# 1NC

### 1NC – Offense

#### We’re impact turning scenario 1—

#### China-Russia counterbalancing solves nuclear war

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China and Russia are the two largest—and neighboring—powers of continental Eurasia. Can two tigers share the same mountain, especially when one great power is rapidly gaining strength and the other is in relative decline? And there seems to be a pattern in the history of international relations that two ambitious major powers that share a land border are less likely to make an alliance, while they are more likely to engage in territorial disputes with one another as well as rivalry over primacy in their common neighborhood. There are at least three major parts of Eurasia—East Asia, the post-Soviet space (mainly Central Asia), and the Arctic—where China’s and Russia’s geopolitical interests intersect, creating potential for competition and conflict. But, on the other hand, if managed wisely, overlapping interests and stakes can also generate opportunities for collaboration. The following sections examine how Russia and China are managing to keep their differences in key Eurasian zones under control while displaying a significant degree of mutual cooperation.

East Asia This is China’s ‘home region’, but also one where Russia, by virtue of possessing the Far Eastern territories, is a resident power. Moscow, which has traditionally been concerned with keeping sovereignty over its vulnerable Far East, does not at present see China as a major security risk on Russia’s eastern borders. All border delimitation issues between Moscow and Beijing were resolved in the 1990s and 2000s, while the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty explicitly states that the two countries have no territorial claims to each other. Furthermore, Moscow is well aware that Chinese military preparations are directed primarily toward Taiwan, the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, not against the Russian Far East. There is the cliché, persistent among the Western media and commentariat, of a Chinese demographic invasion of the Russian Far East. For example, a Wall Street Journal article claimed recently that ‘about 300,000 Chinese, some unregistered, could now be settled in Russia’s Far East’ (Simmons 2019). In reality, the actual number of the Chinese who live more or less permanently in the Russian Far East is far lower, and there are very few cases of illegal Chinese migration. There is no imminent risk of the Russian Far East falling under Chinese control demographically or otherwise.

Not sensing any major Chinese menace to the Russian Far East, Russia has refused to engage in rivalry with China in East Asia. On the most important issues of contemporary East Asian geopolitics Moscow has tended to support Beijing or displayed friendly neutrality. On the Korean Peninsula, Moscow has largely played second fiddle to Beijing. On the South China Sea disputes, although Russia’s official stance is strict neutrality, some Russian moves may be seen as favoring Beijing. For example, following the July 2016 Hague tribunal ruling that rejected China’s claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea, Putin expressed solidarity with China, calling the international court’s decision ‘counterproductive’ (Reuters 2016).

Russia shares with China the objective of reducing American influence in East Asia and undermining the US-centric alliances in the region. Russian weapon sales are helping China alter the military balance in the Western Pacific to the detriment of the USA and its allies. Russia’s decision to assist China with getting its own missile attack early warning system may have also been partly motivated by the desire to strengthen China vis-à-vis the USA in their rivalry for primacy in East Asia. The Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov hinted as much by saying that this strategic system will ‘cardinally increase stability and security in East Asia’ (TASS 2019c).

Russian deference to China on East Asian issues, albeit somewhat hurting Moscow’s great-power pride, makes geopolitical sense. The Kremlin treats Pacific affairs as an area of lower concern than Europe, the Middle East, or Central Asia. Mongolia, which constitutes Siberia’s underbelly, is the only East Asian nation that can count on Russian security protection in case it finds itself in danger of external aggression, at any rate a purely theoretical possibility so far.

It would be incorrect to say that Russia has completely withdrawn from East Asian geopolitics. In some cases, Russia does act against Chinese wishes in the Asia–Pacific. One recent example is Russia’s quiet determination to keep drilling in the areas of the South China Sea on the Vietnamese continental shelf over which China lays sovereignty claims. The Russian state-owned energy company Rosneft operates on Vietnam’s shelf, despite Beijing’s displeasure and periodic harassment by Chinese ships (Zhou 2019). Apart from the desire to make profits from the South China Sea’s hydrocarbons, Russia may be seeking to support its old-time friend Vietnam—to whom it also sells weapons—as well as demonstrate that it is still an independent actor in East Asia. Through such behavior on China’s Southeast Asian periphery, the Kremlin could also be sending the signal to Beijing that, if China gets too closely involved in Russia’s backyard, such as Central Asia or the Caucasus, Russia can do similar things in China’s. Albeit a friction point between Beijing and Moscow, the activities by Russian energy firms in the South China Sea are unlikely to destabilize the Sino-Russian entente, since Moscow and Beijing need each other on much bigger issues.

The post-Soviet space Russia has vital stakes in the geopolitical space formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and is willing to go to great lengths to defend those interests. It was, after all, a perceived brazen attempt by Brussels and Washington to draw Ukraine into the EU’s and NATO’s orbit that induced Moscow to take drastic action in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, causing a rupture with the West.

When it comes to Moscow–Beijing politics over the post-Soviet space, the most problematic question is certainly about Central Asia, a region composed of five former Soviet republics which shares borders with both Russia and China. Since the nineteenth century, Russia has traditionally considered Central Asia as its sphere of influence. However, in the 2000s China began its economic expansion in the region. It is now by far the biggest trade partner for Central Asian states (Bhutia 2019) as well as its largest source of investments. China also set up a small military presence inside Tajikistan, apparently to secure a sensitive area which borders China’s Xinjiang region and Afghanistan (Lo 2019).

#### It's the only thing keeping the Russian economy afloat.

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The coronavirus pandemic and the accompanying economic crisis are impacting Russia-China relations just like the 2014–2015 crisis unleashed by the war in Ukraine did: the bilateral relationship is not fundamentally changing, but existing trends are picking up speed. Russia’s economic and technological development will become increasingly dependent on China, and U.S.-China tensions, which are worsening as a result of the pandemic, may soon make Moscow’s balancing act more precarious.

Since 2014, far-reaching U.S.-EU sanctions have pushed the Kremlin to deepen Sino-Russian cooperation in multiple domains. Ever since, Russia’s asymmetrical dependence on the Chinese economy has grown continuously. China’s share in Russia’s trade turnover increased from 10.5 percent ($88.8 billion) in 2013 to 15.7 percent ($108.3 billion) in 2019. Meanwhile, Russia’s central bank has increased the proportion of the Chinese yuan in its foreign currency reserves from 0.1 percent in 2015 to the current 13.2 percent. Moscow is also increasingly relying on Chinese technology, and firms like Huawei are set to make major inroads in the Russian market as key decisions on 5G approach. In 2016, China for the first time surpassed Germany as the number one source of industrial equipment and other technology-related imports in the Russian market. This trend continued in 2019, as Russia imported $30.8 billion worth of equipment and technology-related products from China (28 percent of all technology-related imports that year), while imports from Germany dropped to $12.9 billion, or just 12 percent.

The deepening of Sino-Russian ties following the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions extended beyond trade. To highlight only a handful of key examples, in 2018 Russia’s armed forces carried out the biggest military exercises in the country’s history in which they were joined by a 3,200-strong contingent from China’s People’s Liberation Army. President Vladimir Putin announced in October 2019 that Moscow is helping Beijing create its own missile early warning system, thus tying China’s strategic nuclear deterrent to a Russian technological backbone.

Crises aside, however, there are several objective reasons for the Sino-Russian rapprochement. The structures of their economies naturally complement each other. The political regimes are similar, which frequently inspires joint approaches on issues like human rights, NGOs, and the future of the internet. The strategic imperative to spend once-scarce resources on a heavily fortified, 4,200-kilometer border has given way to new forms of cross-border cooperation and trade. For all of these reasons, Moscow and Beijing were well-inclined toward each other and likely to become closer partners even without a well-timed nudge from recent crises. But their actions scarcely would have been as coordinated as they are now.

The pandemic is accelerating a wide-ranging set of processes and incentives inside both Russia and China that are helping pull the two largest Eurasian powers toward each other. Unprecedented synchronized global economic turbulence and the drop in oil and gas demand from locked-down economies set the stage for a period of painful adjustment for the Russian economy. Trade with Beijing becomes increasingly important to offset the immediate shocks, as China appears to be the first major economy to recover after the pandemic.

#### Nuke war.

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Scenario 1: Disintegration

If the Russian economy continues to deteriorate and the regime continue to distance themselves from the West, the centre may not be capable to maintain legitimacy and keep the periphery together. Already, some regions and counties are highly indebted. In other parts, ethnic Russians are a minority. Regions in eastern Russia, rich in raw materials, may look to China for funding. It is, however, probable that Beijing will not want to undermine the stability in Russia.

Closer to the region in focus in this report, Kaliningrad is an area that could distance itself from the Kremlin. Economic problems and security concerns form a background that could lead to a political uprising. A “Kaliningrad-Maidan” development is at the heart of this scenario. Triggers could also come from outside Kaliningrad, in or in the immediate surrounding of the Russian Federation, or from other factors such as severe pollution.

The other countries in the region would in all probability remain cool in this situation, considering the county’s military importance for the Russian government. However, a mutiny like the ones in Kroonstad in June 1917, March 1921 or on the frigate Storozjevoj in November 1975 cannot be excluded.

Economic and political tensions in Europe could weaken the EU and worsen the development at the same time. A Greek withdrawal from the EU, triggered by its exit from the Eurozone, could set such a movement in motion. A Podemos-led government in Spain could undermine confidence for the single market, at a time when Europe also faces the consequences of a highly unstable North Africa, with a large flow of migrants.

Attempts by Russia to influence certain members in the EU, such as Hungary and Cyprus, could sow further discord in the EU. At the most severe levels of disintegration, France could adopt policies effectively blocking EU and NATO response in a time of increased tensions. Britain may opt out of the union altogether, or be forced out if their demands for special status is rejected by the other member states.

In all varieties of disintegration, uncertainty concerning the control over the nuclear arsenals will increase. The US will become involved both diplomatically and financially in order to bring clarity and establish control over the arsenals. Should Russia, in that situation, ask for military support for this, it is highly probable that the US would acquiesce: such operations in other parts of the world were the object of joint US-Russian exercises just a few years ago.

Scenario 2: Ultra-nationalism

If Russian domestic and international policy continues to become more radicalised, it might take ever more drastic forms. As the economy deteriorates, wages fall and shortages become common, a focus on nostalgic nationalism, using belligerent rhetoric and demonstrations of military power, could be used to deflect growing discontentment.

A logical target would be to “protect” zones which are perceived as Russian, e.g. where there are Russian ethnic minorities or even just Russian-speaking areas. Such rhetoric was and is used in the Ukraine.

The coming years will tell what the Russian ambitions are in the Ukraine. Offensives to secure and expand their supply lines, and weakening those of the Ukraine, are probable, and more ambitious plans, such as the opening of new directions in Kharkiv or Odessa, are possible. As a distraction, conflicts in Moldavia can be fuelled.

If the West, primarily the US, UK and Poland, support Ukraine with military means, the risk increases for further escalation of the conflict. Remaining passive, on the other hand, runs the risk that Russia perceives that it could act against other targets.

A second country that could be the target of Russian nationalism is Belarus. Judging by president Putin’s justification of the annexation of Crimea, Belarus would similarly be a legitimate candidate for “re-inclusion” in Russia.

There are indications that the regime in Belarus are worried about such a development and acting to thwart it. In late 2014, Lukashenko appointed a new government, and has increased the emphasis on “Belorussian”. The fragmented (and thoroughly infiltrated) opposition has declared that it will not field candidates in elections this autumn, since they deem the threat of president Putin to be greater than of Lukashenko himself.

Belarus has also passed laws permitting prosecution of non-regular armed troops, as a consequence of the Russian method employed in the annexation of Crimea. In the economic sphere, Russia has complained that Belarus is profiting from sanctions against Russia.

Any attempts from Russia to enter Belarus’ with military means would probably not be met by any effective resistance from the Belorussian security apparatus. The opportunities for Russia are in some ways more favourable here than in Ukraine, due to the close cooperation between the countries’ armies and intelligence services. Passive resistance cannot be ruled out but would not mean much in a short-term.

However, tensions with other former Soviet Union republics, with the EU and with NATO would surely increase. Polish and Lithuanian forces would probably mobilize to counteract spillover effects. EU policy would be substantially revised. Belorussian citizens would attempt to flee, primarily to neighbouring Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.

The Russian government would also threaten the Baltic states, in order to undermine their economies and try to influence policy in these countries. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be in a precarious situation. While they need to strengthen their civil and military defence, they must retain credibility with their allies and not be perceived as to exaggerate the Russian threat. The higher the tensions, the more sensitive the world is to psychological influence.

Russia would, in this scenario, also fan nationalism in other parts of Europe through political and financial support. West Balkan is particularly vulnerable, as the EU and the US have invested considerable political capital in the region with only mixed success. Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia have stagnated in their political and economic development with high levels of unemployment, political polarisation and even the establishing of Islamic fundamentalist cells: a fertile ground for nationalist movements.

Finally, Russian ultra-nationalism would also be directed inwards, with an escalated persecution of the domestic political opposition, independent media, and nationalisation of foreign assets. This will be combined with attacks on minority groups, especially on Jews.

This scenario could happen separately or as a precursor to the final, and most dangerous, scenario.

Scenario 3: Test of strength

In this scenario, Russia would attempt to break NATO through challenging of one or more of the Baltic states. The objective would be to demonstrate to alliance members that NATO’s response is too late and too weak.

A precondition for success is a distraction through a crisis by an intermediator, which would tie down especially American attention and resources. The distraction could come in many forms, e.g. by partnering with North Korea, fanning war in the Middle East, or even hidden support for terrorists.

If the current polarisation in US domestic politics continues, any reaction will be obstructed and delayed. An especially vulnerable window of opportunity is in the period between the presidential elections in November 2016 and the installation of the new president in January 2017, which could create a legitimacy problem for the American political system when it comes to the possibilities of directly confronting Russia quickly.

An attack on any Baltic state would directly affect Swedish territory and air space. In the worst-case scenario, it will happen immediately before open conflict with NATO.

The Baltic states each offer different opportunities for Russia, but they all have in common that they lack any strategic depth, which means that an open invasion would be accomplished in a few days, unless support from other alliance members is forthcoming.

Estonia, which is the most powerful of the three, both economically and military, poses as a potential threat to the trade over St Petersburg. To control the maritime traffic through the Gulf of Finland is an important motive for Russia to influence Estonian politics. The population of Estonia, with 25 percent ethnic Russians, could be used to legimize action and as grounds for destabilisation, especially around the border town Narva where more than 90% of the population is ethnic Russian.

Latvia is the most vulnerable of the three states. The economy is weaker; the Russian minority is about the same as in Estonia; and Russian organised crime has a strong hold. Especially the eastern parts of the country are vulnerable to Russian influence.

Lithuania only have about six percent ethnic Russians and a stronger military tradition. On the other hand, Lithuania offers access to Kaliningrad. Lithuania’s attempts to decrease their dependence on energy from Russia has annoyed the Russian regime, as is evident in the harassments by the Russian navy of the cabling operation which will connect the Lithuanian grid to Sweden. There are also some tensions surrounding the Polish minorities in the country which Russia could exploit.

How fast Sweden will become involved depends on the extent of open, armed actions against one or all of the Baltic States.

If a confrontation occurs with non-regular or paramilitary means, maintaining dominance over Swedish territory and territorial waters will be in focus. The same will be the case for Finland, but Finnish action could be influenced by Russian fabrication of tensions in Karelia, that Helsinki could be blamed for.

NATO would try to respond in a controlled manner, i.e. prioritizing transports by air and sea. This would mean greatly increased traffic in and over the Baltic Sea. Tensions will rise drastically, with increased risks of miscalculations on both sides. Sweden and Finland are expected to act together with the rest of the EU and the US. If no direct military threat emerges against Sweden, then Sweden cannot count on any enforcements from the rest of the world apart from mutual information exchange.

The instance that the citizens in the Baltic states perceive a risk of a Russian incursion, the probability is high that a flow of refugees will commence. From Lithuania, the biggest flow will be to Poland while Latvian will flee to Sweden, mainly Gotland. Refugees from Estonia can be expected to flee towards Finland or Sweden depending on where in the country they live and where they have relations or connections.

In the worst-case scenario, Swedish and Finnish territory will become an arena for hostilities. As Russian readiness exercises have shown, airborne and marine infantry could rapidly and with surprise occupy parts of Gotland and Åland. A possible option is also to mine the Danish Straits in connection with this.

By supplies of surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, Russian forces can temporarily extend their air and coastal defence in the Baltic Sea, protecting an incursion by land into the Baltic states. NATO would be faced with a fait accompli. The invasion does not need to happen in all three states nor include the entire territory of a country. The only thing that is needed is a demonstration of NATO’s inability to defend alliance members. This would establish a new security order.

Depending on the level of conflict that Russia would be willing to risk, air and navy bases in Sweden and Finland could be struck with missiles from the ground, air and sea. It is, however, likely that the governments would be issued an ultimatum to remain neutral, with only a few hours to comply.

Public announcement of the ultimatum would put immense pressure on the political system and weaken resistance. Such diplomatic tactics could be reinforced by forced cyber attacks on the electricity and telecommunication networks. During the coldest months of the year, the vulnerability would be the highest.

At the same time, Sweden would be expected to support their Western partners’ need for transports into the theatre of action. If Russia would close the Danish Straits, any military support to the Baltic states would need to move over Swedish territory; such as air support Norwegian air bases or aircraft carriers in the Norwegian Sea. There would also be demands to clear of mines in Oresund, and possibly for allowing equipment and troop transports to harbours on the east coast for further transport across the Baltic Sea. The Swedish to such demands would have consequences for generations to come.

If Gotland would not be occupied by Russian forces, NATO would demand to set up bases on the island. The smallest indication of acquiescing to such demands would have the Russians racing to the island.

Furthermore, Russia would coordinate activities in the far north, with submarines of all kinds and possibly even direct action in northern Finland and even in northern Sweden, in order to expand Russian air defence.

Faced with the risk of direct confrontations between Russian and American forces, Russia could mount land-based as well as amphibian operations in the north of Norway and on Svalbard, to improve the defence of Murmansk. Following a similar strategy, occupying parts of Bornholm would make it more difficult for NATO to support their members. This is probably not necessary, but it is a possible option.

In most people’s minds, there is a sharp line between the Baltic states’ eastern borders and Russia, the crossing of which is unconceivable. By first gaining the control over Gotland and Åland, the Russian General Army Staff could circumvent a mental Maginot line, in the same way as Germany attacked France through Benelux in May 1940.

Russian success in this scenario hinges on speed and the ability to contain the conflict. The first message to Washington will entail the understanding that this is not a direct conflict between the US. For Russia, the uncertainty is therefore how US interests are perceived from an American perspective.

For the US, it is not just the credibility of NATO that is at stake but also the unity of the EU. This has global connotations since allies (and enemies) in the Middle East and Asia will also form assumptions regarding the willingness and ability of the US to act in order to protect their allies. The risk is obviously that Russia miscalculates and underestimates the difference between, for instance, the departing presidential administration perceptions of US security interests on the one hand with the wider US security establishment’s perception of these on the other.

During the whole process, the threat of nuclear strikes would hover over all decision makers, which increases the degree of uncertainty. Nuclear tests in the period before a test of strength cannot be ruled out, especially since Russian emphasis on nuclear deterrence could lose credibility over time. Direct threats of using the nuclear weapons is, however, completely excluded in this scenario.

#### And we’re impact turning scenario 2—

#### Terrorism

#### A. Hegemony fails and propagates terrorism – it justifies intervention and empirically causes blowback.

Bandow 19 (Doug, senior fellow @ Cato Institute and JD Stanford, 6-2-2019, "Understanding the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Albright Doctrine," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/understanding-failure-us-foreign-policy-albright-doctrine-60477)> AG

Since 9/11, Washington has been extraordinarily active militarily—invading two nations, bombing and droning several others, deploying special operations forces in yet more countries, and applying sanctions against many. Tragically, **the threat of Islamist violence and terrorism only have metastasized**. Although Al Qaeda lost its effectiveness in directly plotting attacks, it continues to inspire national offshoots. Moreover, while losing its physical “caliphate” the Islamic State added further terrorism to its portfolio.

Three successive administrations have ever more deeply ensnared the United States in the Middle East. War with Iran appears to be frighteningly possible. Ever-wealthier allies are ever-more dependent on America. Russia is actively hostile to the United States and Europe. Washington and Beijing appear to be a collision course on far more than trade. Yet the current administration appears convinced that doing more of the same will achieve different results, the best definition of insanity.

Despite his sometimes abusive and incendiary rhetoric, the president has departed little from his predecessors’ policies. For instance, American forces remain deployed in Afghanistan and Syria. Moreover, the Trump administration has increased its military and materiel deployments to Europe. Also, Washington has intensified economic sanctions on Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, and even penalized additional countries, namely Venezuela.

U.S. foreign policy suffers from systematic flaws in the thinking of the informal policy collective which former Obama aide Ben Rhodes dismissed as “The Blob.” Perhaps no official better articulated The Blob’s defective precepts than Madeleine Albright, United Nations ambassador and Secretary of State.

First is overweening hubris. In 1998 Secretary of State Albright declared that “If we have to use force, it is because we are America: **we are the indispensable nation**. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.”

Even then her claim was implausible. America blundered into the Korean War and barely achieved a passable outcome. The Johnson administration infused Vietnam with dramatically outsize importance. For decades, Washington foolishly refused to engage the People’s Republic of China. Washington-backed dictators in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and elsewhere fell ingloriously. An economic embargo against Cuba that continues today helped turn Fidel Castro into a global folk hero. Washington veered dangerously close to nuclear war with Moscow during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and again two decades later during military exercises in Europe.

U.S. officials rarely were prepared for events that occurred in the next week or month, let alone years later. Americans did no better than the French in Vietnam. Americans managed events in Africa no better than the British, French, and Portuguese colonial overlords. Washington made more than its share of bad, even awful decisions in dealing with other nations around the globe.

Perhaps the worst failing of U.S. foreign policy was ignoring the inevitable impact of **foreign intervention**. Americans would never passively accept another nation bombing, invading, and occupying their nation, or interfering in their political system. Even if outgunned, they would resist. Yet Washington has undertaken all of these practices, with little consideration of the impact on those most affected—hence **the rise of terrorism** against the United States. Terrorism, horrid and awful though it is, became the weapon of choice of weaker peoples against intervention by the world’s industrialized national states.

The U.S. record since September 11 has been uniquely counterproductive. Rather than minimize hostility toward America, Washington adopted a policy—highlighted by launching new wars, killing more civilians, and ravaging additional societies—guaranteed to create enemies, exacerbate radicalism, and spread terrorism. **Blowback is everywhere**. Among the worst examples: Iraqi insurgents **mutated into ISIS**, which wreaked military havoc throughout the Middle East and turned to terrorism.

#### B. Unipolarity is specifically responsible for the globalization of extremism – that makes heg unsustainable.

Ibrahimi 18 (2/19/18; S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, [researcher and instructor of political science. PhD @ Carleton University] “Unipolar politics and global peace: a structural explanation of the globalizing jihad”; taylor and francis <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17467586.2018.1428763?needAccess=true)>

* JSG = Jihadi-Salafi Groups

Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the peacefulness of the contemporary unipolar system could be discussed beyond the interstate conflict and the likelihood of great powers competition debate. The new forms of asymmetric warfare, particularly the emergence of JSGs and their violent activities at different levels of the global order, could be assessed as another variable in debates on the peacefulness of the system. These actors DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 59 emerged and operate under the unipolarity conditions. Unipolarity, in this sense, has generated conflict-producing mechanisms and nonstate actors that drove sovereign states in lengthy wars against JSGs. This argument makes a significant contribution to the unipolarity-peace puzzle, which is conventionally addressed from the interstate conflict perspective. Second, unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global. In addition to other conflict-generating conditions produced under unipolarity, the United States’ unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology. As a result of the transformation of this doctrine, new forms of JSGs emerged that posed a threat to peace and security at all levels. Finally, because of the unipolarity of the system, global peace depends largely on the sole great power’s foreign and military policies. The US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power, might not generate interstate conflict. However, it would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that would emerge independently or on behalf of states to disrupt the US hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence at different levels. These all might not challenge the durability of unipolarity, drastically, but they would disrupt peace and security at all domestic, regional, and global levels.

#### C. Terrorism causes global nuclear war—collapses internal AND external stability

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But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

#### Trade War

#### A. The pursuit of hegemony makes the US-China trade war inevitable – guarantees large scale conflict.

Kim 18

(Min-Hyung, 11-24-18, Department of Political Science and International Relations, “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future”, <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/pdf?title=a-real-driver-of-uschina-trade-conflict-the-sinous-competition-for-global-hegemony-and-its-implications-for-the-future>) GZ

Since the end of the Second World War, the USA has undoubtedly been a global hegemon. With its preponderant military and economic strength, it has created a liberal international economic order and maintained it by promoting global free trade. USA sudden turn to protectionism under the banner of “America First” in the Trump administration illustrates “US fear” that its hegemony or Pax Americana is declining vis-à-vis China’s growing power. It also demonstrates that the USA now seeks to deter China from overtaking its hegemony so as to keep US hegemony as long as possible. Currently, the USA and China are waging a trade war. What is important to note here is that the driving force of the trade war between the world’s two largest economies is more 36 ITPD 3,1 political than economic. That is to say, as China’s economic and political influence in the world vis-à-vis that of the USA increases, US fear about China’s power also grows. Under these circumstances, Washington makes every effort to assert its global dominance by deterring China’s challenge to its hegemony[13]. It is this sort of “US fear” about hegemonic power transition from Washington to Beijing that brought about US policies against the BRI, the AIIB, and Made in China 2015. The fear of hegemonic power transition is indeed a driving force for the US-launched trade war. Understood this way, the trade war between the USA and China may be a harbinger of a much larger-scale conflicts between the two parties, since as PTT predicts, war is more likely to occur when the power gap between a declining hegemon and a rising challenger is getting closed. As China’s economic, technological, military and political rise continues down the road, the USA will try to contain it in order to maintain its global hegemony. The obvious consequence of this seesaw game is the intensification of the Sino–US competition over global hegemony. The USA and China, the two most powerful states in the world, appear as if they were on a collision course. What this means is that so long as US fear about China’s overtaking US hegemony persists, a similar type of conflict between the two hegemonic powers is likely to occur in the future even if the current trade war is over.

#### B. China trade war will collapse the global economy and go nuclear.

Saetren 18

(Will, is a research associate at the Institute for China-America Studies, where he specialises in nuclear weapons policy. 9/17/18, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2164221/us-cold-war-containment-strategy-against-china)

For months, the United States and China have been exchanging blows over trade. What began with the Trump administration imposing tariffs on a handful of goods earlier this year has ballooned into a list that includes thousands of items. In July, Trump announced that he is prepared to impose tariffs on all US$500 billion of imports from China. The showdown between the world’s two economic powerhouses has shaken the global financial system to its core. Over the summer, the World Bank warned that the trade war could trigger a drop in global trade of as much as 9 per cent, the type of economic shock the world hasn’t seen since the 2008 financial crisis. But, in recent weeks, China has begun to suspect that the trade war is about more than just economics. Chinese officials and academics have indicated that they see the trade war as a piece of a bigger puzzle, a grand strategy reminiscent of the cold war policy of containment intended to thwart China’s rise. This is a dangerous development that has profound implications for strategic stability. US President Donald Trump (left) and Chinese President Xi Jinping leave the Great Hall of the People in Beijing in November 2017. Photo: Kyodo China, Russia agree to boost ties amid American unilateralism Containment was designed shortly after the second world war as a means of curbing Soviet expansionism. At its core, containment sought to confront the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) through back door channels, support for anti-communist forces, and all other means short of direct, armed confrontation. The driving philosophy behind the policy was that the Soviet system was rotten at its core and would eventually collapse on its own The driving philosophy behind the policy was that the Soviet system was rotten at its core and would eventually collapse on its own. Sure enough, in 1989, the Berlin Wall came tumbling down and, by 1991, the Soviet Union had fully dissolved. Although containment worked in this case, it is a policy that entails great risk. An adversary who feels backed into a corner is prone to lash out and take greater risks to achieve limited gains and avoid losing face. This was the case with the Soviet Union, which found itself locked in an ideological struggle with a technologically superior foe. During the Cuban missile crisis, Nikita Khrushchev tried to rectify this imbalance by stationing nuclear missiles capable of striking the US on Cuba. But Khrushchev overplayed his hand. The US detected the transfer before it was complete and the confrontation nearly escalated into a full-blown nuclear war. Although the cold war ended peacefully, we are lucky to have got out of it alive. Putin proposes Russia and Japan sign historic peace treaty Cuban president Fidel Castro (second from left) chats with Leonid Brezhnev, secretary of the central committee of the Soviet Union (left), and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (right) in April 1963. Photo: AFP China will keep talking, but will stand firm against US bullying on trade China, however, is no Soviet Union. Since opening up to the outside world 40 years ago, China has developed into a vibrant economic behemoth. China’s gross domestic product in purchasing power parity terms is much larger than the US’ and it is poised to become the world’s largest market for consumer goods. China is likely to dethrone the US as the world’s largest economy as measured by GDP. In short, it is highly unlikely that the Chinese system will fade into obscurity China’s economy is growing at twice the rate of the global economy, and by 2028, is likely to dethrone the US as the world’s largest economy as measured by GDP. In short, it is highly unlikely that the Chinese system will fade into obscurity. Yet this is the path the Trump administration has chosen. In January, the US labelled China a strategic competitor in its National Defence Strategy. Recent US moves to expand ties to Taiwan have only made matters worse. Just last month, the Trump administration passed a bill making it harder for Chinese companies to acquire high-end technology. Shi Yinhong, a foreign affairs adviser to China’s State Council, called the move “hi-tech containment”. People’s Daily accused the US of seeking global hegemony, and proclaimed that China should be determined to fight. Watch: Are Chinese consumers less willing to buy American goods? And fight they might. China has developed a powerful regional military that is likely to win any fight it picks in its own backyard, particularly in the South China Sea. Chinese and US military forces already spar regularly in the region as the US asserts its freedom of navigation rights in waters claimed by China. By implementing a policy of containment towards China and labelling it as a de facto enemy, the Trump administration is pouring fuel on the fire, increasing tensions, and with it, the likelihood that one of these confrontations could escalate out of control. Consider the following hypothetical scenario: a US destroyer is harassed by Chinese coastguard vessels during a freedom of navigation patrol. Unable to change course, the US warship rams one of the Chinese vessels, killing dozens of sailors. To China, this an act of aggression in its territorial waters, and they call for reinforcements to apprehend the destroyer’s crew. From a US perspective, this was an accident that took place in international waters. The crew refuses to surrender. With tensions soaring the chain of command breaks down. Someone panics and shoots. The ensuing fight escalates into a full-blown naval battle with multiple Chinese ships sunk as well as a US$3 billion US destroyer with all hands. Through a series of unfortunate events, two nuclear armed superpowers find themselves in an armed conflict that nobody wants. War between the US and China would be an unmitigated disaster for both parties. Both countries depend on each other to thrive, but that doesn’t mean that war couldn’t happen. History has taught us that when national pride is involved and one party (or both) feels trapped in a corner, simmering tensions can erupt into a roaring blaze. We can only hope that someone in the Trump administration was paying attention during that lesson.

#### And their Gillard evidence says space militarization causes “proliferation on the ground” – we’ll impact turn that—

#### Prolif solves war – our NC impact scenarios were premised on a lack of a 1AC terminal to prolif so they shouldn’t get new terminals in the 1ar – it wrecks neg strat and encourages sandbagging

Cohen, PhD, ‘17

(Michael D., PoliSci@BritishColumbia, SeniorLecturerSecurityStudies@Macquarie, “How nuclear proliferation causes conflict: the case for optimistic pessimism,” The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 23, Issue 3-4) BW

But there is a systematic effect of experience with nuclear weapons on the conflict propensity of states. The Soviet Union stopped challenging the status quo in Berlin and Cuba after 1963. The number of fatalities from terrorist violence in Kashmir in 2012 was almost that of 1989.83 Mao never again challenged Soviet forces after the 1969 Zhenbao conflict. Recent quantitative studies have also concluded that experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of new nuclear powers. Most quantitative scholarship concludes that nuclear proliferation does not lead to conventional conflict because quantitative tests showed no relationship between these variables.84 States that develop nuclear weapons are highly conflict prone, so a high propensity for conflict likely causes nuclear-weapon development and further conflict.85 But statistical research has ignored the role of experience with nuclear weapons. Temporally disaggregating the effect of nuclear proliferation on state conflict uncovers a robust correlation between nuclear-weapon proliferation, experience, and international dispute behavior.

University of Pennsylvania’s Michael Horowitz conducted a statistical analysis and found that the probability of new nuclear states reciprocating disputes quickly increases and then decreases over time.

The probability that a nuclear state will reciprocate a dispute with a non-nuclear state drops from .53 one year after developing nuclear weapons to .23 in year 56. Two new nuclear powers are 67 percent more likely to reciprocate a dispute than two average non-nuclear states. Two experienced nuclear powers are 65 percent less likely to reciprocate than two average non-nuclear states. The probability of dispute reciprocation between an experienced and new nuclear power is 26 percent greater than two non-nuclear states, and the probability of a very experienced state and a somewhat experienced state reciprocating is 42 percent less than two non-nuclear states.86

University of California-San Diego’s Erik Gartzke conducted a similar statistical test when the dependent variable was dispute initiation rather than reciprocation and found similarly robust results.87 Gartzke found that, while the overall effect of nuclear proliferation on conflict propensity is neutral, there is variation in the effect of proliferation over time. Nuclear proliferation influences the timing, rather than the occurrence, of disputes. While new nuclear states are prone to initiate militarized disputes, over time they moderate their policies and become as likely to initiate disputes as they were before nuclear proliferation.88 These effects wash out in statistical tests that do not control for experience with nuclear weapons. In short, if Iran and North Korea develop nuclear weapons and challenge their regional status quo, the historical record suggests that they will not do so for long. Thus James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations recently claimed that a nuclear Iran would be most dangerous “at first, when it would likely be at its most reckless.” But, “like other nuclear aspirants before them, the guardians of the theocracy might discover that nuclear bombs are simply not good for diplomatic leverage or strategic aggrandizement.” 89

Conclusion: proliferation pessimism, Iran, and North Korea

Three of the four mechanisms long alleged to make nuclear proliferation cause interstate conflict find little to no empirical support when the endogeneity, omitted-variable bias, and conceptual-confusion issues addressed above are recognized and applied to the evidence. Preventive-war motivations, nonsurvivable arsenals, and organizational logics that lead to accidents do not cause armed conflict. The only mechanism that has systematically led to conflict is conventional aggression by weak revisionists after nuclear proliferation, but a few years of experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of new nuclear states. By failing to specify how frequently we should observe preventive motivations, their effect on nonsurvivable arsenals, or how organizational logics lead to conflict, accidents, and nuclear war, proliferation pessimist claims are unfalsifiable. Pessimist scholars need to specify how much longer we should observe them not leading to conflict before concluding that their threat has been greatly exaggerated.

The undesirability of nuclear use has prevented scholars from coming to terms with what a more careful and systematic reading of the historical record suggests about the relationship between these mechanisms and conflict. Sagan has argued that proliferation fatalism and deterrence optimism reduce incentives to combat proliferation.90 But these same dynamics have led scholars to vastly exaggerate the number of threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. If the greatest danger posed by nuclear proliferation is conventional aggression in the short-term, scholars need to rediscover how deterrence can moderate the high conflict propensity of new nuclear states.91 Arguments about the frequency of nuclear escalation, however, say nothing about its cost. Isn’t the possibility of nuclear escalation on the Korean peninsula, for example, evidence against the arguments made throughout this paper? A few cases of accidental, unintentional, or deliberate nuclear escalation could show that the mechanisms offered by pessimist scholars linking nuclear proliferation and conflict survive the criticisms leveled at them here. A lower bar for the proliferation-pessimist theory to pass might be one case of nuclear escalation. But after seventy years, nuclear weapons have not once led to conflict through the mechanisms addressed here.

This is not the place for a lengthier treatment of how the United States and its allies should deal with the challenges posed by a North Korean (or possible Iranian) nuclear bomb. But the historical record suggests that Israeli, South Korean, and others’ preventive motivations to strike will not lead to military action, and that any strike would likely not escalate to conflict unless the United States or its allies decide to topple the regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang. The nonsurvivability of an Iranian or North Korean arsenal will not tempt others to strike. The arguments made here have contrasting findings for preventive-strike considerations. On the one hand, strikes are less costly than many believe because they rarely cause escalation. On the other hand, strikes are less necessary than many believe because the costs of nuclear proliferation are much lower than usually assumed. Nuclear accidents may occur, but these will likely only cause conventional or nuclear escalation if Tehran or Pyongyang have already attempted to revise their status quo. The historical record also suggests that a few years of experience with the bomb will teach Tehran and Pyongyang the limits of nuclear coercion and that any conflict will stop short of nuclear escalation. Future research should further refine proliferation pessimism and integrate it with optimist perspectives through addressing what causes new nuclear states to moderate their aggression and what policies by the United States and its allies might cause this. An optimistic pessimism toward the spread of nuclear weapons can better come to terms with how and when they lead to interstate conflict and form the basis for better policies to reduce the dangers.

#### Reducing nuclear proliferation causes a de-facto shift to CBWs

Particularly true of stronger NPT norms

Narang 16 (Neil Narang, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Senior Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship, 4/6/2016 “All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review. Volume 22. Issue 3-4. pp. 457-468. Taylor and Francis.)

The first inference that one may be tempted to draw from past findings is that a policy focused on achieving reductions in the global nuclear stockpile could cause a rise in chemical and biological weapons proliferation as more states view them as a “poor man's atomic bomb.” As noted above, our findings suggested that states appear to seek chemical and biological weapons for many of the same reasons as they pursue nuclear weapons. Furthermore, our findings also indicate that states that do not possess nuclear weapons appear to be systematically more likely to pursue chemical and biological weapons than states that do possess them. When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, conditional on some level of demand for one of these types of weapons, reductions in the global supply of nuclear weapons could cause some states to pursue chemical and biological weapons as “imperfect substitutes” for the deterrence and compellence benefits of nuclear weapons.

A second inference that one may be tempted to draw is that a strengthened NPT may increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Understood in the terms of our study, policies and institutions designed to monitor and sanction the unilateral pursuit or dissemination of nuclear weapons material and technical expertise—like the NPT or the Nuclear Suppliers Group—might be understood as supply constraints that effectively increase the transaction costs of nuclear weapons acquisition. Furthermore, previous research has shown that the supply of sensitive nuclear assistance and civilian nuclear assistance are both positively associated with the risk of nuclear weapons pursuit and acquisition across states and over time.17

When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, given some demand for a “weapon of mass destruction,” chemical and biological weapons could seem like relatively cheaper pursuits under a more robust global nuclear nonproliferation regime that further regulates the supply of nuclear weapons.

A third inference that one may be tempted to draw is that reductions in the global supply of nuclear weapons and a strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime could increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons pursuit by terrorist groups. If one is willing to assume terrorist groups aim to influence governments by threatening to impose costs in order to achieve concessions— whether this be through strategies like coercion, provocation, spoiling, or outbidding—then it may seem reasonable to suppose that limiting the availability of nuclear weapons might shift the demand to other coercive instruments such as chemical and biological weapons.18

#### That causes extinction

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In the decades to come, **advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence**. **Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low**, **the** **expected value** **of** **reducing the risk** **could still be large**, **since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations**. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, **disease events** **have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity**. **The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone**.2 **The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population**,3 **while other pandemics**, such as the plague of Justinian, **are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century**—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. **A** **skeptic** **would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely**. **Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations**, **overcome rare genetic resistances**, **and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures**. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: **Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off**, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 **While these arguments point to a** very **small risk** of human extinction, **they do not rule the possibility out entirely**. Although rare, **there are recorded instances of species going** extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, **especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity**. **The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases,** such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 **In the modern context**, **no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach**. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. **But advances in biotechnology** **might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits**. Recent **controversy has already emerged** **over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics**.13-17 **Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective**.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, **studies have shown that other disease traits**, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, **could be modified as well**.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 **Delivery capabilities** **have** also **been subject to the cutting edge of technical development**, **with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology**.23,24 **While there is no evidence of** state-run bioweapons **programs directly attempting to** develop or **deploy bioweapons** that would pose an existential risk, **the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could** **create such incentives** **in more unstable political environments** **or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention**.25 **The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons**—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27

#### BSL lab accidents make airborne TB and H5N1 mutations inevitable – those cause extinction – prefer studies

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Incidents causing potential exposures to pathogens occur frequently in the high security laboratories often known by their acronyms, BSL3 (Biosafety Level 3) and BSL4. Lab incidents that lead to undetected or unreported laboratory-acquired infections can lead to the release of a disease into the community outside the lab; lab workers with such infections will leave work carrying the pathogen with them. If the agent involved were a potential pandemic pathogen, such a community release could lead to a worldwide pandemic with many fatalities. Of greatest concern is a release of a lab-created, mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, such as the airborne-transmissible H5N1 viruses created in the laboratories of Ron Fouchier in the Netherlands and Yoshihiro Kawaoka In Madison Wisconsin. Such releases are fairly likely over time, as there are at least 14 labs (mostly in Asia) now carrying out this research. Whatever release probability the world is gambling with, it is clearly far too high a risk to human lives. Mammal-transmissible bird flu research poses a real danger of a worldwide pandemic that **could kill human beings on a vast scale. Human error is the main cause** of potential exposures of lab workers to pathogens. Statistical data from two sources show that human error was the cause of, according to my research, 67 percent and 79.3 percent of incidents leading to potential exposures in BSL3 labs. These percentages come from analysis of years of incident data from the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) and from the National Institutes of Health (NIH). (Details may be found in the Supplementary Material document.) Understanding human error is important to calculating the probability that a pathogen will be released from a lab into the surrounding community, the first step in calculating the likelihood of a pandemic. A key observation is that human error in the lab is **mostly independent of pathogen type and biosafety level**. Analyzing the likelihood of release from laboratories researching less virulent or transmissible pathogens therefore can serve as a reasonable surrogate for how potential pandemic pathogens are handled. (We are forced to deal with surrogate data because, thank goodness, there are little data on the release of potentially pandemic agents.) Put another way, surrogate data allows us to determine with confidence the probability of release of a potentially pandemic pathogen into the community. In a 2015 publication, Fouchier describes the careful design of his BSL3+ laboratory in Rotterdam and its standard operating procedures, which he contends should increase biosafety and reduce human error. Most of Fouchier’s discussion, however, addresses mechanical systems in the laboratory. But the **high percentage of human error reported** here calls into **question claims that state-of-the-art design** of BSL3, BSL3+ (augmented BSL3), and BSL4 labs **will prevent** the release of **dangerous pathogens.** How much lab-worker training might reduce human error and undetected or unreported laboratory acquired infections remains an open question. Given the many ways by which human error can occur**, it is doubtful** that Fouchier’s **human-error-prevention measures can eliminate release** of airborne-transmissible avian flu into the community through undetected or unreported lab infections. Human-error incident data. In its 2016 study for the NIH, “Risk and Benefit Analysis of Gain of Function Research,” Gryphon Scientific looked to the transportation, chemical, and nuclear sectors to define types of human error and their probabilities. As Gryphon summarized in its findings, the three types of human error are **skill-based** (errors involving motor skills involving little thought), **rule-based** (errors in following instructions or set procedures accidentally or purposely), and **knowledge-based** (errors stemming from a lack of knowledge or a wrong judgment call based on lack of experience). Gryphon claimed that “no comprehensive Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) study has yet been completed for a biological laboratory… . This lack of data required finding suitable proxies for accidents in other fields.” But mandatory incident reporting to FSAP and NIH actually does provide sufficient data to quantify human error in BSL3 biocontainment labs. Federal Select Agent Program incident data. FSAP incident data were collected from summary reports to Congress for the years 2009 through 2015. Three of the seven FSAP incident categories involve skill-based errors: 1) **needle sticks** and other through the skin exposures from sharp objects, 2) **dropped containers** or spills/splashes of liquids containing pathogens, and 3) bites or scratches from infected **animals**. Some skill errors, such as spills and needle sticks could be reduced with simple fixes (see below). The rule-based and knowledge-based incident categories are: 4) **pathogens manipulated outside of a biosafety cabinet** or other equipment designed to protect exposures to infectious aerosols; 5) potential exposures resulting from **non-adherence to safety** procedures or deviations from lab standard operating procedures, and 6) failure or **problem with personal protective equipment**–**a mix of skill, rule, or knowledge-based errors.** The seventh category is mechanical or equipment failure, or **defective labware**. Another category not mentioned in the FSAP reports is failure to properly inactivate pathogens before transferring them to a lower biosafety level lab for further research. During the 2009-2015 time period, FSAP received a total of 749 incident reports from select-agent research facilities. Conservatively, 594 or **79.3 percent** of those incidents involve **human error**. (Details may be found in the Supplementary Material.) National Institutes of Health incident data. Incident reports to the NIH Office of Science Policy cover the period from 2004 through 2017 and BSL3 and BSL4 facilities. They were obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request. There were no reported incidents from BSL4 facilities. Reporting to NIH is required only for incidents involving pathogens that contain recombinant DNA. While it is highly likely there have been incidents in BSL4 facilities, they may not have involved pathogens with recombinant DNA and so would not show up in the reports to NIH. The 128 incident reports provide extremely detailed descriptions. The reports are often several-dozen pages long so almost no questions remain about details. Of the 128 incidents, 86 or 67.2 percent were due to human error. This percentage is in the same ballpark as the FSAP reports. Some human errors are “one-off,” meaning they happened once and likely won’t happen again. **One-off errors are difficult to anticipate**, so it is **unlikely that one can** devise meaningful changes in standard operating procedures to **prevent them**. Here is one example of a one-off error, slightly modified from an incident report: A researcher was exchanging two plastic 24-well plates in the tabletop Sorvall centrifuge. While closing the lid, it was caught on a centrifuge wrench which was accidentally placed into the path of the lid. The wrench jumped and knocked one of the removed 24-well plates onto the counter. The plate landed at approximately a 45-degree angle and lost approximately half its contents to the bench top. For some errors, there are procedural changes that should reduce their frequency. For instance, needle sticks can occur from syringes with sharp metal needles when being used to transfer liquids from one small container to another. For injecting animals, sharp metal needles are needed; but for liquid transfers, blunt-plastic needles would suffice. Also, dropping items could sometimes be prevented using lab carts to transport items from place to place, rather than carrying them by hand. Here are three comments from the aforementioned Fouchier publication. “Only authorized and experienced personnel that have received extensive training can access the facility.” “All personnel have been instructed and trained how to act in case of incidents.” “For animal handling, personnel always work in pairs to reduce the chance of human error.” The first two bullets speak to standard training of lab workers who work with particularly dangerous pathogens. It is **unclear whether** the diligent **training of lab workers** he outlines **would** substantially **reduce human error**: The entities reporting incidents to NIH mention similar diligent training; nonetheless, undetected or unreported laboratory acquired infections occur with high frequency in these laboratories. Furthermore, it is unclear whether other laboratories creating and researching airborne-transmissible diseases are so carefully designed and diligent in their training. The two-person rule for animal handling is a good idea that is not typically mentioned in the detailed NIH incident reports. Animal bites and needle punctures brought about by unruly lab animals are not uncommon. Release from high biocontainment through incomplete inactivation. Beyond the aforementioned undetected or unreported laboratory-acquired infections lies **another route by which pathogens can be released** from high biosecure level labs—**incomplete inactivation.** Inactivation is designed to destroy the pathogenicity of an infectious agent, while retaining its other characteristics for research in which live pathogens are not needed. Since there are reliable inactivation procedures, **failure to inactivate is a human error.** Pathogens are inactivated for research that can be performed in lower BSL2 biocontainment, where it is much easier to carry out. Research in BSL3 and BSL4 laboratories is difficult, both because of restricted movement in the personal protective equipment that must be worn and because of restrictions in operating procedures that aim to minimize potential exposure to pathogens. While incomplete inactivation does not usually directly cause a release into the community, researchers in BSL2 labs are at a much higher risk of infection, and their street clothes, hair, and skin can become contaminated. But incomplete inactivation is a route to potential release into the community. The FSAP does not routinely collect data on incomplete inactivation, and it seems no one else does either. Thus, enough data to calculate probabilities for this type of incident are not available. But the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has weighed in on the issue. The GAO reports anecdotal evidence and some numbers on incomplete inactivation to support the contention that it is a serious issue. The office has identified 11 incidents, in addition to 10 incidents already identified by the FSAP. Notably, two of the incidents involved Ebola and Marburg viruses, which because of a lack of countermeasures (vaccines and antivirals) are researched at BSL4 facilities. Among other things, the GAO report called attention to a well-publicized incident in which a Defense Department laboratory “**inadvertently sent live Bacillus anthracis**, the bacterium that **causes anthrax, to almost 200 laboratories** worldwide over the course of 12 years. The laboratory believed that the samples had been inactivated.” The report describes yet another **well-publicized incident in China** in which “two researchers conducting virus research were exposed to severe acute respiratory syndrome (**SARS**) coronavirus samples that were incompletely inactivated. The researchers subsequently transmitted SARS to others, leading to several infections and one death in 2004.” The GAO identified three recent releases of Ebola and Marburg viruses from BSL4 to lower containment labs due to incomplete inactivation. A fourth release in 2014 from the **CDC labs occurred** when “Scientists inadvertently switched samples designated for live **Ebola** virus studies with samples intended for studies with **inactivated material**. As a result, the samples with viable Ebola virus, instead of the samples with inactivated Ebola virus, were transferred out of a BSL-4 laboratory to a laboratory with a lower safety level for additional analysis. While no one contracted Ebola virus in this instance, the **consequences could have been dire** for the personnel involved as there are currently no approved treatments or vaccines for this virus.” The CDC has issued a report on this mixup, and the steps they have taken to avoid this particular error in the future. All these incidents confirm the role of incomplete inactivation that would lead to an increased likelihood of release into the community from a BSL2 lab. These are **all human errors**, some involving BSL4 pathogens. Along with the observation that other human errors are the cause of more than two-thirds of potential exposures in BSL3 labs, i**t is clear that state-of-the-art laboratory design will not prevent release** into the community. The probability of release into the community. In an analysis circulated at the 2017 meeting for the Biological Weapons Convention, a conservative estimate shows that the probability is about 20 percent for a release of a mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus into the community from at least one of 10 labs over a **10-year** period of **developing and researching** this type of pathogen. This percentage was calculated from FSAP data for the years 2004 through 2010. Analysis of the FOIA NIH data gives a **much higher release probability**—**that is, a factor five to 10 times higher**, based on a smaller number of incident reports. While there is no obvious reason in the NIH data that would explain this high probability, exposures and latent (not-active) infections with M. tuberculosis was indicated in four incident reports. M. tuberculosis is not a select agent so incidents involving it would not necessarily be reported to the FSAP. Tuberculosis is highly contagious by the airborne route, so it might be easier to acquire a TB infection in the lab. Unfortunately, airborne TB infections might be a harbinger of what could occur in research on airborne-transmissible flu. Facility-reported descriptions of the 11 relevant incidents are provided in the Supplementary Material (Appendix 2). Lab-acquired infections are often discovered some time after the incident occurred. Only for three were the causes confirmed to be human error. For the other eight, neither the infected lab workers nor facility officials knew how the infection occurred. While it is likely that human error was involved in many of these eight infections, their causes will never be known. Likelihood that mammalian-airborne-transmissible, **highly pathogenic avian influenza** release **could cause a deadly pandemic.** The avian flu virus H5N1 **kills 60 percent of people** who become infected from direct contact with infected birds. The mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza created in the Fouchier and Kawaoka labs should be able to **infect humans through the air**, and the **viruses could be deadly**. A release into the community of such a pathogen could seed a pandemic with a probability of perhaps 15 percent. This estimate is from an average of two very different approaches. One approach involves purely mathematical branching theory, where Harvard researcher Marc Lipsitch and coworkers provide a graph in which, conservatively, the probability that a pandemic is seeded from a single release is **about 20 percent**. In the second approach, where infection progress through the community from person to person is simulated, Bruno Kessler Foundation researcher Stefano Merler and coworkers found that there is a probability from five percent to **15 percent** that a single release could seed a pandemic. How deadly and how transmissible such viruses are in humans is not known. Dealing realistically with human errors in lab research. Human error will continue to play a major role in laboratory incidents, and undetected or unreported laboratory acquired infections and incomplete inactivation incidents will continue to occur. **No matter how well facilities are designed** to prevent release into communities, **human error will dodge design.** For an already identified 14 labs creating or researching mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza, the potential 16 percent probability of a laboratory release into the community over five years of research (a result found in a study now being prepared for publication) is already uncomfortably high. **NIH incident reports indicate possibly much higher probabilities** of a such a release–thus, a greater likelihood of a pandemic. This does not take into the account a release from **incomplete inactivation.** Combining release probability with the not insignificant probability that an airborne-transmissible influenza virus could seed a pandemic, **we have an alarming situation.** Those who support mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza experiments either believe the probability of community release is infinitesimal or the benefits in preventing a pandemic are great enough to justify the risk. For this research, it would take extraordinary benefits and significant risk reduction via extraordinary biosafety measures to correct such a massive overbalance of highly uncertain benefits to too-likely risks. Whatever probability number we are gambling with, **it is clearly far too high a risk to human lives.** There are experimental approaches that do not involve live mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly pathogenic avian influenza which identify mutations involved in mammalian airborne transmission. These “safer experimental approaches are both more scientifically informative and more straightforward to translate into improved public health…” Asian bird flu virus research to develop live strains transmissible via aerosols among mammals (and perhaps some other potentially pandemic disease research as well), should for the present be restricted to special BSL4 laboratories or augmented BSL3 facilities where lab workers are not allowed to leave the facility until it is certain that they have not become infected.

### 1NC – Defense

#### Toplevel—

#### a. Empirics go neg – most qualified studies disprove hegemonic stability theories.

Fettweis 17 –Christopher J. Fettweis is an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace, Security Studies” 26:3, 423-451; EG)

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, **but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear.** Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 **Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not**. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. **US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse.** In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. **In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace.** In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended Table 1. Post-Cold War US intervention and violence by region. High Violence Low Violence High US Intervention Middle East Europe South and Central Asia Pacific Rim North America Low US Intervention Africa South America Former Soviet Union in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

#### b. US hegemony is dead and gone with Trump – treaty exits, Trump foreign policy, and rising power prove

* Russia and China emergence
* Treaty exits
* Response to 9/11 and Iraq War
* Trump FP

Fareed Zakaria 06/11/19 (Host of CNN’s GPS, Harvard Ph. D in Government, served on Council on Foreign Relations Board) "The Self-Destruction of American Power," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-06-11/self-destruction-american-power EE

Sometime in the last two years, American hegemony died. The age of U.S. dominance was a brief, heady era, about three decades marked by two moments, each a breakdown of sorts. It was born amid the collapse of the Berlin Wall, in 1989. The end, or really the beginning of the end, was another collapse, that of Iraq in 2003, and the slow unraveling since. But was the death of the United States’ extraordinary status a result of external causes, or did Washington accelerate its own demise through bad habits and bad behavior? That is a question that will be debated by historians for years to come. But at this point, we have enough time and perspective to make some preliminary observations.

As with most deaths, many factors contributed to this one. There were deep structural forces in the international system that inexorably worked against any one nation that accumulated so much power. In the American case, however, one is struck by the ways in which Washington—from an unprecedented position—mishandled its hegemony and abused its power, losing allies and emboldening enemies. And now, under the Trump administration, the United States seems to have lost interest, indeed lost faith, in the ideas and purpose that animated its international presence for three-quarters of a century.

U.S. hegemony in the post–Cold War era was like nothing the world had seen since the Roman Empire. Writers are fond of dating the dawn of “the American century” to 1945, not long after the publisher Henry Luce coined the term. But the post–World War II era was quite different from the post-1989 one. Even after 1945, in large stretches of the globe, France and the United Kingdom still had formal empires and thus deep influence. Soon, the Soviet Union presented itself as a superpower rival, contesting Washington’s influence in every corner of the planet. Remember that the phrase “Third World” derived from the tripartite division of the globe, the First World being the United States and Western Europe, and the Second World, the communist countries. The Third World was everywhere else, where each country was choosing between U.S. and Soviet influence. For much of the world’s population, from Poland to China, the century hardly looked American.

The United States’ post–Cold War supremacy was initially hard to detect. As I pointed out in The New Yorker in 2002, most participants missed it. In 1990, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued that the world was dividing into three political spheres, dominated by the dollar, the yen, and the deutsche mark. Henry Kissinger’s 1994 book, Diplomacy, predicted the dawn of a new multipolar age. Certainly in the United States, there was little triumphalism. The 1992 presidential campaign was marked by a sense of weakness and weariness. “The Cold War is over; Japan and Germany won,” the Democratic hopeful Paul Tsongas said again and again. Asia hands had already begun to speak of “the Pacific century.”

U.S. hegemony in the post–Cold War era was like nothing the world had seen since the Roman Empire.

There was one exception to this analysis, a prescient essay in the pages of this magazine by the conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer: “The Unipolar Moment,” which was published in 1990. But even this triumphalist take was limited in its expansiveness, as its title suggests. “The unipolar moment will be brief,” Krauthammer admitted, predicting in a Washington Post column that within a very short time, Germany and Japan, the two emerging “regional superpowers,” would be pursuing foreign policies independent of the United States.

Policymakers welcomed the waning of unipolarity, which they assumed was imminent. In 1991, as the Balkan wars began, Jacques Poos, the president of the Council of the European Union, declared, “This is the hour of Europe.” He explained: “If one problem can be solved by Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country, and it is not up to the Americans.” But it turned out that only the United States had the combined power and influence to intervene effectively and tackle the crisis.

Similarly, toward the end of the 1990s, when a series of economic panics sent East Asian economies into tailspins, only the United States could stabilize the global financial system. It organized a $120 billion international bailout for the worst-hit countries, resolving the crisis. Time magazine put three Americans, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan, and Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, on its cover with the headline “The Committee to Save the World.”

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Just as American hegemony grew in the early 1990s while no one was noticing, so in the late 1990s did the forces that would undermine it, even as people had begun to speak of the United States as “the indispensable nation” and “the world’s sole superpower.” First and foremost, there was the rise of China. It is easy to see in retrospect that Beijing would become the only serious rival to Washington, but it was not as apparent a quarter century ago. Although China had grown speedily since the 1980s, it had done so from a very low base. Few countries had been able to continue that process for more than a couple of decades. China’s strange mixture of capitalism and Leninism seemed fragile, as the Tiananmen Square uprising had revealed.

But China’s rise persisted, and the country became the new great power on the block, one with the might and the ambition to match the United States. Russia, for its part, went from being both weak and quiescent in the early 1990s to being a revanchist power, a spoiler with enough capability and cunning to be disruptive. With two major global players outside the U.S.-constructed international system, the world had entered a post-American phase. Today, the United States is still the most powerful country on the planet, but it exists in a world of global and regional powers that can—and frequently do—push back.

The 9/11 attacks and the rise of Islamic terrorism played a dual role in the decline of U.S. hegemony. At first, the attacks seemed to galvanize Washington and mobilize its power. In 2001, the United States, still larger economically than the next five countries put together, chose to ramp up its annual defense spending by an amount—almost $50 billion—that was larger than the United Kingdom’s entire yearly defense budget. When Washington intervened in Afghanistan, it was able to get overwhelming support for the campaign, including from Russia. Two years later, despite many objections, it was still able to put together a large international coalition for an invasion of Iraq. The early years of this century marked the high point of the American imperium, as Washington tried to remake wholly alien nations—Afghanistan and Iraq—thousands of miles away, despite the rest of the world’s reluctant acquiescence or active opposition.

Iraq in particular marked a turning point. The United States embarked on a war of choice despite misgivings expressed in the rest of world. It tried to get the UN to rubber-stamp its mission, and when that proved arduous, it dispensed with the organization altogether. It ignored the Powell Doctrine—the idea, promulgated by General Colin Powell while he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War, that a war was worth entering only if vital national interests were at stake and overwhelming victory assured. The Bush administration insisted that the vast challenge of occupying Iraq could be undertaken with a small number of troops and a light touch. Iraq, it was said, would pay for itself. And once in Baghdad, Washington decided to destroy the Iraqi state, disbanding the army and purging the bureaucracy, which produced chaos and helped fuel an insurgency. Any one of these mistakes might have been overcome. But together they ensured that Iraq became a costly fiasco.

After 9/11, Washington made major, consequential decisions that continue to haunt it, but it made all of them hastily and in fear. It saw itself as in mortal danger, needing to do whatever it took to defend itself—from invading Iraq to spending untold sums on homeland security to employing torture. The rest of the world saw a country that was experiencing a kind of terrorism that many had lived with for years and yet was thrashing around like a wounded lion, tearing down international alliances and norms. In its first two years, the George W. Bush administration walked away from more international agreements than any previous administration had. (Undoubtedly, that record has now been surpassed under President Donald Trump.) American behavior abroad during the Bush administration shattered the moral and political authority of the United States, as long-standing allies such as Canada and France found themselves at odds with it on the substance, morality, and style of its foreign policy.

So which was it that eroded American hegemony—the rise of new challengers or imperial overreach? As with any large and complex historical phenomenon, it was probably all of the above. China’s rise was one of those tectonic shifts in international life that would have eroded any hegemon’s unrivaled power, no matter how skillful its diplomacy. The return of Russia, however, was a more complex affair. It’s easy to forget now, but in the early 1990s, leaders in Moscow were determined to turn their country into a liberal democracy, a European nation, and an ally of sorts of the West. Eduard Shevardnadze, who was foreign minister during the final years of the Soviet Union, supported the United States’ 1990–91 war against Iraq. And after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s first foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, was an even more ardent liberal, an internationalist, and a vigorous supporter of human rights.

The greatest error the United States committed during its unipolar moment was to simply stop paying attention.

Who lost Russia is a question for another article. But it is worth noting that although Washington gave Moscow some status and respect—expanding the G-7 into the G-8, for example—it never truly took Russia’s security concerns seriously. It enlarged NATO fast and furiously, a process that might have been necessary for countries such as Poland, historically insecure and threatened by Russia, but one that has continued on unthinkingly, with little concern for Russian sensitivities, and now even extends to Macedonia. Today, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive behavior makes every action taken against his country seem justified, but it’s worth asking, What forces produced the rise of Putin and his foreign policy in the first place? Undoubtedly, they were mostly internal to Russia, but to the extent that U.S. actions had an effect, they appear to have been damaging, helping stoke the forces of revenge and revanchism in Russia.

The greatest error the United States committed during its unipolar moment, with Russia and more generally, was to simply stop paying attention. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Americans wanted to go home, and they did. During the Cold War, the United States had stayed deeply interested in events in Central America, Southeast Asia, the Taiwan Strait, and even Angola and Namibia. By the mid-1990s, it had lost all interest in the world. Foreign-bureau broadcasts by NBC fell from 1,013 minutes in 1988 to 327 minutes in 1996. (Today, the three main networks combined devote roughly the same amount of time to foreign-bureau stories as each individual network did in 1988.) Both the White House and Congress during the George H. W. Bush administration had no appetite for an ambitious effort to transform Russia, no interest in rolling out a new version of the Marshall Plan or becoming deeply engaged in the country. Even amid the foreign economic crises that hit during the Clinton administration, U.S. policymakers had to scramble and improvise, knowing that Congress would appropriate no funds to rescue Mexico or Thailand or Indonesia. They offered advice, most of it designed to require little assistance from Washington, but their attitude was one of a distant well-wisher, not an engaged superpower.

Ever since the end of World War I, the United States has wanted to transform the world. In the 1990s, that seemed more possible than ever before. Countries across the planet were moving toward the American way. The Gulf War seemed to mark a new milestone for world order, in that it was prosecuted to uphold a norm, limited in its scope, endorsed by major powers and legitimized by international law. But right at the time of all these positive developments, the United States lost interest. U.S. policymakers still wanted to transform the world in the 1990s, but on the cheap. They did not have the political capital or resources to throw themselves into the effort. That was one reason Washington’s advice to foreign countries was always the same: economic shock therapy and instant democracy. Anything slower or more complex—anything, in other words, that resembled the manner in which the West itself had liberalized its economy and democratized its politics—was unacceptable. Before 9/11, when confronting challenges, the American tactic was mostly to attack from afar, hence the twin approaches of economic sanctions and precision air strikes. Both of these, as the political scientist Eliot Cohen wrote of airpower, had the characteristics of modern courtship: “gratification without commitment.”

Of course, these limits on the United States’ willingness to pay prices and bear burdens never changed its rhetoric, which is why, in an essay for The New York Times Magazine in 1998, I pointed out that U.S. foreign policy was defined by “the rhetoric of transformation but the reality of accommodation.” The result, I said, was “a hollow hegemony.” That hollowness has persisted ever since.

THE FINAL BLOW

The Trump administration has hollowed out U.S. foreign policy even further. Trump’s instincts are Jacksonian, in that he is largely uninterested in the world except insofar as he believes that most countries are screwing the United States. He is a nationalist, a protectionist, and a populist, determined to put “America first.” But truthfully, more than anything else, he has abandoned the field. Under Trump, the United States has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and from engaging with Asia more generally. It is uncoupling itself from its 70-year partnership with Europe. It has dealt with Latin America through the prism of either keeping immigrants out or winning votes in Florida. It has even managed to alienate Canadians (no mean feat). And it has subcontracted Middle East policy to Israel and Saudi Arabia. With a few impulsive exceptions—such as the narcissistic desire to win a Nobel Prize by trying to make peace with North Korea—what is most notable about Trump’s foreign policy is its absence.

When the United Kingdom was the superpower of its day, its hegemony eroded because of many large structural forces—the rise of Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union. But it also lost control of its empire through overreach and hubris. In 1900, with a quarter of the world’s population under British rule, most of the United Kingdom’s major colonies were asking only for limited autonomy—“dominion status” or “home rule,” in the terms of the day. Had the country quickly granted that to all its colonies, who knows whether it would have been able to extend its imperial life for decades? But it didn’t, insisting on its narrow, selfish interests rather than accommodating itself to the interests of the broader empire.

There is an analogy here with the United States. Had the country acted more consistently in the pursuit of broader interests and ideas, it could have continued its influence for decades (albeit in a different form). The rule for extending liberal hegemony seems simple: be more liberal and less hegemonic. But too often and too obviously, Washington pursued its narrow self-interests, alienating its allies and emboldening its foes. Unlike the United Kingdom at the end of its reign, the United States is not bankrupt or imperially overextended. It remains the single most powerful country on the planet. It will continue to wield immense influence, more than any other nation. But it will no longer define and dominate the international system the way it did for almost three decades.

What remains, then, are American ideas. The United States has been a unique hegemon in that it expanded its influence to establish a new world order, one dreamed of by President Woodrow Wilson and most fully conceived of by President Franklin Roosevelt. It is the world that was half-created after 1945, sometimes called “the liberal international order,” from which the Soviet Union soon defected to build its own sphere. But the free world persisted through the Cold War, and after 1991, it expanded to encompass much of the globe. The ideas behind it have produced stability and prosperity over the last three-quarters of a century. The question now is whether, as American power wanes, the international system it sponsored—the rules, norms, and values—will survive. Or will America also watch the decline of its empire of ideas?

#### c. Every offensive argument they make is a self-fulfilling prophecy created by their project of primacy.

Ashford, PhD, 19

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

Humility is a virtue. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead the height of hubris. Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism – may not be a total failure, but it has not been successful either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem. It’s also a reliance on flawed assumptions – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions. Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. Primacy – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – is neither sustainable nor prudent. Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

#### Space weapon deployment doesn’t cause an arms race or increase chance of war

Lopez 12 [LAURA DELGADO LO´ PEZ, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Arlington, Virginia. Astropolitics. "Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space Arms Control." https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391]

The previous discussion demonstrates that although a globalized space arms race could follow U.S. deployment of space weapons, it is also plausible and more likely that it may not happen at all. As Mueller states: ‘‘In the end, most of the inevitability arguments are weak.’’62 The assumptions discussed here break the argument into a series of debatable maxims that other scholars have also considered. Hays, for instance, counters the inevitability argument by pointing out that previous ASAT tests did not have this purported destabilizing effect, to which we can add that even after the Chinese ASAT test, neither Russia nor the United States, who would be both capable and more politically likely to launch space weapons, moved forward in that direction.63 Although some may draw attention to the recent wake-up calls in order to underline a sense of urgency, one should also recall that when it seemed truly inevitable before, it did not happen either. In his detailed account of military space developments from 1945 to 1984, Paul Stares described how superpowers’ assessment of the value of space weapons shifted, with a ‘‘hiatus in testing’’ reflecting the attractiveness of satellites as military targets.64 In this changed landscape, Stares also assumed the inevitability argument, claiming that ‘‘the chances of space remaining a ‘sanctuary’ [absence of weapons] into the 21st century appear today to be remote.’’65 Perhaps the conditions are more conducive now, but the important point to be reiterated is that the outcome is not inevitable, and that any such prediction must be undertaken with caution. One of the most prominent theorists to propose an alternate picture and pair it with an aggressive pro-space weapons stance is Everett Dolman. In his Astropolitik theory, Dolman summarizes the steps that the United States must take to assume control of space, particularly through withdrawal from the current space regime.66 This move, he argues, would benefit not only the United States, but also the rest of the world, since having a democracy controlling space is a catalyst for peace.67 Elsewhere, he writes: ‘‘Only a liberal world hegemon would be able to practice the restraint necessary to maintain its preponderant balance of hegemonic power without resorting to an attempt at empire.’’68 Accordingly, he believes that this strategy would be ‘‘perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing U.S. hegemony,’’69 but that other countries, correctly assessing U.S. leadership in space, would not seek to deploy their own systems. Having the ability to prevent the stationing of foreign weapons systems in space, he writes, ‘‘makes the possibility of large-scale space war and a military space race less likely, not more.’’70 In fact, he says, ‘‘to suggest that the inevitable result is a space arms competition is the worst kind of mirror-imaging.’’71 Dolman argues that the weaponization of space by the United States would ‘‘decrease the likelihood of an arms race by shifting spending away from conventional weapons systems,’’ which would reduce U.S. capabilities in territorial occupation and would thus be perceived as less threatening to other countries.72

#### No space war, and no impact if it does happen

Handberg 17 Roger Handberg 17, Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, 2017, “Is space war imminent? Exploring the possibility,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 36, No. 5, p. 413-425

The assumption made is that space war will be successfully waged in both the heavens and on the Earth itself. This assumption, however, is grounded on several hypotheticals occurring. First, that total devastating strategic surprise can be achieved—the side attacked becomes so damaged and devastated that further resistance is impossible to sustain regardless of national will, since nuclear weapons overhang the entire enterprise. The analogy usually invoked for American audiences is a “Pearl Harbor” type attack. This scenario is premised on equivalent American incompetence and lack of readiness as exhibited in December 1941. One must note that Pearl Harbor ended as a strategic failure for Japan—it led to defeat because the attack mobilized U.S. power without hesitation, given the intense political divisions over whether to enter the worldwide conflicts already raging. The attack was a military failure because Navy carriers were not destroyed along with battleship row along with critical fuel facilities. Similar analogies invoke September 11, 2001 as the prototype for such attacks more recently, but the same caveats apply. Total surprise assumes that all relevant opponent systems and civilian assets are disabled and left vulnerable to follow on attacks. In fact, collapse of U.S. defenses leaves U.S. cities as hostages to the rulers of the heavens, or vice versa if the U.S. moves first. Space war is extremely destabilizing, as will be discussed, since survivability of one's strategic assets becomes problematic. Second, surprise requires that sufficient offensive space assets be placed in orbit without triggering a response by other states—the scale of such technology deployment is in itself possibly self-defeating given high costs and a likely lack of launch capacity. In addition, much launch capacity is now international rather than national, so maintaining secrecy becomes even more difficult. Space as an operational environment suffers from excessive transparency, meaning any launches can be monitored and tracked by others with strong evidence as to what is being deployed. One must remember that the original satellite launches in the 1950s were accurately tracked by a British grade-school class as a science project. In addition, at least since the early 1960s, remote sensing has increased exponentially the global capability to detect buildup of military assets of differing types, whether in space or on the ground. Commercial remote-sensing capabilities further enhance the capacity to detect militarily relevant actions. For example, commercial imagery is accessed by private parties to monitor the North Korean missile and nuclear weapons programs, in effect expanding the capacity of the world to look in on various states' interior regions, scanning for relevant information, including weapons buildup and launch capabilities. Even construction of physical facilities for production of space assets or for other weaponry can be monitored, making surprise more difficult but not impossible, as demonstrated in earlier monitoring of North Korea and, in 1998, the nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India. That means if the ASAT weapons come from ground locations, there is a high probability that they can be detected but no guarantee exists that detection will in fact occur. The uncertainty will impact calculations of attack success. Third, the most obvious initial attack of space-based assets will most likely come from cyber attacks, given that such actions do not necessarily require the scale of resources necessary for other modalities such as kinetic weapons, or even lasers or other energy-type weapons. One will have to position the weapons plus the infrastructure to permit rapid recycling of the weapons for the next attack. Firing off interceptors will likely be a one-off, meaning extremely precise targeting will be required if the attack is to be successful. Note that none of these systems require that individuals be placed in Earth orbit, despite the imagery describing such operations in fictional universes. Deployment requires a large lift capacity for initial deployment plus replenishment of destroyed or inoperative space assets, since a space conflict assumes that assets will be lost either kinetically or be compromised by cyber or energy beams. In any case, the combatants must be able to recover their capabilities lost during the conflict; failure to do would mean defeat or at least stalemate, negating the reason for the attack. That raises a major question when one considers the problem or expectation that space war can be successfully conducted or defended. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) remains a critical weak point for all potential space-war participants. Loss of space assets occurs routinely during operations, but actual combat losses can be exponential depending on the weaponry used, and replacing those losses becomes the race to the next level after the initial exchange or combat. Unfortunately, ORS remains a major weakness of the United States and likely other states; deploying replacement satellites remains a multiyear process, while launch capabilities are scheduled long in advance. The rise of multiple private-launch competitors may partially alleviate some of the delay but that remains problematic given that the military payloads may be competing with commercial vendors also trying to replace losses. The tradeoff is that. in principle, private-launch vendors may be able to do so more cheaply, but their capacity may be saturated by demand from the civil and commercial sectors, leaving few “uncommitted” launch options for military purposes. Normally this is not an issue, but the available launch options may be third party rather than national-flag carriers, which raises severe security concerns. Fourth, several other assumptions become essential to make the strategy work, including that such an attack does not render Earth orbit so debris-saturated that further military space operations become impossible to sustain. Also, damage to civilian space assets remains, such that their continuation is possible if undamaged replacements can be quickly reintroduced to restart economically critical operations. Globalization has been fostered through satellite technologies. Their disruption can be devastating for all parties, regardless of who is the winner or the loser. What may occur is the graveyard of the modern economic system. No potential space participants would be immune to the damage, regardless of whether or not they were participants in the actual conflict. Fifth, there must be no difficulty in separating potential targets from the enemy, allied states, and nonbelligerent states. This creates a situation in which the spread of space technologies globally complicates actions, expanding the range of participants beyond the combatants, much like earlier wars at sea, where there were the combatants' ships, along with those of nonbelligerents, including neutrals whom the combatants struggled to draw into the conflict on their side, or at least to render their services unavailable to the other side. The earliest discussion of space conflict was premised on Cold War analogies, meaning two major combatants, either U.S.–Russia, or U.S–-China, or even a three-way war. Presently, analyses focus on a bilateral conflict with the U.S. opposed to China and Russia. Whether that would occur is obviously unknown, despite political rhetoric about a Eurasia coalition of likeminded states. What it does is multiply the number of potential targets and complicates reactions to neutrals' actions to protect their interests or assets. The distinction between combatants and neutrals or third parties will be possibly blurred beyond separation. The byproduct of a kinetic space conflict is massive amounts of space debris, destroying or damaging most space assets regardless of their state sponsor or nationality. Initial attacks may be focused and precise, but the result is still the same. The debris generated by armed conflict will endure beyond the immediate clash. The obvious alternative is a strictly electronic attack on space assets' operating systems, leaving the satellites in orbit, although without the ability to move them or control possible erratic changes in orbit due to collisions with other space debris. Other forms space war will take Reality is more complicated—kinetic action produces debris, the ultimate deterrent to actual space war. Therefore, space war could likely track several distinct phases. The first is cyber attacks, which disable or destroy the working systems of the spacecraft or the ground-support network—in effect, a series of stealth attacks. Civilian satellites are extremely soft targets—defense requires a capacity to detect and analyze any attack on the spacecraft, not available presently for most commercial spacecraft due to cost considerations. Otherwise, one could use nuclear weapons to create electromagnetic pulses (EMP) which can fry unprotected electronics both in space and on the ground, depending on where the weapons are detonated. Interestingly, space war scenarios have some territorial war aspects in that any attacks on space assets will devastate both military and civilian targets without distinction between the war participants and civilians. Similar to unrestricted submarine warfare, all targets in the relevant area will become casualties or otherwise impacted in their operations. Second, attacks that are conducted against the ground down links and/or communications systems, leaving the spacecraft without guidance or instructions, and also no information is returned to the commanders even if the satellites survive the initial onslaught. These can involve kinetic attacks against specific locations or insertion of special operations forces to render the facility inoperative. For example, antennas can be disabled or destroyed, disrupting operations until new facilities are brought online. Other alternatives could include kinetic weapons launched from space, “rods from God.”20 Air strike packages could include electronic warfare elements capable of scrambling or disrupting operations of such facilities even prior to physical strikes against the targets. Spacecraft not destroyed or disabled in the initial two stages of the attack can be directly attacked by “dazzling” their receivers, with laser impulses destroying the receivers for which there are few replacements without replacing the spacecraft physically. Third, rapid replacement of inoperative satellites, regardless of the reasons, does not occur, which translates into a race for the third, possibly end, phase of the war, replenishment. Inability to replace losses may mean that none of the combatants are able to dominate in the end, meaning conventional conflict may be the outcome, although issues of global reach may confine conflicts to relatively small areas. In previous conventional conflicts, large-scale forces were moved, albeit slowly, across the globe to the conflict, i.e., Desert Shield morphing into Desert Storm after a nearly six-month buildup.

#### No China space war – the only scenario for conflict is Earthbound – Chinese military plans prove

Cheng 17 [Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy Heritage. The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains. Chapter 6. Space Deterrence, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Asian Security: A U.S. Perspective. Rand Corporation. 2017]

But while there may be clashes in space, the actual source of any Sino-American conflict will remain earthbound, most likely stemming from tensions associated with the situation in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, or the South China Sea. This suggests that U.S. and allied decisionmakers (both in Asia and Europe) should be focusing on deterring aggression in general, rather than concentrating primarily on trying to forestall actions in space. Indeed, there is little evidence that Chinese military planners are contemplating a conflict limited to space. While there may be actions against space systems, Chinese writings suggest that they would either be limited in nature, as part of a signaling and coercive effort, or else would be integrated with broader terrestrial military operations.

#### MAD checks space escalation – nuclear response and debris

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.

#### Their “be skeptical of heg bad” card is super mistagged—it’s about Chinese government proliferation of misinformation about Covid which doesn’t warrant “all our cards are Chinese government propaganda.” Heg has failed in every quantifiable way – reject ev from liberals with a vested interest in maintaining US adventurism.

Walt, PhD, 18

(Stephen, PoliSci@Berkeley, ProfInternationalAffairs@Harvard, The Hell of Good Intentions, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, ebook no page numbers)

But as the past twenty-five years have shown, the strategy of liberal hegemony is fundamentally flawed. Instead of building an ever-expanding zone of peace united by a shared commitment to liberal ideals, America’s pursuit of liberal hegemony poisoned relations with Russia, led to costly quagmires in Afghanistan, Iraq, and several other countries, squandered trillions of dollars and thousands of lives, and encouraged both states and non-state actors to resist U.S. efforts or to exploit them for their own benefit. Instead of welcoming U.S. leadership, allies took advantage by free-riding, adversaries repeatedly blocked U.S. initiatives, and hostile extremists found different ways to attack, divert, and distract. America’s superior economic and military assets could not rescue an approach to the world that was misguided at its core. So why did the United States adopt a grand strategy that performed so poorly, and why did three very different presidents continue this approach even after its limitations became apparent? I argue that liberal hegemony remained the default setting for U.S. foreign policy because the foreign policy establishment was deeply committed to it and in an ideal position to promote and defend it. As the nearly unified opposition to Trump has shown, the consensus behind this approach transcended party lines and survived repeated disappointments. Leading members of the foreign policy establishment undoubtedly believed that liberal hegemony was the right strategy for America, but they also understood that it was very good for them. Open-ended efforts to remake the world in America’s image gave the foreign policy establishment plenty to do, appealed to its members’ self-regard, and maximized their status and political power. It bolstered the case for maintaining military capabilities that dwarfed those of the other major powers, and it allowed special interest groups with narrow foreign policy objectives to lobby for their preferred policies and logroll with others, thereby making it more likely that the government would give each some of what it wanted. Liberal hegemony, in short, was a full-employment policy for the foreign policy elite and the path of least resistance for groups seeking to convince the U.S. government to do something somewhere far away on behalf of somebody else. By 2016, however, the track record of the past twenty-five years and the costs it had imposed on the nation could not be fully concealed. Awareness of repeated failures opened the door to Trump’s populist assault on what many of his supporters saw as an aloof, insular, and unaccountable elite. Dissatisfaction with the status quo helped propel Trump to the White House, but would he be able to overcome opposition from the establishment and pull off the revolution in foreign policy that he promised?12

#### Zero I/L to the Taiwan scenario – ASAT’s aren’t private actor space appropriation – this means the Plan can’t solve anything.

#### a] Outer Space means above the atmosphere.

Howell 17 Elizabeth Howell 6-7-2017 "What is Space?" <https://www.space.com/24870-what-is-space.html> (Ph.D., is a contributing writer for Space.com since 2012. As a proud Trekkie and Canadian, she tackles topics like spaceflight, diversity, science fiction, astronomy and gaming to help others explore the universe. Elizabeth's on-site reporting includes two human spaceflight launches from Kazakhstan, and embedded reporting from a simulated Mars mission in Utah. She holds a Ph.D. and M.Sc. in Space Studies from the University of North Dakota, and a Bachelor of Journalism from Canada's Carleton University.)//Elmer

From the perspective of an Earthling, outer space is a zone that occurs about 100 kilometers (60 miles) above the planet, where there is no appreciable air to breathe or to scatter light. In that area, blue gives way to black because oxygen molecules are not in enough abundance to make the sky blue.

#### China’s ASAT’s are located on the ground.

Erwin 20 Sandra Erwin 9-1-2020 "Pentagon report: China amassing arsenal of anti-satellite weapons" <https://spacenews.com/pentagon-report-china-amassing-arsenal-of-anti-satellite-weapons/> (Sandra Erwin writes about military space programs, policy, technology and the industry that supports this sector. She has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry for nearly two decades as editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine and Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense.)//Elmer

WASHINGTON — China is progressing with the development of missiles and electronic weapons that could target satellites in low and high orbits, the Pentagon says in a new report released Sept. 1. China already has operational ground-based missiles that can hit satellites in low-Earth orbit and “probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit,” says the Defense Department’s annual report to Congress on China’s military capabilities. DoD has been required by law to submit this report since 2000. The Pentagon says Chinese military strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems and to deny them to adversaries as central to modern warfare. China for years has continued to “strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space,” the report says. China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new anti-satellite weapons programs since it confirmed it used an ASAT missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007, but the nation has been steadily advancing in this area, the report says. So-called counterspace capabilities developed by China include kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, orbiting space robots and space surveillance to monitor objects across the globe and in space.

#### b] Private entity are non-governmental.

Dunk 11 Von Der Dunk, Frans G. "1. The Origins Of Authorisation: Article VI Of The Outer Space Treaty And International Space Law." National Space Legislation in Europe. Brill Nijhoff, 2011. 3-28. (University of Nebraska)//Elmer

4. Interpreting Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty One main novel feature of Article VI stood out with reference to the role of private enterprise in this context. Contrary to the version o fthe concept applicable under general international law, where 'direct state responsibility' only pertained to acts somehow directly attributable to a state and states could only be addressed for acts by private actors under 'indirect', 'due care' / 'due diligence' responsibility18, Article VI made no difference as to whether the activities at issue were the state's own ("whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies" ...) or those of private actors (... "or by non-governmental entities"). The interests of the Soviet Union in ensuring that, whomever would actually conduct a certain space activity, some state or other could be held responsible for its compliance with applicable rules of space law to that extent had prevailed. However, the general acceptance of Article VI as cornerstone of the Outer Space Treaty unfortunately was far from the end of the story. Partly, this was the consequence of key principles being left undefined.

#### China’s ASATs are operated by the Strategic Support Force – proven by 1AC Chow and Kelley.

#### The SSF is a governmental entity – they’re not a private actor.

Pollpeter et Al 17 Pollpeter, Kevin L., Michael S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham. The creation of the PLA strategic support force and its implications for Chinese Military Space Operations. RAND Corporation Santa Monica United States, 2017. (Analyst at Rand)//Elmer

This report explores the missions and organization of China's military space enterprise, focusing on the organizational structure of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF). Created on December 31, 2015, as part of a major reorganization of China's military, the SSF is charged with developing and employing most of the PLA's space capabilities. Its creation signifies a shift in the PLA's prioritization of space and an increased role for PLA space capabilities. Chinese military strategists see military space capabilities and operations as a key component of strategic deterrence, critical to enabling the PLA to fight informatized local wars and counter U.S. military intervention in the region and essential for supporting operations aimed at protecting China's emerging interests in more-distant parts of the world. The main function of the SSF's space component appears to be the launch and operation of satellites to provide the PLA with command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. It appears that information warfare, including space warfare, long identified by PLA analysts as a critical element of future military operations, has entered a new phase of development in which an emphasis on space and information warfare, long-range precision strikes, and the requirements associated with conducting operations at greater distances from China has necessitated the establishment of a new and different type of organization.

#### This means the Aff doesn’t effect ASATs – they will say Commercial Sectors produce them, that’s irrelevant since the PLA operates them as an act of appropriation which isn’t effected by the plan.