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#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being, or hedonistic act utilitarianism.

#### 1] Neuroscience- pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else regresses.

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10].

Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14].

Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals.

Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D

Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it.

It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring.

Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding.

There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health.

Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage.

Finding happiness is different between apes and humans

As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure.

Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered.

Desire and reward centers

It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation.

In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41].

Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42].

Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans.

In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45].

Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations.

Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50]

In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders.

In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS.

Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### 2] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### 3] No intent-foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the death of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### 4] Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 2017 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### 5] That is the only egalitarian metric---anything else collapses cooperation on collective action crises and makes extinction inevitable

Khan 18 (Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/)

Infinite future possibilities I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that human culture is far from immutable. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges. Secondly, that even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. This is a humbling realization. Because faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the possibilities seem endless. They range from an era of abundance to the end of humanity, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns about extinction are often dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism. Sometimes, they are. But repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility. And there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos discusses how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: 1. Extinction is the rule, not the exception More than 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable to the human brain. But if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than 99.9% of all the distinct human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared Diamond charts the history of past societies. He makes the case that overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, if not the only, drivers of collapse. Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, we must still achieve tremendous step changes in our response to several major environmental crises. We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050, and a 90% chance by 2075. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. Visionaries like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’. Tribes have overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals. Even today, our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves. Our task is to find our own Nunuku’s Law. Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. It would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.

#### 6] Err negative, because of innate cognitive biases

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>,

1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

## 2

#### Biden has PC for infrastructure but it needs to maintained in the face of impatient democrats.

**Sullivan and Kane 6/11** [Sean and Paul. Sean Sullivan covers national politics, with a focus on the 2020 presidential campaign. Paul Kane. Washington, D.C.Senior congressional correspondent and columnist. Education: University of Delaware, BA. “‘Time is running out’: Democrats split over Biden’s relentless focus on infrastructure”. 6-9-2021. . https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-split-biden-infrastructure/2021/06/10/f1f95a8e-c91f-11eb-afd0-9726f7ec0ba6\_story.html.] SJ//VM

“The infrastructure bill — its status is up in the air, but its long-term prognosis is okay,” said Brian Fallon, a former Senate Democratic aide who heads the liberal group Demand Justice. “You have another patient that’s dying on the table, and that’s the one you need to triage.” As pressure built in the party, Attorney General Merrick Garland signaled Friday that the Justice Department not only would scrutinize voting laws for signs of discrimination, but also would apply oversight to post-election audits. Supporters of former president Donald Trump have spearheaded audits in various states despite no evidence of fraud. “Where we see violations, we will not hesitate to act,” Garland said. Story continues below advertisement NAACP President Derrick Johnson said his group was “encouraged by the new tone on voting rights set by the Biden-Harris administration” but warned that the battle “is far from over.” As Garland spoke, the infrastructure talks remained fluid. Many Senate Democrats think that a bipartisan deal will never be reached, and that the prolonged bipartisan talks are only delaying the inevitable fallback to party-line legislation. White House press secretary Jen Psaki said Biden remains committed to pushing a bill through Congress this summer. Other Democrats strongly doubt that timetable can be achieved, however, and they worry that it will be even harder to pass anything next year, with congressional elections looming in November. Story continues below advertisement Many liberals initially accepted Biden’s push for a big infrastructure package as a follow-up to his covid-19 relief bill. But now they are alarmed at the plan’s slow progress, combined with aggressive moves by Republicans in Florida, Georgia, Arizona and Texas to pass restrictive voting laws, and they want the White House to redirect the power of the presidency to combat those efforts. [*After blocking voting bill, Texas Democrats call on Congress to do more*](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/texas-voting-rights-congress/2021/05/31/a3ff5f6a-c229-11eb-93f5-ee9558eecf4b_story.html?itid=lk_interstitial_manual_32) Fallon said Biden’s priorities are evident in his trips around the country to tout his infrastructure plan, punctuated by colorful activities such as [driving an electric vehicle in Michigan](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-electric-truck/2021/05/18/168abee0-b815-11eb-a6b1-81296da0339b_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_33). “He’s test-driving Ford F-150s. He’s not going to Selma to talk about voting rights,” Fallon said. “That needs to happen.” Republicans see it differently, contending that Biden is trying to have it both ways by cramming his infrastructure bill with unrelated Democratic priorities. Story continues below advertisement “From the day the White House rolled out its first infrastructure plan in March, it’s been clear that the left’s definition of the word is evolving faster than even some Democrats can keep track,” Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said on the Senate floor this week. “Medicaid expansion as infrastructure. Paid leave as infrastructure. And job-killing tax increases to hold the assortment together.” On the other hand, some liberal Democrats say they will oppose a deal with Republicans if it fails to address issues such as climate change, illustrating how hard a bipartisan deal will be in the evenly divided Senate. “From my perspective — no climate, no deal,” said Sen. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.). “I’m not voting for an infrastructure bill that does not have climate.” He also rejected the idea of passing a more traditional bill that focuses on roads and bridges with the promise that a climate-centered bill would come later. Story continues below advertisement Markey recalled a climate bill passed by the House in 2009 that died in the Senate due to Republican opposition. “We now have a second chance at passing a piece of climate legislation that matches the scope and the scale of the problem,” Markey said. “We can’t allow Republican dilatory tactics to block consideration of a climate bill.” The prospects for a voting rights bill are if anything even more dire. All but one Democratic senator has signed on to the For the People Act, which has passed the House. The legislation, which Biden supports, would [set standards](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/manchin-voting-rights/2021/06/02/103db892-c320-11eb-93f5-ee9558eecf4b_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_43) for early voting and vote-by-mail that could override some state Republican voting laws. But Sen. Joe Manchin III (D-W.Va.), the lone holdout, said definitively this week that he would not vote for the plan, nor would he support changing the Senate filibuster rules to enable Democrats to pass it with a simple majority rather than 60 votes. White House officials have refrained from public criticism of Manchin, a reflection of his pivotal role in the Washington landscape. In a Senate that is divided 50-50, Manchin could single-handedly torpedo the infrastructure bill, prompting many in the White House to carefully mind what they say about him. White House officials said they are not taking voting rights any less seriously than infrastructure, pointing to recent remarks Biden made on the matter in Tulsa, his decision to [tap Vice President Harris to work on the issue](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ahead-of-tulsa-trip-biden-to-unveil-new-plans-to-reduce-black-white-wealth-gap/2021/05/31/b80c9c4e-c269-11eb-8c18-fd53a628b992_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_47) and his executive order expanding ballot access. But voting rights activists note that those moves haven’t prevented the GOP voting laws from taking effect. The White House official working on voting rights expressed strong support for the For the People Act, even though the official thought it was not a panacea. The official said there are other means of fighting the Republican voting laws, through the courts or the executive branch. But the official said such efforts would be cumbersome and acknowledged that none would be as effective as the legislation. When it comes to infrastructure, in contrast, the president’s urgency has been in plain sight. Biden has traveled the country to promote his proposal. He’s enlisted Cabinet secretaries to help sell it. He’s holding Oval Office meetings where he negotiates directly on it. And he is expending significant political capital to get it across the finish line. In the eyes of Biden’s allies, this is a good recipe for success in the midterms and beyond. “The White House is right to make infrastructure a priority,” said Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), who is up for reelection. “It’s urgently time-sensitive because it’s so key to jobs and economic recovery, not to mention faith in the basic capacity of government to build bridges and roads.” Infrastructure is also an appealing goal for the White House because its passage may not require a long-shot effort to end the filibuster. If all 50 Democratic senators stick together, they could pass it with no Republican support using a special budgetary maneuver. That is not true for measures such as the voting rights bill, which has no connection to the budget, making it much more difficult to shepherd into law. Even if the bipartisan talks do not result in a deal, they are important to Manchin, who might not join a Democratic-only bill unless he thinks a real effort has been made to court Republicans, Democrats close to the process said. Underlying Democrats’ anxieties are painful memories of the early months of the Obama administration, when they passed a stimulus bill that many now think was too small, and talks on the Affordable Care Act dragged on without resulting in any GOP support. Now, some fear that if the party doesn’t move more swiftly, it could miss its chance to get an infrastructure bill passed. With no margin for error in the Senate, circumstances could shift at any moment, they say, noting that in 2010, Democrats unexpectedly lost a special Senate election, costing them a filibuster-proof majority and nearly dooming the ACA. “During the Obama admin, folks thought we’d have a 60 Dem majority for a while. It lasted 4 months. Dems are burning precious time & impact,” Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.) tweeted. “It’s a hustle. We need to move now.” Others warn that even if Biden is ultimately successful on infrastructure, his victory could be short-lived without action on voting rights, given next year’s midterm elections. “You can win a round, but it doesn’t mean you win the fight,” said the Rev. Al Sharpton.

#### Preserving comfortable union relations maintains PC.

**Kerrissey and Schofer 13** [Kerrissey, Jasmine, and Evan Schofer. Jasmine Kerrissey Department of Sociology University of California, Irvine Evan Schofer Department of Sociology University of California, Irvine. “Union Membership and Political Participation in the United States.” *Social Forces*, vol. 91, no. 3, 2013, pp. 895–928. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/23361125] SJ//VM

Discussion and Conclusion We observe consistent evidence that union members are more politically engaged than non-members. The effect of union membership is broad, spanning most types of political and civic involvement, including voting, protesting, signing petitions, association membership, and so on, and holds up with a large range of control variables. 36 The prior literature looks mainly at voting outcomes – and often finds weak results when many variables are controlled – so even these basic findings represent a step forward. The magnitude of the union membership effect varies across outcomes, but is generally substantial. For instance, union members have 20% greater odds of voting than comparable non-members. The odds of participating in a protest were 73% to 100% higher among union members, according to the Roper and Verba datasets, respectively. Many of the large and highly significant effects are in areas of social protest and electoral participation. In the case of volunteering and charitable donations, for instance, we see substantially larger effects in political forms of those activities – whereas general measures of volunteering and donations show smaller effects. We observe weaker or non-significant effects of union membership on activities that are far removed from union agendas, such as general civic membership, volunteering, or blood donation. It appears that unions build ‘political capital’ more than generalized ‘social capital’.8 These patterns are broadly consistent with our structural arguments, discussed above, that contemporary American labor unions face strong pressures to mobilize members to prepare for collective action with employers and to maintain political capital with the Democratic party.

#### Strike would divide the Union

Israelstam 17 [Ivan. Ivan Israelstam is the Chief Executive of Labour Law Management Consulting. “What is the impact of strikes for employers and employees?”. 11-22-2017. Skills Portal. https://www.skillsportal.co.za/content/what-impact-strikes-employers-and-employees.] SJ//VM

The loss of production and of customers is usually the first consequence of a strike. However, indirect strike costs incurred later can be just as serious. In the case of *NUM and others vs Chrober Slate (Pty) Ltd* (2008, 3 BLLR 287) the mine dismissed its quarry workers and factory staff due to an unprocedural strike by the quarry workers. The employer admitted that the factory staff were not to blame for the work stoppage as it had been the quarry workers who had refused to work. The dismissals of the factory staff were found to be unfair and the Labour Court ordered the mine to reinstate the 42 dismissed employees with back pay. In order to avoid the snowballing costs and loss of business that strikes can cause the employer needs to understand: What constitutes a strike in legal terms, The economic effects of a strike for both parties, The effects of a strike on the employment relationship, How to resolve constructively the conflict that causes industrial action, How to minimise the damage caused by a strike, and How to bring a strike to a speedy end. WHAT CONSTITUTES A STRIKE? A strike is any concerted withholding of labour by a group of employees in support of a demand made by them to the employer. Examples of this are work stoppages, go-slows, overtime bans and work-to-rule. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A STRIKE FOR BOTH PARTIES. The employer is likely to lose money due to delayed service to clients or to lost production time. The employees will lose their pay due to the no work, no pay principle. If the strikers are dismissed they will lose their livelihoods altogether. THE EFFECTS OF A STRIKE ON THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP. Once the strike is over, even if the business has not been closed down by it, the feelings of hostility resulting from the strike can severely damage teamwork, productivity and profitability. HOW TO RESOLVE CONSTRUCTIVELY THE CONFLICT THAT CAUSES INDUSTRIAL ACTION. Before the conflict gets to the stage of impasse that results in a strike the parties need to utilise the services of an expert in conflict resolution. The CCMA was set up with the purpose of helping the parties to resolve conflict peacefully. However, in practice, the warring parties too often go to the CCMA because the law says they must rather than in a sincere attempt to sort out their differences. In other words, by the time the parties end up at the CCMA the conflict is often beyond the point of no return. For this reason, during times of industrial peace, employers and employees should identify and agree upon the use of a trained and reputable conflict resolution expert to be called in when the parties are unable to solve the problem themselves. HOW TO MINIMISE THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY A STRIKE. Employees should allow the business to continue to run in order to avert the likelihood of a closure that could result in job losses. Employers should use the services of a reputable labour broker who can provide alternative labour during the strike. Both parties should behave in a civil and professional manner towards each other. HOW TO BRING A STRIKE TO A SPEEDY END. Where the parties are unable to find common ground they should not delay in bringing in the services of their mutually agreed strike resolution expert. An expert in this field will not only have techniques of bringing the parties together but will also be able to see solutions that the emotions of the parties have prevented them from seeing. The expert should also be able to help the parties rebuild their relationship once the strike is over.

#### Infrastructure bill is necessary to tackle emission reduction goals.

**Newburger 3/29** [Emma. Emma Newburger is a Climate policy reporter at [@CNBC](https://twitter.com/CNBC). [@Cornell](https://twitter.com/Cornell) grad. “Here’s how Biden’s infrastructure package will likely tackle climate change”. 1-27-2021. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/29/biden-infrastructure-bill-what-to-expect-on-climate-change.html.] SJ//VM

President Joe Biden delivers remarks on tackling climate change prior to signing executive actions as White House climate envoy John Kerry and Vice President Kamala Harris listen in the State Dining Room at the White House in Washington, U.S., January 27, 2021. President [Joe Biden](https://www.cnbc.com/joe-biden/) this week is set to unveil details of a major infrastructure package that’s expected to include record spending on mitigating [climate change](https://www.cnbc.com/environment/) and accelerating a nationwide transition to clean energy. The president is expected to introduce up to $3 trillion in spending on efforts to boost the economy, including rebuilding aging infrastructure like highways, bridges and rail lines, and investing in technologies to reduce planet-warming greenhouse gas emissions. Some of the policies on the table include:

Installing thousands of new electric vehicle charging stations

Funds to build energy-efficient homes

Constructing new electric power lines

The package may be split between two bills, starting with legislation that incorporates Biden’s [Build Back Better agenda](https://joebiden.com/build-back-better/) and supports his goal to achieve carbon-free power generation by 2035 and net-zero emissions by 2050. The recovery plan will potentially involve installing thousands of electric vehicle charging stations and providing incentives to encourage Americans to purchase electric vehicles. As a candidate, Biden vowed to establish ambitious fuel economy standards for gasoline cars to encourage a shift to electric vehicles. The transportation sector accounts for the [largest share of U.S. emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions#:~:text=Transportation%20(28.2%20percent%20of%202018,ships%2C%20trains%2C%20and%20planes.), according to the Environmental Protection Agency, and could be the most difficult to decarbonize. The package also is primed to include funding to build millions of new energy-efficient homes and retrofit existing buildings to increase efficiency. There’s money to construct electric power lines that provide renewable energy and expand electricity storage. Paul Bledsoe, a former Clinton White House climate advisor now with the Progressive Policy Institute, said Biden’s goal is to jumpstart the economy and create new jobs during the transition away from fossil fuels. “Electrifying America’s cars and trucks, creating a nationwide smart grid, expanding electricity storage to allow more renewable energy, establishing universal high speed internet — all of these are intended to boost the productivity and competitiveness of the economy, while also cutting emissions,” Bledsoe said. Loading low-carbon energy initiatives into an infrastructure bill will likely be more divisive in Congress than previous Covid stimulus legislation. The last major push to pass climate legislation through the Senate was in 2009, when congressional Democrats failed to pass a carbon-pricing system. Some Democrats and climate activists fear that another failure to pass meaningful climate legislation amid concerns that a clean energy transition will cost jobs. Some Republicans who opposed Biden’s pandemic relief package have also condemned the president’s goal to incorporate climate policy into infrastructure legislation. Rep. Sam Graves, R-Mo., the top Republican on the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, said he’ll work with Democrats on infrastructure but that prioritizing climate issues would not receive GOP support. “A transportation bill needs to be a transportation bill, not a Green New Deal,” Graves said during a hearing Thursday. “It needs to be about roads and bridges.” House Speaker [Nancy Pelosi](https://www.cnbc.com/nancy-pelosi/) said Thursday she’ll support a bipartisan bill but will not eliminate components addressing climate change due to Republican objections. “We cannot just settle for what we can agree on without recognizing that this has to be a bill for the future, that we have to recognize the climate crisis,” Pelosi [told reporters.](https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/32521-0) Biden has argued that his actions on climate will create millions of jobs. The president has already issued a series of climate executive orders, including suspending new oil and gas leasing on federal lands and [rejoining the U.S. into the Paris climate accord](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/20/biden-inauguration-us-rejoins-paris-climate-accord.html). The administration is leaning toward pursuing the bipartisan infrastructure legislation and passing other components through budget reconciliation, which would require only Senate Democrats to vote. “To gain the broadest support in Congress, Biden must emphasize the economic and jobs benefits of these investments first and foremost, not simply the climate benefits,” Bledsoe said. Stephanie Gidigbi Jenkins, director for policy and partnerships at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said the administration’s infrastructure proposal so far is “clearly focused on the right problems.” “Making these investments will create millions of good, American jobs and help us address the legacy of racial injustice,” Jenkins said. “Given the ambitions from the Biden administration and the commitment from key congressional leaders, we now have a historic opportunity to rebuild our economy for a cleaner, brighter future,” Jenkins added. “We are confident that Congress can achieve these goals.”

#### Extinction

Specktor 19 [Brandon writes about the science of everyday life for Live Science, and previously for Reader's Digest magazine, where he served as an editor for five years] 6-4-2019, "Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims," livescience, <https://www.livescience.com/65633-climate-change-dooms-humans-by-2050.html> Justin

The current climate crisis, they say, is larger and more complex than any humans have ever dealt with before. General climate models — like the one that the [United Nations' Panel on Climate Change](https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/) (IPCC) used in 2018 to predict that a global temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) could put hundreds of millions of people at risk — fail to account for the **sheer complexity of Earth's many interlinked geological processes**; as such, they fail to adequately predict the scale of the potential consequences. The truth, the authors wrote, is probably far worse than any models can fathom. How the world ends What might an accurate worst-case picture of the planet's climate-addled future actually look like, then? The authors provide one particularly grim scenario that begins with world governments "politely ignoring" the advice of scientists and the will of the public to decarbonize the economy (finding alternative energy sources), resulting in a global temperature increase 5.4 F (3 C) by the year 2050. At this point, the world's ice sheets vanish; brutal droughts kill many of the trees in the [Amazon rainforest](https://www.livescience.com/57266-amazon-river.html) (removing one of the world's largest carbon offsets); and the planet plunges into a feedback loop of ever-hotter, ever-deadlier conditions. "Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and **55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of** [**lethal heat conditions**](https://www.livescience.com/55129-how-heat-waves-kill-so-quickly.html), beyond the threshold of human survivability," the authors hypothesized. Meanwhile, droughts, floods and wildfires regularly ravage the land. Nearly **one-third of the world's land surface turns to desert**. Entire **ecosystems collapse**, beginning with the **planet's coral reefs**, the **rainforest and the Arctic ice sheets.** The world's tropics are hit hardest by these new climate extremes, destroying the region's agriculture and turning more than 1 billion people into refugees. This mass movement of refugees — coupled with [shrinking coastlines](https://www.livescience.com/51990-sea-level-rise-unknowns.html) and severe drops in food and water availability — begin to **stress the fabric of the world's largest nations**, including the United States. Armed conflicts over resources, perhaps culminating in **nuclear war, are likely**. The result, according to the new paper, is "outright chaos" and perhaps "the end of human global civilization as we know it."

## Case

#### Reject 1ar theory on face:

#### [a] They get a 7-6 time advantage which is worse later in the debate since there’s less arguments they have to cover and they can blow individual arguments up and get to weigh in the 2ar and have a perceptual advantage meaning they’ll always win

#### [b] Deters the 1NC from checking abuse out of fear for 1AR meta-theory, which destroys me since it’s also preclusive. Turns their infinite abuse args.

#### [c] Resolvability double bind—either you automatically accept 2AR responses to 2NR counter-standards which means they always win since I can’t answer those responses, or you have to intervene to determine the credence you give those 2AR responses, which makes it irresolvable and unfair.

#### Calc indicts fail: A] Ethics- it would indict everything since they use events to understand how their ethics have worked B] Reciprocity- they are NIBs that create a 2:1 skew where I have to answer them to access offense while they only have to win one C] Internalism- asking why we value pain and pleasure is nonsensical cuz the answer is intrinsic since we just do, which means we still prefer hedonism despite shortcomings.

### Fw

**1. Nothing can be assessed apriori – even concepts like reason require experience to understand. Their meta ethic presupposes a universal human subject that doesn’t exist – all humanity is culturally and historically contingent**

#### Schm

#### Tailoring

**There’s no intrinsic value in freedom without a positive obligation to protect wellbeing.**

Richard **Chappell 5** [PhD, Princeton University] Libertarian vs. Utilitarian Justice, Philosophy. June 2005.

Libertarians hold that each person owns themselves, and others may not make use of their property (i.e. them) without their consent.[28] Just as others have no right to shelter a homeless man in my house, so they have no right to tax the products of my labour and redistribute to the needy. But the free market requires ownership rights over both self and external resources,[29] and we have seen that the latter is problematic. Moreover, **self-ownership is a merely ‘formal’ notion that does not guarantee substantive freedom or power over one’s own life.** For suppose that natural resources are initially owned by everyone rather than no-one. On this view, a self-owning individual may not make use of the material world without others’ consent. But, as Kymlicka asks, “**how can I be said to own myself if I may do nothing without the permission of others**?”[30] Such merely **formal freedom has no worth**. Yet **this is the position of the poor and disadvantaged** within a libertarian capitalist society. **Once we recognize the importance of substantive rather than merely formal freedom, our aim becomes to enable people to live the lives they want to live**. This commits us to ensuring access to education, healthcare, and basic human needs like food and shelter, since all of these are essential prerequisites to any form of freedom worth having. If provision of these goods requires us to compromise self-ownership, so be it. **The latter has no value in the absence of the former in any case. We are thus led back in the direction of utilitarianism.**

#### The causal order of action is irrelevant which implies that there is no intent-foresight distinction

Enoch 11 [(David, Philosophy Professor at Hebrew University) “Intending, Foreseeing, and the State,” Legal Theory, 13 (2007), 1–31 published by Cambridge University Press, 9-13-2007] TDI

B. The Moral Insignificance of the Causal Order

One way of understanding the intending-foreseeing distinction is, remember, as the distinction between two kinds of causal structure: In Transplant, the death of the one is on the causal way to the saving of the five. Not so in Trolley, where the death of the one is on a different causal route, causally after the means (diverting the trolley) that saves the five. But when thinking not so much about particular cases and our pretheoretical reactions to them but directly about the distinction based on the causal order, it is hard not to doubt the moral significance of this distinction. Why think that the causal order has such far-reaching moral implications? Upon reflection, causal order facts seem of the wrong kind to have intrinsic moral weight. Facts about the well-being of people, for instance, seem to be of the right kind to make a moral difference. Facts about people’s choices also seem reasonably good candidates to make a moral difference. And facts about some causal relations may also be of the right kind to make a moral difference—for instance, facts such as which action causes which effects on well-being. But facts about causal order—what is causally on the way to what—look simply (intrinsically) morally weightless.11

To see this more clearly, think about a moral agent deliberating about a possible future action of hers—whether or not to act in a certain way. We give this agent some relevant information to help her make the morally right decision, and she can ask for more information if she thinks she needs it. If she then asks for further information regarding the effects of the relevant action (or inaction) on the well-being of some person, her question seems appropriate. If she asks for further information regarding, say, the distribution of hair on the head of one of the affected persons, her question is not appropriate (at least absent some story explaining why it is that the distribution of hair on that person’s head is morally relevant). Thinking about this agent gives us a kind of a test—I will call it “the appropriate-question test”—for the (intrinsic) moral relevance of a given consideration. And it is a test that focuses on the perspective that is morally most important—the first-person perspective of the deliberating agent.12 Let us apply this test, then, in order to check whether causal order is morally significant. Think, then, of our agent, deliberating whether to press the button in front of her. We give her information about the states of affairs that will obtain if she does—and if she does not—press it. We tell her, for instance, that if she presses the button, certain good effects and also certain bad effects will follow (and that they will not follow if she does not press the button), and we describe these effects in detail. She then proceeds to ask whether the bad effect is on the causal way to the good effect. Is her question appropriate? Is it more like the question about further effects on people’s well-being or more like the question about the distribution of hairs on someone’s head? To my ears, her question sounds weird, surprising, indicative of rather disturbing facts about her moral character.13 Given a full description of the relevant consequences, and without some further (for instance, instrumental) story explaining how the exact causal structure is morally significant, the causal order seems (to me) simply morally irrelevant. If you agree with me that the question about the causal order is inappropriate, you have strong reason to suspect that causal order in general, and in particular the distinction between means and side effects, is simply (intrinsically) morally irrelevant.14

Let me emphasize here—in case you are not yet convinced—that what is at issue is not any old way in which the causal structure may be normatively relevant. What is at issue—and what the appropriate-question test is supposed to help us with finding out—is whether the causal structure is Q4 intrinsically morally relevant, whether, in other ways, it is morally relevant regardless of its relations to other factors. So it will be no reply to the line of thought in the previous paragraphs to show that, say, causal-structure facts are correlated with other facts, themselves normatively significant, and can thus serve as reasonably good proxies for them. The question is, rather, whether—holding all other things equal—the causal structure itself makes a moral difference.

And here the answer that seems to me overwhelmingly plausible is that it does not.

It may be objected that the appropriate-question test, as many other intuition pumps, is too sensitive to the way the case is described, or in this case to the way the relevant question is formulated. Thus, if the question is put in the terms I have been using—“Will the bad effects be on the causal way to the good effects?”—perhaps the question sounds inappropriate. But if the question is put differently—say, “Will I be using the harmed person merely as a means?”—the question sounds perfectly appropriate. Does this show that the appropriate-question test is misguided (because too easily manipulable), or indeed that I have been applying it tendentiously?15 It will come as no surprise that I think the answer is “no.” True, proponents of the moral significance of the intending-foreseeing distinction (in either of its meanings) often use such Kantian locutions (“using merely as a means”) as ways of making this claim plausible. Thus it is often said that by diverting the trolley, we will not be using someone merely as a means (in Trolley, at least, for it is not at all clear this is the case in Loop), whereas in Transplant we will be using the person whose organs we take merely as a means. Or perhaps it can be said that in Transplant we would be appropriating someone’s body against their will, which we would not be doing in Trolley.16

But such ways of describing the case—though plausible-sounding—do not help, for two reasons. First, proponents of such ways of talking have to fill in the details in a plausible way, and it is notoriously hard to say what treating someone merely as a means exactly comes to, why exactly it matters morally, and why it applies to Transplant but not to Trolley (and the analogous point applies, it seems to me, to appropriation as well).17 Such ways of talking, then, are best seen not as a solution to our problem, but rather as more elegant names for the problem itself. Second, and perhaps more relevant in the context of the appropriate-question test, such ways of talking are normatively loaded, and so formulating the relevant question in such terms illegitimately biases the appropriate-question test. In order to test for intrinsic moral significance, the question has to be put in the normatively thinnest possible terms. Only if the question—thus put—seems appropriate is the relevant factor intrinsically morally relevant.

Suppose, for instance, that we want to know whether the fact that an act will constitute a killing is intrinsically morally significant and that we plan to find out by employing the appropriate-question test. The way to formulate the question, then, is: “But will it be a killing?” Formulating the question as “But will it be a murder?” is cheating, of course, because “murder” is such a normatively loaded word that its appearance in the question corrupts the appropriate-question test. Similarly, then, the right question to put in our context is not “But will I be appropriating another person?” (for “appropriating a person” is a highly normatively loaded expression) or “But will I be using her merely as a means?” (for “using merely as a means” is—at least among moral philosophers—a highly normatively loaded expression), but rather something like “But will the harm I cause her be on the causal route to the good I cause him?” If you—like myself—are unwilling to answer this question in the positive, you must not hide behind tendentious, normatively loaded alternative descriptions of the case and should instead conclude that causal-structure facts are without intrinsic moral weight.

Of course, as with all controversies regarding whether something is intrinsically morally significant, it is hard to construct sophisticated arguments one way or another—pretty much the best that can be done is to get misunderstandings out of our way, focus as clearly as we can on the precise question in front of us, and give the most plausible answer. And people may differ about what it is, of course. But it is in this spirit that I offer the appropriate-question test—when the misunderstandings above are removed and we focus clearly on the question of intrinsic moral significance, the claim that causal structures are significant in this way seems (to me) just too much to believe.

Consider one last objection to the employment of the appropriate question test as a way of showing that causal structures are intrinsically insignificant.18 Suppose our agent, having been presented with all the information about her possible actions’ effect on people’s well-being and the like, proceeds to ask: “But wait a minute, am I in Transplant or in Trolley?” Is this question not appropriate?

It certainly sounds appropriate, but this is so, I want to suggest, simply because Trolley and Transplant are intuitively so different from each other. And of course, we knew that all along. The objections to the moral relevance of the intending-foreseeing distinction do not deny, of course, the commonsensical appeal of the distinction. Rather, they are arguments for why we may need to revise the judgments that seem to us so intuitive, because they do not seem to us defensible on reflection. Here as elsewhere, what we want from a moral theory is not just a reasonably good fit with our pretheoretical intuitive judgments. Rather, we want the theory to be good as a theory, to score reasonably high on the list of theoretical virtues. In order to do that it must, for instance, offer something by way of unity, coherence, explanatory power, and elegance, it must not be ad hoc, it must focus on factors that upon reflection seem to make a moral difference, and so on. What the discussion above shows is that a moral theory that makes use of the intending-foreseeing distinction (understood causally) fails this further test, and this even if it does fit many of our pretheoretical specific moral judgments. Just noting again that these judgments do seem intuitive carries at this stage of the debate little weight.

#### No intent-foresight distinction implies consequentialism

Enoch 11 [(David, Philosophy Professor at Hebrew University) “Intending, Foreseeing, and the State,” Legal Theory, 13 (2007), 1–31 published by Cambridge University Press, 9-13-2007] TDI

According to consequentialists, the morally right action is, roughly, the one that is expected to promote the good. All it takes, then, in order to reject consequentialism is to believe in some deontological constraints, that is, in some rules to the effect that there are some actions it is morally impermissible to perform (at least sometimes) even when performing them will maximize the good.66 And such constraints need not be put explicitly in terms of intention and foresight. So it is not immediately clear why a nonconsequentialist needs anything like the intending-foreseeing distinction, why without it consequentialism is the way to go.

In order to see that this is nevertheless so, think of an example of a deontological constraint, say a constraint against lying. Now think of the well-known type of case in which the way to minimize constraint violations is to violate that very constraint. So we are to imagine a situation in which, for some reason, if I lie now, fewer lies will be told (this one included) than if I do not lie now. If we want to justify the judgment that at least sometimes a constraint is not to be violated even in order to minimize constraint violations, then we had better distinguish morally between the relation between me and my action and the lying (right now), on the one hand, and the relation between me and my action and future lyings, on the other. Otherwise, if no such moral distinction is to be made, then by not lying now, thereby causing (or allowing) many more future lyings, I am responsible for all those future lyings and so I am acting wrongly. And, of course, in order to distinguish between the relation between me and my lying right now and me and future lyings, the intending-foreseeing distinction, or perhaps some closely related distinction, is needed.

Should we, then, say that at least sometimes we should not violate a constraint even in order to minimize constraint-violations? Well, I do not think that deontologists, as a matter of logical necessity, have to say this. Depending on the details of one’s conception of the good, it is entirely possible that there are actions we should at least sometimes not perform even when performing them will maximize the good, and that nevertheless we should also violate a constraint whenever doing so will minimize constraint violations. But—as I think all deontologists agree—such a way out, though perhaps logically sound, is morally unsound. It seems inconsistent with if not deontology itself, at least the philosophical and moral motivations underlying deontology. And if so, absent the distinction between intending and foreseeing, or some other distinction that could distinguish between my relation to my lying now and my relation to (my or others’) future lyings, consequentialism is hard to resist.67

Note that this little argument is perfectly general and can thus be applied even to deontological theories that are not explicitly formulated in terms of anything like the intending-foreseeing distinction (as can be seen from the example of a constraint against lying). As long as it is at least sometimes morally impermissible to treat someone merely as a means even when doing so will minimize the number of (similarly severe) cases of people treating others merely as means, Kant needs something like the intending-foreseeing distinction. As long as it is at least sometimes morally impermissible to treat someone in a way that violates principles that nobody could reasonably reject even when doing so will minimize the number of times in which people are so treated, Scanlon needs something like the intending-foreseeing distinction.68 And so on.

Whatever your favorite deontological theory, then, as long as you believe that there are deontological constraints that at least sometimes should not be violated even in order to minimize violations, you need something like the intending-foreseeing distinction. And so, if that distinction collapses, and if no similar distinction can be defended, it is very hard not to be a consequentialist.

#### Moral theories must explain degrees of wrongness

Hurka 19 [(Thomas, Department of Philosophy University of Toronto) “More Seriously Wrong, More Importantly Right,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2019] TDI

Wrongness and Degrees

That one act is more seriously wrong than another is often intuitively compelling in itself; thus it seems self-evident that murder is morally worse than breaking a promise. But judgments about serious wrongness have further implications. If you have acted wrongly you should feel guilt, but you should feel more guilt—more intense or longer-lasting guilt—if your act was more seriously wrong, for example, if it was murder rather than breaking a promise. You are also other things equal more blameworthy for a more serious wrong, and if retributivism is true, you deserve more severe punishment for it. In general, whenever wrong acts call for negative responses, more serious wrongs call for stronger ones. The idea of serious wrongness therefore connects with several other aspects of our moral thought, and this allows further tests of it. To decide whether one act is more seriously wrong than another we can not only consult direct intuitions about the two but also ask whether you should feel more guilt about the first or whether the first makes you more blameworthy or more deserving of punishment.

These tests cannot be applied mechanically, because in each case the effect of more serious wrongness is mixed with others that are not relevant to our topic. Guilt is called for by wrong action, and on at least some views an act’s wrongness is independent of its motive (Ross : ch. ; Scanlon : ch. ). But more serious wrongs are often done from worse motives, and even if these cannot be the objects of guilt they can prompt the different emotion of shame. Shame about your motivation can then mix with guilt to make for an overall negative response to your act in which the specific role of serious wrongness is harder to see. (If motives are relevant to wrongness, they can prompt guilt as well as shame, but the two can still be hard to pull apart.) Something similar holds for blameworthiness and retribution. On many views you are more blameworthy for a wrong act or deserve more punishment for it if you acted from a worse motive, for example, if you killed from sadistic hatred rather than excessive anger at injustice. Your blameworthiness can also depend on other facts about your mental states, such as whether you were culpably ignorant or acted under duress (for views on which your degree of blameworthiness for a wrong depends both on its seriousness and on facts about your mental states see, e.g., Beardsley [: –] and Smith [: –]). In all these tests, the effect of serious wrongness on fitting responses is mixed with effects due to your state of mind. Isolating the former effect requires setting these other influences aside.

More serious wrongness may also help to characterize subjective rightness, or rightness relative to your beliefs or evidence. Many philosophers have been persuaded by an example of Frank Jackson that this cannot be done in terms of objective rightness, or rightness relative to the facts; more specifically, the subjectively right act cannot be identified as the one most likely to be objectively right. In Jackson’s example you can give a patient one of three treatments. One of the first two will completely cure him and one will kill him, but you do not know which is which; each has a . probability of doing either. The third treatment will cure his condition almost entirely and is safe. The subjectively right treatment here is clearly the third, but it is certain to be objectively wrong; one or the other of the first two is right relative to the facts (Jackson : –). But a derivation of subjective from objective rightness need not tell you to maximize your probability of acting objectively rightly or, what is the same, to minimize your probability of acting wrongly. As Peter Graham has argued, it can tell you to minimize your probability of acting seriously wrongly, or to minimize the expected objective serious wrongness of what you do. Since in Jackson’s example the act that is certain to be objectively wrong will be only slightly seriously wrong while each of the others has a . probability of being horribly so, this yields the desired result (Graham ). Serious wrongness may also be relevant in cases of moral uncertainty. Imagine that you cannot decide between two moral views and must do either act A or act B, where the first view says A is right and B wrong and the second says the reverse. Andrew Sepielli () has argued that you cannot here consider just the probabilities that the two views are true. If the first says B is only slightly seriously wrong while the second says A is massively so, you should do B even if you think the first view is somewhat more likely to be true.

These last uses of serious wrongness are more controversial. It has been argued that, despite its success with Jackson’s example, the proposed account of subjective rightness does not have the implications we want in cases involving permissions, for example, in cases of self-defense or supererogation (Lazar, forthcoming). The account at least needs supplementation to handle these cases. And the account of moral uncertainty requires comparisons of seriousness not only within a moral view, as I will be discussing, but also between moral views, which raises additional difficulties. Nonetheless, these are two further contexts where the concept of serious wrongness may play a role.

Some philosophers have denied that there can be degrees relating to wrongness. Some Stoics, for example, thought that all moral wrongs are equal. Diogenes Laertius reports that they ‘see fit to believe that [moral] mistakes are equal . . . [so] he who makes a larger [moral] mistake and he who makes a smaller one are [both] equally not acting correctly’ (: –). Some present-day philosophers may likewise deny that wrongness admits of degrees. For an act to be wrong, they may say, is for it not to be permitted, and since an act either just is permitted or just is not, it cannot be more or less wrong.

That there is a concept of wrongness that does not admit of degrees does not mean there cannot be one that does. But I have chosen to avoid this issue by speaking not of one act’s being more wrong than another –I will concede that that is not possible–but of its having the related but different property of being more seriously wrong, which I understand as follows. Because of the supervenience of moral properties, any act that is right or wrong has other properties that make it so. But if these properties admit of degrees, or if their tendencies to make acts right or wrong do, we can use this fact to define a derivative property of serious wrongness that likewise admits of degrees.

Compare the properties concerned with height. There is an initial property of tallness that admits of degrees. By making a cut on the scale of tallness we can introduce a property that does not admit of degrees, such as being over six feet tall in the sense of having some height or other above that. We can then combine these two properties to yield a third that again admits of degrees, that of being more than six feet tall in the sense in which someone who is six feet ten is a lot more than six feet tall, whereas someone who is six feet one is only a little more than that height. I think of the right- and wrong-making properties as analogous to tallness, wrongness as analogous to being at least six feet tall, and being seriously wrong as analogous to being more than six feet tall in the sense that admits of degrees. Being seriously wrong combines underlying properties that can be present to differing degrees with a supervening one that cannot to yield a third property that again can (for similar remarks see Berman and Farrell : –, –).

#### Consequentialism offers the best explanation of degrees of wrongness

Sinnott-Armstrong 09 [(Walter, Professor of Practical Ethics at Duke. Go Blue Devils!) “How strong is this obligation? An argument for consequentialism from concomitant variation” Oxford University Press Analysis Vol. 69 No. 3, July 2009] TDI

This conclusion extends as well to the existence of such moral obligations. There are two main options: we can say either (i) consequences determine both the existence and the strength of the moral obligation not to break the promise or (ii) what determines the existence of the moral obligation is simply that the agent made the promise in the past, whereas what determines the strength of the moral obligation is, instead, the consequences of breaking (or keeping) the promise. Option (i) is clearly simpler and more coherent. Why would one factor determine whether any moral obligation at all exists, while a completely separate factor (in the future rather than the past) deter- mines how strong that moral obligation is? That would be like postulating that the force of a golf club hitting a golf ball is what causes the ball to move but a different factor determines how fast or far the ball moves. Of course, dense air or a tree might explain why the ball did not go as fast or far as otherwise expected. However, in the absence of any such additional force, it would be implausible to postulate separate causes for the existence and degree of the ball's motion. Analogously, we should reject the moral theory that one factor determines the existence of a moral obligation and a separate factor determines its strength. There might be conflicting moral reasons of all sorts (analogous to the dense air and tree), but they do not explain the existence or the strength of the original moral obligation itself. Thus, the better alternative is the consequentialist theory that one factor - the harm caused by violating the obligation - explains both the existence and the strength of the moral obligation not to break promises.

#### Even Kant himself concedes degrees of wrongness matter, but only consequentialism clearly explains it

Calder 05 explains [(Todd, University of Victoria, Department of Philosophy) “Kant and Degrees of Wrongness,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 39: 229–244, 2005] TDI

Most people would agree that there are degrees of wrongness. For instance, it seems that sadistic torture is a greater wrong than telling a white lie and that stealing a welfare check from a single mother is a greater wrong than stealing fifty cents from a billionaire. Degrees of wrongness can be easily accounted for on most consequentialist moral theories. According to consequentialists, an act is right, if the act promotes more good than its alternatives, and wrong if it does not. A consequentialist might contend that the worse the consequences, the greater the degree of wrongness. For example, if sadistic torture leads to more disvalue than telling a white lie, as it seems it would, sadistic torture is the greater wrong.

Kantian moral theorists cannot easily account for degrees of wrongness. For Kant, an act is wrong, if it is prohibited by the supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative. It is not obvious how an act can be more or less prohibited by the categorical imperative. It seems that an act is either prohibited or it is not. The commonsense moral judgment that there are degrees of wrongness is a prima facie problem for a Kantian moral theorist.

It is surprising that this problem has gone unnoticed by Kantians and their critics. Moral theorists seem to have assumed that Kantian moral theory can account for degrees of wrongness. Kant himself seems to have made this assumption. For instance, in the Doctrine of Virtue he writes: “The greatest violation of a human being’s duty to himself regarded merely as a moral being (the humanity in his own person) is the contrary of truthfulness.”1

By calling lying the “greatest violation of a human being’s duty to himself” Kant seems to imply that lying is a greater wrong than other violations of a human being’s duty to himself. However, it is one thing for Kant to believe that his moral theory is able to accommodate degrees of wrongness and another for his theory actually to do so.

### Offense

#### Kant negates--

#### 1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

Gourevitch 18 [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ froze major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.

#### 3] The aff homogenizes all strikes as an unconditional right which is unethical.

Loewy 2K, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

It would seem then that the ethical considerations for workers striking in an industry such as a shoe factory or a chain grocery store are quite different from the ethical considerations for workers in sanitation, police, or fire departments, or for professionals such as teachers or those involved directly in healthcare. Even in the latter “professional” category, there are subtle but distinct differences of “rights” and obligations. However, one cannot conclude that for workers in essential industries strikes are simply ethically not permissible, whereas they are permissible for workers in less essential industries. Strikes, by necessity, injure another, and injuring another cannot be ethically neutral. Injuring others is prima facie ethically problematic—that is, unless a good and weighty argument for doing so can be made, injuring another is not ethically proper. Striking by a worker, in as much as doing so injures another or others, is only a conditional right. A compelling ethical argument in favor of striking is needed as well as an ethical argument in favor of striking at the time and in the way planned. It remains to delineate the conditions under which strikes, especially strikes by workers in essential industries and even more so by persons who consider themselves to be “professionals,” may legitimately proceed and yet fulfill their basic purpose.

#### 4] Free-riding: strikes are a form of free-riding since those who don’t participate still reap the benefits.

Dolsak and Prakash 19 [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>] Justin

While strikes and protests build solidarity among their supporters, they are susceptible to collective action problems. This is because **the goals that strikers pursue tend to create non-excludable benefits**. That is, benefits such as climate protection can be enjoyed by both strikers and non-strikers. Thus, large participation in climate strikes will reveal that in spite of free-riding problems, a large number of people have a strong preference for climate action.