### 1NC – T

#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives must defend the appropriation of outer space

#### Outer space starts 372 miles above the surface of earth.

National Geographic No Date [National Geographic Society, "Atmosphere," <https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/atmosphere/>] Sachin

Earth’s atmosphere stretches from the surface of the planet up to as far as 10,000 kilometers (6,214 miles) above. After that, the atmosphere blends into space. Not all scientists agree where the actual upper boundary of the atmosphere is, but they can agree that the bulk of the atmosphere is located close to Earth’s surface—up to a distance of around eight to 15 kilometers (five to nine miles). While oxygen is necessary for most life on Earth, the majority of Earth’s atmosphere is not oxygen. Earth’s atmosphere is composed of about 78 percent nitrogen, 21 percent oxygen, 0.9 percent argon, and 0.1 percent other gases. Trace amounts of carbon dioxide, methane, water vapor, and neon are some of the other gases that make up the remaining 0.1 percent. The atmosphere is divided into five different layers, based on temperature. The layer closest to Earth’s surface is the troposphere, reaching from about seven and 15 kilometers (five to 10 miles) from the surface. The troposphere is thickest at the equator, and much thinner at the North and South Poles. The majority of the mass of the entire atmosphere is contained in the troposphere—between approximately 75 and 80 percent. Most of the water vapor in the atmosphere, along with dust and ash particles, are found in the troposphere—explaining why most of Earth’s clouds are located in this layer. Temperatures in the troposphere decrease with altitude. The stratosphere is the next layer up from Earth’s surface. It reaches from the top of the troposphere, which is called the tropopause, to an altitude of approximately 50 kilometers (30 miles). Temperatures in the stratosphere increase with altitude. A high concentration of ozone, a molecule composed of three atoms of oxygen, makes up the ozone layer of the stratosphere. This ozone absorbs some of the incoming solar radiation, shielding life on Earth from potentially harmful ultraviolet (UV) light, and is responsible for the temperature increase in altitude. The top of the stratosphere is called the stratopause. Above that is the mesosphere, which reaches as far as about 85 kilometers (53 miles) above Earth’s surface. Temperatures decrease in the mesosphere with altitude. In fact, the coldest temperatures in the atmosphere are near the top of the mesosphere—about -90°C (-130°F). The atmosphere is thin here, but still thick enough so that meteors will burn up as they pass through the mesosphere—creating what we see as “shooting stars.” The upper boundary of the mesosphere is called the mesopause. The thermosphere is located above the mesopause and reaches out to around 600 kilometers (372 miles). Not much is known about the thermosphere except that temperatures increase with altitude. Solar radiation makes the upper regions of the thermosphere very hot, reaching temperatures as high as 2,000°C (3,600°F). The uppermost layer, that blends with what is considered to be outer space, is the exosphere. The pull of Earth’s gravity is so small here that molecules of gas escape into outer space.

#### Starlink’s satelites reach 340 Miles above earth’s surface.

Mann 19, [Adam Mann, 5-24-2019, "Starlink: SpaceX's satellite internet project," Space, <https://www.space.com/spacex-starlink-satellites.html>] Sachin

The first 60 Starlink satellites were launched on May 23, 2019, aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket. The satellites successfully reached their operational altitude of 340 miles (550 kilometers) — low enough to get pulled down to Earth by atmospheric drag in a few years so that they don't become space junk once they die.

#### Violation: 340 miles is less than the 372 miles necessary to be considered outer space; they explicitly defend only LEO

#### Vote neg—limits and ground: the aff interpretation explodes the topic to allow any aff about space generally which structurally alters the neg research burden because there’s a qualitative difference between outer space and the atmosphere. Means we get no ground because of how unpredictable the AC could be from round to round – kills core neg generics like space col bad and mining that don’t link if you specify a part of space

#### Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

#### Drop the debater – it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm.

#### Use competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter.

#### No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) baiting – incentivizes good debaters to be abusive, bait theory, then collapse to the 1AR RVI

### 1NC—T

#### Interpretation: The aff may not specify unjust types of space appropriation.

#### Violation – They specified megaconstellations in LEO

#### Vote neg for limits and ground – their model allows affs to defend any combination of appropriation in any geopolitical context which explodes negative burden and causes random affs every tournament.

### 1NC—DA

#### LEO is uniquely accessible to African industry due to cheaper launch and production costs – that solves Earth Observation, internet, national security, and spills over to enrich the economy

Samanga 21 Ruvimbo Samanga, Zimbabwean scholar and lawyer working with the Space Law & Policy, holds a BA Law (cum laude), an LLB and an LLM in International Trade and Investment Law from the University of Pretoria. "Why Africa Should Expand its Mega-Satellite Constellation Capacity." Space Legal Issues, 3 May. 2021, www.spacelegalissues.com/why-africa-should-expand-its-mega-satellite-constellation-capacity.

Since 1988, Africa has spent approx. USD$4 billion towards the launch of 41 satellites (excluding the cost of the RASCOM-QAF 1R replacement). 30 of these satellites fall into the Small Satellite market. The majority of satellites owned by African institutions typically involves satellites with less than 600kgs in fueled mass and 24 of these satellites have less than 200kg fueled mass. The reason for the interest in the miniaturized satellites? In a nutshell, they offer cheaper design alternatives, coupled with the ease of mass production. They are also significantly more versatile in certain applications, owing to their reduced size. For example, they are the satellite of choice for low data rate communications, being launched in large multi-coverage constellations in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). It comes as no surprise then that small satellites are growing increasingly popular amongst developing countries, no less within the region, for the accessibility. The growth of the small satellite industry is evident in commercial as well as large programs which exhibit steady growth. In 2019, 5 African countries launched 8 satellites, 6 of which were small satellites. It is expected that by the year 2024, 19 African countries would have launched additional satellites into space. These small, sometimes called nano-satellites, are really driving the African space program, especially in line with the African Union’s (AU) science and technology ambitions which are expected to reap huge benefits for the continent. Most importantly through the AU Science, Technology and Innovation Science Strategy for Africa – 2024 (STISA-2024). Small satellites are categorized as space systems of up to 600 kg (falling into the categories of Minisatellites, Microsatellite, Nanosatellite, Picosatellite, and Femto Satellites). They range across different applications (Satellite Communications, Imaging & Earth Observations, Space Situational Awareness, and Technology Development), and have different end users (Government & Defense, and Civil & Commercial). Of the 8 satellites launched in 2019, 6 were small satellites (3 Nanosatellites, 2 Microsatellites, and 1 Picosatellite). Satellite communications mega-constellations are on the rise, however this growing interest is not without its challenges and uncertainties. The biggest risks in the small sat interest in the coming years are mostly ascribed to investor’s rick assessment & funding availability; Securing customers & Return on Investment (ROI); Stronger regulations; Competition from heavier satellite, and reliability. This is also further compounded by the fact that establishing a satellite service industry which is sustainable requires adequate funding. Skillset deficit is also a prominent challenge. Even though Africa has and will in future have the largest population of young people, the youth are generally not interested in pursuing careers in STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics). You can expect more satellites to be launched despite these crises. As regards the African Small Sat market, the growth perspectives seem to point towards predominant university projects which demonstrates a capacity to operate Smallsats, also attesting to the affordability of the systems. This is also a sign of government effort to support the growth of this industry, and the contributions of the youth in satellite development. Indeed the manufacturing ability is extremely important, but also the service capability and development prospects. Despite these positive steps there is still quite a need for funding in this area. Of the overall revenue and results, Earth Observation is the most predominant small sat use, however it is expected in the next few years this may shift to internet broadband, but ultimately, creating value for users and enabling services that drive industry development will be the ultimate determining factor. Internet coverage allows people to create capacity and this might undoubtedly be Africa’s most prolific use of small satellite solutions. CubeSats which are around 50 kg, are the most popular and are only getting bigger because of the interest for carrying larger payloads. But in future it may become less stringent to use the restricted platform, but the threshold is bound to switch to a smaller regular platform. These services are enabled through satellite mega-constellations. Satellite mega-constellations operate in the Lower Earth Orbit which is described as the orbit located no more than 2,000 kilometers from the Earth’s surface. There is room for LEO regarding low-latency connectivity. But this does not mean that the Geostationary Orbit will become redundant, rather, and on the other hand GEO will remain an asset for broadband, because of its efficiency and coverage as well as less-sophisticated ground segments. Nevertheless, the LEO offers the most advantageous orbital resource to come and deserves much policy intervention to regulate, owing to the fact that it is a finite, scare resource. At the end of the day, whether Smallsats are launched in a constellation or as individual space systems, they offer a cost-effective alternative to traditional space objects, and would allow Africa the opportunity to release its potential in various areas of interest including but not limited to communications, global positioning and navigation, and Earth observation. Africa would be enriched by the ability to use this new technology to enable users through diverse services, to protect assets within the value chain, or simply to monitor areas of national security such as the environment and borders. These are all aspects which will have a substantial developmental impact in the African economy, and is well aligned to the African space policy which speaks towards increase of space and satellite capacity in an affordable and beneficial manner.

#### LEO Earth Science Observation Satellites uniquely solve a host of environmental threats – pollution, climate change, biod, defo, soil erosion

Ustin and Middleton 20 Ustin, S.L. [John Muir Institute of the Environment, University of California, Davis] , Middleton, E.M [NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center (Emerita)]. Current and near-term advances in Earth observation for ecological applications. Ecol Process 10, 1 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13717-020-00255-4

There is an unprecedented array of new satellite technologies with capabilities for advancing our understanding of ecological processes and the changing composition of the Earth’s biosphere at scales from local plots to the whole planet. We identified 48 instruments and 13 platforms with multiple instruments that are of broad interest to the environmental sciences that either collected data in the 2000s, were recently launched, or are planned for launch in this decade. We have restricted our review to instruments that primarily observe terrestrial landscapes or coastal margins and are available under free and open data policies. We focused on imagers that passively measure wavelengths in the reflected solar and emitted thermal spectrum. The suite of instruments we describe measure land surface characteristics, including land cover, but provide a more detailed monitoring of ecosystems, plant communities, and even some species then possible from historic sensors. The newer instruments have potential to greatly improve our understanding of ecosystem functional relationships among plant traits like leaf mass area (LMA), total nitrogen content, and leaf area index (LAI). They provide new information on physiological processes related to photosynthesis, transpiration and respiration, and stress detection, including capabilities to measure key plant and soil biophysical properties. These include canopy and soil temperature and emissivity, chlorophyll fluorescence, and biogeochemical contents like photosynthetic pigments (e.g., chlorophylls, carotenoids, and phycobiliproteins from cyanobacteria), water, cellulose, lignin, and nitrogen in foliar proteins. These data will enable us to quantify and characterize various soil properties such as iron content, several types of soil clays, organic matter, and other components. Most of these satellites are in low Earth orbit (LEO), but we include a few in geostationary orbit (GEO) because of their potential to measure plant physiological traits over diurnal periods, improving estimates of water and carbon budgets. We also include a few spaceborne active LiDAR and radar imagers designed for quantifying surface topography, changes in surface structure, and 3-dimensional canopy properties such as height, area, vertical profiles, and gap structure. We provide a description of each instrument and tables to summarize their characteristics. Lastly, we suggest instrument synergies that are likely to yield improved results when data are combined. Background Many environmental scientists have concluded that the Earth is at or near one or more perilous climate tipping points (Krieger et al. 2009; Lenton, 2011, Lenton and Williams 2013; Brook et al. 2013; Hickman et al., 2019). Climate change interacts with and exacerbates many other environmental and societal problems. These include air and water pollution that compound health issues (Harlan and Ruddell 2011; Kan et al. 2012), especially in poor communities (Schlosberg and Colins 2014; Hallegatte and Rozenberg 2017), widespread and/or frequent droughts linked to extensive fires (Amiro et al. 2001; Littell et al. 2016), diminished resources for drinking water and irrigation (Jackson et al. 2001; Oki and Kanae 2006), and large-scale biodiversity losses (Lindenmayer and Likens 2011; Pires et al. 2018) , including species extinctions (Cahill et al. 2013). Related factors include deforestation (Green and Sussman 1990) and soil erosion (Hill et al., 2009, consequences of over-exploitation of resources (Giri et al. 2007) due to massive global conversion of natural resources for human uses (Seto et al. 2002. Documentation of all of these problems and many others are of interest to the broader ecological community at scales from local to global. This can only realistically be accomplished with satellite observations in combination with process and statistical models to reveal patterns and trends that enlighten understanding about how current conditions have developed from past environmental drivers in order to predict future conditions.

#### Warming causes extinction

David **Spratt 19**, Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Ian Dunlop, member of the Club of Rome, formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, May 2019, “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach,” https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0\_b2c0c79dc4344b279bcf2365336ff23b.pdf

An existential risk to civilisation is one posing **permanent large negative consequences** to humanity which may never be undone, either **annihilating intelligent life** or permanently and drastically curtailing its potential.

With the commitments by nations to the 2015 **Paris** Agreement, the current path of warming is 3°C or more by 2100. But this figure does not include “long-term” **carbon-cycle feedbacks**, which are materially relevant now and in the near future due to the **unprecedented** **rate** at which human activity is perturbing the climate system. Taking these into account, the Paris path would lead to around 5°C of warming by 2100.

Scientists warn that warming of 4°C is incompatible with an organised global community, is **devastating** to the **majority of** **ecosystems**, and has a **high probability** of not being stable. The World Bank says it may be “**beyond adaptation**”. But an existential threat may also exist for many peoples and regions at a significantly lower level of warming. In 2017, 3°C of warming was categorised as “catastrophic” with a warning that, on a path of unchecked emissions, low-probability, high-impact warming could be catastrophic by 2050.

The Emeritus Director of the Potsdam Institute, Prof. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, warns that “climate change is now reaching the **end-game**, where very soon humanity must choose between **taking** **unprecedented action**, or accepting that it has been left too late and **bear** **the consequences**.” He says that if we continue down the present path “there is a very big risk that we will just **end** **our** **civilisation**. The human species will survive somehow but we will destroy almost everything we have built up over the last two thousand years.”11

Unfortunately, conventional risk and probability analysis becomes useless in these circumstances because it excludes the full implications of outlier events and possibilities lurking at the fringes.12

Prudent risk-management means a tough, objective look at the real risks to which we are exposed, especially at those **“fat-tail” events**, which may have consequences that are damaging beyond quantification, and **threaten** **the** **survival** **of human** **civilisation**.

Global warming projections display a “fat-tailed” distribution with a **greater likelihood** of warming that is well in **excess of** **the** **average amount** **of warming** **predicted by** **climate** **models**, and are of a higher probability than would be expected under typical statistical assumptions. More importantly, the risk lies disproportionately in the “fat-tail” outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 1.

#### Instability causes global war

**Mead 13** – (Walter Russell, Foreign Affairs Prof @ Bard, “Peace In The Congo? Why The World Should Care”, American Interest; http://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/15/peace-in-the-congo-why-the-world-should-care/)

The Congo war should be a reminder to us all that the foundations of our world are **dynamite**, and that the potential for **new conflicts** on the scale of the **horrific** **wars of the 20th century** is very much **with us** **today.** The second lesson from this conflict stems from the realization of how much patience and commitment from the international community (which in this case included the Atlantic democracies and a coalition of African states working as individual countries and through various international institutions) it has taken to get this far towards peace. Particularly at a time when many Americans want the US to turn inwards, there are people who make the argument that it is really none of America’s business to invest time and energy in the often thankless task of solving these conflicts. That might be an ugly but defensible position if we didn’t live in such a tinderbox world. Someone could rationally say, yes, it’s terrible that a million plus people are being killed overseas in a horrific conflict, but the war is really very far away and America has urgent needs at home and we should husband the resources we have available for foreign policy on things that have more power to affect us directly. The problem is that **these wars spread**. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to **spread to places** that we do care **very much about**. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a **very remote place** triggers problems in places that we **care about** very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or trigger wider conflict with India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends. Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is **of** **more** **importance** to American security than many people may **understand**. The line between **Africa and the Middle** **East is** a **soft** one. The weak states that straddle the **southern approaches** of the Sahara are **ideal petri dishes** for **A**l **Q**aeda **type groups** to form and attract local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries potential **access to funds**, **fighters**, **training** and **weapons** from the Middle East. A war in the eastern Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to **create the swirling underworld** of **arms trading**, **money transfers**, **illegal commerce** and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us. This is why the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations (representing three very different kinds of American politics) have all been engaged in efforts like the peace keeping effort in the Congo. It is why, despite our budget problems at home and despite our often justifiable impatience with the complexities of dealing with international coalitions and the inadequacies of international institutions, we need to continue the slow and painstaking work that makes agreements like this one possible. The world we live in is an **explosive** one. There are **all kinds of things that can go horribly wrong**, and what happens in one corner of the world doesn’t necessarily stay there. Reducing the danger requires an active, global American foreign policy whether we like it or not. The potential for new communal and religious wars that kill millions of people and endanger American security and world peace is very real. The world seems safer than the world of the 1930s and 1940s in part because the United States and many of our friends and allies are working quietly around the world to contain outbreaks of violence, address the issues that exacerbate hatred and distrust, and in the last analysis are willing to provide the security guarantees and deterrents that prevent mass mayhem.

**They get theory but it’s not DTD- 1ar time advantage-, abuse is self-imposed b/c they could always better develop the shell in the 1ar, over-punishment- reading theory cancels out the abuse, and no reason short speech means drop the debater- just get more efficient, short shells already force 2n split; also encourages theory collapses in every debate because of incentive and it becomes the default highest layer**

### 1NC—CP

#### Counterplan:

#### The appropriation of outer space by Starlink, OneWeb, and Telesat via Large Satellite Constellations in Lower Earth Orbit is unjust.

#### Solves the aff—every internal link is about Starlink and avoids the link to the disad because the amount of sats in the African companies’ satellite network will be significantly fewer because they’re not trying to achieve global broadband.

### 1NC—Debris

#### Uncertainty from debris collisions creates restraint not instability.

MacDonald 16, B., et al. "Crisis stability in space: China and other challenges." Foreign Policy Institute. Washington, DC (2016). (senior director of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Project with the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention)//Elmer

In any crisis that threatens to escalate into major power conflict, political and military leaders will face uncertainty about the effectiveness of their plans and decisions. This uncertainty will be compounded when potential conflict extends to the space and cyber domains, where weapon effectiveness is largely untested and uncertain, infrastructure interdependencies are unclear, and damaging an adversary could also harm oneself or one’s allies. Unless the stakes become very high, no country will likely want to gamble its well-being in a “single cosmic throw of the dice,” in Harold Brown’s memorable phrase. 96 The novelty of space and cyber warfare, coupled with risk aversion and worst-case assessments, could lead space adversaries into a situation of what can be called “hysteresis,” where each adversary is restrained by its own uncertainty of success. This is conceptually shown in Figures 1 and 2 for offensive counter-space capabilities, though it applies more generally. 97 These graphs portray the hypothetical differences between perceived and actual performance capabilities of offensive counter-space weapons, on a scale from zero to one hundred percent effectiveness. Where uncertainty and risk aversion are absent for two adversaries, no difference would exist between the likely performance of their offensive counter-space assets and their confidence in the performance of those weapons: a simple, straight-line correlation would exist, as in Figure 1. The more interesting, and more realistic, case is notionally presented in Figure 2, which assumes for simplicity that the offensive capabilities of each adversary are comparable. In stark contrast to the case of Figure 1, uncertainty and risk aversion are present and become important factors. Given the high stakes involved in a possible large-scale attack against adversary space assets, a cautious adversary is more likely to be conservative in estimating the effectiveness of its offensive capabilities, while more generously assessing the capabilities of its adversary. Thus, if both side’s weapons were 50% effective and each side had a similar level of risk aversion, each may conservatively assess its own capabilities to be 30% effective and its adversary’s weapons to be 70% effective. Likewise, if each side’s weapons were 25% effective in reality, each would estimate its own capabilities to be less than 25% effective and its adversary’s to be more than 25% effective, and so on. In Figure 2, this difference appears, in oversimplified fashion, as a gap that represents the realistic worry that a country’s own weapons will under-perform while its adversary’s weapons will over-perform in terms of effectiveness. If both countries face comparable uncertainty and exhibit comparable risk aversion, each may be deterred from initiating an attack by its unwillingness to accept the necessary risks. This gap could represent an “island of stability,” as shown in Figure 2. In essence, given the enormous stakes involved in a major strike against the adversary’s space assets, a potential attacker will likely demonstrate some risk aversion, possessing less confidence in an attack’s effectiveness. It is uncertain how robust this hysteresis may prove to be, but the phenomenon may provide at least some stabilizing influence in a crisis. In the nuclear domain, the immediate, direct consequences of military use, including blast, fire, and direct radiation effects, were appreciated at the outset. Nonetheless, significant uncertainty and under-appreciation persisted with regard to the collateral, indirect, and climatological effects of using such weapons on a large scale. In contrast, the immediate, direct effects of major space conflict are not well understood, and potential indirect and interdependent effects are even less understood. Indirect effects of large-scale space and cyber warfare would be virtually impossible to confidently calculate, as the infrastructures such warfare would affect are constantly changing in design and technology. Added to this is a likely anxiety that if an attack were less successful than planned, a highly aggrieved and powerful adversary could retaliate in unanticipated ways, possibly with highly destructive consequences. As a result, two adversaries facing potential conflict may lack confidence both in the potential effectiveness of their own attacks and in the ineffectiveness of any subsequent retaliation. Such mutual uncertainty would ultimately be stabilizing, though probably not particularly robust. This is reflected in Figure 2, where each side shows more caution than the technical effectiveness of its systems may suggest. Each curve notionally represents one state’s confidence in its offensive counter-space effectiveness relative to their actual effectiveness. Until true space asset resilience becomes a trusted feature of space architectures, deterrence by risk aversion, and cross-domain deterrence, may be the only means for deterrence to function in space.

#### No Escalation over Satellites:

#### 1] Planning Priorities

Bowen 18 Bleddyn Bowen 2-20-2018 “The Art of Space Deterrence” <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/> (Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester)//Elmer

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### 2] Military Precedent

Zarybnisky 18, Eric J. Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space. Naval War College Newport United States, 2018. (Senior Materiel Leader at United States Air Force)//Elmer

PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F 6 Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military satellites as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war.7F 7 In today’s more nuanced world, attacking satellites, including military satellites, does not necessarily result in nuclear war. For instance, foreign countries have used highpowered lasers against American intelligence-gathering satellites8F 8 and the United States has been reluctant to respond, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone operations, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space.

#### 3] Won’t go nuclear – seen as a normal conventional attack because of integration with ground forces

Firth 7/1/19 [News Editor at MIT Technology Review, was Chief News Editor at New Scientist. How to fight a war in space (and get away with it). July 1, 2019. MIT Technology Review]

Space is so intrinsic to how advanced militaries fight on the ground that an attack on a satellite need no longer signal the opening shot in a nuclear apocalypse. As a result, “deterrence in space is less certain than it was during the Cold War,” says Todd Harrison, who heads the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, a think tank in Washington, DC. Non-state actors, as well as more minor powers like North Korea and Iran, are also gaining access to weapons that can bloody the noses of much larger nations in space.

#### 4] If we don’t have sufficient data we move the satellite to ‘lost’ category

Hoots ’15 [Felix; Fall 2015; Distinguished Engineer in the System Analysis and Simulation Subdivision, Ph.D. in Mathematics from Auburn University, M.S. in Mathematics from Tennessee Tech University; Crosslink, “Keeping Track: Space Surveillance for Operational Support,” <https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/Crosslink%20Fall%202015%20V16N1%20.pdf>; RP]

The JSpOC tasks these sensors to track specific satellites and to record data such as time, azimuth, elevation, and range. This data is used to create orbital element sets or state vectors that represent the observed position of the satellite. The observed position can then be compared with the predicted position. The dynamic models used for predicting satellite motion are not perfect; factors such as atmospheric density variation caused by unmodeled solar activity can cause the predicted position to gradually stray from the true position. The observations are used to correct the predicted trajectory so the network can continue to track the satellite. This process of using observations to correct and refine an orbit in an ongoing feedback loop is called catalog maintenance, and it continues as long as the satellite remains in orbit. Ideally, the process is automatic, with manual intervention only required when satellites maneuver or get near to reentry due to atmospheric drag.

Sometimes, however, more effort is required. For example, a sensor may encounter a satellite trajectory that does not correspond well to anything in the catalog. Such observations are known as partially correlated observations if they are somewhat close to a known orbit or uncorrelated observations (or uncorrelated tracks) if they are far from any known orbit. Also, if a satellite is not tracked for five days, it is placed on an attention list for manual intervention. In that case, an analyst will attempt to match the wayward satellite to one of these partially correlated or uncorrelated tracks. If that effort succeeds, then the element sets are updated, and the object is returned to automatic catalog maintenance. On the other hand, if the satellite cannot be matched to a partially correlated or uncorrelated track, the satellite information continues to age. If it reaches 30 days without a match, the satellite is placed on the lost list.

One of the most visible uses of the catalog is to warn about collision risks for active payloads. This function predicts potential close approaches three to five days in advance to allow time to plan avoidance maneuvers, if necessary. Unplanned maneuvers may disturb normal operations and deplete resources for future maneuvers, so one would like to have high confidence in the collision-risk predictions. The reliability of the predictions depends directly on the accuracy of the orbit calculation, which in turn depends on the quality and quantity of the tracking data, which is limited by the capability of the Space Surveillance Network. Simply put, there are not enough tracking resources in the network to achieve high-quality orbits for every object in the catalog. Furthermore, many smaller objects can only be tracked by the most sensitive radars, and this tracking is infrequent. Most objects in the catalog are considered debris, which can neither maneuver nor broadcast telemetry. On the other hand, some satellite operators depend exclusively on the satellite catalog to know where their satellites are, and users of the satellite orbital data depend on the catalog to know when the satellites will be within view.

This situation creates a challenging problem in balancing Space Surveillance Network resources to support the collision-warning task (tracking as many potential hazards as possible) while also providing highly accurate support to operational satellites (tracking the spacecraft as precisely as possible). The practical solution is to perform collision risk assessment using a large screening radius to ensure no close approaches are missed despite lower-quality predictions. Once an object is identified as having a potentially close approach, then the tasking level is raised, with the expectation that more tracking data will be obtained to refine the collision risk calculations. When the danger has passed, the object reverts to a normal tracking level.

Collisions and spontaneous breakups do happen. The first satellite breakup occurred on June 29, 1961, when residual fuel in an Ablestar rocket body exploded, creating 296 trackable pieces of debris. Since that time, there have been more than 200 satellite breakups, the most notable being the missile intercept of the Fengyun-1C satellite, which created more than 3300 trackable fragments. In most cases, these breakups are first detected by the phased-array radars in the Space Surveillance Network. When multiple objects are observed where only one was expected, the downstream sensors are alerted, but no tasking is issued because specific debris orbits are not yet established. Tracks are taken and tagged as uncorrelated. Analysts at JSpOC then attempt to link uncorrelated tracks from different sensors to form a candidate orbit. Subsequent tracking improves the orbit to the point that the object can be named and numbered and moved into the catalog for automatic maintenance.

#### 5] Lack of attribution means no retal

Schwarzer et al ’19 [Daniela, Eva-Marie McCormack, and Torben Schutz; Director, Editor, and Associate Fellow in the Security, Defense, and Armaments Program at the German Council of Foreign Relations; Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, “Technology and Strategy: The Changing Security Environment in Space Demands New Diplomatic and Military Answers,” [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63288/ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology\_and\_Strategy\_the\_Changing.pdf](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63288/ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology_and_Strategy_the_Changing.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology_and_Strategy_the_Changing.pdf);]

However, even a (misinterpreted) threat to space assets could start a chain reaction and quickly escalate an incident in space to a wider war. Successful deterrence, therefore, requires situational awareness, attribution capabilities and resilient assets. Especially the latter two are notoriously difficult to achieve in space. While it might be easy to attribute a kinetic attack executed with a missile, the same is not true for ASAT attacks by other satellites, and, especially, not for cyberattacks and electronic warfare measures. Without clear attribution, however, it is difficult to deter any adversary, since he could speculate that an attack cannot be traced back to him – making deterrence and retaliation more difficult. Although cross-domain deterrence, i.e. threatening an actor through potential retaliation attacks on or by other-than-space assets, is always possible, it also amplifies the problems involved in traditional deterrence: A response has to be timely and proportionate, and it should not further expand of the conflict.

#### But debris is good—

#### Satellite loss shuts down global fracking

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Energy, environment, farming, mining, land use. All of these areas and more are now inextricably linked to satellite data and would be devastated should that flow of data stop. Environmental Monitoring Oh how complacent we've become. We take for granted that we will have instant images from space showing a volcanic eruption somewhere in the South Pacific within hours of learning that it happened. When the BP oll spill happened in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, satellite images were used in conjunction with aircraft and ships to monitor the extent and evolving nature of the spill (Figures 10.1 and 10.2). The data were also used to direct the ships that were attempting to clean up the spill, to warn fishermen of areas in which it would be dangerous to fish, and to generally monitor the extent of the disaster. This is the type of data we get from space in a field known as remote sensing. Remote sensing is, well, exactly what its name implies. With it, you gather data, or sense, usually in the form of electromagnetic radiation (light), remotely - that is, you are not physically touching what you are looking at. Satellite remote sensing began shortly after we began launching satellites and many industries are now totally dependent upon having the capability. We use satellites, like the venerable Landsat series, to study the Earth m unprecedented detail. Since 1972, Landsat satellites have taken millions of high resolution images of the Earth's surface, allowing comprehensive studies of how the land has changed due to human intervention (deforestation, agriculture, settlement, etc.) and natural processes (desertification, floods, etc.). The best way to understand how useful Landsat and similar data can be to governments at all levels is best illustrated by looking at 14then and now" photographs. For example, Africa's Lake Chad has been shrinking for 40 years, as the desert has encroached on this once plentiful inland freshwater lake. Forty years ago, there were about 15,000 square miles of water within the lake. Now, it is less than 500 square miles (Figure 10.3) [1]. And what is the practical side of this particular bit of information? Governments use this type of satellite imagery to avoid human tragedy. Hundreds of thousands of people, if not millions, depend upon the waters of Lake Chad for agriculture, industry, and personal hygiene. With the lake going dry, how has this impacted on their livelihoods, their families, and their very lives? The European Space Agency (ESA) is freely providing satellite data to developing countries as they search for new sources of drinking water. For example, ESA assessed data obtained from space over Nigeria to find over 90 new freshwater sources within that country. After ground teams visited the new sites, all were confirmed to contain fresh water. This was no accident. These were satellites with sensors developed for just such purposes in mind [2]. Desertification is but one example of changing climates affecting people's everyday lives. What about more direct observations of our impact on the planet? Figures 10.4 and 10.5 show the scarring of the Earth's surface as a result of surface mining in West Virginia. This is not a polemic against mining; rather, it is an observation that we can use satellite imagery to monitor such mining and be mindful of its impact on the environment. Other than taking pictures of surface features, like lakes and open pit mines, how are satellites monitoring the Earth's changing climate? In just about every way, by: monitoring global land, sea, and atmospheric temperatures; measuring yearly average rainfall amounts just about everywhere on the globe; measuring glaciation rates; measuring sea surface heights; and more. Remote sensing is more than taking pictures of the Earth in the visible part of the spectrum. We can learn a great deal from looking at part of the spectrum that our eyes cannot see - but our instruments can. Shown in Figure 10.6 is a composite image of the Earth's surface showing the average land-surface temperature at night. The data came from two NASA satellites, Terra and Aqua, as they orbit the Earth in a polar orbit. (This means that they circle the Earth from top to bottom, passing over both the North and South Poles with each complete orbit.) Terra's orbit is such that it passes from the north to the south across the equator in the morning; Aqua passes south to north over the equator in the afternoon. Taken together, they observe the Earth's surface in its entirety every two days. Data sets such as this exist for just about any day of the year and can show either night-time lows or daytime highs. By looking in different parts of the spectrum, like the infrared light discussed above, we can make observations as described in Table 10.1. Pollution Monitoring As emerging countries industrialize, they also become polluters. Many of these countries are not exactly forthright about releasing air-pollution details to the media, so much of our awareness of the rising pollution there is anecdotal - typically m the form of stories told by people who have visited these countries and seen the extreme pollution at first hand. This, by the way, is not exactly scientific. Using satellites, and not relying on either the governments in question or second-hand stories, we can accurately assess the pollution levels there and elsewhere. Using satellite images to measure the amount of light absorbed or blocked by fine particulates in the atmosphere, otherwise known as air pollution, you can determine not only what the airborne pollutant might be, but also its size. And, by looking at the overall light blockage, an accurate estimate of the amount of pollution in the air can also be made. Recent studies show that many of these countries are covered in a pollution cloud that countries in the developed world would deem extremely harmful. And how do we know this with scientific certainty? From satellite measurements. Energy Production The recent boom in the production of shale oil in the United States and elsewhere is due in large part to the identification and geolocation of promising geologic formations for test drilling and fracking. "Fracking" is a somewhat new term that comes from the phrase "hydraulic fracturing". In fracking, massive amounts of previously unusable reservoirs of oil and natural gas are released for capture, sale, and transport from deposits deep within the Earth - many located at least a mile below the surface. In the United States alone, there may be as much as 750 trillion cubic feet of natural gas within shale deposits releasable by fracking [3]. How do energy companies know where to look for these deposits? In large part, by analyzing satellite imagery. According to Science Daily (26 February 2009), a new map of the Earth's gravitational field based on satellite measurements makes it much less resource intensive to find new oil deposits. The map will be particularly useful as the ice melts in the oil-rich Arctic regions. The easy-to-find oilfields have already been found. To fuel the growing world economy, those harder-to-find deposits must be located and tapped - which is why satellite imagery is so important. Take away this and other satellite-dependent techniques of oil and gas exploration and the world economy will feel the impact through higher oil and natural gas prices.

#### Fracking makes extinction inevitable---try-or die to shut it off

Rev. Mac Legerton 18, Co-Founder and Executive Director of the Center for Community Action, Member of the Board of Directors of the NC Climate Solutions Coalition, Member of the Board of Directors of the Windcall Institute, “Will The U.S. Blaze A Trail To Mass Extinction?”, APPPL News, 1/15/2018, https://www.apppl.org/news/will-the-u-s-blaze-a-trail-to-mass-extinction/

As an elder, I now realize that there is even a greater threat to humanity and life on Earth than nuclear war—though, unlike a nuclear exchange, this threat is a slow-motion catastrophe. Can you guess what it is? Here’s a clue: it is something with which most people don’t have a personal relationship. Tragically, some persons remain in total denial of its validity, much less its present danger. And that’s the problem – that’s why this threat needs to be more seriously addressed on the local, state, national, and international level.

What is it? It’s the slow-motion but rapidly growing catastrophe of climate change. There’s now good news amidst this seemingly overwhelming challenge. But the answer may surprise you. Today we know what is the #1 preventable cause of climate change. It’s not coal, it’s not nuclear, and it’s not oil and gasoline. It’s actually the use of the very fuel that is touted as being cleaner, greener, and cheaper than all the rest. This fuel is called “Natural Gas”.

Let’s start with its name – “Natural Gas”. What is “natural gas”? There’s actually nothing “natural” about it when it is forcibly extracted from the ground through hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as “fracking”. When something is forcibly ruptured from deep within the earth with the use of toxic chemicals, the last name you would use for it is “natural”.

Fracking disrupts the geologic fault lines causing earthquakes, uses millions of gallons of fresh water that becomes permanently poisoned by unknown, cancer-producing chemicals added to it, creates air pollution during the drilling process, increases the risk of injury and explosions, raises major health risks to both people and place in close proximity to it, and changes the nature of both neighborhoods and landscapes. Fracking also leaves a massive carbon footprint of drilling wells as deep as 8,000 feet and then drilling horizontally over 10,000 feet; On top of all this, it leaks major amounts of gas into the environment.

So, what is this gas? It is 90-95% methane gas which is a hydrocarbon compound made up of one carbon atom and four hydrogen atoms (CH4). It releases carbon into the atmosphere and produces carbon dioxide (C02) just like coal does when it is burned. Methane is not its trace element–it is its undisputed compound of this fossil fuel product. If a compound is 90-95% of a product, it makes sense to call it by that name. Doesn’t it? Well, actually not if you want people to believe and think that it is something that it is not. It is un-natural methane gas produced under massive and highly toxic pressure and hazardous conditions.

Now that we know what this gas is, what does it do to the atmosphere and climate that is so dangerous? This hydrocarbon has properties that block the radiation of heat from Earth’s surface 100 times more effectively than CO2 (released from burning coal) during its first 10 years of release and 86 times more effectively in its first 20 years. Because of the climate emergency underway, the first 10 or 20 years matter most.

When utility companies and the larger fossil fuel companies state that they are committed to lowering carbon emissions, this just isn’t true. They are radically escalating the most dangerous and worst of all fossil fuels in relation to its impact on the climate. Now the industry wants to expand production of methane gas all over the world by calling it “the most environmentally friendly fossil fuel”and a “bridge fuel” that we can safely use until we transition to 100% renewable energy sources.

Why would a major business industry want to call its product by another name? Perhaps for the same reason that the tobacco industry did not like the term “coffin nails” or “cancer sticks” for cigarettes. Honestly, there’s a striking similarity between what are called cigarettes and natural gas. When both were produced and named, their harm was not fully known. Once the industries promoting them learned of their significant harm, they did everything they could to hide this knowledge from the public. They even hired scientists to deny their dangers. The tobacco industry was eventually sued, the truth was acknowledged, and billions of dollars were paid out in the tobacco settlement.

This same scenario that occurred with the tobacco industry needs to occur with methane gas and the fossil fuel industry. The major difference in these two scenarios is that that this fossil fuel product doesn’t just threaten the lives of individuals who voluntarily breathe it in – it threatens the lives of not only every human being, but also all life on the planet. The outcome of this scenario needs to be a moratorium and eventual end to all use of methane gas as an energy source. For the sake of all of us, our communities, and world, the sooner the better. This abomination is different. There is no time to waste.

#### Loss of satellites shuts down drones

Daniel Ventre 11, Engineer for CNRS and Researcher for CESDIP, Cyberwar and Information Warfare, p. 198-199

The introduction of cyberspace operations is part of a specific context; a major evolution in the operation environment and the nature of the conflicts, which make irregular wars the rule, and make regular actors the exception to the rule. But the battle against unconventional, non-state governed, irregular actors raises specific problems: there are multiple actors, unpredictable at that, who do not abide by the same rules. New orders in conflicts are imposing the implementation of an ever more important need for information, and information collection and processing. Networks now have an incredible importance. The document refers to the growing threats against American heritage: the USA is a target and the increasing amount of attacks against their networks is indeed the proof of this. There are many obstacles which need to be removed before they can achieve real superiority and freedom to act, especially as vulnerable points may originate within the very operations of the armed forces. An example of this is the vulnerability of using products (software and hardware), commercial products (off-the-shelf), and sometimes even foreign products123. This brings to mind the fact that the US Air Force uses commercial, even foreign, applications for its cyberspace operations.

Information space extends to space124, particularly via communication and observation satellites125. Satellites are the keystone to the cyberspace and communication systems, but also the security system: monitoring (Echelon network is the symbol), observation, communication. These are at the heart of the C4ISR systems, without which a concept such as network-centric warfare could not exist. There would be no drones without satellites. It is even a question of extending the Internet to extra-atmospheric space. Projects in this vein (Interplanetary Networks) were being formed in the 1990s, but ran into several technical difficulties (delays in important transmissions due to high distances and costs) [GEL 06]. NASA dedicates a few pages on its website to this project126. The development of communication systems based on the infrastructures in extra-atmospheric space will also raise questions for legal, geopolitical and geostrategic domains: questions of seizing this space, questions of regulation of human activity in this space, of sovereignty, new territoriality and independence.

#### Drone prolif is inevitable and causes global nuclear war

Dr. Michael C. Horowitz 19, Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania, NDT Champion from Emory University, PhD in Government from Harvard University, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “When Speed Kills: Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence, and Stability”, 5/2/2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3348356

Thus, the reason to deploy autonomous systems would have to be their reliability and effectiveness rather than signaling. And giving up human control to algorithms in a crisis that could end with global nuclear war would require an extremely high level of perceived reliability and effectiveness. Few things are more important to militaries in crisis situations than informational awareness and control over decisions, and there might be fear that autonomous systems are prone to accidents.

This counterfactual illustrates that the development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapon systems by national militaries, if it occurs, is unlikely to have simple, easy, and linear consequences. Instead, human factors, including the psychological desire for control and organizational politics, will strongly shape how militaries think about developing and using LAWS. This will not just influence the potential for arms races in peacetime, but deterrence and wartime stability due to the organizational processes militaries implement for the deployment and use of autonomous systems on the battlefield.

This paper draws on research in strategic studies and examples from military history to assess how LAWS could influence the development and deployment of military systems, including arms races, crisis stability, and wartime stability, especially the risk of escalation. It also discusses the potential for arms control. It focuses on these questions through the lens of key characteristics of LAWS, especially the potential for increased operational speed and, simultaneously, less human control over battlefield choices. One of the primary attractions of autonomous systems, even compared to remotely piloted systems, is the potential to operate at machine speed. Another potential benefit is the possibility of machine-like accuracy in following programming, but that comes with a potential downside: the loss of control and the accompanying risk of accidents, adversarial spoofing, and miscalculation. Even if LAWS malfunction at the same rate as humans in a given scenario, the ability of operators to control the impact of those malfunctions may be lower, which could make LAWS less predictable on the battlefield. The paper then examines how these issues interact with the large uncertainty parameter associated with AI-based military capabilities at present, both in terms of the range of the possible and the opacity of their programming.

The results highlight several critical issues surrounding the development and deployment of LAWS.1 First, the desire to fight at machine speed with autonomous systems, while making a military more effective in a conflict, could increase crisis instability. As countries fear losing conflicts faster, it will generate escalation pressure, including an increased incentive for first strikes. Second, in addition to the actual risk of accidents and miscalculation from LAWS, the fear of accidents and losing control of autonomous systems could limit the willingness of militaries to deploy them, particularly since many militaries are conservative when it comes to emerging technologies and have high standards for system reliability. Third, the dual-use, or even general purpose, character of the basic science underlying many autonomous systems will make the technology hard to control, giving many countries and actors access to basic algorithms, though whether this is described as diffusion, proliferation, or an arms race will depend on political dynamics as much as anything.

Finally, multiple uncertainty parameters concerning lethal autonomous weapon systems could exacerbate security dilemmas. Uncertainty over the range of the possible concerning the programming of lethal autonomous weapon systems will increase fear of those systems in the near term, making restraint less likely for competitive reasons. Moreover, the inherent differences between remotely piloted systems and LAWS at the platform level come from software, not hardware. There is arguably an inherent opacity to lethal autonomous weapon systems. If an arms race over lethal autonomous weapon systems occurs, it will likely be because of worse-case assumptions about capability development by potential adversaries.

What is Autonomy or Artificial Intelligence?

Artificial intelligence is the use of computing power, in the form of algorithms, to conduct tasks that previously required human intelligence.2 Artificial intelligence in this context is best thought of as an umbrella technology or enabler, like the combustion engine or electricity. Military applications of artificial intelligence are potentially broad – from image recognition for surveillance to more efficient logistics to battle management.3 These include both non-kinetic applications, including in the cyber realm, as well as kinetic applications.4 One potential application of artificial intelligence is through armed autonomous systems that could be deployed on the battlefield, or what are most popularly called lethal autonomous weapon systems or lethal autonomous weapon systems. This differs from remotely-piloted systems where a human, though at a distance, still operates a given vehicle or system.

What is a lethal autonomous weapon system? While simple to describe on first glance, and easy to understand in the extreme – an armed humanoid robot with extremely broad programming making decisions about engaging in warfare – drawing the line between a lethal autonomous weapon system and other weapon systems is complex. In Directive 3000.09, published in 2012, the US Department of Defense defines an autonomous weapon as “A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”5 What it means to select and engage a target is not entirely clear, however. For example, homing munitions, which have existed since World War II, select and engage targets, according to a common sense understanding of the terms.6

Exactly what functions are autonomous also matters. A system could have automatic piloting, for example, that flies or drives a platform to a target, but still have complete human control over the use of the weapon. That would be a system with a high level of automation, though not a lethal autonomous weapon system according to most perspectives. Heather Roff measures the level of autonomy in a weapon system based on three subcomponents: self-mobility, self-direction, and self-determination. This helps distinguish systems where there might be autonomy concerning the best way a missile should get to a target, but the target itself is designated by a person fromsystems where an algorithm might be making higher-level engagement decisions.7 There are already some applications of limited machine autonomy in military systems, with the most prominent example being the automatic mode present on many Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), such as the Phalanx, used to defend ships and incoming missiles from attack.8

This article will not resolve the definitional debate surrounding lethal autonomous weapon systems, which is still ongoing in meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts focused on lethal autonomous weapon systems in the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Provisionally, this article adopts the Scharre and Horowitz definition that a lethal autonomous weapon system is “[A] weapon system that, once activated, is intended to select and engage targets where a human has not decided those specific targets are to be engaged.”9 However, moving beyond the close cases (e.g. particular types of missile guidance systems) and considering those weapon systems that clearly use machine intelligence to search for, select, and/or engage targets can help clarify what is at stake in this debate in the first place.10 After all, if most militaries most of the time would not have any need for lethal autonomous weapon systems, or those systems have significant disadvantages relative to remotely-piloted military robotics or soldiers on the battlefield, the stakes are lower. In contrast, if the integration of machine intelligence with military systems could give countries or violent non-state actors a significant advantage in how they employ force, it becomes even more crucial to engage the topic.

It is important to note that this article does not address concerns about existential risk related to artificial general intelligence – the fear that a superintelligence could decide to destroy the human race, either because it decides humans are malign or because humans program it to achieve a goal it can only accomplish by destroying humans.11 The existential risk issue associated with artificial intelligence is not necessarily closely coupled to military applications of artificial intelligence. If a super-intelligent machine learning system has the ability to take over human society in the interest of a goal – any goal – whether autonomous systems at much smaller orders of magnitude already exist in military systems will likely be unimportant. The super-intelligent system would simply create what it needed.

Why Invest in Autonomous Systems?

Militaries are already increasing their investments in remotely-piloted robotic systems. From UAVs such as the MQ-9 Reaper (United States) to uninhabited surface vehicles (USVs) such as the Guardium (Israel) to uninhabited ground vehicles (UGV) such as Platform-M (Russia), militaries around the world are investing in remotely piloted platforms, some of which can carry weapons. In these systems, human control over the use of force is not fundamentally different from the use of force with inhabited systems. In some cases, such as the MQ-9 Reaper, the sensor system a drone pilot uses to launch a weapon might even be the same sensor system a pilot in the cockpit of an inhabited fighter uses. Using remotely piloted systems gives militaries the ability to reduce the risk to their own soldiers while still projecting power in similar ways to how they used force previously.12 The first places militaries are likely to use kinetic lethal autonomous weapon systems include relatively “clear” environments such as air-to-air combat or naval combat, especially in geographic arenas where civilians are extremely unlikely to be present.13

#### Drolif means every hotspot goes nuclear.

Zenko and Kreps, PhDs, 14 \*Micah - Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, PhD in political science from Brandeis University; \*Sarah - Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor in the department of government and an adjunct professor at Cornell Law School, BA from Harvard University, MSc from Oxford University, and PhD from Georgetown University; “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation," Council on Foreign Relations, June 2014, http://aspheramedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Limiting\_Armed\_Drone\_Proliferation\_CSR69.pdf

The inherent advantages of drones will not alone make traditional interstate warfare more likely—such conflicts are relatively rare anyway, with only one active interstate conflict in both 2012 and 2013.20 Nor will the probable type, quantity, range, and lethality of armed drones that states possess in coming decades make a government more likely to attempt to defeat an opposing army, capture or control foreign territory, or remove a foreign leader from power. However, misperceptions over the use of armed drones increase the likelihood of militarized disputes with U.S. allies, as well as U.S. military forces, which could lead to an escalating crisis and deeper U.S. involvement. Though surveillance drones can be used to provide greater stability between countries by monitoring ceasefires or disputed borders, armed drones will have destabilizing consequences. Arming a drone, whether by design or by simply putting a crude payload on an unarmed drone, makes it a weapon, and thereby a direct national security threat for any state whose border it breaches. Increased Frequency of Interstate and Intrastate Force For the United States, drones have significantly reduced the political, diplomatic, and military risks and costs associated with the use of military force, which has led to a vast expansion of lethal operations that would not have been attempted with other weapons platforms. Aside from airstrikes in traditional conflicts such as Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan—where one-quarter of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) airstrikes in 2012 were conducted by drones—the United States has conducted hundreds in non-battlefield settings: Pakistan (approximately 369), Yemen (approximately 87), Somalia (an estimated 16), and the Philippines (at least 1, in 2006).21 Of the estimated 473 non-battlefield targeted killings undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were carried out by drones. Moreover, despite maintaining a “strong preference” for capturing over killing suspected terrorists since September 2011, there have been only 3 known capture attempts, compared with 194 drone strikes that have killed an estimated 1,014 people, 86 of whom were civilians.22 Senior U.S. civilian and military officials, whose careers span the pre– and post–armed drone era, overwhelmingly agree that the threshold for the authorization of force by civilian officials has been significantly reduced. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates asserted in October 2013, for example, that armed drones allow decision-makers to see war as a “bloodless, painless, and odorless” affair, with technology detaching leaders from the “inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain” consequences of war.23 President Barack Obama admitted in May 2013 that the United States has come to see armed drones “as a cure-all for terrorism,” because they are low risk and instrumental in “shielding the government” from criticisms “that a troop deployment invites.”24 Such admissions from leaders of a democratic country with a system of checks and balances point to the temptations that leaders with fewer institutional checks will face. President Obama and his senior aides have stated that the United States is setting precedents with drones that other states may emulate.25 If U.S. experience and Obama’s cautionary words are any guide, states that acquire armed drones will be more willing to threaten or use force in ways they might not otherwise, within both interstate and intrastate contexts. States might undertake cross-border, interstate actions less discriminately, especially in areas prone to tension. As is apparent in the East and South China Seas, nationalist sentiments and the discovery of untapped, valuable national resources can make disputes between countries more likely. In such contested areas, drones will enable governments to undertake strike missions or probe the responses of an adversary—actions they would be less inclined to take with manned platforms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there are approximately 430 bilateral maritime boundaries, most of which are not defined by formal agreements between the affected states.26 Beyond the cases of East Asia, other cross-border flashpoints for conflict where the low-risk proposition of drone strikes would be tempting include Russia in Georgia or Ukraine, Turkey in Syria, Sudan within its borders, and China on its western periphery. In 2013, a Chinese counternarcotics official revealed that his bureau had considered attempting to kill a drug kingpin named Naw Kham, who was hiding in a remote region in northeastern Myanmar, by using a drone carrying twenty kilograms of dynamite. “The plan was rejected, because the order was to catch him alive,” the official recalled.27 With armed drones, China might make the same calculation that the United States has made—that killing is more straightforward than capturing—in choosing to target ostensibly high-threat individuals with drone strikes. China’s demonstrated willingness to employ armed drones against terrorists or criminals outside its borders could directly threaten U.S. allies in the region, particularly if the criterion China uses to define a terrorist does not align with that of the United States or its allies. Domestically, governments may use armed drones to target their perceived internal enemies. Most emerging drone powers have experienced recent domestic unrest. Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, and China all have separatist or significant opposition movements (e.g., Kurds, Chechens, the Taliban, Tibetans, and Uighurs) that presented political and military challenges to their rule in recent history. These states already designate individuals from these groups as “terrorists,” and reserve the right to use force against them. States possessing the lower risk—compared with other weapons platforms—capability of armed drones could use them more frequently in the service of domestic pacification, especially against time-sensitive targets that reside in mountainous, jungle, or other inhospitable terrain. Compared with typical methods used by military and police forces to counter insurgencies, criminals, or terrorists—such as ground troops and manned aircraft— unmanned drones provide significantly greater real-time intelligence through their persistent loiter time and responsiveness to striking an identified target. Increased Risk of Misperception and Escalation Pushing limits in already unstable regions is complicated by questions raised regarding rules of engagement: how would states respond to an armed drone in what they contend is their sovereign airspace, and how would opposing sides respond to counter-drone tactics? Japanese defense officials claim that shooting down Chinese drones in what Japan contends is its airspace is more likely to occur than downing manned aircraft because drones are not as responsive to radio or pilot warnings, thereby raising the possibility of an escalatory response.28 Alternatively, Japan might misidentify a Chinese manned fighter as an advanced drone and fire on it, especially if the aircraft’s radar signature is not sufficiently distinctive or if combat drones routinely fly over the disputed area. Thus, the additional risks associated with drone strikes, combined with the lack of clarity on how two countries would react to an attempted downing of a drone, create the potential for miscalculation and subsequent escalation. As U.S. Air Force commanders in South Korea noted, a North Korean drone equipped with chemical agents would not have to kill many or even any people on the peninsula to terrorize the population and escalate tensions.29 This scenario points to the spiraling escalatory dynamic that could be repeated—likely intensified in the context of armed drones—in other tension-prone areas, such as the Middle East, South Asia, and Central and East Africa, where the mix of low-risk and ambiguous rules of engagement is a recipe for escalation. Not all of these contingencies directly affect U.S. interests, but they would affect treaty allies whose security the United States has an interest in maintaining. Compared with other weapons platforms, current practice repeatedly demonstrates that drones make militarized disputes more likely due to a decreased threshold for the use of force and an increased risk of miscalculation. Increased Risk of Lethality The proliferation of armed drones will increase the likelihood of destabilizing or devastating one-off, high-consequence attacks. In March 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) observed of drones: “In some respects it’s a perfect assassination weapon. . . . Now we have a problem. There are all these nations that want to buy these armed drones. I’m strongly opposed to that.”30 The worst-case contingency for the use of armed drones, albeit an unlikely circumstance, would be to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Drones are, in many ways, the perfect vehicle for delivering biological and chemical agents.31 A WMD attack, or even the assassination of a political leader, another troubling though unlikely circumstance, would have tremendous consequences for regional and international stability. Deterring such drone-based attacks will depend on the ability of the United States and other governments to accurately detect and attribute them. Technical experts and intelligence analysts disagree about the extent to which this will be possible, but the difficulties lie in the challenges of detecting drones (they emit small radar, thermal, and electron signatures, and can fly low), determining who controlled it (they can be programmed to fly to a preset GPS coordinate), or assigning ownership to a downed system (they can be composed of commercial, off-the-shelf components).32 It is equally noteworthy that civilian officials or military commanders have almost always used armed drones in ways beyond their initially intended applications. Drones do not simply fulfill existing mission requirements; they create new and unforeseen ones, and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, U.S. officials would be misguided to view future uses of armed drones solely through the prism of how the United States has used them—for discrete military operations in relatively benign air-defense environments. The potential for misperception is compounded by the fact that few governments seeking or acquiring armed drones have publicly articulated any strategy for how they will likely use them. Conversely, the uncertainty about how other countries will use drones provides the United States with an opportunity to shape drone doctrines, especially for U.S. allies interested in procuring drones from U.S. manufacturers.

### 1NC—Ozone

#### Timeframe – ozone depletion is super slow and incoherent there’s no brink argument or falsifiable data that explains the brink, 50 years of launches proves resilience

#### Ozone Layer is increasing – flips U/Q.

Horton 21 Helena Horton 9-15-2021 "‘Larger than usual’: this year’s ozone layer hole bigger than Antarctica" <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/sep/16/larger-than-usual-ozone-layer-hole-bigger-than-antarctica> (Environmental Journalist for the Guardian)//Elmer

The hole in the ozone layer that develops annually is “rather larger than usual” and is currently bigger than Antartica, say the scientists responsible for monitoring it. Researchers from the Copernicus Atmosphere Monitoring Service say that this year’s hole is growing quickly and is larger than 75% of ozone holes at this stage in the season since 1979. Ozone exists about seven to 25 miles (11-40km) above the Earth’s surface, in the stratosphere, and acts like a sunscreen for the planet, shielding it from ultraviolet radiation. Every year, a hole forms during the late winter of thesouthern hemisphere as the sun causes ozone-depleting reactions, which involve chemically active forms of chlorine and bromine derived from human-made compounds. In a statement Copernicus said that this year’s hole “has evolved into a rather larger than usual one”. Vincent-Henri Peuch, the service’s director, told the Guardian: “We cannot really say at this stage how the ozone hole will evolve. However, the hole of this year is remarkably similar to the one of 2020, which was among the deepest and the longest-lasting – it closed around Christmas – in our records since 1979.

#### Two Thumpers to Ozone:

#### 1] Space Tourism

Marais 21 Eloise Marais 7-19-2021 "Space tourism: rockets emit 100 times more CO₂ per passenger than flights – imagine a whole industry" <https://theconversation.com/space-tourism-rockets-emit-100-times-more-co-per-passenger-than-flights-imagine-a-whole-industry-164601> (Associate Professor in Physical Geography, UCL)//Elmer

The commercial race to get tourists to space is heating up between Virgin Group founder Sir Richard Branson and former Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos. On Sunday 11 July, Branson ascended 80 km to reach the edge of space in his piloted Virgin Galactic VSS Unity spaceplane. Bezos’ autonomous Blue Origin rocket is due to launch on July 20, coinciding with the anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon landing. Though Bezos loses to Branson in time, he is set to reach higher altitudes (about 120 km). The launch will demonstrate his offering to very wealthy tourists: the opportunity to truly reach outer space. Both tour packages will provide passengers with a brief ten-minute frolic in zero gravity and glimpses of Earth from space. Not to be outdone, Elon Musk’s SpaceX will provide four to five days of orbital travel with its Crew Dragon capsule later in 2021. What are the environmental consequences of a space tourism industry likely to be? Bezos boasts his Blue Origin rockets are greener than Branson’s VSS Unity. The Blue Engine 3 (BE-3) will launch Bezos, his brother and two guests into space using liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen propellants. VSS Unity used a hybrid propellant comprised of a solid carbon-based fuel, hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), and a liquid oxidant, nitrous oxide (laughing gas). The SpaceX Falcon series of reusable rockets will propel the Crew Dragon into orbit using liquid kerosene and liquid oxygen. Burning these propellants provides the energy needed to launch rockets into space while also generating greenhouse gases and air pollutants. Large quantities of water vapour are produced by burning the BE-3 propellant, while combustion of both the VSS Unity and Falcon fuels produces CO₂, soot and some water vapour. The nitrogen-based oxidant used by VSS Unity also generates nitrogen oxides, compounds that contribute to air pollution closer to Earth. Roughly two-thirds of the propellant exhaust is released into the stratosphere (12 km-50 km) and mesosphere (50 km-85 km), where it can persist for at least two to three years. The very high temperatures during launch and re-entry (when the protective heat shields of the returning crafts burn up) also convert stable nitrogen in the air into reactive nitrogen oxides. These gases and particles have many negative effects on the atmosphere. In the stratosphere, nitrogen oxides and chemicals formed from the breakdown of water vapour convert ozone into oxygen, depleting the ozone layer which guards life on Earth against harmful UV radiation. Water vapour also produces stratospheric clouds that provide a surface for this reaction to occur at a faster pace than it otherwise would. Space tourism and climate change Exhaust emissions of CO₂ and soot trap heat in the atmosphere, contributing to global warming. Cooling of the atmosphere can also occur, as clouds formed from the emitted water vapour reflect incoming sunlight back to space. A depleted ozone layer would also absorb less incoming sunlight, and so heat the stratosphere less. Figuring out the overall effect of rocket launches on the atmosphere will require detailed modelling, in order to account for these complex processes and the persistence of these pollutants in the upper atmosphere. Equally important is a clear understanding of how the space tourism industry will develop. Virgin Galactic anticipates it will offer 400 spaceflights each year to the privileged few who can afford them. Blue Origin and SpaceX have yet to announce their plans. But globally, rocket launches wouldn’t need to increase by much from the current 100 or so performed each year to induce harmful effects that are competitive with other sources, like ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and CO₂ from aircraft. During launch, rockets can emit between four and ten times more nitrogen oxides than Drax, the largest thermal power plant in the UK, over the same period. CO₂ emissions for the four or so tourists on a space flight will be between 50 and 100 times more than the one to three tonnes per passenger on a long-haul flight. In order for international regulators to keep up with this nascent industry and control its pollution properly, scientists need a better understanding of the effect these billionaire astronauts will have on our planet’s atmosphere.

#### 2] Dichloromethane

Perkins 17 Sid Perkins 6-27-2017 "New threat to ozone layer found" <https://www.science.org/content/article/new-threat-ozone-layer-found> (Sid is a freelance science journalist based in Crossville, Tennessee. He specializes in earth sciences and paleontology but often tackles topics such as astronomy, planetary sciences, materials sciences, and engineering. Sid has a bachelor’s degree in natural science from Christian Brothers College in Memphis, Tennessee; bachelor’s and master’s degrees in aeronautical engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology in Ohio; and a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Missouri in Columbia)//Elmer

The ozone layer—a high-altitude expanse of oxygen molecules that protects us from the sun's ultraviolet rays—has been on the mend for the past decade or so. But a newly discovered threat could delay its recovery. Industrial emissions of a chemical commonly used in solvents, paint removers, and the production of pharmaceuticals have doubled in the past few years, researchers have found, which could slow the healing of the ozone layer over Antarctica anywhere between 5 and 30 years—or even longer if levels continue to rise. The findings are "frightening" and "a big deal," says Robyn Schofield, an environmental scientist at the University of Melbourne in Australia who was not involved with the work. The chemical in question is called dichloromethane (CH2Cl2). Natural sources of this substance are small, says Ryan Hossaini, an atmospheric chemist at Lancaster University in the United Kingdom. Thus, he notes, the increase in emissions seen in recent years likely stems from human sources. Between 2000 and 2012, low-altitude concentrations of CH2Cl2 vapor rose, on average, about 8% per year, he adds. Globally, concentrations of CH2Cl2 approximately doubled between 2004 and 2014. Current CH2Cl2 emissions are about 1 million metric tons per year, Hossaini and his team estimate. Like chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and several other ozone-destroying chemicals you may have heard of, CH2Cl2 breaks apart when struck by sunlight. The chlorine atoms that are released then dismantle any ozone molecules they interact with. In 1987, an international agreement known as the Montreal Protocol led to a ban on the production and use of CFCs and many related compounds in industrial nations, but it ignored CH2Cl2 because researchers thought it didn't stay intact in the atmosphere long enough to rise into the stratosphere. Recent evidence now suggests, however, that the molecules can reach the lower edge of the stratosphere, which includes the ozone layer, despite its height 8 kilometers above the poles. To gauge the current and future threat to high-altitude ozone from CH2Cl2, Hossaini and his colleagues used computer simulations. In 2016, their analyses suggest, about 3% of the summer ozone loss in the Antarctic could be traced to CH2Cl2. That seems small, but in 2010 the substance was responsible for only 1.5% of the region's summer ozone loss, Hossaini says. If CH2Cl2 emissions continue to rise at the rate seen in the last decade, recovery of the ozone hole would be delayed about 30 years, the researchers estimate in Nature Communications. But if emissions of CH2Cl2 are held to current levels, healing of the ozone hole would be delayed only 5 years or so, the team finds. Simulations that don't include the effect of CH2Cl2 suggest that high-altitude ozone in the Antarctic will return to pre-1980 levels, the concentration measured before CFCs and other ozone-destroying chemicals were recognized as a problem, in 2065. The team's analyses "are quite important," says Björn-Martin Sinnhuber, an atmospheric scientist at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Germany. "It's clear that concentrations [of CH2Cl2] have increased quite a lot," he notes. But one critical question, he contends, is what will happen to emissions over the long term: "They've been quite variable in recent years, and it's difficult to say how they might evolve." Although the rapid rise in CH2Cl2 emissions may one day level off, it's also possible that emissions of this multipurpose chemical may accelerate even further. Hossaini and his team also assessed what would happen to high-altitude ozone if CH2Cl2 emissions rose at twice the rate seen in the past decade. The answer? Not good. Antarctic ozone wouldn't recover to pre-1980 levels until well after the year 2100, the analyses suggest. All this means that scientists now reviewing the Montreal Protocol should consider expanding the agreement to also regulate substances like CH2Cl2 that have atmospheric lifetimes of less than 6 months, Schofield says. Possibly as important, however, the team's results might also help other researchers identify which sources of CH2Cl2 are contributing most to the recent rise in emissions. That sort of information, Hossaini admits, is sadly lacking as of now.

#### No Ozone Impact.

Ridley 14 (Matthew White Ridley, BA and PhD in Zoology from Oxford. “THE OZONE HOLE WAS EXAGGERATED AS A PROBLEM,” *Rational Optimist*, 9/25/14, <http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/the-ozone-hole-was-exaggerated-as-a-problem.aspx>) dwc 19

Serial hyperbole does the environmental movement no favours My recent Times column argued that the alleged healing of the ozone layer is exaggerated, but so was the impact of the ozone hole over Antarctica: The ozone layer is healing. Or so said the news last week. Thanks to a treaty signed in Montreal in 1989 to get rid of refrigerant chemicals called chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), the planet’s stratospheric sunscreen has at last begun thickening again. Planetary disaster has been averted by politics. For reasons I will explain, this news deserves to be taken with a large pinch of salt. You do not have to dig far to find evidence that the ozone hole was never nearly as dangerous as some people said, that it is not necessarily healing yet and that it might not have been caused mainly by CFCs anyway. The timing of the announcement was plainly political: it came on the 25th anniversary of the treaty, and just before a big United Nations climate conference in New York, the aim of which is to push for a climate treaty modelled on the ozone one. Here’s what was actually announced last week, in the words of a Nasa scientist, Paul Newman: “From 2000 to 2013, ozone levels climbed 4 per cent in the key mid-northern latitudes.” That’s a pretty small change and it is in the wrong place. The ozone thinning that worried everybody in the 1980s was over Antarctica. Over northern latitudes, ozone concentration has been falling by about 4 per cent each March before recovering. Over Antarctica, since 1980, the ozone concentration has fallen by 40 or 50 per cent each September before the sun rebuilds it. So what’s happening to the Antarctic ozone hole? Thanks to a diligent blogger named Anthony Watts, I came across a press release also from Nasa about nine months ago, which said: “ Two new studies show that signs of recovery are not yet present, and that temperature and winds are still driving any annual changes in ozone hole size.” As recently as 2006, Nasa announced, quoting Paul Newman again, that the Antarctic ozone hole that year was “the largest ever recorded”. The following year a paper in Nature magazine from Markus Rex, a German scientist, presented new evidence that suggested CFCs may be responsible for less than 40 per cent of ozone destruction anyway. Besides, nobody knows for sure how big the ozone hole was each spring before CFCs were invented. All we know is that it varies from year to year. How much damage did the ozone hole ever threaten to do anyway? It is fascinating to go back and read what the usual hyperventilating eco-exaggerators said about ozone thinning in the 1980s. As a result of the extra ultraviolet light coming through the Antarctic ozone hole, southernmost parts of Patagonia and New Zealand see about 12 per cent more UV light than expected. This means that the weak September sunshine, though it feels much the same, has the power to cause sunburn more like that of latitudes a few hundred miles north. Hardly Armageddon. The New York Times reported “an increase in Twilight Zone-type reports of sheep and rabbits with cataracts” in southern Chile. Not to be outdone, Al Gore wrote that “hunters now report finding blind rabbits; fisherman catch blind salmon”. Zoologists briefly blamed the near extinction of many amphibian species on thin ozone. Melanoma in people was also said to be on the rise as a result. This was nonsense. Frogs were dying out because of a fungal disease spread from Africa — nothing to do with ozone. Rabbits and fish blinded by a little extra sunlight proved to be as mythical as unicorns. An eye disease in Chilean sheep was happening outside the ozone-depleted zone and was caused by an infection called pinkeye — nothing to do with UV light. And melanoma incidence in people actually levelled out during the period when the ozone got thinner.

### 1NC—Astronomy

#### Chance of asteroids is tiny and no extinction

Robert **Walker 16**. Software Developer of Tune Smithy, Wolfson College, Oxford. 12-14-2016. "Why Resilient Humans Would Survive Giant Asteroid Impact." Science 2.0. https://www.science20.com/robert\_inventor/we\_wont\_go\_extinct\_after\_a\_major\_asteroid\_impact\_even\_96\_of\_species\_extinct\_0\_chance\_of\_humans\_extinct-187383

This is something you hear said so often - that we risk being hit by an asteroid that could make humans extinct. But do we really? This is the article I’m commenting on, a recently breaking news story: Earth woefully unprepared for surprise comet or asteroid, Nasa scientist warns. Some are already worrying that it means that we are all due to die in the near future from an asteroid impact. Well, no, it doesn't mean that. So, what is the truth behind it? The source of all this is a comment by Dr Joseph Nuth who warns: “But on the other hand they are the extinction-level events, things like dinosaur killers, they’re 50 to 60 million years apart, essentially. You could say, of course, we’re due, but it’s a random course at that point.” Photograph of comet Siding Spring by Hubble - right hand image is more processed. This comet did a close flyby of Mars and at one point was predicted to have a tiny chance of hitting Mars. In the end it missed Mars by more than a quarter of the distance from Earth to the Moon If you read the rest of the article, it’s a worthy goal, to prepare us for asteroid impacts of all sizes from the small Chelyabinsk one up to really large 10 km ones. There are a number of things potentially confusing about this statement however, if you read it as a non scientist. Although there is a risk of “mass extinction” if a large asteroid hit Earth, “mass extinction” there doesn’t mean “extinction of humans”, we are such a resilient species that we would certainly survive a giant asteroid impact. We are not “due” an extinction at all. Next giant impact is most likely to happen many millions of years into the future. As we'll see, there is almost zero chance of a giant impact in the next century. There is however much we can do to protect ourselves from smaller asteroids. As a result of extensive asteroid surveys over the last couple of decades: We can be pretty sure (as in perhaps 99.999999% sure) that there isn’t an extinction level asteroid headed our way in the next century. We know the orbits of all the Near Earth Asteroids that could do this and none will hit Earth over that timescale. That leaves comets, and the chance of that is something like 1 in 100 million per century, as a very rough guess (since 99% of the impacts are thought to be from asteroids). This risk has been pretty much retired due to the automated asteroid searches by the likes of Pan STARRS. But the chance of a smaller asteroid impact is still high enough to make it worth working on it, especially since this is the one natural hazard we can not only predict to the minute, decades in advance, with enough information but also prevent also, given a long enough timeline. We are already close to completing the survey of 1 km asteroids (90% done). With a bit more funding we could also find most of the asteroids down to 45 meters in diameter. As a result of new developments in the science of asteroid detection, this could be done for a cost of only $50 million to protect the entire Earth. We would then be able to deflect asteroids decades before they are due to hit, which is a far easier task than a last minute deflection. First when he said "You could say, of course, we’re due, but it’s a random course at that point.”" - that is a scientist speaking as a scientist. But of course people sharing this on social media, retweeting, writing new stories about it, pick up the “we are due” and omit the scientific qualification “but it’s a random course at that point”. To say that we are “due” a mass extinction is a bit like saying that after you throw nine heads, you are due to throw a tail. Not true. The chance that the next coin toss is a tail is always going to be 50/50 for a fair coin no matter how many heads you throw. It's the same with extinctions. So long as it is a random process, then an extinction that happens every 60 million years could happen tomorrow or it could be 60 million years or 120 million years before it happens. On average we would still expect to wait 60 million years for the next such mass extinction even if the last one happened hundreds of millions of years ago. It’s just as for the coin toss. Same for an extinction event of a size that happens every 100 million years. If you look at the diagram the big five are irregularly spaced. The last one happened 66 million years ago. But they are irregularly spaced so we can't conclude either that we need to wait 44 million years for the next big extinction either. Some scientists have tried to discern a periodicity in the extinctions of perhaps 26 to 30 million years. If they are right then we are due the next extinction perhaps 15 million years or so from now. But that is very controversial and if true, it wouldn’t cover all mass extinctions. At any rate that's so far into the future it makes no difference to us now, if they are right or wrong. We could get a mass extinction in the next few millions of years. But it is nearly impossibly unlikely in the next century.

#### Newest research from NASA proves any threat is at least a thousand years away

Mack 19 (Eric, “NASA says city-smashing asteroids aren't so common,” 6-27, <https://www.cnet.com/news/nasa-says-city-smashing-asteroids-arent-so-common/>)

Asteroids are all around us, but we shouldn't be losing sleep over the big buggers. A small space rock was spotted just before slamming into the atmosphere last weekend, and over 20,000 near-earth asteroids have been cataloged, but new research from NASA finds impacts that could do serious damage aren't very frequent. Perhaps the last time an asteroid large enough to inflict serious hurt on a limited part of the Earth's surface (we're not talking about an extinction-level space rock like the one that ended the dinosaurs) came knocking was in 1908. In June of that year, the so-called Tunguska Event impacted an unpopulated part of Siberia and was witnessed by only a handful of people, but it flattened 500,000 acres of forest, scorched the Earth and knocked people out of their chairs 40 miles away (64 km). It's easy and terrifying to imagine what the result might have been had chance dictated the impact occurred over a major metropolitan area instead. "Tunguska is the largest cosmic impact witnessed by modern humans," David Morrison, a planetary science researcher at NASA's Ames Research Center in Silicon Valley, said in a release. "It also is characteristic of the sort of impact we are likely to have to protect against in the future." But when researchers revisited the Tunguska Event with the help of computer models and tooked into account the latest data on the population of asteroids in our neighborhood, they found that such major impacts are exceedingly rare. The results, published in the journal Icarus, find that such a powerful impact should only be expected roughly every thousand years or longer rather than once every century or so, as was previously thought. While this is certainly good news for all earthly life forms, the threat of an asteroid impact is still very real and worth preparing for, as the 2013 bolide explosion over Russia reminded us. "A lot of uncertainty remains about how large asteroids break up in the atmosphere and how much damage they could cause on the ground," said NASA researcher and co-author Lorien Wheeler. "However, recent advancements in computational models, along with analyses of the Chelyabinsk and other meteor events, are helping to improve our understanding of these factors so that we can better evaluate potential asteroid threats in the future."

#### Space based astronomy solves.

NASA 21 “Asteroid-Hunting Space Telescope Gets Two-Year Mission Extension” June 30, 2021 <https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/asteroid-hunting-space-telescope-gets-two-year-mission-extension> SM

Asteroid-Hunting Space Telescope Gets Two-Year Mission Extension

NEOWISE has provided an estimate of the size of over 1,850 near-Earth objects, helping us better understand our nearest solar system neighbors.

For two more years, NASA’s Near-Earth Object Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (NEOWISE) will continue its hunt for asteroids and comets – including objects that could pose a hazard to Earth. This mission extension means NASA’s prolific near-Earth object (NEO) hunting space telescope will continue operations until June 2023.

“At NASA, we’re always looking up, surveying the sky daily to find potential hazards and exploring asteroids to help unlock the secrets of the formation of our solar system,” said NASA Administrator Bill Nelson. “Using ground-based telescopes, over 26,000 near-Earth asteroids have already been discovered, but there are many more to be found. We’ll enhance our observations with space-based capabilities like NEOWISE and the future, much more capable NEO Surveyor to find the remaining unknown asteroids more quickly and identify potentially-hazardous asteroids and comets before they are a threat to us here on Earth.”

Originally launched as the Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) mission in December 2009, the space telescope surveyed the entire sky in infrared wavelengths, detecting asteroids, dim stars, and some of the faintest galaxies visible in deep space. WISE completed its primary mission when it depleted its cryogenic coolant and it was put into hibernation in February 2011. Observations resumed in December 2013 when the space telescope was repurposed by NASA’s Planetary Science Division as “NEOWISE” to identify asteroids and comets throughout the solar system, with special attention to those that pass close to Earth’s orbit.

“NEOWISE provides a unique and critical capability in our global mission of planetary defense, by allowing us to rapidly measure the infrared emission and more accurately estimate the size of hazardous asteroids as they are discovered,” said Lindley Johnson, NASA’s Planetary Defense Officer and head of the Planetary Defense Coordination Office (PDCO) at NASA Headquarters in Washington. “Extending NEOWISE’s mission highlights not only the important work that is being done to safeguard our planet, but also the valuable science that is being collected about the asteroids and comets further out in space.”