## T

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must defend a hypothetical implementation of a post fiat policy action of states ought to eliminate nuclear arsenals: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.

They dont

#### Resolved means a policy

**Words and Phrases 64** Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

**Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “**to establish by law**”.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Fairness Clash – post facto topic adjustment and debates about scholarship breed reactionary generics and allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage. They can specialize in 1 area of literature for 4 years which gives them a huge edge over people switching topics every 2 months – this crushes clash because all neg prep is based on the rez as a stable stasis point and they create a structural disincentive to do research – we lose 90% of negative ground while the aff still gets the perm which makes being neg impossible.

**2] Predictable Limits: their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months. Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary and don’t solve because they aren’t grounded in predictable definitions of the resolution.**

#### Vote neg for fairness – post facto topic adjustment and debates about scholarship breed reactionary generics and allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage. They can specialize in 1 area of literature for 4 years which gives them a huge edge over people switching topics every 2 months – this crushes fairness because all neg prep is based on the rez as a stable stasis point and they create a structural disincentive to do research – we lose 90% of negative ground while the aff still gets args like perms which makes being neg impossible.

#### SSD is good – it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it.

#### Small schools disad: under-resourced are most adversely effected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities. Inclusion is an independent voter – you can’t debate if you can’t participate which is a prerequisite to accessing their benefits and ensures everyone gains from the activity.

#### The impact is fairness which outweighs:

#### A] Debate is fundamentally a game and some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity. The only impact to a ballot is deciding who wins – we all hire coaches and pay money to come to tournaments which proves every argument they make concedes the validity of fairness.

#### B] Fairness straight turns the aff

Bjerg, 11—Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School (Ole, *Poker: the parody of capitalism* pg 190-198)

In order to understand the conceptual difference, it is important to note that when Baudrillard speaks of the law, he is not referring to law only in the strictly judicial meaning of the term. Baudrillard is rather drawing on a psychoanalytical tradition from Freud and Lacan in which the concept of law stands for any kind of social regularity, such as prohibitions, norms, values, morals, conventions, and so on, that structures the way we act and construct meaning in society. Law constitutes the social order of society. Viewed from the perspective of an individual immersed in the daily life of society, the difference between the law of society and the rule of the game is a difference between necessity and arbitrariness. The law consists not only of a series of prohibitions and norms. It carries also an account of the justification and rationality of the law. The law tells us not only what we should and should not do; it tells us also why we should or should not do this or that. The law claims to be valid and necessary regardless of the opinions held by the individual subject included in the law. The necessity of law is founded on transcendence. This may be the transcendence of a religious order, a principle of reason and rationality, or a system of tradition. In any case the law justifies itself with reference to some order beyond the immediate content of itself. Contrary to the law, the game and the rule are characterized by their arbitrariness. The rule claims no justification beyond its immediate appearance. It does not profess to represent a higher religious order or rational principle. In this way the rule is purely immanent to the game. Furthermore, the rule tells the subject engaged in the game what to do and not to do, but it does not give him [them] any reasons why he [they] should follow the rule. When asked, the rule provides no other justification for itself than the mere reference to the game itself: “Because these are the rules of the game!” Baudrillard sums up the difference between the rule and the law: “The Rule plays on an immanent sequence of arbitrary signs, while the Law is based on a transcendent sequence of necessary signs.”4 Think of the very simple game you can play when walking on the street in which you are not allowed to step on the lines between the flags of the pavement. The game is instituted by the invocation of the rule “Don’t step on the lines!” This rule is purely arbitrary. The game could be played just as well with the complete opposite rule: “You must step on a line for every single step you take!” Furthermore, the rule gives no reason that it should be followed. It has no “formal, moral or psychological structure or superstructure”5 to support its functioning. The functioning of the game is dependent on the voluntary submission to the rule by the players engaging in the game. Compare this to the traffic regulations prescribed by law: “Don’t walk in the street.” “Cross the street only at the green light.” These regulations apply unconditionally and must be obeyed by anyone regardless of whether he wants [they want] to or not. Traffic regulations come with a series of explicit and implicit reasons why they should be followed, for instance, that they secure the social order of the traffic situation for the safety of everyone. The transcendence of law makes the validity of law unconditional. It is not up to the individual subject of law to decide whether he wants to submit to the law or not. Conversely, the purely arbitrary character of the rule sets free the subject and leaves it up to the individual whether he [they] wants to participate in the game and become obliged by the rules of the game or not. In Homo Ludens Huizinga indeed proposes voluntariness and freedom as the first in his list of characteristics of play.6 “because it’s fun” Law as understood by Baudrillard not only constitutes society. In the psychoanalytic tradition that Baudrillard is drawing on, law also plays a crucial role in the very constitution of the subject. To be a subject is to be subject to law. Without law, there would be no subject. At first glance, law manifests itself as a prohibition banning our access to certain objects and acts. We may think of the law as an institution necessary in order to discipline our wild and otherwise uncontrolled desires for different forbidden things such as other people’s property (Thou shalt not steal) or transgressive sexual acts (Thou shalt not commit adultery). In this line of thinking, a society without law would be an anarchical allagainst-all with everybody satisfying her every desire at the expense of everybody else. However, working along similar lines as Baudrillard, Zizek argues that law has also the latent function of structuring our very being as subjects since the law is what institutes our desires in the first place. When the law tells us not to do this or that, it carries an underlying fantasmatic message promising that beyond the prohibition of the law lie the objects that may satisfy the desire of the subject. Inherent in the law is the fantasy of what might happen if the law was not there to prevent me from pursuing my immediate desires. As was the case with the concept of law, it is important to note that the concept of fantasy differs from its usual meaning. Here is how Zizek explains the term: Fantasy is usually c]onceived as a scenario that realizes the subject’s desire. This elementary definition is quite adequate, on condition that we take it literally, what the fantasy stages is not a scene in which our desire is fulfilled, fully satisfied, but on the contrary, a scene that realizes, stages, the desire as such. The fundamental point of psychoanalysis is that desire is not something given in advance, but something that has to be constructed—and it is precisely the role of fantasy to give the coordinates of the subject’s desire, to specify its object, to locate the position the subject assumes in it. It is only through fantasy that the subject is constituted as desiring: through fantasy, we learn how to desire.7 Based on this understanding, Zizek often uses the concept of fantasy in conjunction with the concept of ideology.8 Only on a very superficial level is fantasy opposed to law in the sense that we fantasize about the transgression or even the abolition of law. We might think here of consumerist fantasies of the kind where we imagine gaining access to products that we cannot afford to buy: “If only the law of property or the law of equivalences did not prevent me from having this sweater or that car I would . . .” On another level, fantasy and law work together in structuring the desire of the subject. By restraining the subject’s access to the objects of desire designated by fantasy, law prevents the subject from realizing that the qualities and possibilities for enjoyment imagined to belong to the object are in fact projections of the subject’s own fantasy. In this way, the different laws of the market restraining our access to consumer goods are the condition of possibility for the fantasmatic projections about the amount of happiness, enjoyment, and fulfillment we would attain if we had free and unlimited access to these goods. The idea of law instituting order in an otherwise anarchical world of unrestrained desire (e.g., in Hobbes) is actually a myth produced in the domain of fantasy and ideology. First, the myth gives legitimacy to law by explaining why it is necessary, but second and perhaps more importantly the myth tells us what we would really want if it were not for the law restraining us. Thus, the message of the law is split into the explicit prohibition and the fantasmatic injunction to transgress the law.9 In this way law interacts with fantasy in the domain of ideology in order to teach the subject what and how to desire. An important implication of this understanding of the relation between fantasy and law is that even in transgression, the subject does not move beyond the domain of law. A thief illegally appropriating consumer goods by transgressing the law of property does not violate the fundamental principles for the structuring of desire in the consumer society. It may in fact even be argued that his transgressive act confirms the desirability of the consumer goods. Since the thief will go to such extremities in order to attain the goods, the goods must indeed be something extraordinary. In Baudrillard’s analysis of the difference between law and rule, we find the following reflection related to transgression: Ordinarily we live within the realm of the Law, even when fantasizing its abolition. Beyond the law we see only its transgression or the lifting of a prohibition. For the discourse of law and interdiction determines the inverse discourse of transgression and liberation. However, it is not the absence of the law that is opposed to the law, but the Rule.10 Instead of transgression or absence of law, Baudrillard suggests the rule as being opposed to law. The argument is here not that by following the rule of the game, the player is violating the law of society. The point is rather the much more subtle one that by entering the sphere of the rule and the game the player moves beyond the ideological domain of the law. Law, desire, and subjectivity tie into each other in a kind of Gordian knot. In the game, where law is substituted for the rule, this knot is cut. In its explicit contingency, the rule is not supported by fantasy. The rule does not hold a promise of satisfaction; no sublime object is imagined beyond the rule. The rule claims to be nothing more than what it is. So what is the attraction of the rule and the game, if not satisfaction of a desire? Entering the game means voluntarily submitting to an arbitrary rule with no higher meaning. This act is, however, a way of delivering oneself from the law. Since transgression is already inscribed in the law even in the violation of a prohibition, we are still caught in the web of the law and its matrix of satisfaction/unsatisfaction. In the violation, we may contradict the explicit word of the law but we are still confirming its underlying principle of desire. When choosing to submit to the rules of a game, however, we step into another order not structured by the law and desire. We renounce our desire, not in an ascetic abstinence from particular objects of desire (which is by the way only an extreme sublimation of the objects of desire), but by letting ourselves be seduced into an order not promising any kind of satisfaction at all. In this way, we move beyond the law’s matrix of satisfaction/unsatisfaction. When obeying the law, our conscious rational belief in it is supported by an unacknowledged irrational belief. Yet, entering the game, we openly acknowledge the pure contingency of the rule, and so our conscious submission to it is based on no belief whatsoever. We have no illusions that the game is nothing but an illusion, and so our approach to the game is perhaps more “realistic” than our approach to the law. The game’s sole principle . . . is that by choosing the rule one is delivered from the law. Without a psychological or metaphysical foundation, the rule has no grounding in belief. One neither believes nor disbelieves a rule—one observes it. The diffuse sphere of belief, the need for credibility that encompasses the real, is dissolved in the game. Hence their immorality: to proceed without believing in it, to sanction a direct fascination with conventional signs and groundless rules.11 In the game, desire is suspended and so is desire’s eternal shadow figure, unsatisfaction, which is a necessary condition for the reproduction of desire. In the game, there is no promise and therefore no disappointment. In the order of the law, we may find enjoyment in the momentary and partial satisfaction of our desires through obtainment of different objects. The joy of the game stems not from this kind of satisfaction but exactly from the suspension of the satisfaction/unsatisfaction matrix. In order to understand the intensity of ritual forms, one must rid oneself of the idea that all happiness derives from nature, and all pleasure from the satisfaction of a desire. On the contrary, games, the sphere of play, reveal a passion for rules, a giddiness born of rules, and a force that comes from ceremony, and not desire.12 As an equivalent to the “giddiness” of which Baudrillard speaks here, we find in Huizinga’s characteristic of play the notion of “fun.” People play games because it is fun. Rather than providing a full and conclusive explanation for the engagement in games, the concept of fun seems to mark the limitation of such an explanation. “The fun of playing,” Huizinga notes, “resists all analysis,

#### Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

#### Drop the debater because dropping the arg is severance which moots 7 minutes of 1nc offense

#### No rvis—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

#### They can’t weigh the case—lack of preround prep means their truth claims are untested which you should presume false—they’re also only winning case because we couldn’t engage with it

#### No impact turns—exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative

### 1NC – Neolib K

#### Baudrillard’s nihilistic understanding of class struggle actively ensures that we will leave the Earth a smoldering pile of ash – it’s reductionist, ignores history, is just him rambling, and misunderstands failure – don’t let the 1AR’s edgy rhetoric distract you from the fact that they justify an absurd amount of material violence.

Zavarzadeh 95 Mas’ud [educated in Middle Eastern, European, and American universities and teaches critical theory at Syracuse University. He has written on postmodern critical theory and is the author of Mythopoeic Reality and coeditor of Theory, Pedagogy, Politics] “Post-Ality: Marxism and Postmodernism” 1995. IB

Two questions can be considered under this heading: (a) Does Baudrillard present a compelling case against the project of revolutionary class struggle? (b) Does he present an acceptable alternative? (a) We have seen that Baudrillard holds that the idea of a revolution furthering the interests of the working classes is senseless today. His argument was that in the age of hyperreality the very concept of class becomes a “parody,” a “retrospective simulation.” Baudrillard does not really claim that there are no classes today, but only that class struggle is useless. He holds that there is no dialectic within the present epoch that could possibly point to socialism’s being on the historical agenda. “Once capital itself has become its own myth, or rather an interminable machine, aleatory, something like a social genetic code, it no longer leaves any room for a planned reversal; and this is its true violence” (1987, 112). Arguments for the inevitable success of socialism are surely suspect. But are arguments for the inevitability of the failure of socialism any less suspect? Baudrillard’s case for the thesis that capital “no longer leaves any room for a planned reversal” appeals to the fact that in the industrialized West the labor union apparatus has been integrated into the bourgeois order. “Strikes...are incorporated like obsolescence in objects, like crisis in production... There is no longer any strikes or work, but...a scenodrama (not to say melodrama) of production, collective dramaturgy upon the empty stage of the social” (1987,48). The wild extrapolation here is transparent. From the present relative passivity of the labor movement, Baudrillard jumps to the conclusion that all capital/wage labor confrontations in principle can never be more than the mere simulation of conflict. He completely rules out in principle any possibility of there ever being dissident movements within the labor movement that successfully unite workers with consumers, women, racially oppressed groups, environmental activists, and so on in a common struggle against capital. He completely rules out in principle the possibility of a dynamic unfolding of this struggle to the point where capital’s control of investment decisions is seriously, called into question. He makes a wild extrapolation from the fact that these things are not on the agenda today to the conclusion that in principle they cannot ever occur. To say that he fails to provide any plausible arguments for such a strong position is to put things far too mildly. For a Marxist, capitalism remains a contradictory system. Baudrillard is correct when he states that some phenomena of contemporary capitalism make struggles for social change more difficult (for instance, the proliferation of electronically transmitted images celebrating hyperconsumerism). However, he fails to see that such things are systematically connected to other sorts of phenomena that may have quite different implications, such as increasing stratification, increasing extraction of surplus-value through job speed-ups, environmental degradation, the gradual delegitimation of established political parties, and so on. By overlooking the contradictions that pervade contemporary capitalism, Baudrillard is blind to the possibility that capitalism remains vulnerable to crises and to social movements aiming at its transformation. (b) Baudrillard’s alternatives to organized struggle against capital are hyperconformism and defiance. Examples of the former range from yuppies who accumulate the latest electronic gadgets with the proper demeanor of hip irony, to the crack-dealing B-Boys whose obsession with designer labels and BMWs simulates the hypermaterialism of the very system that has destroyed their communities. Rampant hyperconformism of this sort may very well lead the system to implode, from the waste, environmental damage, and community disintegration imposed by hyperconsumerism. The only problem is that by the time this implosion occurs it may be too late for the human species to pick up the pieces. Baudrillard’s crypto-existentialist odes to defiance perhaps present a more attractive option. However, these odes romanticize defeat. They honor the memory of rebels not for the heroism exemplified in their defeats, and not for the lessons that can be learned from those defeats. It is the defeats themselves that meet with Baudrillard’s approval, the fact that the rebels were “acting out (their) own death right a way... instead of seeking political expansion and class hegemony.” This form of implosion is like a fireworks display that brilliantly illuminates the landscape when it goes off, only to dissolve at once, leaving everything immersed in darkness as before. And this form of implosion is an option for suicide. In my view, neither of Baudrillard’s proposals provides a satisfactory alternative to revolutionary Marxism, however unfashionable the latter may be today. (284)

#### Capitalism is an a priori impact under any framework -- it’s the greatest existential threat and the biggest affront to human rights and causes value to life deprivation.

Ahmed 20 (Nafeez Ahmed -- Visiting Research Fellow at the Global Sustainability Institute at Anglia Ruskin University's Faculty of Science & Technology + M.A. in contemporary war & peace studies + DPhil (April 2009) in international relations from the School of Global Studies @ Sussex University, “Capitalism is Destroying ‘Safe Operating Space’ for Humanity, Warn Scientists”, https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-06-24/capitalism-is-destroying-safe-operating-space-for-humanity-warn-scientists/, 24 June 2020, EmmieeM)

The COVID19 pandemic has exposed a strange anomaly in the global economy. If it doesn’t keep growing endlessly, it just breaks. Grow, or die.

But there’s a deeper problem. New scientific research confirms that capitalism’s structural obsession with endless growth is destroying the very conditions for human survival on planet Earth.

A landmark study in the journal Nature Communications, “Scientists’ warning on affluence” — by scientists in Australia, Switzerland and the UK — concludes that the most fundamental driver of environmental destruction is the overconsumption of the super-rich.

This factor lies over and above other factors like fossil fuel consumption, industrial agriculture and deforestation: because it is overconsumption by the super-rich which is the chief driver of these other factors breaching key planetary boundaries.

The paper notes that the richest 10 percent of people are responsible for up to 43 percent of destructive global environmental impacts.

In contrast, the poorest 10 percent in the world are responsible just around 5 percent of these environmental impacts:

The new paper is authored by Thomas Wiedmann of UNSW Sydney’s School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Manfred Lenzen of the University of Sydney’s School of Physics, Lorenz T. Keysser of ETH Zürich’s Department of Environmental Systems Science, and Julia K. Steinberger of Leeds University’s School of Earth and Environment.

It confirms that global structural inequalities in the distribution of wealth are intimately related to an escalating environmental crisis threatening the very existence of human societies.

Synthesising knowledge from across the scientific community, the paper identifies capitalism as the main cause behind “alarming trends of environmental degradation” which now pose “existential threats to natural systems, economies and societies.” The paper concludes:

“It is clear that prevailing capitalist, growth-driven economic systems have not only increased affluence since World War II, but have led to enormous increases in inequality, financial instability, resource consumption and environmental pressures on vital earth support systems.”

Capitalism and the pandemic

Thanks to the way capitalism works, the paper shows, the super-rich are incentivised to keep getting richer — at the expense of the health of our societies and the planet overall.

The research provides an important scientific context for how we can understand many earlier scientific studies revealing that industrial expansion has hugely increased the risks of new disease outbreaks.

Just last April, a paper in Landscape Ecology found that deforestation driven by increased demand for consumption of agricultural commodities or beef have increased the probability of ‘zoonotic’ diseases (exotic diseases circulating amongst animals) jumping to humans. This is because industrial expansion, driven by capitalist pressures, has intensified the encroachment of human activities on wildlife and natural ecosystems.

Two years ago, another study in Frontiers of Microbiology concluded presciently that accelerating deforestation due to “demographic growth” and the associated expansion of “farming, logging, and hunting”, is dangerously transforming rural environments. More bat species carrying exotic viruses have ended up next to human dwellings, the study said. This is increasing “the risk of transmission of viruses through direct contact, domestic animal infection, or contamination by urine or faeces.”

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the COVID19 pandemic thus emerged directly from these rapidly growing impacts of human activities. As the new paper in Nature Communications confirms, these impacts have accelerated in the context of the fundamental operations of industrial capitalism.

Eroding the ‘safe operating space’

The result is that capitalism is causing human societies to increasingly breach key planetary boundaries, such as land-use change, biosphere integrity and climate change.

Remaining within these boundaries is essential to maintain what scientists describe as a “safe operating space” for human civilization. If those key ecosystems are disrupted, that “safe operating space” will begin to erode. The global impacts of the COVID19 pandemic are yet another clear indication that this process of erosion has already begun.

“The evidence is clear,” write Weidmann and his co-authors.

“Long-term and concurrent human and planetary wellbeing will not be achieved in the Anthropocene if affluent overconsumption continues, spurred by economic systems that exploit nature and humans. We find that, to a large extent, the affluent lifestyles of the world’s rich determine and drive global environmental and social impact. Moreover, international trade mechanisms allow the rich world to displace its impact to the global poor.”

The new scientific research thus confirms that the normal functioning of capitalism is eroding the ‘safe space’ by which human civilisation is able to survive.

The structures

The paper also sets out how this is happening in some detail. The super-rich basically end up driving this destructive system forward in three key ways.

Firstly, they are directly responsible for “biophysical resource use… through high consumption.”

Secondly, they are “members of powerful factions of the capitalist class.”

Thirdly, due to that positioning, they end up “driving consumption norms across the population.”

But perhaps the most important insight of the paper is not that this is purely because the super-rich are especially evil or terrible compared to the rest of the population — but because of the systemic pressures produced by capitalist structures.

The authors point out that: “Growth imperatives are active at multiple levels, making the pursuit of economic growth (net investment, i.e. investment above depreciation) a necessity for different actors and leading to social and economic instability in the absence of it.”

At the core of capitalism, the paper observes, is a fundamental social relationship defining the way working people are systemically marginalised from access to the productive resources of the earth, along with the mechanisms used to extract these resources and produce goods and services.

This means that to survive economically in this system, certain behavioural patterns become not just normalised, but seemingly entirely rational — at least from a limited perspective that ignores wider societal and environmental consequences. In the words of the authors:

“In capitalism, workers are separated from the means of production, implying that they must compete in labour markets to sell their labour power to capitalists in order to earn a living.”

Meanwhile, firms which own and control these means of production “need to compete in the market, leading to a necessity to reinvest profits into more efficient production processes to minimise costs (e.g. through replacing human labour power with machines and positive returns to scale), innovation of new products and/or advertising to convince consumers to buy more.”

If a firm fails to remain competitive through such behaviours, “it either goes bankrupt or is taken over by a more successful business. Under normal economic conditions, this capitalist competition is expected to lead to aggregate growth dynamics.”

The irony is that, as the paper also shows, the “affluence” accumulated by the super-rich isn’t correlated with happiness or well-being.

Restructure

The “hegemonic” dominance of global capitalism, then, is the principal obstacle to the systemic transformation needed to reduce overconsumption. So it’s not enough to simply try to “green” current consumption through technologies like renewable energy — we need to actually reduce our environmental impacts by changing our behaviours with a focus on cutting back our use of planetary resources:

“Not only can a sufficient decoupling of environmental and detrimental social impacts from economic growth not be achieved by technological innovation alone, but also the profit-driven mechanism of prevailing economic systems prevents the necessary reduction of impacts and resource utilisation per se.”

The good news is that it doesn’t have to be this way.

The paper reviews a range of “bottom-up studies” showing that dramatic reductions in our material footprint are perfectly possible while still maintaining good material living standards.

In India, Brazil and South Africa, “decent living standards” can be supported “with around 90 percent less per-capita energy use than currently consumed in affluent countries.” Similar possible reductions are feasible for modern industrial economies such as Australia and the US.

By becoming aware of how the wider economic system incentivises behaviour that is destructive of human societies and planetary ecosystems critical for human survival, both ordinary workers and more wealthy sectors — including the super-rich — can work toward rewriting the global economic operating system.

This can be done by restructuring ownership in firms, equalising relations with workers, and intentionally reorganising the way decisions are made about investment priorities.

The paper points out that citizens and communities have a crucial role to play in getting organised, upgrading efforts for public education about these key issues, and experimenting with new ways to work together in bringing about “social tipping points” — points at which social action can catalyse mass change.

While a sense of doom and apathy about the prospects for such change is understandable, mounting evidence based on systems science suggests that global capitalism as we know it is in a state of protracted crisis and collapse that began some decades ago. This research strongly supports the view that as industrial civilization reaches the last stages of its systemic life-cycle, there is unprecedented and increasing opportunity for small-scale actions and efforts to have large system-wide impacts.

The new paper shows that the need for joined-up action is paramount: structural racism, environmental crisis, global inequalities are not really separate crises — but different facets of human civilization’s broken relationship with nature.

Yet, of course, the biggest takeaway is that those who bear most responsibility for environmental destruction — those who hold the most wealth in our societies — urgently need to wake up to how their narrow models of life are, quite literally, destroying the foundations for human survival over the coming decades.

#### The alternative is to decentralize global trade. A pluralistic global system allows for flexible industrial development while avoiding the pitfalls of centralized neoliberalism. Alternative indicts are unfounded fearmongering.

Bello 99 [(Walden, Filipino academic, environmentalist, and social worker who served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.) “Why Reform of the WTO is the Wrong Agenda” Focus on Trade, No. 43, December 1999, <https://www.tni.org/my/node/6851>] TDI

Building a More Pluralistic System of International Trade Governance

If there is one thing that is clear, it is that developing country governments and international civil society must not allow their energies to be hijacked into reforming these institutions. This will only amount to administering a facelift to fundamentally flawed institutions. Indeed, today's need is not another centralized global institution, reformed or unreformed, but the deconcentration and decentralization of institutional power and the creation of a pluralistic system of institutions and organizations interacting with one another amidst broadly defined and flexible agreements and understandings.

It was under such a more pluralistic global system, where hegemonic power was still far form institutionalized in a set of all encompassing and powerful multilateral organizations that the Latin American countries and many Asian countries were able to achieve a modicum of industrial development in the period from 1950-70. It was under a more pluralistic world system, under a GATT that was limited in its power, flexible, and more sympathetic to the special status of developing countries, that the East and Southeast Asian countries were able to become newly industrializing countries through activist state trade and industrial policies that departed significantly from the free-market biases enshrined in the WTO.

The alternative to a powerful WTO is not a Hobbesian state of nature. It is always the powerful that have stoked this fear. The reality of international economic relations in a world marked by a multiplicity of international and regional institutions that check one another is a far cry from the propaganda image of a 'nasty' and 'brutish' world. Of course, the threat of unilateral action by the powerful is ever present in such a system, but it is one that even the powerful hesitate to take for fear of its consequences on their legitimacy as well as the reaction it would provoke in the form of opposing coalitions.

In other words, what developing countries and international civil society should aim at is not to reform the WTO but, through a combination of passive and active measures, to radically reduce its power and to make it simply another international insitution coexisting with and being checked by other international organizations, agreements, and regional groupings. These would include such diverse actors and institutions as UNCTAD, multilateral environmental agreements, the International Labor Organization (ILO), evolving trde blocs such as Mercosur in Latin America, SAARC in South Asia, SADCC in Southern Africa, and ASEAN in Southeast Asia. It is in such a more fluid, less structured, more pluralistic world with multiple checks and balances that the nations and communities of the South will be able to carve out the space to develop based on their values, their rhythms, and the strategies of their choice.

#### The role of the ballot is to investigate and reject the ways capitalism has infected society. While obviously signing the ballot won’t make neoliberalism disappear, endorsing resistance against cap *in this round* actually does something because we start formulating strategies that attack cap head-on.

Zizek & Daly 4 (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute for Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana, Global Distinguished Professor of German at New York University, and international director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities of the University of London, and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world**.** Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system**.** What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations**.** In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and**, in consequence,** social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity**: to redirect** (or misdirect**)** social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation**.** Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.