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**The topic should define the division of affirmative and negative ground**

#### Resolved means a legislative policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964. ED

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### WTO member nations are all except 14 countries.

Amadeo 20 Kimberly Amadeo, 2020, “How Does a Country Become a WTO Member?,” The Balance, [Kimberly Amadeo is president of World Money Watch, where she shares her expertise on U.S. and world economies, as well as investing. The company produces publications about the global economy that are easy to understand, succinct, and full of practical information. Examples include "[The Ultimate Obamacare Handbook](https://www.amazon.com/Ultimate-Obamacare-Handbook-2015%C2%962016-Responsibilities/dp/1634505611/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1441059391&sr=1-1&keywords=the+ultimate+obamacare+handbook&pebp=1441059373218&perid=0DKBJYZ6ZR5WD40EFJF8)" published in 2015, and "[Beyond the Great Recession](https://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Great-Recession-Happened-Prosper/dp/0984532706/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1333307640&sr=1-1)" published in 2010. Prior to reaching a milestone of 20 years of experience in economic analysis and business strategy, Kimberly received her master's in business administration from MIT's Sloan School of Management. Kimberly has been featured as an expert on the PBS program "[To the Contrary](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6eS1y22i88o&feature=youtu.be)" discussing unemployment, as well as Varney & Co., a news talk show on the Fox Business Network, NBC News, and CCTV America. Other features where Kimberly can be heard discussing the state of the economy include U.S. News and World Report, The Dallas Morning News, Forbes, Industry Week, and the Washington Post.] <https://www.thebalance.com/how-does-a-country-become-a-wto-member-3306362>, //SLCAMRRK

Only 14 countries are not WTO members. These nations do not wish to become members. They are Aruba, Eritrea, Kiribati, Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, North Korea, Palau, the Palestinian Territories, San Marino, Sint Maarten, and Tuvalu.

#### Reductions are down to smaller amounts.

Court of Appeals of Oregon 06. Robert A. FOLKERS, Jr., Petitioner-Cross-Respondent, v. LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent-Cross-Petitioner. FDA-01-09; A123667. <https://caselaw.findlaw.com/or-court-of-appeals/1490635.html>

Petitioner seeks judicial review of the decision of the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board (the board) dismissing his appeal.   After respondent Lincoln County School District (the district) unilaterally amended his employment contract by increasing the number of days of work without increasing his pay, petitioner appealed to the board.   The board concluded that the district's action was not a “reduction in pay” and, hence, not an action over which the board had subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

The pertinent facts are undisputed.   Petitioner was a licensed school administrator.   From 1993 to 1998, he was principal of a kindergarten-through-12th-grade school in the district.   In 1998, the district reassigned him to be assistant principal at a high school.   In 2000, petitioner signed a three-year contract with the district that set his monthly salary for the contract year and required 220 work days for the year.   During the first year of that contract, however, the district adopted a new employee compensation plan covering the period from July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2006.   Pursuant to that plan, the district set petitioner's salary at essentially the same amount for the 2001-02 contract year as for the previous year 1 but increased the number of work days for the contract year from 220 to 230.   The district sent petitioner a document informing him of the contract action.   Petitioner signed the document but inserted a statement that he objected to the listed salary and reserved his right to appeal.

Petitioner then filed an appeal with the board contesting the district's action, alleging that it amounted to an unauthorized “reduction in pay.”   In his notice of appeal, petitioner asserted that the district's action constituted a “reduction in pay” within the meaning of ORS 342.845(5)(a), which authorizes administrators to appeal such reductions to the board, and that the reduction was unauthorized because the district had neither “established nor otherwise attempted to establish any grounds for the action.”   The district moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that the appeal was untimely  and that, because the district's action was not a “reduction in pay,” the board lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

The board rejected the district's timeliness argument but agreed that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   The board determined that, under ORS 342.845(5),2 administrators may appeal only two types of actions:  reductions in pay and dismissals.   It rejected petitioner's contention that the district reduced his pay by holding his salary constant but increasing his work year by 10 days.   The board reasoned:

“The statute addresses reductions in pay.   We do not have jurisdiction to consider appeals of changes in other working conditions, whether they be changes in length of day, number of days, duties, location of work, or size of school.   If the legislature wanted us to solve such a complex equation, it would have set forth additional factors for our consideration in the statute.   It did not.   The statute directs us to consider only reductions in pay.   As we said in [McNair v. Springfield School District, FDA 01-06 (2003)], ‘A reduction in pay, using the natural and ordinary meaning of the terms “reduce” and “reduction,” means pay that has been brought down to a smaller amount.’  \* \* \* As in [McNair, petitioner] here did not receive a reduction in pay.   He received the same compensation he had received the prior year.”

#### Intellectual property includes four things

Brewer 19 [(Trevor, advises clients on business structuring and sale transactions, regulatory compliance, third-party contracts, liability protection and general matters facing small business owners. His focus extends beyond legal advice and includes business strategy and wealth preservation.) “WHAT ARE THE FOUR BASIC TYPES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS?” Brewer Long, 5/16/19. <https://brewerlong.com/information/business-law/four-types-of-intellectual-property/>] RR

There are four types of intellectual property rights and protections (although multiple types of intellectual property itself). Securing the correct protection for your property is important, which is why consulting with a lawyer is a must. The four categories of intellectual property protections include:

TRADE SECRETS

Trade secrets refer to specific, private information that is important to a business because it gives the business a competitive advantage in its marketplace. If a trade secret is acquired by another company, it could harm the original holder.

Examples of trade secrets include recipes for certain foods and beverages (like Mrs. Fields’ cookies or Sprite), new inventions, software, processes, and even different marketing strategies.

When a person or business holds a trade secret protection, others cannot copy or steal the idea. In order to establish information as a “trade secret,” and to incur the legal protections associated with trade secrets, businesses must actively behave in a manner that demonstrates their desire to protect the information.

Trade secrets are protected without official registration; however, an owner of a trade secret whose rights are breached–i.e. someone steals their trade secret–may ask a court to ask against that individual and prevent them from using the trade secret.

PATENTS

As defined by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), a patent is a type of limited-duration protection that can be used to protect inventions (or discoveries) that are new, non-obvious, and useful, such a new process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter.

When a property owner holds a patent, others are prevented, under law, from offering for sale, making, or using the product.

COPYRIGHTS

Copyrights and patents are not the same things, although they are often confused. A copyright is a type of intellectual property protection that protects original works of authorship, which might include literary works, music, art, and more. Today, copyrights also protect computer software and architecture.

Copyright protections are automatic; once you create something, it is yours. However, if your rights under copyright protections are infringed and you wish to file a lawsuit, then registration of your copyright will be necessary.

TRADEMARKS

Finally, the fourth type of intellectual property protection is a trademark protection. Remember, patents are used to protect inventions and discoveries and copyrights are used to protect expressions of ideas and creations, like art and writing.

Trademarks, then, refer to phrases, words, or symbols that distinguish the source of a product or services of one party from another. For example, the Nike symbol–which nearly all could easily recognize and identify–is a type of trademark.

While patents and copyrights can expire, trademark rights come from the use of the trademark, and therefore can be held indefinitely. Like a copyright, registration of a trademark is not required, but registering can offer additional advantages.

#### Medicines prevent, diagnose, or treat harms

**MRS 20** [(MAINE REVENUE SERVICE SALES, FUEL & SPECIAL TAX DIVISION) “A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE SALES AND USE TAX LAW” <https://www.maine.gov/revenue/sites/maine.gov.revenue/files/inline-files/Reference%20Guide%202020.pdf> December 2020] SS

[Medicines](https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/medicines) means antibiotics, analgesics, antipyretics, stimulants, sedatives, antitoxins, anesthetics, antipruritics, hormones, antihistamines, certain “dermal fillers” (such as BoTox®), injectable contrast agents, vitamins, oxygen, vaccines and other substances that are used in the prevention, diagnosis or treatment of disease or injury and that either (1) require a prescription in order to be purchased or administered to the retail consumer or patient; or (2) are sold in packaging.

#### Topicality as a procedural constraint is necessary for effective debate

#### They destroy engagement – predictable stasis ensures research accessibility and negative ground. Even if public policy isn’t the best focus for activism, it’s crucial for dialogue because it’s grounded in consistent reporting and academic work.

#### Two impacts -

#### 1) Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by manipulating balance of prep – vote neg b/c debate is a competitive game that’s meaningless without substantive constraints.

#### 2) Also key to have well-prepared opponents. They transform debate into a monologue which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subjected to well researched scrutiny.

#### Also destroys mechanism education—their model creates a structural disincentive to substantial research. Failure to defend the actor and mechanism of the resolution allows them to shift their advocacy to the terms most favorable to them – causes dogmatism and forces the neg into generics at the margins of the literature – destroys good scholarship.

#### Reject the team—T is question of models of debate and the damage to our strategy was already done

#### Competing interps—they have to proactively to justify their model and reasonability links to our offense

### 1NC – DA

#### Liberalism is both inevitable and good – its self-correcting mechanisms maintain global stability, facilitate international cooperation to resolve intractable problems, and raise global standards of living while constantly correcting for failure. Any other system risks global catastrophe and can’t be effectuated anyway given liberalism’s entrenched nature.

Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry ’18, \*Deudney: Associate Professor of political science, international relations and political theory at Johns Hopkins University, received the Alumni Distinguished Teaching Award at Johns Hopkins University, former senior research fellow at the TransAtlantic Academy at the German Marshall Fund, \*\*Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Co-Director of Princeton’s Center for International Security Studies, served as a member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1991-92, as a member of an advisory group at the State Department in 2003-04, and as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on U.S.-European relations, “Liberal World: The Resilient Order,” *Foreign Affairs* 2018, Issue 4, pgs. 18-22

In many respects, today's liberal democratic malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order's success. After the Cold War, that order became a global system, expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political bargains between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. The benefits of globalization and economic expansion were distributed disproportionately to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed. A modulated form of capitalism morphed into winnertake- all casino capitalism. Many new democracies turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows of immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and created openings for opportunistic demagogues.

Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution: a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy. Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current problems call for reforms to better realize them. To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal, pass more progressive taxation, and invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to emphasize education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other words, the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy is more liberal democracy; liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation.

Indeed, liberal democracies have repeatedly recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses. In the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial markets brought about an economic depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But it also triggered the New Deal and social democracy, leading to a more stable form of capitalism. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project, combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of global spaces, deals forged by the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic stagnation, and environmental decay. In response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination agreements, invested in clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at reducing pollutants. The problems that liberal democracies face today, while great, are certainly not more challenging than those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades. Of course, there is no guarantee that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly in the face of repeated historical experiences.

Today's dire predictions ignore these past successes. They suffer from a blinding presentism. Taking what is new and threatening as the master pattern is an understandable reflex in the face of change, but it is almost never a very good guide to the future. Large-scale human arrangements such as liberal democracy rarely change as rapidly or as radically as they seem to in the moment. If history is any guide, today's illiberal populists and authoritarians will evoke resistance and countermovements.

THE RESILIENT ORDER

After World War II, liberal democracies joined together to create an international order that reflected their shared interests. And as is the case with liberal democracy itself, the order that emerged to accompany it cannot be easily undone. For one thing, it is deeply embedded. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people have geared their activities and expectations to the order's institutions and incentives, from farmers to microchip makers. However unappealing aspects of it may be, replacing the liberal order with something significantly different would be extremely difficult. Despite the high expectations they generate, revolutionary moments often fail to make enduring changes. It is unrealistic today to think that a few years of nationalist demagoguery will dramatically undo liberalism.

Growing interdependence makes the order especially difficult to overturn. Ever since its inception in the eighteenth century, liberalism has been deeply committed to the progressive improvement of the human condition through scientific discovery and technological advancements. This Enlightenment project began to bear practical fruits on a large scale in the nineteenth century, transforming virtually every aspect of human life. New techniques for production, communication, transportation, and destruction poured forth. The liberal system has been at the forefront not just of stoking those fires of innovation but also of addressing the negative consequences. Adam Smith's case for free trade, for example, was strengthened when it became easier to establish supply chains across global distances. And the age-old case for peace was vastly strengthened when weapons evolved from being simple and limited in their destruction to the city-busting missiles of the nuclear era. Liberal democratic capitalist societies have thrived and expanded because they have been particularly adept at stimulating and exploiting innovation and at coping with their spillover effects and negative externalities. In short, liberal modernity excels at both harvesting the fruits of modern advance and guarding against its dangers.

This dynamic of constant change and ever-increasing interdependence is only accelerating. Human progress has caused grave harm to the planet and its atmosphere, yet climate change will also require unprecedented levels of international cooperation. With the rise of bioweapons and cyberwarfare, the capabilities to wreak mass destruction are getting cheaper and ever more accessible, making the international regulation of these technologies a vital national security imperative for all countries. At the same time, global capitalism has drawn more people and countries into cross-border webs of exchange, thus making virtually everyone dependent on the competent management of international finance and trade. In the age of global interdependence, even a realist must be an internationalist.

#### Specifically---collapsing US heg means Russia fills in.

Mamuka Tsereteli 18. Tsereteli is a Senior Research Fellow of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at American Foreign Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. 2018. “Can Russia’s Quest for the New International Order Succeed?” Orbis, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 204–219.

At the core of the conflict between the West and Russia is the fundamental disagreement of the current Russian leadership with the post-Cold War European order. Russia is changing realities on the ground to create conditions that will lead to negotiations on a new security architecture for Europe and the entire Northern Hemisphere. The Russian idea of this new system of security is to limit the sovereignty of the countries in its neighborhood and prevent the penetration of Western hard and soft power, as well as its system of values and governance, in the former Soviet space, an area that Russia considers as its sphere of strategic interest. Russian leadership has on several occasions communicated this message to the international community.1 President Vladimir Putin, in his widely publicized 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, expressed Russia’s dissatisfaction with the existing “unipolar” character of the world order. He followed with a harsh criticism of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Western countries in general. He had already criticized the West’s push to fulfill all the conditions of the 1999 revised treaty on Conventional Arm Forces in Europe (CFE), including the removal of all Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova. But most importantly, he stated that “we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.”2 While the speech was publicized widely, world leaders did not take Putin’s statement seriously enough. The Russian leader had a plan that could lead to new realities, forcing others to pay more attention to Russian statements and actions. Implementation of that plan continues to this day. The Russian Federation took the first significant step to shake the existing European status quo in 2007 when Russia officially suspended its participation in the CFE treaty. This move was followed by the events in Georgia in 2008 when the Russian military invaded the territory of the sovereign country and maintained its military presence there after active conflict ended. Russia simultaneously recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions of Georgia, as independent states. All of these actions were publicized as a Russian response to recognizing Kosovo’s independence against the will of Serbia. The same argument was used in 2014. Russian leadership considered NATO’s commitment to Georgia and Ukraine at the 2008 Bucharest summit as a threat to Russia’s security interests. The immediate objective of the Russian Federation was to stop the Eastward expansion of European security and economic institutions. Its long-term goal was to push for a new security arrangement with NATO, the EU, and United States which would recognize Russian supremacy over the sovereign rights of the countries in Russia’s neighborhood. Under the premise of protecting its own sovereignty vis-àvis supra-national organizations and “universal” values,3 the Russian Federation has sought arrangements with Western powers designed to limit the sovereignty of neighboring states. Russia considers this process a legitimate method of ensuring its own security. Sovereignty in this context is understood as the supreme authority within a territory which is exercised in both internal development and external relations.4 The current international relations system is based on the sovereign rights of nation states, both internally and externally sovereign, to ally, trade, conclude agreements, open borders, etc., as well as on the Westphalian premise that interfering in other states’ governing prerogatives is illegitimate.5 The Russian Federation is using military force, coercion, and economic and energy supply disruptions to limit the sovereignty of other countries to prevent their integration into Western led institutions. Russia’s status as the prevailing military power is an essential element of Russian strategy. For Russia, asymmetry in power is a source of asymmetry in sovereignty. Experience of Russian policies vis-à-vis its neighbors, as well as military invasions in Ukraine and Georgia, demonstrates that today’s Russia aggressively pursues power politics to restore control over former Soviet Union space. The West needs a clear strategy to bring Russia back into the system of international norms, and rules and power politics should be part of it. Matching Russian military power in the Black Sea region will send a message that Moscow will understand. Ultimately, various sides need to come back to the basics of the Helsinki process, and the sovereignty of the nation states should remain as a fundamental principle of the stability in Europe.

#### Russian expansion installs a global white supremacist empire.

Lee Edwin Coursey 18. International affairs and history analyst and software engineer in the field of artificial intelligence. 01-07-18. “Russia’s Plan for World Domination – and America’s Unwitting Cooperation With It.” LeeCoWeb. https://www.leecoweb.com/russian\_plan/

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Russia experienced a crushing recession that left millions unemployed. The subsequent vacuum in the decades that followed saw the rapid expansion of the European Union and its single free market eastward. The EU now includes several former Soviet states, including some immediately bordering Russia (e.g., Estonia and Latvia.) More importantly, from a Russian security perspective, the NATO military alliance also expanded aggressively eastward after the Cold War, adding over a dozen European countries as members between 1999 and 2017. This expansion has put NATO allies, and NATO weapons, into countries immediately bordering Russia. The spread of western ideals such as free speech, free and open elections, and multiculturalism into eastern Europe are perceived as a threat to Russian culture and Russian influence. From the Russian point of view, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War was both a humiliating defeat and a harsh rebuke of Soviet-style Communism. A new post-Soviet, neo-fascist political philosophy rose from the ashes of Communism, and Russia is actively engaged in pursuing this philosophy. Their goal is nothing less than the creation of a new Eurasian Empire controlled by, and answering to, Russia. A New Blueprint (or “Putin’s To-Do List”) The Russian political elite could not tolerate the growing threat on their western border, but they needed a new geopolitical strategy – one that would establish goals and methods different from those that had failed the Soviet Union. In 1997, Aleksandr Dugin articulated and defined that new Russian strategy in a 600-page treatise entitled Foundations of Geopolitics. According to historian and Hoover Institution specialist John B. Dunlop, “There has probably not been another book published in Russia during the post-communist period which has exerted an influence on Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites comparable to that of Aleksandr Dugin’s 1997 neo-fascist treatise.” The Foundations of Geopolitics sold out in four editions, and continues to be assigned as a textbook at the General Staff Academy and other military universities in Russia. [source] Eurasian-ism As espoused by Dugin, Russia’s ultimate goal should be nothing less than rule of the world by ethnic Russians, based on a Eurasian empire extending from “Dublin to Vladivostok.” The philosophical basis for this empire will include the rejection of “Atlanticism,” identification of America as a common enemy, and refusal to allow traditional liberal political ideals (e.g., freedom of the press, freedom of speech, free markets, civil rights, etc.,) to affect Russia’s society or political system. According to political scientist Andreas Umland, the Russian political elites, headed by Vladimir Putin, view Dugin’s new Eurasian Empire not as a restoration of an idealized Russian Empire, but as a replacement for the Soviet Union. Eurasianism provides an ideological basis for a new form of Russian imperialism. As for strategic stepping stones toward a new Russian empire, Dugin offers a long list objectives. I have listed just a few of these below: Separate the United Kingdom from Europe. Russian annexation of Ukraine. A strategic alliance between Russia and Iran. Create “geopolitical shocks” within Turkey. Russian annexation of Tibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Finland should be absorbed into Russia. Encourage Germany and France to cooperate with each other and isolate themselves from Europe. Dismember the nation of Georgia. Geopolitical defeat of the United States Sound familiar? In terms of tactics, Foundations of Geopolitics recommends subversion of America and its alliances by encouraging and supporting separatism, isolationism, nationalism, and the creation of factions. It also calls for supporting radical separatist movements in western countries, including support for organizations that espouse extremist, racist, and sectarian ideals. Here is a passage taken directly from Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics (via Dunlop): “It is especially important to introduce geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements — extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S. It would also make sense simultaneously to support isolationist tendencies in American politics.” Evidence Russia Is Actively Pursuing Dugin’s Strategy Russia’s actions, both overt and covert, offer strong indications that her political and military leaders are actively pursuing the strategy described in Foundations. The overt actions include: Russian invasion of the nation of Georgia (2008.) Russian annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine (2014.) Economic and military support for anti-western regimes in Syria and Iran. As for covert (or disguised) actions by the Russian government in support of the Foundations strategy, consider these recent findings from western intelligence and news agencies: BREXIT: “More than 150,000 Russian-language Twitter accounts posted tens of thousands of messages in English urging Britain to leave the European Union in the days before last year’s referendum on the issue. … Most of the messages sought to inflame fears about Muslims and immigrants to help drive the vote.” – New York Times, 15-NOV-2017 US ELECTIONS: “Posts that circulated to a targeted, swing-state audience on Facebook railed against illegal immigrants and claimed “the only viable option is to elect Trump.” They were shared by what looked like a grassroots American, anti-immigrant group called Secured Borders, but Congressional investigators say the group is actually a Russian fabrication designed to influence American voters during and after the presidential election.” – ABC News, 27-SEP-2017 US ELECTIONS: “Russian agents intending to sow discord among American citizens disseminated inflammatory posts that reached 126 million users on Facebook, published more than 131,000 messages on Twitter and uploaded over 1,000 videos to Google’s YouTube service.” – New York Times, 30-OCT-2017 US ELECTIONS: “In July 2015, Russian intelligence gained access to Democratic National Committee (DNC) networks and maintained that access until at least June 2016.” – Findings from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 6-JAN-2017 US SOCIAL UNREST: “Two Russian Facebook pages organized dueling rallies in front of the Islamic Da’wah Center of Houston. Heart of Texas, a Russian-controlled Facebook group that promoted Texas secession, leaned into an image of the state as a land of guns and barbecue and amassed hundreds of thousands of followers. One of their ads on Facebook announced a noon rally on May 21, 2016 to “Stop Islamification of Texas.” A separate Russian-sponsored group, United Muslims of America, advertised a “Save Islamic Knowledge” rally for the same place and time. – The Texas Tribune, 1-NOV-2017 US SOCIAL UNREST: “A social media campaign calling itself “Blacktivist” and linked to the Russian government used both Facebook and Twitter in an apparent attempt to amplify racial tensions during the U.S. presidential election. Both Blacktivist accounts regularly shared content intended to stoke outrage. “Black people should wake up as soon as possible,” one post on the Twitter account read. “Black families are divided and destroyed by mass incarceration and death of black men,” another read. The accounts also posted videos of police violence against African Americans. These fake accounts provide further evidence that Russian-linked social media accounts saw racial tensions as something to be exploited in order to achieve the broader Russian goal of dividing Americans and creating chaos.” CNN, 28-SEP-2017 NOTE TO READERS: Even in light of the information above, I DO NOT necessarily believe that Hillary Clinton would have won the 2016 US Presidential election in the absence of Russian interference – I simply do not have enough data from which to draw that conclusion. I am however certain that Russia wanted Trump to win and spent millions of dollars on propaganda directed at Americans toward that end. How We (Americans) Are Helping Russia Achieve Its Imperialistic Goals Russian propaganda and incitements to separatism are spread through social media, and their success depends on our willingness to reflexively share stories that outrage us. As unwitting agents for Russia, each of us is helping spread the seeds of our own political and economic demise. Hundreds of fake Facebook accounts operating from within Russia purchased $100,000 worth of Facebook ads between mid-2015 and early 2017. These fake Facebook accounts managed to reach 126 million Facebook users during this time frame. Besides their sheer volume, one of the most striking aspects of the ads purchased by these fake accounts is their alignment with the strategy described in Foundations of Geopolitics, namely the creation of division and mistrust among Americans. Alex Stamos, the Chief Information Security Officer for Facebook, issued a statement about the ad placements on September 6, 2017. In it, he made these observations: The vast majority of ads run by these accounts didn’t specifically reference the US presidential election, voting or a particular candidate. Rather, the ads and accounts appeared to focus on amplifying divisive social and political messages across the ideological spectrum — touching on topics from LGBT matters to race issues to immigration to gun rights.

#### That will be drastically worse than the US.

Richard **Arnold 15**. Muskingum University. 05/2015. “Systematic Racist Violence in Russia between ‘Hate Crime’ and ‘Ethnic Conflict.’” Theoretical Criminology, edited by Gavin Slade and Matthew Light, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 239–256.

Scope and characteristics of systematic racist violence in Russia One of the most visible social movements in contemporary Russia, especially following the invasion of Crimea under the pretext of saving ethnic Russians from the allegedly ‘fascist’ Ukrainian government, is the extreme nationalist or ‘skinhead’ movement. After the fall of the Soviet Union, many observers worried about a so-called ‘Weimar Russia’ scenario (Brubaker, 1996; Luks, 2008; Yanov, 1995), noting the similarities between Germany after the First World War and Russia after the Cold War. Both cases featured legends about an internal enemy, a rejection of the West as a model of development, an ethnic diaspora living outside of the country, a transition from a highly regimented to a more open society, and the revenge of former elites. Although this analogy should not be overdrawn (see Luks, 2008), a further parallel between the two cases lies in the explosion of Russia’s skinhead subculture from about the year 2000. Shnirel’man (2007, 28; citing Tarasov, 2006: 19) estimates the number of skinheads in Russia in 1996 at between 7000 and 8000.5 By 2007, this number had grown to 60,000–65,000, or, as noted above, roughly half the world’s total skinhead population, with organized groups in some 85 Russian cities. Moreover, racist violence by skinhead groups now occurs in Russia on a near-daily basis. Although there are no official published statistics, annual reports from a major NGO, Moscow’s SOVA Center (Verkhovskii, 2005, 2006, 2007; Verkhovskii et al., 2010, 2012, 2013), catalogue incidents of skinhead violence. The level of racist violence was highest between 2005 and 2009, after which (as I describe below) the state belatedly stepped up its policing efforts. In 2007, SOVA recorded skinheads as killing 97 people and beating 623. In 2009, the respective numbers were 94 and 443. This number may be an underestimate, as SOVA compiles its data from reports in regional newspapers and regional networks of monitoring experts (Arnold, 2010b). It is likely that many incidents of racist violence do not get included in these regional data, and thus in SOVA reports, because victims are afraid to report their attacks. To measure the scale of underreporting, Amnesty International conducted a survey of ethnic minorities in Moscow, finding that just 61 of 204 racist attacks were reported to the police (McClintock, 2005: 70). These data make Russia the most violent country in the former Soviet Union for ethnic and racial minorities, far outstripping the next most dangerous country, Ukraine, where, even accounting for the difference in population size (roughly one-third of Russia’s), the statistics are much lower. In 2006, for instance, 522 people were beaten in Russia and 66 killed in racist crimes. For comparison, in Ukraine there were 12 beaten and two killed. In 2008, in Russia 434 people were beaten and 97 killed. In the same year in Ukraine, there were 79 beaten and four killed (Umland and Shekhovtsov, 2013: 48). While there has been a decline in racist violence since its peak in 2008, skinheads still remain a potent force in Russia, with 187 deaths and 206 people wounded in 2012 (Verkhovskii et al., 2013: 130–137). Racist groups still thrive in Russia and form a substantial portion of the social support for Putin’s ‘Novorossia’ policy of reuniting ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine (see Arnold, 2014c). Comparisons with the West are more difficult. The best available resource, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) report on systematic racist violence for 2012, recorded nine violent hate crimes in Austria, 98 hate crimes of violence in Germany, one case in the United States, and 10 in the United Kingdom. The same report estimated violent racist crimes in Russia at over 120. The level of racist violence in contemporary Russia is thus the highest in the OSCE. These statistics are almost certainly undercounted for every country and especially so in Russia.6 In looking for historical parallels, one author reports that ‘during the 1980s … the tally of skinhead violence [in the United States] included 121 murders of blacks and gays in urban areas across the nation, 302 racial assaults, and 301 cross burnings’ (Bowling, 1998; Wooden, 1991, cf. Hamm, 1993: 3). The level of racist violence for one year in Russia is thus higher than the entire decade in the United States where Americans were most concerned about this violence. Thus, Russia experiences a very high level of racist violence compared to other OECD countries. Statistics on the number of racist crimes, moreover, do not capture the qualitative differences between them, which further reveal the systematic nature of Russian racist violence. Elsewhere (Arnold, 2009), I have disaggregated the concept ‘ethnic violence’ (of which racist violence is a part) committed by skinheads into four ideal-types: symbolic violence; lynching; pogrom; and massacre. Symbolic violence refers to non-widespread property damage such as graffiti, and pogrom to widespread property damage. Lynching refers to the murder or physical injury of persons. Finally, massacre refers to widespread physical injury and killing of persons. The type of skinhead violence varies by the ethnicity of the subject. Most symbolic violence is used against Jews, as in the spate of anti-Semitic signs erected in Russia by the side of highways from 2002 to 2005. Most lynching is used against Africans, as in the 2002 beating of an African-American US embassy guard. Most pogrom-style violence is used against migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia, as in the 2002 skinhead raid on the Tsaritsino open-air market in Moscow, the 2006 pogrom in the town of Kondopoga, and the 2013 pogrom in Birulyevo, a Moscow suburb. Massacre is most commonly used against the Roma, as in a 2006 incident outside Volgograd when skinheads armed with iron bars beat eight Roma in their camp. This use of racist violence to send such inter-community messages reflects its systemic nature. Explaining the proliferation of skinheads in Russia and abroad Several aspects of post-Soviet social change contribute to racist violence and skinhead proliferation. Part of the attraction of the skinhead subculture in Russia comes from (mainly) young people’s problems of anomie and alienation. One of the most commonly cited causes of skinhead groups in the West is economic decline (Bowling, 1998: 54; Hamm, 1993: 215–216). Unemployed youths with time on their hands need outlets for their frustration. Just as the rise of the skinhead movements in Britain and the United States coincided with industrial decline, Russia experienced an even more precipitous economic decline in the 1990s. Despite economic recovery in the 2000s, unemployment, poor career prospects, and lack of entertainment options remain a problem for many Russian young people. Without the ideological glue of communism, social bonds have frayed as Russian society struggles to find new social legitimations. Elsewhere in the world, racist ideas have historically appealed to young men unhappy with their prospects, as studies of white supremacism in the United States have shown (Hamm, 1993: 211–213). In Russia, however, the 1990s economic and ideological collapse was more severe than any analogous transformation in contemporary western societies, so that organized racism truly emerged as an ‘alternative to Communism’ (Shnirel’man, 2007: 58). As with homicide (see Lysova and Shchitov, this issue), Russia’s persistently high levels of racist violence thus reflect not so much temporary economic hardship as the continuing failure to create an appealing alternative to the communist system. As in other developed countries, Russian skinhead groups violently reject immigration (and internal migration) by ethnic minorities. Extremist groups regularly refer to a ‘genocide’ of ethnic Russians,7 playing on widespread racialized fears of demographic decline. In 1993 Russia’s population stood at 148.6 million but by 2012 had declined to 143 million, the largest peacetime population decline ever recorded in any modern country (Heleniak, 2013). The decline is largely explained by low fertility rates and a low male life expectancy (which in the 2000s fell to 57.5 years). To make up for the labor shortfall, Russia has experienced increased immigration from other post-Soviet countries, most of whom are drawn from non-Russian ethnic groups, such as Armenians, Azeris, and Georgians from the Caucasus, and Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks from Central Asia. Heleniak offers the claim (which Russian officials are fond of repeating) that Russia now has the secondlargest number of immigrants in the world after the United States, including some five to six million undocumented immigrants. The official Muslim population grew from 7.9 percent of the total in the 1989 census to 10.2 percent in 2012, a likely underestimate, given heavily Muslim undocumented immigration from Central Asia. Could one, then, argue that Russia’s skinhead violence was somehow directly produced by higher levels of immigration and resulting ethnic and cultural changes? To be sure, immigration clearly figures into the rise of Russian skinheads, just as the original skinhead movement itself grew out of the ‘Teddy Boy’ subculture that emerged in post- Second World War Britain in part as a reaction to what was then a new phenomenon, large-scale non-white immigration from the Commonwealth (Hamm, 1993: 15–17). However, the ‘fact of’ immigration should be distinguished from the ‘response to’ it in seeking to explain the extreme growth of systematic racist violence in post-1991 Russia. If immigration itself, or even large-scale non-white immigration, produced such violence, then countries of immigration such as Canada and Australia would today be world leaders in such violence. Thus, as an analytical matter, Russia’s skinhead problem is puzzlingly large even for a major immigration-receiving country. In consequence, it is more promising to consider how immigration is received in a given society than to treat immigration as an objective cause of racist violence. Only a discursive and political analysis can explain why Russian society has become particularly fertile ground for such violence. Discursive and ideological factors Pseudo-scientific racism has a longer pedigree in Russia than one might suppose. Although in the USSR such racism was largely constrained by the regime’s official ‘socialist internationalism’, racist ideas entered Russian intellectual life even before the fall of communism. The ‘Soviet Theory of Ethnos’, formulated in the late 1970s, claimed that ethnic distinctions were real and immutable, and had evolved in dialogue with the local environment (Tishkov, 1997). Thus, Lev Gumilev (1990) theorized in Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere that the behavior of ancient nomadic tribes could be traced to fluctuations in solar radiation based on their geographic location. This was fertile soil for more doctrinaire racist thinking. By 1997, there were 10 neo-pagan groups in Moscow and Leningrad alone. The neo-pagans and in particular their most prominent figure, Aleksandr Dugin, preserved theories espoused by Nazi thinkers. Dugin is a former professor at Moscow State University, the chief ideologist of the ‘Eurasian’ movement in Russia, a consultant for the Kremlin, and frequent participant in televised debates.8 In this milieu, the idea of the ‘Great White Race’ appeared with specifically Eurasian characteristics (Moroz, 2005). In the post-Soviet era, such views have become more widespread and have won official backing. Indeed, since the 1990s, the idea of the Aryan origin of the Russian people has discreetly entered into academic studies of history … In 1999 [several individuals] founded an organization Biblioteka rasovoi mysli (‘library of racial thinking’) which publishes nineteenth and twentieth century works on physical anthropology, some of them by Russians but primarily by Western authors. (Laruelle, 2010: 26) These Aryan ideas have evidently played out in at least some documented acts of racist violence. For example, anti-Semitic neo-pagan literature was found in the possession of a young man who walked into a synagogue in 2006, shouting ‘I will kill Jews’, and stabbed several congregants (Shnirel’man, 2007: 88–89). Such ideas may also influence Russian government policy, as think-tanks espousing racist ideas have emerged.9 As a related matter, officially promoted Russian chauvinism has made a substantial comeback during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Some authors describe Putin’s ideology as ‘civilizational nationalism’—the idea that Russia represents a different and better version of modernity than the West (Verkhovskii and Payin, 2012) and has its own Sonderweg, or special historical path. Such a ‘special path’ was implicit in the claim by Putin’s chief ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, that Russia is a ‘sovereign democracy’ that does not need to imitate the institutions of liberal democracy. This ‘civilizational nationalism’ is attractive to the Kremlin because it helps square a particular ideological circle. While the direct endorsement of ethnic Russian chauvinism (or overt racism) might be destabilizing for a multiethnic country such as Russia and would lead to condemnation from western officials, the claim that Russia is distinct from the West and does not need its institutions gives the regime an ideological basis that some people in Russia find appealing, and also deflects criticisms of Putin’s undemocratic practices. In addition to this official endorsement of exclusionary nationalism, particular official attitudes toward the management of ethnic diversity and geographic mobility may facilitate the rise of skinheads. These attitudes predate the current Russian regime. While the Soviet Union formally endorsed ethnic diversity, it adopted a primordialist view of ethnicity as unchanging and linked to specific historic ‘homelands’ in which particular ethnic groups could flourish. This ideology was reflected in the ethno-federal structure of the USSR, with 15 republics ostensibly determined by the dominant ethnic groups within them, as well as formally autonomous ethnic homelands for the non-Slavic ethnic groups within the Russian republic (Slezkine, 1994). Even in the post-Soviet period, Tishkov (1997) argues that primordial conceptions of ethnicity still dominate the Russian intellectual establishment. This can be seen in the widely popular concept of ‘ethnic distance,’ identified by Payin and Susarov (1996: 53), namely ‘the cultural differences between the representatives of different ethnic groups that limit capacities for mutual adaptation’. Such a position implicitly presents hostile interactions as an inevitable part of inter-cultural encounters. Russian officials exhibit hostility to the emergence of new cultural practices as a result of migration. The Soviet government strictly regulated emigration, immigration, and internal migration using a complex system of internal passports and ‘residence permits’ (propiska) (Light, 2012b). Soviet migration policies also entailed the mass displacement of populations for reasons of state. Hill (2003) argues that the Soviet leadership conceived of territory without a population as a security risk and so relocated vast numbers of people to Siberia, where there was neither the climate nor the economic base to support them. In addition, although Soviet migration management had a number of goals, including political surveillance and economic mobilization, it was also used to govern specific ethnic groups, such as the ‘punished peoples’ whom Stalin subjected to internal exile during the Second World War (Polian, 2004). Although the 1993 post-Soviet Russian constitution repudiated the previous draconian migration restrictions, their residue remains in much policy and practice. Thus, some regions of Russia, such as the southern province of Krasnodar, continue to limit residence rights based on ethnicity, although such restrictions are formally illegal (Kuznetsov and Popov, 2008). Moreover, much official discourse is still premised on assumptions derived from Soviet policies concerning the geographic boundaries of particular cultures. This means, in effect, that certain cultural practices, or certain people, are ‘out of place’, even when they are legally present. In consequence, although migration per se is not new in contemporary Russia (as the Soviet Union also featured extensive internal migration), neither Russian society as a whole nor political elites are well prepared to accept the consequences of post-Soviet migration, whether in the appearance of new ethnic minorities throughout Russia, or the cultural or religious practices of such new migrant communities. For example, the population of Soviet-era Moscow was overwhelmingly ethnically Russian, although Moscow was the capital of a multi-ethnic state in which Russians were barely half the national population (Colton, 1995: 407). Today, post-Soviet migration has created a truly multiethnic Moscow, with millions of residents from Central Asia and the Caucasus and the largest Muslim population of any European city. Yet the Moscow government and many residents continue to reject public expressions of non-Russian culture, often in highly 248 Theoretical Criminology 19(2) racist terms (Light, 2010; Vendina, 2013). Likewise, although post-Soviet migration has produced Muslim communities in new regions of Russia, their right to practice their religion is widely infringed, often through the official argument that Islam is not a traditional religion of the region (Light, 2012a). Thus, the effects of increased non-ethnic Russian immigration on racist violence are not direct, but rather are mediated through official ambivalence about racial and cultural equality and the rights of migrants. Primordial concepts of identity, geographically circumscribed ethnic homelands, and ‘ethnic distance’ provide tacit legitimation for racist violence, or at least limit the extent to which official condemnation of racist violence can be effective. Although the exact influence of such attitudes on systematic racist violence would be difficult to capture, they are clearly part of the milieu in which it flourishes. They are also reflected in lax enforcement policies that have facilitated the infiltration of Russia by western skinhead groups, as I chart below. Official passivity and international connections No country has a sterling record when it comes to fighting racist violence. Scholarly analysis should consider the degree of official involvement or complicity in such violence, as well as the historical trajectory of the official response. In the United Kingdom, it took a series of violent events (most notably the 1993 death of Stephen Lawrence) to make the police take the problem of violent racism seriously (Bowling, 1998). Formally non-state but effectively state-sanctioned violence—widespread lynching of African- Americans—continued in the United States from the end of the Civil War through the 1960s. And many western societies, including the United States, continue to experience racialized police violence against minorities. Even so, in post-Soviet Russia, it has proved especially challenging to build a professional police force capable and willing to investigate racist violence effectively. In part, this is because racist attitudes are widespread in the police themselves and openly displayed, as evidenced in a study of police ethnic profiling on the Moscow metro which found ‘the most extreme and egregious ethnic profiling ever documented through a statistical survey of the practice’ (Open Society, 2006: 31). Light (2010) links such profiling to violent police extortion practices targeting minorities with the tacit approval of city officials. Other factors are also important. In part, investigation and prosecution of hate crimes may suffer from broader problems of police management and service (see Light et al., this issue). The Russian government has consciously refrained from aggressive prosecution of racist hate crimes, probably because such prosecutions would interfere with the official promotion of Russian nationalism (Schenk, 2010: 114). The government has often preferred to bring charges of ‘hooliganism’ rather than charges of racist violence, even when the latter would clearly have been appropriate, suggesting an unwillingness to acknowledge the problem or tackle it seriously. Yet it is not all bad news. Since 2009, for instance, the state has begun prosecuting racist violence with greater vigor in an attempt to defang the neo-Nazi movement, after several high-profile skinhead attacks on officials (Verkhovskii et al., 2013). Thus, in 2010, there were 91 hate crimes convictions affecting 297 people, and in 2011, 61 convictions affecting 193 people. These figures can be compared with the 23 convictions Arnold 249 affecting 65 people in 2007, when hate crimes were at their most frequent. Nonetheless, the increase in prosecution may just reflect concerns about the potential of racist organizations to challenge the state itself rather than a fundamental change in official policy, let alone a newfound desire to protect ethnic minorities against racial violence. One effect of the official unwillingness to confront racist violence has been the infiltration into Russia of international racist organizations. In the early 1990s, racist groups in the United States, Britain, and Germany began establishing branches in Russia (Belikov, 2011). Shnirel’man (2007: 23) identifies 1997 as a turning point, when Russian skinheads started to ‘get regular support from their European and American brethren’. Such support initially came from the American Ku Klux Klan and German skinhead groups such as ‘The Right Union’ and ‘Young Vikings’, who gave their Russian counterparts literature, uniforms, and audio-cassettes with recorded speeches about ‘white internationalism’. Other skinhead groups, such as the British ‘Blood and Honor/Combat 18’ and ‘The White Bulldogs’ also set up Russian ‘franchises’. A special Russian forum has existed on the international skinhead ‘Stormfront’ website since 2002. There is evidence that such transnational racism motivates systematic violent racism in Russia. Thus, in October 2013, some youths attacked the Biru-za shopping center in southern Moscow, while shouting ‘White power!’—in English. Moreover, prominent western and Russian racists have become increasingly friendly over the years, sometimes with official involvement. At an international racist convention in 2006, attended by former Louisiana state senator and leader of the Ku Klux Klan David Duke, Russia was designated as the ‘white world’s future’ and the ‘great hope’ of the white race (Arnold and Romanova, 2013). The conference concluded with exhortations to construct a new racially homogenous home in Russia, styled the ‘white Eurasia’ or ‘white Siberia’. Other international meetings of western and Russian racists have followed, with a 2007 conference in Yalta, and presentations in Belgium by Russian racist ideologue Pavel Tulaev. Likewise, in October 2014, the ‘Eurasianist’ Aleksandr Dugin met with US and European racists in Budapest (Arnold, 2014a). Figures close to the Kremlin have also funded similar racist and homophobic conferences (Shekhovtsov, 2015). Indeed, the Kremlin has been courting the leaders of European Far Right parties, such as Marine Le Pen, leader of the French Front Nationale; Nick Griffin, the leader of the British National Party; leaders of the Belgian racist movement Vlaams Belang; and Gabor Vona of Hungary’s racist party, Jobbik (Shekhovtsov, 2015). Members of these parties helped monitor the ‘referendum’ in Crimea on its annexation by Russia in 2014, suggesting that the Russian government can now mobilize international right-wing support for its policies.10

### 1NC – CP

#### We advocate that the United States federal government adopt the Green New Deal.

#### Green New Deal framework unites policy vision, moral framework, and power analysis to address climate change, racial injustice, and economic deprivation. The racist legacy of environmental injustice proves the need to craft a new vision rather than give in to inevitability of failure.

Rhiana **GUNN-WRIGHT** Climate Policy Director @ Roosevelt Inst. ‘**20** in *Winning the Green New Deal* eds. Prakash & Guido Girgenti p. ecopy not paginated

People often ask me why I decided to help develop the Green New Deal. Why did I, a twentysomething black woman, think I could help develop a policy proposal to address something as big as climate change? Often, I think they expect some grand story: about incredible courage or deep ambition or a master plan for the revolution. The truth is that I was scared—and I really needed a job.t

I grew up, raised by my mother and grandmother, in the same house that my mother grew up in, in a neighborhood on the South Side of Chicago called Englewood. In the thirty years between my grandparents moving in with their three babies and me being born, Englewood had gone from being a (mostly) middle-income community, close-knit and quiet, to one of the poorest, most barren parts of the city. My neighborhood had so many problems: poverty, unemployment, underfunded schools, police brutality, pollution, violence. And those were just the big ones. I rarely saw anyone in power try to solve the problems in Englewood. And when they did try, it seemed to make things worse.

When I asked my mom and grandma why Englewood looked like this, they didn’t tell me about guns or drugs or gangs. They told me about the government. About how the highway system had been built through black neighborhoods, destroying communities that would never be rebuilt. About the public housing authority razing public housing and scattering families in the name of “urban development,” only for city officials to turn around and sell the land to developers on the cheap, now that the projects sat on prime real estate. About the city underfunding black schools and then shutting them down because of “underperformance.” And that’s just what happened to my neighborhood—not even what happened to my family. At the time I’m writing this, I now know that:

My grandmother’s family was not eligible for Social Security for at least fifteen years because her mother was a washerwoman, and the New Deal excluded agricultural and domestic workers (nearly all black at the time) from Social Security—President Roosevelt needed to secure votes from Southern Democrats and Southern Democrats needed cheap labor from economically vulnerable black people.

My grandfather bought our house without any help from the GI Bill, despite being a veteran of the Korean War. My mother told me that he was too proud to apply. The truth is, pride or not, the government denied home loans to black veterans, and the notorious redlining in Chicago meant that he wouldn’t have been approved anyway.

I grew up in a frontline community—meaning that I lived in an area close to a pollution source and with high levels of air pollution. I developed asthma, like most of my friends in my neighborhood. I could barely run until I was in my late teens, and I regularly missed school, which, in turn, meant that my self-employed mother had to miss work. My mother and I had no idea that I was sick because of where we lived. My lungs are weakened to this day.

Progress came with a price, and the price was us. And by the time the Green New Deal came into my life, I would be damned before I paid another dime.

WHAT IS POLICY?

I have spent my life trying to rewrite systems of power, and policy is nothing if not a system for creating and distributing power**.** This is, of course, not how most people think of public policy. In fact, most “official” definitions of policy say something like this:

Policy [is] a statement by government—at whatever level, in whatever form—of what it intends to do about a public problem. Such statements can be found in the Constitution, statutes, regulation, case law (that is, court decisions), agency or leadership decisions, or even in changes of the behavior of government officials at all levels. For example, a law that says that those caught driving while intoxicated will go to jail for up to one year is a statement of governmental policy to punish drunk drivers. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is a statement of government policy toward the environment….

And: “Policy is what the government chooses to do or not to do” about a public problem.

This is all true. But definitions like this make policy design sound like it’s orderly and contained—much like going to the doctor. You have a problem; the doctor diagnoses it; you two find the best treatment. Creating policy is more like going to the doctor with a problem, having fifteen people argue about if it’s a “real” problem that requires a doctor to begin with, then having five of those people (plus some new strangers!) start arguing anew about what the cause of the problem is, only to be interrupted by the doctor’s boss coming in to tell them that they can only choose two of five possible treatment options because the other three would hurt the hospital’s bottom line. And once treatment begins, people argue over how to determine whether it’s successful and if it should be reversed to save money or time.

Policymaking is not a science. It is a fight over whose problems get addressed, how those problems are addressed, and how public power and resources are distributed. If politics is a fight to elect people who reflect and share our values, policy is a fight to actually enact those values—to mold the world, through the work of government, into what we think it should be.

That is why, contrary to popular belief, the most important part of a policy proposal is not the details—at least at the beginning. It’s the vision that the policy presents. As a statement about what the government is going to do, policy inherently tells a story about what went wrong, how the government can fix it, and who has power to shape society—whether it’s the state or the public or corporations. The best policies tell compelling stories, galvanizing legislators and citizens to fight for them, and provide public servants with a clear purpose when they sit down to implement the details. The stories may shift as opponents pick new battles; the details may need tweaks or overhauls as unexpected challenges emerge. A coherent policy vision provides the foundation that both the stories and the details draw upon. Three pillars—the problem, principles, and power—form that foundation, and anchor policymaking from conception to execution.

Problems are the center of any public policy. Because policy is the government’s response to a problem, policy can only be created if we agree that an issue constitutes not just a problem but a public problem—that is, a problem that affects the public that cannot be solved without the government. How we define the scope and origin of the problem determines how we’ll craft a solution. That’s why fossil fuel companies spend millions to sow doubts about the urgency of the climate crisis and cover up their culpability. It’s not just about saving face; it’s about changing our understanding of the problem and preventing government action.

Principles. Policymakers need a compass to navigate the near-infinite variety of policy designs, and principles— which include both our moral values and our theories of government—provide that compass. Remember, policymaking is collective problem-solving—not an objective “science.” Policymaking, like all decision-making, is guided not only by facts but by our values—about freedom and justice, about what we deserve, about what “other people” deserve and, perhaps most crucially, about what the government should and should not do. Principles are, in short, the moral and intellectual core of a policy. They define not only how we engage with a problem but what solutions we consider at all.

Problems in our society are rooted in power. Asking why a problem remains unresolved leads to questions of power: Who wields it and to what end? Are the powerful negligent or malevolent? By directing and entrenching flows of government resources and attention, policy always shapes the distribution of power. Effective, lasting policy changes must change the distributions of power that led to the problem initially, or else the old malefactors will undermine any success. When selecting the mechanisms a policy will use (a loan; a new legal protection; a direct public investment; a new federal agency), policymakers are deciding how to maintain or disrupt the balance of power. And this is not limited to power in the public sector. Governments write the laws, enforce the contracts, and build the infrastructure that make a society and economy possible. Policy changes reverberate beyond the public sector into every domain of our lives.

Problems, principles, and power are the pillars of any policy vision. Together, they animate the policymaking process, guiding not just the story policymakers tell but the decisions they make about what should (or should not) be included in a given proposal.

IS THE GREEN NEW DEAL A POLICY?

The Green New Deal is a proposal for a ten-year economic mobilization to rapidly transition the US to a zero-carbon economy and, in so doing so, regenerate and reorganize the US economy in ways that significantly reduce inequality and redress legacies of systemic oppression. The congressional Green New Deal (“GND”) resolution has five goals:

1. Achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just transition for all communities and workers.

2. Create millions of good, high-wage jobs and ensure prosperity and economic security for all people of the United States.

3. Invest in the infrastructure and industry of the United States to sustainably meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

4. Secure clean air and water, climate and community resilience, healthy food, access to nature, and a sustainable environment for all.

5. Promote justice and equity by stopping current, preventing future, and repairing historic oppression of frontline and vulnerable communities, including Indigenous peoples, communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, lowincome workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and youth.

The GND resolution proposes to achieve these goals in two ways. The first is through a set of “projects” that, if completed, would nearly eliminate carbon emissions in the US. The second is through a set of policies that aim to protect Americans from the disruption and instability that transitioning away from fossil fuels will create and reduce inequity. Some people like to refer to the first set of projects as the “Green” part of the GND and the second as the “New Deal” part. While this may be a helpful rhetorical device, it is a dangerous way to conceptualize the GND. All parts of the GND advance decarbonization—even the “non-climate” policies like universal health care, education, and job training. Similarly, the “green” projects can help reduce inequity if they are designed to create millions of wellpaying jobs, bolster worker power, invest in local communities, and strengthen the social safety net—all of which the Green New Deal proposes to do. Addressing decarbonization and inequality simultaneously has prompted critics to accuse the GND of being a “progressive wish list,” not a policy. Their criticism often reveals a narrow policy vision guiding their thinking. The problem is simply the carbon in the atmosphere; Mr. Policy Doctor will prescribe the correct solution based on science; imbalances of power are mostly irrelevant, too difficult to disrupt when an urgent crisis needs solving. This is a compelling story. But it cannot guide policymakers tasked with averting catastrophic warming, as many authors in this book show.

The Green New Deal is a new policy vision—one that will guide government and society through the biggest task in modern history: decarbonizing our global economy within the next ten to twenty years. The stories and details of GND policy will undoubtedly change in the coming years, but they will be anchored by the vision—a conception of the problem, a set of principles, and an analysis of power—that the GND provides. Vision, however, is not enough. The GND also establishes a framework for a national economic mobilization and a set of ever-evolving and specific policies that fit within this vision and framework.

#### Only the state can transform society/behavior in time to avoid worst impacts of climate change

Beardsworth, PhD, 20

(Richard, Politics@Leeds, Climate science, the politics of climate change and futures of IR, *International Relations*, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117820946365)

Climate action requires political action simply because, without political action, the scale of the challenge as well as the time within which this action must be achieved cannot be met. If the shutting down of the global economy during the first 4 months of COVID-19 led to an 8 percent annual decrease in carbon emissions, and this decrease is required yearly for the next 10 years, nothing short of coordinated national and international action can be effective. As the logic behind the CoP15 Paris Agreement understood, in a world structured by a system of states, the state remains, in relation with other states, the effective focus for these national and international acts of coordination. One can maintain, of course, that concerted reflection on goals and their practice cannot be rehearsed within the same state system that, in co-evolution with capitalism, has produced the climate problem in the first place.24 Yet, my argument here is simple: (1) climate action must be of a political kind if this action is to be coherent and effective, and the horizon of this understanding of the political (comprehensive and effective action) is in a vital sense defined by the state; (2) this political action redounds above all to the agency and responsibility of the state both in relation to its own citizenry and in relation to other states and their citizenry. In response to the challenge of time and scale, I argue we should turn to, not turn away from, the state as an agent of change. Only if one renounces the potential of political action today through historically constituted practices of political efficacy does one shun this kind of conclusion. In which case, I would argue, one has renounced politics for our age, as well as the major emotion on which politics is based, hope.25 Since Max Weber, the state is sociologically defined by the legitimate monopoly of violence that it holds over all other forms of force within a nationally determined territory.26 There are many ways in which this monopoly is contested today. The description of a state as ‘vulnerable’ is nothing but the indication that a particular state does not hold the monopoly of violence within its territory. Prior to questions of political authority and legitimacy, all states are today vulnerable in this sense given the nature of global challenges that follow intended and unintended processes of interdependence (global financial instability, global terrorism, migration flows, pandemics, climate change, etc.). That said, the responses both to the financial crisis of 2008 and (much more so) to the present COVID-19 crisis testify to the fact that the monopoly of violence particular to the effectiveness of state governance remains in place. Among an increasing complexity of social actors, the state still holds the levers of power that are decisive in effecting social transformation. Consequently, to one side of the empirical fact that countries constitute the beef of the UNFCCC climate regime, I am arguing that the state remains the primary vehicle of a politics of climate change. As the emerging literature on the Green New Deal implies, the state can do the following. At a national level, it can organize and steer fiscal, monetary and sector-policies like those of energy, transport, agriculture, the communications industry and housing in such a way that both businesses and consumers are motivated to shift behaviour towards a carbon-neutral society. This model of the state is one of a regulated market economy that uses the coordination of state direction with market dynamism to effect broad social change. Governments respond to markets as they plan ahead with regard to climate change (the rapid fall in the price of solar and wind energy, for example), and much of the new green infrastructure is/will be locally distributed and assembled (no ‘giant public works’ given that contemporary technology is smart).27 That said, governments are the sole governance body with appropriate fiscal and monetary tools (1) to set up the rebuilding of national economies with new strategic priorities; (2) to steer and to guarantee concerted action across sectors; and (3) to guarantee, in turn, that this action is underpinned by the principles of ‘a just transition’.28 If the timeline to a 50 percent reduction of carbon emissions is 2030, then the state must so organize and steer that solutions to climate change are integrated. Attention to ‘the climate emergency’ alone will not lead to the necessary change. This last point is important and suggests why the idea of the Green New Deal, whether one is on the Left or Right, harbours the appropriate response. The integration of climate policy with radical policies for poverty alleviation and re-employment in sustainable industries and commerce provides the only way in which the shift from an extractive to a regenerative economy and society is possible in the first place. Without this convergence of solutions, practical solutions to climate change will not only tackle the scale and timeline of the problem; they will re-create a deeply divided polity of the employed and unemployed that could lead to ever-worse scenarios of a politics based on division and fear, not community and hope. It is the state alone – in conjunction with the forces of the market and civil society – that can provide the vision, the terms of execution of this vision (organized integration) and, critically, the policy-leverage that can bring about economic and social convergence.

#### Scale and rate of climate change mean there is no time for pessimism, only state focused political action can stop extinction. This isn’t naïve belief in progress, the SQ has already incorporated insights from their critique

Beardsworth, PhD, 20

(Richard, Politics@Leeds, Climate science, the politics of climate change and futures of IR, *International Relations*, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117820946365)

The politics of climate change and the futures of IR What are the implications of the argument of the last two sections for the discipline of International Relations and its futures? I have argued, first, that climate change presents an empirical global challenge that necessitates not only a normative response, but a normative response through politics if this change is not, at worst, to obliterate human possibility, human time and human space. This political response requires, second, comprehensive, integrated political action on a scale and within a timeline that is historically unprecedented. Given both the nature of the response needed and the scale and time within which this response must work, this politics must be structured, third, through the modern state system and through the economic system upon which this system was built (capitalism). In contradistinction to sub-national and post-national forms of governance, it is only the state that has the power and leverage to organize, steer and enable concerted, coordinated, intersectoral action so that a just transition to a carbon-neutral, indeed carbon-negative society is in the least possible by 2050. If it is only the state in principle that can do this, the success of its action will, at the same time, only happen through enabling other actors across society (both domestic and global) to work to the end of transition more effectively than itself – in energy markets, in local areas, in financial investment strategies for nature-based solutions, in behavioural change towards a society of limits and so forth. The argument is, consequently, not state-centric; it posits that the state, within processes of social agency and social transformation, is the sole political instance of governance, at the same time, to enable and steer in an integrated, comprehensive manner. Fourth, I argue, therefore, that, against the background of faltering global governance regimes and a renewed nationalist mindset, it is the state that bears the responsibility, both towards its own citizens and towards those most vulnerable to the effects of climate change, to respond to climate change and lead, with international institutions, climate alliances among states. Finally, fifth, I have intimated that it is through these alliances that coordinated global climate action will emerge that reorganizes the development agenda beyond the distinction between North and South. A new global order could emerge from this reorganization, in response to climate change. This sequence of points means that a state-focused perspective on international politics must continue to be embraced in the discipline of IR for the coming decades. In the last 40 years, and partly as a healthy intellectual reaction against the supposed domination of state-centred realism and inter-state liberalism in the discipline, there have been multiple initiatives in IR to step to one side of the state and seek the grain of international politics in other actors and processes (from Susan Strange’s Retreat of the State41 to recent critical theoretical interest, as also exemplified in this SI, in the ‘posthuman’). These diverse initiatives have made the discipline intellectually richer and more inter- and pluri-disciplinary. They have, I would suggest, come at the cost, however, of losing grasp of the state where and when the state remains a necessary agent of change. This article has argued that this is foremostly the case when it comes to responding to climate change. From this perspective, continued engagement with the state as an agent of change requires that the discipline as a whole re-engages with the legacy of Weberian realism (the state and the state system), the legacy of classical realism (the ethics of the lesser violence in world of limitation) and the legacy of the English School (state responsibility and state leadership), together with the insights of constructivism, in order to reconstruct domestic and foreign policies in tight relation to climate change and its effects.42 Only, perhaps, as a result of this reconstruction can something like a reinvigorated liberal internationalism emerge that has authentically cosmopolitan aspirations: that is, aspirations that do not redound to the national interests of the more powerful states, but seek to organize, amid the risks of regression, conflict and the greater violence, a global order of sustainable development and sustainability that transcends the conceptual and practical ‘North/South’ divide. A great deal needs to be unpacked in the suggestions of the last paragraph in order to map how the various theoretical legacies in IR can be turned to the most complex human interconnection at hand: climate change. Suffice it to add here three things of import. First, the discipline’s response to climate change must work across its various traditions and ‘schools’ to have ontological, epistemological, ethical and political traction upon it. I have maintained that the state must be foregrounded in this response, but this foregrounding can only make sense if the state is seen to be working in, through, and for a larger environment of actors and their practices. The discipline of IR needs to provide normative vision for, and empirical analysis of, this coordinated set of arrangements. Second, the move to deepen and reconfigure the sustainable development agenda in the light of response to climate change should, I have suggested several times, be far-reaching. Vision for, and analysis of, the ever-closer connections between the disciplines of International Relations and International Development must be forged; for example, connections based not on conflict and post-conflict scenarios, but primarily on what sustainable resilience means conceptually and policy-wise across all states and their populations. Third, and finally, a new academic mindset in the discipline may be required; or it should at least be fostered through the discipline. At a theoretical level, liberalism is considered the one ‘optimistic’ tradition within IR, a tradition predicated on belief in rational politics and cooperation, progress and embetterment. Liberalism harbours an optimism the very critique of which often defines the respective critical mindsets of realism, Marxism, feminism, post-colonialism (and) IR critical theory. These critiques have again been very rich for the discipline of IR over the last 40 years, perhaps, most tellingly for the contemporary student with regard to the hubris of post-Cold War liberalisms. In the context of climate change’s challenge for IR, a fierce optimism is nevertheless now required: an optimism no longer harnessed to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century terms of liberal progress, but a mindset of purpose that is focused, deftly aggressive and sustained within the logics of sustainable resilience. Given both the time and the scale of political action required for net-zero national and global societies to emerge by 2050, there is, in essence, no time to be pessimistic or sceptical; whatever happens empirically in the next 30 years, there is the time to place sustained, focused pressure on political institutions and their leaders so that social transformation towards a national and global society of limits is brought about. In this sense, fiercely optimistic, bearers of the discipline of IR should assume a strong intellectual, pedagogical and social role in the three coming decades.

### 1NC – Case

#### The role of the ballot is to determine if the aff’s a good idea—anything else is self-serving, arbitrary and begs the question of the rest of the debate. Solves their offense since they can weigh the aff. Evaluate consequences

Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### Biological death is the ultimate evil – it obliterates metaphysics and ontology

Paterson 3 - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, SAGE

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather**,** death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclu sion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state thatany intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility**.**

#### Presumption:

#### A – Systems – the 1AC argues that material events and institutions create the social realities that replicate violence but ceding the state refuses to alter these conditions. Even if they don’t they have no solvency—how the hell are a bunch of crusty communists supposed to overthrow the state when they have civilian guns at best and the military has goddamn F-35s.

#### B – Competition – debate is not the forum for social change or revolutionary movements – its competitive nature swallows aff movements since teams ally themselves with people who vote for them and read their arguments, but alienate those who are forced to debate them – this proves their model forwards exclusion and their movements fail due to creating allies based on competition rather than those who genuinely support your project

#### The status quo’s race wars are a product of Republicans going all in to win elections by stoking racial anxiety --- political strategies that beat them with the ballot solve

Drum, 19 Kevin Drum, Writes for Mother Jones, “Liberals Need to Be Lincolnesque In Our Latest Race War,” Mother Jones. July 15, 2019. <https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2019/07/liberals-need-to-be-lincolnesque-in-our-latest-race-war/>

Seven years ago I wrote a piece for Democracy about where political trends would take us by 2024. [Here’s one bit:](https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/25/the-coming-resource-wars/)

Trend #5: The Republican Party will continue to become ever more dependent on the white vote, while the Democratic Party will depend ever more on minorities.

….So what does this all mean? One: Certain aspects of the culture wars will heat up. In particular, thanks to the increasingly polarized demographics of the two main political parties, fights over immigration and race may well be even more acrimonious than they are today.

That’s all I said in that particular piece, but in other posts where I had more space I still mostly failed to grapple with the obvious conclusion of my own reasoning. I figured there was a limit to what Republicans could do. They could pack-and-crack congressional districts. They could squeeze a little more turnout out of evangelicals and older whites. Fox News could run its endless “scary black folks” segments. State legislatures could pass photo ID laws designed to suppress black voter turnout.

But they were running out of options. The last item in that list is a good example of what influenced my thinking. The truth is that photo ID laws [have only a tiny influence on presidential elections.](https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/11/voter-id-laws-terrible-public-policy-probably-pretty-feeble/) It turns out that most people who lack photo IDs aren’t likely to vote in the first place, and loud pushback from liberals offset some of the losses anyway. What’s more, photo ID laws were passed only in states with total Republican control, and by definition those are states that are mostly safe Republican havens to start with. The fact that Republicans put so much energy into this project only showed how desperate they were. There just wasn’t much left for them to do in the face of demographic changes that were reducing the size of their white base by a point or two every election cycle.

For what it’s worth, this was mostly the conclusion of Republicans themselves, too. The famous post-election autopsy written by the Republican National Committee after Mitt Romney’s 2012 loss, [said this:](https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/624581-rnc-autopsy.html)

In 1980, exit polls tell us that the electorate was 88 percent white. In 2012, it was 72 percent white….According to the Pew Hispanic Center, in 2050, whites will be 47 percent of the country….The Republican Party must be committed to building a lasting relationship within the African American community year-round, based on mutual respect and with a spirit of caring.

But there was always a glaring problem with this strategy, one that everybody was keenly aware of: reaching out to black voters would only work if Republicans also ceased their tolerance of white bigotry. In other words, they’d almost certainly lose votes on a net basis at first, which would mean handing over the presidency—and maybe much more—to Democrats for upwards of a decade or so. That’s just too big a sacrifice for any political party to make.

So instead they took another route: they went after the white vote even harder. In Donald Trump they found a candidate who wasn’t afraid to appeal to racist sentiment loudly and bluntly, something that simply hadn’t occurred to other Republicans. They never thought they could get away with something like this in the 21st century, and normally they would have been right: it would have lost them as many votes among educated whites as it won them among working-class whites. But after eight years of a black president in the White House, racial tensions were ratcheted up just enough that Trump could get away with it. Only by a hair, and only with plenty of other help, but he did get away with it, losing 10 points of support among college-educated whites but gaining 14 points among working-class whites.

The entire Republican Party is now all-in on this strategy. They mostly stay quiet themselves and let Trump himself do the dirty work, but that’s enough. Nobody talks anymore about reaching out to the black community with a spirit of caring or any other spirit. Nor is there anything the rest of us can do about this. Republicans believe that wrecking the fabric of the country is their only hope of staying in power, and they’re right. If working-class whites abandon them even a little bit, they’re toast.

So all we can do is try to crush the Republican Party at the ballot box. What other options are there? Reactionary American whites, as always, won’t give up their power unless it’s taken from them by either a literal or figurative war. Liberals need to be as Lincolnesque¹ as possible in this endeavor—we don’t have to win the votes of unrepentent bigots, just the fretful fence-sitters—but we also need to be Lincolnesque² in our commitment to winning the Trump-inspired race war we’re now in the middle of.

Bottom of Form

¹That is, with malice toward none and charity for all.

²That is, with an iron determination to win.

#### Demographics mean white people have already lost the race war

Rocess, 19 Glenn Rocess, Former Navy, now a writer for Medium, “White Supremacists Have Already Lost the Race War,” Medium. May 2, 2019. <https://medium.com/our-human-family/white-supremacists-have-already-lost-the-race-war-7c6c56747492>

Every single day we read about racist acts committed by White people against Black people and People of Color in America, and it’s getting significantly worse. White supremacists (yeah, they prefer the moniker “white nationalists,” but if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck . . . ) celebrate their inside man in the Oval Office and have their own definition of what it means to make America “great” again.

How much worse can it get?

I don’t want to know. One can’t help but wonder if the nation’s advances in Civil Rights and social equality were all for naught. Is there really no hope to be had for effectively ending the one factor that has led to the most tragic and shameful policies and crimes in our nation’s history — racism?

It’s about time we had some hope, right? Here you go: what we’re seeing now is the last great “hurrah” of white supremacists.

Before y’all start replying with every video clip of [BBQ Becky, Permit Patty, Pool-Patrol Paula](https://qz.com/1320154/bbq-becky-permit-patty-and-pool-patrol-paula-how-memes-and-humor-can-combat-racism/?source=post_page---------------------------), and (most recently) [Butt-Crack Betty](https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/woman-pulls-down-pants-racist-tirade-easter-sunday-115302896.html?source=post_page---------------------------), hear me out. Yes, it’s bad now and it will probably get worse given the current political climate; but we Americans are at a crossroads regarding our future. Will we be a nation that upholds freedom from discrimination or freedom todiscriminate? We can’t be both. Yes, racism in some form will be all too common in America for decades to come, but the end result — the decreased relevance of white racists in America — is inevitable. But till then, will we work to hasten that day or will we sit on the sidelines and allow our inaction to further entrench and prolong the racism that has pervaded our political and social climates since our nation’s founding?

Sounds depressing. But think on this: in any war, there comes a time when one side realizes that it will win. Yes, the leaders of that side know that there are more torrents of blood, sweat, and tears yet to be shed, but they also know that victory is certain.

So it was for Winston Churchill when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Before then, Britain was alone on the Western Front, believing that the USSR would soon crumble before the Wehrmacht. But after Churchill received the news about the Japanese attack, he later [recalled](https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/Decoder/2015/1207/Pearl-Harbor-attack-How-did-Winston-Churchill-react?source=post_page---------------------------) of that night —

“ . . . being saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful . . . ”

He knew that America would enter the war, and that the Allies would eventually defeat the Axis, even though the majority of blood had yet to be spilled. Let’s call this the original “Churchill moment.”

So it goes in the much longer war between white supremacists and their enablers in opposition to Black people and People of Color. Some may feel the use of the word “war” is inflammatory or over-the-top, but when one considers the rampant injustices waged against Black people since our nation’s founding (and for most of that time backed by federal statutes, law enforcement, and occasionally even military force), the metaphor “race war” is certainly more accurate than, say, “war on poverty” or “war on drugs.” But if white racists define victory as remaining socioeconomically dominant in the foreseeable future, then America’s Churchill moment has passed, and they’ve already lost the war. They just don’t know it yet.

The Churchill moment for America’s race war came in August 2008, when magazines in Safeway checkout aisles proclaimed that according to [Census Bureau projections](https://money.cnn.com/2008/08/13/news/economy/america_2050/?source=post_page---------------------------), in a few decades, America would become “[majority-minority](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/world/americas/14iht-census.1.15284537.html?module=inline&source=post_page---------------------------),” meaning that non-Hispanic whites would comprise less than half the population. Even then, I thought to myself, “ . . . racists who read that headline are going to feel the same shiver of fear travel down their spines

as when Public Enemy released a certain critically-acclaimed hit album.”

[Dowell Myers](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/us/white-americans-minority-population.html?source=post_page---------------------------), a demographer at the University of Southern California, credits the concurrence of two events — the election of Barack Obama as America’s first black president and the realization that the country would (relatively) soon become a majority-minority nation — as the main reason why white nationalists “went crazy.” At that moment, white supremacists began to successfully exert an increasing degree of influence within the now almost-wholly white Republican party. The proof lay in the fact that in 2006, congressional Republicans voted almost in lockstep to [reauthorize the Voting Rights Act](https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-1.html?source=post_page---------------------------), but after the aforementioned Census Bureau projections hit newsstands and the re-election of President Obama to a second term in office, the Republicans cheered almost as one when the Supreme Court [gutted the Voting Rights Act in 2013](https://www.thenation.com/article/where-are-gop-supporters-voting-rights/?source=post_page---------------------------).

But as much as white supremacists want to deny the demographic shift, the numbers indicate otherwise. A [study](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/14/the-us-will-become-minority-white-in-2045-census-projects/?source=post_page---------------------------) published by the [Brookings Institute](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Brookings-Institution?source=post_page---------------------------), one of America’s oldest and most-respected think tanks, projects that between now and 2060, the combined racial minority population will grow by about seventy-four percent, while at the same time the aging white population will begin to decline beginning in about 2024 and will continue to do so until at least 2060. In fact, the generation of children born in 2007, dubbed “Generation Z-Plus,” is already majority-minority.

More than any other nation, America is at the forefront of a process that will usher in not only a waning impact of white supremacy, but the very concept of race itself will become increasingly irrelevant as well. The Census Bureau [study](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2018/cb18-41-population-projections.html?source=post_page---------------------------) also points out that more than a quarter of all Asians and Hispanics (and nearly half of all American-born Asians) marry outside their race, and that the share of mixed-race children is set to more than double by 2060. The acceptance of what was once called [miscegenation](https://www.britannica.com/topic/miscegenation?source=post_page---------------------------) is growing not only throughout urbanized America, but also in most first-world democracies, as the British royal family can now attest.

Let’s not think, however, that the war against racism is over. It’s not, nor will it be ‘over’ in the foreseeable future. The sharp uptick of reports of racist behavior by White people over the past decade is almost certainly a symptom of the frustration and anxiety felt by those who see their white privilege slipping away, ever so slowly. As [Sabrina Tavernise](https://www.nytimes.com/by/sabrina-tavernise?source=post_page---------------------------) pointed out in her article in the [The New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/us/white-americans-minority-population.html?source=post_page---------------------------)—

For white nationalists, [majority-minority status] signifies a kind of doomsday clock counting down to the end of racial and cultural dominance.

It is indeed a sad commentary on the American experience that this shift in our nation’s demographic makeup would be likened to the ticking of a “doomsday clock.” Any historian of note can easily point to instances in which empires continued to thrive and even grow after significant demographic shifts. In past generations, Black people had to hope for the day that white supremacists would no longer wield such influence and power in America. But now, thanks to the demographic shift, the day will arrive with certainty. It’s our Churchill moment. We are going to win.

There will be continued injustices against Black people and People of Color along the way, but the browning of America is a slow-moving demographic tsunami, one that includes every possible shade of humanity. White people will either adapt to that multicolored tsunami and embrace its advantages and relative peace or get swamped by it. The demographic tsunami is coming.

In fact, it’s already [here](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/06/21/us-white-population-declines-and-generation-z-plus-is-minority-white-census-shows/?source=post_page---------------------------).