# 1NC v. Harker AS

### T

#### Interp – “The” indicates reference to a noun as a whole

Webster’s 5 (Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary)

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

#### Appropriation involves permanent, exclusive use of land and resource extraction

Stephen Gorove, Stephen Gorove (1917-2001) was a space law education pioneer. He served as a professor of space law and director of space studies and policy, from 1991-1998, at the University of Mississippi., 1969 " Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty" Fordham Law Review, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1966&context=flr

With respect to the concept of appropriation the basic question is **what constitutes "appropriation,"** as used in the Treaty, especially in contradistinction to casual or temporary use. The term "appropriation" is used most frequently to denote the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence. Under such interpretation the establishment of a permanent settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute national appropriation if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state. Short of this, if the state wields no exclusive authority or jurisdiction in relation to the area in question, the answer would seem to be in the negative, unless, the nationals also use their individual appropriations as cover-ups for their state's activities.5 In this connection, it should be emphasized that the word "appropriation" indicates a taking which involves something more than just a casual use. Thus a temporary occupation of a landing site or other area, just like the **temporary or nonexclusive use of property, would not constitute appropriation**. By the same token, any use involving consumption or **taking with intention of keeping for one's own exclusive use would amount to appropriation.**

#### Violation: the aff is a restriction; they do not ban mining outright nor do they eliminate ownership

#### “restrict” means limits or conditions have been added; they should have used “prohibit”. PEDIAA 15

PEDIAA 10-12-2015, "Difference Between Prohibited and Restricted," Pediaa, https://pediaa.com/difference-between-prohibited-and-restricted/

Main Difference – Prohibited vs. Restricted Prohibited and Restricted are used in reference to limitations and prevention. However, they cannot be used interchangeably as there is a distinct difference between them. Prohibited is used when we are talking about an impossibility. Restricted is used when we are talking about something that has specific conditions. The **main difference** between prohibited and restricted is that **prohibited** means something is **formally forbidden by law or authority** whereasrestricted means something is put under control or limits**.** What Does Prohibited Mean Prohibited is a variant of the verb prohibit. Prohibited can be taken as the past tense and [past participle](https://pediaa.com/difference-between-gerund-and-participle/) of prohibiting as well as an [adjective](https://pediaa.com/what-are-the-kinds-of-adjectives/). Prohibited means that something is formally forbidden by law or authority**.** When we say ‘smoking is prohibited’, it means that smoking is not allowed at all, there are no exceptions. Prohibit indicates an impossibility. This gives out the idea that it is not at all possible under any condition or circumstance. The term Prohibited goods is used to refer to items that are not allowed to enter or exit certain countries. For example, the government of South America lists Narcotic and habit-forming drugs in any form, Poison and other toxic substances, Fully automatic, military and unnumbered weapons, explosives and fireworks as prohibited goods. The following sentences will further explain the use of prohibited. *Inter-racial marriages were not prohibited by the government.* *He was proved guilty of using prohibited substances.* *No one was allowed to enter the grounds; entry was prohibited.* Prohibited imports are the items that are not allowed to enter a country. What Does Restricted Mean **Restrict means to put under limits or control.** Restricted can be either used as the past tense of restrict or as an adjective meaning limited. When we say something is restricted, it means that limits or conditions have been added to it. It does not mean that it is completely impossible. For example, Restricted goods are allowed to enter or exit a country under certain circumstances. A written permission can help you to import or export that item. Likewise, a restricted area does not mean that people are not allowed to enter; it means that a special permission is required to enter the place. Restricted information refers to information that are not disclosed to the general public for security purposes. The new regulations restricted the free movement of people. The club was restricted to its members and their family members. Only the highest military personnel had access to the restricted area. American scientists had only restricted access to the area. Difference Between Prohibited and Restricted Meaning **Prohibited** means banned or forbidden. Restricted means limited in extent, number, scope, or action Possibility Prohibited means that there is no possibility of doing something. Restricted means that something can be done under certain conditions. Adjective Prohibited functions as an adjective derived from prohibit. Restricted functions as an adjective derived from restrict. Past tense Prohibited is the past tense and past participle of prohibit. Restricted is the past tense and past participle of restrict.

#### Limits – every counterplan is T because the aff can defend a trivial “decrease” in mining. It’s impossible for us to predict every limitation or restriction, which can also include a condition – that opens up conditions affs and other unpredictable offense

#### Ground – restrictions deck the DIB disad, innovation, primacy and winning “mining good” doesn’t get us the ballot because of link magnitude. That forces a shift to process debates and backfile kritiks which kills education and their prep will always be more contextual

#### TVA - Read all your mining bad offense but make it a prohibition

#### Vote neg

#### Use competing interps – reasonability is subjective and causes a race to the bottom, but T is a yes/no question

#### Drop the debater – we can’t read a new disad in the 2nr so dropping the arg doesn’t solve

#### No RVIs – illogical for them to win because they’re T and incentivizes baiting, which outweighs frivolous theory

### 1NC – REM DA

#### Bipartisan bill will require US defense contractors in the US to stop using Chinese REMs by 2026

Ernest Scheyder, Ernest Scheyder is a journalist at Reuters covering the future of energy and transportation, with a focus on lithium, copper, cobalt, rare earths, Jan 14, 2022 " EXCLUSIVE U.S. bill would block defense contractors from using Chinese rare earths" Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exclusive-us-bill-would-block-defense-contractors-using-chinese-rare-earths-2022-01-14/

Jan 14 (Reuters) - A bipartisan piece of legislation introduced in the U.S. Senate on Friday would force defense contractors to stop buying rare earths from China by 2026 and use the Pentagon to create a permanent stockpile of the strategic minerals.

The bill, sponsored by Senators Tom Cotton, an Arkansas Republican, and Mark Kelly, an Arizona Democrat, is the latest in a string of U.S. legislation seeking to thwart China's near control over the sector.

It essentially uses the Pentagon's purchase of billions of dollars worth of fighter jets, missiles and other weapons as leverage to require contractors to stop relying on China and, by extension, support the revival of U.S. rare earths production.

Rare earths are a group of 17 metals that, after processing, are used to make magnets found in electric vehicles, weaponry and electronics. While the United States created the industry in World War Two and U.S. military scientists developed the most widely-used type of rare earth magnet, China has slowly grown to control the entire sector the past 30 years.

The United States has only one rare earths mine and has no capability to process rare earth minerals.

"Ending American dependence on China for rare earths extraction and processing is critical to building up the U.S. defense and technology sectors," Cotton told Reuters.

The senator, who sits on the Senate's Armed Forces and Intelligence committees, described **China's evolution into the global rare earths leader as "simply a policy choice that the United States made**," adding that he hoped fresh policies would loosen Beijing's grip.

Known as the Restoring Essential Energy and Security Holdings Onshore for Rare Earths Act of 2022, the bill would codify and make permanent the Pentagon's ongoing stockpiling of the materials. China temporarily blocked rare earth exports to Japan in 2010 and has issued vague threats it could do the same to the United States.

To build that reserve, though, the Pentagon buys supply in part from China, a paradox that Senate staffers hope will abate in time.

The rare earths production process can be highly pollutive, part of the reason why it grew unpopular in the United States. Ongoing research is attempting to make the process cleaner.

Cotton said he has talked to various U.S. executive agencies about the bill, but declined to say if he had talked with President Joe Biden or the White House.

"This is an area in which Congress will lead, because **many members have been concerned about this very topic, regardless of party**," he said.

ENCOURAGE DOMESTIC OUTPUT

Most members of the nascent U.S. rare earths sector praised the bill, though some worried defense contractors could continue to ask for waivers to buy Chinese rare earths even after 2026.

The Aerospace Industries Association, a trade group for Northrop Grumman Corp (NOC.N), Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N) and other U.S. aerospace and defense companies, declined to comment on the bill.

"Well placed policies such as this one get us closer to the target of onshoring this critical supply chain," said Marty Weems, North American president of Australia-based American Rare Earths Ltd (ARR.AX), which is developing three U.S. rare earth projects.

MP Materials Corp (MP.N), which operates the only U.S. rare earths mine and relies on Chinese processors, said it appreciates "ongoing efforts by the Department of Defense and broader U.S. government to secure the domestic rare earth supply chain and promote free and fair competition."

The bill, which the sponsors expect could be folded into Pentagon funding legislation later this year, **offers no direct support for U.S. rare earths miners or processors.**

#### REM access key to military primacy and tech advancement – alternatives fail

Trigaux 12 (David, University Honors Program University of South Florida St. Petersburg) “The US, China and Rare Earth Metals: The Future Of Green Technology, Military Tech, and a Potential Achilles‟ Heel to American Hegemony,” USF St. Petersberg, May 2, 2012, <https://digital.stpetersburg.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=honorstheses>] TDI

The implications of a rare earth shortage aren’t strictly related to the environment, and energy dependence, but have distinct military implications as well that could threaten the position of the United States world’s strongest military. The United States place in the world was assured by powerful and decisive deployments in World War One and World War Two. Our military expansion was built upon a large, powerful industrial base that created more, better weapons of war for our soldiers. During the World Wars, a well-organized draft that sent millions of men into battle in a short amount of time proved decisive, but as the war ended, and soldiers drafted into service returned to civilian life, the U.S. technological superiority over its opponents provided it with sustained dominance over its enemies, even as the numerical size of the army declined. New technologies, such as the use of the airplane in combat, rocket launched missiles, radar systems, and later, GPS, precision guided missiles, missile defense systems, high tech tanks, lasers, and other technologies now make the difference between victory and defeat.

The United States military now serves many important functions, deterring threats across the world. The United States projects its power internationally, through a network of bases and allied nations. Thus, the United States is a powerful player in all regions of the world, and often serves as a buffer against conflict in these regions. US military presence serves as a buffer against Chinese military modernization in Eastern Asia, against an increasingly nationalist Russia in Europe, and smaller regional actors, such as Venezuela in South America and Iran in the Middle East. The U.S. Navy is deployed all over the world, as the guarantor of international maritime trade routes. The US Navy leads action against challenges to its maritime sovereignty on the other side of the globe, such as current action against Somali piracy. Presence in regions across the world prevents escalation of potential crisis. These could result in either a larger power fighting a smaller nation or nations (Russia and Georgia, Taiwan and China), religious opponents (Israel and Iran), or traditional foes (Ethiopia and Eretria, Venezuela and Colombia, India and Pakistan). US projection is also key deterring emerging threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. While not direct challenges to US primacy, both terrorism and nuclear proliferation can kill thousands.

The US Air Force has a commanding lead over the rest of the world, in terms of both numbers and capabilities. American ground forces have few peers, and are unmatched in their ability to deploy to anywhere in the world at an equally unmatched pace.

The only perceived challenge to the United States militarily comes from the People’s Republic of China.76 While the United States outspends all other nations in the world put together in terms of military spending, China follows as a close second, and has begun an extensive modernization program to boot.77 The Chinese military however, is several decades behind the United States in air power and nuclear capabilities.78 To compensate, China has begun the construction of access-denial technology, preventing the US from exercising its dominance in China’s sphere of influence.79 Chinese modernization efforts have a serious long-term advantage over the United States; access to rare earth metals, and a large concentration of rare earth chemists doing research.80 This advantage, coupled with the U.S. losing access to rare earth metals, will even the odds much quicker than policymakers had previously anticipated. 81

The largest example is US airpower. With every successive generation of military aircraft, the U.S. Air Force becomes more and more dependent on Rare Earth Metals.82 As planes get faster and faster, they have to get lighter and lighter, while adding weight from extra computers and other features on board.83 To lighten the weight of the plane, scandium is used to produce lightweight aluminum alloys for the body of the plane. Rare Earth metals are also useful in fighter jet engines, and fuel cells.84 For example, rare earths are required to producing miniaturized fins, and samarium is required to build the motors for the F-35 fighter jet.85 F-35 jets are the next generation fighter jet that works together to form the dual plane combination that cements U.S. dominance in air power over the Russian PAK FA.86

Rare earth shortages don’t just affect air power, also compromising the navigation system of Abrams Tanks, which need samarium cobalt magnets. The Abrams Tank is the primary offensive mechanized vehicle in the U.S. arsenal. The Aegis Spy 1 Radar also uses samarium.87 Many naval ships require neodymium. Hell Fire missiles, satellites, night vision goggles, avionics, and precision guided munitions all require rare earth metals. 88

American military superiority is based on technological advancement that outstrips the rest of the world. Command and control technology allows the U.S. to fight multiple wars at once and maintain readiness for other issues, as well as have overwhelming force against rising challengers. This technology helps the U.S. know who, where, and what is going to attack them, and respond effectively, regardless of the source of the threat.

Rare Earth Elements make this technological superiority possible.

To make matters worse, the defense industrial base is often a single market industry, dependent on government contracts for its business. If China tightens the export quotas further, major US defense contractors will be in trouble.89 Every sector of the defense industrial base is dependent on rare earth metals. Without rare earths, these contractors can’t build anything, which collapses the industry.90

Rare Earth shortages are actually already affecting our military, with shortages of lanthanum, cerium, europium and gadolinium happening in the status quo. This prevents us not only from building the next generation of high tech weaponry, but also from constructing more of the weapons and munitions that are needed in the status quo. As current weapon systems age and they can’t be replaced, the US primacy will be undermined. Of special concern is that U.S. domestic mining doesn’t produce “heavy” rare earth metals that are needed for many advanced components of military technologies. Given the nature of many military applications, substitutions aren’t possible. 91

#### Primacy and allied commitments solve arms races and great power war – unipolarity is sustainable, and prevents power vacuums and global escalation

Brands 18 [(Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump," Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6

From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep.

This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance.

Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate.

American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap.

Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.

THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors.

First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.

#### Space mining solves---it’s key to US access to rare earth metals and circumventing Chinese monopoly

Stavridis 21 [(James, retired US Navy admiral, chief international diplomacy and national security analyst for NBC News, senior fellow at JHU Applied Physics Library, PhD in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts) “U.S. Needs a Strong Defense Against China’s Rare-Earth Weapon,” Bloomberg Opinion, March 4, 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-04/u-s-needs-a-strong-defense-against-china-s-rare-earth-weapon>] TDI

You could be forgiven if you are confused about what’s going on with rare-earth elements. On the one hand, news reports indicate that China may increase production quotas of the minerals this quarter as a [goodwill gesture](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3122501/china-raises-rare-earth-quotas-goodwill-trade-signal-us) to the Joe Biden administration. But other sources say that China may ultimately ban the export of the rare earths altogether on “[security concerns](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-19/china-may-ban-rare-earth-technology-exports-on-security-concerns?sref=QYxyklwO).” What’s really going on here?

There are 17 elements considered [rare earths](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/why-rare-earths-are-achilles-heal-for-europe-u-s-quicktake) — lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium — and while many aren’t actually rare in terms of global deposits, extracting them is difficult and expensive. They are used across high-tech manufacturing, including smartphones, fighter aircraft and components in virtually all advanced electronics. Of particular note, they are essential to many of the clean-energy technologies expected to come online in this decade.

I began to focus on rare-earth elements when I commanded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence in Afghanistan, known as the International Security Assistance Force. While Afghans live in an extremely poor country, [studies](https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/afghanistans-mineral-resources-are-a-lost-opportunity-and-a-threat/) have assessed that they sit atop $1 trillion to $3 trillion in a wide variety of minerals, including rare earths. Some [estimates](https://www.fraserinstitute.org/article/afghanistans-rare-earth-element-bonanza) put the rare-earth levels alone at 1.4 million metric tons.

But every time I tried to visit a mining facility, the answer I got from my security team was, “It’s too dangerous right now, admiral.” Unfortunately, despite a great deal of effort by the U.S. and NATO, those security challenges remain, deterring the large foreign-capital investments necessary to harvest the lodes. Which brings us back to Beijing.

China controls roughly 80% of the rare-earths market, between what it mines itself and processes in raw material from elsewhere. If it decided to wield the weapon of restricting the supply — something it has repeatedly [threatened](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-trade-fight-raises-specter-of-rare-earth-shortage-11559304000) to do — it would create a significant challenge for manufacturers and a geopolitical predicament for the industrialized world.

It could happen. In 2010, Beijing threatened to cut off exports to Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands. Two years ago, Beijing was reportedly considering restrictions on exports to the U.S. generally, as well as against specific companies (such as defense giant Lockheed Martin Corp.) that it deemed in violation of its policies against selling advanced weapons to Taiwan.

President Donald Trump’s administration issued an executive order to spur the production of rare earths domestically, and created an [Energy Resource Governance Initiative](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Energy-Resource-Governance-Initiative-ERGI-Fact-Sheet.pdf) to promote international mining. The European Union and Japan, among others, are also aggressively seeking newer sources of rare earths.

Given this tension, it was superficially surprising that China announced it would boost its mining quotas in the first quarter of 2021 by nearly 30%, reflecting a continuation in strong (and rising) demand. But the increase occurs under a shadow of uncertainty, as the Chinese Communist Party is undertaking a “review” of its policies concerning future sales of rare earths. In all probability, the tactics of the increase are temporary, and fit within a larger strategy.

China will go to great lengths to maintain overall control of the global rare-earths supply. This fits neatly within the geo-economic approach of the [One Belt, One Road](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-30/china-is-determined-to-reshape-the-globe) initiative, which seeks to use a variety of carrots and sticks — economic, trade, diplomatic and security — to create zones of influence globally. In terms of rare earths, the strategy seems to be allowing carefully calibrated access to the elements at a level that makes it economically less attractive for competitors to undertake costly exploration and mining operations. This is similar to the oil-market strategy used by Russia and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries for decades.

Some free-market advocates believe that China will not take aggressive action choking off supply because that could [precipitate retaliation](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-02-22/china-weaponizing-rare-earths-technology-will-probably-backfire) or accelerate the search for alternate sources in global markets. What seems more likely is a series of targeted shutdowns directed against specific entities such as U.S. defense companies, Japanese consumer electronics makers, or European industrial concerns that have offended Beijing.

The path to rare-earth independence for the U.S. must include: Ensuring supply chains of rare earths necessary for national security; promoting the exploitation of the elements domestically (and removing barriers to responsibly doing so); mandating that defense contractors and other critical-infrastructure entities wean themselves off Chinese rare earths; sponsoring research and development to find alternative materials, especially for clean energy technology; and creating a substantial stockpile of the elements in case of a Chinese boycott.

This is a bipartisan agenda. The Trump administration’s [strategic assessment](https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/06/department-commerce-releases-report-critical-minerals) of what needs to be done (which goes beyond just 17 rare earths to include a total of 35 critical minerals) is thoughtful, and should serve as a basis for the Biden administration and Congress.

### 1NC – Innovation DA

#### Space Commercialization drives Tech Innovation in the Status Quo – it provides a unique impetus.

Hampson 17 Joshua Hampson 1-25-2017 “The Future of Space Commercialization” <https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf> (Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center)//Elmer

The size of the space economy is far larger than many may think. In 2015 alone, the global market amounted to $323 billion. Commercial infrastructure and systems accounted for 76 percent of that 9 total, with satellite television the largest subsection at $95 billion. The global space launch market’s 10 11 share of that total came in at $6 billion dollars. It can be hard to disaggregate how space benefits 12 particular national economies, but in 2009 (the last available report), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimated that commercial space transportation and enabled industries generated $208.3 billion in economic activity in the United States alone. Space is not just about 13 satellite television and global transportation; while not commercial, GPS satellites also underpin personal navigation, such as smartphone GPS use, and timing data used for Internet coordination.14 Without that data, there could be problems for a range of Internet and cloud-based services.15 There is also room for growth. The FAA has noted that while the commercial launch sector has not grown dramatically in the last decade, there are indications that there is latent demand. This 16 demand may catalyze an increase in launches and growth of the wider space economy in the next decade. The Satellite Industry Association’s 2015 report highlighted that their section of the space economy outgrew both the American and global economies. The FAA anticipates that growth to 17 continue, with expectations that small payload launch will be a particular industry driver.18 In the future, emerging space industries may contribute even more the American economy. Space tourism and resource recovery—e.g., mining on planets, moons , and asteroids—in particular may become large parts of that industry. Of course, their viability rests on a range of factors, including costs, future regulation, international problems, and assumptions about technological development. However, there is increasing optimism in these areas of economic production. But the space economy is not just about what happens in orbit, or how that alters life on the ground. The growth of this economy can also contribute to new innovations across all walks of life. Technological Innovation Innovation is generally hard to predict; some new technologies seem to come out of nowhere and others only take off when paired with a new application. It is difficult to predict the future, but it is reasonable to expect that a growing space economy would open opportunities for technological and organizational innovation. In terms of technology, the difficult environment of outer space helps incentivize progress along the margins. Because each object launched into orbit costs a significant amount of money—at the moment between $27,000 and $43,000 per pound, though that will likely drop in the future —each 19 reduction in payload size saves money or means more can be launched. At the same time, the ability to fit more capability into a smaller satellite opens outer space to actors that previously were priced out of the market. This is one of the reasons why small, affordable satellites are increasingly pursued by companies or organizations that cannot afford to launch larger traditional satellites. These small 20 satellites also provide non-traditional launchers, such as engineering students or prototypers, the opportunity to learn about satellite production and test new technologies before working on a full-sized satellite. That expansion of developers, experimenters, and testers cannot but help increase innovation opportunities. Technological developments from outer space have been applied to terrestrial life since the earliest days of space exploration. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a website that lists technologies that have spun off from such research projects. Lightweight 21 nanotubes, useful in protecting astronauts during space exploration, are now being tested for applications in emergency response gear and electrical insulation. The need for certainty about the resiliency of materials used in space led to the development of an analytics tool useful across a range of industries. Temper foam, the material used in memory-foam pillows, was developed for NASA for seat covers. As more companies pursue their own space goals, more innovations will likely come from the commercial sector. Outer space is not just a catalyst for technological development. Satellite constellations and their unique line-of-sight vantage point can provide new perspectives to old industries. Deploying satellites into low-Earth orbit, as Facebook wants to do, can connect large, previously-unreached swathes of 22 humanity to the Internet. Remote sensing technology could change how whole industries operate, such as crop monitoring, herd management, crisis response, and land evaluation, among others. 23 While satellites cannot provide all essential information for some of these industries, they can fill in some useful gaps and work as part of a wider system of tools. Space infrastructure, in helping to change how people connect and perceive Earth, could help spark innovations on the ground as well. These innovations, changes to global networks, and new opportunities could lead to wider economic growth.

#### Space innovation is specifically helpful for a laundry list of industries---proves spill over

Green and Stark 21 (The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs is an office of the U.N. Secretariat that promotes and facilitates peaceful international cooperation in outer space., 2021, " Space Exploration and Innovation," United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-exploration-and-innovation.html>) //slc amrrk

Space exploration and the innovation it entails are essential drivers for opening up new domains in space science and technology. They trigger **new partnerships and develop capabilities that create new opportunities for addressing global challenges**. Space exploration also motivates young people to pursue education and careers in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (the STEM disciplines).

Though the precise nature of future benefits from space exploration is not easily predefined, current trends suggest that significant advantage may be found in areas such as **new materials, health and medicine, transportation and computer technology**. As the benefits of space exploration and innovation become better known, increasingly more countries and non-governmental entities are interested in engaging in exploration and innovation.

#### Strong Innovation solves Extinction.

Matthews 18 Dylan Matthews 10-26-2018 “How to help people millions of years from now” <https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good> (Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University)//Re-cut by Elmer

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the **odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs** we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.

## Case 1

**Probability – 0.1% chance of a collision.**

**Salter 16** [(Alexander William, Economics Professor at Texas Tech) “SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS” 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 \*numbers replaced with English words] TDI

The probability of a collision is currently low. Bradley and Wein estimate that the maximum probability in LEO of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains below one in one thousand, conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth.

**Time frame – Kessler effect 200 years away**

**Stubbe 17** [(Peter, PhD in law @ Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt) “State Accountability for Space Debris: A Legal Study of Responsibility for Polluting the Space Environment and Liability for Damage Caused by Space Debris,” Koninklijke Brill Publishing, ISBN 978-90-04-31407-8, p. 27-31] TDI

The prediction of possible scenarios of the future evolution of the debris p o p ulation involves many uncertainties. Long-term forecasting means the prediction of the evolution of the future debris environment in time periods of decades or even centuries. Predictions are based on models84 that work with certain assumptions, and altering these parameters significantly influences the outcomes of the predictions. Assumptions on the future space traffic and on the initial object environment are particularly critical to the results of modeling efforts.85 A well-known pattern for the evolution of the debris population is the so-called Kessler effect’, which assumes that there is a certain collision probability among space objects because many satellites operate in similar orbital regions. These collisions create fragments, and thus additional objects in the respective orbits, which in turn enhances the risk of further collisions. Consequently, the num ber of objects and collisions increases exponentially and eventually results in the formation of a self-sustaining debris belt aroundthe Earth. While it has long been assumed that such a process of collisional cascading is likely to occur only in a very long-term perspective (meaning a time 1 n of several hundred years),87 a consensus has evolved in recent years that an uncontrolled growth of the debris population in certain altitudes could become reality much sooner.88 In fact, a recent cooperative study undertaken by various space agencies in the scope of i a d c shows that the current l e o debris population is unstable, even if current mitigation measures are applied. The study concludes:

Even with a 90% implementation of the commonly-adopted mitigation measures [...] the l e o debris population is expected to increase by an average of 30% in the next 200 years. The population growth is primarily driven by catastrophic collisions between 700 and 1000 km altitudes and such collisions are likely to occur every 5 to 9 years.89

#### Squo debris thumps

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Earth orbit is getting more and more crowded as the years go by. Humanity has launched about 12,170 satellites since the dawn of the space age in 1957, [according to the European Space Agency](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers) (ESA), and 7,630 of them remain in orbit today — but only about 4,700 are still operational. That means there are nearly 3,000 defunct spacecraft zooming around Earth at tremendous speeds, along with other big, dangerous pieces of debris like upper-stage rocket bodies. For example, orbital velocity at 250 miles (400 kilometers) up, the altitude at which the ISS flies, is about 17,100 mph (27,500 kph). At such speeds, even a tiny shard of debris can do serious damage to a spacecraft — and there are huge numbers of such fragmentary bullets zipping around our planet. ESA estimates that Earth orbit harbors at least 36,500 debris objects that are more than 4 inches (10 centimeters) wide, 1 million between 0.4 inches and 4 inches (1 to 10 cm) across, and a staggering 330 million that are smaller than 0.4 inches (1 cm) but bigger than 0.04 inches (1 millimeter). These objects pose more than just a hypothetical threat. From 1999 to May 2021, for example, the ISS conducted 29 debris-avoiding maneuvers, including three in 2020 alone, [according to NASA officials](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html). And that number continues to grow; the station performed [another such move in November 2021](https://www.space.com/space-station-dodging-chinese-space-junk-spacex-crew-3), for example. Many of the smaller pieces of space junk were spawned by the explosion of spent rocket bodies in orbit, but others were more actively emplaced. In January 2007, for instance, China intentionally destroyed one of its defunct weather satellites in a much-criticized test of anti-satellite technology that generated [more than 3,000 tracked debris objects](https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf) and perhaps 32,000 others too small to be detected. The vast majority of that junk remains in orbit today, experts say. Spacecraft have also collided with each other on orbit. The most famous such incident

occurred in February 2009, when Russia's defunct Kosmos 2251 satellite slammed into the operational communications craft Iridium 33, producing [nearly 2,000 pieces of debris](https://swfound.org/media/6575/swf_iridium_cosmos_collision_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf) bigger than a softball. That 2009 smashup might be evidence that the Kessler Syndrome is already upon us, though a cataclysm of "Gravity" proportions is still a long way off. "The cascade process can be more accurately thought of as continuous and as already started, where each collision or explosion in orbit slowly results in an increase in the frequency of future collisions," [Kessler told Space Safety Magazine in 2012](http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/kessler-syndrome/don-kessler-envisat-kessler-syndrome/).

**The risk to spacecraft is miniscule compared to normal mission hazards.**

Lawrence M. **Wein 9**, Professor & Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Space debris: Assessing risk and responsibility,” *Advances in Space Research*, Volume 43, 2009, pp. 1372-1390

[Translated scientific notation to % probability in brackets]

More importantly, while our **numerical results** mimic earlier results (Liou and Johnson, 2005; Walker and Martin, 2004) that stressed the importance of postmission deorbiting, **we do not** necessarily **agree with the claim** that the only way to prevent future problems is to **remove existing large intacts** from space (Liou and Johnson, 2006, 2008). The divergence between our views and those in Liou and Johnson (2006, 2008) is perhaps due to the different performance metrics used. The root causes for alarm in Liou and Johnson (2006, 2008) appear to be the **growth rate** of fragments and the small increase in the rate of catastrophic collisions over the **next 200 years** (Liou and Johnson, 2008, Fig. 2). However, **the great majority of catastrophic collisions** in the SOI **do not involve operational spacecraft**, and are hazardous only in the sense that the **fragments generated** from such a collision could subsequently damage or destroy operational spacecraft. Therefore, we introduced the notion of the lifetime risk of an operational spacecraft as the primary performance metric. **Our model predicts** that the **lifetime risk is** <5x10^-4 [less than .0005%] over the next two centuries, and always stays <10^-3 **[less than .001%]** than if there is very high (>98%) spacecraft deorbiting compliance. These **risks appear to be low** relative to the **immense cost** and **considerable technological uncertainty involved** in removing large objects from space, are **dwarfed by the ~20% historical** mission-impacting (but **not** necessarily **mission-ending**) **failure rate of spacecraft** (Frost and Sullivan, 2004), and could be **overestimated** if improved traffic management techniques lower future collision risks (Johnson, 2004). Hence, the need to bring large objects down from space **does not** **appear** to be as **clear** cut as suggested in Liou and Johnson (2006, 2008). Nonetheless, our model does not incorporate the possibility of intentional catastrophic collisions (ASAT tests, space wars) that could conceivably occur in the future. In addition, Fig. 5 considers only catastrophic collisions, whereas noncatastrophic intact-fragment collisions could easily disable an operational spacecraft. If the operational lifetime risk is modified to include noncatastrophic collisions with fragments >= 10cm, then the sustainable risk rises by ~50%: it increases from 2.19x10^-2 [.0219%] to 3.09x10^-2 in the base case, and increases from 4.91x10^-4 [.000491%] to 7.94x10^-4 in the full compliance case. Moreover, if fragments >= 1 cm (rather than >= 10 cm) are harmful to spacecraft (Johnson, 2004), then we (as well as other researchers) could be underestimating the risk.

## Case 2

1] No scenario for terrorists to attack now

2] No evidence that resource wars ever happen in the first place

3] blake 17 doesn’t say anything abt extinction, just “demise”