## 1

#### Interpretation: Topical democracies are full democracies in the 2019 EIU Democracy Index. [insert country] isn’t T.

EIU 19 EIU [The Economist Intelligence Unit (The EIU) is the research and analysis division of The Economist Group, the sister company to The Economist newspaper. Created in 1946, we have over 70 years’ experience in helping businesses, financial firms and governments to understand how the world is changing and how that creates opportunities to be seized and risks to be managed. Given that many of the issues facing the world have an international (if not global) dimension, The EIU is ideally positioned to be commentator, interpreter and forecaster on the phenomenon of globalisation as it gathers pace and impact.], 2019, “Democracy Index 2019” http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-2019.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=democracyindex2019 AG

A screenshot of a cell phone

Description automatically generated

Democracy Index 2019, by regime type

Full democracies 22

Flawed democracies 54

Hybrid regimes 37

Authoritarian regimes 54

#### Prefer

#### 1] Limits – Anything but full democracies explodes neg prep to over 115 nations, with the aff capable of defending any permutation of them; **their model of debate encourages a race to the margins for random state of the week affs, which is supercharged by them having the ability to prep their aff for weeks whereas I have barely 20-30 minutes to prep an NC – pigeonholes me into reading generics which they can completely block out, killing fairness and education.**

#### 2] Predictability – The rez is the only predictable stasis point, when the affirmative takes away from it and creates random affs that aren’t in the bounds of the rez, it makes cutting stable neg links impossible.

#### TVA Solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff. We aren’t stopping them from reading new FWs, mechanisms, or advantages. PICs don’t solve – it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff making it impossible for me to win

## 2

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a democracy where a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “democracy” in the res – means that you have to prove the resolution true in a VACCUM, not in a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### Violation: they spec [x]

#### Standards:

#### [1] precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### [2] limits- The EIU says there are over 115 nations that could be considered a democracy but that’s not even agreed upon since some democracies aren’t “full democracies” – explodes limits since there are tons of independent affs plus functionally infinite combinations, all with different advantages in different political situations incentivinsing more cheaty pics due to lack of ground. Kills neg prep and debatability since there are no DAs that apply to every aff – i.e. the need for a right to strike is different in the US than China– means the aff is always more prepared and wins just for speccing.

#### [3] tva – just read your aff as an advantage under a whole res aff, solves all ur offense

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations—it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. Reasonability is arbitrary and unpredictable, inviting a race to the bottom and we’ll win it links to our offense.

#### Drop the debater – T indicts their whole aff which means drop the debater and drop the argument are the same thing.

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

## 3

#### PIC: In a democracy, a free press should prioritize objectivity over advocacy except with black journalists, in which case they should prioritize their advocacies.

#### Objectivity is a tool to silence black voices and issues in media

Schneider 20 [Gabe Schneider, political journalist with a degree in Political Science and Urban Planning from University of California San Diego, 12-21-2020, "Journalism outlets need new social media policies," University of Missouri Reynolds Journalism Institute, https://rjionline.org/reporting/journalism-outlets-need-new-social-media-policies/]/Kankee

What should they look like? Pittsburgh Post-Gazette journalist Alexis Johnson was barred from protest coverage after joking about a Kenny Chesney concert on Twitter. She tweeted: “Horrifying scenes and aftermath from selfish LOOTERS who don’t care about this city!!!!! …. oh wait sorry. No, these are pictures from a Kenny Chesney concert tailgate. Whoops.” Johnson, a Black journalist, was punished for making a joke about the media framing of “riots” and “looting.” While one of her white colleagues called one alleged looter a “scumbag,” it was Johnson who was punished. “I was told it violated our social media policy. They kept calling it an educational conversation, but there was no warning, no ‘Hey can you take the tweet down?’ By Monday morning, they had decided I would no longer be able to cover it,” Johnson told CBS2. The harsh reactionary punishment applied to Johnson is ridiculous, but not unique. Other Black journalists have faced similar repercussions: Wesley Lowery was punished by the Washington Post for correctly framing the Tea Party as a racist reactionary movement. So was Kendra Pierre-Louis, who was punished by the New York Times for saying white supremacy is racist. The trend line is that reporters, often Black, are punished for their perspective, even if it’s rooted in reporting and facts. Punishment can mean being barred from covering a topic that is close to the reporter’s identity, like Johnson was, or an implied threat of being fired. The dynamic is so crystalized that, instead of individually challenging The New York Times for their op-ed calling on the president to use force against civilians, Black New York Times employees and their allies responded as a collective on Twitter, all tweeting: “This puts Black New York Times staff in danger.” But even in the wake of massive protests, even as management at many legacy newspapers committed to better social media policies, and even as journalism has shifted to a mostly online workforce, there’s been a lack of movement in newsrooms to craft a social media policy that allows journalists of color to just do their jobs. “Since the events of January 2020 and the summer, there’s been zero further conversation,” said B, a social media producer at a large legacy newspaper. “It’s just a standstill right now.” Journalists and social media managers I spoke with, like B, did not want their names published out of concern for how their managers might react to them being candid or because press requests required approval from newsroom leadership. But all of them, all younger reporters of color, had extensive thoughts on how newsrooms are failing to craft good social media policies and move the conversation beyond humanizing reporters of color. While social media has become a driving force for digital readership, and therefore ad revenue or donors, many legacy newsrooms have barely pushed the envelope in changing their social media policies. The New York Times adopted a new policy in 2017, which makes the blanket statement: “Our journalists should be especially mindful of appearing to take sides on issues that The Times is seeking to cover objectively.” The Washington Post also updated its policy in 2017, with many of the same themes. R, who recently interned for a different large legacy newspaper, said that they received clear instructions from management when they started: “They asked us not to tweet about Black Lives Matter, but didn’t address the complexity of that issue.” R said it is problematic to frame supporting a human rights issue, like Black Lives Matter, similarly to taking an open political stance. R doesn’t believe any reporter should be explicitly partisan (“don’t tweet about ‘blue’ or ‘red’”), but they do believe it makes you a better reporter if you’re able to be empathetic to readers who are affected by human rights issues, like police violence. “At the end of the day, it makes me a better reporter,” R, who is non-Black, said of saying “Black Lives Matter.” “I’m being empathetic to a movement that’s affecting my Black brothers and sisters. So therefore it would help me connect to readers who identify with that. And two: [It] just makes me more of a human, because I don’t think that people of another race should be shot and killed by police for no reason. I think that makes me a better reporter.” Z, an audience engagement editor at a newer digital publication, said the false equivalencies and double standards in current social media policy are exacerbated by the fact that racist readers are more willing to flag tweets for newsroom management. “It’s always been easier for white reporters to get away with saying things like that is because they’re white,” she said. “People automatically assume they don’t have any ties to a community and they don’t have any reason to say that thing other than it’s a fact.” Z said that the current conversation is way behind the times, in that newsrooms are still trying to figure out how to humanize their own Black and brown reporters. Instead, she’s looking to the future and thinking about the ways in which newsrooms should be expanding their audience. “I don’t see why more newsrooms aren’t sending out tweets in native languages,” she said. “I think that there is a huge population of people on the internet that are not being properly served; readers and persons of the community that don’t have access or can’t understand tweets that are coming from newsrooms because they’re not accessible.” Ultimately, B said that the divide in newsrooms is clear: on one side, there’s management, which is often whiter and older; on the other is the younger journalists, who are often more diverse. She said that management believes that you can separate your humanity from your work and younger journalists do not (although some editors, like The New York Times Dean Baquet, do not believe “there is a big gap”). “It’s like two schools of thought. And they’re both clashing in really ugly, really ugly ways. And one of the schools of thought is almost in every leadership position in the newsroom.” Newsrooms, especially older institutions, need to move on from the conversation of whether or not these social media policies are racist: if journalists of color are saying that the current structure of social media policies are applied unevenly and are racist, then they are racist. If journalists and social media managers from around the newsroom, especially those who are most impacted by these policies are given space to craft these policies, then perhaps we’ll soon see the necessary changes. If B were in charge of social media, she said her changes across the board are easy to articulate: No more penalizing reporters for the experiences they bring to the table. Instead: “Be honest, be truthful, be transparent when you get things wrong and just don’t be a bad person online. It’s very simple. It’s very short.”

#### Systemic incentives to favor the accounts of police over victims means pro-police narratives will always be deemed objective

Mattar 20 [Pacinthe Mattar, Martin Wise Goodman Canadian Nieman Fellow at Harvard University 8-21-2020, "Objectivity Is a Privilege Afforded to White Journalists," Walrus, https://thewalrus.ca/objectivity-is-a-privilege-afforded-to-white-journalists/]/Kankee

I came out of my executive producer’s office with a look on my face that caught the attention of an older white male colleague, who asked me if I was okay. I told him what had happened. He spoke to the executive producer on my behalf. She relented. I’ve since faced several such roadblocks in my journalism career. Combined with the experiences of other racialized journalists, they represent a phenomenon I’ve come to think of as a deep crisis of credibility in Canadian media. There is the lack of trust toward the Black, Indigenous, and other racialized people whose stories we are supposed to cover as a reflection of the world we live in. Then there is the mistrust of the Black, Indigenous, and other racialized journalists who try to report on those stories. Our professionalism is questioned when we report on the communities we’re from, and the spectre of advocacy follows us in a way that it does not follow many of our white colleagues. There is a reckoning underway that has spared almost no industry, sparked by an alarming succession of killings of Black people in the US: Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, and many more. The violence of those deaths, and the inescapable racism that underpinned them all, incited a tidal wave of anger and fatigue from Black people who had long been calling out the discrimination that they face in their daily lives. From academia to theatre, the beauty industry to major tech corporations, Black and other racialized employees are publicly coming forward and detailing how their organizations have perpetuated racism against them. Newsrooms in the US and Canada, for their part, have been forced to acknowledge that they have to do better: in who they hire, who they retain, who gets promoted, what they cover, and how they cover it. This moment has resurrected a question that’s haunted me since I returned from Baltimore: How can the media be trusted to report on what Black and other racialized people are facing when it doesn’t even believe them? IN MANY AMERICAN CITIES, the protests calling for justice following the killings of Black people like Ahmaud Arbery, George Floyd, and Breonna Taylor have been met with violent responses from police, who have tear-gassed, chased, shoved, beaten, and arrested protesters and journalists. In May, Omar Jimenez, a Black CNN reporter, was handcuffed and led away by police while the cameras rolled. Watching the recent police violence against protesters unfold reminded me of how my interview with the two men in Baltimore had ended. It was 10 p.m., meaning the city-wide curfew was now in effect, and we were standing just outside a subway station in the Penn North neighbourhood. Lonnie Moore, the young Black man who had first approached me, had just left. I was putting my recorder away when police came rushing into the block. They told Jarrod Jones and me we had to leave. We tried to enter a nearby subway station, but a police officer blocked the entrance. We tried to turn down a side street, but another officer told us we couldn’t go that way either. We tried every escape we could think of, but we were boxed in. Suddenly, one officer began charging at us, his baton out, swinging, shoving Jones and cursing at him. We ran away from him as fast as we could, my bag with my recording equipment bouncing clumsily behind me. None of this made it to air. I had made the rookie mistake of turning off my radio recorder as soon as the interview ended. But I probably would not have worked it into the documentary anyway; as a journalist, you want to avoid becoming part of the story. One of the core elements of journalism is for reporters to maintain a distance from those they cover, which is meant to provide a sense of objectivity. For many white journalists, that distance is built in to their very life experiences. But, for many other journalists, there is no distance between what happened to George Floyd and what could have happened to them. Distance is a luxury. When I got back to Toronto, I told my deskmates about my time in Baltimore in hushed tones. I felt at the time that to speak of it more openly would somehow implicate me, that my story could be seen through the lens of advocacy instead of hard-and-fast reporting. I also knew you never want to end up on the wrong side of police, especially as a racialized person, and leave it up to others to decide how your actions may have justified violence against you. In journalism, as in predominantly white societies at large, questioning police narratives is complicated. “The police play a very powerful role in defining what the nature and extent of crime is in our society,” says Julius Haag, a criminologist and sociology professor at the University of Toronto’s Mississauga campus. “Police also recognize that they have a powerful role in shaping public perceptions, and they use that ability within the media to help . . . legitimize their purpose and their responses.” A. Dwight Pettit, a Baltimore-based lawyer I interviewed for my documentary in 2015, told me something about why police accounts are rarely questioned by the media that stayed with me. Juries seem to have trouble confronting the violence in police-brutality cases, he said, because so often, people have grown up seeing police doing right by them and have trusted police with their safety. This is especially true for white people, who are less likely to be treated unfairly by police. Putting police on trial would be asking people to challenge their lifelong beliefs. Anthony N. Morgan, a racial-justice lawyer in Toronto, says this same dynamic plays out in Canada in both “obvious and indirect ways.” Racialized people can tell you about water cooler conversations they’ve had with white colleagues about racism they’ve experienced and witnessed, which “often end up in the ‘Did that really happen? What were they doing? Maybe we need to see more of the video?’ territory,” he says. “These kinds of frankly absurd ways of justifying and excusing murder or harm done to Black and Indigenous people play out in society more generally, and I think they play out in journalism.

#### No link turns - only advocacy-based journalism can solve systemic racism

Liederman 21 [Mack Liederman, reporter with a master’s degree in journalism from Northwestern, 02-01-2021, "Let’s rethink objectivity," Redacted Magazine, https://redactedmagazine.com/2021/02/01/lets-rethink-objectivity/]/Kankee

In an op-ed that gained traction this summer in The New York Times, “A Reckoning Over Objectivity, Led by Black Journalists,” two-time Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Wesley Lowery attempts to use the momentum of Black Lives Matter to debunk the myth of objectivity. For Lowery, the stakes of objectivity are heavy. In fact, the Golden Rule may be better labeled as Thinly Veiled Racism. Lowery writes in summary, “The views and inclinations of whiteness are accepted as the objective neutral.” Look no further than the names spilling down any masthead (even this one), or to the TV newsrooms of The Wire, Spotlight, The Post and even Anchorman, and an essential reality becomes unavoidable: Journalism has been owned, operated, curated and defined by white people. The dogma of “quality journalism” has rested on the idea that the truth can stem only from objectivity, one that is defined by white reporters, their white editors, and their white bosses. The ones editing pages in red ink, assigning articles, hiring writers and framing the larger media narratives are the ones that ultimately get to decide what is and what is not objective journalism. While objectivity may be a powerful method of reporting, spurring journalists to strive toward factual accuracy, it is not an achievable goal. There is nothing objective about the subliminal and not-so-subliminal biases that seep into any given piece of journalism. How we interpret objectivity is inherently opinionated. And what’s objective about an opinion? Even your wiry professor, your wholesome English teacher and your loud gum-chewing colleague would know the clear answer to that one. Yet it is the sacred myth of objectivity that has long left it unquestioned, untouched and under-scrutinized in predominantly white spaces. The promises of objective reporting allow for white journalists to cover Black communities from a safe distance, supplying a baseline of journalistic credibility where none should be assumed. The consequence of white-framed objectivity has been an underserving of coverage on Black issues and a general silencing of reporters that dare to challenge the conventions of their profession. Objectivity is not an ideal — it’s a racial issue.

## 4

#### Aff causes a shift to chemical and biological weapons – empirics and economic theory prove.

Narang '16 (Neil Narang; Neil Narang is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Co-Director of the Global Security hub in the Orfalea Center at the University of California, Santa Barbara. In 2015-2016, he served as a Senior Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship. He is currently a research scholar and steering committee member at the University of California Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), faculty affiliate at the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), affiliated researcher at the Centre for Conflict Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute, Geneva, and Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Narang specializes in international relations, with a focus on issues of international security and conflict management. Specifically, his research explores the role of signaling under uncertainty in situations of bargaining and cooperation, particularly as it applies to two substantive domains: (1) crisis bargaining in both interstate and civil war, and (2) cooperation through nuclear and conventional military alliances. His articles have appeared in the Journal of Politics, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, among others. He received his PhD in Political Science from UCSD and he holds a BA in Molecular Cell Biology and Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. He has previously been a fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Browne Center for International Politics, a nonproliferation policy fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and a junior faculty fellow and visiting professor at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation; 4-1-2016; "All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation"; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2016.1153184, Taylor &amp; Francis, accessed 12-8-2019; JPark)

* NBC = Nuclear/Bio/Chemical weapons

Rather than engage in a theoretical debate comparing the ease of acquisition and destructive potential across NBC weapons, we chose an empirical and inductive approach of **observing historical patterns** in states’ pursuit and acquisition of different WMDs to determine whether states appeared to behave as if these weapons were substitutes or compliments. To do this, we estimated something akin to a cross-elasticity of **demand across WMDs** by measuring the impact of pursuing and possessing any one type of WMD on the risk a state will eventually pursue another type, holding that state’s underlying ‘‘willingness’’ to pursue a WMD (demand) constant. In other words, at any given level of demand—which we approximate using a set of **control** variables that previous research has shown to be correlated with states’ willingness to pursue a nuclear weapon—we tried to estimate the **independent effect** that acquiring one type of weapon would have on the probability that a state will pursue another. To begin, this approach required accurate **historical data** on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons pursuit and acquisition across time and space. And although there is some emerging consensus around which states pursued and possessed nuclear weapons over time, there was no previously established data on chemical and biological weapons proliferation.15 To compile this data, we relied on six different sources: (1) the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2) the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, (3) Arms Control Association, the (4) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (5) the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, and (6) the Stimson Center.16 Fortunately for us, the coding in these six sources were highly correlated. However, they did not always agree on which states pursed or acquired chemical and biological weapons in any given year. Nevertheless, we were able to confirm the **robustness** of our **results** to different sampling rules that required either unanimity across sources, agreement across a majority of sources, or any single source reporting pursuit or possession of a chemical or biological weapon by a state in any particular year. The results of our analyses were telling. Specifically, we found that the underlying demand for NBC weapons appears to be correlated. That is, many of the same **factors** that cause states to “**go nuclear**” also appear to systematically **influence the risk** that states will seek chemical and biological weapons. With respect to the relationship between different weapons of mass destruction, we found that NBC weapons generally appear to function as complements at the pursuit stage: simply initiating pursuit of any one WMD appears to independently increase the risk that a state will seek all three simultaneously, controlling for other factors. Finally, and perhaps most interesting, we found some evidence that WMDs do function as **substitutes** in one important fashion: once states **acquire** nuclear weapons, they appear far less likely to **pursue or** **possess** chemical and biological weapons. That is, the data appears to support the popular notion that chemical and biological weapons function as a “poor man’s atomic bomb,” since acquiring a nuclear weapon appears to **satisfy demand** and reduce the risk of chemical and biological weapons pursuit, but not vice-versa. This last finding is also remarkably consistent with the idea that nuclear weapons acquisition may uniquely entail some prestige. Of course, these results are not without their limitations. First, these are systematic empirical regularities estimated across states in the international system over time. There certainly are, however, important historical cases that do not fit these general patterns well. For example, both the United States and the Soviet Union maintained chemical weapons programs for decades after they acquired nuclear weapons. Second, the pursuit and acquisition of WMDs are relatively rare events, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons. For this reason, some of our findings may be driven by the behavior of only a handful of states, which could limit the applicability of the findings. Finally, our results are only instructive if the historical data under analysis are accurate. However, because WMD programs are notoriously secret, determining which states actively pursue or possess a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon in any given year is a non-trivial measurement challenge. We were careful to check the **robustness** of our findings to different datasets and different sampling rules, but this still assumes some **independence** **across measurements**. In the end, we emphasized these limitations and encouraged caution in making strong policy inferences based on our results. Misleading Inferences So what inferences—if any—from this research can we draw to the likely impact of deep nuclear reductions on the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation? Might policies that limit the supply of nuclear weapons simply shift proliferation risk elsewhere? Even more to the point, could actors increasingly view chemical and biological weapons as the “poor man’s atomic bomb,” in inverse relationship to declining global nuclear stockpiles? The short answer to these questions is that we cannot yet know the likely impact of deep nuclear reductions on chemical and biological weapons proliferation. This is because existing research—including our own study—does not provide the type of empirical evidence needed to forecast these outcomes with any real confidence. To illustrate this, I anticipate four mechanisms through which restrictions in the global supply of nuclear weapons might be posited to increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. I then show that each of these inferences is nevertheless unsustainable based on the findings described above. The first inference that one may be tempted to draw from past findings is that a policy focused on achieving reductions in the global nuclear stockpile could cause a rise in chemical and biological weapons proliferation as more states view them as a “poor man’s atomic bomb.” As noted above, our findings suggested that states appear to seek chemical and biological weapons for many of the same reasons as they pursue nuclear weapons. Furthermore, our findings also indicate that states that do not possess nuclear weapons appear to be systematically more likely to pursue chemical and biological weapons than states that do possess them. When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, conditional on some level of demand for one of these types of weapons, reductions in the **global supply of nuclear weapons** could cause some states to **pursue** chemical and biological weapons as “imperfect substitutes” for the **deterrence** and **compellence benefits** of nuclear weapons.

#### That causes extinction –

Millett & Snyder-Beattie ‘17. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence. Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low, the expected value of reducing the risk could still be large, since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease

## 5

### 1NC – CP

#### Counterplan: States should:

#### implement a policy of operational no-first-use

#### take intercontinental ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alerts through a physical switch and retain all other nuclear weapons

#### end all use of Artificial Intelligence

#### substantially reduce arsenal sizes

#### enact robust modernization programs.

#### NFU solves – it’s a realistic goal that drastically reduces the risk of nuclear war – abolition is impractical and fails

Ulgen, 14 – chairman of the Istanbul-based think tank EDAM and a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe. He has served in the Turkish foreign service in several capacities and was among the international security experts tasked by NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen with reporting on the transatlantic relationship in advance of NATO’s September 2014 summit. His research focuses on nuclear policy, the implications of Turkish foreign policy for Europe and the United States, and the security and economic aspects of transatlantic relations. He is co-author of The European Transformation of Modern Turkey [Sinan Ulgen, "No nukes? No—no first use", 10-25-2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <https://thebulletin.org/roundtable_entry/no-nukes-no-no-first-use/>]

In his final essay, Li Bin makes the case that delegitimizing nuclear weapons represents a promising alternative to disarmament initiatives that, with their focus on numerical controls, are probably doomed to failure. I don't agree that numerical limits on arsenals are doomed to failure—especially if disarmament's aim, as I wrote in Round One, is to approach but not reach "zero." To buttress his views on numerical limits, Li discusses the failed Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. This treaty limited the number and size of warships that nations could maintain in their fleets, and it collapsed in the 1930s. Li writes that the treaty collapsed because "controlling numbers of warships didn't change attitudes toward warships." I disagree. The real reason the treaty failed was that it lacked a proper enforcement mechanism. Its failure says little about the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency, and ultimately the UN Security Council provide the regime with institutional underpinnings for enforcement, and because of this the regime has managed to survive for several decades in the face of numerous challenges. With the participation of these institutions, limiting the size of nuclear arsenals on a multilateral basis is indeed a viable proposition (though a code of transparency would also be required, one that allowed nuclear weapon states to monitor one another's compliance with agreements). I continue to believe that, due to the nature of the world's security threats and the character of established security architectures on both the global and regional levels, total abolition of nuclear weapons is a far-fetched objective. But here's something that can be achieved: a universal commitment by nuclear weapon states not to use these weapons first. Today, China espouses a no-first-use policy. The United States foreswears first use against non-nuclear weapon states that are parties to the NPT and are in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations—though Washington places some restrictions on that commitment. Russia does not maintain a no-first-use policy. This is a complicated picture, and prevailing on all nuclear weapon states to adopt no-first-use policies would be challenging. Ultimately, though, the goal is achievable. If every nuclear-armed state adopted an unconditional no-first-use policy, the risk of nuclear war would be greatly reduced.

## Case

### !

Kronig says conflict between any 2 states, ur china pak scenario also proves

#### India is counterforce-capable – India will wipe out Pakistan’s nukes - It'll be successful, because India has supersonic missiles. BMD doesn’t work against those.

Christine Leah 18, visiting fellow at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS), working on conventional arms sales and conventional and nuclear arms control in South Asia, “Counterforce to counter what?”, https://nation.com.pk/31-Jan-2018/counterforce-to-counter-what

With India developing its indigenous defence industry, and acquiring technology from the West as well, it seems to be on a track to gain an edge over its South Asian neighbors, especially Pakistan. This includes the acquisition/development with other countries on technology such as cruise missiles, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), and strike aircraft. Of these, inciting concern is India’s growing air combat and ground strike capacity based on Su-30 MKI, Mirage-2000H, Jaguar strike aircraft, Tu-22M backfire bombers, and more recently, C-295 transport aircraft, and the French Rafale which augment its capacity to go after its counterforce targets. Moreover, major arms sales to India in the last decade include U.S. F-16s and guided bombs for Jaguar aircraft. From France, the sales include 36 French-built Rafale planes, six Scorpene submarines, upgrades to 49 Mirage-2000-5, air-to air missiles for these planes and a huge sale of 126 multi-role medium combat aircraft. Similarly, Russia has exported combat aircraft such as 270 Su-30s, 45 naval Mig-29Ks, 150 Mi-17 transport helicopters and ten Ka-31 helicopters. In 2006, the DRDO and a Russian venture jointly developed the BrahMos cruise missile — a supersonic missile that combines Russian propulsion technology and new Indian guidance technology. BrahMos cruise missile can reach supersonic speed and thus bypass surface-to-air missile defense systems. Israel has also transferred electronic warfare technology and precision-guided munitions. The Indian-Israeli arms trade amounts to more than $2 billion annually. In 2004, the British company BAE Systems won a deal to sell advanced jet trainers to the Indian Air Force. In 2007, India paid the United States $50 million for the amphibious USS Trenton, and in 2009, Boeing won a $2 billion order for eight P-8 maritime reconnaissance aircraft and Lockheed Martin won a $1 billion contract for six C-1301J transport aircraft. Together with former U.S. President Barack Obama also offered to sell C-17 and F-414 aircraft. More so, India’s inclusion into the Missile Technology Control Regime gives it access to technology that is normally restricted for non-members. By stark contrast, the Pakistan Air Force has been denied state of the art aircraft acquisitions for two decades, and has been limited to refurbishing older high-performance aircraft. India is also expanding its naval capabilities, including a sea-based strike force as the logical step in its quest for an assured retaliatory capability. In turn, Pakistan’s naval nuclear developments are fueled by nuclear developments on the Indian side, an understandable reaction but one which has drawn considerable criticism. The drone technology which has been easily accessible to India is another controversial issue. Recently, the U.S. made a sales agreement with New Delhi for naval drones. It has been reported that Washington does not deem its sale of naval drones to India to be threatening for Pakistan, as it considers that these are not armed but are only intended for surveillance across the Indian Ocean. However, AWACS, drones, and other sophisticated surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities make India’s conventional strikes more effective, as well as enabling it to achieve air superiority more quickly. The accumulation of all this has increased threat to the survivability of Pakistani nuclear delivery systems. Indeed, it is capabilities like precision-guided munitions/guided bombs, in this particular strategic context, that make Pakistan more vulnerable to an Indian pre-emptive strike.

#### Otherwise, Pakistan’s nukes are vulnerable – causes global nuclear war

William Pitt 9, a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence”, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183

But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world.The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself. Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spinesof those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

#### Specifically – nuke terror causes a Russia war – extinction!

Barrett et al. 13 – PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb,

#### Even if Pakistan retaliates, no extinction now – India has BMD and it works to protect cities from current Pakistani nukes

Zachary Keck 18, very intelligent, Public Affairs Fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, "India's Missile Defenses Can Now Take On Decoys. That's a Really Big Deal.", National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/indias-missile-defenses-can-now-take-decoys-thats-really-big-deal-28627

India’s efforts to build a homegrown ballistic missile defense system achieved a major success. On August 2nd, India tested its Advanced Area Defence (AAD)/Ashvin Advanced Defense interceptor missile against decoy targets for the first time. “One target among simultaneously incoming multiple targets was selected on [sic] real time, the weapon system radars tracked the target and the missile locked on to it and intercepted the target with a high degree of accuracy,” India’s government announced in [a press release](http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=181451) . The test was against a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers. Franz-Stefan Gady of The Diplomat [speculates that this](https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/indias-advanced-air-defense-interceptor-shoots-down-ballistic-missile-target-in-test/) was the first test of the new indigenous imaging infrared (IIR) seeker, which was developed to help the interceptors distinguish warheads from decoy/dummies. This capability is increasingly necessary as countries like China and [Pakistan](https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/why-pakistans-newly-flight-tested-multiple-nuclear-warhead-capable-missile-really-matters/) develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV)

### Disease

#### No extinction from disease:

#### 1] Resilience and countermeasures prevent spread – distinct from burnout

Adalja 16

Amesh Adalja is an infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh, The Atlantic, June 17, 2016, “Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?”, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained.

I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience.

For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived.

Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like.

#### Scenario 1 is warming:

#### 1] Disease outbreaks will be defeated with quarantines

**Szalai 7/26** [(Jennifer Szalai - author for the NYT) “The Extradordinary History (and likely busy future) of quarantine” The New York Times. 7-26-2021]

**Quarantine can be lifesaving**; it can also be dangerous, an exercise of extraordinary power in the name of disease control, a presumption of guilt instead of innocence.

In “Until Proven Safe,” a new book about quarantine’s past and future, Geoff Manaugh and Nicola Twilley do an impressively judicious job of explaining exactly why fears of quarantine are understandable and historically justified, while also showing how in coming years “we will almost certainly find ourselves more dependent on quarantine, not less.” Quarantine has to do with risk and uncertainty, and its logic is simple: “There might be something dangerous inside you — something contagious — on the verge of breaking free.”

**While medical advances have made some diseases more diagnosable** and less deadly, newfound knowledge can also accentuate the depths of our ignorance. The more we know, the more we know how much we don’t know — not to mention that **modern life, with escalating numbers of people and goods churning** their way **around the world**, has **increased the opportunities for contagion.**

Quarantine is distinct from isolation, even if the terms are often used interchangeably. Someone is isolated when they are known to be sick; **someone is quarantined when they might be but we cannot be sure**. Manaugh, an architecture and technology blogger, and Twilley, the co-host of a podcast about the science and history of food, bring an impressively wide range of interests to bear on a subject that involves not only infectious disease but also — in their ambitious yet seamless narration — politics, agriculture, surveillance and even outer space.

#### 2] Quarantines solve climate change – COVID was responsible for the largest drop in emissions ever

**Alexander 20** [(Kurtis, a general assignment reporter for The San Francisco Chronicle, frequently writing about water, wildfire, climate and the American West. His recent work has focused on the impacts of drought, the widening rural-urban divide and state and federal environmental policy. Before joining the Chronicle, Alexander worked as a freelance writer and as a staff reporter for several media organizations, including The Fresno Bee and Bay Area News Group, writing about government, politics and the environment.) "Coronavirus has altered the global warming trajectory. But for how long?" San Francisco Chronicle, 5/20/20, https://www.sfchronicle.com/health/article/Greenhouse-gas-emissions-on-track-for-record-drop-15279312.php] TDI

The disruption caused by the coronavirus has been so profound that it’s altered the trajectory of global warming.

Not since World War II — and perhaps never before — have the emissions of heat-trapping gases dropped as much around the planet as they have during the COVID-19 outbreak.

The latest and most detailed study yet on the pandemic’s impact on climate pollution, published Tuesday and authored by the research group Global Carbon Project chaired by Stanford University’s Rob Jackson, finds that the Earth will see up to a 7% decrease in carbon dioxide this year. The dip is five times the decline in emissions in 2009, when the recession choked the world’s economy, and double what it was in 1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The paper’s findings mirror other reports that have similarly found sharp drops in greenhouse gases recently. The emerging research also is in agreement that the lull will likely be short-lived and, at best, buy time before the most devastating effects of climate change take hold. The lockdown that has halted factories, energy plants and automobiles during the pandemic is already lifting, and without deliberate action, carbon-intense activities are bound to resume.

“That’s the danger here,” said Jackson, a professor of earth system science and senior fellow at Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. “We’ve decreased emissions for the wrong reasons. Will they jump back up starting this fall, or could the virus allow us to rethink transportation and other parts of the economy?”

The answer to the question, say Jackson and others, may not be so straightforward. Greenhouse gases could rebound in some areas, and there could be lasting decreases in others.

Measuring heat-trapping gas emissions, for which carbon dioxide is a proxy, is not easy to do, especially in real time. The researchers at the Global Carbon Project analyzed daily economic activity in 69 countries from January through April and modeled the carbon pollution that likely resulted, then compared it to last year. The countries included have historically produced almost all of the world’s carbon dioxide.

The researchers found that China, the largest polluter, reduced emissions by nearly 24% on some days in mid-February. The United States, the second-largest polluter, cut emissions by nearly 32% for almost two weeks in mid-April. The European Union, including Great Britain, trimmed emissions by about 27% during the first week of April.

The dates of peak reductions varied in different parts of the globe because each locked down at a different time. The biggest cumulative drop in carbon dioxide was on April 7 and measured about 17%, according to the study.

While a variety of activity explains the declines, fewer people driving was the largest contributor worldwide. Less industrial pollution was also a big contributor.

Based on the observed drops in emissions, the researchers estimate that going forward, carbon dioxide will fall between 4% and 7% for the year worldwide, depending on how quickly countries end their lockdowns.

Jackson said the amount of the decline can be viewed as both considerable, given that it’s the largest ever seen, and humbling because it’s the minimum needed annually to put the planet on track to meet the Paris climate agreement — enough of a drop to prevent the global temperature from rising 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels.

“We would need to do this every year,” he said.

The International Energy Agency recently projected an 8% dip in greenhouse gases for the year while the International Monetary Fund came up with an estimate closer to 6%. Both organizations said carbon pollution would likely rise again in 2021.

After the decline in emissions in 2009 of about 1.4%, the following year saw an increase of 5.1%.

The Global Carbon Project says there’s reason to think that at least some parts of the globe will try to prevent heat-trapping gases from bouncing back. Stimulus programs aimed at developing clean energy and new carbon-friendly ways of living adopted during the pandemic, such as working from home, could help limit emissions.

“Cities from Seattle to Milan are keeping roads closed to cars and letting them stay open to bikes and pedestrians even after the shelter-in-place,” Jackson said. “And maybe COVID-19 and stimulus funding will jump-start electric cars.”

#### 3] Shutdowns solve climate change – substantially reduce emissions, air and water pollution, directs attention to climate

**Chow 20** [(Denise, a reporter for NBC News Science focused on general science and climate change) "Coronavirus shutdowns have unintended climate benefits: cleaner air, clearer water," NBC News, 3/18/20, https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/coronavirus-shutdowns-have-unintended-climate-benefits-n1161921] DRD

Concentrations of nitrogen dioxide in the atmosphere over Italy also fell precipitously, as they did in China. An analysis by The Washington Post found that the most dramatic drop was observed over northern Italy.

Nitrogen dioxide can irritate the lungs, and inhaling the pollutant can increase the risk of asthma and inflammation of the lungs. Although the noxious gas isn't thought to be a major contributor to climate change, studying its concentration in the atmosphere can help scientists understand other heat-trapping greenhouse gases that do drive global warming.

Jacqueline Klopp, co-director of the Center for Sustainable Urban Development at Columbia University in New York City, said she expects to see greenhouse gas emissions plummet across the board because of the quarantine measures.

"People were in their homes and really stopped a lot of the activities that lead to greenhouse gas emissions and other pollution," she said.

Early observations have shown that extreme social-distancing measures are likely also having an effect on air pollution at the city level in the U.S.

Jordan Wildish, a project director at Earth Economics, an environmental non-profit organization based in Tacoma, Washington, developed an online dashboard to track air quality in San Francisco, New York City and the Seattle area, comparing the measurements with figures from the same time last year.

In San Francisco, which is under shelter-in-place orders to control the spread of the coronavirus, the average concentration of fine particulate matter — tiny particles in the air that are dangerous because they can be breathed deeply into the lungs — over the past five days was almost 40 percent lower than the previous year.

In New York City, there was a 28 percent drop over the same period of time, and the Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue saw a 32 percent decrease.

But experts warned that observed reductions are temporary and that as cities, countries and economies bounce back, so, too, will emissions — unless major infrastructure or societal changes are adopted.

Klopp said the pandemic could make companies and governments realize that other threats to humanity, including climate change, could be just as devastating and that it's imperative to develop protective measures.

#### 2] Solves war

#### A] Disease pandemics decrease the likelihood of war

Walt 20 (Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University; “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”; Foreign Policy; May 13, 2020; https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/; ERB)

By many measures, 2020 is looking to be the worst year that humankind has faced in many decades. We’re in the midst of a pandemic that has already claimed more than 280,000 lives, sickened millions of people, and is certain to afflict millions more before it ends. The world economy is in free fall, with unemployment rising dramatically, trade and output plummeting, and no hopeful end in sight. A plague of locusts is back for a second time in Africa, and last week we learned about murderous killer wasps threatening the bee population in the United States. Americans have a head-in-the-sand president who prescribes potentially lethal nostrums and ignores the advice of his scientific advisors. Even if all those things magically disappeared tomorrow—and they won’t—we still face the looming long-term danger from climate change. Given all that, what could possibly make things worse? Here’s one possibility: war. It is therefore worth asking whether the combination of a pandemic and a major economic depression is making war more or less likely. What does history and theory tell us about that question? For starters, we know neither plague nor depression make war impossible. World War I ended just as the 1918-1919 influenza was beginning to devastate the world, but that pandemic didn’t stop the Russian Civil War, the Russo-Polish War, or several other serious conflicts. The Great Depression that began in 1929 didn’t prevent Japan from invading Manchuria in 1931, and it helped fuel the rise of fascism in the 1930s and made World War II more likely. So if you think major war simply can’t happen during COVID-19 and the accompanying global recession, think again. But war could still be much less likely. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead. He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace. Moreover, by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic. For the moment at least, beleaguered governments of all types are focusing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen. Posen adds that COVID-19 is also likely to reduce international trade in the short to medium term. Those who believe economic interdependence is a powerful barrier to war might be alarmed by this development, but he points out that trade issues have been a source of considerable friction in recent years—especially between the United States and China—and a degree of decoupling might reduce tensions somewhat and cause the odds of war to recede. For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely? One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders