence is merely defining a subsection which can’t constitute a model of Debate since it arbitrarily defines the limits of the Topic beyond Framers Intent to always favor the Aff.

#### 2] Violation – the Aff only interprets Objectivity as factual reporting which isn’t sufficient to constitute Objectivity – [that’s the 1AC Definition and CX proves].

#### If the 1AR makes a No Link or a Permutation on the CP, it proves the Violation since they don’t defend an Objective Free Press as being impartial or emotionally detached, thus not meeting their resolutional burden. At worst, view this as auto-competition for our CP’s and links for our DA’s.

#### 3] Standards:

#### a] Neg Ground – Making the Debate Facts Good/Bad is physically impossible to Negate since both Advocacy and Objective Journalists agree Lying is Bad – removing perspective, solution, and point of view Journalism, all of which are factual but disagree w/ the detached and impartial aspects of Objective Journalism destroys all Core Generics.

#### b] Topic Ed – Topic Lit Controversy isn’t Objectivity Good/Bad BUT about distinctions of Impartial Reporting and Point of View – the Topic is about tensions between Advocacy and Objectivity which ISN’T Factual Research Good/Bad – that outweighs since we only debate the Topic for one tournament.

#### 4] Paradigm Issues –

#### a] Topicality is Drop the Debater – it’s a fundamental baseline for debate-ability.

#### b] Use Competing Interps – 1] Topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical and 2] Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### c] No RVI’s - 1] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, 2] Encourages Baiting since the 1AC will purposely be abusive, and 3] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

### 1NC—Case

#### The role of the ballot is to determine if the aff’s a good idea—anything else is self-serving, arbitrary and begs the question of the rest of the debate. Evaluate consequences

Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### Biological death is the ultimate evil – it obliterates metaphysics and ontology

Paterson 3 - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, SAGE

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather**,** death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclu sion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state thatany intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility**.**

#### Tech innovation undergirded by profit motives are driving the Second Machine Age, which dematerializes capitalism and makes growth a sustainable necessity

This ev is v v v long but it’s amazing – answers basically every aff arg

McAfee, 19—cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management, former professor at Harvard Business School and fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society (Andrew, “Looking Ahead: The World Cleanses Itself This Way,” *More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources—and What Happens Next*, Chapter 14, pg 278-292, Kindle, dml)

The decreases in resource use, pollution, and other exploitations of the earth cataloged in the preceding chapters are great news. But are they going to last? It could be that we're just living in a pleasant interlude between the Industrial Era and another rapacious period during which we massively increase our footprint on our planet and eventually cause a giant Malthusian crash.

It could be, but I don't think so. Instead, I think we're going to take better care of our planet from now on. I'm confident that the Second Machine Age will mark the time in our history when we started to progressively and permanently tread more lightly on the earth, taking less from it and generally caring for it better, even as we humans continue to become more numerous and prosperous. The work of Paul Romer, who shared the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics, is one of the sources of this confidence.

Growth Mindset

Romer's largest contribution to economics was to show that it's best not to think of new technologies as something that companies buy and bring in from the outside, but instead as something they create themselves (the title of his most famous paper, published in 1990, is "Endogenous Technological Change"). These technologies are like designs or recipes; as Romer put it, they’re "the instructions that we follow for combining raw materials." This is close to the definitions of technology presented in chapter 7.

Why do companies invent and improve technologies? Simply, to generate profits. They come up with instructions, recipes, and blueprints that will let them grow revenues or shrink costs. As we saw repeatedly in chapter 7, capitalism provides ample incentive for this kind of tech progress.

So far, all this seems like a pretty standard argument for how the first two horsemen work together. Romer's brilliance was to highlight the importance of two key attributes of the technological ideas companies come up with as they pursue profits. The first is that they're nonrival, meaning that they can be used by more than one person or company at a time, and that they don't get used up. This is obviously not the case for most resources made out of atoms—I can't also use the pound of steel that you've just incorporated into the engine of a car—but it is the case for ideas and instructions. The Pythagorean theorem, a design for a steam engine, and a recipe for delicious chocolate chip cookies aren't ever going to get "used up" no matter how much they're used.

The second important aspect of corporate technologies is that they're partially excludable. This means that companies can kind of prevent others from using them. They do this by keeping the technologies secret (such as the exact recipe for Coca-Cola), filing for patents and other intellectual-property protection, and so on. However, none of these measures is perfect (hence the words partially and kind of). Trade secrets leak. Patents expire, and even before they expire, they must describe the invention they're claiming and so let others study it.

Partial excludability is a beautiful thing. It provides strong incentives for companies to create useful, profit-enhancing new technologies that they alone can benefit from for a time, yet it also ensures that the new techs will eventually "spill over"—that with time they’ll diffuse and get adopted by more and more companies, even if that's not what their originators want.

Romer equated tech progress to the production by companies of nonrivalrous, partially excludable ideas and showed that these ideas cause an economy to grow. What's more, he also demonstrated that this idea-fueled growth doesn't have to slow down with time. It's not constrained by the size of the labor force, the amount of natural resources, or other such factors. Instead, economic growth is limited only by the idea-generating capacity of the people within a market. Romer called this capacity "human capital" and said at the end of his 1990 paper, "The most interesting positive implication of the model is that an economy with a larger total stock of human capital will experience faster growth."

This notion, which has come to be called "increasing returns to scale," is as powerful as it is counterintuitive. Most formal models of economic growth, as well as the informal mental ones most of us walk around with, feature decreasing returns—growth slows down as the overall economy gets bigger. This makes intuitive sense; it just feels like it would be easier to experience 5 percent growth in a $1 billion economy than a $1 trillion one. But Romer showed that as long as that economy continued to add to its human capital—the overall ability of its people to come up with new technologies and put them to use—it could actually grow faster even as it grew bigger. This is because the stock of useful, nonrivalrous, nonexcludable ideas would keep growing. As Romer convincingly showed, economies run and grow on ideas.

The Machinery of Prosperity

Romer's ideas should leave us optimistic about the planetary benefits of digital tools—hardware, software, and networks—for three main reasons. First, countless examples show us how good these tools are at fulfilling the central role of technology, which is to provide "instructions that we follow for combining raw materials." Since raw materials cost money, profit-maximizing companies are particularly keen to find ways to use fewer of them. So they use digital tools to come up with beer cans that use less aluminum, car engines that use less steel and less gas, mapping software that removes the need for paper atlases, and so on and so on. None of this is done solely for the good of the earth—it's done for the pursuit of profit that's at the heart of capitalism—yet it benefits the planet by, as we've seen, causing us to take less from it.

Digital tools are technologies for creating technologies, the most prolific and versatile ones we've ever come up with. They're machines for coming up with ideas. Lots of them. The same piece of computer-aided design software can be used to create a thinner aluminum can or a lighter and more fuel-efficient engine. A drone can be used to scan farmland to see if more irrigation is needed, or to substitute for a helicopter when filming a movie. A smartphone can be used to read the news, listen to music, and pay for things, all without consuming a single extra molecule.

In the Second Machine Age, the global stock of digital tools is increasing much more quickly than ever before. It's being used in countless ways by profit-hungry companies to combine raw materials in ways that use fewer of them. In advanced economies such as America's, the cumulative impact of this combination of capitalism and tech progress is clear: absolute dematerialization of the economy and society, and thus a smaller footprint on our planet.

The second way Romer's ideas about technology and growth are showing up at present is via decreased excludability. Pervasive digital tools are making it much easier for good designs and recipes to spread around the world. While this is often not what a company wants—it wants to exclude others from its great cost-saving idea— excludability is not as easy as it used to be.

This isn't because of weaker patent protection, but instead because of stronger digital tools. Once one company shows what's possible, others use hardware, software, and networks to catch up to the leader. Even if they can't copy exactly because of intellectual-property restrictions, they can use digital tools to explore other means to the same end. So, many farmers learn to get higher yields while using less water and fertilizer, even though they combine these raw materials in different ways. Steve Jobs would certainly have preferred for Apple to be the only provider of smartphones after it developed the iPhone, but he couldn't maintain the monopoly no matter how many patents and lawsuits he filed. Other companies found ways to combine processors, memory, sensors, a touch screen, and software into phones that satisfied billions of customers around the world.

The operating system that powers most non-Apple smartphones is Android, which is both free to use and freely modifiable. Google's parent company, Alphabet, developed and released Android without even trying to make it excludable; the explicit goal was to make it as widely imitable as possible. This is an example of the broad trend across digital industries of giving away valuable technologies for free.

The Linux operating system, of which Android is a descendant, is probably the best-known example of free and open-source software, but there are many others. The online software repository GitHub maintains that it's "the largest open source community in the world" and hosts millions of projects. The Arduino community does something similar for electronic hardware, and the Instructables website contains detailed instructions for making equipment ranging from air-particle counters to machine tools, all with no intellectual-property protection. Contributors to efforts such as these have a range of motivations (Alphabet's goals with Android were far from purely altruistic—among other things, the parent of Google wanted to achieve a quantum leap in mobile phone users around the world, who would avail themselves of Google Search and services such as YouTube), but they're all part of the trend of technology without excludability, which is great news for growth.

As we saw in chapter 10, smartphone use and access to the Internet are increasing quickly across the planet. This means that people no longer need to be near a decent library or school to gain knowledge and improve their abilities. Globally, people are taking advantage of the skill-building opportunities of new technologies. This is the third reason that the spread of digital tools should make us optimistic about future growth: these tools are helping human capital grow quickly.

The free Duolingo app, for example, is now the world's most popular way to learn a second language. Of the nearly 15 billion Wikipedia page views during July of 2018, half were in languages other than English. Google's chief economist, Hal Varian, points out that hundreds of millions of how-to videos are viewed every day on YouTube, saying, "We never had a technology before that could educate such a broad group of people anytime on an as-needed basis for free."

Romer's work leaves me hopeful because it shows that it's our ability to build human capital, rather than chop down forests, dig mines, or burn fossil fuels that drives growth and prosperity. His model of how economies grow also reinforces how well capitalism and tech progress work together, which is a central point of this book. The surest way to boost profits is to cut costs, and modern technologies, especially digital ones, offer unlimited ways to combine and recombine materials—to swap, slim, optimize, and evaporate—in cost-reducing ways. There's no reason to expect that the two horsemen of capitalism and tech progress will stop riding together anytime soon. Quite the contrary. Romer's insights reveal that they're likely to gallop faster and farther as economies grow.

Our Brighter, Lighter Future

The world still has billions of desperately poor people, but they won't remain that way. All available evidence strongly suggests that most will become much wealthier in the years and decades ahead. As they earn more and consume more, what will be the impact on the planet?

The history and economics of the Industrial Era lead to pessimism on this important question. Resource use increased in lockstep with economic growth throughout the two centuries between James Watt's demonstration of his steam engine and the first Earth Day. Malthus and Jevons seemed to be right, and it was just a question of when, not if, we'd run up against the hard planetary limits to growth.

But in America and other rich countries something strange, unexpected, and wonderful happened: we started getting more from less. We decoupled population and economic growth from resource consumption, pollution, and other environmental harms. Malthus's and Jevons's ideas gave way to Romer's, and the world will never be the same.

This means that instead of worrying about the world's poor becoming richer, we should instead be helping them upgrade economically as much and as quickly as possible. Not only is it the morally correct thing to do, it's also the smart move for our planet. As today’s poor countries get richer, their institutions will improve and most will eventually go through what Ricardo Hausmann calls "the capitalist makeover of production." This makeover doesn't enslave people, nor does it befoul the earth.

As today’s poor get richer, they'll consume more, but they'll also consume much differently from earlier generations. They won't read physical newspapers and magazines. They'll get a great deal of their power from renewables and (one hopes) nuclear because these energy sources will be the cheapest. They’ll live in cities, as we saw in chapter 12; in fact, they already are. They'll be less likely to own cars because a variety of transportation options will be only a few taps away. Most important, they'll come up with ideas that keep the growth going, and that benefit both humanity and the planet we live on.

Predicting exactly how technological progress will unfold is much like predicting the weather: feasible in the short term, but impossible over a longer time. Great uncertainty and complexity prevent precise forecasts about, for example, the computing devices we’ll be using thirty years from now or the dominant types of artificial intelligence in 2050 and beyond.

But even though we can't predict the weather long term, we can accurately forecast the climate. We know how much warmer and sunnier it will be on average in August than in January, for example, and we know that global average temperatures will rise as we keep adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. Similarly, we can predict the "climate" of future technological progress by starting from the knowledge that it will be heavily applied in the areas where it can affect capitalism the most. As we've seen over and over, tech progress supplies opportunities to trim costs (and improve performance) via dematerialization, and capitalism provides the motive to do so.

As a result, the Second Enlightenment will continue as we move deeper into the twenty-first century. I'm confident that it will accelerate as digital technologies continue to improve and multiply and global competition continues to increase. We’ll see some of the most striking examples of slim, swap, evaporate, and optimize in exactly the places where the opportunities are biggest. Here are a few broad predictions, spanning humanity's biggest industries.

Manufacturing. Complex parts will be made not by the techniques developed during the Industrial Era, but instead by three- dimensional printing. This is already the case for some rocket engines and other extremely expensive items. As 3-D printing improves and becomes cheaper, it will spread to automobile engine blocks, manifolds and other complicated arrangements of pipes, airplane struts and wings, and countless other parts. Because 3-D printing generates virtually no waste and doesn't require massive molds, it accelerates dematerialization.

We'll also be building things out of very different materials from what we're using today. We're rapidly improving our ability to use machine learning and massive amounts of computing power to screen the huge number of molecules available in the world. Well use this ability to determine which substances would be best for making flexible solar panels, more efficient batteries, and other important equipment. Our search for the right materials to use has so far been slow and laborious. That's about to change.

So is our ability to understand nature's proteins, and to generate new ones. All living things are made out of the large biomolecules known as proteins, as are wondrous materials such as spiders' silk. The cells in our bodies are assembly lines for proteins, but we currently understand little about how these assembly lines work—how they fold a two-dimensional string of amino acids into a complicated 3-D protein. But thanks to digital tools, we're learning quickly. In 2018, as part of a contest, the AlphaFold software developed by Google DeepMind correctly guessed the structure of twenty-five out of forty-three proteins it was shown; the second-place finisher guessed correctly three times. DeepMind cofounder Demis Hassabis says, "We [haven't] solved the protein-folding problem, this is just a first step... but we have a good system and we have a ton of ideas we haven't implemented yet." As these good ideas accumulate, they might well let us make spider-strength materials.

Energy. One of humanity's most urgent tasks in the twenty-first century is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Two ways to do this are to become more efficient in using energy and, when generating it, to shift away from carbon-emitting fossil fuels. Digital tools will help greatly with both.

Several groups have recently shown that they can combine machine learning and other techniques to increase the energy efficiency of data centers by as much as 30 percent. This large improvement matters for two reasons. First, data centers are heavy users of energy, accounting for about 1 percent of global electricity demand. So efficiencies in these facilities help. Second, and more important, these gains indicate how much the energy use of all our other complicated infrastructures— everything from electricity grids to chemical plants to steel mills—can be trimmed. All are a great deal less energy efficient than they could be. We have both ample opportunity and ample incentive now to improve them.

Both wind and solar power are becoming much cheaper, so much so that in many parts of the world they're now the most cost-effective options, even without government subsidies, for new electrical generators. These energy sources use virtually no resources once they're up and running and generate no greenhouse gases; they're among the world champions of dematerialization.

In the decades to come they might well be joined by nuclear fusion, the astonishingly powerful process that takes place inside the sun and other stars. Harnessing fusion has been tantalizingly out of reach for more than half a century—the old joke is that it's twenty years away and always will be. A big part of the problem is that it's hard to control the fusion reaction inside any human- made vessel, but massive improvements in sensors and computing power are boosting hope that fusion power might truly be only a generation away.

Transportation. Our current transportation systems are chronically inefficient. Most vehicles aren't used much of the time, and even when they’re in use, they're not nearly full. Now that we have technologies that let us know where every driver, passenger, piece of cargo, and vehicle is at all times, we can greatly increase the utilization and efficiency of every element of transportation.

Renting instead of owning transportation is a likely consequence of this shift. Instead of owning cars, which typically sit idle more than 90 percent of the time, more people will choose to access transportation as needed. We're already seeing this with car-hailing companies such as Uber and Lyft. These services are quickly spreading around the world, and expanding to cover more modes of transportation, from motorbikes to bicycles to electric scooters. They're also moving into commercial applications such as long- and short-haul trucking. As this shift continues, we’ll need fewer tons of steel, aluminum, plastic, gasoline, and other resources to move the world's people and goods around.

We might also experience less congestion and gridlock as we try to get around. Bikes and scooters take up little space compared to cars, so streets can accommodate many more of them. Technology also gives us the ability to implement many forms of "congestion pricing," which has been shown to reduce gridlock by making car access to busy streets expensive enough that people use other options. The most intriguing future transportation platform of all might be the sky. The same technologies that power today's small drones can be scaled up to build "air taxis" with as many as eight propellers and no pilot. Such contraptions sound like science fiction today, but they might be carrying us around by midcentury.

Agriculture. As we saw in chapter 5, leading farms have demonstrated an ability to increase their tonnage of output year after year while decreasing their use of inputs such as land, water, and fertilizer. This trend toward optimization will continue thanks to a set of innovations under the label precision agriculture. The precision comes from many sources, including better sensors of plant and animal health, soil quality and moisture, and so on; the ability to deliver fertilizer, pesticides, and water just where they're needed; and machinery that adapts itself to each plant or animal. All these varieties of precision will combine to allow traditional farms to generate more from less.

So will changes to the genomes of plants and animals. DNA modifications will increase disease and drought tolerance, expand where crops can be grown, and allow us to get more of what we want from each crop or herd. As we saw in chapter 9, they'll also allow us to take better care of vulnerable populations such as infants in poor countries by creating golden rice and other nutrition enhancers. We'll also be able to make much more precise and targeted genetic modifications thanks to a new crop of gene-editing tools that are large improvements over their more scattershot predecessors. Opposition to genetically modified organisms is fierce in some quarters, but isn't based on reason or science. This opposition will, one hopes, fade.

Throughout human history, just about all farming has been done in fields. For some crops, this is now changing. Agriculture has moved indoors, where parameters such as light, humidity, fertilizer, and even the composition of the atmosphere can be precisely monitored and controlled. In everything from urban buildings to shipping containers, crops are now being grown with progressively less labor and fewer material inputs. These completely contained farms will spread and help reduce the planetary footprint of our agriculture.

These examples aren't intended to be comprehensive, and I don't have precise estimates of how likely each innovation is, or when it's most likely to occur. I offer them only to indicate how broad and exciting are the possibilities offered by the two horsemen of capitalism and technological progress, and how they’ll continue to dematerialize our consumption and let us increase our prosperity while treading more lightly on our planet.

#### No limits to growth---their models ignore key feedback effects.

Lynch 16—President of Strategic Energy and Economic Consulting, Director of Asian Energy and Security at the Center for International Studies at MIT, and a Lecturer at Tufts and Vienna University [Michael, *The “peak oil” scare and the coming oil flood*, p. 63-74]

More recently, there has been a clamor about "peak everything" based on the idea that, well, everything is finite and we 're using it up, so it is "running out." Or at least, production must peak. Or, as one physicist [END OF PAGE 63] points out, eventually human energy production will generate as much heat as the sun does-eventually being 1400 years.

Flat Earth

Colin Campbell, in the famed (well, famous in the IEA's offices) debate at the IEA in 1997, compared resource optimists to the conservative Spanish court that opposed the visionary, Columbus, and has since referred to those, like Adelman and me, who disagreed with him as "flat-earth economists." Albert Bartlett later explained that the term actually meant that economists thought the earth had two dimensions and thus was infinite, containing equivalently infinite resources.

But this description ignores two important variables: capital and knowledge. Additional investment can often increase the production of renewables like agricultural products and nonrenewables like minerals and oil in the same amount of space, as can better technology. Neo-Malthusians tend to ignore this factor and argue that the rate of technological advance (and greater scientific knowledge) has diminished or disappeared, as described in Chapter 7.

The argument is somewhat specious and relies in part the question of the finiteness of resources, discussed earlier-or a static measure of resources and dynamic view of consumption, as in The Limits to Growth.

HOW LONG?

Perhaps the most important factor that raises skepticism is the fact that at least some exponential alarmists fear the distant future. Any number of pundits have looked at long-term forecasts of economic and/or technological development and characterized them as foolish. We have no flying cars, nuclear power is not too cheap to meter, and no one is eating Soylent Green. On the other hand, most of these were not serious forecasting efforts, but rather off-the-cuff remarks (or the equivalent), and those making them were not particularly serious about achieving them within a specific time frame. And we do eat Soylent Green already; only we call it tofu and vegemite. (Read the book, it wasn't people.)

NEWTON'S FIRST LAW

The biggest mistakes have come from an apparent source: extrapolation of a trend endlessly, as if there were no feedback or other variables [END PAGE 64] involved. Jay Forrester, the inventor of Systems Dynamics, which was used in The Limits to Growth model (and which I have used), reportedly once said that feedback effects tend to overwhelm the initial stimuli, which is probably true in many cases. Yet, many neo-Malthusians and especially peak oil advocates tend to extrapolate a given trend endlessly, assuming no feedback effect whatsoever.

Indeed, the first wave of peak oil advocates explicitly argued that no feedback effect would occur: prices didn't affect production or consumption levels. Technological advances were either unimportant or had ceased and so could not increase the resource base.

An important element of the fear of exponential growth is the analysts' choice of particularly high growth rates. As Figure 4.1 showed, Ehrlich chose the highest observed growth in the 20th century for his calculations, even though it represented the post-World War II baby boom and should have been considered an exception, not the norm. Similarly, Bartlett, writing in 1998, talks about the growth in oil demand from the 1950s and 1960s at 7 [percent] a year, which causes a doubling of use every decade, 25 which sounds alarming, given the arguments about the difficulty of making a speedy energy transition, until you realize that consumption growth dropped to 3% per year in the 1970s (a doubling time of 24 years), and under 1 [percent] per year in the 1980s (a doubling period of 75 years), before recovering to 1.5% in the seven years before his talk (48 years).

This emphasizes the lack of feedback mechanism used in these simplistic models and how important they are in the real world.

REAL SCARCITY

Indeed, the subtext of the fear of resource scarcity is that renewable resources have repeatedly been the source of problems. In Tainter's The Collapse of Complex Societies, he talks about resources as causing the fall of a number of (mostly) ancient civilizations; nearly all suffered from problems like lengthy droughts and salt buildup in irrigated farmland. 26

And similar problems continue today, especially if you consider endangered species, from rhinos to tuna. In all cases, these are renewable resources, the very ones that are NOT finite, that are sustainable, that we can rely on for all eternity-in theory. No lasting shortage of nonrenewable resources minerals and energy-has occurred since the advent of the global economy.

#### Free markets key to solve disease cures

Jackson 16. Kerry, Pacific Research Institute; 12/19/16; Free Market Policies Needed To Incentivize Creation Of New Life-Saving Treatments; https://www.pacificresearch.org/article/free-market-policies-needed-to-incentivize-creation-of-new-life-saving-treatments/

“Our strongest antibiotics don’t work and patients are left with potentially untreatable infections,” Director Dr. Tom Frieden said when the CDC issued its warning. He asked doctors, hospitals and public health officials to “work together” to “stop these infections from spreading.” The 2014 Report to the President expressed a similar concern: “The evolution of antibiotic resistance is now occurring at an alarming rate and is outpacing the development of new countermeasures capable of thwarting infections in humans. This situation threatens patient care, economic growth, public health, agriculture, economic security and national security.” For those thinking this sort of thing shouldn’t be happening when medical science is more advanced than can almost be conceived, be assured that it is. And unless there are public policy interventions, it’s likely to get worse. “More and more microorganisms will continue to gain resistance to the current drug therapies because (antimicrobial resistance, or AMR) is basic evolution,” Wayne Winegarden writes in the Pacific Research Institute’s newly-released report “Incenting the Development of Antimicrobial Medicines to Address the Problem of Drug-Resistant Infections.” The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers says the problem is caused by “a dearth of new antibiotic medicines.” At the same time that there’s been an increase in AMR, there has been “a sharp decline in the development of new antibiotic medicines.” The group reports that only two new classes of antibiotics have been discovered in the last three decades compared to 11 in the previous 50 years. The answers to many medical problems are still not within reach of researchers. But the hazards of AMR can be diminished. Winegarden suggests we begin with public health campaigns that encourage handwashing, which he calls a highly effective and low-cost way to reduce the spread of infection. He further recommends policy that would address the problem of antibiotic overuse and greater use of vaccines to cut the incidents of infection. But Winegarden’s primary concern is establishing the correct incentives for developing new antimicrobial medicines that would be effective against AMR microorganisms. He’s specifically referring to policies “based on a thorough understanding of the disincentives that are currently inhibiting their development.” “These disincentives are well-recognized,” he writes. “Despite the medical need, and despite the generally strong return on investment for many other drug classes, the return on investment for developing new antimicrobial medicines (particularly antibiotics) is too low.” Producing a new drug is a grinding and expensive endeavor. It can take 10 to 15 years to develop a single prescription drug that is introduced to the market, and a company can spend as much as $5.5 billion on research and development for each medication that is eventually approved and prescribed. Less than 2 percent of all projects launched to create new drugs succeed. This is not an environment in which pharmaceutical companies can get too amped up about pursuing new treatments. Yet new drug approvals increased over the last decade. Don’t look for a surge of antimicrobial drugs in that pipeline, though. Winegarden says that particular drug class is among several that “face unique impediments” that serve as disincentives for innovation. To overcome the steep hill that impedes the development of new AMR drugs, lawmakers must implement policies that unleash the incentives of the free market. Policymakers also should look at the 1983 federal Orphan Drug Act and its market-oriented reforms that increased the number of drugs developed to treat rare diseases. More than 400 have been introduced to the market since the law was enacted, compared to fewer than 10 in the 1970s. Put another way, government needs to remove its anchors from the process and let the market do what it does so well. In this case, that’s restoring patients’ health, enriching innovative companies that create jobs, and inspiring biotech start-ups such as the group of Stanford undergraduates that has been capitalized to develop new antibiotics. If the proper incentives are in place, the needed treatments will follow.

#### Pandemics end civilization – no burnout

Kerscher 14. Karl-Heinz, professor and management consultant “Space Education”, Wissenschaftliche Studie, 2014

The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence, the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens, multiplied by the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an upper limit to the virulence of naturally evolved pathogens. This is because a pathogen that quickly kills its hosts might not have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its hosts more slowly or not at all will allow carriers more time to spread the infection, and thus likely out-compete a more lethal species or strain. This simple model predicts that if virulence and transmission are not linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards low virulence and rapid transmission. However, this assumption is not always valid and in more complex models, where the level of virulence and the rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can evolve. The level of virulence that is possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations of hosts, with different susceptibilities to infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and competition between different strains of pathogens can also alter virulence. There are numerous historical examples of pandemics that have had a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the possibility of global pandemic a realistic threat to human civilization.

#### Independently profit motive key to effective resource management

Fitzmaurice 15. Matthew, CEO, EcoAlpha Asset Management LLC. “ONLY CAPITALISM CAN SAVE THE PLANET,” Ensla. 3/23/2015. http://ensia.com/voices/only-capitalism-can-save-the-planet/

Here’s the thing, though: where there are problems to be solved, there’s money to be made. And where there’s money to be made, we awaken one of the world’s most powerful forces for change: capitalism. ¶ Of course capitalism has played a starring role in distressing the planet’s resources. Historically, the combination of unchecked industry, a readiness to externalize costs and a relentless thirst for growth have plundered and polluted the earth. It’s not a debate, but simple fact that our population size and economies cannot continue on their present trajectories without exhausting the world’s resources. Yet, a rapidly expanding global middle class — increasingly urbanized and hungry for protein — threatens further and accelerating distress. ¶ The hopeful news is that businesses, with their almost singular focus on economic self-interest, and governments, motivated by a variety of interests, are beginning to recognize and address in earnest these inevitable problems. ¶ Today, the businesses that develop practical and affordable solutions to burdened resource problems will end up being the world’s most profitable companies. No longer can they be considered “sustainability” businesses. They are everyday businesses with a long view, targeting problems that are not going away. That’s smart business. Burdened resources have become a strong economic driver for businesses of all sizes, in all industries everywhere to spend and change — and one that will only grow in scope and intensity over time. ¶ The companies that provide effective solutions to burdened resources will provide superior risk-adjusted returns to their investors as business and governments accelerate their solutions spending out of their own economic self-interest. And because the products, technologies and services these companies provide are common solutions to global problems — and are therefore exponentially repeatable — these investments will have amplified positive impact on global resource scarcity issues. ¶ Too often people have a narrow view of these solutions, thinking only of solar panels and windmills. But solutions are enormously diverse: They include, among many others, agricultural drones that monitor soil conditions, smart irrigation technology that delivers water only where and when it’s really needed, more efficient distributed energy generation and component suppliers that make cars use less gas. ¶ We face a new reality in which our economic self-interest and the long-term well-being of the planet are coming into alignment.¶ As a whole, the human race has a poor track record when it comes to altruism. Although there are a great many saints among us who spend — and even sacrifice — their lives to help others, most of us are hard pressed to take care of ourselves and our families. We have a much better track record when it comes to investing money in our own self- interest, which has fueled the unprecedented innovation, economic and life-expectancy growth of the past century. ¶ In the past, many people who invested in sustainable solutions were motivated principally by conscience, willing to accept reduced returns in order to invest their money in a way that was consistent with their beliefs and convictions — be they religious, social or environmental. Now, however, we face a new reality in which our economic self-interest and the long-term well-being of the planet are coming into alignment. Because we have to face the reality of burdened resources, there’s money in it. ¶ Recently, some asset managers have based investments on environmental, social and governance screening, betting that good corporate citizens are inherently better-managed companies, which will therefore be more profitable over time. Increasingly, however, ESG screening is becoming more pervasive and will likely over time become commonplace, robbing this sort of screening as a differentiator when making investment decisions. ¶ The primary goal for investing in sustainable solutions is to achieve superior risk-adjusted returns. Companies that provide solutions to the issues of burdened resources will be the recipients of a massive global spend cycle, no matter one’s motivation. The fact that one’s investment is also part of the solution rather than the problem is worth getting excited about. Self-interest is what moves markets. According to McKinsey’s report, How to make Green Growth the new normal, “In order to mobilize the US$3 trillion a year that will be needed to build a resource-efficient growth model, investing in the markets of the future needs to be seen as possessing superior risk-return characteristics.”¶ No government subsidy or charity case can move the needle for long. Only capitalism has the power to retool industries, reshape economies and rebuild infrastructure across the planet. It’s a big part of what got us into this mess, but it’s also what will get us out.

#### Ineffective resource management degrades public health, kills global air quality, and causes tensions over water scarcity in South Asia—culminates in extinction

Thompson 13. Thomas, President of Analytics Inc., a financial research and economic analysis firm. Citing Wang Shucheng, China’s former minister of water resources. “Choking on China,” Foreign Affairs. 6/8/2013. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-04-08/choking-china

The dangers of China’s environmental degradation go well beyond the country’s borders, as pollution threatens global health more than ever. Chinese leaders have argued that their country has the right to pollute, claiming that, as a developing nation, it cannot sacrifice economic growth for the sake of the environment. In reality, however, China is holding the rest of the world hostage -- and undermining its own prosperity.¶ According to the World Bank, only one percent of China’s 560 million urban residents breathe air considered safe by EU standards. Beijing’s levels of PM2.5s -- particles that are smaller than 2.5 micrometers in diameter and can penetrate the gas exchange regions of the lungs -- are the worst in the world. Beijing’s 2012 March average reading was 469 micrograms of such particles per cubic meter, which compares abysmally with Los Angeles’ highest 2012 reading of 43 micrograms per cubic meter.¶ Such air pollution contributed to 1.2 million premature deaths in China in 2010, according to the Global Burden of Disease Study. The unrelenting pace of construction of coal-fired power plants is only making matters worse. In his recent monograph, Climate Change: The China Problem, environmental scholar Michael Vandenbergh writes, “On average, a new coal-powered electric plant large enough to serve a city the size of Dallas opens in China every seven to ten days.” The lack of widespread coal-washing infrastructure and scrubbers at Chinese industrial facilities exacerbates the problem.¶ Carbon dioxide emissions from cars in China are also growing exponentially, replacing coal-fired power plants as the major source of pollution in major Chinese cities. Deutsche Bank estimates that the number of passenger cars in China will reach 400 million by 2030, up from today’s 90 million. And the sulfur levels produced by diesel trucks in China are at least 23 times worse than those in the United States. Acid rain, caused by these emissions, has damaged a third of China’s limited cropland, in addition to forests and watersheds on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan. This pollution reaches the United States as well, sometimes at levels prohibited by the U.S. Clean Water Act. In 2006, researchers at the University of California–Davis discovered that almost all of the harmful particulates over Lake Tahoe originated in China. The environmental experts Juli Kim and Jennifer Turner note in their essay “China’s Filthiest Export” that “by the time it reaches the U.S., mercury transforms into a reactive gaseous material that dissolves easily in the wet climates of the Pacific Northwest.” At least 20 percent of the mercury entering the Willamette River in Oregon most likely comes from China. Black carbon soot from China also threatens to block sunlight, lower crop yields, heat the atmosphere, and destabilize weather throughout the Pacific Rim.¶ China’s use of fresh water resources also threatens those beyond its borders. As Mark Twain reportedly said, in reference to California in the late nineteenth century, “Whiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over.” The sentiment holds true in modern-day Asia as well. Asia’s per capita fresh water availability is less than half the global average. China and India, for example, are home to 40 percent of the world’s population but make do with ten percent of the world’s fresh water. China is guzzling and polluting this limited resource at an alarming rate. The country has dammed every major river on the Tibetan plateau, including the Mekong, the Salween, the Brahmaputra, the Yangtze, the Yellow, the Indus, the Sutlej, the Shweli, and the Karnali, and there are large-scale plans to dam others. Of the 50,000 largest dams in the world, more than half are in China. As a result, China now controls the river water supply to 13 nearby countries but so far has refused to sign any treaties or cooperate with other countries on water issues. Beijing also voted against the UN attempt to regulate water sharing in the region. China’s former minister of water resources, Wang Shucheng, described China’s water policy as “fight for every drop of water or die.” This philosophy, combined with China’s unabated pursuit of economic development, will have profoundly destabilizing consequences for the region, both politically and environmentally.¶ Unfortunately for China, compromising the environment and health in pursuit of economic growth is not a sustainable strategy. The threat of water scarcity and the adverse domestic health effects of pollution darken China’s future. Pollution-related illnesses are soaring. A recent social media campaign led by locals and international activities shed light on the growing phenomena of “cancer villages” -- areas where water pollution is so bad that it has led to a sharp rise in diseases like stomach cancer. China’s own Ministry of Environmental Protection has concluded that 70 percent of the country’s major waterways are heavily polluted. According to Scott Moore of the Sustainability Science Program at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, pollutants have even seeped into the country’s subsurfaces, with more than half of monitored wells deemed unsafe to use for drinking water. The China Geological Survey now estimates that 90 percent of China’s cities depend on polluted groundwater supplies. Water that has been purified at treatment plants is often recontaminated en route to homes. China has plundered its groundwater reserves, drilling massive underground tunnels that have even caused some cities to literally sink.¶ China has also completely botched its waste-removal efforts. Eighty percent of the East China Sea, one of the world’s largest fisheries, is now unsuitable for fishing, according to Elizabeth C. Economy, a China and environmental expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. Most Chinese coastal cities pump at least half of their waste directly into the ocean, which causes red tides and coastal fish die-offs. According to the World Wildlife Fund, the country is now the largest polluter of the Pacific Ocean.¶ The economic costs of pollution have been the focus of various government-backed studies in China. A recent study by the Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning found that environmental damage to forests, wetlands, and grasslands shaved 3.5 percent off China’s 2012 GDP. The World Bank puts the total cost of China’s environmental degradation in the late 1990s at between 3.5 and 8 percent of GDP. China’s pollution problem is holding back its economy -- and poisoning its own people and the rest of the world in the process. The international community should push China to realize that if it continues to ravage the environment, it will be unable to secure its future health and prosperity -- or avoid a global disaster.