### 1

#### U.S. global leadership is key to a new policy of containment that preserves the LIO and prevents global war but American popular support and commitment is key.

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The quarter century following the Cold War was the most peaceful in modern history. The world’s strongest powers did not fight one another or even think much about doing so. They did not, on the whole, prepare for war, anticipate war, or conduct negotiations and political maneuvers with the prospect of war looming in the background. As U.S. global military hegemony persisted, the possibility of developed nations fighting one another seemed ever more remote. Then history began to change course. In the last several years, three powers have launched active efforts to revise security arrangements in their respective regions. [Russia](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2018-06-14/russia-it) has invaded Crimea and other parts of Ukraine and has tried covertly to destabilize European democracies. [China](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning) has built artificial island fortresses in international waters, claimed vast swaths of the western Pacific, and moved to organize Eurasia economically in ways favorable to Beijing. And the [Islamic Republic of Iran](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-07-26/how-us-empowering-iran-yemen) has expanded its influence over much of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen and is pursuing nuclear weapons. This new world requires a new American foreign policy. Fortunately, the country’s own not-so-distant past can offer guidance. During the Cold War, the United States chose to contain the Soviet Union, successfully deterring its military aggression and limiting its political influence for decades. The United States should apply containment once again, now to Russia, China, and Iran. The contemporary world is similar enough to its mid-twentieth-century predecessor to make that old strategy relevant but different enough that it needs to be modified and updated. While success is not guaranteed, a new containment policy offers the best chance to defend American interests in the twenty-first century. Now as before, the possibility of armed conflict exerts a major influence on the foreign policies of the United States and countries throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The Cold War divided the world into rival camps, with regions and even countries split in two. Today, similar cleavages are developing, with each revisionist power seeking its own sphere of influence separate from the larger U.S.-backed global order. Now as before, the revisionist powers are dictatorships that challenge American values as well as American interests. They seek to overturn political, military, and economic arrangements the United States helped establish long ago and has supported ever since. Should [Vladimir Putin’s](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2018-06-14/peoples-authoritarian) Russia succeed in reasserting control over parts of the former Soviet Union, [Xi Jinping’s](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-05-10/how-xi-jinping-views-world) China gain control over maritime commerce in the western Pacific, or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s Iran dominate the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf, the United States, its allies, and the global order they uphold would suffer a major blow. The China-occupied Subi Reef in the disputed South China Sea, April 2017But today’s circumstances differ from those of the past in several important ways. During most of the Cold War, Washington confronted a single powerful opponent, the Soviet Union—the leader of the international communist movement. Now it must cope with three separate adversaries, each largely independent of the other two. Russia and China cooperate, but they also compete with each other. And while both have good relations with Iran, both also have large and potentially [restive Muslim populations](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-06-20/reeducation-returns-china), giving them reason to worry about the growth of Iranian power and influence. Cold War containment was a single global undertaking, implemented regionally. Contemporary containment will involve three separate regional initiatives, implemented in coordination. The Soviet Union, moreover, presented a strong ideological challenge, devoted as it was to advancing not just Moscow’s geopolitical interests but also its communist principles. Neither Russia nor China has such a crusading ideology today. Russia has abandoned communism completely, and China has done so partially, retaining the notion of party supremacy but shedding most of the economics and the messianic zeal. And although the Islamic Republic represents a cause and not just a stretch of territory, the potential appeal of its ideology is largely limited to the Muslim world and, primarily, its Shiite minority. None of today’s revisionist powers possesses the Soviet Union’s fearsome military capabilities. Russia is a shrunken version of its older self militarily, and Iran lacks formidable modern military forces. China’s economic growth may ultimately allow it to match the United States in all strategic dimensions and pose a true peer threat, but to date, Beijing is concentrating on developing forces to exclude the United States from the western Pacific, not to project power globally. Moreover, the initiatives each has launched so far—Russia’s seizure of Crimea and Middle East meddling, [China’s island building](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-06-05/vanishing-borders-south-china-sea), Iran’s regional subversion—have been limited probes rather than all-out assaults on the existing order. Lastly, the Soviet Union was largely detached from the U.S.-centered global economy during the Cold War, whereas today’s revisionist powers are very much a part of it. Russia and Iran have relatively small economies and export mostly energy, but China has the world’s second-largest economy, with deep, wide, and growing connections to countries everywhere. Economic interdependence will complicate containment. China, for example, may be a political and military rival, but it is also a crucial economic partner. The United States depends on China to finance its deficits. China depends on the United States to buy its exports. Containment in Asia will thus require other policies as well, because although a Chinese military collapse would enhance Asian security, a Chinese economic collapse would bring economic disaster. Together, these differences make today’s containment a less urgent challenge than its Cold War predecessor. The United States does not have to deal with a single mortal threat from a country committed to remaking the entire world in its own image. It must address three serious but lesser challenges, mounted by countries seeking not heaven on earth but greater regional power and autonomy. But if today’s challenges are less epic, they are far more complicated. The old containment was simple, if not easy. The new containment will have to blend a variety of policies, carefully coordinated with one another in design and execution. This will tax the ingenuity and flexibility of the United States and its allies. STRONGER TOGETHER As during the Cold War, containment today requires American military deployments abroad. In Europe, ground troops are needed to deter Russian aggression. The Putin regime has already sent forces into Georgia and Ukraine. The United States is committed to protecting its NATO allies. These include the Baltic states, tiny countries on Russia’s border. By defending them, the United States could encounter some of the same difficulties it did defending West Berlin, including, in the worst case, having to decide whether to bring nuclear weapons into play rather than accept military defeat. East Asia requires a robust U.S. naval presence to fend off China’s campaign to dominate the western Pacific. The United States is committed to protecting allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and maintaining open sea-lanes, and it conducts what it calls “freedom-of-navigation operations” in international waters newly claimed by China to make clear that the rest of the world does not accept Chinese claims and Chinese dominance there. And in the Middle East, American naval and air forces are needed to safeguard shipments of Persian Gulf oil to Europe and Asia and to support a successful rollback of the [Iranian nuclear program](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2019-01-11/year-living-dangerously-nuclear-weapons), should that become necessary. American troops on the ground are not required; it is local forces that must check Iranian efforts at regional subversion (which are carried out by local militias). Diplomatically, Washington needs to maintain or assemble broad coalitions of local powers to oppose each revisionist challenge. In Europe, NATO was created to carry out this very mission and so should be the pillar of the United States’ strategy there. In Asia and the Middle East, the “hub and spoke” pattern of American Cold War alliances still exists, even as regional powers have begun to collaborate among themselves. Working with partners exploits Washington’s greatest strength: its ability to attract allies and create powerful coalitions against isolated opponents. Coordinating with other countries also endows American foreign policy with a legitimacy it would otherwise lack, showing that the United States is not simply acting for itself but defending broad principles of international order that many others support. The dependence of the revisionists on access to the global economy gives the United States and its coalition partners a potential source of leverage. Washington and its allies have tried to exploit this through sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, tariffs on China for its trade practices, and sanctions on Iran for its nuclear weapons program. But interdependence cuts both ways. Russia has tried to pressure Ukraine by restricting Ukrainian access to Russian energy. China has placed targeted embargoes on Japan and Norway to express displeasure with specific Japanese and Norwegian policies. Moreover, economic instruments have at best a mixed record in achieving political goals; the broader the sanctioning coalition is, the greater its impact will be. MAKING IT OFFICIAL The prospect of a twenty-first-century triple containment strategy raises several questions. Since the United States is already doing much of what is required, how much change in American foreign policy is needed? Is it necessary or feasible to confront all three revisionist powers at once? And how does all this end? As for the first, explicitly committing the United States to containment would build on many existing policies while reframing them as part of a coherent national strategy rather than the products of inertia or inattention. A public commitment to containment would enhance the credibility of American deterrence and lower the chance of opportunistic attacks by opponents hoping for easy gains (as happened in Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990). That, in turn, would reassure actual and potential allies and increase their willingness to join the effort. Adopting containment as a strategic frame would also help restrain Washington’s occasional impulses to do more (try to transform other societies) or less (retreat from global engagement altogether). As for confronting all three at once, geopolitical logic and historical experience suggest that reducing the number of threats is the best course, as the United States did by joining with the Soviet Union to defeat the Nazis and then aligning with Mao Zedong’s China to defeat the Soviet Union. Post-Soviet Russia would have been a natural partner for the West. But Moscow was needlessly alienated from its logical geopolitical partnership by NATO expansion, which brought foreign armies to its doorstep over its objections. At this point, all three revisionist regimes rely for domestic support on nationalist hostility to the United States specifically and Western democracies more generally and reject being part of a U.S.-led coalition. Fortunately, Russia is much weaker than the Soviet Union, China is restrained by both deterrence and the knowledge that military conflict would damage its economy, and Iran is a regional power. So the United States can afford to pursue the containment of all three simultaneously (so long as it does so as part of robust coalitions). Cold War containment was an open-ended policy with a hoped-for eventual outcome. The same will be true for the new version: the policy should continue as long as the threats it is intended to counter continue, and ideally it will end similarly. Constructive regime change, for example, especially the advent of democracy, would alter the foreign policy orientations of the revisionist powers. Such a change would have to come about through internal processes and is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Still, none of the regimes can be confident of its longevity; repeated outbreaks of political turbulence over the years have shown that each faces significant domestic opposition, maintains itself in power through coercion, and fears its people rather than trusts them. Situations like that can shift rapidly. A well-executed policy of containment could increase the chances of disruption by creating an external context that would encourage it. But when or, indeed, if it would bear fruit is impossible to predict. BEWARE OF FREE RIDERS The biggest obstacles to a new policy of containment come, ironically, not from the powers being contained but from the countries doing the containing. The United States needs to relearn how to manage durable coalitions of allies and persuade its own citizenry that the exercise of global leadership is still worth the effort required. Coalitions are difficult to manage in the best of circumstances. It was hard to hold the Western alliance together during the Cold War, even though it faced a single powerful threat. Building and maintaining comparable coalitions today, confronted by diverse smaller threats, will be more difficult still. In Europe, although all countries are wary of Russia, some are more so than others. Those closest to Russia’s borders most strongly support an enhanced Western military presence. Years of crisis over Europe’s common currency, meanwhile, have taken a political toll, increased intra-European tensions, and made cooperation of all kinds more difficult. The continuing Brexit drama will only compound the problems. Coalitions are difficult to manage in the best of circumstances. In Asia, the Philippines and South Korea have sometimes taken a more benign view of Chinese power than other countries in the region. And among those agreeing on the need to check Chinese ambitions (including Australia, India, Indonesia, and Japan), developing common policies is difficult because they are an amorphous, heterogeneous group. In the Middle East, crucial American allies, such as Qatar (which hosts a U.S. air base) and [Saudi Arabia](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/opinion/saudi-arabia-mohammed-bin-salman-trump-khashoggi.html), are sharply at odds. The government of Turkey, a member of NATO, identifies with the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt and Saudi Arabia regard as a mortal enemy. Ironically, the one unproblematic member of the anti-Iran coalition is Israel, a country that for decades was anathematized as the root of all the problems in the Middle East but that is now recognized as a dependable counterweight to Persian power. All coalitions encounter [free-rider problems](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-08-15/pay-europe), and the dominant members usually pay more than their fair share of the costs involved. So it will be with the new containment. The imbalance will be most glaring in Europe, where a tradition of letting Washington carry much of the burden of collective defense has persisted for too long; it originated when U.S. allies were weak and poor but continued even after they became strong and rich. During the Cold War, every American president tried, without much success, to get European countries to pay more for NATO, but none pushed the issue hard because the priority was to maintain a common front against the Soviet threat. There may be a lower tolerance for such free-riding today, as U.S. President Donald Trump’s comments make clear. The Asian countries wary of China have increased their spending on defense. Still, the United States is destined to take the lead in opposing China because the most pressing threat the People’s Republic presents is a maritime one—one that requires major naval forces to contest, of the kind that only the United States commands. In the Middle East, Israel has capable armed forces. Saudi Arabia has purchased expensive military hardware from the United States but has not demonstrated the capacity to use it effectively. Turkey has a formidable military, but the present Turkish government cannot be counted on to use it to contain Iran. WILL AMERICA LEAD? The weakest link in the chain may be the most powerful country itself. There are reasons to expect the American public to support a leading role in the containment of Russia, China, and Iran. The United States has a long history with such a foreign policy. The approach has geopolitical logic behind it, promising to protect American interests in crucial parts of the world at a reasonable price. But there are also reasons for skepticism. Today’s threats appear less urgent, coping with them will be more complicated, and the country’s attitude toward foreign entanglements has understandably soured over the last two decades. The weakest link in the chain may be the most powerful country itself. The United States was pulled into both world wars by external attacks, and Americans gave their support to a foreign policy of global reach during the Cold War because they were persuaded it would head off yet another world war. After the Soviet collapse, many of the Cold War arrangements persisted through inertia and gained support because they seemed to entail little expense or risk. Now that the expenses and risks of such a policy have increased, many Americans may reconsider their support. The skepticism has deepened because of the county’s recent misadventures abroad. The interventions in [Afghanistan](https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/donald-trumps-chance-to-bring-peace-to-afghanistan-and-end-americas-longest-war), Iraq, and Libya turned out poorly, and the public has little taste for more. This view has much to recommend it. But it need not threaten the prospects of a new containment, because that course is quite different from the failed crusades of recent decades. Those involved efforts to transform the internal politics and economies of weak states. Containment involves the opposite, checking the external conduct of strong states. If national leaders can appreciate and explain the difference, they may be able to bring the public along.

#### The best studies confirm our impact---err on the side of a consensus of empirical research---our evidence assumes every skeptic

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Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence to the expectation that US security commitments actually can shape the strategic environment as deep engagement presupposes. But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed in chapter 5. These theories make strong assumptions that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security. Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects. And to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms— assurance and deterrence— and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them.

This chapter moves beyond theory to examine patterns of evidence. If the theoretical arguments about the security effects of deep engagement are right, what sort of evidence should we see? Two major bodies of evidence are most important: general empirical findings concerning the strategy’s key mechanisms and regionally focused research.

General Patterns of Evidence Three key questions about US security provision have received the most extensive analysis. First, do alliances such as those sustained by the United States actually deter war and increase security? Second, does such security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? And third, does limiting proliferation actually increase security?

Deterrence Effectiveness The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted scores of quantitative and case study tests. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire. 1 Many quantitative findings, mean- while, are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But some relevant results receive broad support:

* Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect. In a study spanning nearly two centuries, Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes.” They conclude that “defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.” Sechser and Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits. 2 3
* The overall balance of military forces (including nuclear) between states does not appear to influence deterrence; the local balance of military forces in the specific theater in which deterrence is actually practiced, however, is key. 4
* Forward- deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect of alliances with overseas allies. 5
* Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence. 6
* Case studies strongly ratify the theoretical expectation that it is easier to defend a given status quo than to challenge it forcefully: compellence (sometimes termed “coercion” or “coercive diplomacy”) is extremely hard.

The most important finding to emerge from this voluminous research is that alliances— especially with nuclear- armed allies like the United States— actually work in deterring conflict. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “selection bias” probably works against it. The United States is more inclined to offer— and protégés to seek— alliance rela- tionships in settings where the probability of military conflicts is higher than average. The fact that alliances work to deter conflict in precisely the situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy.

More specifically, these findings buttress the key theoretical implication that if the United States is interested in deterring military challenges to the status quo in key regions, relying only on latent military capabilities in the US homeland is likely to be far less effective than having an overseas military posture. Similarly, they lend support to the general proposition that a forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing to a status quo power, because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, restoring the status quo ante can be expected to be fearsomely costly. Recognizing the significance of these findings clearly casts doubt on the “wait on the sidelines and decide whether to intervene later” approach that is so strongly favored by retrenchment proponents.

The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.” These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists. 9 8

Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, findings are decidedly mixed. Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above- average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. 10

Bearing these challenges in mind, the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are:

* The most recent statistical analysis of the precise question at issue concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.” In addition, states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology to other nonnuclear states. 12 11
* Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter. 13
* Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb. … This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals.” 15 14
* Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment. In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks. 17
* Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur. But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met: (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries; (2) the prospective proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear- armed patron; and (3) the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear program. 18 19 16

In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War in 1989.” Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter- proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why. 20

The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them. It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. 21

This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces. The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.” 22 23

Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use. If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of 24 nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war. Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk.

Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.” Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises. As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?” The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. 27 26 25

#### Specifically---collapsing US heg means Russia fills in.

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At the core of the conflict between the West and Russia is the fundamental disagreement of the current Russian leadership with the post-Cold War European order. Russia is changing realities on the ground to create conditions that will lead to negotiations on a new security architecture for Europe and the entire Northern Hemisphere. The Russian idea of this new system of security is to limit the sovereignty of the countries in its neighborhood and prevent the penetration of Western hard and soft power, as well as its system of values and governance, in the former Soviet space, an area that Russia considers as its sphere of strategic interest. Russian leadership has on several occasions communicated this message to the international community.1 President Vladimir Putin, in his widely publicized 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, expressed Russia’s dissatisfaction with the existing “unipolar” character of the world order. He followed with a harsh criticism of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Western countries in general. He had already criticized the West’s push to fulfill all the conditions of the 1999 revised treaty on Conventional Arm Forces in Europe (CFE), including the removal of all Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova. But most importantly, he stated that “we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.”2 While the speech was publicized widely, world leaders did not take Putin’s statement seriously enough. The Russian leader had a plan that could lead to new realities, forcing others to pay more attention to Russian statements and actions. Implementation of that plan continues to this day. The Russian Federation took the first significant step to shake the existing European status quo in 2007 when Russia officially suspended its participation in the CFE treaty. This move was followed by the events in Georgia in 2008 when the Russian military invaded the territory of the sovereign country and maintained its military presence there after active conflict ended. Russia simultaneously recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions of Georgia, as independent states. All of these actions were publicized as a Russian response to recognizing Kosovo’s independence against the will of Serbia. The same argument was used in 2014. Russian leadership considered NATO’s commitment to Georgia and Ukraine at the 2008 Bucharest summit as a threat to Russia’s security interests. The immediate objective of the Russian Federation was to stop the Eastward expansion of European security and economic institutions. Its long-term goal was to push for a new security arrangement with NATO, the EU, and United States which would recognize Russian supremacy over the sovereign rights of the countries in Russia’s neighborhood. Under the premise of protecting its own sovereignty vis-àvis supra-national organizations and “universal” values,3 the Russian Federation has sought arrangements with Western powers designed to limit the sovereignty of neighboring states. Russia considers this process a legitimate method of ensuring its own security. Sovereignty in this context is understood as the supreme authority within a territory which is exercised in both internal development and external relations.4 The current international relations system is based on the sovereign rights of nation states, both internally and externally sovereign, to ally, trade, conclude agreements, open borders, etc., as well as on the Westphalian premise that interfering in other states’ governing prerogatives is illegitimate.5 The Russian Federation is using military force, coercion, and economic and energy supply disruptions to limit the sovereignty of other countries to prevent their integration into Western led institutions. Russia’s status as the prevailing military power is an essential element of Russian strategy. For Russia, asymmetry in power is a source of asymmetry in sovereignty. Experience of Russian policies vis-à-vis its neighbors, as well as military invasions in Ukraine and Georgia, demonstrates that today’s Russia aggressively pursues power politics to restore control over former Soviet Union space. The West needs a clear strategy to bring Russia back into the system of international norms, and rules and power politics should be part of it. Matching Russian military power in the Black Sea region will send a message that Moscow will understand. Ultimately, various sides need to come back to the basics of the Helsinki process, and the sovereignty of the nation states should remain as a fundamental principle of the stability in Europe.

#### Russian expansion installs a global white supremacist empire.

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In the aftermath of the Cold War, Russia experienced a crushing recession that left millions unemployed. The subsequent vacuum in the decades that followed saw the rapid expansion of the European Union and its single free market eastward. The EU now includes several former Soviet states, including some immediately bordering Russia (e.g., Estonia and Latvia.) More importantly, from a Russian security perspective, the NATO military alliance also expanded aggressively eastward after the Cold War, adding over a dozen European countries as members between 1999 and 2017. This expansion has put NATO allies, and NATO weapons, into countries immediately bordering Russia. The spread of western ideals such as free speech, free and open elections, and multiculturalism into eastern Europe are perceived as a threat to Russian culture and Russian influence. From the Russian point of view, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War was both a humiliating defeat and a harsh rebuke of Soviet-style Communism. A new post-Soviet, neo-fascist political philosophy rose from the ashes of Communism, and Russia is actively engaged in pursuing this philosophy. Their goal is nothing less than the creation of a new Eurasian Empire controlled by, and answering to, Russia. A New Blueprint (or “Putin’s To-Do List”) The Russian political elite could not tolerate the growing threat on their western border, but they needed a new geopolitical strategy – one that would establish goals and methods different from those that had failed the Soviet Union. In 1997, Aleksandr Dugin articulated and defined that new Russian strategy in a 600-page treatise entitled Foundations of Geopolitics. According to historian and Hoover Institution specialist John B. Dunlop, “There has probably not been another book published in Russia during the post-communist period which has exerted an influence on Russian military, police, and statist foreign policy elites comparable to that of Aleksandr Dugin’s 1997 neo-fascist treatise.” The Foundations of Geopolitics sold out in four editions, and continues to be assigned as a textbook at the General Staff Academy and other military universities in Russia. [source] Eurasian-ism As espoused by Dugin, Russia’s ultimate goal should be nothing less than rule of the world by ethnic Russians, based on a Eurasian empire extending from “Dublin to Vladivostok.” The philosophical basis for this empire will include the rejection of “Atlanticism,” identification of America as a common enemy, and refusal to allow traditional liberal political ideals (e.g., freedom of the press, freedom of speech, free markets, civil rights, etc.,) to affect Russia’s society or political system. According to political scientist Andreas Umland, the Russian political elites, headed by Vladimir Putin, view Dugin’s new Eurasian Empire not as a restoration of an idealized Russian Empire, but as a replacement for the Soviet Union. Eurasianism provides an ideological basis for a new form of Russian imperialism. As for strategic stepping stones toward a new Russian empire, Dugin offers a long list objectives. I have listed just a few of these below: Separate the United Kingdom from Europe. Russian annexation of Ukraine. A strategic alliance between Russia and Iran. Create “geopolitical shocks” within Turkey. Russian annexation of Tibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Finland should be absorbed into Russia. Encourage Germany and France to cooperate with each other and isolate themselves from Europe. Dismember the nation of Georgia. Geopolitical defeat of the United States Sound familiar? In terms of tactics, Foundations of Geopolitics recommends subversion of America and its alliances by encouraging and supporting separatism, isolationism, nationalism, and the creation of factions. It also calls for supporting radical separatist movements in western countries, including support for organizations that espouse extremist, racist, and sectarian ideals. Here is a passage taken directly from Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics (via Dunlop): “It is especially important to introduce geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements — extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S. It would also make sense simultaneously to support isolationist tendencies in American politics.” Evidence Russia Is Actively Pursuing Dugin’s Strategy Russia’s actions, both overt and covert, offer strong indications that her political and military leaders are actively pursuing the strategy described in Foundations. The overt actions include: Russian invasion of the nation of Georgia (2008.) Russian annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine (2014.) Economic and military support for anti-western regimes in Syria and Iran. As for covert (or disguised) actions by the Russian government in support of the Foundations strategy, consider these recent findings from western intelligence and news agencies: BREXIT: “More than 150,000 Russian-language Twitter accounts posted tens of thousands of messages in English urging Britain to leave the European Union in the days before last year’s referendum on the issue. … Most of the messages sought to inflame fears about Muslims and immigrants to help drive the vote.” – New York Times, 15-NOV-2017 US ELECTIONS: “Posts that circulated to a targeted, swing-state audience on Facebook railed against illegal immigrants and claimed “the only viable option is to elect Trump.” They were shared by what looked like a grassroots American, anti-immigrant group called Secured Borders, but Congressional investigators say the group is actually a Russian fabrication designed to influence American voters during and after the presidential election.” – ABC News, 27-SEP-2017 US ELECTIONS: “Russian agents intending to sow discord among American citizens disseminated inflammatory posts that reached 126 million users on Facebook, published more than 131,000 messages on Twitter and uploaded over 1,000 videos to Google’s YouTube service.” – New York Times, 30-OCT-2017 US ELECTIONS: “In July 2015, Russian intelligence gained access to Democratic National Committee (DNC) networks and maintained that access until at least June 2016.” – Findings from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 6-JAN-2017 US SOCIAL UNREST: “Two Russian Facebook pages organized dueling rallies in front of the Islamic Da’wah Center of Houston. Heart of Texas, a Russian-controlled Facebook group that promoted Texas secession, leaned into an image of the state as a land of guns and barbecue and amassed hundreds of thousands of followers. One of their ads on Facebook announced a noon rally on May 21, 2016 to “Stop Islamification of Texas.” A separate Russian-sponsored group, United Muslims of America, advertised a “Save Islamic Knowledge” rally for the same place and time. – The Texas Tribune, 1-NOV-2017 US SOCIAL UNREST: “A social media campaign calling itself “Blacktivist” and linked to the Russian government used both Facebook and Twitter in an apparent attempt to amplify racial tensions during the U.S. presidential election. Both Blacktivist accounts regularly shared content intended to stoke outrage. “Black people should wake up as soon as possible,” one post on the Twitter account read. “Black families are divided and destroyed by mass incarceration and death of black men,” another read. The accounts also posted videos of police violence against African Americans. These fake accounts provide further evidence that Russian-linked social media accounts saw racial tensions as something to be exploited in order to achieve the broader Russian goal of dividing Americans and creating chaos.” CNN, 28-SEP-2017 NOTE TO READERS: Even in light of the information above, I DO NOT necessarily believe that Hillary Clinton would have won the 2016 US Presidential election in the absence of Russian interference – I simply do not have enough data from which to draw that conclusion. I am however certain that Russia wanted Trump to win and spent millions of dollars on propaganda directed at Americans toward that end. How We (Americans) Are Helping Russia Achieve Its Imperialistic Goals Russian propaganda and incitements to separatism are spread through social media, and their success depends on our willingness to reflexively share stories that outrage us. As unwitting agents for Russia, each of us is helping spread the seeds of our own political and economic demise. Hundreds of fake Facebook accounts operating from within Russia purchased $100,000 worth of Facebook ads between mid-2015 and early 2017. These fake Facebook accounts managed to reach 126 million Facebook users during this time frame. Besides their sheer volume, one of the most striking aspects of the ads purchased by these fake accounts is their alignment with the strategy described in Foundations of Geopolitics, namely the creation of division and mistrust among Americans. Alex Stamos, the Chief Information Security Officer for Facebook, issued a statement about the ad placements on September 6, 2017. In it, he made these observations: The vast majority of ads run by these accounts didn’t specifically reference the US presidential election, voting or a particular candidate. Rather, the ads and accounts appeared to focus on amplifying divisive social and political messages across the ideological spectrum — touching on topics from LGBT matters to race issues to immigration to gun rights.

#### That will be drastically worse than the US.

Richard **Arnold 15**. Muskingum University. 05/2015. “Systematic Racist Violence in Russia between ‘Hate Crime’ and ‘Ethnic Conflict.’” Theoretical Criminology, edited by Gavin Slade and Matthew Light, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 239–256.

Scope and characteristics of systematic racist violence in Russia One of the most visible social movements in contemporary Russia, especially following the invasion of Crimea under the pretext of saving ethnic Russians from the allegedly ‘fascist’ Ukrainian government, is the extreme nationalist or ‘skinhead’ movement. After the fall of the Soviet Union, many observers worried about a so-called ‘Weimar Russia’ scenario (Brubaker, 1996; Luks, 2008; Yanov, 1995), noting the similarities between Germany after the First World War and Russia after the Cold War. Both cases featured legends about an internal enemy, a rejection of the West as a model of development, an ethnic diaspora living outside of the country, a transition from a highly regimented to a more open society, and the revenge of former elites. Although this analogy should not be overdrawn (see Luks, 2008), a further parallel between the two cases lies in the explosion of Russia’s skinhead subculture from about the year 2000. Shnirel’man (2007, 28; citing Tarasov, 2006: 19) estimates the number of skinheads in Russia in 1996 at between 7000 and 8000.5 By 2007, this number had grown to 60,000–65,000, or, as noted above, roughly half the world’s total skinhead population, with organized groups in some 85 Russian cities. Moreover, racist violence by skinhead groups now occurs in Russia on a near-daily basis. Although there are no official published statistics, annual reports from a major NGO, Moscow’s SOVA Center (Verkhovskii, 2005, 2006, 2007; Verkhovskii et al., 2010, 2012, 2013), catalogue incidents of skinhead violence. The level of racist violence was highest between 2005 and 2009, after which (as I describe below) the state belatedly stepped up its policing efforts. In 2007, SOVA recorded skinheads as killing 97 people and beating 623. In 2009, the respective numbers were 94 and 443. This number may be an underestimate, as SOVA compiles its data from reports in regional newspapers and regional networks of monitoring experts (Arnold, 2010b). It is likely that many incidents of racist violence do not get included in these regional data, and thus in SOVA reports, because victims are afraid to report their attacks. To measure the scale of underreporting, Amnesty International conducted a survey of ethnic minorities in Moscow, finding that just 61 of 204 racist attacks were reported to the police (McClintock, 2005: 70). These data make Russia the most violent country in the former Soviet Union for ethnic and racial minorities, far outstripping the next most dangerous country, Ukraine, where, even accounting for the difference in population size (roughly one-third of Russia’s), the statistics are much lower. In 2006, for instance, 522 people were beaten in Russia and 66 killed in racist crimes. For comparison, in Ukraine there were 12 beaten and two killed. In 2008, in Russia 434 people were beaten and 97 killed. In the same year in Ukraine, there were 79 beaten and four killed (Umland and Shekhovtsov, 2013: 48). While there has been a decline in racist violence since its peak in 2008, skinheads still remain a potent force in Russia, with 187 deaths and 206 people wounded in 2012 (Verkhovskii et al., 2013: 130–137). Racist groups still thrive in Russia and form a substantial portion of the social support for Putin’s ‘Novorossia’ policy of reuniting ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine (see Arnold, 2014c). Comparisons with the West are more difficult. The best available resource, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) report on systematic racist violence for 2012, recorded nine violent hate crimes in Austria, 98 hate crimes of violence in Germany, one case in the United States, and 10 in the United Kingdom. The same report estimated violent racist crimes in Russia at over 120. The level of racist violence in contemporary Russia is thus the highest in the OSCE. These statistics are almost certainly undercounted for every country and especially so in Russia.6 In looking for historical parallels, one author reports that ‘during the 1980s … the tally of skinhead violence [in the United States] included 121 murders of blacks and gays in urban areas across the nation, 302 racial assaults, and 301 cross burnings’ (Bowling, 1998; Wooden, 1991, cf. Hamm, 1993: 3). The level of racist violence for one year in Russia is thus higher than the entire decade in the United States where Americans were most concerned about this violence. Thus, Russia experiences a very high level of racist violence compared to other OECD countries. Statistics on the number of racist crimes, moreover, do not capture the qualitative differences between them, which further reveal the systematic nature of Russian racist violence. Elsewhere (Arnold, 2009), I have disaggregated the concept ‘ethnic violence’ (of which racist violence is a part) committed by skinheads into four ideal-types: symbolic violence; lynching; pogrom; and massacre. Symbolic violence refers to non-widespread property damage such as graffiti, and pogrom to widespread property damage. Lynching refers to the murder or physical injury of persons. Finally, massacre refers to widespread physical injury and killing of persons. The type of skinhead violence varies by the ethnicity of the subject. Most symbolic violence is used against Jews, as in the spate of anti-Semitic signs erected in Russia by the side of highways from 2002 to 2005. Most lynching is used against Africans, as in the 2002 beating of an African-American US embassy guard. Most pogrom-style violence is used against migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia, as in the 2002 skinhead raid on the Tsaritsino open-air market in Moscow, the 2006 pogrom in the town of Kondopoga, and the 2013 pogrom in Birulyevo, a Moscow suburb. Massacre is most commonly used against the Roma, as in a 2006 incident outside Volgograd when skinheads armed with iron bars beat eight Roma in their camp. This use of racist violence to send such inter-community messages reflects its systemic nature. Explaining the proliferation of skinheads in Russia and abroad Several aspects of post-Soviet social change contribute to racist violence and skinhead proliferation. Part of the attraction of the skinhead subculture in Russia comes from (mainly) young people’s problems of anomie and alienation. One of the most commonly cited causes of skinhead groups in the West is economic decline (Bowling, 1998: 54; Hamm, 1993: 215–216). Unemployed youths with time on their hands need outlets for their frustration. Just as the rise of the skinhead movements in Britain and the United States coincided with industrial decline, Russia experienced an even more precipitous economic decline in the 1990s. Despite economic recovery in the 2000s, unemployment, poor career prospects, and lack of entertainment options remain a problem for many Russian young people. Without the ideological glue of communism, social bonds have frayed as Russian society struggles to find new social legitimations. Elsewhere in the world, racist ideas have historically appealed to young men unhappy with their prospects, as studies of white supremacism in the United States have shown (Hamm, 1993: 211–213). In Russia, however, the 1990s economic and ideological collapse was more severe than any analogous transformation in contemporary western societies, so that organized racism truly emerged as an ‘alternative to Communism’ (Shnirel’man, 2007: 58). As with homicide (see Lysova and Shchitov, this issue), Russia’s persistently high levels of racist violence thus reflect not so much temporary economic hardship as the continuing failure to create an appealing alternative to the communist system. As in other developed countries, Russian skinhead groups violently reject immigration (and internal migration) by ethnic minorities. Extremist groups regularly refer to a ‘genocide’ of ethnic Russians,7 playing on widespread racialized fears of demographic decline. In 1993 Russia’s population stood at 148.6 million but by 2012 had declined to 143 million, the largest peacetime population decline ever recorded in any modern country (Heleniak, 2013). The decline is largely explained by low fertility rates and a low male life expectancy (which in the 2000s fell to 57.5 years). To make up for the labor shortfall, Russia has experienced increased immigration from other post-Soviet countries, most of whom are drawn from non-Russian ethnic groups, such as Armenians, Azeris, and Georgians from the Caucasus, and Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks from Central Asia. Heleniak offers the claim (which Russian officials are fond of repeating) that Russia now has the secondlargest number of immigrants in the world after the United States, including some five to six million undocumented immigrants. The official Muslim population grew from 7.9 percent of the total in the 1989 census to 10.2 percent in 2012, a likely underestimate, given heavily Muslim undocumented immigration from Central Asia. Could one, then, argue that Russia’s skinhead violence was somehow directly produced by higher levels of immigration and resulting ethnic and cultural changes? To be sure, immigration clearly figures into the rise of Russian skinheads, just as the original skinhead movement itself grew out of the ‘Teddy Boy’ subculture that emerged in post- Second World War Britain in part as a reaction to what was then a new phenomenon, large-scale non-white immigration from the Commonwealth (Hamm, 1993: 15–17). However, the ‘fact of’ immigration should be distinguished from the ‘response to’ it in seeking to explain the extreme growth of systematic racist violence in post-1991 Russia. If immigration itself, or even large-scale non-white immigration, produced such violence, then countries of immigration such as Canada and Australia would today be world leaders in such violence. Thus, as an analytical matter, Russia’s skinhead problem is puzzlingly large even for a major immigration-receiving country. In consequence, it is more promising to consider how immigration is received in a given society than to treat immigration as an objective cause of racist violence. Only a discursive and political analysis can explain why Russian society has become particularly fertile ground for such violence. Discursive and ideological factors Pseudo-scientific racism has a longer pedigree in Russia than one might suppose. Although in the USSR such racism was largely constrained by the regime’s official ‘socialist internationalism’, racist ideas entered Russian intellectual life even before the fall of communism. The ‘Soviet Theory of Ethnos’, formulated in the late 1970s, claimed that ethnic distinctions were real and immutable, and had evolved in dialogue with the local environment (Tishkov, 1997). Thus, Lev Gumilev (1990) theorized in Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere that the behavior of ancient nomadic tribes could be traced to fluctuations in solar radiation based on their geographic location. This was fertile soil for more doctrinaire racist thinking. By 1997, there were 10 neo-pagan groups in Moscow and Leningrad alone. The neo-pagans and in particular their most prominent figure, Aleksandr Dugin, preserved theories espoused by Nazi thinkers. Dugin is a former professor at Moscow State University, the chief ideologist of the ‘Eurasian’ movement in Russia, a consultant for the Kremlin, and frequent participant in televised debates.8 In this milieu, the idea of the ‘Great White Race’ appeared with specifically Eurasian characteristics (Moroz, 2005). In the post-Soviet era, such views have become more widespread and have won official backing. Indeed, since the 1990s, the idea of the Aryan origin of the Russian people has discreetly entered into academic studies of history … In 1999 [several individuals] founded an organization Biblioteka rasovoi mysli (‘library of racial thinking’) which publishes nineteenth and twentieth century works on physical anthropology, some of them by Russians but primarily by Western authors. (Laruelle, 2010: 26) These Aryan ideas have evidently played out in at least some documented acts of racist violence. For example, anti-Semitic neo-pagan literature was found in the possession of a young man who walked into a synagogue in 2006, shouting ‘I will kill Jews’, and stabbed several congregants (Shnirel’man, 2007: 88–89). Such ideas may also influence Russian government policy, as think-tanks espousing racist ideas have emerged.9 As a related matter, officially promoted Russian chauvinism has made a substantial comeback during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Some authors describe Putin’s ideology as ‘civilizational nationalism’—the idea that Russia represents a different and better version of modernity than the West (Verkhovskii and Payin, 2012) and has its own Sonderweg, or special historical path. Such a ‘special path’ was implicit in the claim by Putin’s chief ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, that Russia is a ‘sovereign democracy’ that does not need to imitate the institutions of liberal democracy. This ‘civilizational nationalism’ is attractive to the Kremlin because it helps square a particular ideological circle. While the direct endorsement of ethnic Russian chauvinism (or overt racism) might be destabilizing for a multiethnic country such as Russia and would lead to condemnation from western officials, the claim that Russia is distinct from the West and does not need its institutions gives the regime an ideological basis that some people in Russia find appealing, and also deflects criticisms of Putin’s undemocratic practices. In addition to this official endorsement of exclusionary nationalism, particular official attitudes toward the management of ethnic diversity and geographic mobility may facilitate the rise of skinheads. These attitudes predate the current Russian regime. While the Soviet Union formally endorsed ethnic diversity, it adopted a primordialist view of ethnicity as unchanging and linked to specific historic ‘homelands’ in which particular ethnic groups could flourish. This ideology was reflected in the ethno-federal structure of the USSR, with 15 republics ostensibly determined by the dominant ethnic groups within them, as well as formally autonomous ethnic homelands for the non-Slavic ethnic groups within the Russian republic (Slezkine, 1994). Even in the post-Soviet period, Tishkov (1997) argues that primordial conceptions of ethnicity still dominate the Russian intellectual establishment. This can be seen in the widely popular concept of ‘ethnic distance,’ identified by Payin and Susarov (1996: 53), namely ‘the cultural differences between the representatives of different ethnic groups that limit capacities for mutual adaptation’. Such a position implicitly presents hostile interactions as an inevitable part of inter-cultural encounters. Russian officials exhibit hostility to the emergence of new cultural practices as a result of migration. The Soviet government strictly regulated emigration, immigration, and internal migration using a complex system of internal passports and ‘residence permits’ (propiska) (Light, 2012b). Soviet migration policies also entailed the mass displacement of populations for reasons of state. Hill (2003) argues that the Soviet leadership conceived of territory without a population as a security risk and so relocated vast numbers of people to Siberia, where there was neither the climate nor the economic base to support them. In addition, although Soviet migration management had a number of goals, including political surveillance and economic mobilization, it was also used to govern specific ethnic groups, such as the ‘punished peoples’ whom Stalin subjected to internal exile during the Second World War (Polian, 2004). Although the 1993 post-Soviet Russian constitution repudiated the previous draconian migration restrictions, their residue remains in much policy and practice. Thus, some regions of Russia, such as the southern province of Krasnodar, continue to limit residence rights based on ethnicity, although such restrictions are formally illegal (Kuznetsov and Popov, 2008). Moreover, much official discourse is still premised on assumptions derived from Soviet policies concerning the geographic boundaries of particular cultures. This means, in effect, that certain cultural practices, or certain people, are ‘out of place’, even when they are legally present. In consequence, although migration per se is not new in contemporary Russia (as the Soviet Union also featured extensive internal migration), neither Russian society as a whole nor political elites are well prepared to accept the consequences of post-Soviet migration, whether in the appearance of new ethnic minorities throughout Russia, or the cultural or religious practices of such new migrant communities. For example, the population of Soviet-era Moscow was overwhelmingly ethnically Russian, although Moscow was the capital of a multi-ethnic state in which Russians were barely half the national population (Colton, 1995: 407). Today, post-Soviet migration has created a truly multiethnic Moscow, with millions of residents from Central Asia and the Caucasus and the largest Muslim population of any European city. Yet the Moscow government and many residents continue to reject public expressions of non-Russian culture, often in highly 248 Theoretical Criminology 19(2) racist terms (Light, 2010; Vendina, 2013). Likewise, although post-Soviet migration has produced Muslim communities in new regions of Russia, their right to practice their religion is widely infringed, often through the official argument that Islam is not a traditional religion of the region (Light, 2012a). Thus, the effects of increased non-ethnic Russian immigration on racist violence are not direct, but rather are mediated through official ambivalence about racial and cultural equality and the rights of migrants. Primordial concepts of identity, geographically circumscribed ethnic homelands, and ‘ethnic distance’ provide tacit legitimation for racist violence, or at least limit the extent to which official condemnation of racist violence can be effective. Although the exact influence of such attitudes on systematic racist violence would be difficult to capture, they are clearly part of the milieu in which it flourishes. They are also reflected in lax enforcement policies that have facilitated the infiltration of Russia by western skinhead groups, as I chart below. Official passivity and international connections No country has a sterling record when it comes to fighting racist violence. Scholarly analysis should consider the degree of official involvement or complicity in such violence, as well as the historical trajectory of the official response. In the United Kingdom, it took a series of violent events (most notably the 1993 death of Stephen Lawrence) to make the police take the problem of violent racism seriously (Bowling, 1998). Formally non-state but effectively state-sanctioned violence—widespread lynching of African- Americans—continued in the United States from the end of the Civil War through the 1960s. And many western societies, including the United States, continue to experience racialized police violence against minorities. Even so, in post-Soviet Russia, it has proved especially challenging to build a professional police force capable and willing to investigate racist violence effectively. In part, this is because racist attitudes are widespread in the police themselves and openly displayed, as evidenced in a study of police ethnic profiling on the Moscow metro which found ‘the most extreme and egregious ethnic profiling ever documented through a statistical survey of the practice’ (Open Society, 2006: 31). Light (2010) links such profiling to violent police extortion practices targeting minorities with the tacit approval of city officials. Other factors are also important. In part, investigation and prosecution of hate crimes may suffer from broader problems of police management and service (see Light et al., this issue). The Russian government has consciously refrained from aggressive prosecution of racist hate crimes, probably because such prosecutions would interfere with the official promotion of Russian nationalism (Schenk, 2010: 114). The government has often preferred to bring charges of ‘hooliganism’ rather than charges of racist violence, even when the latter would clearly have been appropriate, suggesting an unwillingness to acknowledge the problem or tackle it seriously. Yet it is not all bad news. Since 2009, for instance, the state has begun prosecuting racist violence with greater vigor in an attempt to defang the neo-Nazi movement, after several high-profile skinhead attacks on officials (Verkhovskii et al., 2013). Thus, in 2010, there were 91 hate crimes convictions affecting 297 people, and in 2011, 61 convictions affecting 193 people. These figures can be compared with the 23 convictions Arnold 249 affecting 65 people in 2007, when hate crimes were at their most frequent. Nonetheless, the increase in prosecution may just reflect concerns about the potential of racist organizations to challenge the state itself rather than a fundamental change in official policy, let alone a newfound desire to protect ethnic minorities against racial violence. One effect of the official unwillingness to confront racist violence has been the infiltration into Russia of international racist organizations. In the early 1990s, racist groups in the United States, Britain, and Germany began establishing branches in Russia (Belikov, 2011). Shnirel’man (2007: 23) identifies 1997 as a turning point, when Russian skinheads started to ‘get regular support from their European and American brethren’. Such support initially came from the American Ku Klux Klan and German skinhead groups such as ‘The Right Union’ and ‘Young Vikings’, who gave their Russian counterparts literature, uniforms, and audio-cassettes with recorded speeches about ‘white internationalism’. Other skinhead groups, such as the British ‘Blood and Honor/Combat 18’ and ‘The White Bulldogs’ also set up Russian ‘franchises’. A special Russian forum has existed on the international skinhead ‘Stormfront’ website since 2002. There is evidence that such transnational racism motivates systematic violent racism in Russia. Thus, in October 2013, some youths attacked the Biru-za shopping center in southern Moscow, while shouting ‘White power!’—in English. Moreover, prominent western and Russian racists have become increasingly friendly over the years, sometimes with official involvement. At an international racist convention in 2006, attended by former Louisiana state senator and leader of the Ku Klux Klan David Duke, Russia was designated as the ‘white world’s future’ and the ‘great hope’ of the white race (Arnold and Romanova, 2013). The conference concluded with exhortations to construct a new racially homogenous home in Russia, styled the ‘white Eurasia’ or ‘white Siberia’. Other international meetings of western and Russian racists have followed, with a 2007 conference in Yalta, and presentations in Belgium by Russian racist ideologue Pavel Tulaev. Likewise, in October 2014, the ‘Eurasianist’ Aleksandr Dugin met with US and European racists in Budapest (Arnold, 2014a). Figures close to the Kremlin have also funded similar racist and homophobic conferences (Shekhovtsov, 2015). Indeed, the Kremlin has been courting the leaders of European Far Right parties, such as Marine Le Pen, leader of the French Front Nationale; Nick Griffin, the leader of the British National Party; leaders of the Belgian racist movement Vlaams Belang; and Gabor Vona of Hungary’s racist party, Jobbik (Shekhovtsov, 2015). Members of these parties helped monitor the ‘referendum’ in Crimea on its annexation by Russia in 2014, suggesting that the Russian government can now mobilize international right-wing support for its policies.10

#### The alternative and the role of debate is to center epistemology that involves the benefits of US primacy.

#### Nuanced debates about the necessity of internationalism lock in deep engagement---the public is primed to ignore the benefits of great-power peace in favor of shallow indictments of its cost.

---Card is the 5th of a list of things to help heg ---- here are the other 4

1. Sustain grand strategy
2. Fund/maintain primacy
3. Sustain alliances
4. Use relative restraint

**Brands 18** [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 21-23]

Fifth and finally, sustaining America’s post–Cold War strategy entails persuading the American public to recommit to that strategy and the investments it requires. The state of American opinion on that subject is currently ambiguous. Polling data indicates that public support for most key aspects of American internationalism has recovered somewhat from where it was in 2012–13, and is again at or near postwar averages.32 But the 2016 election cycle and its eventual outcome revealed strong support for candidates who advocated rolling back key elements of post–Cold War (and post–World War II) grand strategy, from free trade to U.S. alliances. This atmosphere reflects discontent with the failures and frustrations of U.S. grand strategy in the post–Cold War era, no doubt, yet it also reflects the fact that American strategy seems at risk of becoming a victim of its own success.33 By helping to foster a comparatively stable and congenial environment, American policies have made it more difficult for Americans to remember why significant investments in the global order are needed in the first place.

Today, this ambivalence is becoming increasingly problematic, for the simple reason that properly resourcing American strategy requires making politically difficult trade-offs with respect to entitlements and other ballooning domestic costs. It is also becoming problematic, of course, because even if the American public seems to support particular aspects of American grand strategy, the public has shown itself willing to elect a president who appears to care little for the successful postwar and post–Cold War tradition, even if he has, so far, maintained more aspects of that tradition as president than his campaign rhetoric might have led one to expect. In the future—and indeed, looking beyond Trump’s presidency— sustaining American grand strategy will thus require more intensive political efforts.

American leaders will need to more effectively make the case for controversial but broadly beneficial policies such as free trade, while also addressing the inevitable socioeconomic dislocations such policies cause.34 They will need to more fully articulate the underlying logic and value of alliances and other commitments whose costs are often more visible—not to say greater—than their benefits. They will need to remind Americans that their country’s leadership has not been a matter of charity; it has helped produce an international order that is exceptional in its stability, liberalism, and benefits for the United States. Not least, they will need to make the case that the costs that the country has borne in support of that order are designed to avoid the necessity of bearing vastly higher costs if the international scene returned to a more tumultuous state. After all, the success of American statecraft is often reflected in the bad things that don’t happen as well as in the good things that do. Making this point is essential to reconsolidating domestic support now and in the future—and to preserving a grand strategy that has delivered pretty good results for a quarter century.

### 2

1. Nuke war hurts native’s disproportionately, the need for more nuclear energy causes massive amount sof dumping on Native populations.

#### Extinction is the only coherent and egalitarian framework – prefer it

Khan 18 (Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/)

Infinite future possibilities I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that human culture is far from immutable. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges. Secondly, that even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. This is a humbling realization. Because faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the possibilities seem endless. They range from an era of abundance to the end of humanity, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns about extinction are often dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism. Sometimes, they are. But repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility. And there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos discusses how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: 1. Extinction is the rule, not the exception More than 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable to the human brain. But if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than 99.9% of all the distinct human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared Diamond charts the history of past societies. He makes the case that overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, if not the only, drivers of collapse. Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, we must still achieve tremendous step changes in our response to several major environmental crises. We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050, and a 90% chance by 2075. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. Visionaries like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’. Tribes have overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals. Even today, our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves. Our task is to find our own Nunuku’s Law. Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. It would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.

#### Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 2017 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true>, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

### Case