# 1NC

### 1NC – T

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must only defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust and may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation of the plan – they don’t.

#### Resolved requires a policy

Merriam Webster '18 (Merriam Webster; 2018 Edition; Online dictionary and legal resource; Merriam Webster, "resolve," <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve;> RP)  
: a legal or official determination especially: a legislative declaration

#### Private entity is defined by

Cornell Law n.d. “private entity” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term_occur=999&term_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501> TG

(A) In general Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

#### Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty defines outer space and appropriation

OST 66 “2222 (XXI). Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1499th plenary meeting, Dec 19, 1966, <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html> TG

ARTICLE II. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

#### Topicality as a procedural constraint is a voting issue and is necessary for effective debate

#### They destroy engagement – predictable stasis ensures research accessibility and negative ground. Even if public policy isn’t the best focus for activism, it’s crucial for dialogue because it’s grounded in consistent reporting and academic work.

#### Two impacts -

#### 1) Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by manipulating balance of prep – vote neg b/c debate is a competitive game that’s meaningless without substantive constraints.

#### 2) Also key to have well-prepared opponents. They transform debate into a monologue which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subjected to well researched scrutiny.

#### Also destroys mechanism education—their model creates a structural disincentive to substantial research. Failure to defend the actor and mechanism of the resolution allows them to shift their advocacy to the terms most favorable to them – causes dogmatism and forces the neg into generics at the margins of the literature – destroys good scholarship.

#### Competing interps—they have to proactively to justify their model and reasonability links to our offense.

### 1NC – DA

#### Brazil’s commercial space industry is flourishing.

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* AEB – Brazilian Space Agency
* AIAB – Aerospace Industries Association of Brazil

Lately, there has been a surge of interest in commercial space in Brazil due to institutional development, private sector engagement, and entrepreneurial activities. A Committee of Development of the Brazilian Space Program (CDPEB) was established in 2018 and comprises representatives of several Ministries. The CDPEB has the mandate to advise the President on the implementation of the Brazilian Space Program. Among its primary responsibilities is the elaboration of the General Law of Space, which is expected to provide the guidelines for commercial space activities.[13](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2021.0002#B13) In May 2020, Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) issued a public call inviting local and foreign companies to use its civilian launch facilities.[14](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2021.0002#B14)

The private sector has been actively promoting commercial space. An industrial cluster now constitutes a “Space Valley” around the Sao Jose dos Campos Technology Park (PqTec), with spin-off companies impacting both space and nonspace sectors. The Aerospace Industries Association of Brazil (AIAB) is a trade organization of traditional space companies and defense contractors such as Avibras, Akaer (Opto), Atech, Fibraforte, Orbital, and SIATT. According to its website, AIAB has 30 members working in small satellites, satellite structures, payloads, satellite equipment, ground systems, propulsion, sounding rockets, and launchers.[15](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2021.0002#B15) Braskem, the world's leading biopolymer producer, has partnered with Silicon Valley-born startup Made in Space to produce recyclable plastic objects in the ISS.[16](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2021.0002#B16)

Since 2017, AEB has organized the Brazilian Space Industry Forum, an annual event that congregates stakeholders, fosters the exchange of ideas, and promotes collaboration between domestic and international participants. The U.S.-Brazil CEO Forum, which brings together 12 U.S. and 12 Brazilian CEOs to develop joint recommendations for both governments on how to increase bilateral trade, proposed the development of a framework for joint space research programs in 2019.

A small but vibrant New Space startup community is rapidly forming. The Alliance of Brazilian Space Startups was launched in 2020. Although some companies target low earth orbit and beyond, others are creating solutions to our planet using space technologies. PION has commercial products focusing on space and education. CRON and EMSIS have developed software and hardware for CubeSat missions, whereas Alya Nanosatellites aims to launch a constellation and tap into the earth's observation market. DeltaV, a spin-off from INPE, specializes in propulsion systems. ACRUX and VSAT are working on small satellite launchers. Airvantis sent multiple educational experiments to the ISS and has partnerships with companies and space agencies worldwide. The startup is carrying out Brazil's first lunar mission.[17](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2021.0002#B17) In parallel, Agrosmart, Solinftec, and Strider are harnessing the power of space assets to provide remote sensing, weather forecast, and image processing services to the agricultural sector.[18](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2021.0002#B18) Data companies such as Storm have incorporated open source algorithms developed by NASA for security applications.[19](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/space.2021.0002#B19)

#### Strong space sector cements Brazilian prestige and international influence AND solves alt causes

Dr. Robert C. Harding 17, Professor of Political Science at Valdosta State University, PhD in Political Science from the University of Miami, MA from the University of Louisville, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and Development on the Final Frontier, Paperback Edition, p. 1-4

Change in the post-Cold War period has become the standard of our time. Whether it be the changing power structure of the international system, climate change, the speed of technological innovation, or changes within our societies, the current international situation is one of constant, accelerating transformation. One area that has certainly evolved is the importance and priority given to space-related programs by a growing number of countries around the world. As the various captains of Star Trek fame have somberly declared, space really is the final frontier. But while it has been the basis for engaging science fiction, outer space nonetheless has a very down-to-Earth feature—it has become the ultimate venue for the growth of national power and socioeconomic development among a number of the world’s emergent states.

This new paradigm of international relations has been evolving for over 50 years. From the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik in 1957, many states began to include space-based security concerns in their foreign policies, which forced them to consider what the then-new operations in space meant for national security; they also began to integrate space-based assets into their approaches to a wide range of national development challenges, from agriculture to health improvement to the development of natural resources. Though the importance of space to national power, prestige, and potential has been less obvious in the intervening years since the heady days of the Cold War’s space race, its significance has never waned and continues to increase as many states increase national space budgets. Space has, in fact, earned a permanent place at the table in matters of international conflict, peace, national and international development, and international law.

Space was at one time the sole domain of the wealthiest developed countries. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, and to some extent the European Union, dominated the use of space and the associated technology in the first decades after World War II. But the last couple of decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first witnessed an increase in the number of countries with state-supported space programs. At this writing, no fewer than 25 developing states, including the rapidly emerging economic powers of Brazil (the sixth largest), China (second largest), and India (fourth largest), possess active national space programs with proven independent launch capability or concrete plans to achieve it soon. Space programs and their related technologies are now an integral part of the strategic and developmental policies of many relatively wealthy developing states that aspire to elevate their international status, security, and economic future. A multitude of other developing states as diverse as Mexico, Nigeria, and Malaysia have established and elevated their own space policy through the creation of national space agencies and the purchase and/or production of satellites and related space technology either through state, private, or joint efforts. For these smaller and rising middle powers, the acquisition of space capabilities is now an integral component of their national policies.

Though commercial enterprise is not a focus of this study, it must be noted that as the cost of space-related technology has decreased dramatically, the expanding number of national state actors in space has been paced by the equally impressive expansion in the number of strictly commercial space companies. Communications, geospatial information, and a wide variety of other services provided by commercial satellites affect much of modern life, and also provide vital information to governments, their agencies, and business interests worldwide. This information covers many of the same areas that national governments find important to national well-being, such as weather and climate monitoring, water management, environmental observation, topographic mapping, natural disaster planning, and crop management. These services are provided commercially by a growing cadre of companies that build satellites, create the associated technologies, and are beginning to provide basic launch services, all areas that were previously the exclusive domain of state-owned space agencies.

The growth of commercial space services has been a double-edged sword for states. By 2010, the global space industry was estimated to be worth US$276.52 billion, an 18 percent increase over 2009.2 Of this total, worldwide commercial satellite industry revenues rose 11 percent to US$160.9 billion in 2010.3 Despite sporadic attempts to control its proliferation, commercial satellite imagery has become so good and so broadly disseminated that many national governments, for example Israel, have complained that its existence endangers national security because potential terrorists now have access to the detailed satellite imagery necessary to plan precise attacks. Until the 1990s, such high-resolution satellite imagery was almost exclusively the domain of the militaries of developed space powers, which, for national security reasons, did not generally make their data public. And since there were a limited number of states with the capability to launch surveillance satellites, the potential sources were likewise limited.

Those civilian satellites that did operate before the 1990s provided imagery of a much lower spatial resolution than their military counterparts, typically not showing clear images of objects smaller than 10 meters across. However, that situation changed with the launch of the US company Lockheed Martin’s Ikonos satellite in 1999. Its spatial resolution of one meter meant that for the first time, no country could depend on geographic distance and national borders to ensure state secrets. The situation became even more fluid through the 1990s and into the 2000s as the transfer of space technology—satellites and associated technology— became a commercially viable avenue for major satellite producers. Today, imagery services such as Google Earth have revolutionized access to satellite imagery in the same way that cell phones have changed communications access for hundreds of millions of people around the world—they have democratized it.

Nonetheless, the growing actual importance of space policy stands in stark contrast to the popular perception of the significance of space in the modern world. Indeed, more than 50 years after the launch of Sputnik, the exploration of near space via the moon-landings, and various robotic missions to the solar system’s planets, surveys have shown that few people in the West still consider space as anything novel. The popular mindset has moved on to the wonders of the “information age” and the benefits (or detriments) of globalization. The generations of technology spawned by those earlier days of space exploration have been indispensable in the creation of our high-tech, instantaneous world, but space and its benefits are now so integrated into our daily infrastructure that most people do not give it a second thought. The reactions to the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle tragedies aside, public complacency toward the importance of space has become the rule, rather than the exception.

Despite these popular sentiments, the recent expansion of space programs in the developing world demonstrates that national governments have never altered their view of the importance of space for achieving and expanding national power—militarily or socioeconomically. This expansion of space programs is especially noteworthy because it reflects an emergent democratization of space, which is one of the most important factors in the changing distribution of power in the current international arena. Many countries now use satellites for communications and obtaining weather data, through ownership or simply purchase of the data. In fact, this broadening and expansion of the usage of space and the attendant transformation of power distribution is seen by some observers as leading to a new space race, albeit one that has yet to gain the high profile that the previous contest had during the Cold War. This competition is emerging as the catalyst for a new generation of space-related policies and innovations in both established and emerging space-faring countries. Consider how one recent space-related event affected the dynamic of interstate relations.

In January 2007, the news that China had successfully tested an anti-satellite ballistic missile sent shockwaves around the world’s foreign policy community. By shooting down one of its own aging satellites from low Earth orbit, China—a country that only a generation before was seen as poor by most measures—demonstrated its intent to join the existing space powers, thus attracting attention, if not commanding respect as a potential world power. China plans to land a nuclear-powered unmanned rover on the moon by 2013, and to have in place an orbital military space station later in the second decade of this century.4

But while China’s space policy is more ambitious and better funded than those of other developing states, it is by no means unique. The next year of this twenty-first century space race saw India following up on the Chinese success by launching its own successful probe to the moon. Around the world, increasing numbers of developing countries are investing in space-related technologies, seeking partners for space projects, and even constructing launch facilities that may one day rival the established space powers of the United States, Russia, the European Union, and more recently Japan.

But what motivates a developing country, which by definition is relatively poor, to spend the comparatively large amounts of money required for these space adventures? The short answer is that, like the United States and the Soviet Union before them, developing countries pursue active space policies because of the recognition that space is, in many ways, the ultimate measure of national power, international prestige, and demonstrated national potential. Moreover, space-based assets allow states to more fully utilize their national resources and to expand the reach of domestic socioeconomic programs into areas as diverse as agriculture, education, medicine, and economic development. Thus a space program figures as an integral facet of any capable state’s national security and developmental policies. The benefits of a successful space program include advanced communications, a platform for technology improvement, greatly enhanced geographic information, and, for some, expanded defensive and intelligence capabilities. Equally important, space programs can provide the host state with increased international prestige, which accrues both domestic and international advantages. Hence, developing countries are merely being rational state actors and following the path pioneered by those space-faring states that preceded them.

#### It's key to project success AND overcome historical domination

Dr. Robert C. Harding 17, Professor of Political Science at Valdosta State University, PhD in Political Science from the University of Miami, MA from the University of Louisville, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and Development on the Final Frontier, Paperback Edition, p. 23

Space programs bestow equally important soft power, especially those that involve human space flight. Every major space power has spent considerable funds to achieve the ability to put humans in space for both tangible and intangible benefits. Logsdon (2007) has argued that human space flight ranks among the most intensely patriotic symbols of modern times.27 Some of the emerging space actors have pursued or are pursuing human space flight as a demonstration of their programs’ sophistication, and their astronauts are held up by their governments as national patriotic icons. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, for the largest EMSAs—Brazil, China, and India—their space programs have been touted not only as national accomplishments but as a national catharsis to overcome histories of direct and indirect domination by outside powers and to project to others a sense of greatness.

#### Brazilian leadership solves multiple existential threats

**Huck 20** [Luciano Huck, from the Law School of the University of São Paulo, Host of Rede Globo, Founder of Joá Investments 1/15/2020, "This country is vital to 'global survival'," World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/what-happens-next-in-brazil-has-global-consequences-here-are-three-priorities-for-the-next-decade/> accessed 12/14/21] recut Adam

* Need to find new impact card

From spiralling geopolitical tensions in the Middle East to raging forest fires in Australia, 2020 certainly started with a bang. A shortlist of some of our biggest existential threats includes accelerating climate change, staggering inequalities and the failure of nation-states to cooperate to mitigate shared global risks. With all the bad news, it is hard to see the incredible possibilities on the horizon, not least advances in health, education and the boundless potential of new technologies. A growing number of businesses including huge asset managers like BlackRock are also becoming greener. All of these challenges and opportunities are apparent in Brazil, the world’s fourth-largest democracy and its ninth biggest economy.

Brazil will play a leading role in how the next decade unfolds. A big reason for this is its immense natural resources - including over 40% of the world’s tropical forests and 20% of the planet's fresh-water supply. The Amazon is often described as the "lungs of the world" - for good reason. But the lungs are collapsing as a result of man-made fires and runaway deforestation. With more than 210 million citizens, Brazil also has an impressive stock of human resources. But it is also convulsed by breathtaking inequality and grinding poverty. Complicating matters, we are facing a crisis of political leadership and shirking our international responsibilities.

What happens next in Brazil has far-reaching consequences for global survival. The decisions adopted by Latin America's largest country - whether in relation to protecting the Amazon, reducing inequality or strengthening multilateral cooperation - will help determine whether this is the world's best century or its last one. The sheer scope of the challenges facing Brazilians can feel overwhelming. Without a transformative vision and narrative, a renewal of political leadership, and tangible improvement, people feel rudderless and afraid.

For the past 20 years, I've been taking the pulse of Brazil. I produce and present a popular television program reaching roughly 30 million Brazilians every week. Most of the time, I travel across the country listening to the inspiring and heartbreaking stories of my countrymen and women. They remind me every day why I need to contribute to building a better Brazil. So here are three challenges that I firmly believe Brazilians can turn into opportunities.

Amazon 4.0

Dramatic fires and deforestation in the Amazon made global headlines in 2019. Despite the best efforts of the Brazilian authorities to conceal the problem, the Science Ministry's own satellite data showed that deforestation rates were at the highest levels in two decades. While falling out of the international news cycle, the destruction continues. If deforestation persists at current rates, irreversible die-off could convert the world’s largest tropical forests into its largest savannah. This would release up to 140 billion tons of stored carbon into the atmosphere, effectively scuppering efforts to meet the Paris Agreement targets.

A radical new paradigm is needed to ensure the sustainable stewardship of Brazil's stunning cultural and biodiversity. It must harness the Amazon's most powerful resource - the 25 million people who live there. For one, there has to be zero tolerance for deforestation and a concerted focus on improving the productivity of areas where forests have already been cut down. Roughly 90% of deforestation in the Amazon is illegal and at least two-thirds of the 80 million hectares of cleared land are under-used, degraded and abandoned. Just as important as sustainable agri-business, the expansion of eco-tourism, investment in biotechnology research and the development of fairly-traded rainforest products.

In a survey conducted in August of 2019, the majority of Brazilians thought that the Amazon rainforest was a reason for national pride. At that time, up to 68 percent of respondents in Brazil strongly agreed with the sentence

Reducing inequality

Deepening social and economic inequality within countries is fundamentally reconfiguring domestic and international politics. In some cases, governments are retreating from multilateral cooperation and reverting to reactionary nationalism and protectionism. These dynamics are apparent in Brazil, among the world’s most unequal countries. Although Brazil made important advances in reducing poverty since the 2000s, inequality remained stubbornly high. And in recent years, per capita income plunged and the gap between the rich and poor started rising, wiping out many social gains of the previous three decades. Today, the average monthly income of the wealthiest one per cent is more than 33 times the income of the poorest 50%. Inequality not only hinders economic growth, but it also fuels polarization and populism.

Brazil needs to put inequality reduction at the top of the national agenda in 2020. A combination of common-sense interventions are required: ensuring the fairer collection of taxes, reducing subsidies for the wealthy, rolling-out more equal opportunity policies, and stimulating opportunities for the most vulnerable. Most important of all is dramatically improving the quality of basic public education, especially early childhood schooling. Brazil's education system is failing poorer families. Wealth inequality is reinforcing inequality of opportunity for the next generation. To win the war on inequality, Brazil needs an inclusive growth strategy, one that is not limited to growing income and smart deregulation but also ensures that quality public services delivering security, education, health, sanitation and transportation reach all citizens, not just those who pay a premium for them.

Restoring leadership

After years of corruption and stagnation, Brazil is suffering from sharp societal divisions and simmering tensions. In 2013, well before the street protests that flared up in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador, Brazil experienced the largest demonstrations since the restoration of democracy in 1985. The impeachment of President Dilma in 2016, the unprecedented unpopularity of the Temer administration and the election of far-right Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 revealed the extent of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Bolsonaro was partly elected because the credibility of Brazil's political establishment was demolished by ongoing “Car Wash” investigations into government corruption. Exhausted by scandal and stagnation, Brazilians voted for change.

To tackle the big challenges of the next decade, Brazil needs to restore and renew its political leaders from the top to bottom. Accountable, responsible and representative leadership and public service are fundamental to revitalizing the social contract. This won't happen spontaneously. It requires a conscious effort to attract and invest in talent. it also demands that each and every Brazilian gets involved. In 2017, I joined Agora, one of several dynamic civic movements investing in a new generation of leaders committed to a more inclusive and sustainable Brazil. And in 2018, I co-founded RenovaBR, attracting over 4,600 submissions from people who'd never been involved in politics for training in governance and ethics. Of the 120 successful applicants, 17 were elected to federal office that year.

Brazil is a country of infinite possibility. It has achieved breathtaking gains over the last generation - bringing tens of millions of people out of poverty. But these improvements were fragile. As we’ve seen in other parts of the world, when societies and living standards start moving backwards, social protest and unrest are not far behind. This is dangerous. Irresponsible leaders can take advantage of the fear and uncertainty that result. But we can also fight back. We will start rewriting the Brazilian story in 2020, first by acknowledging our most intractable problems and then by leveraging our tremendous creativity, scientific prowess and expertise. This means stepping out of our comfort zones. Powered by civic and social entrepreneurs from across the political spectrum, we can rebuild a positive vision for the future in Brazil.

### 1NC – Case

#### First, framing—

#### The role of the ballot is to determine if the aff’s a good idea—anything else is self-serving, arbitrary and begs the question of the rest of the debate. Evaluate consequences

Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### Biological death is the ultimate evil – it obliterates metaphysics and ontology

Paterson 3 - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, SAGE

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather**,** death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclu sion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state thatany intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility**.**

#### Focus on large scale catastrophes is good and they outweigh – appeals to social costs, moral rules, and securitization play into cognitive biases and flawed risk calculus – 2020 is living proof

Weber 20 (ELKE U. WEBER is Gerhard R. Andlinger Professor in Energy and the Environment and Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at Princeton University.), November-December 2020 Issue, "Heads in the Sand," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-10-13/heads-sand> mvp

We are living in a time of crisis. From the immediate challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic to the looming existential threat of climate change, the world is grappling with massive global dangers—to say nothing of countless problems within countries, such as inequality, cyberattacks, unemployment, systemic racism, and obesity. In any given crisis, the right response is often clear. Wear a mask and keep away from other people. Burn less fossil fuel. Redistribute income. Protect digital infrastructure. The answers are out there. What’s lacking are governments that can translate them into actual policy. As a result, the crises continue. The death toll from the pandemic skyrockets, and the world makes dangerously slow progress on climate change, and so on.

It’s no secret how governments should react in times of crisis. First, they need to be nimble. Nimble means moving quickly, because problems often grow at exponential rates: a contagious virus, for example, or greenhouse gas emissions. That makes early action crucial and procrastination disastrous. Nimble also means adaptive. Policymakers need to continuously adjust their responses to crises as they learn from their own experience and from the work of scientists. Second, governments need to act wisely. That means incorporating the full range of scientific knowledge available about the problem at hand. It means embracing uncertainty, rather than willfully ignoring it. And it means thinking in terms of a long time horizon, rather than merely until the next election. But so often, policymakers are anything but nimble and wise. They are slow, inflexible, uninformed, overconfident, and myopic.

Why is everyone doing so badly? Part of the explanation lies in the inherent qualities of crises. Crises typically require navigating between risks. In the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers want to save lives and jobs. With climate change, they seek a balance between avoiding extreme weather and allowing economic growth. Such tradeoffs are hard as it is, and they are further complicated by the fact that costs and benefits are not evenly distributed among stakeholders, making conflict a seemingly unavoidable part of any policy choice. Vested interests attempt to forestall needed action, using their money to influence decision-makers and the media. To make matters worse, policymakers must pay sustained attention to multiple issues and multiple constituencies over time. They must accept large amounts of uncertainty. Often, then, the easiest response is to stick with the status quo. But that can be a singularly dangerous response to many new hazards. After all, with the pandemic, business as usual would mean no social distancing. With climate change, it would mean continuing to burn fossil fuels.

But the explanation for humanity’s woeful response to crises goes beyond politics and incentives. To truly understand the failure to act, one must turn to human psychology. It is there that one can grasp the full impediments to proper decision-making—the cognitive biases, emotional reactions, and suboptimal shortcuts that hold policymakers back—and the tools to overcome them.

AVOIDING THE UNCOMFORTABLE

People are singularly bad at predicting and preparing for catastrophes. Many of these events are “black swans,” rare and unpredictable occurrences that most people find difficult to imagine, seemingly falling into the realm of science fiction. Others are “gray rhinos,” large and not uncommon threats that are still neglected until they stare you in the face (such as a coronavirus outbreak). Then there are “invisible gorillas,” threats in full view that should be noticed but aren’t—so named for a psychological experiment in which subjects watching a clip of a basketball game were so fixated on the players that they missed a person in a gorilla costume walking through the frame. Even professional forecasters, including security analysts, have a poor track record when it comes to accurately anticipating events. The COVID-19 crisis, in which a dystopic science-fiction narrative came to life and took everyone by surprise, serves as a cautionary tale about humans’ inability to foresee important events.

Not only do humans fail to anticipate crises; they also fail to respond rationally to them. At best, people display “bounded rationality,” the idea that instead of carefully considering their options and making perfectly rational decisions that optimize their preferences, humans in the real world act quickly and imperfectly, limited as they are by time and cognitive capacity. Add in the stress generated by crises, and their performance gets even worse.

Because humans don’t have enough time, information, or processing power to deliberate rationally, they have evolved easier ways of making decisions. They rely on their emotions, which serve as an early warning system of sorts: alerting people that they are in a positive context that can be explored and exploited or in a negative context where fight or flight is the appropriate response. They also rely on rules. To simplify decision-making, they might follow standard operating procedures or abide by some sort of moral code. They might decide to imitate the action taken by other people whom they trust or admire. They might follow what they perceive to be widespread norms. Out of habit, they might continue to do what they have been doing unless there is overwhelming evidence against it.

Not only do humans fail to anticipate crises; they also fail to respond rationally to them.

Humans evolved these shortcuts because they require little effort and work well in a broad range of situations. Without access to a real-time map of prey in different hunting grounds, for example, a prehistoric hunter might have resorted to a simple rule of thumb: look for animals where his fellow tribesmen found them yesterday. But in times of crisis, emotions and rules are not always helpful drivers of decision-making. High stakes, uncertainty, tradeoffs, and conflict—all elicit negative emotions, which can impede wise responses. Uncertainty is scary, as it signals an inability to predict what will happen, and what cannot be predicted might be deadly. The vast majority of people are already risk averse under normal circumstances. Under stress, they become even more so, and they retreat to the familiar comfort of the status quo. From gun laws to fossil fuel subsidies, once a piece of legislation is in place, it is hard to dislodge it, even when cost-benefit analysis argues for change.

#### Either no solvency or they violate T – vote neg on presumption

#### A. Creating new subjectivities and histories in debate will do nothing to resolve the imposition of technoorientalism in other structures or the fact that people are socialized outside of this space i.e. from their parents or the media

#### B. Bringing this in to debate only encourages people to want to react with framework – competition makes your project of change obsolete

#### C. Systems – the 1AC argues that material events and institutions create the social realities that replicate violence but ceding the state refuses to alter these conditions

#### D. Nothing about debate leads to technoorientalism – you can read affs that critique it.

Esaki and Roh are both about discourse of Asians in literature—has nothing to do with the resolution meaning they can’t solve unless they go outside the topic meaning they violate topicality.

Their ROB args are wrong – single debates don’t shape subjectivity

Their offense is literally about commercial space flight being inaccessible to most people – that has literally zero to do with technorientalism.

Varma is literally racist – it says asian people are stuck within those values and can’t access things outside them – independently nonuq to private space exploration.

#### Second, their offense—

#### Commercial Space Race favors American Companies that cements space dominance – shift away endangers our lead – losing green-lights Chinese Dominance across the board.

Autry and Kwast 19 Greg Autry and Steve Kwast 8-22-2019 "America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China" (Greg Autry, a clinical professor of space leadership, policy, and business at Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management, and Steve Kwast)//Elmer

America Is Losing the Second Space Race to China The private sector can give the United States a much-needed rocket boost. The current U.S. space defense strategy is inadequate and on a path to failure. President Donald Trump’s vision for a Space Force is big enough. As he said on June 18, “It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.” But the Air Force is not matching this vision. Instead, the leadership is currently focused on incremental improvements to existing equipment and organizational structures. Dominating the vast and dynamic environment of space will require revolutionary capabilities and resources far deeper than traditional Department of Defense thinking can fund, manage, or even conceive of. Success depends on a much more active partnership with the commercial space industry— and its disruptive capabilities. U.S. military space planners are preparing to repeat a conflict they imagined back in the 1980s, which never actually occurred, against a vanished Soviet empire. Meanwhile, China is executing a winning strategy in the world of today. It is burning hard toward domination of the future space markets that will define the next century. They are planning infrastructure in space that will control 21st-century telecommunications, energy, transportation, and manufacturing. In doing so, they will acquire trillion-dollar revenues as well as the deep capabilities that come from continuous operational experience in space. This will deliver space dominance and global hegemony to China’s authoritarian rulers. Despite the fact that many in the policy and intelligence communities understand exactly what China is doing and have been trying to alert leadership, Air Force leadership has convinced the White House to fund only a slightly better satellite command with the same leadership, while sticking a new label onto their outmoded thinking. A U.S. Space Force or Corps with a satellite command will never fulfill Trump’s call to dominate space. Air Force leadership is demonstrating the same hubris that Gen. George Custer used in convincing Congress, over President Ulysses S. Grant’s better experience intuition, that he could overtake the Black Hills with repeating rifles and artillery. That strategy of technological overconfidence inflamed conflict rather than subduing it, and the 7th Cavalry were wiped out at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. The West was actually won by the settlers, ranchers, miners, and railroad barons who were able to convert the wealth of the territory itself into the means of holding it. They laid the groundwork that made the 20th century the American Century and delivered freedom to millions of people in Europe and Asia. Of course, they also trampled the indigenous people of the American West in their wake—but empty space comes with no such bloody cost. The very emptiness and wealth of this new, if not quite final, frontier, however, means that competition for resources and strategic locations in cislunar space (between the Earth and moon) will be intense over the next two decades. The outcome of this competition will determine the fate of humanity in the next century. China’s impending dominance will neutralize U.S. geopolitical power by allowing Beijing to control global information flows from the high ground of space. Imagine a school in Bolivia or a farmer in Kenya choosing between paying for a U.S. satellite internet or image provider or receiving those services for free as a “gift of the Chinese people.” It will be of little concern to global consumers that the news they receive is slanted or that searches for “free speech” link to articles about corruption in Western democracies. Nor will they care if concentration camps in Tibet and the Uighur areas of western China are obscured, or if U.S. military action is presented as tyranny and Chinese expansion is described as peacekeeping or liberation. China’s aggressive investment in space solar power will allow it to provide cheap, clean power to the world, displacing U.S. energy firms while placing a second yoke around the developing world. Significantly, such orbital power stations have dual use potential and, if properly designed, could serve as powerful offensive weapons platforms. China’s first step in this process is to conquer the growing small space launch market. Beijing is providing nominally commercial firms with government-manufactured, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles they can use to dump launch services on the market below cost. These start-ups are already undercutting U.S. pricing by 80 percent. Based on its previous success in using dumping to take out U.S. developed industries such as solar power modules and drones, China will quickly move upstream to attack the leading U.S. launch providers and secure a global commercial monopoly. Owning the launch market will give them an unsurmountable advantage against U.S. competitors in satellite internet, imaging, and power. The United States can still build a strategy to win. At this moment, it holds the competitive advantage in every critical space technology and has the finest set of commercial space firms in the world. It has pockets of innovative military thinkers within groups like the Defense Innovation Unit, under Mike Griffin, the Pentagon’s top research and development official. If the United States simply protects the intellectual property its creative minds unleash and defend its truly free markets from strategic mercantilist attack, it will not lose this new space race. The United States has done this before. It beat Germany to the nuclear bomb, it beat the Soviet Union to the nuclear triad, and it won the first space race. None of those victories was achieved by embracing the existing bureaucracy. Each of them depended on the president of the day following the only proven path to victory in a technological domain: establish a small team with a positively disruptive mindset and empower that team to investigate a wide range of new concepts, work with emerging technologies, and test innovative strategies. Today that means giving a dedicated Space Force the freedom to easily partner with commercial firms and leverage the private capital in building sustainable infrastructure that actually reduces the likelihood of conflict while securing a better economic future for the nation and the world.

#### US leadership in this decade solves global war and results in a peaceful end to Chinese revisionism **Erickson and Collins 10/21** [(Andrew, A professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute)(Gabriel, Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) “A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy, 10/18/2021] **U.S. and allied policymakers are facing the most important foreign-policy challenge of the 21st century. China’s power is peaking; so is the political position of Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic strength. In the long term, China’s likely decline after this peak is a good thing. But right now, it creates a decade of danger from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a short time to fulfill some of its most critical, long-held goals.**

Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives. As Xi internalizes these challenges, his foreign policy is likely to become even more accepting of risk, feeding on his nearly decadelong track record of successful revisionist action against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and militarizing sub-tidal features in the South China Sea, ramping up air and maritime incursions against Japan and Taiwan, pushing border challenges against India, occupying Bhutanese and Tibetan lands, perpetrating crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, and coercively enveloping Hong Kong.

The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan.

Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, but concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. It’s remarkable and dangerous that China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown.

Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures for both “gray zone” and high-end scenarios, the 2021 to late 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its 68-year-old leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career.

U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. That will be the first step to pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese power.

As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination in Asia and beyond, it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity to achieve them. China is, in fact, likely nearing the apogee of its relative power; and by 2030 to 2035, it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. Growing headwinds constraining Chinese growth, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, help explain Xi’s high and apparently increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut.

China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds.

As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. Moreover, the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do.

Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections from Tsinghua University make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 and 2035. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can have outsized negative impacts.

Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries.

Each of these dynamics—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action.

While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time.

While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years.

Just as China is mustering its own strategic actions, so the United States must also intensify its focus and deployment of resources. The United States has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it retains formidable advantages, agility, and the ability to prevail—provided it goes all-in now. Conversely, if Washington fails to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030 or 2035 will matter little. Seizing the 2020s would enable Beijing to ~~cripple~~ [destroy] the free and open rules-based order and entrench its position by economically subjugating regional neighbors (including key U.S. treaty allies) to a degree that could offset the strategic headwinds China now increasingly grapples with.

Deterrence is never certain. But it offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a CCP-led China would doom treaty allies, threaten the U.S. homeland, and likely set the stage for worse to come. Accordingly, U.S. planners should immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade.

The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. and allied success or failure will be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped and rallied to the challenge.

So how should policymakers assess the potential risk of Chinese action against Taiwan reaching dangerous levels by 2027 or possibly even earlier—as emphasized in the testimonies of Adms. Philip Davidson and John Aquilino? In June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley testified to the House of Representatives that Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan.

U.S. military leaders’ assessments are informed by some of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated internal information. But what’s striking is open-source information available to everyone suggests similar things. Moving forward, a number of open-source indicators offer valuable “early warning lights” that can help policymakers more accurately calibrate both potential timetables and risk readings as the riskiest period of relations—from 2027 onward—approaches.

Semiconductors supply self-sufficiency. Taiwan is the “OPEC+” of semiconductors, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global chip foundry capacity. A kinetic crisis would almost certainly disrupt—and potentially even completely curtail—semiconductor supplies. China presently spends even more each year on semiconductor imports (around $380 billion) than it does on oil, but much of the final products are destined for markets abroad. Taiwan is producing cutting-edge 5-nanometer and 7-nanometer chips, but China produces around 80 percent of the rest of the chips in the world. The closer China comes to being able to secure “good enough” chips for “inside China-only” needs, the less of a constraint this becomes.

Crude oil, grain, strategic metals stockpiles—the commercial community (Planet Labs, Ursa Space Systems, etc.) has developed substantial expertise in cost-effectively tracking inventory changes for key input commodities needed to prepare for war.

Electric vehicle fleet size—the amount of oil demand displaced by electric vehicles varies depending on miles driven, but the more of China’s car fleet that can be connected to the grid (and thus powered by blockade-resistant coal), the less political burden Beijing will face if it has to weather a maritime oil blockade imposed in response to actions it took against Taiwan or other major revisionist adventures. China’s passenger vehicle fleet, now approximately 225 million units strong, counts nearly 6.5 million electric vehicles among its ranks, the lion’s share of which are full-battery electrics. China’s State Council seeks to have 20 percent of new vehicles sold in China be electric vehicles by 2025. This target has already basically been achieved over the last few months, meaning at least 3.5 to 4 million (and eventually many more) new elective vehicles will enter China’s car fleet each year from now on.

Local concentration of maritime vessels—snap exercises with warships, circumnavigations, and midline tests with swarms of aircraft highlight the growing scale of China’s threat to Taiwan. But these assets alone cannot invade the island. To capture and garrison, Beijing would need not only air, missile, naval, and special operations forces but also the ability to move lots of equipment and—at the very least—tens of thousands of personnel across the Taiwan Strait. As such, Beijing would have to amass maritime transport assets. And given the scale required, this would alter ship patterns elsewhere along China’s coast in ways detectable with artificial intelligence-facilitated imagery analysis from firms like Planet Labs (or national assets).

Only the most formidable, agile American and allied deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown to shut the window of vulnerability. Holding the line is likely to require frequent and sustained proactive enforcement actions to disincentivize full-frontal Chinese assaults on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese probing behavior and provocations must be met with a range of symmetric and asymmetric responses that impose real costs, such as publishing assets owned by Chinese officials abroad, cyber interference with China’s technological social control apparatus, “hands on” U.S. Navy and Coast Guard enforcement measures against Maritime Militia-affiliated vessels in the South China Sea, intensified air and maritime surveillance of Chinese naval bases, and visas and resettlement options to Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will fall heaviest on China.

Bombastic Chinese reactions to emerging cohesive actions verify the approach’s effectiveness and potential for halting—and perhaps even reversing—the revisionist tide China has unleashed across the Asian region. Consider the recent nuclear submarine deal among Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Beijing’s strong public reaction (including toleration of nuclear threats made by the state-affiliated *Global Times*) highlights the gap between its global information war touting China’s irresistible power and deeply insecure internal self-perception. Eight nuclear submarines will ultimately represent formidable military capacity, but for a bona fide superpower that believes in its own capabilities, they would not be a game-changer. Consider the U.S.-NATO reaction to the Soviet Union’s commissioning of eight Oscar I/II-class cruise missile subs during the late Cold War. These formidable boats each carried 24 SS-N-19 Granit missiles specifically designed to kill U.S. carrier battle groups, yet NATO never stooped to public threats.

With diplomatic proofs of concepts like the so-called AUKUS deal, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and hard security actions like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative now falling into place, it is time to comprehensively peak the non-authoritarian world’s protective action to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific. During this decade, U.S. policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate Chinese behavior. Xi’s recreation of a “one-man” system is a one-way, high-leverage bet that decisions he drives will succeed.

If Xi miscalculates, a significant risk given his suppression of dissenting voices while China raises the stakes in its confrontation with the United States, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left him with outsized returns on a successful bet would instead amplify the downside, all of which he personally and exclusively signed for. Resulting tensions could very realistically undermine his status and authority, embolden internal challengers, and weaken the party. They could also foreseeably drive him to double down on mistakes, especially if those led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict. Personal survival measures could thus rapidly transmute into regional or even global threats.

If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the U.S. electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure as well as that of allies and partners abroad for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that actual conflict is a concrete possibility. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“if you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a variety of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with China.

Given these unforgiving dynamics and stakes, implications for U.S. planners are stark: Do whatever remains possible to “peak” for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s, and accept whatever trade-offs are available for doing so.

Nothing we might theoretically achieve in 2035 and beyond is worth pursuing at the expense of China-credible capabilities we can realistically achieve no later than the mid-to-late 2020s.