### 1

#### PIC: In a democracy, a free press should prioritize objectivity over advocacy except with black journalists, in which case they should prioritize their advocacies.

#### Objectivity is a tool to silence black voices and issues in media

Schneider 20 [Gabe Schneider, political journalist with a degree in Political Science and Urban Planning from University of California San Diego, 12-21-2020, "Journalism outlets need new social media policies," University of Missouri Reynolds Journalism Institute, https://rjionline.org/reporting/journalism-outlets-need-new-social-media-policies/]/Kankee

What should they look like? Pittsburgh Post-Gazette journalist Alexis Johnson was barred from protest coverage after joking about a Kenny Chesney concert on Twitter. She tweeted: “Horrifying scenes and aftermath from selfish LOOTERS who don’t care about this city!!!!! …. oh wait sorry. No, these are pictures from a Kenny Chesney concert tailgate. Whoops.” Johnson, a Black journalist, was punished for making a joke about the media framing of “riots” and “looting.” While one of her white colleagues called one alleged looter a “scumbag,” it was Johnson who was punished. “I was told it violated our social media policy. They kept calling it an educational conversation, but there was no warning, no ‘Hey can you take the tweet down?’ By Monday morning, they had decided I would no longer be able to cover it,” Johnson told CBS2. The harsh reactionary punishment applied to Johnson is ridiculous, but not unique. Other Black journalists have faced similar repercussions: Wesley Lowery was punished by the Washington Post for correctly framing the Tea Party as a racist reactionary movement. So was Kendra Pierre-Louis, who was punished by the New York Times for saying white supremacy is racist. The trend line is that reporters, often Black, are punished for their perspective, even if it’s rooted in reporting and facts. Punishment can mean being barred from covering a topic that is close to the reporter’s identity, like Johnson was, or an implied threat of being fired. The dynamic is so crystalized that, instead of individually challenging The New York Times for their op-ed calling on the president to use force against civilians, Black New York Times employees and their allies responded as a collective on Twitter, all tweeting: “This puts Black New York Times staff in danger.” But even in the wake of massive protests, even as management at many legacy newspapers committed to better social media policies, and even as journalism has shifted to a mostly online workforce, there’s been a lack of movement in newsrooms to craft a social media policy that allows journalists of color to just do their jobs. “Since the events of January 2020 and the summer, there’s been zero further conversation,” said B, a social media producer at a large legacy newspaper. “It’s just a standstill right now.” Journalists and social media managers I spoke with, like B, did not want their names published out of concern for how their managers might react to them being candid or because press requests required approval from newsroom leadership. But all of them, all younger reporters of color, had extensive thoughts on how newsrooms are failing to craft good social media policies and move the conversation beyond humanizing reporters of color. While social media has become a driving force for digital readership, and therefore ad revenue or donors, many legacy newsrooms have barely pushed the envelope in changing their social media policies. The New York Times adopted a new policy in 2017, which makes the blanket statement: “Our journalists should be especially mindful of appearing to take sides on issues that The Times is seeking to cover objectively.” The Washington Post also updated its policy in 2017, with many of the same themes. R, who recently interned for a different large legacy newspaper, said that they received clear instructions from management when they started: “They asked us not to tweet about Black Lives Matter, but didn’t address the complexity of that issue.” R said it is problematic to frame supporting a human rights issue, like Black Lives Matter, similarly to taking an open political stance. R doesn’t believe any reporter should be explicitly partisan (“don’t tweet about ‘blue’ or ‘red’”), but they do believe it makes you a better reporter if you’re able to be empathetic to readers who are affected by human rights issues, like police violence. “At the end of the day, it makes me a better reporter,” R, who is non-Black, said of saying “Black Lives Matter.” “I’m being empathetic to a movement that’s affecting my Black brothers and sisters. So therefore it would help me connect to readers who identify with that. And two: [It] just makes me more of a human, because I don’t think that people of another race should be shot and killed by police for no reason. I think that makes me a better reporter.” Z, an audience engagement editor at a newer digital publication, said the false equivalencies and double standards in current social media policy are exacerbated by the fact that racist readers are more willing to flag tweets for newsroom management. “It’s always been easier for white reporters to get away with saying things like that is because they’re white,” she said. “People automatically assume they don’t have any ties to a community and they don’t have any reason to say that thing other than it’s a fact.” Z said that the current conversation is way behind the times, in that newsrooms are still trying to figure out how to humanize their own Black and brown reporters. Instead, she’s looking to the future and thinking about the ways in which newsrooms should be expanding their audience. “I don’t see why more newsrooms aren’t sending out tweets in native languages,” she said. “I think that there is a huge population of people on the internet that are not being properly served; readers and persons of the community that don’t have access or can’t understand tweets that are coming from newsrooms because they’re not accessible.” Ultimately, B said that the divide in newsrooms is clear: on one side, there’s management, which is often whiter and older; on the other is the younger journalists, who are often more diverse. She said that management believes that you can separate your humanity from your work and younger journalists do not (although some editors, like The New York Times Dean Baquet, do not believe “there is a big gap”). “It’s like two schools of thought. And they’re both clashing in really ugly, really ugly ways. And one of the schools of thought is almost in every leadership position in the newsroom.” Newsrooms, especially older institutions, need to move on from the conversation of whether or not these social media policies are racist: if journalists of color are saying that the current structure of social media policies are applied unevenly and are racist, then they are racist. If journalists and social media managers from around the newsroom, especially those who are most impacted by these policies are given space to craft these policies, then perhaps we’ll soon see the necessary changes. If B were in charge of social media, she said her changes across the board are easy to articulate: No more penalizing reporters for the experiences they bring to the table. Instead: “Be honest, be truthful, be transparent when you get things wrong and just don’t be a bad person online. It’s very simple. It’s very short.”

#### Systemic incentives to favor the accounts of police over victims means pro-police narratives will always be deemed objective

Mattar 20 [Pacinthe Mattar, Martin Wise Goodman Canadian Nieman Fellow at Harvard University 8-21-2020, "Objectivity Is a Privilege Afforded to White Journalists," Walrus, https://thewalrus.ca/objectivity-is-a-privilege-afforded-to-white-journalists/]/Kankee

I came out of my executive producer’s office with a look on my face that caught the attention of an older white male colleague, who asked me if I was okay. I told him what had happened. He spoke to the executive producer on my behalf. She relented. I’ve since faced several such roadblocks in my journalism career. Combined with the experiences of other racialized journalists, they represent a phenomenon I’ve come to think of as a deep crisis of credibility in Canadian media. There is the lack of trust toward the Black, Indigenous, and other racialized people whose stories we are supposed to cover as a reflection of the world we live in. Then there is the mistrust of the Black, Indigenous, and other racialized journalists who try to report on those stories. Our professionalism is questioned when we report on the communities we’re from, and the spectre of advocacy follows us in a way that it does not follow many of our white colleagues. There is a reckoning underway that has spared almost no industry, sparked by an alarming succession of killings of Black people in the US: Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, and many more. The violence of those deaths, and the inescapable racism that underpinned them all, incited a tidal wave of anger and fatigue from Black people who had long been calling out the discrimination that they face in their daily lives. From academia to theatre, the beauty industry to major tech corporations, Black and other racialized employees are publicly coming forward and detailing how their organizations have perpetuated racism against them. Newsrooms in the US and Canada, for their part, have been forced to acknowledge that they have to do better: in who they hire, who they retain, who gets promoted, what they cover, and how they cover it. This moment has resurrected a question that’s haunted me since I returned from Baltimore: How can the media be trusted to report on what Black and other racialized people are facing when it doesn’t even believe them? IN MANY AMERICAN CITIES, the protests calling for justice following the killings of Black people like Ahmaud Arbery, George Floyd, and Breonna Taylor have been met with violent responses from police, who have tear-gassed, chased, shoved, beaten, and arrested protesters and journalists. In May, Omar Jimenez, a Black CNN reporter, was handcuffed and led away by police while the cameras rolled. Watching the recent police violence against protesters unfold reminded me of how my interview with the two men in Baltimore had ended. It was 10 p.m., meaning the city-wide curfew was now in effect, and we were standing just outside a subway station in the Penn North neighbourhood. Lonnie Moore, the young Black man who had first approached me, had just left. I was putting my recorder away when police came rushing into the block. They told Jarrod Jones and me we had to leave. We tried to enter a nearby subway station, but a police officer blocked the entrance. We tried to turn down a side street, but another officer told us we couldn’t go that way either. We tried every escape we could think of, but we were boxed in. Suddenly, one officer began charging at us, his baton out, swinging, shoving Jones and cursing at him. We ran away from him as fast as we could, my bag with my recording equipment bouncing clumsily behind me. None of this made it to air. I had made the rookie mistake of turning off my radio recorder as soon as the interview ended. But I probably would not have worked it into the documentary anyway; as a journalist, you want to avoid becoming part of the story. One of the core elements of journalism is for reporters to maintain a distance from those they cover, which is meant to provide a sense of objectivity. For many white journalists, that distance is built in to their very life experiences. But, for many other journalists, there is no distance between what happened to George Floyd and what could have happened to them. Distance is a luxury. When I got back to Toronto, I told my deskmates about my time in Baltimore in hushed tones. I felt at the time that to speak of it more openly would somehow implicate me, that my story could be seen through the lens of advocacy instead of hard-and-fast reporting. I also knew you never want to end up on the wrong side of police, especially as a racialized person, and leave it up to others to decide how your actions may have justified violence against you. In journalism, as in predominantly white societies at large, questioning police narratives is complicated. “The police play a very powerful role in defining what the nature and extent of crime is in our society,” says Julius Haag, a criminologist and sociology professor at the University of Toronto’s Mississauga campus. “Police also recognize that they have a powerful role in shaping public perceptions, and they use that ability within the media to help . . . legitimize their purpose and their responses.” A. Dwight Pettit, a Baltimore-based lawyer I interviewed for my documentary in 2015, told me something about why police accounts are rarely questioned by the media that stayed with me. Juries seem to have trouble confronting the violence in police-brutality cases, he said, because so often, people have grown up seeing police doing right by them and have trusted police with their safety. This is especially true for white people, who are less likely to be treated unfairly by police. Putting police on trial would be asking people to challenge their lifelong beliefs. Anthony N. Morgan, a racial-justice lawyer in Toronto, says this same dynamic plays out in Canada in both “obvious and indirect ways.” Racialized people can tell you about water cooler conversations they’ve had with white colleagues about racism they’ve experienced and witnessed, which “often end up in the ‘Did that really happen? What were they doing? Maybe we need to see more of the video?’ territory,” he says. “These kinds of frankly absurd ways of justifying and excusing murder or harm done to Black and Indigenous people play out in society more generally, and I think they play out in journalism too.” ON MAY 27, a twenty-nine-year-old Black Indigenous woman named Regis Korchinski-Paquet fell from a twenty-fourth floor balcony in Toronto while police were in her apartment, responding to the family’s call for help with her mental health crisis. Police were the only ones there during the fall, and questions about the moments before her death remain unanswered. The tragedy has also boosted calls from racialized journalists to challenge the media’s overreliance on police narratives. It wasn’t until the next day that media reports included any of her family members’ voices or began questioning the role of police in Korchinski-Paquet’s death. Not because the family didn’t want to talk to the media: the family’s social media posts are what had raised initial awareness about Korchinski-Paquet’s death. One journalist described arriving at the scene to talk to family members and seeing other reporters there. (This gap in the reporting may have stemmed from some family members’ initial social media posts, which effectively accused the police of killing Korchinski-Paquet and would have been impossible to independently verify at the time. The family’s lawyer later clarified their initial statements, saying they believed police actions may have played a role in Korchinski-Paquet’s death.) Instead, the very first news stories about Korchinski-Paquet’s death were based solely on a statement from the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), the civilian-oversight agency in Ontario that is automatically called to investigate circumstances involving police that have resulted in death, serious injury, or allegations of sexual assault. Some journalists asked their newsrooms and organizations to explain why early coverage excluded the family’s narrative. I know one journalist whose editor questioned her for reporting what the family had told her in the early hours. Korchinski-Paquet’s death is just the latest reminder of why some journalists have long been arguing that police versions of events—whether their own actions or the actions of those they police—should be subject to the same levels of scrutiny other powerful bodies garner, and that their accounts cannot be relied on as the only source. “The police are not, in and of themselves, objective observers of things,” said Wesley Lowery—who was part of a Washington Post team that won a Pulitzer Prize for its coverage of fatal shootings by police officers—in a Longform Podcast interview in June. “They are political and government entities who are the literal characters in the story.” Nor do police watchdogs offer a sufficient counternarrative. The SIU has long been plagued with concerns about its power and credibility. Former Ontario ombudsman André Marin released a 2008 report stating that Ontario’s system of police oversight has failed to live up to its promise due to a “complacent” culture and a lack of rigour in ensuring police follow the rules. More recently, the limited powers of the SIU have been made clear in the aftermath of the fatal shooting of D’Andre Campbell, a twenty-six-year-old Black man with schizophrenia, who was shot by a Peel police officer in April after he called the police for help. So far, that officer has refused to be interviewed by the SIU and has not submitted any notes to the police watchdog—nor can the officer be legally compelled to do so. In 2018, I would see these obstacles play out in my own reporting. I had helped produce a series of live town halls on racism across the country. The Vancouver edition focused on racism in health care, with one conversation centring the experiences of two Indigenous nurses. Diane Lingren, provincial chair for the Indigenous leadership caucus of the BC Nurses’ Union, recounted how she often saw non-Indigenous people who appeared to be intoxicated be “told to settle down, and then they get a cab ride” to an overnight shelter. With Indigenous people, she said, “I see the RCMP called. . . . I see them handcuff their ankles to their wrists so they can’t walk. . . . I see those people get taken away in the police cars.” The RCMP denied that account; their response included a statement about their practice of a “bias free policing policy.” In response to that statement, the executive producer on the series wanted to cut the Indigenous nurses’ anecdotes from the show entirely. (The producer could not be reached for confirmation.) My co-producers and I fought to retain them, to present them along with the RCMP’s statement. This shouldn’t have been a battle: our very role as journalists is to present all the facts, fairly, with context. But, in many newsrooms, police narratives carry enough weight to effectively negate, silence, and disappear the experiences of racialized people. That it’s racialized journalists who have had to challenge police narratives and counter this tradition is an immense burden—and it’s risky. “The views and inclinations of whiteness are accepted as the objective neutral,” Wesley Lowery wrote in a June op-ed in the New York Times. “When Black and Brown reporters and editors challenge those conventions, it’s not uncommon for them to be pushed out, reprimanded, or robbed of new opportunities.” That last point rings entirely too true for me. IN JULY 2017, I was guest producing on a weekly show for a brief summer stint. One story I produced was an interview with Ahmed Shihab-Eldin, an Emmy-nominated journalist who was in Jerusalem covering protests that had sprung up at the al-Aqsa mosque. Worshippers were praying outside the mosque, instead of inside, in an act of civil disobedience against the installation of metal detectors following the killing of two Israeli police officers by Israeli Arab attackers. In the interview, he explained the source of the tension, what the front lines of the protests looked like, and also touched on press freedom—Shihab-Eldin himself had been stopped, questioned, and jostled by Israeli security forces while he was reporting. From the moment I pitched having him on the show, the acting senior producer showed keen interest in the story. This enthusiasm made what happened next all the more confounding. We recorded the interview on a Friday. Shortly afterward, that same senior producer told me the segment was being pulled from the show and that she would not have the time to explain why. She had consulted a director, and together they had ultimately decided to kill it. The story never went to air. I spent a week trying to get an explanation. It wasn’t lost on me that the interview would have included criticism of Israeli security forces and that I was coming upon the intersection of two issues here: the media’s aversion to criticism of law enforcement coupled with its deeply ingrained reluctance to wade into the conversation about Israel and Palestine, especially if this means critiquing the Israeli government’s policies or actions. Bias or one-sidedness shouldn’t have been a concern: I had planned on incorporating the Israel Defense Force press office’s response into the story. The story couldn’t, and wouldn’t, have run without it. In the end, the director, who had been the one to make the final call to not run the interview, wrote an apologetic email to Shihab-Eldin and me, which read, in part: “Our hope was that further work on our end would allow us to give our audiences more context so that they would not leave your interview with unanswered questions. . . . We ran into unexpected difficulties in doing so.” I had heard nothing about the story needing more context, or about questions that the director and senior producer felt were unanswered, before the decision was made. Nor did I have a clear understanding of what these “unexpected difficulties” were. (The senior producer and director say they felt the interview was too opinionated.) For his part, Shihab-Eldin responded to the senior director with: “Unfortunately I’m all too familiar with ‘unexpected difficulties’.” It was the first and only time in my ten years of journalism that a story was pulled—let alone without an open editorial discussion or transparency. And I did not realize just how much this experience would mark me and my future in this profession.

#### No link turns - only advocacy-based journalism can solve systemic racism

Liederman 21 [Mack Liederman, reporter with a master’s degree in journalism from Northwestern, 02-01-2021, "Let’s rethink objectivity," Redacted Magazine, https://redactedmagazine.com/2021/02/01/lets-rethink-objectivity/]/Kankee

In an op-ed that gained traction this summer in The New York Times, “A Reckoning Over Objectivity, Led by Black Journalists,” two-time Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Wesley Lowery attempts to use the momentum of Black Lives Matter to debunk the myth of objectivity. For Lowery, the stakes of objectivity are heavy. In fact, the Golden Rule may be better labeled as Thinly Veiled Racism. Lowery writes in summary, “The views and inclinations of whiteness are accepted as the objective neutral.” Look no further than the names spilling down any masthead (even this one), or to the TV newsrooms of The Wire, Spotlight, The Post and even Anchorman, and an essential reality becomes unavoidable: Journalism has been owned, operated, curated and defined by white people. The dogma of “quality journalism” has rested on the idea that the truth can stem only from objectivity, one that is defined by white reporters, their white editors, and their white bosses. The ones editing pages in red ink, assigning articles, hiring writers and framing the larger media narratives are the ones that ultimately get to decide what is and what is not objective journalism. While objectivity may be a powerful method of reporting, spurring journalists to strive toward factual accuracy, it is not an achievable goal. There is nothing objective about the subliminal and not-so-subliminal biases that seep into any given piece of journalism. How we interpret objectivity is inherently opinionated. And what’s objective about an opinion? Even your wiry professor, your wholesome English teacher and your loud gum-chewing colleague would know the clear answer to that one. Yet it is the sacred myth of objectivity that has long left it unquestioned, untouched and under-scrutinized in predominantly white spaces. The promises of objective reporting allow for white journalists to cover Black communities from a safe distance, supplying a baseline of journalistic credibility where none should be assumed. The consequence of white-framed objectivity has been an underserving of coverage on Black issues and a general silencing of reporters that dare to challenge the conventions of their profession. Objectivity is not an ideal — it’s a racial issue. Lowery chooses to look forward. While America can never truly uproot itself from the enduring appeal, familiarity and continuously consequential history of white supremacy, journalism stands in a strong position to challenge the status quo. The democratization of information through the internet has allowed for more Black voices to be heard and more Black stories to be told. The changing demographics and increasingly diverse readerships of major publications have leveraged its most powerful galvanizing agent — C.R.E.A.M. (Cash Rules Everything Around Me) — toward hiring and promoting the work of non-white staff. These favorable trends are not nearly enough. Our collective reckoning on race calls for a reckoning on our media — the total dismantlement of objectivity. Redacted Magazine hopes to play its (albeit small) part in a new direction forward. As pre-professional writers and editors, we believe that we have the runway and the independence (from potential future employers) to build a platform that begins with a socially equitable ethos. And when we fall short, we ask to be called out. This is how we become not objective journalists — but fair journalists. Let’s ditch the Golden Rule and forget objectivity. That’s the only way we can begin to tell the truth.

### 2

#### Text: In a democracy, a free press should prioritize objectivity over advocacy unless reporting on violent conflict, in which case they should prioritize peace journalism.

Intentions are bad for war journalism solves that, peace journalism has fire intentions

#### Objective journalism causes war – 3 warrants. Peace journalism solves.

McGoldrick 6 (Annabel, PhD in Peace Journalism & psychotherapist, 2006, "War Journalism and Objectivity," Conflict & Communication Online, <https://regener-online.de/journalcco/2006_2/pdf/mcgoldrick.pdf>) AG

Lynch and McGoldrick argue that there are three ways in which news said to be Objective fuels further violence. “Three conventions of Objective reporting, in particular, are predisposed towards War Journalism. Their ‘natural drift’, as it were, is to lead us – or leave us – to over-value violent, reactive responses to conflict, and under-value non-violent, developmental ones: • A bias in favour of official sources • A bias in favour of event over process • A bias in favour of ‘dualism’ in reporting conflicts” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, p. 209). The problem is that news is, by its very nature, preoccupied with change, yet it has a very fixed and one-dimensional understanding of how change comes about. Built into it is an orientation in favour of realism and ignores the insights of Peace and Conflict Studies, which argue that there are many ways to bring about change in a conflict, many ‘levers’ to pull. Later I will suggest that anyone working to intervene in the Cycle of Violence, for example, can be regarded as a ‘change agent’. But the Objectivity conventions mean we hear relatively little about them, compared with official sources – a category topped by leaders of national states. Max Weber provided a well-known definition: the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1946, p.78). Weber’s argument was that a state could only be defined in terms of means rather than ends. States could not be said to be for anything, necessarily; they were better conceived in terms of their observable characteristics than assumptions about their purpose. Weber’s formulation has been seen as neutral, even normative – the word, ‘legitimate’ has seemed, to some, to suggest a benign hand, guaranteeing security for all citizens. But these are concepts later interrogated and revised by researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies. What if the effect of state action favours the interests of some citizens, and not others? In the words of veteran Australian peace researcher, John W Burton, the very notion of ‘conflict resolution’ is only admissible if conflict is understood as attributable not to “inherent human aggressiveness” but to “the emergence of inappropriate social institutions and norms that reasonably would seem to be well within human capacities to alter, to which the person has problems in adjustment” (Burton 1998). Perhaps Burton’s cardinal insight is that there is more to human relations than power – there are also human needs, including the basics of food, drinking water and shelter from the elements, certainly, but also intangibles such as identity, recognition and respect. If the institutions and norms of a state entrench power relations of a kind that deny these human needs to any or all of its citizens, ‘the person’ will inevitably resist them. In those circumstances, what Burton calls the ‘deterrent strategies’ of the state take on an altogether more sinister aspect. Once deterrent strategies – such as the $560bn Pentagon budget – are put in place, they inevitably alter the nature of power relations. Missiles have to be fired and replaced in order to maintain ‘defence capacities’ – rich and powerful interests are not served by allowing military hardware to gather dust. Prisons have to be filled to generate orders for correctional corporations to build more. So norms and institutions come to be influenced in favour of wars overseas and punitive criminal justice policies at home – variants on what President Dwight D Eisenhower called the “military-industrial complex” (Eisenhower, 1960). Then the number of levers under the control of the leaders of national states has diminished in recent times. Industry has globalised, public services have been marketised and/or privatised and economic policy-making has become increasingly contingent on events elsewhere. Hence there may be more emphasis on the levers they do control, including the ability to set the news agenda and also the deployment of armed forces. British Prime Minister Tony Blair has pitched the UK into more armed conflicts than any other – Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan – and is said to admire the armed forces for their “professionalism” (Brogan 2003). Their stock-in-trade being, of course, to follow orders, in marked contrast to Blair’s experience with other areas of the public sector where change has to be negotiated and efforts at reform had left him with “scars on his back” (Watt 1999). It all means that a reliance on official sources may, of necessity, predispose the coverage of conflict towards War Journalism. Military deployment always seems to move, as if by osmosis, on to the news agenda. Calls for collaborative effort to enforce international law, or building solidarity at the level of civil society – even, latterly, accepting as final the will of the UN – always seem to have to be justified afresh from first principles. A bias in favour of event over process A news story is supposed to answer six basic questions: • Who? • What? Annabel McGoldrick conflict & communication online, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2006 War Journalism and ‘Objectivity’  2006 by verlag irena regener berlin 4 • When? • Where? • Why? • How? Most stories only deal superficially – if at all – with the ‘why’. Many journalists argue that that it would make the story too long. But people can only begin to think themselves out of a conflict if they understand the underlying issues. The important thing to note here is that without some exploration of underlying causes, violence can be left to appear, by default, as the only response that ‘makes sense’. Wars remain opaque, in the sense that we are given no means to see through the violence to problems that lie beneath. It therefore makes no sense to hear from anyone wanting those problems to be addressed and set right, as a contribution to ending or avoiding violence. A bias in favour of dualism One safe way to insulate oneself against allegations of bias is to ‘hear both sides’. It means the journalist cannot be seen as ‘the voice of any particular party or sect’. By tradition, classic BBC reporting, for instance, is said to adopt the formula: “On the one hand … on the other … in the end, only time will tell” (Kampfner 2003). But this inscribes a paradigm of dualism that frames out multiparty initiatives, complex causes and win-win situations. Dualism is a key part of Objectivity but also, for these reasons, a major contributory factor in the way in which it escalates a conflict, by turning it into a tug of war in which each party faces only two alternatives – victory or defeat. Their words and deeds must be unequivocally ‘winning’ if they are not to risk being reported as ‘losing’, ‘backsliding’ or ‘going soft’. Findings from researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies provide abundant evidence that this dualistic model of conflict is seldom, if ever, the whole picture; there are always third (or more) parties whose involvement may be hidden; and within the parties, there are fault lines and differentiations which open up the scope for more creative conceptualisations of the issues at stake (Francis, 2002). The liberal theory of press freedom Kempf puts his finger on a dilemma facing every journalist covering conflicts – “either to take sides and to incite one party against the other, or to play the role of a moderating third party in order to improve the communication between them and contribute to constructive conflict transformation” (Kempf 2003 p. 83). Failure to adopt a deliberate policy of constructive conflict coverage, he argues, is tantamount to escalating them, because of “the lack of differentiation between traditional conflict coverage and propaganda” (Kempf 2003 p. 83). Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) give the following definitions: “Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them – which create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict. Peace Journalism: • Uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting • Provides a new route map tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their journalism – the ethics of journalistic intervention • Builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005 p. 5).

#### That outweighs – a laundry list of hotspots are primed to escalate in 2022 – our authors predicted Ukraine.

Ero and Atwood 21 (Comfort, CEO @ Crisis Group & PhD IR, and Richard, MA IR @ Princeton, 12-17-2021, "10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022," <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2022>) AG

After all, by some measures, war is in retreat. The number of people killed in fighting worldwide has mostly declined since 2014—if you count only those dying directly in combat. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, figures through the end of 2020 show [battle deaths are down](https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/) from seven years ago, mostly because Syria’s terrible slaughter has largely subsided. The number of major wars has also descended from a recent peak. Despite Russian President Vladimir Putin menacing Ukraine, states rarely go to war with one another. More local conflicts rage than ever, but they tend to be of lower intensity. For the most part, 21st-century wars are less lethal than their 20th-century predecessors. A more cautious United States might also have an upside. The 1990s bloodletting in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia; the post-9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq wars; Sri Lanka’s murderous campaign against the Tamils; and the collapse of Libya and South Sudan all happened at a time of—and, in some cases, thanks to—a dominant U.S.-led West. That recent U.S. presidents have refrained from toppling enemies by force is a good thing. Besides, one shouldn’t overstate Washington’s sway even in its post-Cold War heyday; absent an invasion, it has always struggled to bend recalcitrant leaders (former Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, for example) to its will. Still, if these are silver linings, they’re awfully thin. Battle deaths, after all, tell just a fraction of the story. Yemen’s conflict kills more people, mostly women and young children, due to starvation or preventable disease than violence. Millions of Ethiopians suffer acute food insecurity because of the country’s civil war. Fighting involving Islamists elsewhere in Africa often doesn’t entail thousands of deaths but drives millions of people from their homes and causes humanitarian devastation. Afghanistan’s violence levels have sharply dropped since the Taliban seized power in August, but starvation, caused mostly by Western policies, could leave more Afghans dead—including millions of children—than past decades of fighting. Worldwide, the number of displaced people, most due to war, is at a record high. Battle deaths may be down, in other words, but suffering due to conflict is not. Foreign involvement in conflicts creates the risk that local clashes light bigger fires. Moreover, states compete fiercely even when they’re not fighting directly. They do battle with cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, election interference, economic coercion, and by instrumentalizing migrants. Major and regional powers vie for influence, often through local allies, in war zones. Proxy fighting has not so far sparked direct confrontation among meddling states. Indeed, some navigate the danger adeptly: Russia and Turkey maintain cordial relations despite backing competing sides in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts. Still, foreign involvement in conflicts creates the risk that local clashes light bigger fires. Standoffs involving major powers look increasingly dangerous. Putin may gamble on another incursion into Ukraine. A China-U.S. clash over Taiwan is unlikely in 2022, but the Chinese and U.S. militaries increasingly bump up against each another around the island and in the South China Sea, with all the peril of entanglement that entails. If the Iran nuclear deal collapses, which now seems probable, the United States or Israel may attempt—possibly even early in 2022—to knock out Iranian nuclear facilities, likely prompting Tehran to sprint toward weaponization while lashing out across the region. One mishap or miscalculation, in other words, and interstate war could make a comeback. And whatever one thinks of U.S. influence, its decline inevitably brings hazards, given that American might and alliances have structured global affairs for decades. No one should exaggerate the decay: U.S. forces are still deployed around the globe, NATO stands, and Washington’s recent Asia diplomacy shows it can still marshal coalitions like no other power. But with much in flux, Washington’s rivals are probing to see how far they can go. As for COVID-19, the pandemic has exacerbated the world’s worst humanitarian disasters and propelled the impoverishment, rising living costs, inequality, and joblessness that fuel popular anger. It had a hand this past year in a power grab in Tunisia, Sudan’s coup, and protests in Colombia. The economic hurt COVID-19 is unleashing could strain some countries to a breaking point. Although it’s a leap from discontent to protest, from protest to crisis, and from crisis to conflict, the pandemic’s worst symptoms may yet lie ahead. So while today’s troubling undercurrents haven’t yet set battle deaths soaring or the world ablaze, things still look bad. As this year’s list shows all too starkly, they could easily get worse.

### 3

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being, or hedonistic act utilitarianism.

#### 1] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### 2] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### 3] Neuroscience- pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else regresses.

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10].

Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14].

Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals.

Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D

Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it.

It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring.

Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding.

There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health.

Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage.

Finding happiness is different between apes and humans

As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure.

Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered.

Desire and reward centers

It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation.

In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41].

Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42].

Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans.

In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45].

Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations.

Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50]

In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders.

In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS.

#### 4] No intent-foresight distinction for democracies

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the death of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### 5] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first which is the most intuitive.

### Case

#### Reject democratic peace – 52 years of analysis and newest models

Grabmeier ’15 (Jeff; 9/3/15; Senior Director of Research and Innovation at Ohio State University, citing a 52-year study; Phys.org, “'Democratic peace' may not prevent international conflict,” <https://phys.org/news/2015-09-democratic-peace-international-conflict.html)>

Using a new technique to analyze **52 years of international conflict**, researchers suggest that there may be **no such thing** as a "democratic peace." In addition, a model developed with this new technique was found to predict international conflict five and even ten years in the future better than any existing model. Democratic peace is the widely held theory that democracies are less likely to go to war against each other than countries with other types of government. In the new study, researchers found that economic trade relationships and participation in international governmental organizations play a strong role in keeping the peace among countries. But democracy? Not so much. "That's a startling finding because the value of joint democracy in preventing war is what we thought was the closest thing to a law in international politics," said Skyler Cranmer, lead author of the study and The Carter Phillips and Sue Henry Associate Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University. "There's been empirical research supporting this theory for the past 50 years. Even U.S. presidents have touted the value of a democratic peace, but it **doesn't seem to hold up**, at least the way we looked at it." The study appears this week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Cranmer's co-authors are Elizabeth Menninga, assistant professor of political science at the University of Iowa and recent Ph.D. graduate in political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and Peter Mucha, professor of mathematics in the College of Arts and Sciences at UNC-Chapel Hill. Along with casting doubt on democratic peace theory, the study also developed a new way to **predict levels** of international conflict that is **more accurate than any previous model**. The researchers used a new technique to examine all violent conflicts between countries during the period of 1948 to 2000. The result was a model of international conflict that was 47 percent better than the standard model at predicting the level of worldwide conflict five and even 10 years into the future. "The Department of Defense needs to know at least that far in advance what the world situation is going to be like, because it can't react in a year to changes in levels of conflict due to bureaucratic inertia and its longer funding cycle," Cranmer said. "Being able to have a sense of the global climate in five or 10 years would be extremely helpful from a policy and planning perspective." The researchers started the study with a famous idea posed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant back in 1795: that the world could enjoy a "perpetual peace" if countries would become more interconnected in three ways. The modern interpretation of those three ways is: Through the spread of democratic states, more economic interdependence through trade, and more joint membership in international governmental organizations, or IGOs. (Modern examples range from regional agricultural organizations to the European Union and NATO.) Many studies have looked at how these three elements, either together or separately, affect conflict between countries. But even when they were considered together, the impact of the three individual factors were considered additively. What makes this study unique is that the researchers were the first to use a new **statistical measure** developed by Mucha - called multislice community detection—to analyze **all three of these components** collectively. They were able to examine, for the first time, how each component was related to each other. For example, how membership in IGOs affected trade agreements between counties, and vice versa. "When we looked at these networks holistically, we found communities of countries that are similar not only in terms of their IGO memberships, or trade agreements, or in their democratic governments, but in terms of all these three elements together," Cranmer said. The separation between such communities in the world is what the researchers called "Kantian Fractionalization." "You might think of it as the number of cliques the world is split up into and how easy it is to isolate those cliques from one another," Cranmer said. But the deeper the separation between communities or cliques there are in the world at one time, the more dangerous the world becomes. By measuring these communities in the world at one specific time, the researchers could predict with **better accuracy** than ever before how many violent conflicts would occur in one, 5 or 10 years in the future. This study had a broad definition of conflict: any military skirmish where one country deliberately kills a member of another country. Many of the conflicts in this study were relatively small, but it also includes major wars. Predicting one year into the future, this new model was 13 percent better than the standard model at predicting levels of worldwide conflict. But it was 47 percent better at predicting conflict 5 and 10 years into the future. "We measured how fragile these networks are to breaking up into communities," Mucha said. "Remarkably, that fragility in a mathematical sense has a clear political consequence in terms of increased conflict." The linear relationship between higher levels of Kantian fractionalization and more future conflict was so strong that Cranmer couldn't believe it at first. "I threw up my hands in frustration when I first saw the results. I thought we surely must have made a mistake because you almost never see the kind of **clean, linear relationship** that we found outside of textbooks," Cranmer said. "But we confirmed that there is this strong relationship."

#### Robust empirical data.

Christopher Coyne and Rachel Mathers 2011 (Mercatus Center and Department of Economics, George Mason University; Department of Accounting, Economics, and Finance, Delaware State University, USA; “The Handbook on the Political Economy of War”; <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eAPWvararR37CcoH5RXVA0zcjdqD5Pwu/view?usp=sharing>)

Democratic wars There is considerable evidence that the absence of war claim is incorrect. As Christopher Layne (2001, p. 801) notes, 'The most **damning indictment** of democratic peace theory, is that **it happens not to be true**: democratic states have gone to war with one another." For example, categorizing a state as democratic if it achieves a democracy score of six or more in the Polity dataset on regime type - as several analysts do - yields three inter-democratic wars: the American Civil War, the Spanish American War and the Boer War. This is something defenders of the theory readily admit - adopting relatively inclusive definitions of democracy, they themselves generate anywhere between a dozen and three dozen cases of inter-democratic war. In order to exclude these anomalies and thereby preserve the absence of war claim, the theory's defenders restrict their definitions of democracy. In the most compelling analysis to date, Ray (1993, pp. 256-9, 269) argues that no two democracies have gone to war with one another as long as a democracy is defined as follows: the members of the executive and legislative branches arc determined in fair and competitive elections, which is to say that at least two independent parties contest the election, half of the adult population is eligible to vole and the possibility that the governing party can lose has been established by historical precedent. Similarly, Doyle (1983a, pp. 216-17) rescues the claim by arguing that states" domestic and foreign policies must both be subject to the control of the citizenry if they are to be considered liberal. Russett, meanwhile, argues that his no war claim rests on defining democracy as a stale wilh a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of the population, a government brought to power in elections involving two or more legally recognized parties, a popularly elected executive or one responsible to an elected legislature, requirements for civil liberties including free speech and demonstrated longevity of at least three years (Russett 1993, pp. 14-16). Despite imposing these definitional restrictions, proponents of the democratic peace cannot exclude up to five major wars, a figure which, if confirmed, would invalidate the democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995, p. 27). The first is the **War of 1812** between Britain and the United States. Ray argues that it does not contradict the claim because Britain does not meet bis suffrage requirement. Yet this does not make Britain any less democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult population was eligible to vote. In fact, as Laync (2001, p. 801) notes, "the United States was not appreciably more democratic than un re formed Britain." This poses a problem for the democratic peace; if the United States was a democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was an inter-democratic war. The second case is the **American Civil War.** Democratic peace theorists believe the United States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett 1993, pp. 16-17). However, a plausible argument can be made that the United Stales was not a state but a union of states, and that this was therefore a war between states rather than within one. Note, for example, that the term "United States" was plural rather than singular at the time and the conflict was known as the "War Between the States."7 This being the case, the Civil War also contradicts the claim.8 The Spanish-American and Boer wars constitute two further exceptions to the rule. Ray excludes the former because half of the members of Spain's upper house held their positions through hereditary succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little different to Britain, which he classifies as a democracy at the time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish-American War was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democracy during the Boer War because black Africans were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States as a democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Ray 1993. pp. 265, 267; Layne 2001. p. 802). In short, defenders of the democratic peace can only rescue their core claim through the selective application of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important exception is World War I, which, by virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States, would count as five instances of war between liberal states in most analyses of the democratic peace.9 As Ido Oren (1995, pp. 178-9) has shown. Germany was widely considered lo be a liberal state prior to World War I: "Germany was a member of a select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that arc currently coded as having been "liberal' during that period." In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that group, "either as second only to the United States ... or as positioned below England and above France." Moreover, Doyle’s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal domestically, but not in foreign affairs, does not stand up to scrutiny. As Layne (1994, p. 42) points out. foreign policy was "insulated from parliamentary control" in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see also Mcarshcimcr 1990, p. 51, fn. 77; Layne 2001, pp. 803 807). Thus it is difficult to classify Germany as non-liberal and World War I constitutes an imporiant exception to Ihe finding. Small numbers Even if restrictive definitions of democracy enable democratic peace theorists to uphold their claim, they render it unsurprising by reducing the number of democracies in any analysis. As several scholars have noted, there were only a dozen or so democracies in the world prior to World War I, and even fewer in a position to fight one another. Therefore, since war is a rare event for any pair of states, the fact that democracies did not fight one (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 50; Cohen 1994, pp. 214, 216; Layne 1994, p. 39; Henderson 1999, p. 212).10 It should be a source of even less surprise as the number of democracies and the potential for conflict among them falls, something that is bound to happen as the democratic bar rises. Ray\*s suffrage criterion, for example, eliminates two great powers - Britain and the United States - from the democratic ranks before World War I. thereby making the absence of war between democracies eminently predictable."

#### Democracy causes CCP collapse.

Chen & Kinzelbach ’15 (Dingding Chen- assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Katrin Kinzelbach- associate director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, March 2015, “Democracy promotion and China: blocker or bystander?” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2014.999322>)

The People's Republic of China is both a decisive blocker as well as an indifferent bystander of democratization. In this article, we looked at whether and how China countervails EU and US democracy promotion at home and in its immediate neighbourhood. In terms of domestic politics, the CCP is clearly determined to withstand, repress, outperform, and outsmart home-grown as well as external pressures for democratization. It is impossible to predict how long this approach will be sustainable. With regard to China's foreign policy, we tested the hypothesis that geostrategic interests or a perceived risk of regime survival at home will lead the People's Republic to countervail democracy promotion outside its own borders as well. The case of Hong Kong confirms that a perceived risk of regime survival leads Beijing to countervail US and EU democracy support outside the Chinese mainland. Although the scope of this article did not allow for additional case studies, we consider it likely that the CCP's focus on regime-survival at home does not only trump the “one country, two systems” doctrine, but ultimately also Beijing's declared non-interference principle in foreign policy. Yet, the fact that Beijing does not seem to use its significant leverage over Myanmar to hinder democracy support is an empirical challenge to the common proposition that authoritarian China is likely to export or protect autocracy, especially in its near-abroad. Given that we view Myanmar as the most likely case with respect to strategic interests, we suggest with considerable certainty that Beijing will only counteract democratization, including US and EU democracy support, where it perceives a challenge to the CCP's survival. Where this is not the case, Beijing is likely to focus on protecting its economic and strategic interests abroad, regardless of regime type. While this finding might be taken to suggest that a focus on China's international influence should not be a priority for democracy supporters, we remain more cautious. China's economic performance has not only granted the CCP legitimacy domestically, it has also made China's development path – economic liberalization without political reform – appear desirable further afield. And the recent economic troubles in Europe and the US, in turn, have challenged the thus far common perception that democracy was required for prosperity. As democracy promoters, both the US and the EU should therefore ensure that the very real governance shortcomings in China, beyond as well as within the economic sphere, are publicly identified for what they are. Without such concerted efforts, it is likely that authoritarian China will continue to be looked at as an alternative development model, thereby challenging democracy's power of attraction.

#### Goes nuclear.

Yee & Storey ’13 (Yee and Storey 13 Herbert - Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University. Ian - Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality 2013 p. 15)

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in **territorial fragmentation**, **civil war** and waves of **refugees** pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a **profoundly negative impact on regional stability**. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in **millions of Chinese refugees** seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a **severe strain** on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in **a**nother **nightmare scenario**—**nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local** provincial **leaders** or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also **pose a threat to** its neighbours and **the world**.

#### Growth is unsustainable and innovation doesn’t solve---shifting away from production is key.

Büchs and Koch 17 [Milena Büchs & Max Koch 17. Milena Büchs is Associate Professor in Sustainability, Economics and Low Carbon Transitions at the University of Leeds, UK. Max Koch is Professor of Social Policy at Lund University (School of Social Work), Sweden. 2017. Postgrowth and Wellbeing. Springer International Publishing. CrossRef, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59903-8.] // Re-Cut Justin

As the previous chapters have shown, economic growth is regarded as a prime policy aim by policy makers and economists because it is thought to be essential for reducing poverty and generating rising living standards and stable levels of employment (Ben-Ami 2010: 19–20). More generally, support for economic growth is usually intertwined with advocating social progress based on scientific rationality and reason and hence with an optimistic view of humans’ ingenuity to solve problems (ibid.: 17, 20, Chap. 5). Growth criticism thus tends to be portrayed as anti-progress and inherently conservative (ibid.: Chap. 8). While it is important to acknowledge and discuss this view, it needs to be emphasised that growth criticism is formulated with long-term human welfare in mind which advocates alternative types of social progress (Barry 1998). This chapter first outlines ecological and social strands of growth critiques and then introduces relevant concepts of and positions within the postgrowth debate. Ecological Critiques of G rowth Generally speaking, two types of growth criticism can be distinguished: the first focuses on limitations of GDP as a measure of economic performance; the second goes beyond this by highlighting the inappropriateness of growth as the ultimate goal of economic activity and its negative implications for environment and society. Since GDP measures the monetary value of all final goods and services in an economy, it excludes the environmental costs generated by production. For instance, as long as there is no cost associated with emitting greenhouse gases , the cost for the environmental and social damage following from this is not reflected in GDP figures. Worse even, GDP increases as a consequence of some types of environmental damage: if deforestation and timber trade increase or if natural disasters or industrial accidents require expenditures for clean-up and reconstruction, GDP figures will rise (Douthwaite 1999: 18; Leipert 1986). Several critics of GDP as a measure of progress have proposed alternative indicators of welfare such as the Genuine Progress Indicator, Green GDPs or other approaches which factor in environmental costs (see Chap. 5 for more details), but they do not necessarily object to economic growth being the primary goal of economic activity (van den Bergh 2011). In contrast, the idea of ecological limits to growth goes beyond the critique of GDP as a measure of economic performance. Instead, it maintains that economic growth should not, and probably cannot, be the main goal of economic activity because it requires increasing resource inputs, some of which are non-renewable, and generates wastes, including greenhouse gases, that disturb various ecosystems, severely threatening human and planetary functioning in the short and long term. 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 41 Resources are regarded as non-renewable if they cannot be naturally replaced at the rate of consumption (Daly and Farley 2011: 75–76). Examples include fossil fuels, earth minerals and metals, and some nuclear materials like uranium (Daly and Farley 2011: 77; Meadows et al. 2004: 87–107). Based on work by Georgescu-Roegen (1971), many ecological economists also assume that non-renewable resources cannot be fully recycled because they become degraded in the process of economic activity. Historically speaking, economic growth is a fairly recent phenomenon (Fig. 2.1). Since its onset in the late seventeenth century in Europe and mid-eighteenth century in the US (Gordon 2012), it has gone hand in hand with an exponentially increasing use of non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels (Fig. 4.1). While we are not yet close to running out of non-renewable resources, over time they will become more difficult and hence more expensive to recover. This idea is captured by the concept of “energy returned on energy invested” (EROEI). In relation to oil for instance, it has been shown that the easily recoverable fields have been targeted first and that therefore greater energy (and hence financial) inputs will be required to produce more oil. Over time, the ratio of energy returned on energy invested will decrease, reducing the financial incentive to invest further in the recovery of these non-renewable resources (Dale et al. 2011; Brandt et al. 2015: 2). Relevant to this is also the debate about peak oil—a concept coined by Shell Oil geologist Marion King Hubbert in the 1950s—the point at which the rate of global conventional oil production reaches its maximum which is expected to take place roughly once half of global oil reserves have been produced. There is still controversy about whether global peak oil will occur, and if so when, as it is difficult to predict, or get reliable data on, the rate at which alternative types of energy will replace oil (if this was to happen fast enough, peak oil might not be reached, if it has not yet occurred), the size of remaining oil reserves and the future efficiency of oil extraction technologies (Chapman 2014). However, it is plausible to assume that oil prices will rise in the long term if conventional oil availability diminishes, while global demand for oil increases with continuing economic and population growth. Since economic growth in the second half of the twentieth century required increasing inputs of conventional oil, higher oil prices would have a negative impact on growth unless alternative technologies are developed that can generate equivalent liquid fuels at lower prices (Murphy and Hall 2011). Some scholars have criticised the focus on physical/energy resource limitations as initially highlighted in the “limits to growth” debate (Meadows et al. 1972) and state that instead catastrophic climate change is likely to be a more serious and immanent threat to humanity (Schwartzman 2012). The main arguments here are first that much uncertainty remains about the potential and timing of peak oil, future availability of other fossil fuels and development of alternative low energy resources, while the impacts of climate change are already immanent and may accelerate within the very near future. Second, even if peaks in fossil fuel production occurred in the near future, remaining resources could still be exploited to their maximum. However, this would be devastating from a climate change perspective as, according to the latest IPCC scenarios, greenhouse gas emissions need to turn net-zero by the second half of this century for there to be a good chance to limit global warming to 2° Celsius (and ideally, below that) (Anderson and Peters 2016). It is telling that some of the more recent debates about ecological limits to growth put much more emphasis on environmental impacts of growth, rather than on peak oil or other resource limitations (Dietz and O’Neill 2013). Differently put, limits of sinks, especially to absorb greenhouse gases, and to the regeneration of vital ecosystems are now attracting greater concern, compared to limits of resources. Growing economic production generates increasing pressures on the environment due to pollution of air, water and soil, the destruction of natural habitats and landscapes, for instance, through deforestation and the extraction of natural resources. Therefore, growth often also threatens the regeneration of renewable resources such as healthy soil, freshwater and forests, as well as the functioning of vital ecosystems and ecosystems services such as the purification of air and water, water absorption and storage and the related mitigation of droughts and floods, decomposition and detoxification and absorption of wastes, pollination and pest control (Meadows et al. 2004: 83–84). Recent research on planetary boundaries has started to identify thresholds of environmental pollution or disturbance of a range of ecosystems services beyond which the functioning of human life on earth will be put at risk. Rockström and colleagues have identified nine such “planetary boundaries”—“climate change; rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine); interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; stratospheric ozone depletion; ocean acidification; global freshwater use; change in land use; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol loading” (Rockström et al. 2009: 472). They also present evidence according to which three of these boundaries—climate change, rate of biodiversity loss and the nitrogen cycle—have already reached their limits (Rockström et al. 2009). Of those three thresholds, climate change has received most attention. The 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014) concluded that global temperatures have risen by an average of 0.85° since the 1880s (while local temperature increases can be much higher than that) and that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has reached unprecedented levels over the last 800,000 years—that of CO2 has now reached 405.6 parts per million (NASA, January 2017, Fig. 4.2), far surpassing the level of 350 ppm which is considered safe by many scientists (Rockström et al. 2009). The IPCC report also maintained that humans very likely contributed to at least 50% of global warming that occurred since the 1950s (IPCC 2014: 5). A range of climate change impacts can already be observed, including a 26% increase of ocean acidification since industrialisation; shrinking of glaciers, Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, as well as arctic sea ice; and the rise of sea levels of 19 cm since 1901. This is projected to increase by an additional 82 cm by the end of this century at current levels of greenhouse gas emissions (ibid.: 13). Climate change impacts are already felt with increased occurrences of heat waves, heavy rain fall, increased risk of flooding and impacts on food and water security in a number of regions around the world. It is projected that with a rise of 2° of global temperatures, 280 million people worldwide (with greatest numbers in China, India and Bangladesh) would be affected by sea level rise, escalating to a projected 627 million people under a 4° scenario (Strauss et al. 2015: 10). At the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris in 2015, representatives agreed that action should be taken to limit rise of global temperatures to 2° and Fig. 4.2 Concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. Source NASA, available from https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/. The CO2 levels have been reconstructed from measures of trapped air in polar cap ice cores 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 45 to “pursue efforts” to limit it to 1.5°. This has been adopted by 196 countries, but immense efforts and very radical reductions of greenhouse gas emissions will be required to comply with the agreement. Even if net greenhouse gas emissions were reduced to zero, surface temperatures would remain constant at their increased levels for hundreds of years to come and climate change impacts such as ocean acidification and rising sea levels would continue for hundreds or even thousands of years once global temperatures are stabilised; moreover, a range of climate change impacts are deemed irreversible (IPCC 2014: 16). One controversial question in the debate about economic growth and environmental impacts has been whether growth can be decoupled from the damage it causes. Important to this debate is the theory of the Environmental Kuznets Curve which applies Simon Kuznets’ hypothesised inverted u-shaped relationship between economic development and income inequality to the relationship between economic development and environmental degradation. According to this theory, environmental degradation is low in the early phases of economic development, then rises with increasing development up to a certain point, beyond which it falls again with advancing development because more resources can be invested to render production and consumption more efficient and less polluting. Therefore, this theory suggests that it is possible to decouple economic growth (measured in GDP) from its environmental implications. The counter-argument to this theory is that it does not take into account the difference between relative and absolute decoupling. Relative decoupling refers to the environmental impacts generated over time per unit of economic output, for instance CO2 emissions per million of US$. In contrast, absolute decoupling would examine aggregate environmental impact, compared to total economic output over time. Here it has been argued that while relative decoupling may be possible as the environmental impact per unit of economic output decreases over time due to efficiency gains, absolute decoupling is much harder to achieve while growth continues. Indeed, there is no evidence for absolute decoupling as total environmental impacts, for instance total global CO2 emissions, are still rising with rising global GDP (Jackson 2011: 67–86). This is partly due to rebound effects which we discussed in Chap. 2: rising consumption because the increase in efficiency has made it cheaper to produce/consume (Jackson 2011: 67–86; see also Czech 2013: Chap. 8 criticising “green growth”). Furthermore, if decoupling is examined at the country level, one would need to take consumptionbased resource use/emissions into account rather than productionbased impacts. Substantial environmental impacts related to everything that is consumed in rich countries occur in developing countries from which goods are imported. A focus on production-based environmental impacts would hence be misleading as it ignores the [and] environmental impacts that relate to a country’s living standards and that occur outside of that country. Social Critiques of Growth Economic growth has not only been criticised from an ecological perspective, but also from an individual and social wellbeing point of view. Here, we can again distinguish a critique of GDP as a measure of wellbeing and a wider critique which highlights potential negative consequences of economic growth for human wellbeing. Several scholars have argued that GDP is an inadequate measure of prosperity or wellbeing because it only includes market transactions and ignores activities of the informal economy in households and the volunteering sector which make an important contribution to individual and social wellbeing (Stiglitz et al. 2011; van den Bergh 2009; Jackson 2011). It also excludes the contribution of certain government services that are provided for free (Douthwaite 1999: 14; Stiglitz et al. 2011: 23), and the roles of capital stocks and of leisure in generating welfare (Costanza et al. 2015: 137). Furthermore, all market transactions make a positive contribution to GDP, regardless of whether expenditures increase or decrease welfare. Similar to the way in which environmental costs of growth are either excluded from GDP or even increase it, expenditures that arise from road accidents, divorces, crime, etc., contribute positively to GDP (ibid.: 133). The focus on market transactions also means that an increasing marketisation (or “commodification”) of an economy will be reflected in a rise of GDP, which may or may not be related to actual “welfare” outcomes (Stiglitz et al. 2011: 49). It also implies that GDP is an insufficient cross-national comparator for the quality of life, as it does not take into account the different sizes of the informal economy across countries (ibid.: 15). Furthermore, GDP does not indicate how income and consumption are distributed in society (Stiglitz et al. 2011: 44). This implies that a rise of GDP can be consistent with a rise of inequality of income and wealth. 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 47 However, if greater inequality has negative impacts on social wellbeing (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009), this would be masked by rising GDP figures (Douthwaite 1999: 17). An even more fundamental criticism of GDP as a measure of wellbeing is that it focuses on the accumulation of money or wealth and thus on the material aspects of wellbeing. Such a narrow conception of the goals of economic activity and wellbeing has been criticised early on in the history of economic thought, e.g. by Aristotle’s distinction between oikonomia and chrematistics. The latter refers to the accumulation of wealth and was regarded by him as an “unnatural” activity which did not contribute to the generation of use value and wellbeing (Cruz et al. 2009: 2021). The argument that wider conceptions of wellbeing and prosperity are required has also become relevant for contemporary critiques of economic growth (Jackson 2011; Paech 2013; Schneider et al. 2010) as we will discuss this in more detail in Chap. 5. Arguments About the Psychological and S ocial Costs of G rowth The broader social critique of economic growth highlights potential “social limits” to or even negative consequences of economic growth for individual and collective wellbeing. The term “social limits to growth” was coined by Fred Hirsch (1976). He argued that the benefits of growth are initially exclusive to small elites and that these benefits disappear as soon as they spread more widely through mass consumption. For instance, only few people can own a Rembrandt painting; holiday destinations are more enjoyable when they are not overrun by hordes of other tourists; there are only few leadership positions, etc. From this perspective, there are “social limits” to the extent to which the benefits of growth can be socially expanded and equally shared. Other scholars have expressed concern about individual and collective social costs of economic growth. First, there is the argument that the need to keep up with ever-rising living standards and new consumer habits, “keeping up with the Joneses”—a lot of which is seen to be driven by advertisement and social pressure rather than real needs, for instance fashionable clothing or gadgets—can generate stress and increase the occurrence of mental disorders (James 2007; Offer 2006; Kasser 2002). 48 M. BÜCHS AND M. KOCH Second, it has been argued that economic growth can imply wider social costs. For instance, with its emphasis on individual gain, market relations and competition, and the need that it generates for spatial mobility (e.g. for successful participation in education and labour markets), it is feared to undermine moral and social capital and put a strain on family and community relations, potentially even leading to increasing divorce and crime rates (Douthwaite 1999; Daly and Cobb 1989: 50–51; Hirsch 1976). Social costs of technological development and industrialisation also include industrial workplace and traffic accidents and time lost in traffic jams and for commuting (Czech 2013: Chap. 2; Stiglitz et al. 2011: 24). Technological innovation which arises from growth can also act as a factor for job losses and increasing job insecurity (Douthwaite 1999), especially if growth rates are not sufficiently high to compensate gains in productivity. It is often assumed that growth will benefit the many because of assumed “trickle-down” effects which promise to improve the lot of the poor simply because the “cake” of available wealth is growing. While progress has been made in reducing extreme global poverty and inequality (Sala-i-Martin 2006; Rougoor and van Marrewijk 2015), the number of people living in poverty across the globe remains high.1 At the same time, income inequality in a range of countries has been rising and the situation of many of the people living in extreme poverty is not improving which means the fruits of economic growth remain to be unequally distributed (Collier 2007; Piketty and Saez 2014). The post-development debate goes even further than that in arguing that not only may growth not have reached the global poor to the extent that had been predicted by neoclassical economists, but that it can also have negative impacts on indigenous communities in developing countries, especially those who rely on local natural resources for their livelihoods which often suffer exploitation, pollution or even destruction through the inclusion of local economies into global value chains (Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). While the distinction between critiques of growth that focus on its problematic ecological and social consequences is useful for analytic purposes, the two dimensions are of course closely linked. Ecological consequences of growth have the potential to severely impact or even undermine human wellbeing. Local livelihoods are already affected by current climate change impacts such as ocean acidification and its impact on marine organisms, draughts, floods and severe weather events, the 4 CRITIQUES OF GROWTH 49 frequency of which has been rising. Accordingly, it is estimated that crop and fish yields are already diminishing in several regions (Stern 2015; IPCC 2014) and that millions of people are already being displaced and forced to migrate due to climate change and other environmental impacts (Black et al. 2011). While the overall long-term impacts of climate change and the surpassing of other planetary boundaries are difficult to predict, they clearly have the potential to substantially undermine human wellbeing. Since greenhouse gas emissions are driven by economic growth, the development of alternative economic models that do not depend on growth is urgent since continued growth “threatens to alter the ability of the Earth to support life” (Daly and Farley 2011: 12).