# 1NC

### 1NC – T

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must only defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust and may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation of the plan – they don’t.

#### Resolved requires a policy

Merriam Webster '18 (Merriam Webster; 2018 Edition; Online dictionary and legal resource; Merriam Webster, "resolve," <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve;> RP)  
: a legal or official determination especially: a legislative declaration

#### Private entity is defined by

Cornell Law n.d. “private entity” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term_occur=999&term_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501> TG

(A) In general Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

#### Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty defines outer space and appropriation

OST 66 “2222 (XXI). Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1499th plenary meeting, Dec 19, 1966, <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html> TG

ARTICLE II. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

#### Vote neg for fairness – post facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep. They can specialize in 1 area of literature for 4 years which gives them a huge edge over people switching topics every 2 months – this crushes clash because all neg prep is based on the rez as a stable stasis point and they create a structural disincentive to do research – we lose 90% of negative ground while the aff still gets the perm which makes being neg impossible.

#### The impact is fairness which outweighs:

#### A] Debate is fundamentally a game and some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity. The only impact to a ballot is deciding who wins – we all hire coaches and pay money to come to tournaments which proves every argument they make concedes the validity of fairness.

#### B] Fairness straight turns the aff

Bjerg, 11—Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School (Ole, *Poker: the parody of capitalism* pg 190-198)

In order to understand the conceptual difference, it is important to note that when Baudrillard speaks of the law, he is not referring to law only in the strictly judicial meaning of the term. Baudrillard is rather drawing on a psychoanalytical tradition from Freud and Lacan in which the concept of law stands for any kind of social regularity, such as prohibitions, norms, values, morals, conventions, and so on, that structures the way we act and construct meaning in society. Law constitutes the social order of society. Viewed from the perspective of an individual immersed in the daily life of society, the difference between the law of society and the rule of the game is a difference between necessity and arbitrariness. The law consists not only of a series of prohibitions and norms. It carries also an account of the justification and rationality of the law. The law tells us not only what we should and should not do; it tells us also why we should or should not do this or that. The law claims to be valid and necessary regardless of the opinions held by the individual subject included in the law. The necessity of law is founded on transcendence. This may be the transcendence of a religious order, a principle of reason and rationality, or a system of tradition. In any case the law justifies itself with reference to some order beyond the immediate content of itself. Contrary to the law, the game and the rule are characterized by their arbitrariness. The rule claims no justification beyond its immediate appearance. It does not profess to represent a higher religious order or rational principle. In this way the rule is purely immanent to the game. Furthermore, the rule tells the subject engaged in the game what to do and not to do, but it does not give him [them] any reasons why he [they] should follow the rule. When asked, the rule provides no other justification for itself than the mere reference to the game itself: “Because these are the rules of the game!” Baudrillard sums up the difference between the rule and the law: “The Rule plays on an immanent sequence of arbitrary signs, while the Law is based on a transcendent sequence of necessary signs.”4 Think of the very simple game you can play when walking on the street in which you are not allowed to step on the lines between the flags of the pavement. The game is instituted by the invocation of the rule “Don’t step on the lines!” This rule is purely arbitrary. The game could be played just as well with the complete opposite rule: “You must step on a line for every single step you take!” Furthermore, the rule gives no reason that it should be followed. It has no “formal, moral or psychological structure or superstructure”5 to support its functioning. The functioning of the game is dependent on the voluntary submission to the rule by the players engaging in the game. Compare this to the traffic regulations prescribed by law: “Don’t walk in the street.” “Cross the street only at the green light.” These regulations apply unconditionally and must be obeyed by anyone regardless of whether he wants [they want] to or not. Traffic regulations come with a series of explicit and implicit reasons why they should be followed, for instance, that they secure the social order of the traffic situation for the safety of everyone. The transcendence of law makes the validity of law unconditional. It is not up to the individual subject of law to decide whether he wants to submit to the law or not. Conversely, the purely arbitrary character of the rule sets free the subject and leaves it up to the individual whether he [they] wants to participate in the game and become obliged by the rules of the game or not. In Homo Ludens Huizinga indeed proposes voluntariness and freedom as the first in his list of characteristics of play.6 “because it’s fun” Law as understood by Baudrillard not only constitutes society. In the psychoanalytic tradition that Baudrillard is drawing on, law also plays a crucial role in the very constitution of the subject. To be a subject is to be subject to law. Without law, there would be no subject. At first glance, law manifests itself as a prohibition banning our access to certain objects and acts. We may think of the law as an institution necessary in order to discipline our wild and otherwise uncontrolled desires for different forbidden things such as other people’s property (Thou shalt not steal) or transgressive sexual acts (Thou shalt not commit adultery). In this line of thinking, a society without law would be an anarchical allagainst-all with everybody satisfying her every desire at the expense of everybody else. However, working along similar lines as Baudrillard, Zizek argues that law has also the latent function of structuring our very being as subjects since the law is what institutes our desires in the first place. When the law tells us not to do this or that, it carries an underlying fantasmatic message promising that beyond the prohibition of the law lie the objects that may satisfy the desire of the subject. Inherent in the law is the fantasy of what might happen if the law was not there to prevent me from pursuing my immediate desires. As was the case with the concept of law, it is important to note that the concept of fantasy differs from its usual meaning. Here is how Zizek explains the term: Fantasy is usually c]onceived as a scenario that realizes the subject’s desire. This elementary definition is quite adequate, on condition that we take it literally, what the fantasy stages is not a scene in which our desire is fulfilled, fully satisfied, but on the contrary, a scene that realizes, stages, the desire as such. The fundamental point of psychoanalysis is that desire is not something given in advance, but something that has to be constructed—and it is precisely the role of fantasy to give the coordinates of the subject’s desire, to specify its object, to locate the position the subject assumes in it. It is only through fantasy that the subject is constituted as desiring: through fantasy, we learn how to desire.7 Based on this understanding, Zizek often uses the concept of fantasy in conjunction with the concept of ideology.8 Only on a very superficial level is fantasy opposed to law in the sense that we fantasize about the transgression or even the abolition of law. We might think here of consumerist fantasies of the kind where we imagine gaining access to products that we cannot afford to buy: “If only the law of property or the law of equivalences did not prevent me from having this sweater or that car I would . . .” On another level, fantasy and law work together in structuring the desire of the subject. By restraining the subject’s access to the objects of desire designated by fantasy, law prevents the subject from realizing that the qualities and possibilities for enjoyment imagined to belong to the object are in fact projections of the subject’s own fantasy. In this way, the different laws of the market restraining our access to consumer goods are the condition of possibility for the fantasmatic projections about the amount of happiness, enjoyment, and fulfillment we would attain if we had free and unlimited access to these goods. The idea of law instituting order in an otherwise anarchical world of unrestrained desire (e.g., in Hobbes) is actually a myth produced in the domain of fantasy and ideology. First, the myth gives legitimacy to law by explaining why it is necessary, but second and perhaps more importantly the myth tells us what we would really want if it were not for the law restraining us. Thus, the message of the law is split into the explicit prohibition and the fantasmatic injunction to transgress the law.9 In this way law interacts with fantasy in the domain of ideology in order to teach the subject what and how to desire. An important implication of this understanding of the relation between fantasy and law is that even in transgression, the subject does not move beyond the domain of law. A thief illegally appropriating consumer goods by transgressing the law of property does not violate the fundamental principles for the structuring of desire in the consumer society. It may in fact even be argued that his transgressive act confirms the desirability of the consumer goods. Since the thief will go to such extremities in order to attain the goods, the goods must indeed be something extraordinary. In Baudrillard’s analysis of the difference between law and rule, we find the following reflection related to transgression: Ordinarily we live within the realm of the Law, even when fantasizing its abolition. Beyond the law we see only its transgression or the lifting of a prohibition. For the discourse of law and interdiction determines the inverse discourse of transgression and liberation. However, it is not the absence of the law that is opposed to the law, but the Rule.10 Instead of transgression or absence of law, Baudrillard suggests the rule as being opposed to law. The argument is here not that by following the rule of the game, the player is violating the law of society. The point is rather the much more subtle one that by entering the sphere of the rule and the game the player moves beyond the ideological domain of the law. Law, desire, and subjectivity tie into each other in a kind of Gordian knot. In the game, where law is substituted for the rule, this knot is cut. In its explicit contingency, the rule is not supported by fantasy. The rule does not hold a promise of satisfaction; no sublime object is imagined beyond the rule. The rule claims to be nothing more than what it is. So what is the attraction of the rule and the game, if not satisfaction of a desire? Entering the game means voluntarily submitting to an arbitrary rule with no higher meaning. This act is, however, a way of delivering oneself from the law. Since transgression is already inscribed in the law even in the violation of a prohibition, we are still caught in the web of the law and its matrix of satisfaction/unsatisfaction. In the violation, we may contradict the explicit word of the law but we are still confirming its underlying principle of desire. When choosing to submit to the rules of a game, however, we step into another order not structured by the law and desire. We renounce our desire, not in an ascetic abstinence from particular objects of desire (which is by the way only an extreme sublimation of the objects of desire), but by letting ourselves be seduced into an order not promising any kind of satisfaction at all. In this way, we move beyond the law’s matrix of satisfaction/unsatisfaction. When obeying the law, our conscious rational belief in it is supported by an unacknowledged irrational belief. Yet, entering the game, we openly acknowledge the pure contingency of the rule, and so our conscious submission to it is based on no belief whatsoever. We have no illusions that the game is nothing but an illusion, and so our approach to the game is perhaps more “realistic” than our approach to the law. The game’s sole principle . . . is that by choosing the rule one is delivered from the law. Without a psychological or metaphysical foundation, the rule has no grounding in belief. One neither believes nor disbelieves a rule—one observes it. The diffuse sphere of belief, the need for credibility that encompasses the real, is dissolved in the game. Hence their immorality: to proceed without believing in it, to sanction a direct fascination with conventional signs and groundless rules.11 In the game, desire is suspended and so is desire’s eternal shadow figure, unsatisfaction, which is a necessary condition for the reproduction of desire. In the game, there is no promise and therefore no disappointment. In the order of the law, we may find enjoyment in the momentary and partial satisfaction of our desires through obtainment of different objects. The joy of the game stems not from this kind of satisfaction but exactly from the suspension of the satisfaction/unsatisfaction matrix. In order to understand the intensity of ritual forms, one must rid oneself of the idea that all happiness derives from nature, and all pleasure from the satisfaction of a desire. On the contrary, games, the sphere of play, reveal a passion for rules, a giddiness born of rules, and a force that comes from ceremony, and not desire.12 As an equivalent to the “giddiness” of which Baudrillard speaks here, we find in Huizinga’s characteristic of play the notion of “fun.” People play games because it is fun. Rather than providing a full and conclusive explanation for the engagement in games, the concept of fun seems to mark the limitation of such an explanation. “The fun of playing,” Huizinga notes, “resists all analysis, all logical interpretation.”13 Think again of the game Don’t Step on the Lines. Why would someone engage in this game? Why would someone chose to submit himself to the stupid and completely arbitrary rule of not stepping on the lines? In the obvious absence of sanctions, potential rewards or other kinds of meaningful satisfactions, the question can only be answered: “Because it’s fun.” This, however, is probably more of a displacement of the question than an actual answer. In the tradition of psychoanalysis, we find also the concept of drive. Drive is opposed to desire insofar as desire is focused on a particular object imagined to provide satisfaction for the desire, whereas drive is not directed at any object. Drive is a short circuit unmediated by fantasy, where the joy of an act derives from the activity of acting itself. Here is how Zizek defines the difference between drive and desire: Drive . . . stands for the paradoxical possibility that the subject, forever prevented from achieving his Goal (and thus fully satisfying his desire), can nevertheless find satisfaction in the very circular movement of repeatedly missing its object, of circulating around it.14 The point is here of course that the concept of drive as opposed to desire provides an account of fun as opposed to the meaning of ordinary goal-oriented behavior. Here is how the distinction between goal-oriented desire and self-propelling drive turns out in the words of the legendary poker player Nick “The Greek” Dandalos: “The next best thing to gambling and winning is gambling and losing.”15 game as parody We have seen that the rule is opposed to the law and that the choice of the rule delivers the player from the ideology of law. What does this say about the relation between game and society? We might for a brief moment be tempted to proclaim the playing of games as an act of criticism toward the ideology of society. This, however, would be jumping ahead, and it would fit very badly with the actual position held by different games in our society. How would we think, for instance, of Champions League football as a form of resistance toward society? Furthermore, our analysis has just shown that the domain of the rule and fun is characterized by arbitrariness and absence of meaning. Hence, it would be contradictory to project a certain critical and normative intentionality into the mere engagement in a game. At the same time, the analyses carried out in this book are motivated by the assumption that there is indeed some kind of sociologically significant relation between the games played in society and society as a whole. This assumption is shared by Huizinga, whom we have already quoted saying: “All play means something.”16 In order to avoid the pitfalls of formally fixating the normativity of the meaning of games in relation to society by making general statements such as: “games constitute a critique of the ideology of society,” “games constitute a celebration of societal values,” “games constitute a way of governing the subjects of society,” “games constitute a way of opposing dominant power structures of society,” and so on, we shall once again turn to Baudrillard for conceptual support: The rule functions as the parodic simulacrum of the law. Neither an inversion nor subversion of the law, but its reversion in simulation. The pleasure of the game is twofold: the invalidation of time and space within the enchanted sphere of an indestructible form of reciprocity—pure seduction—and the parodying of reality, the formal outbidding of the law’s constraints.17 Insofar as the game emerges as the institution of an extra set of rules governing the subject, it seems to constitute an addition to the order of the law. Perhaps the social significance of the game lies, however, in the subtraction of fantasmatic ideology from the prescriptions of law. On an immediate level, the rules of a game look like the law of society. The rule “Don’t step on the lines” looks like the regulation “Only walk on a green light.” However, on closer inspection the rule lacks the fantasmatic support of ideology. The game thus presents the rule in its naked arbitrariness. To the extent that the rules of a game carry some similarity to particular laws of society, the institution of the game may affect and transform our view of the particular law. The subtraction of ideology in the game may make us aware of the ideological dimension of the law, thus causing us to view the law in the same “naked arbitrariness” as the rule. According to Zizek, any law is inherently contradictory and basically founded on a violent and illegitimate move in which law constitutes itself as law. The obvious example here is of course the allegedly humanistic laws of democracy, which are founded on the cruel, violent, and anything but democratic brutality of the French Revolution. Underneath the surface of the normal, rational, legitimate, universal law lies a traumatic truth about the abnormal, irrational, illegitimate, contingent foundation of the law, and for law to function this traumatic truth must remain concealed. Zizek states: “Every reign of law has its hidden roots in such an absolute—selfreferential, self-negating—crime by means of which crime assumes the form of law, and if the law is to reign in its ‘normal’ form, this reverse must be unconditionally repressed.”18 The function of ideology is to conceal the traumatic contradictions of law in order for law to function in a smooth and orderly fashion. When the rule, in the words of Baudrillard, functions as the parodic simulacrum of the law, it simulates the law in the context of the play world. Since the play world is devoid of the fantasmatic projections of ideology, the rule stands forth in a more “naked” appearance than the way we are used to seeing the law. The rule of the game mimics law. It does not pretend to be law. In fact, the rule does not pretend to be anything more or less than what it is. Given that the rule is conventional and arbitrary, and has no hidden truth, it knows neither repression nor the distinction between the manifest and the latent. It does not carry any meaning, it does not lead anywhere; by contrast, the Law has a determinate finality.19 The absence of any kind of justification or rationalization transcending the rule produces a vacuum around the game. Contrary to the laws of the social order, the game does not explain or account for itself. It merely offers itself. Consequently, the game does not pass any critical or normative judgment on the law and society. However, the vacuum produced by the rule— the space devoid of ideology constituted by the game—opens the potential for critical reflections on the nature of law and society. Indeed, these reflections cannot be made from within the game. The game merely opens the space for such reflections.

#### Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

#### Drop the debater because dropping the arg is severance which moots 7 minutes of 1nc offense

#### No rvis—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

#### They can’t weigh the case—lack of preround prep means their truth claims are untested which you should presume false—they’re also only winning case because we couldn’t engage with it

#### No impact turns—exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative

### 1NC – CP

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### **US–China war goes nuclear – crisis mis-management ensures conventional escalation.**

Kulacki 20 [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Chinese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

### 1NC – Case

#### First, framing—

#### The role of the judge is to determine if the aff’s a good idea—anything else is self-serving, arbitrary and begs the question of the rest of the debate. Evaluate consequences

Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### Focus on large scale catastrophes is good and they outweigh – appeals to social costs, moral rules, and securitization play into cognitive biases and flawed risk calculus – 2020 is living proof

Weber 20 (ELKE U. WEBER is Gerhard R. Andlinger Professor in Energy and the Environment and Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at Princeton University.), November-December 2020 Issue, "Heads in the Sand," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-10-13/heads-sand> mvp

We are living in a time of crisis. From the immediate challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic to the looming existential threat of climate change, the world is grappling with massive global dangers—to say nothing of countless problems within countries, such as inequality, cyberattacks, unemployment, systemic racism, and obesity. In any given crisis, the right response is often clear. Wear a mask and keep away from other people. Burn less fossil fuel. Redistribute income. Protect digital infrastructure. The answers are out there. What’s lacking are governments that can translate them into actual policy. As a result, the crises continue. The death toll from the pandemic skyrockets, and the world makes dangerously slow progress on climate change, and so on.

It’s no secret how governments should react in times of crisis. First, they need to be nimble. Nimble means moving quickly, because problems often grow at exponential rates: a contagious virus, for example, or greenhouse gas emissions. That makes early action crucial and procrastination disastrous. Nimble also means adaptive. Policymakers need to continuously adjust their responses to crises as they learn from their own experience and from the work of scientists. Second, governments need to act wisely. That means incorporating the full range of scientific knowledge available about the problem at hand. It means embracing uncertainty, rather than willfully ignoring it. And it means thinking in terms of a long time horizon, rather than merely until the next election. But so often, policymakers are anything but nimble and wise. They are slow, inflexible, uninformed, overconfident, and myopic.

Why is everyone doing so badly? Part of the explanation lies in the inherent qualities of crises. Crises typically require navigating between risks. In the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers want to save lives and jobs. With climate change, they seek a balance between avoiding extreme weather and allowing economic growth. Such tradeoffs are hard as it is, and they are further complicated by the fact that costs and benefits are not evenly distributed among stakeholders, making conflict a seemingly unavoidable part of any policy choice. Vested interests attempt to forestall needed action, using their money to influence decision-makers and the media. To make matters worse, policymakers must pay sustained attention to multiple issues and multiple constituencies over time. They must accept large amounts of uncertainty. Often, then, the easiest response is to stick with the status quo. But that can be a singularly dangerous response to many new hazards. After all, with the pandemic, business as usual would mean no social distancing. With climate change, it would mean continuing to burn fossil fuels.

But the explanation for humanity’s woeful response to crises goes beyond politics and incentives. To truly understand the failure to act, one must turn to human psychology. It is there that one can grasp the full impediments to proper decision-making—the cognitive biases, emotional reactions, and suboptimal shortcuts that hold policymakers back—and the tools to overcome them.

AVOIDING THE UNCOMFORTABLE

People are singularly bad at predicting and preparing for catastrophes. Many of these events are “black swans,” rare and unpredictable occurrences that most people find difficult to imagine, seemingly falling into the realm of science fiction. Others are “gray rhinos,” large and not uncommon threats that are still neglected until they stare you in the face (such as a coronavirus outbreak). Then there are “invisible gorillas,” threats in full view that should be noticed but aren’t—so named for a psychological experiment in which subjects watching a clip of a basketball game were so fixated on the players that they missed a person in a gorilla costume walking through the frame. Even professional forecasters, including security analysts, have a poor track record when it comes to accurately anticipating events. The COVID-19 crisis, in which a dystopic science-fiction narrative came to life and took everyone by surprise, serves as a cautionary tale about humans’ inability to foresee important events.

Not only do humans fail to anticipate crises; they also fail to respond rationally to them. At best, people display “bounded rationality,” the idea that instead of carefully considering their options and making perfectly rational decisions that optimize their preferences, humans in the real world act quickly and imperfectly, limited as they are by time and cognitive capacity. Add in the stress generated by crises, and their performance gets even worse.

Because humans don’t have enough time, information, or processing power to deliberate rationally, they have evolved easier ways of making decisions. They rely on their emotions, which serve as an early warning system of sorts: alerting people that they are in a positive context that can be explored and exploited or in a negative context where fight or flight is the appropriate response. They also rely on rules. To simplify decision-making, they might follow standard operating procedures or abide by some sort of moral code. They might decide to imitate the action taken by other people whom they trust or admire. They might follow what they perceive to be widespread norms. Out of habit, they might continue to do what they have been doing unless there is overwhelming evidence against it.

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Humans evolved these shortcuts because they require little effort and work well in a broad range of situations. Without access to a real-time map of prey in different hunting grounds, for example, a prehistoric hunter might have resorted to a simple rule of thumb: look for animals where his fellow tribesmen found them yesterday. But in times of crisis, emotions and rules are not always helpful drivers of decision-making. High stakes, uncertainty, tradeoffs, and conflict—all elicit negative emotions, which can impede wise responses. Uncertainty is scary, as it signals an inability to predict what will happen, and what cannot be predicted might be deadly. The vast majority of people are already risk averse under normal circumstances. Under stress, they become even more so, and they retreat to the familiar comfort of the status quo. From gun laws to fossil fuel subsidies, once a piece of legislation is in place, it is hard to dislodge it, even when cost-benefit analysis argues for change.

#### Vote neg on presumption – no explanation of solvency of the impacts in their Oberg evidence within the bounds of the resolution which means either they violate framework or don’t solve.

#### Second, Baudrillard is wrong about basically everything—

#### 1. Research on audiences disproves your “information is dissuasive” claims --- and the terrorism alt won’t disrupt the system

**Robinson 04** [Andrew, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/baudrillard-zizek-and-laclau-on-common.html]

Baudrillard's claim that the masses are "dumb", silent and conduct any and all beliefs (SSM 28) and "the reversion of any social" (SSM 49) is problematised by the persistence of subcultures and countercultures, while his claim that any remark could be attributed to the masses (SSM 29) hardly proves that it lacks its own demands or beliefs. He is leaping far too quickly from the confused and contradictory nature of mass beliefs to the idea that the masses lack - or even reject - meaning per se. He wants to portray the masses as disinterested in meaning, instinctual and "above and beyond all meaning" (SSM 11), lacking even conformist beliefs (87-8) and without a language of their own (22). This is contradicted by extensive evidence on the construction of meaning in everyday life, from Hoggart on working class culture to Becker, Lemert, Goffman and others on deviance. Even in the sphere of media effects, the evidence from research on audiences, such as Ang on Dallas viewers and Morley on the Nationwide audience, suggests an active construction of meaning by members of the masses, negotiating with or even opposing dominant codes of meaning. This may well show a decline of that kind of meaning promoted by the status quo - but it hardly shows a rejection of meaning per se. When the masses act stupid, it may well be due to what radical education theorists term "reactive stupidity" - an adaptive response to avoid being falsified and "beaten" by acting stupid. Baudrillard again wrongly conflates the dominant system with meaning as such. Indeed, Baudrillard seems to have changed his mind AGAIN by the time of the Gulf War essays, when he refers to the MEDIA, not the masses, as in control (GW 75), and to stupidity as a result of "mental deterrence" (GW 67-8), which produces a "suffocating atmosphere of deception and stupidity" (GW 68) and a control through the violence of consensus (GW 84). Baudrillard's view that the masses respond to official surveys and the like in a tautological way (SSM 28) may well be true, without proving what Baudrillard claims it does about the absence of meaning in the masses. The attitudes of subaltern groups towards dominant beliefs has often taken such forms throughout history, but this does not preclude the parallel existence of what Jim Scott terms "hidden transcripts" - a parallel set of beliefs with a separate structure of meaning which are not compromised by power. Baudrillard does not dig deep enough into evidence on mass culture to assess whether such transcripts exist or not. He simply assumes the omnipotence of the official, "public" system of meaning. Further, his claim that what passes through the masses leaves no trace (SSM 2) is very problematic, as his claim that the masses are the negation of all dominant meanings (SSM 49). There are some very strange 'proofs' in Baudrillard's work: for instance, the claim that people don't believe the myths they adopt rests on the statement that to claim the opposite is to accuse the masses of being stupid and naive (SSM 99-100). He does not explain why we should not believe this - especially since he elsewhere calls them "dumb like beasts"! Occasionally, Baudrillard acknowledges evidence against his approach: namely, the research of the "two-step flow" theorists on audience effects, and also the kind of syncretic resistances analysed by Scott, which resist the dominant social system and reinterpret or "recycled" its messages towards different codes and ends, often linked to earlier social forms (SSM 42-3). However, he does not dwell on such evidence. This, he says, is simply a different issue, unrelated to the question of the MASSES as "an innumerable, unnameable and anonymous group" operating through inertia and fascination (SSM 43-4). Attempts to recreate meaning at the periphery are a "secondary" matter (SSM 103-4). Similarly, at times, Baudrillard admits both the unsatisfactory nature of the society of the spectacle for many of its participants, and the existence of spheres of belief and discourse beyond its borders. For instance, people don't fully believe the hyperreality which substitutes for reality (SSM 99); some groups, so-called "savages" such as the Arab masses, are not submerged in simulation and can still become passionately involved in, for instance, war (GW 32); the real still exists underground (GW 63). Indeed, although his analysis of the Gulf War suggests that the WEST is trapped in simulacra, his account of the rest of the world suggests it follows a different logic (eg GW 65). Wars or non-wars today are waged by the west against symbolic logics which break with the dominant system, such as Islam (GW 85-6), to absorb everything which is singular and irreducible (GW 86). Also, though he thinks the risk of it is low, he admits that an accident, an irruption of Otherness, or an event which breaks the control exerted by information can disrupt the "celibate machine" of media control (GW 36, 48). If this is the case, however, there is no basis for assuming its totality, and it is still meaningful to try to win people over to alternatives. In SSM Baudrillard retreats from this analysis, suggesting the reduction of society to a rat race is a result of the masses' resistance to 'objective' economic management (SSM 45) - the system benefits as a result but that is not the main issue. This contrasts with Baudrillard's earlier analyses and also those of others such as Illich, who see the destructive social effects of such competition. However, Baudrillard does attack "the social", which he identifies with control through information, simulation, security and deterrence (SSM 50-1) - though how it can be resisted since he thinks it "produces" us is never explained. Baudrillard tends to conflate existing dominant beliefs with thought and meaning per se. As a result, he leaves it impossible to critique dominant ideas in a meaningful way. For instance, he poses political problems in terms of "resistance to the social", with the social in general being conflated with the EXISTING social system (SSM 41); ditto on the existing sign system, which Baudrillard identifies with meaning per se. In such cases, Baudrillard misses the whole question of countercultural practices and the creation of alternative hegemonies. Baudrillard's conflation of meaning per se with dominant beliefs leads to a refusal to countenance the possibility of transforming mass beliefs. Raising the cultural level of the masses, Baudrillard claims, is "Nonsense" because the masses, who want spectacle rather than meaning, are resistant to "rational communication" (SSM 10). An "autonomous change in consciousness" by the masses, Baudrillard tells us, is a "glaring impossibility" (SSM 30) - though he never tells us how he deduces this. Furthermore, he also claims that people who try to raise consciousness, liberate the unconscious or promote subjectivity "are acting in accordance with the system" (SSM 109). This anathematisation is a result of Baudrillard's strange claim that the system's logic is based on total inclusion and speech! It is on this basis that Baudrillard rejects argument based on empirical claims and locates truth outside such claims (SSM 121-2). From the second pole of his contradictory argument about the masses, which portrays them as de facto agents engaging in resistance, defiance and so on, Baudrillard wants to draw a politics starting from the refusal of meaning (SSM 15), and from the contradictory combination of the two he draws his model of hyperconformity as annulling control (SSM 30-3). He can't deal with the contradiction, especially since he uses terms which imply consciousness - such as ruse and offensive practice - when he admits the object of such terms is acting unknowingly (SSM 43). Indeed, he actually writes as if one can UNKNOWINGLY carry out a CONSCIOUS act (SSM 42). This is sinister, reproducing the Stalinist idea of objective alignment - especially when used against Baudrillard's theoretical rivals (SSM 123). Further, it is not clear from where he is deducing his idea that one can destroy a system by pushing its logic to the extreme (SSM 46), which he sees as a resistance to demands to participate (SSM 106-8). There are a few cases of the letter of the law being used to subvert its implementation, such as go-slows at work; these, however, are rooted in concrete practices elsewhere. There are also a few cases of hyperconformity disrupting official projects - for instance, the disastrous effects of Chinese peasants' literal reading of Maoist imperatives to (eg.) kill all birds. These, however, did not actually LIBERATE anyone or DESTROY the system; and most hyperconformity simply produces a more oppressive variant on the system - for instance, hyperconformist racism produces genocide. He also never sets out the stakes of the conflict between the masses and society or the effects of the masses' victories, though he vaguely links these to the (unspecified) goals of radical critics (SSM 49). Indeed, he uses the opt-out that our present epistemology prevents us knowing what possibilities would be offered by the system's destruction (SSM 52). Furthermore, to be a resistance, there would have to be an AGENT CHOOSING to be an object. Baudrillard's sectarianism is clearly shown by his belief that popular rethinking of ideas is always a "misappropriation" or "radical distortion" rather than an improvement (SSM 8). He also engages in a highly essentialist attack on popular ethics, representing the stress on real practices and small images in popular religion as "degraded", banal and profane, a way of "refusing the categorical imperative of morality and faith", as well as of meaning, because it stresses immediacy in the world (SSM 7-8). Popular ethics, as Hoggart, Scott and others show, is far more than a mere refusal, and its rejection of the transcendentalism of the intellectual allies of dominant strata is hardly evidence that they are degraded, banal or anti-ethical. Furthermore, on an empirical level, fatalism DOES occur in popular ethics, contrary to Baudrillard's claims. The problem is further complicated by Baudrillard's vague claim that something passes between the masses and terrorism (SSM 52-3), which seems to imply that isolated terrorist acts can somehow transform overnight the entire structure of meaning by rendering representation impossible and meanings reversible (SSM 54, 116), and which is also based on a definition of terrorism which is so restricted that it rules out virtually all actual "terrorists" and which Baudrillard admits (116) does not fit the identities of the Baader-Meinhof group, the one example he gives. His politics results directly from the artificial grimness of his analysis of popular beliefs, since it involves a radical subjectlessness and a random blow against victims who are punished for being nothing (SSM 56-7). Like Zizek, he calls for the suicidal destruction of one's own perspective (SSM 69-70), and denounces everything short of this as strengthening the system (SSM 72). Furthermore, his model of social change, which rests on the inevitability of implosive catastrophe (SSM 61), has no room for any human intervention. It simply assumes that another reality lies beyond our own perspective which can be reached in this way, but which is presently blocked by our way of thinking (SSM 104). Baudrillard substitutes "logical exacerbation" and "catastrophic revolution" for alternatives (SSM 106), and locates the frontier of struggle at the level of "production of truth" (SSM 123). The progressive side of this struggle seems to involve unknowability and fascination. The lack of alternatives seriously blunts Baudrillard's critical force, and can even lead to conservative positions, such as portraying manipulation of the media as better than pursuing truth (GW 46).

#### 2. War cannot be reduced to simulation – the alternative ignores the real material determinants of warfare and guarantees escalating military interventions

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(Mitchell, “Reflections on the Reality of the Iraq Wars: The Demise of Baudrillard’s Search for Truth?,” https://www.academia.edu/2569231/Reflections\_on\_the\_reality\_of\_the\_Iraq\_Wars\_the\_demise\_of\_Baudrillards\_search\_for\_truth)

Although Baudrillard’s work on “simulation” and “simulacra” is valuable in highlightingthe relationship between the mass media and reality, and, in particular, the ways in which media content (images and narratives) come to be de-contextualised, his theses are per se insufficient for the analysis of the contemporary mass media. For instance, asmedia theorist and researcher Douglas Kellner (2003:31) notes, beyond the level of media spectacle, Baudrillard does not help readers understand events such as the Gulf War, because he reduces the actions of actors and complex political issues to categories of “simulation” and “hyper-reality”, in a sense “erasing their concrete determinants”. Kellner, who like Baudrillard, has written extensively on media spectacles, including theGulf Wars, sees Baudrillard’s theory as being “one-dimensional”, “privilege[ing] the form of media technology over its content, meaning and…use” (Kellner, 1989:73). In thisregard, Baudrillard does not account for the political economic dimensions of the newsmedia, nor the cultural practices involved with the production of news (Kellner, 1989:73-74). Thus, he suffers from the same technologically deterministic essentialism thatundermined the media theories of Marshall McLuhan, albeit in a different form (Kellner,1989:73-74). Although Kellner (2003:32) believes that Baudrillard’s pre-1990s works on “the consumer society, on the political economy of the sign, simulation and simulacra,and the implosion of [social] phenomenon” are useful and can be deployed within criticalsocial theory, he prefers to read Baudrillard’s later, more controversial and obscure, workas “science fiction which anticipates the future by exaggerating present tendencies” In order to understand war and its relationship with the media in the contemporary era it is, then, necessary to move beyond Baudrillard’s spectacular theory of media spectacle. For although our culture is resplendent with images, signs and narratives, circulating in aseemingly endless dance of mimicry (or, rather, simulacra), there are observable social institutions and practices producing this semiotic interplay. Although all that is solidmight melt into air (Marx and Engles, 2002:223), appearances and illusions are not an end for sociological analysis, but are rather a seductive invitation to further social inquiry. As the research of Douglas Kellner (1992; 1995; 2005) has shown, when media spectacles are dissected by critical cultural analysis, re-contextualisation is possible. Images and narratives can be traced back to their sources: whether they lie in Hollywood fantasies or government ‘spin’. In short, by assessing the veracity of competing texts, war (as understood by media audiences) can be re-connected to its antecedents and consequences. Indeed, through wrestling with the ideological spectres of myth and narrative, and by searching widely for critically informed explanations of different events, the social sciences can acquire an understanding of the ‘truthfulness’ of media representations; of the ‘authentic’ in a realm bewildered by smoke and mirrors. As long as there are competing media voices on which to construct a juxtaposition of ‘truths’, sociologists can, to a certain extent, force the media to grapple with their own disparate reflections. 3 CONCLUSIONS 3.1 REST IN PEACE BAUDRILLARD? In the final analysis, then, Baudrillard’s work on the Gulf War and the September 11terrorist attacks should (respectfully) be laid to rest. For although some, such as RichardKeeble (2004:43), have followed Baudrillard in arguing that “there was no war in the gulf in 2003”, such statements are somewhat antithetical to the truth aims of the social sciences. Baudrillard, being both an icon and iconoclast, pushed his language and arguments to rhetorical extremes in order to force the collapse of representations andarguments he saw as having supplanted truth. His fatal theory was in a sense intellectual ‘hype’, for a capricious world in which only ‘hype’ can be noticed. Yet in shouting his arguments he served to obfuscate their nuance and subtext, the very intellectualessences of his work and, ultimately, his contribution to the body of knowledge. However, although fatal theory is of little practical use for media researchers seeking anempirically derived ‘truth’, Baudrillard’s oeuvre is still (somewhat) instructive, remindingus of the importance of de-mystifying reality. For although the voice of the scholar is that of a pariah in the entertainment driven public sphere, we must force our voices into the public sphere if we are to re-contextualise events such as the Iraq war, by providing audiences with better, more veracious accounts of events. Failing this, we will continue to find our ‘defence’ forces engaged in military operations under spurious casus belli arguments. Accordingly, despite the many faults of his work, Baudrillard should not beforgotten. For although his contribution was more of a slap-of-the-face than a gentlepush in the right direction, his ideas regarding simulacra and reality have helped to further our understanding of media spectacles (and their potential repercussions). In apost-Baudrillard world, as social inquiry (it is to be hoped) returns to a more empiricallyinformed understanding of the media, we should not forget the implications posed by thiscultural field. For if sociology seeks to explain the social world, then it must work to prevent the dislocation of reality from the ‘real’ that Baudrillard so feared.

#### 3. War Exists - their claims mask the slow and brutal violence of modern warfare, and replicates Pentagon’s propaganda and shutds down any change for coalitionary change

Krishna 93 (Sankaran, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa, *Alternatives*, Summer, p. 397-401)//Elmer

Postmodern Amnesias: Resurrecting the Dead in Iraq

I have absolutely no idea what the Iraqi casualties are, and I tell you, if I have anything to say about it, we're never going to get into the body-count business. —General H. Norman Schwarzkopf24 Well, the numbers are in, if anybody cares. Between 100,000 and 200,000 Iraqi soldiers and civilians were killed in the Gulf War and an estimated 300,000 were injured. In contrast to this, fewer than four hundred Allied soldiers died, many of them due to "friendly fire."25 In two weeks, the Allied forces managed to kill almost four times as many Iraqis as all the US soldiers who died in Vietnam, which should indicate the magnitude of the violence. Coverage of the war was closely orchestrated by the Pentagon, and, eager to be in on the story, the news networks were complicitous in the selective coverage, giving up any liberal pretensions of being impartial observers.26 One of the obvious and distressing aspects of the war was the ineffectiveness of the antiwar movement in derailing the momentum during the months of build up, and the incredible degree of censorship of media coverage of the war by the Pentagon." In this context, some of the poststructuralist analyses of the war (examined here through Der Derian's chapter in AD; Shapiro's chapter on security policy in the video age in RP, and his article on the Gulf War published recently;28 and Chaloupka's sections on the impact of speed and technology on the modern warrior in KN) have been invaluable in their depiction of the alienation and complicity produced through a hyperreal and almost real-time media coverage. The objectification of the Iraqis; the role of electronic simulations in rendering the Iraqi people content-less; the annihilation of space by time and the obsoleteness of conventional spatiotemporal axes in describing and understanding what Der Derian describes as the first "cyberwar"; the intertextuality of the war itself, with both foe and friend often getting information from the same sources (CNN)—all these have been highlighted by critical international theorists. Yet overemphasizing the new forms of representations of the war in the media can become politically problematic. First, a focus on the newness of "cyberwar" detracts attention from the fact that in many ways the Gulf War was very much in the mold of previous conflicts. Far from indicating any shift from the material to the perceptual, this conflict was about territory, oil, and reasserting US hegemony. Second, one ought not to confuse the actual nature of the Gulf War with the Pentagon's close orchestration of its media coverage. In this regard, quotes such as the following leave this reviewer with a sense of disquiet: The consequence . . . is that in modern warfare, as the aim of battle shifts from territorial, economic, and material gains to immaterial, perceptual fields the spectacle of war is displaced by the war of spectacle. (AD: 191) For several reasons (technological, political, and theoretical), the warrior has ceased to hold any kind of possibility. Instances where the warrior seems to be present—Panama, Liberia, Grenada, Afghanistan, even the Persian Gulf—quickly present themselves as failures, spectacles, or exercises in nostalgia. (KN: 24) Contrasted with this supposed dematerialization of war, territory, and the warrior, and a supposedly new era of cyberwars of sign systems, a few enduring realities seem to need reiteration: The war in Iraq was over one of those stubborn geopolitical facts of the present era—oil. It was preceded by a Hannibal-esque build-up lasting more than six months (in contrast to all this talk about speed). The overwhelming percentage of the bombs used in Iraq were not "smart" bombs; in fact nearly 93 percent of the 88,500 tons of bombs used in that war were not precision-guided but "dumb" bombs. US bombs are estimated to have "missed" their targets about 70 percent of the time (needless to add, a "missed target" probably means higher civilian casualties). Far from being a "clean" war (as General Powell and others suggested during the conflict), the weapons systems used were deliberately designed to increase human casualties and suffering. Thus, the Multiple-Launch Rocket System; the Army Tactical Missile System; the "Adam" bombs designed to "spin out tiny darts with razor edges; phosphorous 1 or 2 square kilometers, destroying all human life through asphyxiation or through implosion of the lungs, leaving no chance for survival" and replicating tactical nuclear weapons in their destructiveness—all these and more were used on the traffic jam on the road connecting Kuwait to Iraq, where thousands of soldiers and civilians (including migrant laborers) were trapped and became a turkey-shoot for US "technology."29 By emphasizing the technology and speed in the Gulf War, endlessly analyzing the representation of the war itself, without a simultaneous exposition of the "ground realities," postmodernist analyses wind up, unwittingly, echoing the Pentagon and the White House in their claims that this was a "clean" war with smart bombs that take out only defense installations with minimal "collateral damage." One needs to reflesh the Gulf War dead through our postmortems instead of merely echoing, with Virilio and others, the "disappearance" of territory or the modern warrior with the new technologies; or the intertext connecting the war and television; or the displacement of the spectacle of war by the war of spectacle." Second, the emphasis on the speed with which the annihilation proceeded once the war began tends to obfuscate the long build-up to the conflict and US complicity in Iraqi foreign and defense policy in prior times. Third, as the details provided above show, if there was anything to highlight about the war, it was not so much its manner of representation as the incredible levels of annihilation that have been perfected. To summarize: I am not suggesting that postmodernist analysts of the war are in agreement with the Pentagon's claims regarding a "clean" war; I am suggesting that their preoccupation with representation, sign systems, and with the signifier over the signified, leaves one with little sense of the annihilation visited upon the people and land of Iraq. And, as the Vietnam War proved and Schwarzkopf well realized, without that physicalistic sense of violence, war can be more effectively sold to a jingoistic public. In this regard, Der Derian's point that the nature of antiwar protest movements has to change, has to recognize the fact that one can no longer wait for the body bags to come home, is one that merits attention. He notes, in a sharp attack on the left's anti-Gulf War movement: "Like old generals the anti-war movement fought the last war ... a disastrous war of position, constructing ideologically sound bunkers of facts and history while the 'New' World Order fought a highly successful war of maneuver ... with high speed visuals and a high-tech aesthetics of destruction." (AD: 176-77) While this point is, perhaps, debatable, Der Derian's further assertion, that a postmodern critique of the Gulf War mobilization would be somehow more effective, sounds less convincing. An alternative, late-modern tactic against total war was to war on totality itself, to delegitimize all sovereign truths based on class, nationalist, or internationalist metanarratives ... better strategically to play with apt critiques of the powerful new forces unleashed by cyberwar than to hold positions with antiquated tactics and nostalgic unities. (Al): 177-178; emphasis in original) The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to "nostalgic," essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing "facts" and "realities" while a "postmodern" President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy' choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is compromised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling- reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialism in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

#### 4. Claims to undermine meaning is an imposition of meaning

Francois Debrix 3, professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnical Institute, Rituals of Mediation: International Politics and Social Meaning, p. xxxvii-xxxix, google books //Elmer

Wodiczko's projections encourage their observers to not just remain passive consumers of rituals of transformation or representation.33 They intimate that social meanings come from the inside, from the mediated visions that, in late modernity, have taken over the social domain within which individual subjects interact. Wodiczko's method is to "manipu- late the system from within (and) interfere with (itsl codes."34 Because mediation's codes are crucial to the production of meaning and social meaning maintains relations of power, wealth, and cultural governance, the commanding force of mediation must be revealed. To reveal media- tion, Wodiczko chooses to ironically mimic and exaggerate the effects of some media forms and objects (architecture, public monuments, televi- sion) by defacing and perverting them. Wodiczko's point is not to use different mediated forms to condemn mediation's excesses. His method is rather to use and reappropriate traditionally mobilized modern ritu- als of transformation to display their power of signification. ¶ The problematization of mediation is not an end in itself for Wodiczko, though. Problematizing modern rituals of transformation by defacing them is necessary for him to the extent that it contributes to reopening social meaning and to freeing up cultural possibilities. Another project by Wodiczko, the Alien Staff, demonstrates the capacity Of perverting and mimicking (re)mediations to open up (their) meaning.35 The Alien Staff is a situation performance concocted by Wodiczko to reveal the pluralizing potential of mediation once it has been freed from transfor- mative and representational rituals. In this art project, Wodiczko asked immigrants (in the United States mostly) to walk about the city and carry a tall stick made to look like a biblical staff (a new type Of flåneur perhaps). The staff opens up at its top to reveal an inserted television screen. On the screen, the same individual who carries the biblical staff is shown telling his or her life story. The staff bearer is asked to meander around the city and abruptly Stop in front Of pedestrians. The pedestri- ans are then faced with the staff and its mini TV screen. The staff bearer never speaks, and in fact remains as still and stoic as can be. Only the staff is active and conveys information. ¶ At one level, Alien Staff could be interpreted as a work of critical trans- formation and radical mobilization performed by this new kind of me- diating ritual. Wodiczko, perhaps, uses the magical staff and its talking head as a metaphor for the silencing of immigrant populations in in- dustrialized societies. Postmodern mediations do not give voice to im- migrants in societies still governed by Modern Man's political power and regime of economic production. This is one possible interpreta- tion offered by Wodiczko's art. Wodiczko does not indicate whether the problematization of postmodern media forms is the intended meaning of the display. But I think that Wodiczko, as silent as his staff bearer, re- fuses to tell the meaning of this art performance on purpose. Explain- ing the art scene would imply that one signification has been imposed. Meaning would be foreclosed and, contrary to the image that is shown, the immigrant would thus be forced to speak. By forcing the immigrant to speak (through someone else's narrating voice), the social system that "silenced" the immigrant in the first place would be reaffirmed. ¶ At another level, this performative (re)mediation by Wodiczko is an ironic play of meaning. The contrasting image of a silent human being with this same being's talking face on a miniature TV screen mimics the blinding sight and the deafening sound of contemporary media(tions) that have no place for the immigrant. Who pays attention to television's message anyway? But instead of individual silence or the media's white noise, Wodiczko's Alien Staff speaks volumes. While it denounces and challenges our postmodern mediating rituals, it also offers people (im- migrants in this case) vectors of speech, new methods of signification and presentation Of themselves. Outside the dominant code, different forms of meaning may be accessed. Perhaps, through new mediations of meaning, new social interactions and cultural practices may be developed. Wodiczko observes: "If I could make it more playful. Laughter—all the jokes, the disruptions, the changes of topics, all the absurdity and impossibility of talking about identity. This is the new community." ¶ Wodiczko's mediated art forms reimagine subjectivities and commu- nities but do not give them names. They enable meaning by multiplying the ways by which meaning is produced. They Offer different paths through which presentation Of one's body and self can be realized with- out having to postulate this presence from systems Of representation or transformation. In fact, multiple, possibly not essential, but certainly meaningful presentations Of one's selves (as immigrant, as Street per- former, as artist, as talking head) are facilitated. At the same time, Wodiczko's performances are not inaccessible to observers in search Of more traditional representational and transformative rituals Of media- tion. AS a ritual Of representation, Wodiczko's Alien Staff may be taken as an allegory for the im—ble passage of some individuals in demo- cratic political Systems from the status of alien to that Of citizen. Simi- larly, Alien Staff could be interpreted as a ritual Of transformation that denounces the unequal status of some individuals in society visa-vis Others and thus calls for a change of condition. Although those are possi- ble interpretations of Wodiczko's mediations, however, they may not be the most fruitful as they merely seek to impose one (their) privileged understanding of the method of mediation onto Wodiczko's own rituals. ¶ In the end, Wodiczko provides a pluralizing model of mediation. Differ- ent outcomes of mediation can take place because, after all, the method of mediation is neither value-free nor the sole possession of romantic man. What Wodiczko's plural approach to the manipulation of the medium and to the use of mediation wants to avoid is not the fact that mediation is being used to produce social meanings. This, Wodiczko suggests, is inevitable and in a sense desirable. What it wants to avoid and what it protects against is the idea, prevalent among proponents of mediation as either or transformation, that desirable so- cial meanings are decided and often established before the method of mediation even has a chance to deploy its cultural and political effects. When this happens, mediation remains an empty middle point between two distant realities or is used as a tool for something else, for some other more romantic social reality that mediation helps to substantiate. When this happens, mediation negates pluralization. The following es- show that contemporary transnational cultural interactions often mobilize mediations to dc just this. The (mediating) internationals that result from such mediations are not always as open and plural as they could be.

#### Third, impact turns! Oberg 14 indicates the aff would be a “no” to “Western interventions” we’ll impact turn that—

#### American intervention is NOT Melodrama—it stops mass atrocities --- overwhelming statistical evidence confirms that it halts conflict and even when it can’t, it diverts resources from slaughtering civilians which net reduces harm

Western and Goldstein 11 JON WESTERN is Five College Associate Professor of International Relations at Mount Holyoke College. JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at American University and the author of Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, "Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age",http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136502/jon-western-and-joshua-s-goldstein/humanitarian-intervention-comes-of-age?page=show

To some extent, widespread skepticism is understandable: past failures have been more newsworthy than successes, and foreign interventions inevitably face steep challenges. Yet such skepticism is unwarranted. Despite the early setbacks in Libya, NATO’s success in protecting civilians and helping rebel forces remove a corrupt leader there has become more the rule of humanitarian intervention than the exception. As Libya and the international community prepare for the post-Qaddafi transition, it is important to examine the big picture of humanitarian intervention -- and the big picture is decidedly positive. Over the last 20 years, the international community has grown increasingly adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities. Humanitarian intervention has also benefited from the evolution of international norms about violence, especially the emergence of “the responsibility to protect,” which holds that the international community has a special set of responsibilities to protect civilians -- by force, if necessary -- from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide when national governments fail to do so. The doctrine has become integrated into a growing tool kit of conflict management strategies that includes today’s more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective international criminal justice mechanisms. Collectively, these strategies have helped foster an era of declining armed conflict, with wars occurring less frequently and producing far fewer civilian casualties than in previous periods. A TURBULENT DECADE Two decades of media exposure to genocide have altered global attitudes about intervention. Modern humanitarian intervention was first conceived in the years following the end of the Cold War. The triumph of liberal democracy over communism made Western leaders optimistic that they could solve the world’s problems as never before. Military force that had long been held in check by superpower rivalry could now be unleashed to protect poor countries from aggression, repression, and hunger. At the same time, the shifting global landscape created new problems that cried out for action. Nationalist and ethnic conflicts in former communist countries surged, and recurrent famines and instability hit much of Africa. A new and unsettled world order took shape, one seemingly distinguished by the frequency and brutality of wars and the deliberate targeting of civilians. The emotional impact of these crises was heightened by new communications technologies that transmitted graphic images of human suffering across the world. For the first time in decades, terms such as “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” appeared regularly in public discussions. Western political elites struggled to respond to these new realities. When U.S. marines arrived in Somalia in December 1992 to secure famine assistance that had been jeopardized by civil war, there were few norms or rules of engagement to govern such an intervention and no serious plans for the kinds of forces and tactics that would be needed to establish long-term stability. Indeed, the marines’ very arrival highlighted the gap between military theory and practice: the heavily armed troops stormed ashore on a beach occupied by only dozens of camera-wielding journalists. Although the Somalia mission did succeed in saving civilians, the intervention was less successful in coping with the political and strategic realities of Somali society and addressing the underlying sources of conflict. U.S. forces were drawn into a shooting war with one militia group, and in the October 1993 “Black Hawk down” incident, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, and one of their bodies was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu while television cameras rolled. Facing domestic pressures and lacking a strategic objective, President Bill Clinton quickly withdrew U.S. troops. The UN soon followed, and Somalia was left to suffer in a civil war that continues to this day. Meanwhile, two days after the “Black Hawk down” fiasco, the UN Security Council authorized a peacekeeping mission for Rwanda, where a peace agreement held the promise of ending a civil war. The international force was notable for its small size and paltry resources. Hutu extremists there drew lessons from the faint-hearted international response in Somalia, and when the conflict reignited in April 1994, they killed ten Belgian peacekeepers to induce the Belgian-led UN force to pull out. Sure enough, most of the peacekeepers withdrew, and as more than half a million civilians were killed in a matter of months, the international community failed to act. Around the same time, a vicious war erupted throughout the former Yugoslavia, drawing a confused and ineffective response from the West. At first, in 1992, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared that the United States did not “have a dog in that fight.” Even after the world learned of tens of thousands of civilian deaths, in May 1993, Clinton’s secretary of state, Warren Christopher, described the so-called ancient hatreds of ethnic groups there as a presumably unsolvable “problem from hell.” Unwilling to risk their soldiers’ lives or to use the word “genocide,” with all of its political, legal, and moral ramifications, the United States and European powers opted against a full-scale intervention and instead supported a UN peacekeeping force that found little peace to keep. At times, the UN force actually made things worse, promising protection that it could not provide or giving fuel and money to aggressors in exchange for the right to send humanitarian supplies to besieged victims. The UN and Western powers were humiliated in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. War criminals elsewhere appeared to conclude that the international community could be intimidated by a few casualties. And in the United States, a number of prominent critics came to feel that humanitarian intervention was an ill-conceived enterprise. The political scientist Samuel Huntington claimed that it was “morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible” to put U.S. soldiers at risk in intrastate conflicts, and he argued at another point that it was “human to hate.” Henry Kissinger saw danger in the United States becoming bogged down in what he later called “the bottomless pit of Balkan passions,” and he warned against intervening when there were not vital strategic interests at stake. Other critics concluded that applying military force to protect people often prolonged civil wars and intensified the violence, killing more civilians than otherwise might have been the case. And still others argued that intervention fundamentally altered intrastate political contests, creating long-term instability or protracted dependence on the international community. Nonetheless, international actors did not abandon intervention or their efforts to protect civilians. Rather, amid the violence, major intervening powers and the UN undertook systematic reviews of their earlier failures, updated their intervention strategies, and helped foster a new set of norms for civilian protection. A key turning point came in 1995, when Bosnian Serb forces executed more than 7,000 prisoners in the UN-designated safe area of Srebrenica. The Clinton administration quickly abandoned its hesitancy and led a forceful diplomatic and military effort to end the war. The persistent diplomacy of Anthony Lake, the U.S. national security adviser, persuaded the reluctant Europeans and UN peacekeeping commanders to support Operation Deliberate Force, NATO’s aggressive air campaign targeting the Bosnian Serb army. That effort brought Serbia to the negotiating table, where U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke crafted the Dayton agreement, which ended the war. In place of the hapless UN force, NATO sent 60,000 heavily armed troops into the “zone of separation” between the warring parties, staving off renewed fighting. The “problem from hell” stopped immediately, and the ensuing decade of U.S.-led peacekeeping saw not a single U.S. combat-related casualty in Bosnia. Unlike previous interventions, the post-Dayton international peacekeeping presence was unified, vigorous, and sustained, and it has kept a lid on ethnic violence for more than 15 years. A related innovation was the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a court that has indicted 161 war criminals, including all the principal Serbian wartime leaders. Despite extensive criticism for ostensibly putting justice ahead of peace, the tribunal has produced dramatic results. Every suspected war criminal, once indicted, quickly lost political influence in postwar Bosnia, and not one of the 161 indictees remains at large today. More important than an exit strategy is a comprehensive transition strategy. Buoyed by these successes, NATO responded to an imminent Serbian attack on Kosovo in 1999 by launching a major air war. Despite initial setbacks (the operation failed to stop a Serbian ground attack that created more than a million Kosovar Albanian refugees), the international community signaled that it would not back down. Under U.S. leadership, NATO escalated the air campaign, and the ICTY indicted Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for crimes against humanity. Within three months, the combined military and diplomatic pressure compelled Serbia to withdraw its forces from Kosovo. And even though many observers, including several senior Clinton administration officials, feared that the ICTY’s indictment of Milosevic in the middle of the military campaign would make it even less likely that he would capitulate in Kosovo or ever relinquish power, he was removed from office 18 months later by nonviolent civil protest and turned over to The Hague. Outside the Balkans, the international community continued to adapt its approach to conflicts with similar success. In 1999, after a referendum on East Timor’s secession from Indonesia led to Indonesian atrocities against Timorese civilians, the UN quickly authorized an 11,000-strong Australian-led military force to end the violence. The intervention eventually produced an independent East Timor at peace with Indonesia. Later missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire used a similar model of deploying a regional military force in coordination with the UN and, on occasion, European powers. CORRECTING THE RECORD Despite the international community’s impressive record of recent humanitarian missions, many of the criticisms formulated in response to the botched campaigns of 1992–95 still guide the conversation about intervention today. The charges are outdated. Contrary to the claims that interventions prolong civil wars and lead to greater humanitarian suffering and civilian casualties, the most violent and protracted cases in recent history -- Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bosnia before Srebrenica, and Darfur -- have been cases in which the international community was unwilling either to intervene or to sustain a commitment with credible force. Conversely, a comprehensive study conducted by the political scientist Taylor Seybolt has found that aggressive operations legitimized by firm UN Security Council resolutions, as in Bosnia in 1995 and East Timor in 1999, were the most successful at ending conflicts. Even when civil wars do not stop right away, external interventions often mitigate violence against civilians. This is because, as the political scientist Matthew Krain and others have found, interventions aimed at preventing mass atrocities often force would-be killers to divert resources away from slaughtering civilians and toward defending themselves. This phenomenon, witnessed in the recent Libya campaign, means that even when interventions fail to end civil wars or resolve factional differences immediately, they can still protect civilians. Another critique of humanitarian interventions is that they create perverse incentives for rebel groups to deliberately provoke states to commit violence against civilians in order to generate an international response. By this logic, the prospect of military intervention would generate more rebel provocations and thus more mass atrocities. Yet the statistical record shows exactly the opposite. Since the modern era of humanitarian intervention began, both the frequency and the intensity of attacks on civilians have declined. During the Arab Spring protests this year, there was no evidence that opposition figures in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, or Yemen sought to trigger outside intervention. In fact, the protesters clearly stated that they would oppose such action. Even the Libyan rebels, who faced long odds against Qaddafi’s forces, refused what would have been the most effective outside help: foreign boots on the ground. Recent efforts to perfect humanitarian intervention have been fueled by deep changes in public norms about violence against civilians and advances in conflict management. Two decades of media exposure to mass atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and genocide have altered global -- not simply Western -- attitudes about intervention. The previously sacrosanct concept of state sovereignty has been made conditional on a state’s responsible behavior, and in 2005, the UN General Assembly unanimously endorsed the doctrine of the responsibility to protect at the UN’s World Summit. NATO’s intervention in Libya reflects how the world has become more committed to the protection of civilians. Both UN Security Council resolutions on Libya this year passed with unprecedented speed and without a single dissenting vote. In the wake of conflicts as well, the international community has shown that it can and will play a role in maintaining order and restoring justice. Peacekeeping missions now enjoy widespread legitimacy and have been remarkably successful in preventing the recurrence of violence once deployed. And because of successful postconflict tribunals and the International Criminal Court, individuals, including national leaders, can now be held liable for egregious crimes against civilians. Collectively, these new conflict management and civilian protection tools have contributed to a marked decline in violence resulting from civil war. According to the most recent Human Security Report, between 1992 and 2003 the number of conflicts worldwide declined by more than 40 percent, and between 1988 and 2008 the number of conflicts that produced 1,000 or more battle deaths per year fell by 78 percent. Most notably, the incidence of lethal attacks against civilians was found to be lower in 2008 than at any point since the collection of such data began in 1989. Still, although international norms now enshrine civilian protection and levels of violence are down, humanitarian interventions remain constrained by political and military realities. The international community’s inaction in the face of attacks on Syrian protesters, as of this writing, demonstrates that neither the UN nor any major power is willing or prepared to intervene when abusive leaders firmly control the state’s territory and the state’s security forces and are backed by influential allies. Furthermore, the concept of civilian protection still competes with deeply held norms of sovereignty, especially in former colonies. Although humanitarian intervention can succeed in many cases, given these constraints, it is not always feasible.

#### No risk of endless warfare

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7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

#### Categorical rejection from cherrypicked examples forecloses the countless times they’ve worked

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As the casualties and financial costs of the United States’ Middle Eastern wars have mounted, Americans’ appetite for new interventions—and their commitment to existing ones—has understandably diminished. The conventional wisdom now holds that the next phase in the United States’ global life should be marked by military restraint, allowing Washington to focus on other pressing issues. This position seems to be one of the few principles uniting actors as diverse as foreign policy realists, progressives, nearly all of the presidential candidates in the 2020 Democratic primary, and President Donald Trump.

It’s not hard to see why Americans would look at U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya and conclude that such interventions should never be repeated. The costs of these wars have been extraordinary: at a rally in Ohio in April 2018, Trump estimated them at $7 trillion over 17 years and concluded that the country has nothing to show for the effort “except death and destruction.” Although the precise financial cost depends on how one counts, what is certain is that more than 4,500 U.S. military personnel have been killed in Iraq and nearly 2,500 in Afghanistan, plus tens of thousands injured in both wars—to say nothing of the casualties among allied forces, military contractors, and local civilians. Critics of these resource-intensive operations blame them for bogging down the United States in a region of second-tier importance and distracting Washington from the greater threats of China and Russia, as well as from pressing domestic issues.

With the costs so high, and the benefits seen as low, the imperative is obvious to political leaders in both parties: get out of the existing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and avoid starting new ones. In his State of the Union address this year, Trump declared that “great nations do not fight endless wars.” Scores of House Democrats have signed a pledge to “end the forever war,” referring to the global war on terrorism and U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Niger, Somalia, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen, as have many of the Democrats running for president. Joe Biden, the former vice president and current presidential candidate, has also promised to “end the forever wars.” He has described the Obama administration’s withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq as “one of the proudest moments of [his] life” and has called for pulling U.S. forces out of Afghanistan.

Many experts are of a similar mind. Discussions of “offshore balancing,” a strategy in which the United States would dramatically scale back its global military presence and reduce the frequency of its interventions, were once mostly confined to the halls of academia, but today the idea is garnering new attention.

Faced with such a sweeping political consensus, one might conclude that Washington should simply get on with it and embrace restraint. The problem is that such a strategy overlooks the interests and values that have prompted U.S. action in the first place and that may for good reasons give rise to it in the future. The consensus also neglects the fact that, despite the well-known failures of recent large-scale interventions, there is also a record of more successful ones—including the effort underway today in Syria.

To assume that nonintervention will become a central tenet of future U.S. foreign policy will, if anything, induce Americans to think less seriously about the country’s military operations abroad and thus generate not only less successful intervention but possibly even more of it. Instead of settling into wishful thinking, policymakers should accept that the use of military force will remain an essential tool of U.S. strategy. That, in turn, requires applying the right lessons from recent decades.

GOODBYE TO ALL THAT?

The first sign that the sweeping consensus around “ending endless war” is more problematic than it first appears is the telling set of caveats that emerges even among its most ardent advocates. Consider the many qualifications that Democratic presidential candidates are applying to a withdrawal from Afghanistan. Biden has said that he would bring U.S. combat troops home during his first term but that he remains open to a “residual presence” to conduct counterterrorism operations—roughly the same approach as Trump’s. Senator Cory Booker of New Jersey has promised that as president he would immediately begin a “process” to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, while somehow ensuring that the country does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. Pete Buttigieg, the mayor of South Bend, Indiana, who served as a naval officer in Afghanistan, has agreed that “it’s time to end this endless war,” and yet he envisions a peace agreement that keeps U.S. special operations forces and intelligence operatives there. Such concessions, responsible policy though they are, stop well short of terminating the United States’ longest war.

Even the most committed anti-interventionists continue to come up with exceptions. The foreign policy manifesto of Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, published in Foreign Affairs in June, is titled “Ending America’s Endless War,” and yet he has acknowledged that “military force is sometimes necessary, but always—always—as the last resort.” His foreign policy adviser has emphasized Sanders’ commitment to collective defense among NATO allies and has said that genocide and mass atrocities would “weigh heavily” on Sanders when contemplating military action. Advocates of offshore balancing, such as the scholar John Mearsheimer, favor using force if a regional balance of power is breaking down, and Mearsheimer has written that his approach would not preclude operations to halt genocides like the one that befell Rwanda in 1994.

Even at a rhetorical and intellectual level, then, the end of intervention is not nearly as clear-cut as today’s politicians suggest. The reality of being commander in chief complicates things further: on the campaign trail, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Trump each pledged to engage in fewer foreign military adventures and redirect resources toward needs at home. In office, each reluctantly proceeded to not only continue existing wars but also launch new offensives.

The result is that, according to a Congressional Research Service estimate, the United States has employed military force over 200 times since the end of the Cold War. Many of these operations have taken place in or around the Middle East, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. But other, less frequently recalled interventions have occurred elsewhere, as in Bosnia, Colombia, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, and the Philippines. What’s more, the tendency to intervene is not simply the product of the United States’ emergence as an unbridled superpower after the Cold War. Between 1948 and 1991, during a time of supposedly stabilizing bipolar competition, the United States sent its military to fight abroad more than 50 times. American military action is not, as many believe, a feature of post–Cold War overstretch; it has been a central element of the United States’ approach to the world for decades.

THE CASE AGAINST

Just because the United States has intervened so frequently over its history does not mean that it will continue to do so or that it should. The case against intervention generally takes five forms. And although there are elements of truth to each, they also threaten to obscure other, more complicated realities.

The first argument holds that the United States need not employ military means in response to terrorism, civil wars, mass atrocities, and other problems that are not its business. Washington has used force against terrorists in countries ranging from Niger to Pakistan, with massive human and financial expenditures. And yet if more Americans die in their bathtubs each year than in terrorist attacks, why no war on porcelain? The post-9/11 overreach, this camp contends, endures some 18 years later, having stretched well beyond eradicating the original al Qaeda perpetrators and their Afghan base. In this view, as the threats have diminished, so should American attention. The civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen may be tragic, but they do not demand a U.S. military response any more than did the atrocities in Rwanda, eastern Congo, or Darfur.

Adopting such a cramped view of American interests, however, carries its own costs. Terrorism remains a threat, and the effect of successful attacks on Americans goes beyond their immediate casualties to include increased pressure to restrict civil liberties at home and wage impromptu operations abroad—operations that end up being costlier and less effective than longer-term, better-planned ones would be. After the Islamic State (or ISIS) took hold in Iraq and Syria and footage of terrorists decapitating American hostages horrified the public, Obama undertook a far larger operation than would have likely been necessary had he left a residual force in Iraq after 2011. As for genocide and civil war, certain cases can pose such serious threats to U.S. interests, or be so offensive to American values, as to merit intervention. Successive presidents have used military might to prevent, halt, or punish mass atrocities—Clinton to cease the genocide against Bosnian Muslims in the Balkans, Obama to protect the Yezidi minority in Iraq, and Trump after Bashar al-Assad’s chemical attacks against his own people in Syria. There is every reason to believe that similar cases will arise in the future.

The second argument against intervention highlights its supposedly poor track record. For all of the United States’ good intentions—stopping terrorists, ending genocide, stabilizing countries, spreading democracy—Washington simply is not very successful in its attempts. Iraq and Libya look worse today than when the wars against Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Qaddafi began, and the Taliban currently control more of Afghanistan than at any time since 2001. Long gone are U.S. aspirations to turn these countries into democracies that would radiate liberalism beyond their borders.

Yet this argument ignores the many other times in which the use of American force worked. It ejected Saddam from Kuwait, it ended a war in Bosnia, it stopped ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, it paved the way for a democratic transition in Liberia, and it helped defeat narcoterrorists and bring temporary peace to Colombia. Even in Afghanistan, it should not be forgotten that Washington denied al Qaeda a safe haven, and in Iraq and Syria, it eliminated ISIS’ physical presence, limited the flow of foreign fighters, and liberated cities from depravity. Then there are other, harder-to-measure effects of U.S. intervention, such as enforcing norms against ethnic cleansing and deterring countries from offering terrorists sanctuary or engaging in wars of aggression. To get an accurate picture of intervention’s mixed track record, one cannot cherry-pick the disastrous cases or the successful ones.

The third argument against intervention points to the slippery slope involved in such efforts: start a military campaign, and the United States will never get out. After the 1995 Dayton peace accords formally ended the ethnic conflict in Bosnia, U.S. troops stayed in the area for ten years, and NATO retains a presence in Kosovo to this day. The United States seems to be stuck in Afghanistan, too, because without a peace deal with the Taliban, the U.S.-backed government could fall. In Iraq, Obama removed all U.S. troops, only to send them back in when ISIS established a vast presence there. Check in to a military intervention, and it often seems like you can never leave.

Once deployed, American troops often do stay a long time. But staying is not the same as fighting, and it is wrong to think of troops who are largely advising local forces the same way as one thinks about those who are actively engaged in combat. There is a stark difference between what it meant to have U.S. forces in Iraq during the peak of the war and what it means to have U.S. troops there now to train Iraqi forces—just as there is a massive gulf between deploying troops to Afghanistan during the troop surge there and keeping a residual presence to strengthen the government and its security forces. Some American interests are worth the price of continued military deployments, and the aim should be to diminish those costs in blood and treasure as the conditions stabilize. Even once they do, there may remain a case for an enduring role, particularly when the U.S. troop presence is the only thing maintaining the domestic political equilibrium, as was the case in Iraq before the 2011 withdrawal and as is true in Afghanistan today.

The fourth argument can be boiled down to the plea, “Why us?” Why must the United States always run to the sound of the guns, especially when other countries are capable of taking on such burdens and may have more skin in the game? Europe is geographically closer to Libya and Syria, at far greater risk from terrorism and refugee flows, and possesses capable military forces of its own. Middle Eastern allies have their own resources, too. The American role might not be so indispensable after all.

For all the contributions of U.S. partners, however, more often than not, only the United States has the will and the capability to lead successful military operations. France led a successful operation in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004 and in Mali in 2013, and the United Kingdom led one in Sierra Leone in 2000, but those were exceptions. Iraq would not have left Kuwait in 1991 had the United States not led the effort; mass slaughter in the Balkans during the 1990s would not have ended without a dominant U.S. role, even though it took place on European soil. In Afghanistan and Syria, U.S. allies have made it clear that they will stay as long as the United States does but will head for the exit otherwise. U.S. friends in Europe have proved decidedly uninterested in taking matters into their own hands, and when Washington has declined to meaningfully intervene itself, they have often stood idly by. In Libya after Qaddafi’s fall, the Europeans failed to impose security even as growing numbers of refugees and migrants set sail across the Mediterranean. In Syria before U.S. bombing began, they undertook no military campaign against ISIS, even as the arrival of Syrian refugees destabilized European politics. When U.S. allies do take matters into their own hands, they can make a bad situation worse. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates decided to intervene in Yemen’s civil war, but their brutal and indiscriminate campaign led to a humanitarian disaster and strengthened the very Iranian role it sought to eliminate.

The final reason most frequently offered for getting out of the intervention business relates to its costs, both direct ones—the lives lost and damaged, the dollars borrowed and spent—and opportunity costs. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia represent the foremost challenge to the United States over the long term and that the competition with them has begun in earnest. If that’s the case, why tie up scarce resources in less important military interventions?

Here, too, a dose of subtlety is in order. The prospect of great-power competition should indeed structure the United States’ coming approach to national security, but a focus on counterterrorism is required, as well. After all, the George W. Bush administration entered office hoping to focus on China, only to see its best-laid plans upended by the 9/11 attacks. Withdrawing prematurely from terrorist safe havens such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria would threaten the great-power emphasis necessary in the next phase of the United States’ global life. A major terrorist attack on U.S. soil, for instance, would likely cause Washington to once again embrace counterterrorism as its chief national security priority, leaving it more vulnerable to threats from China and Russia. Unless the United States chooses to give up its global role and instead focus only on Asia and Europe, it must engage in great-power competition while attending to other security challenges in other areas.

A SUBTLER STRATEGY

Every possible intervention, past and future, raises difficult what-ifs. If presented again with a situation like that in Rwanda in 1994—800,000 lives in peril and the possibility that a modest foreign military effort could make a difference—would the United States once again avoid acting? Should it have stayed out of the bloodbath in the Balkans or intervened earlier to prevent greater carnage? Should it have left Qaddafi to attack Benghazi? Pursued al Qaeda after the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, perhaps obviating the need to overthrow the Taliban three years later?

In such discussions, the gravitational pull of the Iraq war bends the light around it, and for obvious reasons. The war there has been so searing, so badly bungled, and so catastrophically costly that, according to former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, anyone thinking of a similar engagement “should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.” Almost everything that could go wrong in Iraq did. What started as a war to eliminate weapons of mass destruction found none. The impulse to liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny pushed them into a civil war. The desire to open another front in the war on terrorism created far more terrorists than it eliminated. A war that some U.S. officials promised would be a “cakewalk” exacted an unbearable toll on U.S. troops, their families, and the Iraqi people themselves.

Ironically, many among Washington’s political and national security elite, especially on the Republican side, were for years unable to admit publicly that the invasion was the mistake it so clearly was. After the 2003 invasion, politics and a resistance to suggesting that American sacrifices were in vain kept such observations private. Republican political leaders’ failure to admit that the war’s costs exceeded its benefits undermined their credibility, which was already tarnished by their general support for the war in the first place. That, in turn, may have helped usher in the blunt anti-interventionism so prevalent today. Washington needs a subtler alternative to it.

U.S. military interventions take diverse forms—an isolated drone strike in a remote area of Pakistan is as different from a theoretical future war with China as is possible to contemplate. As a result, there are no precise rules about when leaders should and should not use force. Context matters, and human judgment always comes into play. Yet it is possible to sketch out several principles, informed by the experience of recent decades, that should guide the general conduct of U.S. decision-making.

The first guideline is to avoid overlearning the supposed lessons of past interventions. It’s often said that generals are always fighting the last war, and the same can be said of policymakers. Sometimes, they draw the right lessons, but sometimes, they do not. President Harry Truman sent troops north of the 38th parallel in Korea, drawing China into the Korean War, so in Vietnam, U.S. ground forces remained on their side of the demilitarized zone—which put enormous emphasis on extensive bombing campaigns against the North. Hoping to avoid a Vietnam-style quagmire, when the George H. W. Bush administration fought the Gulf War, it sought to limit its objective to the specific aim of restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty. But because Saddam was left in power, the Iraq problem festered. The second Iraq war was supposed to finish the job—but it showed how a purportedly short conflict can lead to an indefinite occupation. To prevent that from happening in Libya, Obama decided to use airpower to help oust Qaddafi but keep American boots off the ground; he was thus unable to contain the chaos that followed. And so in Syria, Obama and Trump would fight terrorists without attempting to remove Assad. Sticking to rigid lines based on prior errors can easily lead to new and different pitfalls.

Another guideline is to pick interventions that meet clear conditions and commit to those that are chosen. The United States should generally undertake interventions only when political leaders—namely, the president and a majority of Congress—believe that force is necessary to attain a clearly stated objective. They should have a reasonable expectation that allies, especially those in the region in question, will join the effort, and they should make serious efforts to enlist them. They should conclude that the benefits of a military intervention over the long run are reasonably expected to exceed the costs. And they should undertake military interventions in which they are prepared for the possibility that U.S. forces will have to stay for a long time, indefinitely if necessary.

Guidelines such as these cannot possibly supply all the answers policymakers might need, but they can point to the right questions. Requiring decision-makers to clearly define the objectives of the possible intervention, for example, will force them to distinguish between managing a problem (such as preventing Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist safe haven) and solving it (such as rendering that country a Taliban-free modern democracy). Enlisting allies in the effort should involve an honest assessment of their strengths and weaknesses, whether those allies are someone in the nature of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, or exiles in Iraq, or European troops in Libya, or the Syrian Democratic Forces. And the judgment about an operation’s likely costs and benefits should include an analysis of the success or failure of various approaches in the past, such as targeted counterterrorism operations or a full-fledged counterinsurgency campaign.

One traditional way of thinking about intervention is represented by the Powell Doctrine, developed by General Colin Powell during the Gulf War, which emphasizes the importance of using decisive force, having a clear exit strategy, and mobilizing U.S. public support. But the opposite has proved at least equally important in recent wars: there will be cases in which the employment of modest force over an open-ended timeline will be the better strategy. Policymakers’ general unwillingness to contemplate a long-term U.S. presence in a foreign country, along with their tendency to see conflicts as temporary problems that can be solved in a limited period of time, often makes them rush for the exits when the going gets tough. Had the United States not frantically sought an off-ramp in both Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, its prospects for success in both conflicts would have been brighter—and, paradoxically, the wars might have ended sooner. Even many years after the initiation of those conflicts, sustainable, low-cost, and long-term American engagement is preferable to unconditional withdrawal.

#### American intervention solves genocide – the alternative is Russian fill in

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The eight years of the Obama presidency have offered us a natural experiment of sorts. Not all U.S. presidents are similar on foreign policy, and not all (or any) U.S. presidents are quite like Barack Obama. After two terms of George W. Bush’s aggressive militarism, we have had the opportunity to watch whether attitudes toward the U.S.—and U.S. military force—would change, if circumstances changed. President Obama shared at least some of the assumptions of both the hard Left and foreign-policy realists, that the use of direct U.S. military force abroad, even with the best of intentions, often does more harm then good. Better, then, to “do no harm.”

This has been Barack Obama’s position on the Syrian Civil War, the key foreign-policy debate of our time. The president’s discomfort with military action against the Syrian regime seems deep and instinctual and oblivious to changing facts on the ground. When the debate over intervention began, around 5,000 Syrians had been killed. Now it’s close to 500,000. Yet, Obama’s basic orientation toward the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has remained unchanged. This suggests that Obama, like many others who oppose U.S. intervention against Assad, is doing so on “principled” or, to put it differently, ideological grounds.

Despite President Obama’s very conscious desire to limit America’s role in the Middle East and to minimize the extent to which U.S. military assets are deployed in the region, there is little evidence that the views of the hard Left and other critics of American power have changed as a result. (Yes, the U.S. military is arguably involved in more countries now than when the Obama administration took office, but—compared to Iraq and Afghanistan before him—Obama’s footprint has been decidedly limited, with a reliance on drone strikes and special-operations forces.) As for those who actually live in the Middle East, a less militaristic America has done little to temper anti-Americanism. In the three countries—Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon—for which Pew has survey data for both Bush’s last year and either 2014 or 2015, favorability toward the U.S. is significantly worse under Obama today than it was in 2008. Why exactly is up for debate, but we can at the very least say that a drastic drawdown of U.S. military personnel—precisely the policy pushed for by Democrats in the wake of Iraq’s failure—does not seem to have bought America much goodwill.

Despite the fact that Assad and Russia are responsible for indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, many leftists have viewed even the mere mention of the U.S. doing anything in response as “warmongering.” We have had the unfortunate situation of someone as (formerly) well-respected as Jeffrey Sachs arguing that the U.S. should provide “air cover and logistical support” to Bashar al-Assad. We have had Wikileaks’ attacks on the White Helmets, who have risked—and, for at least 140, lost—their lives in the worst conditions to save Syrian lives from the rubble of Syrian and Russian bombardment. Of course, it is not an absurd position to be skeptical of any proposed American escalation against Assad, and many reasonable people across the political spectrum have made that case. But it is something else entirely to apply such skepticism selectively to the U.S. and not to others, especially when the others in question deliberately target civilians as a matter of policy. It can be a slippery slope. While no one would accuse Obama of liking Putin, coordinating with and enabling Russia in Syria is effectively U.S. policy. As the New York Times columnist Roger Cohen noted in February, well before the current disaster in Aleppo: “The troubling thing is that the Putin policy on Syria has become hard to distinguish from the Obama policy.”

The Left has always had a utopian bent, believing that life, not just for Americans, but for millions abroad, can be made better through human agency (rather than, say, simply hoping that the market will self-correct). The problem, though, is that the better, more just world that so many hope for is simply impossible without the use of American military force. At first blush, such a claim might seem self-evidently absurd. Haven’t we all seen what happened in Iraq? The 2003 Iraq invasion was one of the worst strategic blunders in the history of U.S. foreign policy. Yet, it’s not clear what exactly this has to do with the Syrian conflict, which is almost the inverse of the Iraq war. In Iraq, civil war happened after the U.S. invasion. In Syria, civil war broke out in the absence of U.S. intervention.

What all of this suggests is that attitudes toward the U.S. military, and by extension the United States, are often “inelastic,” meaning that what the U.S. actually does or doesn’t do abroad has limited bearing on perceptions of American power. As a general proposition, many leftists, for example, seem to believe that there is something intrinsically wrong with the use of military force by the United States. In other words, when America does it, it is a bad thing, irrespective of the outcomes it produces, and therefore should be opposed outright. There is rarely any real effort to explain why it’s bad—after all, if it were purely a moral stand against the killing of innocents, the use of Russian or Syrian military force would have to be considered much worse.

But, for the use of American power abroad to be intrinsically wrong or immoral, all uses of military force would have to be either immoral or ineffective, or both. However, as a factual matter, this is simply not the case. There was no way to stop mass slaughter and genocide in Bosnia or Kosovo without U.S. military force, buttressed, as it should be, by broad regional or international consensus. In those two cases, a U.S.-led coalition acted. In those cases where the international community did not act, genocide did, in fact, occur, as we witnessed in Rwanda. What became clear then—and what has become clear once again in Syria—is that a world where others than the U.S. take the initiative to stop such slaughter does not exist, and is unlikely to exist at any point in the foreseeable future. While they may be less common, there are also cases where dictators will not only kill their own people but try to forcefully invade and conquer their neighbors. As in the first Gulf War, the gobbling up of Kuwait could not have been prevented without a U.S.-led coalition, again with broad international support.

The list goes on. From a moral standpoint, no one should have to suffer under the indignities of ISIS rule. From a strategic standpoint, having an extremist state the size of Indiana in the middle of the Middle East, needless to say, does not suggest the coming of a better, more secure world. While Obama was late to act against the organization and while the anti-ISIS campaign has been deeply flawed, the amount of territory that ISIS controls has been reduced significantly, due in large part to U.S. airstrikes, intelligence, and special-operations forces. No one, not Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or anyone else, was going to seriously confront ISIS without U.S. coordination and leadership, and it’s U.S. coordination and leadership that is facilitating the current battle for the Islamic State’s Iraqi stronghold in Mosul. This is the faulty—and ultimately quite dangerous—premise behind one of the founding assumptions of Obama’s foreign policy: that if the U.S. steps back, others will step in. Even when “others” do step in, the results are often destructive, since America’s allies and adversaries alike do not generally share its values, interests, or objectives.

Of course, U.S. military force may be necessary, but it can never be sufficient on its own. This is where the judgment, morality, and strategic vision of politicians and policymakers can make the crucial difference. The United States has not been the “force for good” that many Americans would like to think it’s been. There is a tragic history of intervention abroad that more Americans should be aware of, whether it’s overthrowing democratically elected leaders in Latin America or backing brutal dictators in the Middle East. There is no reason to think the U.S. is necessarily doomed to repeat those mistakes indefinitely. But even if it was, there would still be instances where only U.S. military force could be counted on to stop genocide.

The alternative to a proactive and internationalist U.S. policy is to “do no harm,” and this might seem a safe fallback position: Foreign countries and cultures are too complicated to understand, so instead of trying to understand them, let’s at least not make the situation worse. The idea that the U.S. can “do no harm,” however, depends on the fiction that the most powerful nation in the world can ever be truly “neutral” in foreign conflicts, not just when it acts, but also when it doesn’t. Neutrality, or silence, is often complicity, something that was once the moral, urgent claim of the Left. The fiction of neutrality is growing more dangerous, as we enter a period of resurgent authoritarianism, anti-refugee incitement, and routine mass killing.

This is the built-in contradiction of what might be called the “anti-imperialist Left.” They are against empire, and there is only one country powerful enough to reasonably be considered “imperial.” (Russia, of course, engages in bloody imperial ventures, but it gets a pass since it is acting against the United States.) But to insist that the fundamental problem in today’s world is American imperialism is to have only the most outdated “principles”—principles that, in the case of Syria, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and even Libya, have left, or would have left, the most vulnerable and suffering without any recourse to safety and protection.

If the United States announced tomorrow morning that it would no longer use its military for anything but to defend the borders of the homeland, many would instinctively cheer, perhaps not quite realizing what this would mean in practice. But that is the conundrum the Left is now facing. A world without mass slaughter, of the sort of we are seeing every day in Syria, cannot ever come to be without American power. But perhaps this will prove one of the positive legacies of the Obama era: showing that the alternative of American disinterest and disengagement is not necessarily better. For those, though, that care about ideology—holding on to the idea that U.S. military force is somehow inherently bad—more than they care about actual human outcomes, the untenability of their position will persist. That, too, will be a tragedy, since at a time when many on the Right are turning jingoistic or isolationist, there is a need for voices that not just believe in U.S. power, but believe that that power—still, for now, preeminent—can be used for better, more moral ends.

#### And Grove is a criticism of capitalist accumulation and specifically expansion into space—we’ll impact turn both—

#### Tech innovation undergirded by profit motives are driving the Second Machine Age, which dematerializes capitalism and makes growth a sustainable necessity.

This ev is v v v long/a but it’s amazing – answers basically every aff arg

McAfee, 19—cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management, former professor at Harvard Business School and fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society (Andrew, “Looking Ahead: The World Cleanses Itself This Way,” *More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources—and What Happens Next*, Chapter 14, pg 278-292, Kindle, dml)

The decreases in resource use, pollution, and other exploitations of the earth cataloged in the preceding chapters are great news. But are they going to last? It could be that we're just living in a pleasant interlude between the Industrial Era and another rapacious period during which we massively increase our footprint on our planet and eventually cause a giant Malthusian crash.

It could be, but I don't think so. Instead, I think we're going to take better care of our planet from now on. I'm confident that the Second Machine Age will mark the time in our history when we started to progressively and permanently tread more lightly on the earth, taking less from it and generally caring for it better, even as we humans continue to become more numerous and prosperous. The work of Paul Romer, who shared the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics, is one of the sources of this confidence.

Growth Mindset

Romer's largest contribution to economics was to show that it's best not to think of new technologies as something that companies buy and bring in from the outside, but instead as something they create themselves (the title of his most famous paper, published in 1990, is "Endogenous Technological Change"). These technologies are like designs or recipes; as Romer put it, they’re "the instructions that we follow for combining raw materials." This is close to the definitions of technology presented in chapter 7.

Why do companies invent and improve technologies? Simply, to generate profits. They come up with instructions, recipes, and blueprints that will let them grow revenues or shrink costs. As we saw repeatedly in chapter 7, capitalism provides ample incentive for this kind of tech progress.

So far, all this seems like a pretty standard argument for how the first two horsemen work together. Romer's brilliance was to highlight the importance of two key attributes of the technological ideas companies come up with as they pursue profits. The first is that they're nonrival, meaning that they can be used by more than one person or company at a time, and that they don't get used up. This is obviously not the case for most resources made out of atoms—I can't also use the pound of steel that you've just incorporated into the engine of a car—but it is the case for ideas and instructions. The Pythagorean theorem, a design for a steam engine, and a recipe for delicious chocolate chip cookies aren't ever going to get "used up" no matter how much they're used.

The second important aspect of corporate technologies is that they're partially excludable. This means that companies can kind of prevent others from using them. They do this by keeping the technologies secret (such as the exact recipe for Coca-Cola), filing for patents and other intellectual-property protection, and so on. However, none of these measures is perfect (hence the words partially and kind of). Trade secrets leak. Patents expire, and even before they expire, they must describe the invention they're claiming and so let others study it.

Partial excludability is a beautiful thing. It provides strong incentives for companies to create useful, profit-enhancing new technologies that they alone can benefit from for a time, yet it also ensures that the new techs will eventually "spill over"—that with time they’ll diffuse and get adopted by more and more companies, even if that's not what their originators want.

Romer equated tech progress to the production by companies of nonrivalrous, partially excludable ideas and showed that these ideas cause an economy to grow. What's more, he also demonstrated that this idea-fueled growth doesn't have to slow down with time. It's not constrained by the size of the labor force, the amount of natural resources, or other such factors. Instead, economic growth is limited only by the idea-generating capacity of the people within a market. Romer called this capacity "human capital" and said at the end of his 1990 paper, "The most interesting positive implication of the model is that an economy with a larger total stock of human capital will experience faster growth."

This notion, which has come to be called "increasing returns to scale," is as powerful as it is counterintuitive. Most formal models of economic growth, as well as the informal mental ones most of us walk around with, feature decreasing returns—growth slows down as the overall economy gets bigger. This makes intuitive sense; it just feels like it would be easier to experience 5 percent growth in a $1 billion economy than a $1 trillion one. But Romer showed that as long as that economy continued to add to its human capital—the overall ability of its people to come up with new technologies and put them to use—it could actually grow faster even as it grew bigger. This is because the stock of useful, nonrivalrous, nonexcludable ideas would keep growing. As Romer convincingly showed, economies run and grow on ideas.

The Machinery of Prosperity

Romer's ideas should leave us optimistic about the planetary benefits of digital tools—hardware, software, and networks—for three main reasons. First, countless examples show us how good these tools are at fulfilling the central role of technology, which is to provide "instructions that we follow for combining raw materials." Since raw materials cost money, profit-maximizing companies are particularly keen to find ways to use fewer of them. So they use digital tools to come up with beer cans that use less aluminum, car engines that use less steel and less gas, mapping software that removes the need for paper atlases, and so on and so on. None of this is done solely for the good of the earth—it's done for the pursuit of profit that's at the heart of capitalism—yet it benefits the planet by, as we've seen, causing us to take less from it.

Digital tools are technologies for creating technologies, the most prolific and versatile ones we've ever come up with. They're machines for coming up with ideas. Lots of them. The same piece of computer-aided design software can be used to create a thinner aluminum can or a lighter and more fuel-efficient engine. A drone can be used to scan farmland to see if more irrigation is needed, or to substitute for a helicopter when filming a movie. A smartphone can be used to read the news, listen to music, and pay for things, all without consuming a single extra molecule.

In the Second Machine Age, the global stock of digital tools is increasing much more quickly than ever before. It's being used in countless ways by profit-hungry companies to combine raw materials in ways that use fewer of them. In advanced economies such as America's, the cumulative impact of this combination of capitalism and tech progress is clear: absolute dematerialization of the economy and society, and thus a smaller footprint on our planet.

The second way Romer's ideas about technology and growth are showing up at present is via decreased excludability. Pervasive digital tools are making it much easier for good designs and recipes to spread around the world. While this is often not what a company wants—it wants to exclude others from its great cost-saving idea— excludability is not as easy as it used to be.

This isn't because of weaker patent protection, but instead because of stronger digital tools. Once one company shows what's possible, others use hardware, software, and networks to catch up to the leader. Even if they can't copy exactly because of intellectual-property restrictions, they can use digital tools to explore other means to the same end. So, many farmers learn to get higher yields while using less water and fertilizer, even though they combine these raw materials in different ways. Steve Jobs would certainly have preferred for Apple to be the only provider of smartphones after it developed the iPhone, but he couldn't maintain the monopoly no matter how many patents and lawsuits he filed. Other companies found ways to combine processors, memory, sensors, a touch screen, and software into phones that satisfied billions of customers around the world.

The operating system that powers most non-Apple smartphones is Android, which is both free to use and freely modifiable. Google's parent company, Alphabet, developed and released Android without even trying to make it excludable; the explicit goal was to make it as widely imitable as possible. This is an example of the broad trend across digital industries of giving away valuable technologies for free.

The Linux operating system, of which Android is a descendant, is probably the best-known example of free and open-source software, but there are many others. The online software repository GitHub maintains that it's "the largest open source community in the world" and hosts millions of projects. The Arduino community does something similar for electronic hardware, and the Instructables website contains detailed instructions for making equipment ranging from air-particle counters to machine tools, all with no intellectual-property protection. Contributors to efforts such as these have a range of motivations (Alphabet's goals with Android were far from purely altruistic—among other things, the parent of Google wanted to achieve a quantum leap in mobile phone users around the world, who would avail themselves of Google Search and services such as YouTube), but they're all part of the trend of technology without excludability, which is great news for growth.

As we saw in chapter 10, smartphone use and access to the Internet are increasing quickly across the planet. This means that people no longer need to be near a decent library or school to gain knowledge and improve their abilities. Globally, people are taking advantage of the skill-building opportunities of new technologies. This is the third reason that the spread of digital tools should make us optimistic about future growth: these tools are helping human capital grow quickly.

The free Duolingo app, for example, is now the world's most popular way to learn a second language. Of the nearly 15 billion Wikipedia page views during July of 2018, half were in languages other than English. Google's chief economist, Hal Varian, points out that hundreds of millions of how-to videos are viewed every day on YouTube, saying, "We never had a technology before that could educate such a broad group of people anytime on an as-needed basis for free."

Romer's work leaves me hopeful because it shows that it's our ability to build human capital, rather than chop down forests, dig mines, or burn fossil fuels that drives growth and prosperity. His model of how economies grow also reinforces how well capitalism and tech progress work together, which is a central point of this book. The surest way to boost profits is to cut costs, and modern technologies, especially digital ones, offer unlimited ways to combine and recombine materials—to swap, slim, optimize, and evaporate—in cost-reducing ways. There's no reason to expect that the two horsemen of capitalism and tech progress will stop riding together anytime soon. Quite the contrary. Romer's insights reveal that they're likely to gallop faster and farther as economies grow.

Our Brighter, Lighter Future

The world still has billions of desperately poor people, but they won't remain that way. All available evidence strongly suggests that most will become much wealthier in the years and decades ahead. As they earn more and consume more, what will be the impact on the planet?

The history and economics of the Industrial Era lead to pessimism on this important question. Resource use increased in lockstep with economic growth throughout the two centuries between James Watt's demonstration of his steam engine and the first Earth Day. Malthus and Jevons seemed to be right, and it was just a question of when, not if, we'd run up against the hard planetary limits to growth.

But in America and other rich countries something strange, unexpected, and wonderful happened: we started getting more from less. We decoupled population and economic growth from resource consumption, pollution, and other environmental harms. Malthus's and Jevons's ideas gave way to Romer's, and the world will never be the same.

This means that instead of worrying about the world's poor becoming richer, we should instead be helping them upgrade economically as much and as quickly as possible. Not only is it the morally correct thing to do, it's also the smart move for our planet. As today’s poor countries get richer, their institutions will improve and most will eventually go through what Ricardo Hausmann calls "the capitalist makeover of production." This makeover doesn't enslave people, nor does it befoul the earth.

As today’s poor get richer, they'll consume more, but they'll also consume much differently from earlier generations. They won't read physical newspapers and magazines. They'll get a great deal of their power from renewables and (one hopes) nuclear because these energy sources will be the cheapest. They’ll live in cities, as we saw in chapter 12; in fact, they already are. They'll be less likely to own cars because a variety of transportation options will be only a few taps away. Most important, they'll come up with ideas that keep the growth going, and that benefit both humanity and the planet we live on.

Predicting exactly how technological progress will unfold is much like predicting the weather: feasible in the short term, but impossible over a longer time. Great uncertainty and complexity prevent precise forecasts about, for example, the computing devices we’ll be using thirty years from now or the dominant types of artificial intelligence in 2050 and beyond.

But even though we can't predict the weather long term, we can accurately forecast the climate. We know how much warmer and sunnier it will be on average in August than in January, for example, and we know that global average temperatures will rise as we keep adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. Similarly, we can predict the "climate" of future technological progress by starting from the knowledge that it will be heavily applied in the areas where it can affect capitalism the most. As we've seen over and over, tech progress supplies opportunities to trim costs (and improve performance) via dematerialization, and capitalism provides the motive to do so.

As a result, the Second Enlightenment will continue as we move deeper into the twenty-first century. I'm confident that it will accelerate as digital technologies continue to improve and multiply and global competition continues to increase. We’ll see some of the most striking examples of slim, swap, evaporate, and optimize in exactly the places where the opportunities are biggest. Here are a few broad predictions, spanning humanity's biggest industries.

Manufacturing. Complex parts will be made not by the techniques developed during the Industrial Era, but instead by three- dimensional printing. This is already the case for some rocket engines and other extremely expensive items. As 3-D printing improves and becomes cheaper, it will spread to automobile engine blocks, manifolds and other complicated arrangements of pipes, airplane struts and wings, and countless other parts. Because 3-D printing generates virtually no waste and doesn't require massive molds, it accelerates dematerialization.

We'll also be building things out of very different materials from what we're using today. We're rapidly improving our ability to use machine learning and massive amounts of computing power to screen the huge number of molecules available in the world. Well use this ability to determine which substances would be best for making flexible solar panels, more efficient batteries, and other important equipment. Our search for the right materials to use has so far been slow and laborious. That's about to change.

So is our ability to understand nature's proteins, and to generate new ones. All living things are made out of the large biomolecules known as proteins, as are wondrous materials such as spiders' silk. The cells in our bodies are assembly lines for proteins, but we currently understand little about how these assembly lines work—how they fold a two-dimensional string of amino acids into a complicated 3-D protein. But thanks to digital tools, we're learning quickly. In 2018, as part of a contest, the AlphaFold software developed by Google DeepMind correctly guessed the structure of twenty-five out of forty-three proteins it was shown; the second-place finisher guessed correctly three times. DeepMind cofounder Demis Hassabis says, "We [haven't] solved the protein-folding problem, this is just a first step... but we have a good system and we have a ton of ideas we haven't implemented yet." As these good ideas accumulate, they might well let us make spider-strength materials.

Energy. One of humanity's most urgent tasks in the twenty-first century is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Two ways to do this are to become more efficient in using energy and, when generating it, to shift away from carbon-emitting fossil fuels. Digital tools will help greatly with both.

Several groups have recently shown that they can combine machine learning and other techniques to increase the energy efficiency of data centers by as much as 30 percent. This large improvement matters for two reasons. First, data centers are heavy users of energy, accounting for about 1 percent of global electricity demand. So efficiencies in these facilities help. Second, and more important, these gains indicate how much the energy use of all our other complicated infrastructures— everything from electricity grids to chemical plants to steel mills—can be trimmed. All are a great deal less energy efficient than they could be. We have both ample opportunity and ample incentive now to improve them.

Both wind and solar power are becoming much cheaper, so much so that in many parts of the world they're now the most cost-effective options, even without government subsidies, for new electrical generators. These energy sources use virtually no resources once they're up and running and generate no greenhouse gases; they're among the world champions of dematerialization.

In the decades to come they might well be joined by nuclear fusion, the astonishingly powerful process that takes place inside the sun and other stars. Harnessing fusion has been tantalizingly out of reach for more than half a century—the old joke is that it's twenty years away and always will be. A big part of the problem is that it's hard to control the fusion reaction inside any human- made vessel, but massive improvements in sensors and computing power are boosting hope that fusion power might truly be only a generation away.

Transportation. Our current transportation systems are chronically inefficient. Most vehicles aren't used much of the time, and even when they’re in use, they're not nearly full. Now that we have technologies that let us know where every driver, passenger, piece of cargo, and vehicle is at all times, we can greatly increase the utilization and efficiency of every element of transportation.

Renting instead of owning transportation is a likely consequence of this shift. Instead of owning cars, which typically sit idle more than 90 percent of the time, more people will choose to access transportation as needed. We're already seeing this with car-hailing companies such as Uber and Lyft. These services are quickly spreading around the world, and expanding to cover more modes of transportation, from motorbikes to bicycles to electric scooters. They're also moving into commercial applications such as long- and short-haul trucking. As this shift continues, we’ll need fewer tons of steel, aluminum, plastic, gasoline, and other resources to move the world's people and goods around.

We might also experience less congestion and gridlock as we try to get around. Bikes and scooters take up little space compared to cars, so streets can accommodate many more of them. Technology also gives us the ability to implement many forms of "congestion pricing," which has been shown to reduce gridlock by making car access to busy streets expensive enough that people use other options. The most intriguing future transportation platform of all might be the sky. The same technologies that power today's small drones can be scaled up to build "air taxis" with as many as eight propellers and no pilot. Such contraptions sound like science fiction today, but they might be carrying us around by midcentury.

Agriculture. As we saw in chapter 5, leading farms have demonstrated an ability to increase their tonnage of output year after year while decreasing their use of inputs such as land, water, and fertilizer. This trend toward optimization will continue thanks to a set of innovations under the label precision agriculture. The precision comes from many sources, including better sensors of plant and animal health, soil quality and moisture, and so on; the ability to deliver fertilizer, pesticides, and water just where they're needed; and machinery that adapts itself to each plant or animal. All these varieties of precision will combine to allow traditional farms to generate more from less.

So will changes to the genomes of plants and animals. DNA modifications will increase disease and drought tolerance, expand where crops can be grown, and allow us to get more of what we want from each crop or herd. As we saw in chapter 9, they'll also allow us to take better care of vulnerable populations such as infants in poor countries by creating golden rice and other nutrition enhancers. We'll also be able to make much more precise and targeted genetic modifications thanks to a new crop of gene-editing tools that are large improvements over their more scattershot predecessors. Opposition to genetically modified organisms is fierce in some quarters, but isn't based on reason or science. This opposition will, one hopes, fade.

Throughout human history, just about all farming has been done in fields. For some crops, this is now changing. Agriculture has moved indoors, where parameters such as light, humidity, fertilizer, and even the composition of the atmosphere can be precisely monitored and controlled. In everything from urban buildings to shipping containers, crops are now being grown with progressively less labor and fewer material inputs. These completely contained farms will spread and help reduce the planetary footprint of our agriculture.

These examples aren't intended to be comprehensive, and I don't have precise estimates of how likely each innovation is, or when it's most likely to occur. I offer them only to indicate how broad and exciting are the possibilities offered by the two horsemen of capitalism and technological progress, and how they’ll continue to dematerialize our consumption and let us increase our prosperity while treading more lightly on our planet.

#### Space privatization is good—it prevents war and ensures sustainably-sourced space projects for public good.

Frankowski 17 [(Paweł, assistant Professor at the Chair of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Institute of Political Science and International Relations, Jagiellonian University) “Outer Space and Private Companies: Consequences for Global Security,” 2017, pg. 144-145] TDI

In the terms of privatization and space security, space remains relatively untapped, but commercial and military benefits from space exploration/exploitation could even lead to ‘privatization of space’. Such privatization will result from growing pressure on spacefaring countries to defect from cooperation, since is less viable with good number of multiple actors who entered the space.36 However, space policy and space research are characterized by very high costs, which are rather impossible to bear by private companies, limited by economic calculation. As pointed out earlier, under-investment in technological development by private companies it is related to the fact that these actors are not focused on profits of a social nature, such as improving the quality of life of the recipient of the product.37 This makes some technology, potentially beneficial to society, not developed or introduced into use, because the profit margin is too small to make this viable for commercial players.

To conclude, privatization of space security can develop in unexpected way, but in today’s space environment private actors would rather play the role of security regulators than security providers. When investment in space technologies is less profitable than other areas of economy, private actors would focus on soft law and conflict prevention in space, and new private initiatives will appear. For example, apart from important space companies, as SpaceX or Blue Origin active in outer space, other private actors as Secure World Foundation (SWF), who focus on space sustainability, will play more important role in crafting international guidelines for space activities.38 This path the way for future solutions and projects, as cleaning the space debris, extracting resources from asteroids and planetoids, refuelling satellites, providing payload capabili-ties for governmental entities on market-based logic, will be based on activity non-state actors, providing soft law and regulatory solutions, where space faring states are unable to find any compromise. Therefore private companies will be in fact global (or space) regulators, as part of UNCOPUS, being involved in space activities.39

The last argument for private involvement in space security comes from an approach based on common good and resilience of space assets, emphasized by the Project Ploughshares, as an important part of space security. As of 2017 there are more than 700,000 man-made objects on the Earth’s orbit bigger than 1 cm, while 17,000 of them are bigger than 10 cm.40 Some of them are traced by SSA systems, both American and European, but these systems are public-military owned, and private operators are not granted any access to this data. Any collision of space object with space debris, even with small particles, might result in a chain reaction, called Kessler’s syndrome, and not only private but public, and military assets will be destroyed or impaired. In such conditions, a reluctant cooperation between the public and private sector, and unwillingness to share vulnerable data by public actors seem to confirm that private space activity is more than necessary. This is an apparent case when logic of mistrust between state powers must be overcome by private actors, perhaps by suggesting common preferences for debris mitigation, and space situational awareness. In the case of space debris, Space Data Association, an initiative supported by private sector, with its main aim to enhance data sharing between commercial satellite operators, could be an example of nascent public good provided by private actors for the sake of global security.