## 1

#### Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.

Bostrom 12 [(Nick Bostrom, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford) “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy, 2012] TDI

These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

#### Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.

Moen 16 [(Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo) “An Argument for Hedonism,” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-015-9506-9>] TDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### Moreover, *only* pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.

Moen 16 [(Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo) “An Argument for Hedonism,” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-015-9506-9>] TDI

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, **I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable.** Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, **there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values** that counts in hedonism’s favor**: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain.** To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, **wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly.** **Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after.** To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if **the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain** (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), **then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts.** **The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists.** The challenge can be phrased as the following question: **If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?**27

## 2

**US dominance is secured in biotech now, but China’s closing the gap fast – that allows geopolitical and economic advantages**

Scott **Moore** **2020** [(Director of the Penn Global China Program at the University of Pennsylvania. Previously, Moore was a Young Professional and Water Resources Management Specialist at the World Bank Group, and Environment, Science, Technology, and Health Officer for China at the U.S.) “China’s Role In The Global Biotechnology Sector And Implications For U.S. Policy” https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP\_20200427\_china\_biotechnology\_moore.pdf]TDI

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Even by the standards of emerging technologies, **biotechnology has the potential to utterly transform geopolitics, economics**, and society in the 21st century. Yet while the United States has long been the world leader in most segments of the global biotechnology sector, **China is fast becoming a significant player**. This brief assesses the implications of China’s changing role in biotechnology for the United States, which span national security, data security, and economic competitiveness. On current trends the United States is likely to remain the world leader in most biotechnology areas. **However, the gap between China and the U.S. is narrowing in the biotechnology sector,** and U.S. policymakers must boost public investment, liberalize immigration and foreign student visa policies, and enact regulatory reforms to ensure America remains competitive. At the same time, areas like vaccine development and regulation of emerging technologies like synthetic biology present rich opportunities for Sino-U.S. cooperation. INTRODUCTION Thanks to extensive government funding for biomedical research, an unparalleled ability to translate basic research into commercial products and applications, and strong intellectual property protections, the United States has been the dominant global player in developing and commercializing biotechnology for decades.1 This dominance is reflected in the fact that United States accounted for almost half of all biotechnology patents filed worldwide from 1999 to 2013.2 However, in the intervening years, and just as in the case of artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies, other nations, including South Korea and Singapore, have invested heavily in developing their biotechnology sectors and industries. These efforts pale, however, in comparison to those of China, and the sheer size and scale of the Chinese biotechnology industry pose a range of economic, security, and regulatory issues for American policymakers. The determination of China’s one-party state to become a leading player in biotechnology is reflected by the rapid growth in investment in the sector. Some estimates claim that collectively, **China’s** central, local, and provincial **governments have invested over $100 billion in life sciences** research and development. Regardless of the true figure, official encouragement has led to a torrid place of investment. In just the two-year period from 2015 to 2017, venture capital and private equity investment in the sector totaled some $45 billion.3 The value of commercial deals concluded in the fields of biology, medicine and medical machine technology, meanwhile increased from 25.8 billion renminbi (RMB), or $3.6 billion, in 2011 to over 75 billion RMB ($10.6 billion) in 2017.4 Annual research and development expenditures by Chinese pharmaceutical firms, the foundation of the biotechnology sector, rose from some 39 billion RMB in 2014 ($5.5 billion) to over 53 billion RMB (US$7.5 billion) by 2017. Expenditure on new product development among these firms, an important indicator of future growth potential, increased from just over 40 billion RMB ($5.6 billion) to almost 60 billion ($8.4 billion).5 By Western standards, some of these figures are still low. Swiss drugmaker Roche, the world leader in biotechnology research and development, spent some $11 billion in 2018 alone.6 As these figures suggest, the development of China’s biotechnology sector paints a nuanced picture for U.S. policymakers. On one hand, the sector’s rapid growth, and high-level commitment to continued investment, means that China will inevitably become an increasingly important player in the global biotechnology sector, **with implications for national security, economic competitiveness, and regulation**. An executive from In-Q-Tel, the U.S. government’s inhouse national security venture capital fund, warned Congress in a November 2019 hearing, for example, that China “intends to own the biorevolution… and they are building the infrastructure, the talent pipeline, the regulatory system, and the financial system they need to do that.”7 The CEO of European drugmaker AstraZeneca has similarly opined that “Much of [China’s] innovation in the last three to four years has been ‘me too,’ but now on the horizon we can see firstin-class innovation.”8 Yet on the other hand, while China’s biotechnology sector will almost certainly continue to grow in scale, sophistication, and competitiveness, there is little reason to believe on current trends that the United States will lose its edge in the sector. Indeed, the biggest risk to the global competitiveness of the U.S. biotechnology industry likely comes from the prospect of declining public investment and reduced mobility for world-class researchers and industry professionals. Moreover, the COVID-19 crisis underscores both the importance of continued investment in biotechnology and the many challenges to promoting effective international cooperation on global health security. This brief first examines the key policies and actors in China’s biotechnology sector, then offers an assessment of the sector’s current capabilities and future trends, and finally further explores the implications of developments in Chinese biotechnology for U.S. policy.

**The aff’s waiving of IP doesn’t solve but it does give away sensitive national security information that allows China to lead ahead in biotech**

Josh **Rogin 4-8**. [(Washington Post Columnist covering National Security Issues.) “Opinion: The wrong way to fight vaccine nationalism” https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-wrong-way-to-fight-vaccine-nationalism/2021/04/08/9a65e15e-98a8-11eb-962b-78c1d8228819\_story.html ] TDI

Americans will not be safe from covid-19 until the entire world is safe. That basic truth shows why vaccine nationalism is not only immoral but also counterproductive. But the simplest solutions are rarely the correct ones, **and some countries are using the issue to advance their own strategic interests**. The Biden administration must reject the effort by some nations to turn our shared crisis into their opportunity. As the inequities of vaccine distribution worldwide grow, a group of more than 50 developing countries led by India and South Africa is pushing the World Trade Organization to dissolve all international intellectual property protections for pandemic-related products, which would include vaccine research patents, manufacturing designs and technological know-how. The Trump administration rejected the proposal to waive the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) for the pandemic when it was introduced in October. Now, hundreds of nongovernmental organizations and dozens of Democratic lawmakers are pushing the Biden administration to support the proposal. But many warn **the move would result in the United States handing over a generation of advanced research** — much of it funded by the U.S. taxpayer — **to** our country’s greatest competitors, above all **China**. In Congress, there’s justified frustration with the United States’ failure to respond to China’s robust vaccine diplomacy, in which Beijing has conditioned vaccine offers to pandemic-stricken countries on their ignoring security concerns over Chinese telecom companies or abandoning diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. There’s also a lot of anger at Big Pharma among progressives for profiting from the pandemic. “We are in a race against time, and unfortunately Big Pharma is standing in the way of speedily addressing this problem,” Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.), who supports the effort to waive intellectual property protections, told me in an interview. “I think the real security issue is that while the United States balks in making sure that we help ourselves, that these adversaries will just jump right in.” Schakowsky argued that alternative measures for helping poor countries manufacture vaccines are simply not moving fast enough to save lives and that the United States has a duty to respond. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) personally conveyed her support for the waiver to President Biden, Schakowsky said. But Big Pharma is just one piece of the puzzle. Countries such as India and South Africa have been trying to weaken WTO intellectual property protections for decades. **The mRNA technology that underpins the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines was funded initially by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and has national security implications.** Inside the Biden administration, the National Security Council has already convened several meetings on the issue. The waiver is supported by many global health officials in the White House and at the U.S. Agency for International Development, who believe the United States’ international reputation is suffering from its perceived “America First” vaccine strategy. On Wednesday, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai spoke with WTO Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala about the waiver issue. USTR is convening its own interagency meetings on the issue, which many see as a move to reassert its jurisdiction over WTO matters. If and when this does get to Biden’s desk, he will also hear from national security officials who believe that waiving TRIPS would result in the forced transfer of national security-sensitive technology to China, **a country that strives to dominate the biotechnology** ***field*** as part of its Made in China 2025 strategy. **Once countries such as China have this technology, they will apply their mercantilist industrial models to ensure their companies dominate these strategically important industries, potentially erasing thousands of U.S. jobs.** “We would be delivering a competitive advantage to countries that are increasingly viewed as our adversaries, at taxpayer expense, when there are other ways of doing this,” said Mark Cohen, senior fellow at the University of California at Berkeley Law School. **A preferable approach would be to build more vaccine-manufacturing capacity** in the United States and then give those vaccines to countries in need, said Cohen. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry would surely benefit, but **that’s preferable to being dependent on other countries when the next pandemic hits.** “If there’s anything that the pandemic has taught us, it’s that we need to have a robust supply chain, for ourselves and for the world generally,” Cohen said. What’s more, it’s not clear that waiving the TRIPS agreement for the pandemic would work in the first place. Bill Gates and others involved in the current vaccine distribution scheme have argued that it would not result in more vaccines, pointing out that licensing agreements are already successfully facilitating cooperation between patent-holding vaccine-makers and foreign manufacturers. Critics respond that such cooperation is still failing to meet the urgent needs in the developing world. Vaccine equity is a real problem, but waiving intellectual property rights is not the solution. If the current system is not getting shots into the arms of people in poor countries, we must fix that for their sake and ours. But the pandemic and our responses to it have geopolitical implications, whether we like it or not. **That means helping the world and thinking about our strategic interests at the same time.**

**China will convert biotechnology gains to military advantages, undermining US primacy – specifically true in the context of vaccines**

Mercy A. **Kuo 2017** [(Executive Vice President at Pamir Consulting.) “The Great US-China Biotechnology and Artificial Intelligence Race” <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-great-us-china-biotechnology-and-artificial-intelligence-race/>] TDI

Trans-Pacific View author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into the U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Eleonore Pauwels – Director of Biology Collectives and Senior Program Associate, Science and Technology Innovation Program at the Wilson Center in Washington D.C. – is the 104th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.” Explain the motivation behind Chinese investment in U.S. genomics and artificial intelligence (AI). With large public and private investments inland and in the U.S., China plans to become the next AI-Genomics powerhouse, which indicates that these technologies will soon converge in China. China’s ambition is to lead the global market for precision medicine, **which necessitates acquiring strategic tech**nological and human capital in both genomics and AI. And the country excels at this game. A sharp blow in this U.S.-China competition happened in 2013 when BGI purchased Complete Genomics, in California, with the intent to build its own advanced genomic sequencing machines, therefore securing a technological knowhow mainly mastered by U.S. producers. There are significant economic incentives behind China’s heavy investment in the increasing convergence of AI and genomics. This golden combination will drive precision medicine to new heights by developing a more sophisticated understanding of how our genomes function, leading to precise, even personalized, cancer therapeutics and preventive diagnostics, such as liquid biopsies. By one estimate, the liquid biopsy market is expected to be worth $40 billion in 2017. Assess the implications of iCarbonX of Shenzhen’s decision to invest US$100 million in U.S.-company PatientsLikeMe relative to AI and genomic data collection. iCarbonX is a pioneer in AI software that learns to recognize useful relationships between large amounts of individuals’ biological, medical, behavioral and psychological data. Such a data-ecosystem will deliver insights into how an individual’s genome is mutating over time, and therefore critical information about this individual’s susceptibilities to rare, chronic and mental illnesses. In 2017, iCarbonX invested $100 million in PatientsLikeMe, getting a hold over data from the biggest online network of patients with rare and chronic diseases. If successful, this effort could turn into genetic gold, making iCarbonX one of the wealthiest healthcare companies in China and beyond. The risk factor is that iCarbonX is handling more than personal data, but potentially vulnerable data as the company uses a smartphone application, Meum, for customers to consult for health advice. Remember that the Chinese nascent genomics and AI industry relies on cloud computing for genomics data-storage and exchange, creating, in its wake, new vulnerabilities associated with any internet-based technology. This phenomenon has severe implications. How much consideration has been given to privacy and the evolving notion of personal data in this AI-powered health economy? And is our cyberinfrastructure ready to protect such trove of personal health data from hackers and industrial espionage? In this new race, will China and the U.S. have to constantly accelerate their rate of cyber and bio-innovation to be more resilient? Refining our models of genomics data protection will become a critical biosecurity issue. Why is Chinese access to U.S. genomic data a national security concern? **Genomics** and computing research **is inherently dual-use, therefore a strategic advantage in a nation’s security arsenal.** Using AI systems to understand how the functioning of our genomes impacts our health **is of strategic importance for biodefense.** This knowledge will lead to increasing developments at the forefront of medical countermeasures, **including vaccines**, antibiotics, and targeted treatments relying on virus-engineering and microbiome research. Applying deep learning to genomics data-sets could help geneticists learn how to use genome-editing (CRISPR) to efficiently engineer living systems, but also to treat and, even “optimize,” human health, **with potential applications in military enhancements**. A $15 million partnership between a U.S. company, Gingko Bioworks, and DARPA aims to genetically design new probiotics as a protection for soldiers against a variety of stomach bugs and illnesses. China could be using the same deep learning techniques on U.S. genomics data to better comprehend how to develop, patent and manufacture tailored cancer immunotherapies in high demand in the United States. Yet, what if Chinese efforts venture into understanding how to impact key genomics health determinants relevant to the U.S. population? **Gaining access to increasingly large U.S. genomic data-sets gives China a knowledge advantage into leading the next steps in bio-military research.** Could biomedical data be used to develop bioweapons? Explain. Personalized medicine advances mean that personalized bio-attacks are increasingly possible. The combination of AI with biomedical data and genome-editing technologies will help us predict genes most important to particular functions. Such insights will contribute to knowing how a particular disease occurs, how a newly-discovered virus has high transmissibility, but also why certain populations and individuals are more susceptible to it. Combining host susceptibility information with pathogenic targeted design, **malicious actors could engineer pathogens that are tailored to overcome the immune system or the microbiome of specific populations.**

**Maintenance of the ILO is key to reduce a host of existential threats – establishes great-power peace.**

**Brands 18**. [(Hal Brands is a Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. “America’s Global Order Is Worth Fighting For, Bloomberg Opinion, Politics & Policy,” August 14, 2018, Bloomberg. <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-14/america-s-global-order-is-worth-fighting-for>] TDI

The first argument is **easily disposed** of. Yes, the postwar world has been **thoroughly imperfect**, featuring nuclear arms races, genocides, widespread poverty and other scourges. But the world has **always been** imperfect, and by **any** meaningful **comparison**, the last **seven decades** have been a **veritable golden age**. The **liberal international** economic order has led to an **explosion** of **domestic** and **global prosperity**: According to World Bank data, both U.S. and global **per capita** income have increased **roughly three-fold** (in inflation-adjusted terms) since 1960, with U.S. gross domestic product increasing nearly six-fold. The U.S. **system** of alliances and forward military deployments has **contributed critically** to the **longest period** of **great-power peace** in modern history, and **the incidence of war** and conquest **more broadly** have dropped **dramatically**. The number of **democracies** in the world has **increased** from perhaps a dozen during World War II to well over 100 today; **respect for basic** human rights has also reached **impressive levels**. As a **bevy of scholarship** has shown, the policies that the U.S. has **pursued** and the **international order** it has built have contributed **enormously** and **directly** to these **outcomes**. If the **liberal international order** can’t be considered a **smashing success**, no **international order** could be. The second critique is also overstated. It is true that Washington, like all great powers throughout history, has been willing to bend the rules to get its way. It is hard to reconcile Cold War-era interventions in Guatemala, Chile and other countries with a professed solicitude for human rights and democracy; the Iraq War of 2003 is only one instance in which the U.S. brushed aside the concerns of international organizations such as the U.N. Security Council. Likewise, when the U.S. government determined that the Bretton Woods system of monetary relations no longer suited its interests in the 1970s, it terminated that scheme and insisted on creating a more favorable one. But again, the proper standard here is not sainthood but reality. And the U.S. has **generally** enlisted its power in the **service** of **universal values** such as **democracy** and **human rights**; it has, more often than not, promoted **a positive-sum** international system in which **like-minded** nations can be **secure** and **wealthy**. This goes back to the very beginning of the liberal order: Washington did not seek to hold its defeated adversaries in subjugation after World War II; it rebuilt Japan and western Germany into thriving, democratic allies that became fierce economic competitors to the U.S. The U.S. has taken this approach not simply because it wanted to do good in the world — powerful as this motivation is — but because of a hard-headed desire to do good for itself. In an interdependent global environment, American officials have long calculated, the U.S. cannot divorce its own well-being from that of the wider world. And in contrast to how other great powers — Imperial Japan, for instance, or the Soviet Union — ruled their spheres of influence, American behavior has been positively enlightened. It is this relatively benign behavior that has convinced so many countries to tolerate American leadership — and it is the emergence of a darker form of U.S. hegemony under the Trump administration that so profoundly worries them today. As for the third critique, the premise is right, but the **conclusion** can easily **go too far**. It is always **dangerous** to become **so enraptured** by past **achievements** that one **loses sight** of the **need for adaptation** in **the future**. This is particularly true today, because the strength of the liberal order is being tested from within and without, by issues ranging from unequal burden-sharing among American allies to the ambivalence of the American people themselves. There is **little evidence** to suggest, however, that either American power or **the liberal order** it supports have **eroded** so **dramatically** that **Washington**’s postwar project cannot be **sustained**. Quite the contrary — the U.S. is likely to remain the **world’s strongest power** for **decades to come**.

## 3

**1NC – Production CP**

**The United States federal government should:**

**- substantially increase production and global distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccine, specifically providing all necessary vaccines to India and South Africa, and**

**- cooperate with allies to achieve increased production and global distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccine.**

**That comparatively solves better – IP rights don’t hinder vaccine cooperation, but manufacturing capacity is the current constraint.**

Hans **Sauer 6-17** [(Deputy General Counsel, Biotechnology Industry Organization.) “Web event — Confronting Joe Biden’s proposed TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments” https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/210617-Confronting-Joe-Bidens-proposed-TRIPS-waiver.pdf?x91208&x91208] TDI

But contrary to what Lori said, **there are genuine real problems in the supply chain** that are **not caused by patents**, that are simply caused by the unavailability and the constraints on existing capacity. There is in this world such a thing as maxed-out capacity that just can’t be increased on a dime. It’s not all due to intellectual property. This is true for existing vaccines as well as for vaccine raw materials. There are trade barriers. There are export restrictions that we should all be aware of and that we need to work on. And there are very real political, I think, interests in finding an explanation for how we got to this place that absolve governments around the world from their own policy decisions that they made in the past. In the United States, again, it was the declared policy of the previous administration, as well as this one, that we would vaccinate healthy college kids and go all down the line and offer a vaccine to everybody who wants it before we start sharing any with grandmothers in Burkina Faso. That was the policy. You can agree with it or disagree with it, but that was policy. We had export restrictions in place before a lot of other countries did. And that, too, contributed to unequal access of vaccines around the world. Another thing that was predictable was that politicians and governments around the world who want to be seen as proactive, on the ball, in control, for a long time were actually very indecisive, very unsure about how to address the COVID problem, which has so many dimensions. Vaccines are only one of those. But with respect to vaccines, not many governments took decisive action, put money on the table, put bets on multiple horses, before we knew whether these vaccines would work, would be approved. And it was governments in middle-income countries who now, I think, justifiably are concerned that they’re not getting fast enough access, who didn’t have the means and who didn’t have the decision-making structure to place the same bets on multiple horses, if you will, that were placed in the relatively more wealthy, global North and global West. But there is, I think, a really good and, with hindsight, predictable explanation of how we got to this place, and I think it teaches us something about how to fix the problem going forward. **So why will the waiver not work**? Well, first of all, with complex technology like vaccines, Lori touched on it, reverse engineering, like you would for a small molecule drug, is much more difficult if not impossible. But it depends very much more than small molecule drugs on cooperation, on voluntary transfer of technology, and on mutual assistance. We have seen as part of the pandemic response an unprecedented level of collaborations and cooperation and no indication that IP has stood in the way of the pandemic response. **The waiver proponents have found zero credible examples of where IP has actually been an obstacle,** where somebody has tried to block somebody else from developing a COVID vaccine or other COVID countermeasure, right? It’s not there. **Second, the myth of this vast global capacity to manufacture COVID vaccines that somehow exists** **out there is unsubstantiated** and frankly, in my opinion, untrue. But there is no such thing as vast untapped, idle capacity that could be turned around on a dime to start making COVID vaccines within weeks or even months. This capacity needs to be built; it needs to be established. And at a time when time is of the essence to beat this pandemic, starting capacity-building discussions is helpful, but it won’t be the answer to beat this pandemic. It will be the answer if we do everything right to beating the next pandemic. And if we learn any lesson of this, and then I will stop, is that the COVID waiver as well as the situation in which we find ourselves — if anything, it’s a reminder that we definitely have to take global capacity-building more seriously than we did in the past. That is true for the global North, as well as for middle-income countries — all of whom have to dedicate themselves much more determinedly to pandemic preparedness. And there’s a need to invest both in preparedness and in public health systems that hasn’t happened in the wake of past pandemic threats. This is what we will need to do. We will need to reduce export restrictions, and we will need to rededicate ourselves to preparing for the next pandemic. As far as this pandemic goes, **there are 11 vaccines around the world that are already being shot into arms, only four of which come from the global North. How many more vaccines do we want?** I don’t know, maybe 11 is enough if we start making more of them. But there are manufacturers around the world who know how to do this — including in China, including in India, and including in Russia. All developed their homegrown vaccines, apparently without interference by IP rights, right? **So let’s make more of those. I think that’s going to be the more practical and realistic answer to solving the problem**. And we need to lean on governments to stop export controls and to dedicate themselves to more global equity.

## Case

schm

**1. Nothing can be assessed apriori – even concepts like reason require experience to understand. Their meta ethic presupposes a universal human subject that doesn’t exist – all humanity is culturally and historically contingent**

**2. The ac fails because of the tailroing objection**

**4. The causal structure of action is irrelevant, so there’s no intent foresight distinction.**

David **Enoch 7** (Professor of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem). Intending, Foreseeing, and the State. Legal Theory, Vol. 13, No. 2. 2007

Let us apply this test, then, in order to check whether causal order is morally significant. **Think**, then, **of our agent, deliberating whether to press the button** in front of her**. We give her information about the states of affairs that will obtain if she does** – and if she does not – press it. We tell her, for instance, that **if she presses the button certain good effects and also certain bad effects will follow** (and that they won’t follow if she doesn’t press the button), and we describe these effects in detail. **She then proceeds to ask whether the bad effect is on the causal way to the good effect.** Is her question appropriate? Is it more like the question about further effects on people’s well-being or more like the question about the distribution of hairs on someone’s head? To my ears, **her question sounds** weird, surprising, **indicative of rather disturbing facts about her moral character**. **Given a full description of the relevant consequences**, and without some further (for instance, instrumental) story explaining how the exact causal structure is morally significant, **the causal order seems** (to me) simply **morally irrelevant.** If you agree with me that **the question about the causal order is inappropriate**, you have strong reason to suspect that causal order in general, and in particular **the distinction between means and side-effects are simply** (intrinsically) **morally irrelevant**. Let me emphasize here – in case you are not yet convinced – that what is at issue is not any old way in which the causal structure may be normatively relevant. What is at issue – and what the appropriate question test is supposed to help us with finding out – is whether the causal structure is intrinsically morally relevant, whether, in other ways, it is morally relevant regardless of its relations to other factors. So **it will be no reply** to the line of thought in the previous paragraphs **to show that**, say, **causal-structure facts are correlated with other facts, themselves normatively significant, and can thus serve as reasonably good proxies for them. The question is**, rather, **whether** – holding all other things equal – **the causal structure itself makes a moral difference**. And here **the answer** that **seems** to me **overwhelmingly plausible is that it does not.**

#### Moral theories must explain degrees of wrongness

Hurka 19 [(Thomas, Department of Philosophy University of Toronto) “More Seriously Wrong, More Importantly Right,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2019] TDI

Wrongness and Degrees

That one act is more seriously wrong than another is often intuitively compelling in itself; thus it seems self-evident that murder is morally worse than breaking a promise. But judgments about serious wrongness have further implications. If you have acted wrongly you should feel guilt, but you should feel more guilt—more intense or longer-lasting guilt—if your act was more seriously wrong, for example, if it was murder rather than breaking a promise. You are also other things equal more blameworthy for a more serious wrong, and if retributivism is true, you deserve more severe punishment for it. In general, whenever wrong acts call for negative responses, more serious wrongs call for stronger ones. The idea of serious wrongness therefore connects with several other aspects of our moral thought, and this allows further tests of it. To decide whether one act is more seriously wrong than another we can not only consult direct intuitions about the two but also ask whether you should feel more guilt about the first or whether the first makes you more blameworthy or more deserving of punishment.

These tests cannot be applied mechanically, because in each case the effect of more serious wrongness is mixed with others that are not relevant to our topic. Guilt is called for by wrong action, and on at least some views an act’s wrongness is independent of its motive (Ross : ch. ; Scanlon : ch. ). But more serious wrongs are often done from worse motives, and even if these cannot be the objects of guilt they can prompt the different emotion of shame. Shame about your motivation can then mix with guilt to make for an overall negative response to your act in which the specific role of serious wrongness is harder to see. (If motives are relevant to wrongness, they can prompt guilt as well as shame, but the two can still be hard to pull apart.) Something similar holds for blameworthiness and retribution. On many views you are more blameworthy for a wrong act or deserve more punishment for it if you acted from a worse motive, for example, if you killed from sadistic hatred rather than excessive anger at injustice. Your blameworthiness can also depend on other facts about your mental states, such as whether you were culpably ignorant or acted under duress (for views on which your degree of blameworthiness for a wrong depends both on its seriousness and on facts about your mental states see, e.g., Beardsley [: –] and Smith [: –]). In all these tests, the effect of serious wrongness on fitting responses is mixed with effects due to your state of mind. Isolating the former effect requires setting these other influences aside.

More serious wrongness may also help to characterize subjective rightness, or rightness relative to your beliefs or evidence. Many philosophers have been persuaded by an example of Frank Jackson that this cannot be done in terms of objective rightness, or rightness relative to the facts; more specifically, the subjectively right act cannot be identified as the one most likely to be objectively right. In Jackson’s example you can give a patient one of three treatments. One of the first two will completely cure him and one will kill him, but you do not know which is which; each has a . probability of doing either. The third treatment will cure his condition almost entirely and is safe. The subjectively right treatment here is clearly the third, but it is certain to be objectively wrong; one or the other of the first two is right relative to the facts (Jackson : –). But a derivation of subjective from objective rightness need not tell you to maximize your probability of acting objectively rightly or, what is the same, to minimize your probability of acting wrongly. As Peter Graham has argued, it can tell you to minimize your probability of acting seriously wrongly, or to minimize the expected objective serious wrongness of what you do. Since in Jackson’s example the act that is certain to be objectively wrong will be only slightly seriously wrong while each of the others has a . probability of being horribly so, this yields the desired result (Graham ). Serious wrongness may also be relevant in cases of moral uncertainty. Imagine that you cannot decide between two moral views and must do either act A or act B, where the first view says A is right and B wrong and the second says the reverse. Andrew Sepielli () has argued that you cannot here consider just the probabilities that the two views are true. If the first says B is only slightly seriously wrong while the second says A is massively so, you should do B even if you think the first view is somewhat more likely to be true.

These last uses of serious wrongness are more controversial. It has been argued that, despite its success with Jackson’s example, the proposed account of subjective rightness does not have the implications we want in cases involving permissions, for example, in cases of self-defense or supererogation (Lazar, forthcoming). The account at least needs supplementation to handle these cases. And the account of moral uncertainty requires comparisons of seriousness not only within a moral view, as I will be discussing, but also between moral views, which raises additional difficulties. Nonetheless, these are two further contexts where the concept of serious wrongness may play a role.

Some philosophers have denied that there can be degrees relating to wrongness. Some Stoics, for example, thought that all moral wrongs are equal. Diogenes Laertius reports that they ‘see fit to believe that [moral] mistakes are equal . . . [so] he who makes a larger [moral] mistake and he who makes a smaller one are [both] equally not acting correctly’ (: –). Some present-day philosophers may likewise deny that wrongness admits of degrees. For an act to be wrong, they may say, is for it not to be permitted, and since an act either just is permitted or just is not, it cannot be more or less wrong.

That there is a concept of wrongness that does not admit of degrees does not mean there cannot be one that does. But I have chosen to avoid this issue by speaking not of one act’s being more wrong than another –I will concede that that is not possible–but of its having the related but different property of being more seriously wrong, which I understand as follows. Because of the supervenience of moral properties, any act that is right or wrong has other properties that make it so. But if these properties admit of degrees, or if their tendencies to make acts right or wrong do, we can use this fact to define a derivative property of serious wrongness that likewise admits of degrees.

Compare the properties concerned with height. There is an initial property of tallness that admits of degrees. By making a cut on the scale of tallness we can introduce a property that does not admit of degrees, such as being over six feet tall in the sense of having some height or other above that. We can then combine these two properties to yield a third that again admits of degrees, that of being more than six feet tall in the sense in which someone who is six feet ten is a lot more than six feet tall, whereas someone who is six feet one is only a little more than that height. I think of the right- and wrong-making properties as analogous to tallness, wrongness as analogous to being at least six feet tall, and being seriously wrong as analogous to being more than six feet tall in the sense that admits of degrees. Being seriously wrong combines underlying properties that can be present to differing degrees with a supervening one that cannot to yield a third property that again can (for similar remarks see Berman and Farrell : –, –).

#### 5. Even Kant himself concedes degrees of wrongness matter, but only consequentialism clearly explains it

Calder 05 explains [(Todd, University of Victoria, Department of Philosophy) “Kant and Degrees of Wrongness,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 39: 229–244, 2005] TDI

Most people would agree that there are degrees of wrongness. For instance, it seems that sadistic torture is a greater wrong than telling a white lie and that stealing a welfare check from a single mother is a greater wrong than stealing fifty cents from a billionaire. Degrees of wrongness can be easily accounted for on most consequentialist moral theories. According to consequentialists, an act is right, if the act promotes more good than its alternatives, and wrong if it does not. A consequentialist might contend that the worse the consequences, the greater the degree of wrongness. For example, if sadistic torture leads to more disvalue than telling a white lie, as it seems it would, sadistic torture is the greater wrong.

Kantian moral theorists cannot easily account for degrees of wrongness. For Kant, an act is wrong, if it is prohibited by the supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative. It is not obvious how an act can be more or less prohibited by the categorical imperative. It seems that an act is either prohibited or it is not. The commonsense moral judgment that there are degrees of wrongness is a prima facie problem for a Kantian moral theorist.

It is surprising that this problem has gone unnoticed by Kantians and their critics. Moral theorists seem to have assumed that Kantian moral theory can account for degrees of wrongness. Kant himself seems to have made this assumption. For instance, in the Doctrine of Virtue he writes: “The greatest violation of a human being’s duty to himself regarded merely as a moral being (the humanity in his own person) is the contrary of truthfulness.”1

By calling lying the “greatest violation of a human being’s duty to himself” Kant seems to imply that lying is a greater wrong than other violations of a human being’s duty to himself. However, it is one thing for Kant to believe that his moral theory is able to accommodate degrees of wrongness and another for his theory actually to do so.

#### Countries can’t get vaccines post plan; developed countries hold a monopoly over vaccines regardless of COVAX and use it to increase hegemony

Sridhar **Venkatapuram** **and** Anna C. **Zielinska** 6-1-2021 [Sridhar Venkatapuram and Anna C. Zielinska, 6-1-2021, "Covid Vaccine Patent Waivers are for Health Sovereignty," Hastings Center, accessed at https://www.thehastingscenter.org/covid-vaccine-patent-waivers-are-for-health-sovereignty/] TA 9-3-2021

On May 5, U.S. trade representative Katherine Tai surprised the world with a tweet stating that “the U.S. supports the waiver of IP protections on Covid-19 vaccines to help end the pandemic and we’ll actively participate in @WTO negotiations to make that happen.” The next day, Vladimir Putin expressed Russia’s support for the waiver. And a week later, China also stated its support. That all three superpower rivals support Covid vaccine patent waivers puts them awkwardly on the same side against notable non-supporters, including European Union countries, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, the vaccine makers, and Bill Gates. And, maybe for the first time, the Gates Foundation, a major funder and architect of the global Covid response, diverged from Mr. Gates’s views and publicly expressed its support for a narrow waiver. While we do not know what led up to Tai’s tweet, from early 2020 a global movement has been growing for Covid “global public goods,” including vaccines (a people’s vaccine, and the European Citizens’ Initiative No Profit on Pandemic). Initially spearheaded by civil society organizations and the head of UNAIDS, it has been gaining support from celebrities, academics, scientists, former politicians, and others worldwide. The nightmare situation the earliest advocates were worried about–well before there were any effective vaccines–has come true. As of now, 80% to 90% of Covid vaccinations have been given in high-income countries, starkly dividing the world into the richest haves versus the rest. Only 1% to 2% of global vaccine supply has been administered in African countries as of May 2021. Current manufacturers, even with increased partnerships, cannot produce enough vaccines for the rest of the world for years to come. This means deaths in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) will continue rising, their economies and other dimensions of social life will continue suffering, and new variants could arise potentially undermining what has been achieved

#### Generic medicine is dangerous—contamination and unsanitary manufacturing conditions.

White 19 [(C. Micheal, Professor and Head of the Department of Pharmacy Practice, University of Connecticut) “Why your generic drugs may not be safe and the FDA may be too lax” The Conversation, 12/4/19. <https://theconversation.com/why-your-generic-drugs-may-not-be-safe-and-the-fda-may-be-too-lax-125529>] RR

This leads to a vital question: Are generics safe? If drug manufacturers followed the FDA’s strict regulations, the answer would be a resounding yes. Unfortunately for those who turn to generics to save money, the FDA relies heavily on the honor system with foreign manufacturers, and U.S. consumers get burned. Eighty percent of the active ingredients and 40% of the finished generic drugs used in the U.S. are manufactured overseas.

As a pharmacist, I know that the safety of prescription medications is vital. My research, recently published in the “Annals of Pharmacotherapy,” raises alarming concerns about our vulnerabilities.

Do experts have something to add to public debate?

Where are your drugs being made?

A pharmacist at a drug plant outside Mumbai in 2012, shortly after a change in patent law allowed production of a generic cancer drug. Rafiq Mugbool/AP Photo

Generic drug manufacturers either make bulk powders with the active ingredient in them or buy those active ingredients from other companies and turn them into pills, ointments or injectable products.

In 2010, 64% of foreign manufacturing plants, predominantly in India and China, had never been inspected by the FDA. By 2015, 33% remained uninspected.

In addition, companies in other countries are informed before an inspection, giving them time to clean up a mess. Domestic inspections are unannounced.

Faking results

The FDA informs manufacturing plants in other countries when it plans to inspect their plants. Andrew Harnik/AP Photo

As I detail in my paper, when announced foreign FDA inspections began to occur in earnest between 2010 and 2015, numerous manufacturing plants were subsequently barred from shipping drugs to the U.S. after the inspections uncovered shady activities or serious quality defects.

Unscrupulous foreign producers shredded documents shortly before FDA visits, hid documents offsite, altered or manipulated safety or quality data or utilized unsanitary manufacturing conditions. Ranbaxy Corporation pleaded guilty in 2013 to shipping substandard drugs to the U.S. and making intentionally false statements. The company had to withdraw 73 million pills from circulation, and the company paid a $500 million fine.

These quality and safety issues can be deadly. In 2008, 100 patients in the U.S. died after receiving generic heparin products from foreign manufacturers. Heparin is an anticoagulant used to prevent or treat blood clots in about 10 million hospitalized patients a year and is extracted from pig intestines.

Some of the heparin was fraudulently replaced with chondroitin, a dietary supplement for joint aches, that had sulphur groups added to the molecule to make it look like heparin.

One of the heparin manufacturers inspected by the FDA received a warning letter after it was found to have used raw material from uncertified farms, used storage equipment with unidentified material adhering to it and had insufficient testing for impurities.

These issues continue to this day. Dozens of blood-pressure and anti-ulcer drugs were recalled in 2018 and 2019 due to contamination with the potentially carcinogenic compounds N-nitrosodimethylamine or N-nitrosodiethylamine.

One of the major producers of these active ingredient powders used by multiple generic manufacturers was inspected in 2017. The FDA found that the company fraudulently omitted failing test results and replaced them with passing scores.

This raises a critical question: How many more violations would occur with inspections occurring as frequently as they do in the U.S., and more importantly, if they were unannounced? Relatively speaking, the number of drugs proved to be tainted or substandard has been small, and the FDA has made some progress since 2010. But the potential for harm is still great.

#### Unpatented medicine cause counterfeits—

Lynbecker 16 [(Kristina M. L. Acri née, an Associate Professor of Economics at Colorado College in Colorado Springs, where she is also the Associate Chair of the Department of Economics and Business and the Gerald L. Schlessman Professor of Economics. Dr. Lybecker’s research analyzes the difficulties of strengthening intellectual property rights protection in developing countries, specifically special problems facing the pharmaceutical industry.) “Counterfeit Medicines and the Role of IP in Patient Safety,” IPWatchDog, 7/27/16. <https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/06/27/counterfeit-medicines-ip-patient-safety/id=70397/>] RR

The threat of counterfeit goods took center stage on June 15th in a hearing convened by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). Focusing on trade opportunities and challenges for American businesses in the digital age, Senator Hatch stated:

“The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) recently released a study that shows that counterfeit products accounted for up to 2.5 percent of world trade, or $461 billion, in 2013. This is a dramatic increase from a 2008 estimate that showed that fake products accounted for less than half that amount. Counterfeits are a worldwide problem, but the OECD estimates that the United States is the hardest hit, followed by Italy and France. Of the estimated $461 billion in counterfeit trade in 2013, goods with registered intellectual property rights in the U.S. represented 20 percent, or $92 billion, of the OECD estimate.”[1]

As the author of the chapter on illicit trade in counterfeit medicines within the OECD report, I worry that global policymakers may be working against each other when it comes to battling counterfeit drugs, especially in the context of intellectual property rights. While the Senate Hearing and the OECD report highlight the importance of strong IP protection in combating the growing threat of counterfeit goods,