# 1nc vs Fem aff

## 1

#### Interpretation: Objectivity is defined as

Wien 17 [Charlotte Wein is a German scholar, study mapped out 7 types of ideas of journalism from German, American, and Asian authors, “Defining Objectivity within Journalism,” 10/15/17, <https://sciendo.com/pdf/10.1515/nor-2017-0255>] **SC EP**

The positivist concept of objectivity is binary: one is either objective or one is subjective. To be subjective is to say that one’s own assessments (attitudes and values) have influence on knowledge. To be objective is to say that one is content to present that which is not affected by one’s own assessments, i.e., the facts. Facts are what can be experienced directly, that which others would be able to know in precisely the same way. And the truth value of a fact is not under discussion. If one is content to communicate a fact, one is by definition objective. Hence, it is a precondition of positivism that one can distinguish between facts and opinions. In a recent textbook on journalism, in a chapter appropriately entitled ‘Fact vs. Opinion’, one can read: In the previous examples, the writers reported the sights, sounds and smells they observed. Those observations were factual – evidence of conditions that anyone on the scene could have observed. The writers let the readers form their own opinions (Rich 2000:85). 5 The assumption of the possibility of unequivocally distinguishing between facts and opinions emerges clearly and accords precisely with the positivistic way of understanding the concept of objectivity: everything that the journalist can and must write is that which he can directly observe and that which is factual. The journalist must keep his or her own opinions outside of the product and allow the readers to form their own opinions on the basis of the facts which the journalist has presented. There also exists a Danish version of this article of faith, i.e., that it is possible for the journalist to present the facts and only the facts and allow readers to formulate their own opinions. Ufer writes with a powerful quote from his old own master: Goddamnit, you must not tell people whether a fire is ‘terrible’ or not. [...] Just report, damnit! People won’t give a shit about what you think. They want to know what has happened! (Ufer 2001:39, emphasis in original, my translation from the Danish). Ufer’s old master thus demanded of his students that they be able to distil their own person out of the journalistic product and thus simply report what has happened (the facts) and keep their own opinions out of the product.

#### Oxford Dictionary defines objectivity as –

<https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/objectivity>

​1] the fact of not being influenced by personal feelings or opinions but considering only facts 2] the fact of something being based only on facts that can be proved

* a high standard of scientific objectivity.

#### That differs from 1ac’s [insert their definition]

#### 1] limits – they explode the topic to include any type of journalism. If advocacy and objectivity aren’t binary then forms of advocacy could be objectivity and vice versa. I.e. fact with context might have some advocacy but it’s still objective journalism. Means any aff can “technically prioritize objectivity” with some other arbitrary add on. The aff still gets the core of the topic lit: vaccines, scientific journalism, etc. Explosion of aff ground makes neg prep burden impossible, either killing neg ground or forcing the neg to read generics that barely link, always letting aff win.

#### Force the 1AR to read a definition card with a clear list of what’s included and excluded – otherwise, vote neg since they can’t put a clear limit on the topic. Our interp solves – it establishes a clear bright-line for that gives the neg a chance to predict and prepare for every aff ahead of time. At best, the aff’s extra-T still links to all our offense since they can get extra-T advantages to solve disads and defend whatever they want, magnifying limits.

#### [2] Precision – not defending the text of the resolution justifies the affirmative doing away with random words in the resolution which a] means they’re not within the topic which is a voter for jurisdiction since you can only vote affirmative on the resolution and this debate never should have happened, b] they’re unpredictable and impossible to engage in so we always lose

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. o/w because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps –

#### [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention

#### [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs –

#### a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair

#### b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

## 2

#### Text: In a democracy, a free press should prioritize objectivity over advocacy unless reporting on violent conflict, in which case they should prioritize peace journalism.

#### Objective journalism causes war – 3 warrants. Peace journalism solves.

McGoldrick 6 (Annabel, PhD in Peace Journalism & psychotherapist, 2006, "War Journalism and Objectivity," Conflict & Communication Online, <https://regener-online.de/journalcco/2006_2/pdf/mcgoldrick.pdf>) AG

Lynch and McGoldrick argue that there are three ways in which news said to be Objective fuels further violence. “Three conventions of Objective reporting, in particular, are predisposed towards War Journalism. Their ‘natural drift’, as it were, is to lead us – or leave us – to over-value violent, reactive responses to conflict, and under-value non-violent, developmental ones: • A bias in favour of official sources • A bias in favour of event over process • A bias in favour of ‘dualism’ in reporting conflicts” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, p. 209). The problem is that news is, by its very nature, preoccupied with change, yet it has a very fixed and one-dimensional understanding of how change comes about. Built into it is an orientation in favour of realism and ignores the insights of Peace and Conflict Studies, which argue that there are many ways to bring about change in a conflict, many ‘levers’ to pull. Later I will suggest that anyone working to intervene in the Cycle of Violence, for example, can be regarded as a ‘change agent’. But the Objectivity conventions mean we hear relatively little about them, compared with official sources – a category topped by leaders of national states. Max Weber provided a well-known definition: the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1946, p.78). Weber’s argument was that a state could only be defined in terms of means rather than ends. States could not be said to be for anything, necessarily; they were better conceived in terms of their observable characteristics than assumptions about their purpose. Weber’s formulation has been seen as neutral, even normative – the word, ‘legitimate’ has seemed, to some, to suggest a benign hand, guaranteeing security for all citizens. But these are concepts later interrogated and revised by researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies. What if the effect of state action favours the interests of some citizens, and not others? In the words of veteran Australian peace researcher, John W Burton, the very notion of ‘conflict resolution’ is only admissible if conflict is understood as attributable not to “inherent human aggressiveness” but to “the emergence of inappropriate social institutions and norms that reasonably would seem to be well within human capacities to alter, to which the person has problems in adjustment” (Burton 1998). Perhaps Burton’s cardinal insight is that there is more to human relations than power – there are also human needs, including the basics of food, drinking water and shelter from the elements, certainly, but also intangibles such as identity, recognition and respect. If the institutions and norms of a state entrench power relations of a kind that deny these human needs to any or all of its citizens, ‘the person’ will inevitably resist them. In those circumstances, what Burton calls the ‘deterrent strategies’ of the state take on an altogether more sinister aspect. Once deterrent strategies – such as the $560bn Pentagon budget – are put in place, they inevitably alter the nature of power relations. Missiles have to be fired and replaced in order to maintain ‘defence capacities’ – rich and powerful interests are not served by allowing military hardware to gather dust. Prisons have to be filled to generate orders for correctional corporations to build more. So norms and institutions come to be influenced in favour of wars overseas and punitive criminal justice policies at home – variants on what President Dwight D Eisenhower called the “military-industrial complex” (Eisenhower, 1960). Then the number of levers under the control of the leaders of national states has diminished in recent times. Industry has globalised, public services have been marketised and/or privatised and economic policy-making has become increasingly contingent on events elsewhere. Hence there may be more emphasis on the levers they do control, including the ability to set the news agenda and also the deployment of armed forces. British Prime Minister Tony Blair has pitched the UK into more armed conflicts than any other – Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan – and is said to admire the armed forces for their “professionalism” (Brogan 2003). Their stock-in-trade being, of course, to follow orders, in marked contrast to Blair’s experience with other areas of the public sector where change has to be negotiated and efforts at reform had left him with “scars on his back” (Watt 1999). It all means that a reliance on official sources may, of necessity, predispose the coverage of conflict towards War Journalism. Military deployment always seems to move, as if by osmosis, on to the news agenda. Calls for collaborative effort to enforce international law, or building solidarity at the level of civil society – even, latterly, accepting as final the will of the UN – always seem to have to be justified afresh from first principles. A bias in favour of event over process A news story is supposed to answer six basic questions: • Who? • What? Annabel McGoldrick conflict & communication online, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006 War Journalism and ‘Objectivity’  2006 by verlag irena regener berlin 4 • When? • Where? • Why? • How? Most stories only deal superficially – if at all – with the ‘why’. Many journalists argue that that it would make the story too long. But people can only begin to think themselves out of a conflict if they understand the underlying issues. The important thing to note here is that without some exploration of underlying causes, violence can be left to appear, by default, as the only response that ‘makes sense’. Wars remain opaque, in the sense that we are given no means to see through the violence to problems that lie beneath. It therefore makes no sense to hear from anyone wanting those problems to be addressed and set right, as a contribution to ending or avoiding violence. A bias in favour of dualism One safe way to insulate oneself against allegations of bias is to ‘hear both sides’. It means the journalist cannot be seen as ‘the voice of any particular party or sect’. By tradition, classic BBC reporting, for instance, is said to adopt the formula: “On the one hand … on the other … in the end, only time will tell” (Kampfner 2003). But this inscribes a paradigm of dualism that frames out multiparty initiatives, complex causes and win-win situations. Dualism is a key part of Objectivity but also, for these reasons, a major contributory factor in the way in which it escalates a conflict, by turning it into a tug of war in which each party faces only two alternatives – victory or defeat. Their words and deeds must be unequivocally ‘winning’ if they are not to risk being reported as ‘losing’, ‘backsliding’ or ‘going soft’. Findings from researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies provide abundant evidence that this dualistic model of conflict is seldom, if ever, the whole picture; there are always third (or more) parties whose involvement may be hidden; and within the parties, there are fault lines and differentiations which open up the scope for more creative conceptualisations of the issues at stake (Francis, 2002). The liberal theory of press freedom Kempf puts his finger on a dilemma facing every journalist covering conflicts – “either to take sides and to incite one party against the other, or to play the role of a moderating third party in order to improve the communication between them and contribute to constructive conflict transformation” (Kempf 2003 p. 83). Failure to adopt a deliberate policy of constructive conflict coverage, he argues, is tantamount to escalating them, because of “the lack of differentiation between traditional conflict coverage and propaganda” (Kempf 2003 p. 83). Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) give the following definitions: “Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them – which create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict. Peace Journalism: • Uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting • Provides a new route map tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their journalism – the ethics of journalistic intervention • Builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005 p. 5).

#### It competes – peace journalism is a form of advocacy. Solves conflict on a massive scale by reorienting knowledge production.

Michelis 18 (Silvia De, PhD Student in Peace Research @ University of Bradford, 12-23-2018, "Peace Journalism in Theory and Practice," E-International Relations, <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/12/23/peace-journalism-in-theory-and-practice/>) AG

This subject is constantly debated, especially in relation to the most frequent critique against peace journalism which considers it as a form of advocacy towards a particular cause: that of peace, in breach of the principle of journalistic objectivity. As a counter-argument to this critique, Christian et al.’s theory of the media proves useful to explain why peace journalism is needed and how it can be operationalised. Within the practice of journalism, they inscribe ‘the social responsibility tradition’, which “retains freedom as the basic principle for organizing public communication, including the media” (Christian, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng and White, 2009: 24), and legitimises the promotion of certain moral givens within the public discourse, such as the protection of air, water and the environment for the future existence of the human race and other living beings. These moral obligations are, in fact, generally accepted within most advanced societies.

Within the field of peace journalism ‘peace’ – intended as an end – and ‘nonviolence’ – intended as a means or practice – are considered as both the organizing principles of news-making and the fundamental moral givens all societies should aim towards, nationally and globally, in line with the view expressed by Christian et al. (ibid.). It is for this reason that peace journalism can be approached as an evolving profession as well as an analytical model for scholarly research of media representations (or mis-representations). It constitutes a medium for exploring the aspects and dynamics of physical, cultural, and structural violence, exploration that is considered vital for the orientation of knowledge and production of actions, which are needed to build more peaceful societies.

Inscribed into news-making are the selectivity and framing of news. In the field of journalism studies “to frame is to select some aspect of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993: 51). Therefore, according to peace journalism scholars (Lynch, 2014; Seaga Shaw, Lynch and Hackett, 2011; Keeble, Tulloch and Zollmann, 2010; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; Dente Ross and Tehranian, 2009; Shinar and Kempf, 2007; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005), nonviolent initiatives need to be reported to foster peaceful solutions of conflict and de-saturate the collective imaginary from the sustained belief that violence and war are the only viable responses to it. Peace scholar John Lederach states in this regard that: “There are people who have a vision for peace, emerging often from their own experience of conflict and pain” which are often unheard “because they do not represent official power … or because they are written off as biased” (1997: 94).

The traditional conceptualisation of journalism considers the world as a set of ready-made facts, whose building up process and meaning are often ignored, or excessively simplified. Instead, within the field of foreign intervention for example, a critical examination of the dominant interpretation of what journalists observe should be reported in a way that takes into consideration the implementation of nonviolent practices for the solution of conflicts. With regards to war reporting, Paul Mason reports in The Guardian:

We are besieged now by images of the dead in conflict, usually published by people who believe it will either deter killing, expose the perpetrators or illustrate war’s futility and brutality. It is an old illusion […]. Many Germans in the 1920s and 30s came to believe, despite the horrific photos, that the war had embodied the noblest and most exhilarating aspects of human life; and that warfare represented the ultimate in technological modernity and moral freedom. This remains a more dangerous myth than the idea that war is harmless, fun or heroic (2014: 5).

#### That outweighs – a laundry list of hotspots are primed to escalate in 2022 – our authors predicted Ukraine.

Ero and Atwood 21 (Comfort, CEO @ Crisis Group & PhD IR, and Richard, MA IR @ Princeton, 12-17-2021, "10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022," <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2022>) AG

After all, by some measures, war is in retreat. The number of people killed in fighting worldwide has mostly declined since 2014—if you count only those dying directly in combat. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, figures through the end of 2020 show [battle deaths are down](https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/) from seven years ago, mostly because Syria’s terrible slaughter has largely subsided. The number of major wars has also descended from a recent peak. Despite Russian President Vladimir Putin menacing Ukraine, states rarely go to war with one another. More local conflicts rage than ever, but they tend to be of lower intensity. For the most part, 21st-century wars are less lethal than their 20th-century predecessors. A more cautious United States might also have an upside. The 1990s bloodletting in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia; the post-9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq wars; Sri Lanka’s murderous campaign against the Tamils; and the collapse of Libya and South Sudan all happened at a time of—and, in some cases, thanks to—a dominant U.S.-led West. That recent U.S. presidents have refrained from toppling enemies by force is a good thing. Besides, one shouldn’t overstate Washington’s sway even in its post-Cold War heyday; absent an invasion, it has always struggled to bend recalcitrant leaders (former Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, for example) to its will. Still, if these are silver linings, they’re awfully thin. Battle deaths, after all, tell just a fraction of the story. Yemen’s conflict kills more people, mostly women and young children, due to starvation or preventable disease than violence. Millions of Ethiopians suffer acute food insecurity because of the country’s civil war. Fighting involving Islamists elsewhere in Africa often doesn’t entail thousands of deaths but drives millions of people from their homes and causes humanitarian devastation. Afghanistan’s violence levels have sharply dropped since the Taliban seized power in August, but starvation, caused mostly by Western policies, could leave more Afghans dead—including millions of children—than past decades of fighting. Worldwide, the number of displaced people, most due to war, is at a record high. Battle deaths may be down, in other words, but suffering due to conflict is not. Foreign involvement in conflicts creates the risk that local clashes light bigger fires. Moreover, states compete fiercely even when they’re not fighting directly. They do battle with cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, election interference, economic coercion, and by instrumentalizing migrants. Major and regional powers vie for influence, often through local allies, in war zones. Proxy fighting has not so far sparked direct confrontation among meddling states. Indeed, some navigate the danger adeptly: Russia and Turkey maintain cordial relations despite backing competing sides in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts. Still, foreign involvement in conflicts creates the risk that local clashes light bigger fires. Standoffs involving major powers look increasingly dangerous. Putin may gamble on another incursion into Ukraine. A China-U.S. clash over Taiwan is unlikely in 2022, but the Chinese and U.S. militaries increasingly bump up against each another around the island and in the South China Sea, with all the peril of entanglement that entails. If the Iran nuclear deal collapses, which now seems probable, the United States or Israel may attempt—possibly even early in 2022—to knock out Iranian nuclear facilities, likely prompting Tehran to sprint toward weaponization while lashing out across the region. One mishap or miscalculation, in other words, and interstate war could make a comeback. And whatever one thinks of U.S. influence, its decline inevitably brings hazards, given that American might and alliances have structured global affairs for decades. No one should exaggerate the decay: U.S. forces are still deployed around the globe, NATO stands, and Washington’s recent Asia diplomacy shows it can still marshal coalitions like no other power. But with much in flux, Washington’s rivals are probing to see how far they can go. As for COVID-19, the pandemic has exacerbated the world’s worst humanitarian disasters and propelled the impoverishment, rising living costs, inequality, and joblessness that fuel popular anger. It had a hand this past year in a power grab in Tunisia, Sudan’s coup, and protests in Colombia. The economic hurt COVID-19 is unleashing could strain some countries to a breaking point. Although it’s a leap from discontent to protest, from protest to crisis, and from crisis to conflict, the pandemic’s worst symptoms may yet lie ahead. So while today’s troubling undercurrents haven’t yet set battle deaths soaring or the world ablaze, things still look bad. As this year’s list shows all too starkly, they could easily get worse.

#### China will use power aggressively

Jennifer Lind 18, Associate Professor, Department of Government, Dartmouth College, March/April 2018, “Life in China's Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 2

It may be tempting to believe that China will be a relatively benign regional hegemon. Economic interdependence, one argument goes, should restrain Chinese aggression: because the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rests on economic growth, which depends on trade, Beijing would maintain peaceful relations with its neighbors. Moreover, China claims to be a different sort of great power. Chinese officials and scholars regularly decry interventionism and reject the notion of "spheres of influence" as a Cold War relic. Chinese President Xi Jinping has said that his country has "never engaged in colonialism or aggression" thanks to its "peace-loving cultural tradition." In this view, life in China's Asia would not be so different from what it is today. But this is not how regional hegemons behave. Great powers typically dominate their regions in their quest for security. They develop and wield tremendous economic power. They build massive militaries, expel external rivals, and use regional institutions and cultural programs to entrench their influence. Because hegemons fear that neighboring countries will allow external rivals to establish a military foothold, they develop a profound interest in the domestic politics of their neighborhood, and even seek to spread their culture to draw other countries closer. China is already following the strategies of previous regional hegemons. It is using economic coercion to bend other countries to its will. It is building up its military to ward off challengers. It is intervening in other countries' domestic politics to get friendlier policies. And it is investing massively in educational and cultural programs to enhance its soft power. As Chinese power and ambition grow, such efforts will only increase. China's neighbors must start debating how comfortable they are with this future, and what costs they are willing to pay to shape or forestall it.

#### Rise sparks US China war.

Pickrell 2015 - Master’s in IR, currently pursuing a PhD in IR and Diplomacy at Central China Normal University  
Ryan, "The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No Return?," Oct 26, nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-china-relationship-passed-the-14168?page=3

Conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable as most realist scholars suggest. However, in every relationship, there is a tipping point or a point of no return, and China and the United States are rapidly approaching this point. As traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to resolve the more challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers have been increasingly relying on their military capabilities and hard power tactics. That’s especially true in the South China Sea, which is one of the single greatest points of contention between China and the United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to prevent great power conflict, both China and the United States remain unwilling to compromise and make the kind of meaningful concessions required to move the relationship further from confrontation and conflict and closer to cooperation and rapprochement. Instead, these two countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst. Failed pursuit of strategic stability China’s proposed solution to the Sino-American strategic stability issue is the “new model of major-country relations,” which encourages the United States and China to avoid confrontation and conflict, respect one another’s political systems and national interests—specifically China’s core interests—and pursue win-win cooperation. China is exceptionally enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-American meeting. Chinese enthusiasm for the “new model of major-country relations” can be explained in a number of different ways. American acceptance of China’s proposal would facilitate Beijing’s rise, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a leader for national strength and revival and reduce the likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the “new model of major-country relations” would create an international environment conducive to China’s rise, it would essentially allow China to become the preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential to put China on par with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged by the United States. Not only would American recognition of China’s strength and power have effects abroad, but it would also stoke Chinese nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of establishing a new code of conduct for the Sino-American relationship that is more in line with Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric regional order. Prior to the recent meeting between Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi announced that China’s proposed “new model of major-country-relations” would be an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that the “new model of major-country relations” is not in America’s best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed China’s proposal. As the hegemonic power, the United States maintains its power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence. Along those same lines, acceptance of China’s proposal might give other states in the international system the impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic “Thucydides trap.” Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United States to respect China’s “core interests”— as many Chinese and foreign scholars have noted—is a loaded statement. While the United States is not opposed to respecting a state’s national interests, it tends to be unwilling to respect national interests which are highly contested, which is the situation for the majority of China’s “core interests.” In addition to traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, China’s “core interests” also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is concerned that China’s “new model of major-country relations” is a ploy designed to trick the United States into acknowledging China’s extensive territorial claims and undercutting the interests of American allies and long-time strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region, which would likely result in the weakening of the American-led “hub-and-spoke” security structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security Concept. There are also suspicions in the United States that China’s proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to which the Obama administration has been consistently opposed. America’s approach to Sino-American strategic stability is to have China and the United States focus on cooperation and agree to avoid letting competition in one area affect cooperation and collaboration in others. In many ways, this resembles China’s old “shelving disputes and pursuing joint development” strategy for Asia. As this kind of strategy is the geopolitical equivalent of sweeping dirt under the rug, it is only effective to a point. Eventually, the dirt spills out. Sooner or later, unaddressed problems surface. At best, this approach is only a temporary stop on the road to functional strategic stability. At worst, this approach has already outlived its usefulness. China views this strategy as an attempt by the United States to avoid addressing China’s demands that the United States acknowledge China’s rise to great power status and redefine the relationship accordingly, which only encourages the already strong Chinese desire to push forward the “new model of major-country relations.” China and the United States are at an impasse regarding strategic stability. While both states have made commitments and promises to prevent great power conflict, neither China nor the United States has developed a reasonable or implementable solution for Sino-American strategic stability. Thus, competition continues unmanaged, unchecked and confrontation is steadily evolving into conflict. Drawing Lines in the “Sea” The problems pushing the Sino-American relationship towards conflict are numerous and diverse, but if you are looking for the issue most likely to cause conflict, you need look no further than the South China Sea. China perceives the territorial disputes in this area as issues in which aggressive foreign state actors led by the United States are threatening China’s territorial sovereignty. For China, because of its history, territorial sovereignty issues implicate regime survival in a way that transcends all other quarrels and disagreements. The United States, on the other hand, views China’s territorial claims and actions to bolster those claims as Chinese expansionism, aggression against American allies and strategic partners, and a threat to the guiding principles of the liberal world order—which the United States views as crucial for the preservation of America’s global hegemonic power. The situation in the South China Sea has been steadily escalating for several years now. In April, 2014, American defense secretary Chuck Hagel met with Chinese defense minister Chang Wanquan. During the meeting, Hagel said, “All parties should refrain from provocative actions and the use of intimidation, coercion, or aggression to advance their claims. Such disputes must be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law.” Chang replied, “I’d like to reiterate that the territorial sovereignty issue is a Chinese core interest. On this issue, we will make no compromises, no concessions. Not even a tiny bit of violation will be allowed.” The inability to discuss openly or compromise on this issue has made it impossible to resolve and has led to escalation and increased tension. In the aftermath of this meeting, China began investing heavily in island construction and land reclamation activities in disputed waters. As these activities have stirred up a lot of dust in the region, the United States has demanded that China abandon its present course of action, insisting that it is provocative and negatively impacting regional peace and stability. Not only has China dismissed America’s demands, it has also increased its military presence in contested areas in order to establish anti-access zones. While China claims that its actions are within the scope of international law, the United States asserts that Chinese actions are in violation of the law of the sea and laws for the regulation of the international commons. China argues that the South China Sea issue is a territorial sovereignty issue, yet the United States regards this issue as a freedom of navigation dispute, as well as a fight for the preservation of the international legal system—a cornerstone for the American-led liberal world order. In August of this year, the United States launched its new Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, which aims “to safeguard the freedom of the seas, deter conflict and escalation, and promote adherence to international law and standards.” The Asia-Pacific region is now at the heart of the American naval security agenda. In response, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said that China “opposes any country’s attempt to challenge China’s territorial sovereignty and security under the pretext of safeguarding navigation freedom.” Responding to Chinese criticisms of America’s new regional maritime security strategy, American Defense Secretary Ashton Carter stated, “Make no mistake, we will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits…We will do that at times and places of our choosing.” In 2014, the United States carried out “freedom of navigation” exercises in various parts of the world and challenged the territorial claims of 18 different countries; however, the United States has yet to officially challenge China’s claims in the South China Sea. But, that may soon change, as the United States is currently considering sending American naval vessels within 12 nautical miles of China’s artificial islands in order to force China to end its land reclamation activities. Such plans are considered aggressive, dangerous and extremely provocative by the Chinese. A recent Global Times editorial read, “China mustn’t tolerate rampant US violations of China’s adjacent waters and the skies over these expanding islands. The Chinese military should be ready to launch countermeasures according to Washington’s level of provocation.” The article further stated, “If the US encroaches on China’s core interests, the Chinese military will stand up and use force to stop it.” The article stated plainly, “If the US adopts an aggressive approach, it will breach China’s bottom line, and China will not sit idly by.” Other reports from this newspaper, a state-sponsored Chinese media outlet, have made it clear that if the bottom line for the United States is that China must end all of its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, then war is inevitable, which suggests that this issue may be the tipping point for the Sino-American relationship. How the United States and China choose to move forward on this issue will permanently redefine the relationship between these two great powers. Granted, this may just be saber rattling, but even if that is the case, this issue is still decidedly zero-sum—which increases the likelihood of conflict. For China, political preservation and a potential Chinese sphere of influence are on the line, and for the United States, the liberal world order and American hegemony are at stake. Sooner or later, this trying issue will need to be resolved, and regardless of whether it is resolved through diplomacy or military force, it will take a toll on the geopolitical influence of either one or both countries. Were the international institutions for collective security strong enough to handle situations like this when they arise—and if China and the United States were willing to establish a new relationship model which addresses each country’s respective security concerns and encourages effective collaboration—it might actually be possible to resolve this issue peacefully. But given current circumstances, this is little more than idealism and wishful thinking. As there is currently no clear solution to this problem that would allow both countries to walk out of this situation with their heads held high, these two states are pondering the unthinkable. Depending on each country’s level of commitment and resolve, this situation may have already passed the tipping point. The outcome of the geopolitical power struggle between China and the United States will almost certainly be decided in the South China Sea. Some have suggested that the South China Sea issue is not a Sino-American issue. On the contrary, it is the most pressing Sino-American issue. One side will either choose to back down or be forced to back down. No matter how everything plays out in the South China Sea, geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region will never be the same again.

#### A US-China war ends all life on earth

Sharman 2017 – Citing professor of Chinese studies and director of King's College London's Lau China Institute & Prof of Politics @ U of Warwick  
Jon, "US would go into any war with China with 'unparalleled violence', warn experts," www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-china-war-be-end-of-life-earth-nuclear-weapons-apocalypse-steve-bannon-donald-trump-white-house-a7561821.html

US and China have been engaged in a back-and-forth dispute over military build-up and territorial claims in the region for some years. In December the US said it would base its deadliest fighter jets in Australia, and days later China seized an unmanned US Navy drone. It followed a diplomatic spat around then-President-elect Trump's congratulatory phone call with Taiwan's Prime Minister Tsai Ing-wen, which broke with decades of US policy. Mr Trump has been forthright about China's influence, blaming it for the loss of American jobs. The war of words recently heated up when a Chinese military official was quoted as saying talk of war with the US under Mr Trump "are not just slogans, they are becoming a practical reality". Trevor McCrisken, associate professor of politics and international studies at the University of Warwick, said that if war broke out "we would be looking, I would imagine, at World War Three". He said: "I really do think that would be the end of life as we know it on Earth. "From a global strategic risk level I would say the last thing you want is war between the United States and any of the major powers because of the risks of escalation, obviously the potential for nuclear weapons to be used. The likelihood of nuclear exchange between the two principals involved is high." But, he added, the "overwhelming view of most policy-makers in Washington since at least the late 1970s" favours a form of "cooperative, if competitive" relationship with China. Dr Peter Roberts, director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute, said: "America would take military losses. They would lose thousands and thousands [of personnel]. But China would be utterly defeated. If America goes to war, it wages war in its totality. They would go to this with unparalleled violence and energy." The US has an "overall competitive edge" partly due to technological superiority, Dr Roberts said, but also because the four branches of its military—Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force—are trained to work closely together. "It's demonstrated how it can use all those arms to deliver military victory," he said. In contrast, China's services operate "individually" and also have less, and less recent, combat experience compared to their American counterparts. "There's a huge difference between someone who's been in combat before, and someone who hasn't," Dr Roberts said, comparing the potential confrontation to one between Greek hero Achilles and farmers recruited from the fields. Kerry Brown, professor of Chinese studies and director of King's College London's Lau China Institute, said: "US naval superiority is massive. And if we are talking just military, then for sure, a conflict right beside China would hurt China more than the US. "It would, of course, totally upend supply routes, however, and probably cause a global recession. So it would, no matter who won in terms of military outcomes, be lose-lose and cut against the logic of self interest of both the US and China." Professor Brown added: "We have to expect this war of words to simply get worse. The best outcome is that the two sides ultimately compromise—China acts more responsibly, and stops its adventurism, and the US concedes it more space. The worst outcome would be a misunderstanding that would lead to real conflict."

## 3

#### Ballot PIK: We endorse the entirety of the affirmative except for the call for a ballot. Instead I want a society where men people do not win performative virtue signaling by stealing the accomplishments of women like me. You didn’t make those bitches famous. During women’s history month too? Yikes.

Pauly 17 [https://www.motherjones.com/media/2017/03/men-taking-credit-women-history/?fbclid=IwAR2j77Y5iHllQAgcN0\_gxVeqyFaFoeGx9cdRyM6Lfp9VbhdR-TCeWwU5M58] **SC EP**

In Donald Trump’s 2011 book Time to Get Tough: Making America #1 Again, the president-to-be made an astonishing claim: Lady Gaga likely owed her international fame to none other than…Donald Trump. “She became a big star and maybe she became a star because I put her on the Miss Universe pageant,” he [wrote](https://www.amazon.com/Time-Get-Tough-America-Great/dp/1621574954). “It’s very possible, who knows what would have happened without it, because she caused [a sensation](https://vimeo.com/129600935).”

The problem goes beyond Trump, of course. Women, especially women of color, are routinely denied credit for their ideas, creativity, genius, and success (not to mention [they’re paid less than men](http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2016/04/women-are-still-screwed-over-pay-gap) for full-time work). So, in honor of Women’s History Month, I’ve put together this woefully incomplete timeline of the lowlights:

Paleolithic era

Pre-European cave paintings are attributed to male hunters up until 2013, when an [anthropologist shows](http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/10/131008-women-handprints-oldest-neolithic-cave-art/) that hand tracings found alongside the art at 10 famous sites were likely done by women.

12th c.

[“Trota of Salerno”](http://www.academia.edu/4613161/Monica_H._Green_The_Development_of_the_Trotula_Revue_d_Histoire_des_Textes_26_1996_119-203) authors a gynecology handbook, On the Sufferings of Women. For centuries, scholars falsely assume Trota was a man.

1806

At the close of the Lewis and Clark expedition, Sacagawea is [paid nothing](http://www.pbs.org/lewisandclark/inside/saca.html) for her year and a half of work as an interpreter and guide. Her husband, a white trapper who married her after she was taken captive, receives [$500](https://www.nps.gov/jeff/learn/historyculture/toussaint-charbonneau.htm).

1818

Mary Shelley [publishes Frankenstein](http://mult-kor.hu/file/Frankenstein%20CHE%20article%20(2)%20(2).doc) anonymously. Her husband pens the preface and people assume he was behind it.

1843

Mathematician Ada Lovelace shows how Charles Babbage’s Analytical Engine (a theoretical computer) could be induced to perform complex math. Her contribution, considered the first software, was dismissed by many [male historians](http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/ada-lovelace-the-first-tech-visionary): “It is no exaggeration to say that she was a manic-­depressive with the most amazing delusions.”

Ada Lovelace/Wikimedia

1840s

The Brontë sisters take [male pen names](https://books.google.com/books?id=k9sGKi1M-RMC&pg=PA257&dq=bronte+sisters+male+pseudonyms&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwir8ufuk6zRAhVIxWMKHZSsDtYQ6AEIUzAJ#v=onepage&q=bronte%20sisters%20male%20pseudonyms&f=false). “Authoresses are liable to be looked on with prejudice,” notes Charlotte, author of Jane Eyre. Mary Ann Evans later writes Middlemarch as George Eliot, probably to avoid “being treated as ‘just’ a female writer,” one expert notes.

1859

After 10 years working with engineers to [design signal flares](http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/a-woman-with-flare/), Martha Coston is listed as “administratrix” on [the patent](https://www.google.com/patents/US23536). Her long-dead husband is listed as the inventor.

1888

Ellen Eglin sells the rights to the clothes wringer she invented to an agent. The invention brings “great financial success” to the buyer, who paid her $18. “If it was known that a negro woman patented the invention, white ladies would not buy the wringer,” she [explains](https://archive.org/stream/Womaninventor1Smit#page/n1/mode/2up).

1904

Elizabeth Magie creates The Landlord’s Game. Player Charles Darrow later patents [a modified version](https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/apr/11/secret-history-monopoly-capitalist-game-leftwing-origins): Monopoly.

Jens Buettner/DPA via ZUMA

1905

Nettie Stevens publishes a paper establishing that chromosomes, not environmental factors or diet, determine the sex of an organism. The same year, E.B. Wilson, a more celebrated male colleague, independently arrives at a similar conclusion and gets [most of the credit](http://www.vox.com/2016/7/7/12105830/nettie-stevens-genetics-gender-sex-chromosomes).

1908

Henrietta Leavitt, a [“human computer”](https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/12/the-women-computers-who-measured-the-stars/509231/) at the Harvard College Observatory, discovers the period-luminosity relationship (the brighter the star, the more slowly it appears to pulse). Her [work is key](http://www.ryanwyatt.net/Writing/missLeavitts_2005dec01.pdf) to calculating interstellar distances, but male astronomers snag the credit—Leavitt dies in obscurity.

1917

“Fountain” (a urinal) is submitted to a New York City exhibition. Art critics later [cite evidence](http://old.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Did-Marcel-Duchamp-steal-Elsas-urinal/36155) that Marcel Duchamp’s infamous piece was sent to him by a “female friend”—possibly [Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven](https://books.google.com/books?id=ak2UNE5rRpQC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=fountain&f=false)—under the pseudonym R. Mutt.

Alfred Stieglitz/Wikimedia

1938

Based on observations by her German colleague Otto Hahn, Jewish physicist Lise Meitner works out [the first model](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/style/longterm/books/reviews/lisemeitner.htm) of nuclear fission. Hahn publishes the work and accepts the Nobel Prize, portraying Meitner as his assistant. A new element, Meitnerium, is named in her honor—60 years later.

1939

The British government hires Joan Clarke as a [codebreaker](http://www-history.mcs.st-and.ac.uk/Biographies/Clarke_Joan.html) on Alan Turing’s team during World War II. Years later, she is immortalized [on screen](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2084970/) by Kiera Knightly—but remembered mainly for her doomed engagement with Turing.

1946

“Government and scientific men” hold a dinner gala to celebrate the first electronic computer, the [New York Times reports](http://www.computerhistory.org/revolution/birth-of-the-computer/4/78/323?position=0). None of the [women responsible](http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/fashion/the-innovators-by-walter-isaacson-how-women-shaped-technology.html?referrer=&_r=1) for programming it are invited.

1952

R&B singer Willie Mae “Big Mama” Thornton is the first to record “Hound Dog,” a country blues tune written especially for her. Elvis Presley’s vastly more famous version is later [featured](https://www.rockhall.com/digital-classroom-elvis-presley-hound-dog) by the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame as “the most illustrative example of the white appropriation of African-American music.”

1953

James Watson and Francis Crick’s discovery of DNA’s structure hinges on Rosalind Franklin’s X-ray diffraction studies, but she’s [excluded](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jun/23/sexism-in-science-did-watson-and-crick-really-steal-rosalind-franklins-data) from their Nobel Prize-winning paper. “Rosy might have been quite stunning had she taken even a mild interest in clothes,” [Watson notes](https://books.google.com/books?id=CESjmRQtfrUC&pg=PT26&lpg=PT26&dq=rosy+might+have+been+quite+stunning&source=bl&ots=FiHoiGLEpH&sig=SowIiD8fV_7q7SX-UnCFIZ9XPsk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjYpafC86HSAhVEjlQKHeAHCnEQ6AEIMjAF#v=onepage&q=rosy%20might%20have%20been%20quite%20stunning&f=false) in his memoir, The Double Helix.

Rosalind Franklin Cold Spring Laboratory Harbor Archives

1957

The Nobel Committee for Physics [passes over](http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130519-women-scientists-overlooked-dna-history-science/) Chien-Shiung Wu—a Manhattan Project scientist who designed an experiment that overturned the so-called parity law of physics—in favor of the two male scientists who had recruited her to work on the topic.

1961

Male NASA scientists rely on math whiz [Katherine Johnson](https://www.nasa.gov/content/katherine-johnson-biography) and her fellow [Hidden Figures](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt4846340/) to send men into space. “Woe unto thee if they shall make thee a computer,” a [NASA newsletter](https://crgis.ndc.nasa.gov/crgis/images/0/09/LARC1945.pdf) preached to female employees. “For the Project Engineer will take credit for whatsoever thou doth that is clever and full of glory.”

1970

Forty-six female researchers [sue Newsweek](http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/07/opinion/la-oe-povich-newsweek-discrimination-gender-20121007), alleging that male writers and editors took all the credit for their efforts.

1986

Margaret Keane sues ex-husband Walter Keane, claiming she created the [paintings of big-eyed children](http://time.com/3632635/the-true-story-behind-big-eyes/) and animals that made him famous. The case drags on for many years. By the time Margaret prevails, Walter is too broke to pay the award.

1993

Historian Margaret Rossiter coins the phrase [“Matilda effect”](http://www.jstor.org.libproxy1.usc.edu/stable/pdf/285482.pdf) (after a suffragette who claimed a woman was behind Eli Whitney’s cotton gin) to refer to the undervaluing of women’s contributions in science.

2006

[Truman Capote’s letter](http://www.monroecountymuseum.org/myth-buster) praising a draft of his childhood friend Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird turns up, putting to rest [decades of speculation](http://blog.al.com/live/2012/04/harper_lee_did_she_or_didnt_sh_1.html) (which Capote made little attempt to dispel) that he was the true author.

2007

M.I.A. [vents about male reporters](http://pitchfork.com/news/27349-mia-confronts-the-haters/) crediting her ex, who contributed to [a few songs](https://www.scribd.com/document/60130571/Digital-Booklet-Arular) on her debut album, as its mastermind: “I just find it kind of insulting that I can’t have any ideas on my own because I’m a female.”

2008

After know-nothing guys try to school essayist Rebecca Solnit on topics in which she happens to be an expert, she [pens an essay](http://www.motherjones.com/media/2012/08/problem-men-explaining-things-rebecca-solnit) titled “Men Explain Things to Me.” The word “mansplain” enters the lexicon.

2014

Whitney Wolfe [sues Tinder](http://www.rezlaw.com/News-Events/06-30-14_Complaint_with_Exhibits-1.pdf), claiming a fellow exec stripped away her title because “having a young female co-founder makes the company seem like a joke.” The case is [settled privately](http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2014/11/04/exclusive-sean-rad-out-as-tinder-ceo-inside-the-crazy-saga/4/#6e4192b65a0a).

2015

In a [study of the tenure process](http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/01/women-dont-get-credit-when-they-work-with-men.html) at top economics programs, Harvard Ph.D. student Heather Sarsons finds that women aren’t getting credit for papers they co-author with men.

2016

Just after Hungarian swimmer Katinka Hosszú shatters a world record at the Rio Olympics, NBC cuts to her volatile coach/husband in the stands. “And there’s the man responsible!” a [male commentator proclaims](http://ijr.com/2016/08/667639-everyones-talking-about-what-nbc-did-before-gold-medal-winning-swimmer-was-even-out-of-the-water/).

Hosszú and hubby. Hosszú: David Gray/Reuters; Husband: Dominic Ebenbichler/Reuters/Zuma

2016

[Kanye West raps](http://genius.com/Kanye-west-famous-lyrics), “I feel like me and Taylor [Swift] might still have sex. Why? I made that bitch famous. (God damn) I made that bitch famous.

#### 2] Men already have a perceptual bias in debate. Women being voted down because their clothes are too revealing or my makeup is too much. my voice isnt “too high either.” In prep rooms there’s 16 males and I’m the only female. The judge should overcorrect bias and vote for me. As the only woman, that too a woman of color, in this extemely sexist debate round the judge should overcompensate for bias and give me the ballot. Overcompensating for bias controls the internal link to debate being an educational space and lets me challenge a system built off of patriarchy.

#### 3] I’m 2-2. Every round is the bubble for me. Not giving me the ballot hurts the already decked women representation in debate. Visibility of women in debate is key to role models, representation and resistance. It’s a state tournament and more people are watching what I do.

#### 4] forcing me to negate a fem aff only forces me to think in terms of patriarchy – reason why the aff fails.

## 4

#### Weezer rhetoric is a voting issue – its irreparably sexist, incel behavior and psychological unsafe.

Caitlin White, 4-8-2016, "Weezer And Women," Brooklyn Magazine, <https://www.bkmag.com/2016/04/08/weezer-and-women/> CHO

So, what are we to do with these newly revised understandings of art we previously embraced without reservation? Is the latent sexism important or damaging enough to throw out all comfort I gleaned from nights of teenage angst driving around my tiny town screaming Weezer lyrics? Who do I owe this 180 to, if I choose it? Myself? Future women? The Feminist Cause? It’s easier if I’m talking about sexism, which directly impacts me, but what if we’re talking about the troubling Mad TV sketch? Does my responsibility change when I’m the privileged party, not directly impacted by the outdated, hurtful portrayals in a cultural artifact? I don’t think any of us have any answers to these questions, though we try to hash them out in Tweets, articles or bar conversations. We try to thinkpiece or call out or champion–and we fuck it up all the time. We create more anger and hurt in the process, we do a lot more bludgeoning than teaching or listening. Still, this album deserves some bludgeoning. The White Album is so bad and so oddly out of touch with the current wave of #hashtag #feminism, that it makes it hard not to interrogate my past love for this band. “LA Girlz” is “El Scorcho” part two, (whether it’s tongue-in-cheek or not) all the dumb blonde and regional bullshit that my Los Angeles cohort has to face is presented here as fact. It’s not even boring; it’s abrasive. “Thank God For Girls” is basically [the virtual reality suit for simulating sex with women](http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/04/illusion-virtual-reality-sex-suit.html) in song form. “Summer Elaine And Drunk Dori” just picks two imaginary women to be playthings for Cuomo while he’s sad over yet another relationship’s demise.

#### Treat this as a pik of their rhetoric – no reason why they had to titled their arguments as something else. Screenshots

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated

A screenshot of a phone

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

## Case

#### The role of the ballot is to determine if the aff’s a good idea—anything else is self-serving, arbitrary and begs the question of the rest of the debate. Evaluate consequences

Christopher A. Bracey 6, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle. Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." [281](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=cd9713b340d60abd42c2b34c36d8ef95&_docnum=9&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkVA&_md5=9645fa92f5740655bdc1c9ae7c82b328) For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.

#### Focus on large scale catastrophes is good and they outweigh – appeals to social costs, moral rules, and securitization play into cognitive biases and flawed risk calculus – 2020 is living proof

Weber 20 (ELKE U. WEBER is Gerhard R. Andlinger Professor in Energy and the Environment and Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at Princeton University.), November-December 2020 Issue, "Heads in the Sand," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-10-13/heads-sand> mvp

We are living in a time of crisis. From the immediate challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic to the looming existential threat of climate change, the world is grappling with massive global dangers—to say nothing of countless problems within countries, such as inequality, cyberattacks, unemployment, systemic racism, and obesity. In any given crisis, the right response is often clear. Wear a mask and keep away from other people. Burn less fossil fuel. Redistribute income. Protect digital infrastructure. The answers are out there. What’s lacking are governments that can translate them into actual policy. As a result, the crises continue. The death toll from the pandemic skyrockets, and the world makes dangerously slow progress on climate change, and so on.

It’s no secret how governments should react in times of crisis. First, they need to be nimble. Nimble means moving quickly, because problems often grow at exponential rates: a contagious virus, for example, or greenhouse gas emissions. That makes early action crucial and procrastination disastrous. Nimble also means adaptive. Policymakers need to continuously adjust their responses to crises as they learn from their own experience and from the work of scientists. Second, governments need to act wisely. That means incorporating the full range of scientific knowledge available about the problem at hand. It means embracing uncertainty, rather than willfully ignoring it. And it means thinking in terms of a long time horizon, rather than merely until the next election. But so often, policymakers are anything but nimble and wise. They are slow, inflexible, uninformed, overconfident, and myopic.

Why is everyone doing so badly? Part of the explanation lies in the inherent qualities of crises. Crises typically require navigating between risks. In the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers want to save lives and jobs. With climate change, they seek a balance between avoiding extreme weather and allowing economic growth. Such tradeoffs are hard as it is, and they are further complicated by the fact that costs and benefits are not evenly distributed among stakeholders, making conflict a seemingly unavoidable part of any policy choice. Vested interests attempt to forestall needed action, using their money to influence decision-makers and the media. To make matters worse, policymakers must pay sustained attention to multiple issues and multiple constituencies over time. They must accept large amounts of uncertainty. Often, then, the easiest response is to stick with the status quo. But that can be a singularly dangerous response to many new hazards. After all, with the pandemic, business as usual would mean no social distancing. With climate change, it would mean continuing to burn fossil fuels.

But the explanation for humanity’s woeful response to crises goes beyond politics and incentives. To truly understand the failure to act, one must turn to human psychology. It is there that one can grasp the full impediments to proper decision-making—the cognitive biases, emotional reactions, and suboptimal shortcuts that hold policymakers back—and the tools to overcome them.

AVOIDING THE UNCOMFORTABLE

People are singularly bad at predicting and preparing for catastrophes. Many of these events are “black swans,” rare and unpredictable occurrences that most people find difficult to imagine, seemingly falling into the realm of science fiction. Others are “gray rhinos,” large and not uncommon threats that are still neglected until they stare you in the face (such as a coronavirus outbreak). Then there are “invisible gorillas,” threats in full view that should be noticed but aren’t—so named for a psychological experiment in which subjects watching a clip of a basketball game were so fixated on the players that they missed a person in a gorilla costume walking through the frame. Even professional forecasters, including security analysts, have a poor track record when it comes to accurately anticipating events. The COVID-19 crisis, in which a dystopic science-fiction narrative came to life and took everyone by surprise, serves as a cautionary tale about humans’ inability to foresee important events.

Not only do humans fail to anticipate crises; they also fail to respond rationally to them. At best, people display “bounded rationality,” the idea that instead of carefully considering their options and making perfectly rational decisions that optimize their preferences, humans in the real world act quickly and imperfectly, limited as they are by time and cognitive capacity. Add in the stress generated by crises, and their performance gets even worse.

Because humans don’t have enough time, information, or processing power to deliberate rationally, they have evolved easier ways of making decisions. They rely on their emotions, which serve as an early warning system of sorts: alerting people that they are in a positive context that can be explored and exploited or in a negative context where fight or flight is the appropriate response. They also rely on rules. To simplify decision-making, they might follow standard operating procedures or abide by some sort of moral code. They might decide to imitate the action taken by other people whom they trust or admire. They might follow what they perceive to be widespread norms. Out of habit, they might continue to do what they have been doing unless there is overwhelming evidence against it.

Not only do humans fail to anticipate crises; they also fail to respond rationally to them.

Humans evolved these shortcuts because they require little effort and work well in a broad range of situations. Without access to a real-time map of prey in different hunting grounds, for example, a prehistoric hunter might have resorted to a simple rule of thumb: look for animals where his fellow tribesmen found them yesterday. But in times of crisis, emotions and rules are not always helpful drivers of decision-making. High stakes, uncertainty, tradeoffs, and conflict—all elicit negative emotions, which can impede wise responses. Uncertainty is scary, as it signals an inability to predict what will happen, and what cannot be predicted might be deadly. The vast majority of people are already risk averse under normal circumstances. Under stress, they become even more so, and they retreat to the familiar comfort of the status quo. From gun laws to fossil fuel subsidies, once a piece of legislation is in place, it is hard to dislodge it, even when cost-benefit analysis argues for change.

#### Extinction is a distinct phenomenon that requires prior consideration

Burke et al 16 Associate Professor of International and Political Studies @ UNSW, Australia, 2016 (Anthony, Stefanie Fishel is Assistant Professor, Department of Gender and Race Studies at the University of Alabama, Audra Mitchell is CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and, Daniel J. Levine is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, “Planet Politics: Manifesto from the End of IR,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1–25)

8. Global ethics must respond to mass extinction. In late 2014, the Worldwide Fund for Nature reported a startling statistic: according to their global study, 52% of species had gone extinct between 1970 and 2010.60 This is not news: for three decades, conservation biologists have been warning of a ‘sixth mass extinction’, which, by definition, could eliminate more than three quarters of currently existing life forms in just a few centuries.61 In other words, it could threaten the practical possibility of the survival of earthly life. Mass extinction is not simply extinction (or death) writ large: **it is a qualitatively different phenomena that demands its own ethical categories.** It cannot be grasped by aggregating species extinctions, let alone the deaths of individual organisms. Not only does it erase diverse, irreplaceable life forms, their **unique histories** and **open-ended possibilities**, but it **threatens the ontological conditions of Earthly life**.

IR is one of few disciplines that is explicitly devoted to the pursuit of survival, yet it has almost nothing to say in the face of a possible mass extinction event.62 It utterly lacks the conceptual and ethical frameworks necessary to foster diverse, meaningful responses to this phenomenon. As mentioned above, Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their scale and moral horror. However, they are asymptotic: they imagine nightmares of a severely denuded planet, yet they do not contemplate the **comprehensive negation** that a mass extinction event entails. In contemporary IR discourses, where it appears at all, extinction is treated as a problem of scientific management and biopolitical control aimed at securing existing human lifestyles.63 Once again, this approach fails to recognise the reality of extinction, which is a **matter of being and nonbeing**, not one of life and death processes.

Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is ‘lost’ in extinction has, since the inception of the concept of ‘conservation’, been addressed in terms of financial cost and economic liabilities.64 Beyond reducing life to forms to capital, currencies and financial instruments, the dominant neoliberal political economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon. Yet the **enormity, complexity, and scale** of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to **draw on every possible resource in order to find ways of responding**. This means that they need to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways – including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies. Above all, it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a **matter of global ethics**. It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular visions of the good life. Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change.

9. An Earth-worldly politics. Humans are worldly – that is, we are fundamentally worldforming and embedded in multiple worlds that traverse the Earth. However, the Earth is not ‘our’ world, as the grand theories of IR, and some accounts of the Anthropocene have it – an object and possession to be appropriated, circumnavigated, instrumentalised and englobed.65 Rather, it is a complex of worlds that we share, co-constitute, create, destroy and inhabit with countless other life forms and beings.

The formation of the Anthropocene reflects a particular type of worlding, one in which the Earth is treated as raw material for the creation of a world tailored to human needs. Heidegger famously framed ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as two countervailing, conflicting forces that constrain and shape one another. We contend that existing political, economic and social conditions have pushed human worlding so far to one extreme that it has become almost entirely detached from the conditions of the Earth. Planet Politics calls, instead, for a mode of worlding that is responsive to, and grounded in, the Earth. One of these ways of being Earth-worldly is to embrace the condition of being entangled. We can interpret this term in the way that Heidegger66 did, as the condition of being mired in everyday human concerns, worries, and anxiety, to prolong existence. But, in contrast, we can and should reframe it as authors like Karen Barad67 and Donna Haraway68 have done. To them and many others, ‘entanglement’ is a radical, indeed fundamental condition of being-with, or, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, ‘being singular plural’.69 This means that no being is truly autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum physics. World itself is singular plural: what humans tend to refer to as ‘the’ world is actually a multiplicity of worlds at various scales that intersect, overlap, conflict, emerge as they surge across the Earth. World emerges from the poetics of existence, the collision of energy and matter, the tumult of agencies, the fusion and diffusion of bonds.

Worlds erupt from, and consist in, the intersection of **diverse forms of being** – material and intangible, organic and inorganic, ‘living’ and ‘nonliving’. Because of the tumultuousness of the Earth with which they are entangled, ‘**worlds’ are not static, rigid or permanent. They are permeable and fluid**. They can be **created**, **modified** – and, of course, destroyed. Concepts of violence, harm and (in)security that focus only on humans ignore at their peril the destruction and severance of worlds,70 **which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life on Earth to thrive.**

#### Debate doesn’t affect subjectivity –

#### Debate doesn’t change conditions 1] Reading this K in a round with one other person and a judge makes no tangible change – if the intention was to improve conditions you should read it somewhere like the cafeteria or at school so more people acc hear it – no unique warrant why debate round is key 2] They don’t read it every round which means they only read it for the strategic benefit of winning –reason to drop the team because they’re using oppression to get strategic benefit or they would have read it every round

#### Vote neg on presumption---they have no parameter on what the aff does or how we determine how patriarchy operates---means they never solve any impacts because debate is not key to their mechanism AND incentivizes judge intervention and hurts women