# 1NC

### 1NC – Russia China

#### China-Russia coop solves nuclear war

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China and Russia are the two largest—and neighboring—powers of continental Eurasia. Can two tigers share the same mountain, especially when one great power is rapidly gaining strength and the other is in relative decline? And there seems to be a pattern in the history of international relations that two ambitious major powers that share a land border are less likely to make an alliance, while they are more likely to engage in territorial disputes with one another as well as rivalry over primacy in their common neighborhood. There are at least three major parts of Eurasia—East Asia, the post-Soviet space (mainly Central Asia), and the Arctic—where China’s and Russia’s geopolitical interests intersect, creating potential for competition and conflict. But, on the other hand, if managed wisely, overlapping interests and stakes can also generate opportunities for collaboration. The following sections examine how Russia and China are managing to keep their differences in key Eurasian zones under control while displaying a significant degree of mutual cooperation. East Asia This is China’s ‘home region’, but also one where Russia, by virtue of possessing the Far Eastern territories, is a resident power. Moscow, which has traditionally been concerned with keeping sovereignty over its vulnerable Far East, does not at present see China as a major security risk on Russia’s eastern borders. All border delimitation issues between Moscow and Beijing were resolved in the 1990s and 2000s, while the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty explicitly states that the two countries have no territorial claims to each other. Furthermore, Moscow is well aware that Chinese military preparations are directed primarily toward Taiwan, the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, not against the Russian Far East. There is the cliché, persistent among the Western media and commentariat, of a Chinese demographic invasion of the Russian Far East. For example, a Wall Street Journal article claimed recently that ‘about 300,000 Chinese, some unregistered, could now be settled in Russia’s Far East’ (Simmons 2019). In reality, the actual number of the Chinese who live more or less permanently in the Russian Far East is far lower, and there are very few cases of illegal Chinese migration. There is no imminent risk of the Russian Far East falling under Chinese control demographically or otherwise. Not sensing any major Chinese menace to the Russian Far East, Russia has refused to engage in rivalry with China in East Asia. On the most important issues of contemporary East Asian geopolitics Moscow has tended to support Beijing or displayed friendly neutrality. On the Korean Peninsula, Moscow has largely played second fiddle to Beijing. On the South China Sea disputes, although Russia’s official stance is strict neutrality, some Russian moves may be seen as favoring Beijing. For example, following the July 2016 Hague tribunal ruling that rejected China’s claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea, Putin expressed solidarity with China, calling the international court’s decision ‘counterproductive’ (Reuters 2016). Russia shares with China the objective of reducing American influence in East Asia and undermining the US-centric alliances in the region. Russian weapon sales are helping China alter the military balance in the Western Pacific to the detriment of the USA and its allies. Russia’s decision to assist China with getting its own missile attack early warning system may have also been partly motivated by the desire to strengthen China vis-à-vis the USA in their rivalry for primacy in East Asia. The Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov hinted as much by saying that this strategic system will ‘cardinally increase stability and security in East Asia’ (TASS 2019c). Russian deference to China on East Asian issues, albeit somewhat hurting Moscow’s great-power pride, makes geopolitical sense. The Kremlin treats Pacific affairs as an area of lower concern than Europe, the Middle East, or Central Asia. Mongolia, which constitutes Siberia’s underbelly, is the only East Asian nation that can count on Russian security protection in case it finds itself in danger of external aggression, at any rate a purely theoretical possibility so far. It would be incorrect to say that Russia has completely withdrawn from East Asian geopolitics. In some cases, Russia does act against Chinese wishes in the Asia–Pacific. One recent example is Russia’s quiet determination to keep drilling in the areas of the South China Sea on the Vietnamese continental shelf over which China lays sovereignty claims. The Russian state-owned energy company Rosneft operates on Vietnam’s shelf, despite Beijing’s displeasure and periodic harassment by Chinese ships (Zhou 2019). Apart from the desire to make profits from the South China Sea’s hydrocarbons, Russia may be seeking to support its old-time friend Vietnam—to whom it also sells weapons—as well as demonstrate that it is still an independent actor in East Asia. Through such behavior on China’s Southeast Asian periphery, the Kremlin could also be sending the signal to Beijing that, if China gets too closely involved in Russia’s backyard, such as Central Asia or the Caucasus, Russia can do similar things in China’s. Albeit a friction point between Beijing and Moscow, the activities by Russian energy firms in the South China Sea are unlikely to destabilize the Sino-Russian entente, since Moscow and Beijing need each other on much bigger issues. The post-Soviet space Russia has vital stakes in the geopolitical space formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and is willing to go to great lengths to defend those interests. It was, after all, a perceived brazen attempt by Brussels and Washington to draw Ukraine into the EU’s and NATO’s orbit that induced Moscow to take drastic action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, causing a rupture with the West. When it comes to Moscow–Beijing politics over the post-Soviet space, the most problematic question is certainly about Central Asia, a region composed of five former Soviet republics which shares borders with both Russia and China. Since the nineteenth century, Russia has traditionally considered Central Asia as its sphere of influence. However, in the 2000s China began its economic expansion in the region. It is now by far the biggest trade partner for Central Asian states (Bhutia 2019) as well as its largest source of investments. China also set up a small military presence inside Tajikistan, apparently to secure a sensitive area which borders China’s Xinjiang region and Afghanistan (Lo 2019).

#### Space weapon deployment doesn’t cause an arms race or increase chance of war

Lopez 12 [LAURA DELGADO LO´ PEZ, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Arlington, Virginia. Astropolitics. "Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space Arms Control." https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391]

The previous discussion demonstrates that although a globalized space arms race could follow U.S. deployment of space weapons, it is also plausible and more likely that it may not happen at all. As Mueller states: ‘‘In the end, most of the inevitability arguments are weak.’’62 The assumptions discussed here break the argument into a series of debatable maxims that other scholars have also considered. Hays, for instance, counters the inevitability argument by pointing out that previous ASAT tests did not have this purported destabilizing effect, to which we can add that even after the Chinese ASAT test, neither Russia nor the United States, who would be both capable and more politically likely to launch space weapons, moved forward in that direction.63 Although some may draw attention to the recent wake-up calls in order to underline a sense of urgency, one should also recall that when it seemed truly inevitable before, it did not happen either. In his detailed account of military space developments from 1945 to 1984, Paul Stares described how superpowers’ assessment of the value of space weapons shifted, with a ‘‘hiatus in testing’’ reflecting the attractiveness of satellites as military targets.64 In this changed landscape, Stares also assumed the inevitability argument, claiming that ‘‘the chances of space remaining a ‘sanctuary’ [absence of weapons] into the 21st century appear today to be remote.’’65 Perhaps the conditions are more conducive now, but the important point to be reiterated is that the outcome is not inevitable, and that any such prediction must be undertaken with caution. One of the most prominent theorists to propose an alternate picture and pair it with an aggressive pro-space weapons stance is Everett Dolman. In his Astropolitik theory, Dolman summarizes the steps that the United States must take to assume control of space, particularly through withdrawal from the current space regime.66 This move, he argues, would benefit not only the United States, but also the rest of the world, since having a democracy controlling space is a catalyst for peace.67 Elsewhere, he writes: ‘‘Only a liberal world hegemon would be able to practice the restraint necessary to maintain its preponderant balance of hegemonic power without resorting to an attempt at empire.’’68 Accordingly, he believes that this strategy would be ‘‘perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing U.S. hegemony,’’69 but that other countries, correctly assessing U.S. leadership in space, would not seek to deploy their own systems. Having the ability to prevent the stationing of foreign weapons systems in space, he writes, ‘‘makes the possibility of large-scale space war and a military space race less likely, not more.’’70 In fact, he says, ‘‘to suggest that the inevitable result is a space arms competition is the worst kind of mirror-imaging.’’71 Dolman argues that the weaponization of space by the United States would ‘‘decrease the likelihood of an arms race by shifting spending away from conventional weapons systems,’’ which would reduce U.S. capabilities in territorial occupation and would thus be perceived as less threatening to other countries.72

#### No space war, and no impact if it does happen

Handberg 17 Roger Handberg 17, Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, 2017, “Is space war imminent? Exploring the possibility,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 36, No. 5, p. 413-425

The assumption made is that space war will be successfully waged in both the heavens and on the Earth itself. This assumption, however, is grounded on several hypotheticals occurring. First, that total devastating strategic surprise can be achieved—the side attacked becomes so damaged and devastated that further resistance is impossible to sustain regardless of national will, since nuclear weapons overhang the entire enterprise. The analogy usually invoked for American audiences is a “Pearl Harbor” type attack. This scenario is premised on equivalent American incompetence and lack of readiness as exhibited in December 1941. One must note that Pearl Harbor ended as a strategic failure for Japan—it led to defeat because the attack mobilized U.S. power without hesitation, given the intense political divisions over whether to enter the worldwide conflicts already raging. The attack was a military failure because Navy carriers were not destroyed along with battleship row along with critical fuel facilities. Similar analogies invoke September 11, 2001 as the prototype for such attacks more recently, but the same caveats apply. Total surprise assumes that all relevant opponent systems and civilian assets are disabled and left vulnerable to follow on attacks. In fact, collapse of U.S. defenses leaves U.S. cities as hostages to the rulers of the heavens, or vice versa if the U.S. moves first. Space war is extremely destabilizing, as will be discussed, since survivability of one's strategic assets becomes problematic. Second, surprise requires that sufficient offensive space assets be placed in orbit without triggering a response by other states—the scale of such technology deployment is in itself possibly self-defeating given high costs and a likely lack of launch capacity. In addition, much launch capacity is now international rather than national, so maintaining secrecy becomes even more difficult. Space as an operational environment suffers from excessive transparency, meaning any launches can be monitored and tracked by others with strong evidence as to what is being deployed. One must remember that the original satellite launches in the 1950s were accurately tracked by a British grade-school class as a science project. In addition, at least since the early 1960s, remote sensing has increased exponentially the global capability to detect buildup of military assets of differing types, whether in space or on the ground. Commercial remote-sensing capabilities further enhance the capacity to detect militarily relevant actions. For example, commercial imagery is accessed by private parties to monitor the North Korean missile and nuclear weapons programs, in effect expanding the capacity of the world to look in on various states' interior regions, scanning for relevant information, including weapons buildup and launch capabilities. Even construction of physical facilities for production of space assets or for other weaponry can be monitored, making surprise more difficult but not impossible, as demonstrated in earlier monitoring of North Korea and, in 1998, the nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India. That means if the ASAT weapons come from ground locations, there is a high probability that they can be detected but no guarantee exists that detection will in fact occur. The uncertainty will impact calculations of attack success. Third, the most obvious initial attack of space-based assets will most likely come from cyber attacks, given that such actions do not necessarily require the scale of resources necessary for other modalities such as kinetic weapons, or even lasers or other energy-type weapons. One will have to position the weapons plus the infrastructure to permit rapid recycling of the weapons for the next attack. Firing off interceptors will likely be a one-off, meaning extremely precise targeting will be required if the attack is to be successful. Note that none of these systems require that individuals be placed in Earth orbit, despite the imagery describing such operations in fictional universes. Deployment requires a large lift capacity for initial deployment plus replenishment of destroyed or inoperative space assets, since a space conflict assumes that assets will be lost either kinetically or be compromised by cyber or energy beams. In any case, the combatants must be able to recover their capabilities lost during the conflict; failure to do would mean defeat or at least stalemate, negating the reason for the attack. That raises a major question when one considers the problem or expectation that space war can be successfully conducted or defended. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) remains a critical weak point for all potential space-war participants. Loss of space assets occurs routinely during operations, but actual combat losses can be exponential depending on the weaponry used, and replacing those losses becomes the race to the next level after the initial exchange or combat. Unfortunately, ORS remains a major weakness of the United States and likely other states; deploying replacement satellites remains a multiyear process, while launch capabilities are scheduled long in advance. The rise of multiple private-launch competitors may partially alleviate some of the delay but that remains problematic given that the military payloads may be competing with commercial vendors also trying to replace losses. The tradeoff is that. in principle, private-launch vendors may be able to do so more cheaply, but their capacity may be saturated by demand from the civil and commercial sectors, leaving few “uncommitted” launch options for military purposes. Normally this is not an issue, but the available launch options may be third party rather than national-flag carriers, which raises severe security concerns. Fourth, several other assumptions become essential to make the strategy work, including that such an attack does not render Earth orbit so debris-saturated that further military space operations become impossible to sustain. Also, damage to civilian space assets remains, such that their continuation is possible if undamaged replacements can be quickly reintroduced to restart economically critical operations. Globalization has been fostered through satellite technologies. Their disruption can be devastating for all parties, regardless of who is the winner or the loser. What may occur is the graveyard of the modern economic system. No potential space participants would be immune to the damage, regardless of whether or not they were participants in the actual conflict. Fifth, there must be no difficulty in separating potential targets from the enemy, allied states, and nonbelligerent states. This creates a situation in which the spread of space technologies globally complicates actions, expanding the range of participants beyond the combatants, much like earlier wars at sea, where there were the combatants' ships, along with those of nonbelligerents, including neutrals whom the combatants struggled to draw into the conflict on their side, or at least to render their services unavailable to the other side. The earliest discussion of space conflict was premised on Cold War analogies, meaning two major combatants, either U.S.–Russia, or U.S–-China, or even a three-way war. Presently, analyses focus on a bilateral conflict with the U.S. opposed to China and Russia. Whether that would occur is obviously unknown, despite political rhetoric about a Eurasia coalition of likeminded states. What it does is multiply the number of potential targets and complicates reactions to neutrals' actions to protect their interests or assets. The distinction between combatants and neutrals or third parties will be possibly blurred beyond separation. The byproduct of a kinetic space conflict is massive amounts of space debris, destroying or damaging most space assets regardless of their state sponsor or nationality. Initial attacks may be focused and precise, but the result is still the same. The debris generated by armed conflict will endure beyond the immediate clash. The obvious alternative is a strictly electronic attack on space assets' operating systems, leaving the satellites in orbit, although without the ability to move them or control possible erratic changes in orbit due to collisions with other space debris. Other forms space war will take Reality is more complicated—kinetic action produces debris, the ultimate deterrent to actual space war. Therefore, space war could likely track several distinct phases. The first is cyber attacks, which disable or destroy the working systems of the spacecraft or the ground-support network—in effect, a series of stealth attacks. Civilian satellites are extremely soft targets—defense requires a capacity to detect and analyze any attack on the spacecraft, not available presently for most commercial spacecraft due to cost considerations. Otherwise, one could use nuclear weapons to create electromagnetic pulses (EMP) which can fry unprotected electronics both in space and on the ground, depending on where the weapons are detonated. Interestingly, space war scenarios have some territorial war aspects in that any attacks on space assets will devastate both military and civilian targets without distinction between the war participants and civilians. Similar to unrestricted submarine warfare, all targets in the relevant area will become casualties or otherwise impacted in their operations. Second, attacks that are conducted against the ground down links and/or communications systems, leaving the spacecraft without guidance or instructions, and also no information is returned to the commanders even if the satellites survive the initial onslaught. These can involve kinetic attacks against specific locations or insertion of special operations forces to render the facility inoperative. For example, antennas can be disabled or destroyed, disrupting operations until new facilities are brought online. Other alternatives could include kinetic weapons launched from space, “rods from God.”20 Air strike packages could include electronic warfare elements capable of scrambling or disrupting operations of such facilities even prior to physical strikes against the targets. Spacecraft not destroyed or disabled in the initial two stages of the attack can be directly attacked by “dazzling” their receivers, with laser impulses destroying the receivers for which there are few replacements without replacing the spacecraft physically. Third, rapid replacement of inoperative satellites, regardless of the reasons, does not occur, which translates into a race for the third, possibly end, phase of the war, replenishment. Inability to replace losses may mean that none of the combatants are able to dominate in the end, meaning conventional conflict may be the outcome, although issues of global reach may confine conflicts to relatively small areas. In previous conventional conflicts, large-scale forces were moved, albeit slowly, across the globe to the conflict, i.e., Desert Shield morphing into Desert Storm after a nearly six-month buildup.

#### No China space war – the only scenario for conflict is Earthbound – Chinese military plans prove

Cheng 17 [Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy Heritage. The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains. Chapter 6. Space Deterrence, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Asian Security: A U.S. Perspective. Rand Corporation. 2017]

But while there may be clashes in space, the actual source of any Sino-American conflict will remain earthbound, most likely stemming from tensions associated with the situation in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, or the South China Sea. This suggests that U.S. and allied decisionmakers (both in Asia and Europe) should be focusing on deterring aggression in general, rather than concentrating primarily on trying to forestall actions in space. Indeed, there is little evidence that Chinese military planners are contemplating a conflict limited to space. While there may be actions against space systems, Chinese writings suggest that they would either be limited in nature, as part of a signaling and coercive effort, or else would be integrated with broader terrestrial military operations.

#### MAD checks space escalation – nuclear response and debris

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.

### 1NC – ASATs

#### Vote Neg on Zero I/L – ASAT’s aren’t private actor space appropriation – this means the Plan can’t solve anything.

#### a] Outer Space means above the atmosphere.

Howell 17 Elizabeth Howell 6-7-2017 "What is Space?" <https://www.space.com/24870-what-is-space.html> (Ph.D., is a contributing writer for Space.com since 2012. As a proud Trekkie and Canadian, she tackles topics like spaceflight, diversity, science fiction, astronomy and gaming to help others explore the universe. Elizabeth's on-site reporting includes two human spaceflight launches from Kazakhstan, and embedded reporting from a simulated Mars mission in Utah. She holds a Ph.D. and M.Sc. in Space Studies from the University of North Dakota, and a Bachelor of Journalism from Canada's Carleton University.)//Elmer

From the perspective of an Earthling, outer space is a zone that occurs about 100 kilometers (60 miles) above the planet, where there is no appreciable air to breathe or to scatter light. In that area, blue gives way to black because oxygen molecules are not in enough abundance to make the sky blue.

#### China’s ASAT’s are located on the ground.

Erwin 20 Sandra Erwin 9-1-2020 "Pentagon report: China amassing arsenal of anti-satellite weapons" <https://spacenews.com/pentagon-report-china-amassing-arsenal-of-anti-satellite-weapons/> (Sandra Erwin writes about military space programs, policy, technology and the industry that supports this sector. She has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry for nearly two decades as editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine and Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense.)//Elmer

WASHINGTON — China is progressing with the development of missiles and electronic weapons that could target satellites in low and high orbits, the Pentagon says in a new report released Sept. 1. China already has operational ground-based missiles that can hit satellites in low-Earth orbit and “probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit,” says the Defense Department’s annual report to Congress on China’s military capabilities. DoD has been required by law to submit this report since 2000. The Pentagon says Chinese military strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems and to deny them to adversaries as central to modern warfare. China for years has continued to “strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space,” the report says. China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new anti-satellite weapons programs since it confirmed it used an ASAT missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007, but the nation has been steadily advancing in this area, the report says. So-called counterspace capabilities developed by China include kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, orbiting space robots and space surveillance to monitor objects across the globe and in space.

#### b] Private entity are non-governmental.

Dunk 11 Von Der Dunk, Frans G. "1. The Origins Of Authorisation: Article VI Of The Outer Space Treaty And International Space Law." National Space Legislation in Europe. Brill Nijhoff, 2011. 3-28. (University of Nebraska)//Elmer

4. Interpreting Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty One main novel feature of Article VI stood out with reference to the role of private enterprise in this context. Contrary to the version o fthe concept applicable under general international law, where 'direct state responsibility' only pertained to acts somehow directly attributable to a state and states could only be addressed for acts by private actors under 'indirect', 'due care' / 'due diligence' responsibility18, Article VI made no difference as to whether the activities at issue were the state's own ("whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies" ...) or those of private actors (... "or by non-governmental entities"). The interests of the Soviet Union in ensuring that, whomever would actually conduct a certain space activity, some state or other could be held responsible for its compliance with applicable rules of space law to that extent had prevailed. However, the general acceptance of Article VI as cornerstone of the Outer Space Treaty unfortunately was far from the end of the story. Partly, this was the consequence of key principles being left undefined.

#### China’s ASATs are operated by the Strategic Support Force – proven by 1AC Chow and Kelley.

#### The SSF is a governmental entity – they’re not a private actor.

Pollpeter et Al 17 Pollpeter, Kevin L., Michael S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham. The creation of the PLA strategic support force and its implications for Chinese Military Space Operations. RAND Corporation Santa Monica United States, 2017. (Analyst at Rand)//Elmer

This report explores the missions and organization of China's military space enterprise, focusing on the organizational structure of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF). Created on December 31, 2015, as part of a major reorganization of China's military, the SSF is charged with developing and employing most of the PLA's space capabilities. Its creation signifies a shift in the PLA's prioritization of space and an increased role for PLA space capabilities. Chinese military strategists see military space capabilities and operations as a key component of strategic deterrence, critical to enabling the PLA to fight informatized local wars and counter U.S. military intervention in the region and essential for supporting operations aimed at protecting China's emerging interests in more-distant parts of the world. The main function of the SSF's space component appears to be the launch and operation of satellites to provide the PLA with command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. It appears that information warfare, including space warfare, long identified by PLA analysts as a critical element of future military operations, has entered a new phase of development in which an emphasis on space and information warfare, long-range precision strikes, and the requirements associated with conducting operations at greater distances from China has necessitated the establishment of a new and different type of organization.

#### This means the Aff doesn’t effect ASATs – they will say Commercial Sectors produce them, that’s irrelevant since the PLA operates them as an act of appropriation which isn’t effected by the plan.

#### No Taiwan invasion – geography, and no heg solves because it removes the US from the war which keeps it conventional

Michael A. Cohen, MA, 21 [Fellow @ The Century Foundation, Adjunct Lecturer in School of International and Public Affairs @ Columbia], "No, Neocons, China Is Not About to Invade Taiwan," New Republic, 11-19-2021 <https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan> C.VC

Earlier this month, the Defense Department released its annual report to Congress on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” While the report lays out the ways in which China’s “People’s Liberation Army” is seeking to modernize its forces, the threat to Taiwan of armed invasion is still minimal at best:

Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the PRC’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk.

One might expect that a country intent on launching the largest and most difficult amphibious invasion in history would be making intense preparations. That’s not happening.

As the Pentagon report notes, Chinese naval investments have focused on building up the capacity to launch “regional and eventually global expeditionary missions rather than the large number of landing ship transports and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault.” The Pentagon also finds that while China is focusing on conducting joint operations that involve forces from the army, navy, and air force, as of present it currently lacks such capabilities.

That the Chinese military enjoys vast military superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan is not in doubt. But that such resources can be used to mount an amphibious assault is something else altogether. The Chinese military last fought a war in 1979 against Vietnam, and the PLA was badly bloodied. That means that the soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience.

China’s own media outlets have, according to the Pentagon, noted the PLA’s shortcomings, which include that “commanders cannot (1) judge situations; (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions; (3) make operational decisions; (4) deploy forces; and, (5) manage unexpected situations.” These problems would be challenging enough in a conventional conflict. For a complex invasion of Taiwan, they would render such efforts virtually impossible.

One big reason is that Taiwan is about as inhospitable an environment as can be imagined for an amphibious invasion. Ian Easton, a defense expert who has written extensively about Taiwan defense strategy, wrote earlier this year that the country’s “coastal terrain … is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles.” Easton also notes that “many of Taiwan’s outer islands bristle with missiles, rockets, and artillery guns. Their granite hills have been honeycombed with tunnels and bunker systems.”

### 1NC – Primacy

#### Unipolarity wil inevitably fall

Mearsheimer 19 [John J. Professor of IR @ Uchicago, “Bound to Fail.” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4]

There is an additional problem linked to hyperglobalization that has little to do with the growing political opposition to the international order in liberal countries, and everything to do with the global balance of power. Until Trump came to power in 2017, Western elites, in keeping with their post–Cold War policy of engaging, not containing, China, were deeply committed to integrating China into the world economy, including all of its key economic institutions. An increasingly prosperous and wealthy China, they assumed, would eventually become a liberal democracy and an upstanding member of the liberal international order. What the architects of that policy did not realize, however, is that by helping accelerate Chinese growth, they were actually helping undermine the liberal order, as China has rapidly grown into an economic powerhouse with significant military capability. In effect, they have helped China become a great power, thus undercutting unipolarity, which is essential for maintaining a liberal world order. This problem has been compounded by the resurgence of Russia, which is once again a great power, although clearly a weak one. With the rise of China and Russia’s comeback, the international system has become multipolar, which is a death knell for the liberal international order. To make matters worse, neither China nor Russia has become a liberal democracy. Even if China and Russia had not become great powers and the world remained unipolar, the liberal order would still be falling apart today because of its intrinsic flaws. The election of Donald Trump, who sharply and frequently criticized all the key elements of the post–Cold War order during his presidential campaign, is evidence of how much trouble it was in by 2016. Thus, if the international system had remained unipolar, the liberal world order would have devolved into an agnostic order under President Trump, as realist orders have no place in unipolarity. There is certainly no evidence that he is committed to refashioning the existing liberal order. Indeed, he appears bent on wrecking it. With or without China, the liberal international order was destined to fail, because it was fatally flawed at birth

summary

The various causal processes described above have all played an important role in subverting the liberal international order. Although each one has a distinct logic, they have often operated synergistically. For example, the negative effects of hyperglobalization on the lower and middle classes have combined with the nationalist resentment over immigration and the sense of lost sovereignty to fuel a strong populist backlash against the principles and practices of the liberal order. Indeed, that anger has often been directed at the liberal elites who have benefitted from the order and who vigorously defend it. That resentment, of course, has had significant political consequences. It has caused deep political divisions in the United States and other Western democracies, led to Brexit, helped put Trump in the White House, and fueled support for nationalist leaders around the world.

Where Are We Headed?

One might acknowledge that the liberal international order is in terminal decline, but argue that it can be replaced with a more pragmatic version, one that avoids the excesses of the post–Cold War order.85 This more modest liberal order would pursue a more nuanced, less aggressive approach to spreading liberal democracy, rein in hyperglobalization, and put some significant limits on the power of international institutions. The new order, according to this perspective, would look something like the Western order during the Cold War, although it would be global and liberal, not bounded and realist. This solution is not feasible, however, because the unipolar moment is over, which means there is no chance of maintaining any kind of liberal international order for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, President Trump has no intention of pursuing a “liberal-lite” world order, and without his support, that option is a nonstarter. But even if Trump were not an obstacle and the international system were to remain unipolar, the United States would fail if it lowered its sights and attempted to construct a less ambitious liberal order. Indeed, it would end up building an agnostic international order instead. It is impossible to build a meaningful liberal global order with modest or more passive policies. The enterprise requires too much social engineering in too many places. If it has any chance of succeeding (I think it has none), the liberal unipole and its allies must relentlessly pursue highly ambitious global policies, which is why the United States and its liberal partners acted the way they did in the wake of the Cold War. That approach, however, is now politically infeasible because of past failures. Consequently, the liberal democracies have no choice but to take small steps here and there to remake the world in their own image, while adopting a live and let live approach toward most countries in the world. That humble approach would effectively produce an agnostic order. But that is not going to happen, because the system is multipolar and great power politics are once again at play. Thus, the key question is: What kinds of realist orders will dominate the landscape in the new multipolar world?

#### Heg is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.

Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.

The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge.

Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork.

The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.

#### Empirics go neg – most qualified studies disprove hegemonic stability theories.

Fettweis 17 –Christopher J. Fettweis is an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace, Security Studies” 26:3, 423-451; EG)

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, **but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear.** Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 **Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not**. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. **US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse.** In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. **In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace.** In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended Table 1. Post-Cold War US intervention and violence by region. High Violence Low Violence High US Intervention Middle East Europe South and Central Asia Pacific Rim North America Low US Intervention Africa South America Former Soviet Union in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

#### Their “be skeptical of heg bad” card is super mistagged—it’s about Chinese government proliferation of misinformation about Covid which doesn’t warrant “all our cards are Chinese government propaganda.”

#### China decline isn’t inevitable

Robert May 20, Postgraduate Masters’s student in International Relations at Queen Mary University of London. He is also the CEO of a non-profit multinational education provider (ABE) a member of the Royal Overseas League, a member of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, and a Friend of UNESCO, “Is War Inevitable Between the US and China?” Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 9/7/2020, https://www.internationalaffairshouse.org/is-war-inevitable-between-the-us-and-china/

Since 1500 C.E., when a rising power has challenged an established power it has ended in violent conflict 80 percent of the time.4 This indicates that war between America and China is not inevitable, but it is highly probable. The applicability of structural analysis to the changes in relative strength and privilege in world order generates the principle anxieties and pressures that lead to war, but classical realism instead stresses the historical processes and biases that determine political action. Policymakers should realise that China is not Nazi Germany; in 2019, Xi Jinping stated, “Civilisations don’t have to clash, what is needed are eyes to see the beauty in all civilisations”, implying China will not use its role or influence to change the ideologies or political practices of other societies (Cited in Mahbubani, 2020:254-255). Neither is China nor the USSR; ‘The Chinese Communist Party is far more capable and adaptable than the Soviet Communist Party’ (Ibid, 271). China does not seek to export its political system around the world, its objective is international respect, not conversion; the grandest expression of Chinese power, the Great Wall, also denotes a consciousness of its limitations and vulnerability (Kissinger, 2014:214). Nevertheless, America is convinced of an existential threat to its hegemony and the emergence of new world order, which arguably has more to do with the failure of the liberal international order, and the misguided belief system that ‘the end-point of development and modernisation is defined by the contemporary West’ (Barkawi& Laffey, 2006:331). Those under attack feel compelled ‘to defend not only their territory but their basic way of life’ (Kissinger, 2014:366).

A realist recalibration of U.S. foreign policy around current national interest and a reassessment of whether its grand strategy of primacy is worth bleeding for may conclude that the U.S. has no necessity to confront China. America’s borders are not in danger of being breached, U.S. defence spending is still more than the next 10 countries combined and it remains the only superpower capable of projecting a military presence globally5. China’s territorial sphere remains limited to the Indo-Pacific region, ‘with more neighbours than any other country, it is deeply embedded in the Asian economic system’ and must balance multiple threats with nuclear powers on many fronts (Khanna, 2019:147). America must remain mindful that ‘War does not always arise from wickedness or folly. It sometimes arises from mere growth and movement (Murray, cited in Carr, 1940: 191). Washington should replace an improvisational China attitude rooted in exceptionalism, with a strategy to accommodate legitimate Chinese interests. It must strengthen, rather than withdraw from its Asian balancing alliances ‘forcing China to focus most of its attention closer to home’ (Walt, 2020) whilst also rebuilding diplomatic capability with China, and abandoning the temptation to view every Chinese action as inherently aggressive, rather as based on legitimate historical and domestic designs; ‘exaggerating the threat posed by small changes to the status quo and rejecting adaptation to the new balance of power in East Asia… could encourage the U.S. to adopt overly competitive policies’ (Glaser, 2019:52).

#### Status competition goes nuclear — letting China peacefully surpass the U.S. is the only way to avoid war.

Heath 18, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND (Timothy, February 2nd, “The Competition for Status Could Increase the Risk of a Military Clash in Asia,” *RAND*, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/the-competition-for-status-could-increase-the-risk.html>, Accessed 09-05-2021)

However, while the salience of conflict for the sake of gaining territory may be declining, the importance of status as a potential driver of conflict may be increasing. Status is an ambiguous and elusive concept, but at its core, status consists of a country's ranking in a hierarchy within a peer group. Status can be measured indirectly through estimations of a country's influence and prestige, as well as its reputation. Status matters a great deal because it can confer considerable benefits, as studies on the topic have shown. Jonathon Renshon, an expert on the role of status in international relations, has described how high-status countries enjoy a greater degree of deference from other countries and can thus secure a far larger share of available resources at a far lower cost than their lower-status peers. Status can only be achieved through competition, however. Because rankings are inherently zero-sum, one country's rise in status invariably requires the diminishment of its competitors.

The immense benefits that can accompany high status and the competition required to secure it help explain why status concerns have historically underpinned many inter-state conflicts. Historically, many a country has gone to great lengths and sometimes incurred crippling costs to salvage a faltering status or increase its standing. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, for example, Great Britain pursued an unnecessary and pointless military attack to stave off a challenge from Egypt to its waning status in the Middle East. The ensuing debacle confirmed Britain's decline as a great power. During the 1960s, U.S. anxiety over its status vis-á-vis its primary rival, the Soviet Union, led Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to escalate the country's commitment to a war in Vietnam of dubious prospects, a situation the Soviet Union mirrored in its own disaster in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Conversely, the value of an increase in status can be seen in the aftermath of Japan's stunning defeat of Russia in 1904 and 1905. The outcome shocked Western opinion and earned Japan the status of peer with the world's leading imperial powers. Tokyo subsequently expanded its control of Asia. Similarly, America's victory in the Spanish-American War confirmed Spain's eclipse as a great power in Latin and South America. The United States cemented its status as the leading nation in the Americas and saw its influence expand accordingly.

As these examples suggest, competition for status tends to recede when consensus exists among peer states about relative rankings, as happened briefly in the largely peaceful and stable post-Cold War “unipolar” moment of U.S. global preeminence. However, competition for status also tends to increase in periods of uncertainty. Today, persistent economic stagnation in the developed world and the rise of developing countries have unsettled existing hierarchies and raised afresh anxiety over the standing of many great powers.

Fears of diminished standing can be seen in the immense commentary bemoaning the decline in U.S. and European influence and in the debate over the possibilities of a post-Western age. Such apprehensions have also featured prominently in U.S. policy documents. In its recently released National Security Strategy (PDF), U.S. authorities warned that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests.” These concerns are particularly acute in Asia, which has seen an intensifying strategic competition for status and influence between China and its principal rivals—the United States, Japan, and India.

For China, status is increasingly vital to realizing its revitalization as a great power. To sustain growth, China seeks to deepen Asia's integration through the Belt and Road Initiative and shape the terms of regional trade. China also seeks to construct a regional security architecture defined by Chinese-led organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building. With adequate status, China could gain the deference and cooperation from regional powers needed to control potential flashpoints, improve its security, and secure preferential access to resources and markets at a fraction of the cost in resources than would be required if it had to fight and negotiate its way through every issue. Recognizing the importance of the issue, the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress report outlined as a long-term goal the ambition to “become a global leader” in “international influence.” Similarly, Chinese leaders have stepped up efforts to strengthen the country's leadership position in the region.

For China, status is increasingly vital to realizing its revitalization as a great power.

China for now has relied on peaceful, albeit intrusive, measures to increase its influence and bolster its standing, such sustained military modernization, massive economic diplomacy initiatives, United Front tactics and the manipulation of diplomatic carrots and sticks. Some observers have seen evidence of China's increasing influence in the Philippines' and South Korea's growing sensitivity to Chinese concerns. But the effectiveness of incremental, peaceful methods is difficult to prove because their effects are harder to perceive. Some commentators, for example, regard Chinese gains in influence as limited. Moreover, peaceful, incremental efforts are also vulnerable to counter-measures. Already, a growing array of countries have begun to raise concern about Chinese economic coercion and influence operations.

The United States and its allies and partners rightfully seek to protect their interests by bolstering their respective positions, even as they continue to cooperate with China. The strategy may succeed, but at its core is the assumption that stability can best be gained if China continues to acquiesce to the international order as established after World War II by the United States and its allies. China's conviction that its security depends on changes to this order sets up a deep, structural contradiction that is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Beijing can accordingly be expected to persist in peaceful methods to supplant the United States as Asia's leader. If, however, Beijing at some point concludes that the United States and its allies have successfully stymied its aspirations, China may be tempted by riskier methods to assert its status. A precedent for such behavior may be seen in a rising Germany of the 1890s-1900s. Convinced that it had been denied a status befitting its national power by Britain and France, Germany provoked a series of militarized crises around the world. In 1906, Germany threatened war against France after the two feuded about influence over Morocco. And in a second Moroccan crisis five years later, Germany extracted colonial concessions after it deployed a gunboat in response to a French military intervention. In China's case, brinksmanship behavior could be carried out in the contested East or South China Seas with military ships and aircraft. Already, a growing literature by Chinese military writers recommends the skillful exploitation of military crises for strategic gain.

Brinksmanship carries its own risks, of course. Miscalculation could lead to unwanted war. The strategic effects could be severe as well. Rivals like the United States, Japan, and India could be alarmed enough by a clash that they step up military preparations, aggravating China's security situation. Moreover, conflict could imperil China's grand Belt and Road Initiative ambition, if aggrieved neighbors opt out and welcome investments by Japan and India instead. China has many good reasons to never consider military provocations against a neighbor. But Beijing also has compelling reasons to increase the country's standing and diminish that of the United States and its allies. Given that the ruling Chinese Communist Party has staked its reputation towards that end, China's leaders should be expected to consider all available options to achieve it.

#### Balancing solves regional stability by expanding alliance networks and stopping favoritism that encourages regional aggression

Walt 19 [STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School and the author of The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy. Foreign Affairs. May/June. “The End of Hubris And the New Age of American Restraint.” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/end-hubris> My OCR sometimes turns E’s into C’s, I think I got them all, but please let me know if I missed one]

As an offshore balancer, the United States would establish normal relations with all countries in the region, instead of having “special relationships" with a few states and profoundly hostile relations with others. No country in the Middle East is so virtuous or vital that it deserves unconditional U.S. support, and no country there is so heinous that it must be treated as a pariah. The United States should act as China, India, Japan, Russia, and the eu do, maintaining normal working relationships with all states in the region -including Iran. Among other things, this policy would encourage rival regional powers to compete for U.S. support, instead of taking it for granted. For the moment, Washington should also make it clear that it will reduce its support for local partners if they repeatedly act in ways that undermine U.S. interests or that run contrary to core U.S. values. Should any state threaten to dominate the region from within or without in the future, the United States would help the rest balance against it, calibrating its level of effort and local presence to the magnitude of the danger.

#### China rise is peaceful

* China seeks limited predation not outright competition
* Strategy and policy moves show coop over conflict
* Care most about stability
* No evidence they are focused on heg – leaders understand risks of competition

Shifrinson 19 [Joshua Shifrinson is an Assistant Professor of International Relations with the Pardee School of Global Affairs at Boston University. Should the United States Fear China’s Rise? Winter 2019. www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/01/Winter-2019\_Shifrinson\_0.pdf]

In short, limited predation—not an overt and outright push to overtake and challenge the United States—is the name of China’s current and highly rational game. As significantly, it appears Chinese leaders are aware of the structural logic of the situation. Despite ongoing debate over the extent to which China has departed from its long-standing “hide strength, bide time” strategy first formulated by Deng Xiaoping in favor a more assertive course seeking to increase Chinese influence in world affairs, Chinese leaders and China watchers have been at pains to point out that Chinese strategy still seeks to avoid provoking conflict with the United States.49 As one analyst notes, China’s decision to carve out a more prominent role for itself in world politics has been coupled with an effort to reassure and engage the United States so as to avoid unneeded competition while facilitating stability.50 Chinese leaders echo these themes, with one senior official noting in 2014 that Chinese policy focused on “properly addressing] conflicts and differences through dialogue and cooperation instead of confrontational approaches.”51 Xi Jinping himself has underlined these currents, arguing even before taking office that U.S.-Chinese relations should be premised on “preventing conflict and confrontation,” and more recently vowing that “China will promote coordination and cooperation with other major countries.”52 Ultimately, as one scholar observes, there is “hardly evidence that [... China has] begun to focus on hegemonic competition.”53 Put another way, China’s leaders appear aware of the risks of taking an overly confrontational stance toward a still-potent United States and have scoped Chinese ambitions accordingly.

#### But pursuit of hegemony makes the US-China trade war inevitable – guarantees large scale conflict.

Kim 18

(Min-Hyung, 11-24-18, Department of Political Science and International Relations, “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future”, <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/pdf?title=a-real-driver-of-uschina-trade-conflict-the-sinous-competition-for-global-hegemony-and-its-implications-for-the-future>) GZ

Since the end of the Second World War, the USA has undoubtedly been a global hegemon. With its preponderant military and economic strength, it has created a liberal international economic order and maintained it by promoting global free trade. USA sudden turn to protectionism under the banner of “America First” in the Trump administration illustrates “US fear” that its hegemony or Pax Americana is declining vis-à-vis China’s growing power. It also demonstrates that the USA now seeks to deter China from overtaking its hegemony so as to keep US hegemony as long as possible. Currently, the USA and China are waging a trade war. What is important to note here is that the driving force of the trade war between the world’s two largest economies is more 36 ITPD 3,1 political than economic. That is to say, as China’s economic and political influence in the world vis-à-vis that of the USA increases, US fear about China’s power also grows. Under these circumstances, Washington makes every effort to assert its global dominance by deterring China’s challenge to its hegemony[13]. It is this sort of “US fear” about hegemonic power transition from Washington to Beijing that brought about US policies against the BRI, the AIIB, and Made in China 2015. The fear of hegemonic power transition is indeed a driving force for the US-launched trade war. Understood this way, the trade war between the USA and China may be a harbinger of a much larger-scale conflicts between the two parties, since as PTT predicts, war is more likely to occur when the power gap between a declining hegemon and a rising challenger is getting closed. As China’s economic, technological, military and political rise continues down the road, the USA will try to contain it in order to maintain its global hegemony. The obvious consequence of this seesaw game is the intensification of the Sino–US competition over global hegemony. The USA and China, the two most powerful states in the world, appear as if they were on a collision course. What this means is that so long as US fear about China’s overtaking US hegemony persists, a similar type of conflict between the two hegemonic powers is likely to occur in the future even if the current trade war is over.

#### China trade war will collapse the global economy and go nuclear.

Saetren 18

(Will, is a research associate at the Institute for China-America Studies, where he specialises in nuclear weapons policy. 9/17/18, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2164221/us-cold-war-containment-strategy-against-china)

For months, the United States and China have been exchanging blows over trade. What began with the Trump administration imposing tariffs on a handful of goods earlier this year has ballooned into a list that includes thousands of items. In July, Trump announced that he is prepared to impose tariffs on all US$500 billion of imports from China. The showdown between the world’s two economic powerhouses has shaken the global financial system to its core. Over the summer, the World Bank warned that the trade war could trigger a drop in global trade of as much as 9 per cent, the type of economic shock the world hasn’t seen since the 2008 financial crisis. But, in recent weeks, China has begun to suspect that the trade war is about more than just economics. Chinese officials and academics have indicated that they see the trade war as a piece of a bigger puzzle, a grand strategy reminiscent of the cold war policy of containment intended to thwart China’s rise. This is a dangerous development that has profound implications for strategic stability. US President Donald Trump (left) and Chinese President Xi Jinping leave the Great Hall of the People in Beijing in November 2017. Photo: Kyodo China, Russia agree to boost ties amid American unilateralism Containment was designed shortly after the second world war as a means of curbing Soviet expansionism. At its core, containment sought to confront the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) through back door channels, support for anti-communist forces, and all other means short of direct, armed confrontation. The driving philosophy behind the policy was that the Soviet system was rotten at its core and would eventually collapse on its own The driving philosophy behind the policy was that the Soviet system was rotten at its core and would eventually collapse on its own. Sure enough, in 1989, the Berlin Wall came tumbling down and, by 1991, the Soviet Union had fully dissolved. Although containment worked in this case, it is a policy that entails great risk. An adversary who feels backed into a corner is prone to lash out and take greater risks to achieve limited gains and avoid losing face. This was the case with the Soviet Union, which found itself locked in an ideological struggle with a technologically superior foe. During the Cuban missile crisis, Nikita Khrushchev tried to rectify this imbalance by stationing nuclear missiles capable of striking the US on Cuba. But Khrushchev overplayed his hand. The US detected the transfer before it was complete and the confrontation nearly escalated into a full-blown nuclear war. Although the cold war ended peacefully, we are lucky to have got out of it alive. Putin proposes Russia and Japan sign historic peace treaty Cuban president Fidel Castro (second from left) chats with Leonid Brezhnev, secretary of the central committee of the Soviet Union (left), and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (right) in April 1963. Photo: AFP China will keep talking, but will stand firm against US bullying on trade China, however, is no Soviet Union. Since opening up to the outside world 40 years ago, China has developed into a vibrant economic behemoth. China’s gross domestic product in purchasing power parity terms is much larger than the US’ and it is poised to become the world’s largest market for consumer goods. China is likely to dethrone the US as the world’s largest economy as measured by GDP. In short, it is highly unlikely that the Chinese system will fade into obscurity China’s economy is growing at twice the rate of the global economy, and by 2028, is likely to dethrone the US as the world’s largest economy as measured by GDP. In short, it is highly unlikely that the Chinese system will fade into obscurity. Yet this is the path the Trump administration has chosen. In January, the US labelled China a strategic competitor in its National Defence Strategy. Recent US moves to expand ties to Taiwan have only made matters worse. Just last month, the Trump administration passed a bill making it harder for Chinese companies to acquire high-end technology. Shi Yinhong, a foreign affairs adviser to China’s State Council, called the move “hi-tech containment”. People’s Daily accused the US of seeking global hegemony, and proclaimed that China should be determined to fight. Watch: Are Chinese consumers less willing to buy American goods? And fight they might. China has developed a powerful regional military that is likely to win any fight it picks in its own backyard, particularly in the South China Sea. Chinese and US military forces already spar regularly in the region as the US asserts its freedom of navigation rights in waters claimed by China. By implementing a policy of containment towards China and labelling it as a de facto enemy, the Trump administration is pouring fuel on the fire, increasing tensions, and with it, the likelihood that one of these confrontations could escalate out of control. Consider the following hypothetical scenario: a US destroyer is harassed by Chinese coastguard vessels during a freedom of navigation patrol. Unable to change course, the US warship rams one of the Chinese vessels, killing dozens of sailors. To China, this an act of aggression in its territorial waters, and they call for reinforcements to apprehend the destroyer’s crew. From a US perspective, this was an accident that took place in international waters. The crew refuses to surrender. With tensions soaring the chain of command breaks down. Someone panics and shoots. The ensuing fight escalates into a full-blown naval battle with multiple Chinese ships sunk as well as a US$3 billion US destroyer with all hands. Through a series of unfortunate events, two nuclear armed superpowers find themselves in an armed conflict that nobody wants. War between the US and China would be an unmitigated disaster for both parties. Both countries depend on each other to thrive, but that doesn’t mean that war couldn’t happen. History has taught us that when national pride is involved and one party (or both) feels trapped in a corner, simmering tensions can erupt into a roaring blaze. We can only hope that someone in the Trump administration was paying attention during that lesson.

#### And their Gillard evidence says space militarization causes “proliferation on the ground” – we’ll impact turn that—

#### Prolif solves war – our NC impact scenarios were premised on a lack of a 1AC terminal to prolif so they shouldn’t get new terminals in the 1ar – it wrecks neg strat and encourages sandbagging

Cohen, PhD, ‘17

(Michael D., PoliSci@BritishColumbia, SeniorLecturerSecurityStudies@Macquarie, “How nuclear proliferation causes conflict: the case for optimistic pessimism,” The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 23, Issue 3-4) BW

But there is a systematic effect of experience with nuclear weapons on the conflict propensity of states. The Soviet Union stopped challenging the status quo in Berlin and Cuba after 1963. The number of fatalities from terrorist violence in Kashmir in 2012 was almost that of 1989.83 Mao never again challenged Soviet forces after the 1969 Zhenbao conflict. Recent quantitative studies have also concluded that experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of new nuclear powers. Most quantitative scholarship concludes that nuclear proliferation does not lead to conventional conflict because quantitative tests showed no relationship between these variables.84 States that develop nuclear weapons are highly conflict prone, so a high propensity for conflict likely causes nuclear-weapon development and further conflict.85 But statistical research has ignored the role of experience with nuclear weapons. Temporally disaggregating the effect of nuclear proliferation on state conflict uncovers a robust correlation between nuclear-weapon proliferation, experience, and international dispute behavior.

University of Pennsylvania’s Michael Horowitz conducted a statistical analysis and found that the probability of new nuclear states reciprocating disputes quickly increases and then decreases over time.

The probability that a nuclear state will reciprocate a dispute with a non-nuclear state drops from .53 one year after developing nuclear weapons to .23 in year 56. Two new nuclear powers are 67 percent more likely to reciprocate a dispute than two average non-nuclear states. Two experienced nuclear powers are 65 percent less likely to reciprocate than two average non-nuclear states. The probability of dispute reciprocation between an experienced and new nuclear power is 26 percent greater than two non-nuclear states, and the probability of a very experienced state and a somewhat experienced state reciprocating is 42 percent less than two non-nuclear states.86

University of California-San Diego’s Erik Gartzke conducted a similar statistical test when the dependent variable was dispute initiation rather than reciprocation and found similarly robust results.87 Gartzke found that, while the overall effect of nuclear proliferation on conflict propensity is neutral, there is variation in the effect of proliferation over time. Nuclear proliferation influences the timing, rather than the occurrence, of disputes. While new nuclear states are prone to initiate militarized disputes, over time they moderate their policies and become as likely to initiate disputes as they were before nuclear proliferation.88 These effects wash out in statistical tests that do not control for experience with nuclear weapons. In short, if Iran and North Korea develop nuclear weapons and challenge their regional status quo, the historical record suggests that they will not do so for long. Thus James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations recently claimed that a nuclear Iran would be most dangerous “at first, when it would likely be at its most reckless.” But, “like other nuclear aspirants before them, the guardians of the theocracy might discover that nuclear bombs are simply not good for diplomatic leverage or strategic aggrandizement.” 89

Conclusion: proliferation pessimism, Iran, and North Korea

Three of the four mechanisms long alleged to make nuclear proliferation cause interstate conflict find little to no empirical support when the endogeneity, omitted-variable bias, and conceptual-confusion issues addressed above are recognized and applied to the evidence. Preventive-war motivations, nonsurvivable arsenals, and organizational logics that lead to accidents do not cause armed conflict. The only mechanism that has systematically led to conflict is conventional aggression by weak revisionists after nuclear proliferation, but a few years of experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of new nuclear states. By failing to specify how frequently we should observe preventive motivations, their effect on nonsurvivable arsenals, or how organizational logics lead to conflict, accidents, and nuclear war, proliferation pessimist claims are unfalsifiable. Pessimist scholars need to specify how much longer we should observe them not leading to conflict before concluding that their threat has been greatly exaggerated.

The undesirability of nuclear use has prevented scholars from coming to terms with what a more careful and systematic reading of the historical record suggests about the relationship between these mechanisms and conflict. Sagan has argued that proliferation fatalism and deterrence optimism reduce incentives to combat proliferation.90 But these same dynamics have led scholars to vastly exaggerate the number of threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. If the greatest danger posed by nuclear proliferation is conventional aggression in the short-term, scholars need to rediscover how deterrence can moderate the high conflict propensity of new nuclear states.91 Arguments about the frequency of nuclear escalation, however, say nothing about its cost. Isn’t the possibility of nuclear escalation on the Korean peninsula, for example, evidence against the arguments made throughout this paper? A few cases of accidental, unintentional, or deliberate nuclear escalation could show that the mechanisms offered by pessimist scholars linking nuclear proliferation and conflict survive the criticisms leveled at them here. A lower bar for the proliferation-pessimist theory to pass might be one case of nuclear escalation. But after seventy years, nuclear weapons have not once led to conflict through the mechanisms addressed here.

This is not the place for a lengthier treatment of how the United States and its allies should deal with the challenges posed by a North Korean (or possible Iranian) nuclear bomb. But the historical record suggests that Israeli, South Korean, and others’ preventive motivations to strike will not lead to military action, and that any strike would likely not escalate to conflict unless the United States or its allies decide to topple the regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang. The nonsurvivability of an Iranian or North Korean arsenal will not tempt others to strike. The arguments made here have contrasting findings for preventive-strike considerations. On the one hand, strikes are less costly than many believe because they rarely cause escalation. On the other hand, strikes are less necessary than many believe because the costs of nuclear proliferation are much lower than usually assumed. Nuclear accidents may occur, but these will likely only cause conventional or nuclear escalation if Tehran or Pyongyang have already attempted to revise their status quo. The historical record also suggests that a few years of experience with the bomb will teach Tehran and Pyongyang the limits of nuclear coercion and that any conflict will stop short of nuclear escalation. Future research should further refine proliferation pessimism and integrate it with optimist perspectives through addressing what causes new nuclear states to moderate their aggression and what policies by the United States and its allies might cause this. An optimistic pessimism toward the spread of nuclear weapons can better come to terms with how and when they lead to interstate conflict and form the basis for better policies to reduce the dangers.

#### Reducing nuclear proliferation causes a de-facto shift to CBWs

Particularly true of stronger NPT norms

Narang 16 (Neil Narang, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Senior Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship, 4/6/2016 “All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review. Volume 22. Issue 3-4. pp. 457-468. Taylor and Francis.)

The first inference that one may be tempted to draw from past findings is that a policy focused on achieving reductions in the global nuclear stockpile could cause a rise in chemical and biological weapons proliferation as more states view them as a “poor man's atomic bomb.” As noted above, our findings suggested that states appear to seek chemical and biological weapons for many of the same reasons as they pursue nuclear weapons. Furthermore, our findings also indicate that states that do not possess nuclear weapons appear to be systematically more likely to pursue chemical and biological weapons than states that do possess them. When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, conditional on some level of demand for one of these types of weapons, reductions in the global supply of nuclear weapons could cause some states to pursue chemical and biological weapons as “imperfect substitutes” for the deterrence and compellence benefits of nuclear weapons.

A second inference that one may be tempted to draw is that a strengthened NPT may increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Understood in the terms of our study, policies and institutions designed to monitor and sanction the unilateral pursuit or dissemination of nuclear weapons material and technical expertise—like the NPT or the Nuclear Suppliers Group—might be understood as supply constraints that effectively increase the transaction costs of nuclear weapons acquisition. Furthermore, previous research has shown that the supply of sensitive nuclear assistance and civilian nuclear assistance are both positively associated with the risk of nuclear weapons pursuit and acquisition across states and over time.17

When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, given some demand for a “weapon of mass destruction,” chemical and biological weapons could seem like relatively cheaper pursuits under a more robust global nuclear nonproliferation regime that further regulates the supply of nuclear weapons.

A third inference that one may be tempted to draw is that reductions in the global supply of nuclear weapons and a strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime could increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons pursuit by terrorist groups. If one is willing to assume terrorist groups aim to influence governments by threatening to impose costs in order to achieve concessions— whether this be through strategies like coercion, provocation, spoiling, or outbidding—then it may seem reasonable to suppose that limiting the availability of nuclear weapons might shift the demand to other coercive instruments such as chemical and biological weapons.18

#### That causes extinction

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In the decades to come, **advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence**. **Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low**, **the** **expected value** **of** **reducing the risk** **could still be large**, **since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations**. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, **disease events** **have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity**. **The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone**.2 **The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population**,3 **while other pandemics**, such as the plague of Justinian, **are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century**—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. **A** **skeptic** **would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely**. **Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations**, **overcome rare genetic resistances**, **and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures**. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: **Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off**, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 **While these arguments point to a** very **small risk** of human extinction, **they do not rule the possibility out entirely**. Although rare, **there are recorded instances of species going** extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, **especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity**. **The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases,** such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 **In the modern context**, **no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach**. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. **But advances in biotechnology** **might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits**. Recent **controversy has already emerged** **over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics**.13-17 **Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective**.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, **studies have shown that other disease traits**, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, **could be modified as well**.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 **Delivery capabilities** **have** also **been subject to the cutting edge of technical development**, **with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology**.23,24 **While there is no evidence of** state-run bioweapons **programs directly attempting to** develop or **deploy bioweapons** that would pose an existential risk, **the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could** **create such incentives** **in more unstable political environments** **or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention**.25 **The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons**—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27

#### BSL lab accidents make airborne TB and H5N1 mutations inevitable – those cause extinction – prefer studies

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Incidents causing potential exposures to pathogens occur frequently in the high security laboratories often known by their acronyms, BSL3 (Biosafety Level 3) and BSL4. Lab incidents that lead to undetected or unreported laboratory-acquired infections can lead to the release of a disease into the community outside the lab; lab workers with such infections will leave work carrying the pathogen with them. If the agent involved were a potential pandemic pathogen, such a community release could lead to a worldwide pandemic with many fatalities. Of greatest concern is a release of a lab-created, mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, such as the airborne-transmissible H5N1 viruses created in the laboratories of Ron Fouchier in the Netherlands and Yoshihiro Kawaoka In Madison Wisconsin. Such releases are fairly likely over time, as there are at least 14 labs (mostly in Asia) now carrying out this research. Whatever release probability the world is gambling with, it is clearly far too high a risk to human lives. Mammal-transmissible bird flu research poses a real danger of a worldwide pandemic that **could kill human beings on a vast scale. Human error is the main cause** of potential exposures of lab workers to pathogens. Statistical data from two sources show that human error was the cause of, according to my research, 67 percent and 79.3 percent of incidents leading to potential exposures in BSL3 labs. These percentages come from analysis of years of incident data from the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) and from the National Institutes of Health (NIH). (Details may be found in the Supplementary Material document.) Understanding human error is important to calculating the probability that a pathogen will be released from a lab into the surrounding community, the first step in calculating the likelihood of a pandemic. A key observation is that human error in the lab is **mostly independent of pathogen type and biosafety level**. Analyzing the likelihood of release from laboratories researching less virulent or transmissible pathogens therefore can serve as a reasonable surrogate for how potential pandemic pathogens are handled. (We are forced to deal with surrogate data because, thank goodness, there are little data on the release of potentially pandemic agents.) Put another way, surrogate data allows us to determine with confidence the probability of release of a potentially pandemic pathogen into the community. In a 2015 publication, Fouchier describes the careful design of his BSL3+ laboratory in Rotterdam and its standard operating procedures, which he contends should increase biosafety and reduce human error. Most of Fouchier’s discussion, however, addresses mechanical systems in the laboratory. But the **high percentage of human error reported** here calls into **question claims that state-of-the-art design** of BSL3, BSL3+ (augmented BSL3), and BSL4 labs **will prevent** the release of **dangerous pathogens.** How much lab-worker training might reduce human error and undetected or unreported laboratory acquired infections remains an open question. Given the many ways by which human error can occur**, it is doubtful** that Fouchier’s **human-error-prevention measures can eliminate release** of airborne-transmissible avian flu into the community through undetected or unreported lab infections. Human-error incident data. In its 2016 study for the NIH, “Risk and Benefit Analysis of Gain of Function Research,” Gryphon Scientific looked to the transportation, chemical, and nuclear sectors to define types of human error and their probabilities. As Gryphon summarized in its findings, the three types of human error are **skill-based** (errors involving motor skills involving little thought), **rule-based** (errors in following instructions or set procedures accidentally or purposely), and **knowledge-based** (errors stemming from a lack of knowledge or a wrong judgment call based on lack of experience). Gryphon claimed that “no comprehensive Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) study has yet been completed for a biological laboratory… . This lack of data required finding suitable proxies for accidents in other fields.” But mandatory incident reporting to FSAP and NIH actually does provide sufficient data to quantify human error in BSL3 biocontainment labs. Federal Select Agent Program incident data. FSAP incident data were collected from summary reports to Congress for the years 2009 through 2015. Three of the seven FSAP incident categories involve skill-based errors: 1) **needle sticks** and other through the skin exposures from sharp objects, 2) **dropped containers** or spills/splashes of liquids containing pathogens, and 3) bites or scratches from infected **animals**. Some skill errors, such as spills and needle sticks could be reduced with simple fixes (see below). The rule-based and knowledge-based incident categories are: 4) **pathogens manipulated outside of a biosafety cabinet** or other equipment designed to protect exposures to infectious aerosols; 5) potential exposures resulting from **non-adherence to safety** procedures or deviations from lab standard operating procedures, and 6) failure or **problem with personal protective equipment**–**a mix of skill, rule, or knowledge-based errors.** The seventh category is mechanical or equipment failure, or **defective labware**. Another category not mentioned in the FSAP reports is failure to properly inactivate pathogens before transferring them to a lower biosafety level lab for further research. During the 2009-2015 time period, FSAP received a total of 749 incident reports from select-agent research facilities. Conservatively, 594 or **79.3 percent** of those incidents involve **human error**. (Details may be found in the Supplementary Material.) National Institutes of Health incident data. Incident reports to the NIH Office of Science Policy cover the period from 2004 through 2017 and BSL3 and BSL4 facilities. They were obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request. There were no reported incidents from BSL4 facilities. Reporting to NIH is required only for incidents involving pathogens that contain recombinant DNA. While it is highly likely there have been incidents in BSL4 facilities, they may not have involved pathogens with recombinant DNA and so would not show up in the reports to NIH. The 128 incident reports provide extremely detailed descriptions. The reports are often several-dozen pages long so almost no questions remain about details. Of the 128 incidents, 86 or 67.2 percent were due to human error. This percentage is in the same ballpark as the FSAP reports. Some human errors are “one-off,” meaning they happened once and likely won’t happen again. **One-off errors are difficult to anticipate**, so it is **unlikely that one can** devise meaningful changes in standard operating procedures to **prevent them**. Here is one example of a one-off error, slightly modified from an incident report: A researcher was exchanging two plastic 24-well plates in the tabletop Sorvall centrifuge. While closing the lid, it was caught on a centrifuge wrench which was accidentally placed into the path of the lid. The wrench jumped and knocked one of the removed 24-well plates onto the counter. The plate landed at approximately a 45-degree angle and lost approximately half its contents to the bench top. For some errors, there are procedural changes that should reduce their frequency. For instance, needle sticks can occur from syringes with sharp metal needles when being used to transfer liquids from one small container to another. For injecting animals, sharp metal needles are needed; but for liquid transfers, blunt-plastic needles would suffice. Also, dropping items could sometimes be prevented using lab carts to transport items from place to place, rather than carrying them by hand. Here are three comments from the aforementioned Fouchier publication. “Only authorized and experienced personnel that have received extensive training can access the facility.” “All personnel have been instructed and trained how to act in case of incidents.” “For animal handling, personnel always work in pairs to reduce the chance of human error.” The first two bullets speak to standard training of lab workers who work with particularly dangerous pathogens. It is **unclear whether** the diligent **training of lab workers** he outlines **would** substantially **reduce human error**: The entities reporting incidents to NIH mention similar diligent training; nonetheless, undetected or unreported laboratory acquired infections occur with high frequency in these laboratories. Furthermore, it is unclear whether other laboratories creating and researching airborne-transmissible diseases are so carefully designed and diligent in their training. The two-person rule for animal handling is a good idea that is not typically mentioned in the detailed NIH incident reports. Animal bites and needle punctures brought about by unruly lab animals are not uncommon. Release from high biocontainment through incomplete inactivation. Beyond the aforementioned undetected or unreported laboratory-acquired infections lies **another route by which pathogens can be released** from high biosecure level labs—**incomplete inactivation.** Inactivation is designed to destroy the pathogenicity of an infectious agent, while retaining its other characteristics for research in which live pathogens are not needed. Since there are reliable inactivation procedures, **failure to inactivate is a human error.** Pathogens are inactivated for research that can be performed in lower BSL2 biocontainment, where it is much easier to carry out. Research in BSL3 and BSL4 laboratories is difficult, both because of restricted movement in the personal protective equipment that must be worn and because of restrictions in operating procedures that aim to minimize potential exposure to pathogens. While incomplete inactivation does not usually directly cause a release into the community, researchers in BSL2 labs are at a much higher risk of infection, and their street clothes, hair, and skin can become contaminated. But incomplete inactivation is a route to potential release into the community. The FSAP does not routinely collect data on incomplete inactivation, and it seems no one else does either. Thus, enough data to calculate probabilities for this type of incident are not available. But the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has weighed in on the issue. The GAO reports anecdotal evidence and some numbers on incomplete inactivation to support the contention that it is a serious issue. The office has identified 11 incidents, in addition to 10 incidents already identified by the FSAP. Notably, two of the incidents involved Ebola and Marburg viruses, which because of a lack of countermeasures (vaccines and antivirals) are researched at BSL4 facilities. Among other things, the GAO report called attention to a well-publicized incident in which a Defense Department laboratory “**inadvertently sent live Bacillus anthracis**, the bacterium that **causes anthrax, to almost 200 laboratories** worldwide over the course of 12 years. The laboratory believed that the samples had been inactivated.” The report describes yet another **well-publicized incident in China** in which “two researchers conducting virus research were exposed to severe acute respiratory syndrome (**SARS**) coronavirus samples that were incompletely inactivated. The researchers subsequently transmitted SARS to others, leading to several infections and one death in 2004.” The GAO identified three recent releases of Ebola and Marburg viruses from BSL4 to lower containment labs due to incomplete inactivation. A fourth release in 2014 from the **CDC labs occurred** when “Scientists inadvertently switched samples designated for live **Ebola** virus studies with samples intended for studies with **inactivated material**. As a result, the samples with viable Ebola virus, instead of the samples with inactivated Ebola virus, were transferred out of a BSL-4 laboratory to a laboratory with a lower safety level for additional analysis. While no one contracted Ebola virus in this instance, the **consequences could have been dire** for the personnel involved as there are currently no approved treatments or vaccines for this virus.” The CDC has issued a report on this mixup, and the steps they have taken to avoid this particular error in the future. All these incidents confirm the role of incomplete inactivation that would lead to an increased likelihood of release into the community from a BSL2 lab. These are **all human errors**, some involving BSL4 pathogens. Along with the observation that other human errors are the cause of more than two-thirds of potential exposures in BSL3 labs, i**t is clear that state-of-the-art laboratory design will not prevent release** into the community. The probability of release into the community. In an analysis circulated at the 2017 meeting for the Biological Weapons Convention, a conservative estimate shows that the probability is about 20 percent for a release of a mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus into the community from at least one of 10 labs over a **10-year** period of **developing and researching** this type of pathogen. This percentage was calculated from FSAP data for the years 2004 through 2010. Analysis of the FOIA NIH data gives a **much higher release probability**—**that is, a factor five to 10 times higher**, based on a smaller number of incident reports. While there is no obvious reason in the NIH data that would explain this high probability, exposures and latent (not-active) infections with M. tuberculosis was indicated in four incident reports. M. tuberculosis is not a select agent so incidents involving it would not necessarily be reported to the FSAP. Tuberculosis is highly contagious by the airborne route, so it might be easier to acquire a TB infection in the lab. Unfortunately, airborne TB infections might be a harbinger of what could occur in research on airborne-transmissible flu. Facility-reported descriptions of the 11 relevant incidents are provided in the Supplementary Material (Appendix 2). Lab-acquired infections are often discovered some time after the incident occurred. Only for three were the causes confirmed to be human error. For the other eight, neither the infected lab workers nor facility officials knew how the infection occurred. While it is likely that human error was involved in many of these eight infections, their causes will never be known. Likelihood that mammalian-airborne-transmissible, **highly pathogenic avian influenza** release **could cause a deadly pandemic.** The avian flu virus H5N1 **kills 60 percent of people** who become infected from direct contact with infected birds. The mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza created in the Fouchier and Kawaoka labs should be able to **infect humans through the air**, and the **viruses could be deadly**. A release into the community of such a pathogen could seed a pandemic with a probability of perhaps 15 percent. This estimate is from an average of two very different approaches. One approach involves purely mathematical branching theory, where Harvard researcher Marc Lipsitch and coworkers provide a graph in which, conservatively, the probability that a pandemic is seeded from a single release is **about 20 percent**. In the second approach, where infection progress through the community from person to person is simulated, Bruno Kessler Foundation researcher Stefano Merler and coworkers found that there is a probability from five percent to **15 percent** that a single release could seed a pandemic. How deadly and how transmissible such viruses are in humans is not known. Dealing realistically with human errors in lab research. Human error will continue to play a major role in laboratory incidents, and undetected or unreported laboratory acquired infections and incomplete inactivation incidents will continue to occur. **No matter how well facilities are designed** to prevent release into communities, **human error will dodge design.** For an already identified 14 labs creating or researching mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza, the potential 16 percent probability of a laboratory release into the community over five years of research (a result found in a study now being prepared for publication) is already uncomfortably high. **NIH incident reports indicate possibly much higher probabilities** of a such a release–thus, a greater likelihood of a pandemic. This does not take into the account a release from **incomplete inactivation.** Combining release probability with the not insignificant probability that an airborne-transmissible influenza virus could seed a pandemic, **we have an alarming situation.** Those who support mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza experiments either believe the probability of community release is infinitesimal or the benefits in preventing a pandemic are great enough to justify the risk. For this research, it would take extraordinary benefits and significant risk reduction via extraordinary biosafety measures to correct such a massive overbalance of highly uncertain benefits to too-likely risks. Whatever probability number we are gambling with, **it is clearly far too high a risk to human lives.** There are experimental approaches that do not involve live mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza which identify mutations involved in mammalian airborne transmission. These “safer experimental approaches are both more scientifically informative and more straightforward to translate into improved public health…” Asian bird flu virus research to develop live strains transmissible via aerosols among mammals (and perhaps some other potentially pandemic disease research as well), should for the present be restricted to special BSL4 laboratories or augmented BSL3 facilities where lab workers are not allowed to leave the facility until it is certain that they have not become infected.

#### Extra—

#### China’s not evil

Ambrosio et al. 19 -\*professor of political science in the Criminal Justice and Political Science Department at North Dakota State University, [Thomas Ambrosio, Carson Schram, Professor of Political Science at North Dakota State University and teaches courts on international politics and international law & Preston Heopfne, Department of Political Science, North Dakota State University, The American securitization of China and Russia: U.S. geopolitical culture and declining unipolarity, 2019, Eurasian Geography and Economics, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2019.1702566, DKP]

China

America’s post-Cold War China threat narrative has evolved significantly into one in which China’s growing capabilities have complemented its ambition to establish itself both as a great power with regional dominance and as a global actor – all in the service of transforming the current world order. As seen in Figure 1, 9 which illustrates the overall percentages of references in terms of source of threat, the China threat has been defined in aggregate by capabilities, either by itself or in combination with another source. Indeed, 44.6% of all references to the China threat defined it exclusively in terms of capabilities – i.e. not combined with any other source. One reason is that nearly 39% of all references were about China’s nuclear weapons or growing conventional assets. However, the aggregate view can be misleading, as seen in Figure 2, which details the data from Figure 1 annually. It shows that there were five distinct periods in which references to intentions spiked: 1996-1998, 2001, 2010, 2012, and 2018–2019.10 These corresponded to points of punctuation in which the

A picture containing timeline

Description automatically generated

threat narrative notably intensified, indicating that Chinese actions helped to significantly drive it.

Fueled by its rapid economic growth, strategic geographic location, and large population, China was recognized early as being well-placed to have a greater impact on the regional and world stages. The primary theme of the initial narrative was about China’s potential power. However, whether it would constitute a threat to U.S. interests and the region was placed primarily on the Chinese government and how it would employ its newfound power – that is, whether it would actively seek to undermine American regional dominance. In 1995, for example, China was noted as the chief exception to the global trend of declining military budgets, but special emphasis was placed on how it “might use its military forces” (S.Hrg.104-15 1995, 33). Specifically, “the rapid growth in China’s material strength has raised the importance of China in the Asian security equation” and the “peace, stability, and economic growth in the AsiaPacific region” was, in large part, dependent upon whether China sought friendly relations with its neighbors (S.Hrg.104-15 1995, 43). At this point, the notion that China could threaten American global position and the world order was not discussed. Instead, the possibility only was that China could use its rising power to challenge the regional order.

A significant intensification of the China threat narrative accompanied the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, in which China conducted a series of missile tests in waters surrounding Taiwan and mobilized its military across the strait. As seen in Figure 3, which illustrates China’s role in triggering regional instability within East-Asia as a percentage of annual references, there was a significant increase in this issue during the 1996 and 1997 hearings. This crisis was generated in response to a visit to the U.S. by Taiwan’s president, which the Chinese government considered an unacceptable symbolic act of American support for the more independence-leaning leader, and in the context of Taiwan’s 1996 election, in which he was standing for reelection. The U.S. eventually responded by sending two carrier battle groups to the area. The consequences of this crisis were still unfolding when the 1996 threat hearing was held, and it was the first time in which China was described as actually “threatening” and “serious questions” were raised “about Beijing’s intentions” and regional goals (S.Hrg.104- 510 1996, 5). Chinese “saber-rattling” was placed in the context of its preparations for “local and limited conflicts,” which ran counter to China’s claims that it sought constructive relations with its neighbors (S.Hrg.104-510 1996, 47). The reasons for its actions were not provided in the testimony nor were its concerns over Taiwan given any legitimacy. This narrative direction continued in 1997, with greater attention paid to China’s potential, and negative, impact in Asia-Pacific should it choose to become “more assertive and aggressive” (S.Hrg.105-201 1997, 16). The implication of this testimony was that the success of America’s policy of engagement with China was ultimately dependent upon Chinese intentions and not American policy.

Given China’s policies vis-à-vis Taiwan, it is perhaps not surprising that its great power ambitions and revisionist goals were first introduced in 1996 and became recurring themes in American depictions of China over the next several years. By 2001, Chinese ambitions were described as having “come sharply into focus” and “one of the toughest challenges we face” (S.Hrg.107-2 2001, 10). As seen in Figure 3, over 11% of these reports, on average, referenced China’s great power

Chart

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

ambitions in the decade following 1996. Significantly, this impulse stemmed from internal sources: a nationalist impulse to “[redress] what it often proclaims as a hundred years of humiliation at the hands of Western powers” (S.Hrg.106-580 2000, 18);“a centuries-old quest for national wealth and power” (S.Hrg.107-2 2001, 28); and, domestic politics amongst Communist Party elites who feel “obliged to avoid any hint of being soft on the United States” (S.Hrg.107-597 2002, 134).11 This desire ultimately manifested itself in China’s goal to establish itself as the dominant power in East Asia (S.Hrg.107-2 2001, 28). U.S. officials framed China’s economic growth, military spending, and desire for a sphere of influence as connected to, and in many ways a direct consequence of, its great power ambitions, which largely emerged from internal Chinese dynamics.

This narrative was also connected to one which described China as a revisionist power, with a commitment to a “multipolar world” – a phrase which was first used in regard to China in 2000 (S.Hrg.106-580 2000, 7). This goal rejected the U.S.-led unipolar international system and sought to establish a new geopolitical architecture. This assessment of Chinese goals can, in large part, explain why the China threat narrative again spiked in 2001: China was expected to consistently “attempt to limit or forestall American unilateral or US led actions judged adverse to China’s own interests because they seem to strengthen and perpetuate a unipolar world” (S.Hrg.107-2 2001, 28). This new narrative was important because it rearticulated the China threat as directly inimical to America’s global position. While officials recognized that China saw the U.S. as its primary impediment to achieving regional goals, there was no acknowledgment from the U.S. side that its policies were in any way responsible. Furthermore, there was no sense that China had a legitimate concern regarding American unilateralism or its forward military positioning along China’s periphery. Rather, the implication was that Beijing’s perceptions were simply incorrect.

While these themes were repeated during hearings over the first decade of the 2000s, there was a lull in the amount of attention paid to China at this time associated with America’s preoccupation with the Global War on Terrorism. For example, there were only a few score references to China across all reports submitted in 2007, and these were almost entirely focused on recounting China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities. But, after China became far more active in the South China Sea around 2008 and as the U.S. moved further away from 9/11, there was a meaningful intensification in the China threat narrative. The Obama administration’s intention to refocus U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East and toward the Asia-Pacific region through the so called “pivot” also played a key role in this narrative shift as a means to justify it (Ambrosio et al. 2018).

Thus, the China threat narrative which developed around this time depicted China as a far more active, confident threat, which was willing to assert its great power ambitions regionally and even extra-regionally – the latter reflected its growing engagement with Africa and Latin America (S.Hrg.110-634 2008, 28). Accordingly, China was characterized as dedicated to “assertive . . . behavior” and becoming “a more imposing and potentially difficult international actor” in the future (S.Hrg.112-159 2011, 16). This wider focus was backed by a military which (a)energetically sought to counter America’s military advantages in the region, to the point that it was beginning to emerge as a peer competitor, at least regionally; (b)adopted “an offensive operational [military] doctrine” and “possible preemptive action;” and, (c)was building the capacity to act extraregionally in support of its broader great power interests, such as establishing naval facilities in the Indian Ocean (S.Hrg.110-634 2008, 43). These actions were portrayed as ultimately connected to overturning America’s global position.

This increased threat narrative was evidenced by the 2010 spike in references to China’s great power ambitions, as seen in Figure 3, where nearly a third of all references to China mentioned these designs. This overall characterization was reinforced by an increased focus on Chinese actions in the South China Sea, with references to intentions reaching a high-point in 2012 (see Figure 2). Furthermore, China was depicted as a multifaceted threat dedicated to expanding its geographic profile, with an increased willingness to undertake cyberspace and foreign intelligence operations against the U.S., and prepared for conflicts in which space/counterspace capabilities would prove crucial. Over the next decade, each of these themes continued, becoming significantly more serious as U.S. perceptions of great power threat became central to the American narrative in the latter half of the 2010

#### Only restraint solves nuke war BUT the transition would be peaceful and create more resilient global governance, which is goldilocks and balances security with cohesion – that straight turns every answer

Pampinella 19 [Stephenis Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the State University of New York (SUNY) at New Paltz. 1/23. "The Internationalist Disposition and US Grand Strategy." https://thedisorderofthings.com/2019/01/23/the-internationalist-disposition-and-us-grand-strategy/]

A concert strategy can do what establishment foreign policy cannot, namely de-escalate great power competition by giving up US hegemony. If adopted, the United States would treat other great powers, like Russia, China, and Iran, as equal partners in the maintenance of global stability and incorporate their interests into regional security agreements. The United States would give up its self-assumed role as an unrivaled global hegemon and seek a balance of power based on mutual respect with other great powers as partners rather than enemies. This kind of international posture would result in a more horizontal great power system, one that Stacie Goddard as identified as being productive of status quo rather than revisionist intentions. It would be compatible with recognition of the great power identities of other states and provide them with ontological security.

Transitioning from a hegemonic security strategy to a balance of power one will require that the United States engage in some degree of retrenchment from its already expansive commitments. But supporters of hegemony are wrong when they claim that retrenchment will encourage great power aggression and lead to the abandonment of our allies. The United States can engage in moderate forms of retrenchment consistent with great power recognition while still maintaining commitments to allies that strive to uphold human dignity. For example, were the United States to support a moratorium on NATO expansion, as Michael O’Hanlon suggests, it would signal that the United States is no longer interested in moving the frontiers of its influence to the gates of Moscow and remove the sense of threat experienced by Russian leaders. By recognizing the validity of Russian security interests as well as its great power identity, the equal relationship made possible by a concert strategy will better deal with the threat of interstate conflict compared to US hegemony.

Reviving Global Governance

A concert strategy informed by the internationalist disposition can further enable more robust forms of global governance. Rather than attempt international cooperation based on a priori liberal normative templates, the United States would accept the validity of all claims made by collective actors in world politics in an open-ended and inclusive process of deliberation. The result would be less of a hegemonic order and more of a constitutionalist one, in which the United States binds itself to a truly democratic process of decision-making at the global level. The emergence of global governance norms would be a function less of hegemonic socialization and more of a right held by all actors to contest the validity of standards of expected behavior. In other words, a concert strategy would enable the United States to accept processes of norm contestation as the motor of transnational cooperation and generate more legitimate rules for regulating global governance. It would expand the US order building project initially identified by Ikenberry on the basis of restraint and institutional self-binding, but without retaining its own hierarchical position in world politics or engaging in hypocritical forms of dominance.

#### Every offensive argument they make is a self-fulfilling prophecy created by their project of primacy.

Ashford, PhD, 19

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

Humility is a virtue. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead the height of hubris. Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism – may not be a total failure, but it has not been successful either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem. It’s also a reliance on flawed assumptions – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions. Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. Primacy – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – is neither sustainable nor prudent. Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.