### 1NC – T

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must only defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust– they don’t.

#### Resolved requires a policy

Merriam Webster '18 (Merriam Webster; 2018 Edition; Online dictionary and legal resource; Merriam Webster, "resolve," <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve;> RP)  
: a legal or official determination especially: a legislative declaration

#### Private entity is defined by

Cornell Law n.d. “private entity” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term_occur=999&term_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501> TG

(A) In general Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

#### Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty defines outer space and appropriation

OST 66 “2222 (XXI). Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1499th plenary meeting, Dec 19, 1966, <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html> TG

ARTICLE II. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

#### Topicality as a procedural constraint is necessary for effective debate

#### They destroy engagement – predictable stasis ensures research accessibility and negative ground. Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by manipulating balance of prep – vote neg b/c debate is a competitive game that’s meaningless without substantive constraints.

#### Also destroys mechanism education—their model creates a structural disincentive to substantial research. Failure to defend the actor and mechanism of the resolution allows them to shift their advocacy to the terms most favorable to them – causes dogmatism and forces the neg into generics at the margins of the literature – destroys good scholarship.

#### Reject the team—T is question of models of debate and the damage to our strategy was already done

#### Competing interps—they have to proactively to justify their model and reasonability links to our offense

#### No rvis or impact turns—it’s their burden to prove their topical. Beating back T doesn’t prove their advocacy is good

### 1NC – DA

#### Algorithmic governance as per their Beller evidence is good -- it solves crisis escalation.

Corneliu Bjola 19, Head of the Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group, University of Oxford, 11/10/19, “Diplomacy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence,” http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\_en/contenido?WCM\_GLOBAL\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\_in/zonas\_in/ari98-2019-bjola-diplomacy-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence

Taking note of the fact that developments in AI are so dynamic and the implications so wide-ranging, another report prepared by a German think tank calls on Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) to immediately begin planning strategies that can respond effectively to the influence of AI in international affairs. Economic disruption, security & autonomous weapons, and democracy & ethics are the three areas they identify as priorities at the intersection of AI and foreign policy. Although they believe that transformational changes to diplomatic institutions will eventually be needed to meet the challenges ahead, they favour, in the short term, an incremental approach to AI that builds on the successes (and learns from the failures) of “cyber-foreign policy”, which, in many countries, has been already internalised in the culture of the relevant institutions, including of the MFAs.13 In the same vein, the authors of a report prepared for the Centre for a New American Security see great potential for AI in national security-related areas, including diplomacy. For example, AI can help improve communication between governments and foreign publics by lowering language barriers between countries, enhance the security of diplomatic missions via image recognition and information sorting technologies, and support international humanitarian operations by monitoring elections, assisting in peacekeeping operations, and ensuring that financial aid disbursements are not misused through anomaly detection.14

From an AI perspective, consular services could be a low-hanging fruit for AI integration in diplomacy as decisions are amenable to digitisation, the analytical contribution is reasonable relevant and the technology favours collaboration between users and the machine. Consular services rely on highly structured decisions, as they largely involve recurring and routinised operations based on clear and stable procedures, which do not need to be treated as new each time a decision has to be made (except for crisis situations, which are discussed further below). From a knowledge perspective, AI-assisted consular services may embody declarative (know-what) and procedural knowledge (know-how) to automate routinised operations and scaffold human cognition by reducing cognitive effort. This can be done by using data mining and data discovery techniques to organize the data and make it possible to identify patterns and relationships that would be difficult to observe otherwise (e.g., variation of demand for services by location, time, and audience profile).

Case study #1: AI as Digital Consul Assistant

The consulate of country X has been facing uneven demand for emergency passports, visa requests and business certifications in the past five years. The situation has led to a growing backlog, significant loss of public reputation and a tense relationship between the consulate and the MFA. An AI system trained with data from the past five years uses descriptive analytics to identify patterns in the applications and concludes that August, May and December are the most likely months to witness an increase of the demand in the three categories next year. AI predictions are confirmed for August and May but not for December. AI recalibrates its advice using updated data and the new predictions help consular officers manage requests more effectively. As the MFA confidence in the AI system grows, the digital assistant is then introduced to other consulates experiencing similar problems.

Digital platforms could also emerge as indispensable tools for managing diplomatic crises in the digital age and for good reasons. They can help embassies and MFAs make sense of the nature and gravity of the events in real-time, streamline the decision-making process, manage the public’s expectations, and facilitate crisis termination. At the same time, they need to be used with great care as factual inaccuracies, coordination gaps, mismatched disclosure level, and poor symbolic signalling could easily derail digital efforts of crisis management.15 AI systems could provide great assistance to diplomats in times of crisis by helping them make sense of what it is happening (descriptive analytics) and identify possible trends (predictive analytics). The main challenge for AI is the semi-structured nature of the decisions to be taken. While many MFAs have pre-designed plans to activate in case of a crisis, it is safe to assume that reality often defies the best crafted plans. Given the high level of uncertainty in which crisis decision-making operates and the inevitable scrutiny and demand of accountability to occur if something goes wrong, AI integration can work only if humans retain control over the process. As a recent SIPRI study pointed out, AI systems may fail spectacularly when confronted with tasks or environments that differ slightly to those they were trained for. Their algorithms are also opaque, which makes difficult for humans to explain how they work and whether they include bias that could lead to problematic –if not dangerous– behaviours.16

#### Externally, environmental sustainability – extinction.

David Victor 19, professor of international relations at the School of Global Policy and Strategy and director of the Laboratory on International Law and Regulation, Co-Chair of the Brookings Initiative on Energy and Climate, 1/10/19, “How artificial intelligence will affect the future of energy and climate,” https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-artificial-intelligence-will-affect-the-future-of-energy-and-climate/

HOW AI WILL IMPROVE CLIMATE POLICY

Since the chief protagonist in the climate change story, CO2, has a long atmospheric lifetime, there is only a sluggish relationship between changes in emissions and the accumulated concentrations; in turn, those concentrations have a sluggish impact on the climate. Even if AI were part of some massive transformation in the energy system, the built-in inertia of that energy system, along with the inertia in the climate system, virtually guarantees that the world is in for a lot of climate change. All this is grim news and means that widely discussed goals, such as stopping warming at 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius are unlikely to be realized.

These geophysical and infrastructural realities give rise to a new policy reality: adaptation is urgent.[7] They also mean that emergency responses to extreme climate impacts—for example, solar geoengineering, might be needed as well.

Existing research shows that there is a huge difference in the impact on public welfare from scenarios where climate change affects a society that doesn’t have an adaptation plan compared with a society that takes active adaptive measures. For example, the most recent U.S. climate-impact assessment released in November 2018 demonstrates that active adaptation measures can radically reduce losses from some climate impacts—often with benefits that far exceed the costs.[8] Extreme climate change is going to be ugly and will require hard choices—such as which coastlines to protect or abandon. Without smart adaptation strategies, it will be a lot worse.

One of the central insights from the science of climate impacts is that extreme events will cause most of the damage. A world that is a bit warmer and wetter (and a bit drier in some places) is a world that societies, within reason, can probably adapt to—especially if those gradual changes are easy to anticipate. But a world that has more extreme events—put differently, climate events that have a higher variance—is a world that requires a lot more preparedness. A farming area that faces a new, significant risk of truly extreme drought for example, such as a decade-long dust bowl, will need to prepare as if that extreme event is commonplace. It will need irrigation systems, the option of planting hardier crops and other possible interventions that sit ready when the extreme events come.

Once those systems are purchased, much of the expense is borne and it makes sense to use them all the time. This has been the experience, for example, with the Thames river barrier or a similar Dutch flood barrier—these systems were designed and installed at vast expense with extreme events in mind, and now they are being used much more frequently. Climate impacts are, fundamentally, stochastic events centered around shifting medians—a warmer world, for example, is one where median temperature rises and where the whole distribution of temperatures from cold to hot shifts hotter. But the tails in that statistical distribution also probably fatten, and for some impacts, those tails get a lot fatter. Machine learning techniques will probably improve the ability to understand the shapes of those tails.

This logic of extreme events as the main drivers of climate impacts and response strategies has some big implications for how societies will plan for adaptation and how AI can help—possibly in transformative ways.

First, AI can help focus and adjust adaptation strategies. Because uncertainty is high and extreme events are paramount, policymakers, firms, and households will not know where to act nor what expense is merited. They will have a large portfolio of responses, each with an option value. Machine learning can help improve the capacity to assess those option values more rapidly. Such techniques might also make it possible to rely more heavily on market forces to weigh which options generate private and public welfare—if so, AI could help reduce one of the greatest dangers as societies develop adaptation strategies, which is that they commit vast resources to adaptation without guiding resources to their greatest value. High levels of uncertainty, along with acute private incentives that can mis-allocate resources—for example, local construction firms and organized labor might favor some kinds of adaptive responses (e.g., building sea walls and other hardened infrastructure) even when other less costly options are available—mean that adaptation needs could generate a massive call on resources and thus a massive opportunity for mischief and mis-allocation.

Second, most adaptation efforts are intrinsically local and regional affairs. As a matter of geophysics, climate change harms public welfare when general perturbations in the oceans and atmosphere get translated into specific climatological events that are manifest in specific places—specific coastlines, mountainous regions, public lands, and natural ecosystems. As a matter of public policy, the actors whose responses have the biggest leverage on local impacts are managers of local infrastructures—coastal and urban planners, developers, city managers, and the like. Politically, this is one of the reasons why, despite all the difficulties in mobilizing action to control emissions, it is likely that as communities realize what’s at stake with adaptation, they will respond. Local responses generate, for the most part, local benefits. A big challenge in all this local response, however, is that local authorities are intrinsically decentralized and usually not steeped in technical expertise. Getting the best information on climate impacts and response strategies—let alone keeping that information aligned with local circumstances and shifting odds for climate impacts—is all but impossible. AI could help lower that cost and, in effect, democratize quality climate impacts response.

### 1NC – Case

Kelsie is wrong – all our skills offense internal link turns the ability to analyze debate as a site of the race war. Our arg is that policy analysis IS the best planning

Their optimism bad args are wrong and contradictory – a] they have called for a multicultural coalition to accumulate ballots in order to counter antiblackness b] c/a our case args about optimism good

Debate is a question of models is an arg for framework – their model is not just their aff but the competitive model that allows jettisoning the topic

Yes fairness – the Wilderson card a] relies on ontological claims they have not made or warranted and b] presumes decontexutalized fairness that ignores structural issues, but we’ve contextualized our args to structural change on framework c] procedural > stuctural fairness [kagi u can extempt this]

The Locke card is not about fiat at all – fiat is good – it allows us to consider problems for people beyond ourselves which turns egoism

Power is wrong – the TVA and alternative forms of affirming the topic like soft left or critical affs solve – their method is equally hypothetical because jack shit happens if you vote aff

Aff is a multicultural coalition – perf con – we don’t say future good.

#### Vote Negative on Presumption – multiple warrants:

#### 1] Their forms of sociality through the “Echo” that they embrace are ongoing – black forms of collectivity within debate like LBS, forms of spiritual endurance, etc. which proves there is no unique benefit to voting Aff

#### 2] Neel has been reading the Aff since Grapevine AND NoBro and Coppell did it for years before-hand – the Race War hasn’t ended nor have they worked the code against the code of Logistics – proves the Ballot isn’t key to their offense and only a risk of commodification

#### 3] The 1AC’s method of Endurance means they cannot leverage all of the Race War as offense, only the process of individual survival

#### Presumption is a sequencing question to any other part of this debate – Neel does not get the ballot for simply saying the Race War exists and identifies sociality in the Status Quo – they have to prove their affective orientation is successful in overcoming violent structures

#### 4] Voting aff doesn’t access social change, but voting neg resolves our procedural impacts.

Ritter ‘13 (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)//rct Joey

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually **incapable of creating any social change**, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with **nonapplicable** rhetorical **theory** that **fails to account for the unique aspects** of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: **“Can debate cause social change?”** Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen **not to prove this fundamental assumption**, which—as this article argues—is **merely a fiction** that is **harmful in** most, if not **all, respects**. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a **fiction** than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is **not provable** by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be **incredibly critical** of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes.

#### 5] Their K is not Nearly as radical as they think – Its just a Charade that props up the same structures they Critique note .

Harney And Moten 13 [Stefano and Fred, Minor Compositions, 2013, Fred Moten is Professor of English at the University of California, Riverside, where he teaches courses and conducts research in black studies, performance studies, poetics and literary theory. Stefano Harney is Professor of Strategic Management Education, Singapore Management University and co-founder of the School for Study, an ensemble teaching project. He employs autonomist and postcolonial theory in looking into issues associated with race, work, and social organization, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study, November 15, 2018]//Raunak Dua

* Modified for Gendered Language

Meanwhile, that critical academic in the university, in the circle of the American state, questions the university. [They] claims to be critical of the negligence of the university. But is [they] not the most accomplished professional in his studied negligence? If the labor upon labor, the labor among labor of the unprofessionals in the university sparks revolt, retreat, release, does the labor of the critical academic not involve a mockery of this first labor, a performance that is finally in its lack of concern for what it parodies, negligent? Does the questioning of the critical academic not become a pacification? Or, to put it plainly, does the critical academic not teach how to deny precisely what one produces with others, and is this not the lesson the professions return to the university to learn again and again? Is the critical academic then not dedicated to what Michael E. Brown termed the impoverishment, the immiseration, of society’s cooperative prospects? This is the professional course of action. This enlightenment-type charade is utterly negligent in its critique, a negligence that disavows the possibility of a thought of an outside, a nonplace called the undercommons – the nonplace that must be thought outside to be sensed inside, from which the enlightenment-type charade has stolen everything for its game.

#### Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Objectivity- body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### C] Comes before value-to-life.

Tännsjö 11 (Torbjörn, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” <http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf>) //BS 1-27-2018

\*\*Bracketed to avoid triggers

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all [die] commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not [die] commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I [die] kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

#### D] Mathematically outweighs.

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### If you think they’re right about their theory - their re-tooling of the Code through the “Echo” gets coopted within the university – this ev is unbelievably fire AND indicts their Form of Militancy.

Webb, Darren. "Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?)." Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies 40.2 (2018): 96-118. (Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield)//Elmer

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but **refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job.** When Moten **describes subversion** as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), **one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.**7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically **short-lived**, and—as Harney and Moten warned—**there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you** into alternative spaces “**because we’ve been inside so much**” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, **meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda**, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, **it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia**. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And **we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance**. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more. The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street. The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that.

#### Political hope is good and optimism turns the k

Smith et al 12 (William, Associate Professor in the Department of Education, Culture & Society and Associate Professor, Ethnic Studies Program (African American Studies division). He serves as the Associate Dean for Diversity, Access, & Equity in the College of Education and has a Presidential Appointment as the Special Assistant to the President & Faculty Athletics Representative, Dr. Smith coined the term racial battle fatigue as a theoretical framework to better understand how the biopsychosocial approach is a valuable method for examining the impact of race-related stress to the biological, psychological, and social factors and their complex interactions in the health of People of Color, Man Hung, Assistant Professor in the Department of Orthopaedics at the University of Utah. She is also affiliated with the Huntsman Cancer Institute, the Center for Clinical & Translational Science, and the Division of Epidemiology, Department of Internal Medicine at the University of Utah, & Jeremy D. Franklin, doctoral student in the Department of Education, Culture & Society at the University of Utah, “Between Hope and Racial Battle Fatigue: African American Men and Race-Related Stress,” Journal of Black Masculinity, Vol.2, No. 1)

Hope appears to play a different role for the African American men in this study when compared to previous research. Race-related socialization appears to influence how much hope is healthy or realistic (Bowman & Howard, 1985; Brown, 2008; Fischer & Shaw, 1999; Neblett, Philip, Cogburn, & Sellers, 2006). African American men with high to moderate levels of hope had more stress associated with racial microaggressions and societal problems than did men who had low hope. Like similar findings in the study by Danoff-Burg, Prelow, and Swenson (2004), we are encouraged from our findings that hope works differently for African American men. Hope appears to be correlated with a more realistic assessment of the possibilities of experiences that African American men might face. Possessing a more realistic understanding of the potential for racist discrimination offers these men additional avenues for coping. Hope does not always have to be based in reality. Therefore, by having a more accurate understanding of racial microaggressions and societal problems, these men learn to avoid extremely harmful external control behaviors that can destroy typical or mainstream avenues for reaching their goals. It should be clear that we are not suggesting that African American men with low or moderate levels of hope are playing into a negative self-fulfilling prophecy or that they are not reaching their expected goals. However, we are suggesting that low and moderate hope men are taking into account additional realities that their high hope peers appear to overlook and therefore they are struggling with more self-reported stressors. Under these circumstances, the opening quote from Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. is still appropriate in the present lives of African American men. Moreover, in our study, to be an African American man is to hope against hope that racial microaggressions, societal problems, and racial battle fatigue will diminish in the near future. Thus, we agree with Stevenson (1997), African American men must possess three important forms of racial socialization as forms of coping: proactive, protective, and adaptive. In our study, it appears that adaptive racial socialization might be playing a significant role in reducing stress among low hope African American men. Adaptive racial socialization is an orientation that recognizes the racial microaggressions and racist discrimination that pervades, identifies it, and then keeps it at bay long enough to develop room for creative counterstrategies (Stevenson, 1997). Consequently, high hope African American men, who tend to be slightly more formally educated, older, hold full-time jobs, higher incomes, and who married in greater numbers, are more at-risk from the relative safety that adaptive racial socialization provides. Maintaining or developing adaptive racial socialization strategies can enhance African American men’s belief in a world that is obfuscated with racists relations while promoting healthy self-development despite the obstacles they face (Stevenson, 1997).

#### The 1AC’s demand for the haptic is the very invasion of captive space of blackness which uniquely traps black women between the two-sided force of public discipline and private sexual coercion.

Spillers 17, Hortense. "Shades of Intimacy: Women in the Time of Revolution." NOTE – This was originally transcribed and cut by Greg Zoda, Presentation at the Barnard Center for Research on Women, February 16 (2017). (Professor of English at Vanderbilt University, PhD in English from Brandeis University)//Elmer

This weave of relations is partially shrouded by the public world of profit and production, just as it disappears into the shadowy remoteness of the private world with its masks of affection, sentimentality, and cruelty. The one word that crosses this ambiguous territory of public and private, light and shade, production and reproduction, could be intimacy, intimacy that registers the confusion precisely because it is, in this instance, neither fish nor fowl. What do we call children born of sexual congress between the enslaved and their owners? More precisely, the liaison between the enslaved and their masters? Douglass, in his 1845 narrative, observes a new social fact on the ground of coercive labor. The sexual work engendered in this calculus of relations has produced what Douglass calls there, as you will remember, “new people”, although, such children have appeared in the Virginia colony in the eighteenth century and even before, in the story Ira Berlin tells about communities that spring up along the African literal. Douglass draws out this strand of sociality because he wants to emphasize the other corruption of slavery’s protocols: masters who own their children. As such a subject himself, Douglass was keenly aware of the contradictions of his status—that mixed race standing did not guarantee freedom even as it enhanced the owner’s profit. An investigator is struck by the epiphenomenon of the “new people”, not only because of figures like Frederick Douglass and Sally Hemings, who was the daughter and mother of interracial crossing, but also as these particulars lead us to a broader inquiry about intimate life in a world that allows, indeed enables, both family life, in its juridical privilege and personality, and extra-familial life, as the secret heart of the family’s other. The stuff of novels and film, as for example, William Wells Brown’s Clotel; or, The President’s Daughter will attest, this familial parallelism—the family and the shadow family—is not an exception to the rule, but as it came to me not too long ago, it was as common as grass and appears to be a substantial arrangement of slavery’s generations across the color line. So it’s almost as if saying: not who was involved in such relationships but who was not involved in such relationships. So what I hope to extract from the record eventually is a redefined and refined sense of intimacy in a circumstance where flesh becomes the medium of exchange. The problematic that I am attempting to isolate in this project is how to name what appears at a depth in the century of revolution. We have a fairly good sense of the spatiotemporal sweep of the revolutionary arc, but what I am searching for attempts to evade the archives, to disappear into the world of the everyday. If the shadow families of the master class were defined by their economic relations to the master, then how did this intrusion of money matters reconfigure the whole range of structures of feeling, of intimate relations between husbands and wives, of the sibling relationship? In other words, one even begins to suspect that affection, official affection, is {?} under circumstances that allow slavery. So we are confronted here by two genres of historiography, or the historiographical record. I would call Annette Gordon-Reed’s work on *The Hemingses of Monticello*, for example, a prominent instance of positive assertion. In the triad of texts that I am sure you are familiar with that she has so far produced on Sally Hemings’s liaison with Thomas Jefferson, the overall narrative that she advances pursues the tropological fortunes of what Toni Morrison has referred to as “the American romance of race”. In this instance, Hemings and her relatives are given protective cover and a proximity to Jefferson that spares them the more brutal realities of enslavement. This mode of historiographical reflection resembles a kind of fiction-writing as in the case of Barbara Chase-Riboud’s Hemings novels that posit the seed or the seeds of intimacy between masters and the enslaved. In other words, the enslaved is constituted in those novels, more or less, as sexual objects of desire, so that what we understand as love and intimacy are not only possible between master and slave, but even likely. In the antithetical instance, the historiographical narrative paints a different picture that projects a negative assertion. For example, in a study of intimacy in the Antebellum South, Steven Stowe, author of this study, argues that even the most persistent and intense contact between masters and the bonded—as in the case of enslaved figures who, like the Hemingses, worked as domestic servants in the household of masters—did not yield intimacy between parties. As Stowe describes it, intimacy, in the Antebellum South, was aligned with public forms and perception, as expressed in rituals of courtship. Such rituals assured the acknowledgement of an intimate relation’s unfolding, so that the ritual became a kind of knowledge, we might say, or epistemology distributed to members of a class, or affiliates of a class, which bespeaks a sharing of values. This very private thing, which is a very private thing in our world, between and among lovers, which we relegate, in the sharable imaginary, to the private and public sphere, if those terms still work, is relegated in Stowe’s conceptual narrative to the world of public forms and performance. Why does the difference matter, or how does it matter? If close proximity, or constant contact, does not guarantee intimacy in this social order, then it seems to me that our notions of intimacy and shades of intimacy are thrown into crisis. This is what I mean: if proximity is not reliable as a measure of social cohesion, if sexual partners and their children can be sold off, if shadow families can assert no claim to the human dignity of official families, then sentimentality and feelings of love can be shown to be unstable, and that’s across the social order, it seems to me that we could say that justifiably. Did slavery across the western world rupture ties of kinship and filiation so completely that the eighteenth century, and possibly earlier, demolishes what Constance Classen in The Deepest Sense: A Cultural History of Touch calls a tactile cosmology? When in an earlier piece of writing I saw the distinction between body and flesh, I was attempting to isolate features of citizen belonging from alien bodies and entities. I would associate bodiedness with juridical personality, or the historical actor who has access to what our Fourteenth Amendment would call “due process”. Under its impress, at least in theory, other rights-bearing follows in its wake. Flesh describes an alien intimacy, or an alien entity—a more or less expendable figure. Not only does the alien, by race or language, or culture and custom, not have access to the protocols of due process, but perhaps its most poignant determination is the extent to which such a body cannot prevent or ward off another’s touch. For me, the single most powerful evidence of the loss of freedom is the fact that bodies lose their integrity and may be invaded or entered, so to speak, by coercive power. This touch that we associate with intimacy—the haptic that we associate with intimacy—can, under the right conditions, engender invasion and violence, and in its immediacy, in relationship to the enslaved, robs the *haptic* of its powers to heal, to bind, to cure, and becomes instead the power to wound and violate. As you know, Audre Lorde talks about this in her powerful essays on the erotic. Another note from Classen’s study of this particular sense: “In the sensory scale of ‘races’ created by the natural historian Lorenz Oken, the ‘civilized’ European ‘eye-man,’ who focused on the visual world, was positioned at the top and the African ‘skin-man,’ who used touch as his primary sensory modality, at the bottom.” I am suggesting that, under slavery’s regime, the captive body’s susceptibility to being touched places this body on the side of the flesh, so that touching, here, is not a token of social cohesion, of brotherhood or fellowship or fellow feeling, and certainly it has nothing to do with the erotic, or does it (maybe…it just occurred to me, that maybe that’s the question…okay…), but rather the very depth and breadth **of alienation**, among other things, from the laws, and perhaps even ways of distinguishing human life from bare life or animal life. The leading descriptive features of slavery’s eras tend to be economic in the most pointed sense of the term—balance sheets and accounting procedures, gains and losses, profit margins and the flow of goods—while our most sustained focus on the institution and its practices comes to rest on what Pierre Bourdieu might have called a “general science of the economy of practices”. In other words, the argument based on narrow economic considerations defines the enslaved as a species of property. By contrast, the argument that seeks to mobilize an understanding of the position of the enslaved, and of the world that unmakes him and her [them], as a cumulative instance of a general science of an economy of practices attempts to grasp the circumstance of the bonded as a type of historical subjectivity. In both the species of property and a type of historical subjectivity, we recognize, in their very naming, the ambivalence of status that would prohibit either from standing in as a pure or legible example of property, or a purely unforeclosed instance of the subject of history, which revolutionary movement seeks to create.

#### “Feeling others, feeling through you” is racial sentimentality that calcifies colonial sympathy to re-vitalize liberal individualist subjectivity.

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**The volatility of the impressible body**, which depended on its impressions from the external world for its own development, requireda strict disciplinary technology. **Sentiment**was enlisted for this purpose. Thealleged supple **impressibility**of the civilized races ensured that they continuously developed new, hopefully advantageous, physical and mental characteristics. Most important among these was the capacity for sentiment. Cope argued that the advanced “social life and the family relation” of civilization “have developed the benevolent sentiments and the affections,” as the effects of evolution became the stimuli themselves. **Sentiment**, in these scientists’ work, involves the ability to make an appropriate and **sympathetic reaction to an impression**, rather than an impulsive and self-serving one. Cope and his cohort posited that **racial progress** stems from the ability of the civilized to control the impulses of their body through **the faculty of sentiment**.Le Conte surmised that “sympathy, pity, [and] love” thus drive species change among the most advanced races, freeing them from the indignity of struggle.Hence for Cope “evolution is . . . the long process of learning how to bring matter into subserviency to the uses of mind,” or the sublimation of the body to “self-control, from the material as well as from the mental standpoint.”**Sentiment**thus **functions asan epistemology**, an ontology, and **a discipline**. Scientific articulations of sentimentalism clarify that sympathyhas an intercessory and teleological function, in thatit ensures that civilized responses to stimuli benefit racial progress. In her recent analysis of the role of sympathy in late nineteenth-century sciences of the mind, Susan Lanzoni argues that late nineteenth-century psychologists and philosophers believed sympathy to increase with evolutionary advance. For Herbert Spencer, **sympathy**is the “**awareness of consequences**,” or an access to the future as opposed to the primitive “impulsivity” of “reflex-oriented” responses,which are **mired in the eternal present**.Primitive bodies, Spencer maintained, were capable only of reflexes, not of reflection; they kicked experience off rather than absorbing it over time. In his view, social experience reverberates off black bodies in artful mimicry entertaining to their racial superiors, but arguably useless to themselves. Otherscientists proposed that a “savage would throw a crying baby to the ground because of **‘torpid sympathy**.’”For Cope, sympathy enables the civilized to transform basic impulses of pleasure or pain into a moral feeling that considers the social good, yetstillensures **individual development**. Cope characterized sympathy as an advanced faculty evolving from sentiment that acts as a gatekeeper between the impressible civilized body—especially the more delicate female constitution—and its environment. This mediating capacity ensures that those who possessed it could overcome the threats inherent to the impressible body, for sympathy allowed them to transform others’ suffering into opportunities for personal growth rather than for degeneration. On account of its developmental function, Cope declared thatsympathy is ultimately in one’s own self-interest:“ The affections or sympathies should be developed sufficiently to produce a desire for the happiness of others, through the pleasure the happiness of others gives us.”Presenting the formula of the domestic novel as evolutionary doctrine—that making others feel good, especially those beneath you in social stature, **brings its own reward**—Cope lays bare the function of sympathy as building the actor’s body and character. Cope’s emphasis on the asymmetrical relations of sympathy illustrates the aptness of Glenn Hendler and Elizabeth Barnes’s analysis that sentimental sympathy functions as an “act of imagining oneself in another’s position” that ultimately works to constitute the self.**Sympathy**bothincreases and regulates the body’s affective experiences. **Abolitionists famously drew on the sentimental discourse of shared feeling**. Yet **sentimental taxonomies of feeling**broadly denied a common intensity of feelingand self-possession. As Saidiya Hartmanhas argued,the sentimental principle that **a shared capacity for pain renders all life worthy of political recognition** was a process that cut two ways, one that subjected **blacks** *to***power** far more than it granted liberal individualist subjectivity to the enslaved.The American School’s emphasis on the reflective quality of sentiment, as opposed to the immediate and impulsive acts of sensation, suggests a final way in which these scientists drew on sentimentalism in their account of species change. As Dana Luciano has argued, nineteenth-century U.S. sentimentalism marks “a way of using deployments of mixed feeling(pleasure and pain) to negotiate problems in time.”For these evolutionists, fundamentally concerned with the narration of temporality, sentimentalism proved a rich resource through which to challenge Darwin’s account of evolutionary time as a ruthless, senseless process. In the first half of the century, Luciano argues, a wide variety of writers and lecturers understood grief asaway to access sacred,a reflective time that connected the grieving subject to the repetitive cycles of the organic and to offer protection from the linear, relentless, forward-moving temporality of national progress as well as from the impetuousness of sensation. Sensation“**signals a mode of intensified embodiment in which all times but the present fall away—a condition simultaneously desired, in its recollection of the infantile state, and feared, in its negation of social agency**”; by contrast, “a morally regulated sentimentality,” manifested particularly in the capacity of reflection, “properly disperses feeling across time.”Cope and the American School adapted sentimentalism’s function as a measured, reflective orientation of the civilized subjectin time into an evolutionary discourse that gave the civilized the ability to manage the future development of the race. In keeping with their political paradigm, this entailed reworking affective feeling as a sacred time *outside*the linear time line of national development into the means by whichthe organic body could be brought in synchrony with national and imperial progress. The American School drew on sentimentalism to assert Anglo-Saxons’ capacity to subjugate the recursive rhythms of organic time to the service of the linear progress of national development. In the post-Darwinian context, the sentimental premise that refined feeling enables the transcendence of the physical body promised Anglo-Saxons a correlated control over natural time both cyclical and linear.Denied the status of fellow subjects of the nineteenth century, racialized peoples were understood to be animated fossils of the evolutionary past. The“**great chain of feeling,**” in historian Martin Pernick’s apt phrase, hierarchized human groups on the basis of their assumed sensibility and extendedspatially to the expanding borders of the nationand temporally from the past to the future yet to come.The American School championed the cyclical theory of recapitulation, in which fetuses literally retrace the development of their ancestors in the womb, only fully reaching the evolutionary plane of their parents at puberty. Recapitulationists rearranged the spatial distinctions that polygenesis, as articulated by Agassiz and others in the American School of Ethnology, relied on to conceive of racial difference. Cope and Hyatt interpreted their collections of fossilized dinosaurs and cephalopods as evidence that different species exhibit parallel development, such that evolutionary change is best depicted not as a branching tree but as a common trunk that divides into multiple parallel lines of differing length. Frozen somewhere near the dawn of civilization, blacks, Native Americans, Asians, and other racial groups formed different stages of “the infancy of civilized man,” which nonetheless persisted into the present.They were the roots of humanity, the base from which the civilized had branched off and surpassed.The primitive would retrace the evolution of lizards and other animals in the womb: they would become human at birth but remain frozen in the same developmental state as their parents, even as their body seemingly matured. Biopolitics entails **the racialization of temporality**. In Foucault’s words, itis thenineteenth-century “recasting ofthe theme of racial confrontations. . . [within] the theory of evolutionism and the struggle for existence,” in whichsomepeoples now represent “the past of [the] race”that consolidates modern“**biologico-social racism**” as well as modern political power.As opposed to earlier understandings of human difference in which races were unequivocally distinct entities with diverse origins and were thus fundamentally at odds with one another, evolutionary perspectives conceived of racial difference as “permanently, ceaselessly in ltrating the social body,” and as the lingering prehistory of the individual body.To be racialized in biopower isnot to be figured as an innately distinct species, as the American School of Ethnology infamously had it several decades prior, but to be located within the past of civilization itself. **Population management aimed to harness the enemy lurking**within the very borders of the settler colonial nation and the matter of the civilized body. Sentiment, in turn, functioned as one of thekey **technologies to contain the threat of the biological past that haunted the settler colonial nation-state**.