## 1

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing-hedonistic act util

#### 1] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### 2] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### 3] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### 4] Extinction is a distinct phenomenon that requires prior consideration

**Burke et al 16** Associate Professor of International and Political Studies @ UNSW, Australia, 2016 (Anthony, Stefanie Fishel is Assistant Professor, Department of Gender and Race Studies at the University of Alabama, Audra Mitchell is CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and, Daniel J. Levine is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, “Planet Politics: Manifesto from the End of IR,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1–25)

8. Global ethics must respond to mass extinction. In late 2014, the Worldwide Fund for Nature reported a startling statistic: according to their global study, 52% of species had gone extinct between 1970 and 2010.60 This is not news: for three decades, conservation biologists have been warning of a ‘sixth mass extinction’, which, by definition, could eliminate more than three quarters of currently existing life forms in just a few centuries.61 In other words, it could threaten the practical possibility of the survival of earthly life. Mass extinction is not simply extinction (or death) writ large: **it is a qualitatively different phenomena that demands its own ethical categories.** It cannot be grasped by aggregating species extinctions, let alone the deaths of individual organisms. Not only does it erase diverse, irreplaceable life forms, their **unique histories** and **open-ended possibilities**, but it **threatens the ontological conditions of Earthly life**.

IR is one of few disciplines that is explicitly devoted to the pursuit of survival, yet it has almost nothing to say in the face of a possible mass extinction event.62 It utterly lacks the conceptual and ethical frameworks necessary to foster diverse, meaningful responses to this phenomenon. As mentioned above, Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their scale and moral horror. However, they are asymptotic: they imagine nightmares of a severely denuded planet, yet they do not contemplate the **comprehensive negation** that a mass extinction event entails. In contemporary IR discourses, where it appears at all, extinction is treated as a problem of scientific management and biopolitical control aimed at securing existing human lifestyles.63 Once again, this approach fails to recognise the reality of extinction, which is a **matter of being and nonbeing**, not one of life and death processes.

Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is ‘lost’ in extinction has, since the inception of the concept of ‘conservation’, been addressed in terms of financial cost and economic liabilities.64 Beyond reducing life to forms to capital, currencies and financial instruments, the dominant neoliberal political economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon. Yet the **enormity, complexity, and scale** of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to **draw on every possible resource in order to find ways of responding**. This means that they need to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways – including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies. Above all, it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a **matter of global ethics**. It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular visions of the good life. Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change.

9. An Earth-worldly politics. Humans are worldly – that is, we are fundamentally worldforming and embedded in multiple worlds that traverse the Earth. However, the Earth is not ‘our’ world, as the grand theories of IR, and some accounts of the Anthropocene have it – an object and possession to be appropriated, circumnavigated, instrumentalised and englobed.65 Rather, it is a complex of worlds that we share, co-constitute, create, destroy and inhabit with countless other life forms and beings.

The formation of the Anthropocene reflects a particular type of worlding, one in which the Earth is treated as raw material for the creation of a world tailored to human needs. Heidegger famously framed ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as two countervailing, conflicting forces that constrain and shape one another. We contend that existing political, economic and social conditions have pushed human worlding so far to one extreme that it has become almost entirely detached from the conditions of the Earth. Planet Politics calls, instead, for a mode of worlding that is responsive to, and grounded in, the Earth. One of these ways of being Earth-worldly is to embrace the condition of being entangled. We can interpret this term in the way that Heidegger66 did, as the condition of being mired in everyday human concerns, worries, and anxiety, to prolong existence. But, in contrast, we can and should reframe it as authors like Karen Barad67 and Donna Haraway68 have done. To them and many others, ‘entanglement’ is a radical, indeed fundamental condition of being-with, or, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, ‘being singular plural’.69 This means that no being is truly autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum physics. World itself is singular plural: what humans tend to refer to as ‘the’ world is actually a multiplicity of worlds at various scales that intersect, overlap, conflict, emerge as they surge across the Earth. World emerges from the poetics of existence, the collision of energy and matter, the tumult of agencies, the fusion and diffusion of bonds.

Worlds erupt from, and consist in, the intersection of **diverse forms of being** – material and intangible, organic and inorganic, ‘living’ and ‘nonliving’. Because of the tumultuousness of the Earth with which they are entangled, ‘**worlds’ are not static, rigid or permanent. They are permeable and fluid**. They can be **created**, **modified** – and, of course, destroyed. Concepts of violence, harm and (in)security that focus only on humans ignore at their peril the destruction and severance of worlds,70 **which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life on Earth to thrive.**

#### 5] No intent-foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the death of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### 6] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first which is the most intuitive.

#### Outweighs- A] Parsimony- metaphysics relies on long chains of questionable claims that make conclusions less likely. B] Hijacks- intuitions are inevitable since even every framework must take some unjustified assumption as a starting point.

#### 7] Calc indicts fail: A] Ethics- it would indict everything since they use events to understand how their ethics have worked B] Reciprocity- they are NIBs that create a 2:1 skew where I have to answer them to access offense while they only have to win one C] Internalism- asking why we value pain and pleasure is nonsensical cuz the answer is intrinsic since we just do, which means we still prefer hedonism despite shortcomings.

#### 8] Err affirmative, because of innate cognitive biases

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>,

1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

## 2

#### Bill passes now- negotiations are holding with Manchin and Sinema-but UN meeting and state elections make it so that there is no margin for error

Edmonson and Cochrane 10-24 Catie Edmondson and Emily Cochrane, 10-24-2021, "Biden Meets With Manchin and Schumer as Democrats Race to Finish Social Policy Bill," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/24/us/politics/biden-manchin-schumer-spending-bill.html/SJKS

WASHINGTON — President Biden huddled with key Democrats on Sunday to iron out crucial spending and [tax provisions](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/26/us/politics/democrats-billionaires-tax.html) as they raced to wrap up their expansive social safety net legislation before his appearance at a U.N. climate summit next week. Speaker Nancy Pelosi of California said Democrats were close to completing the bill, displaying confidence that the negotiations over issues like paid leave, tax increases and Medicare benefits that have bedeviled the party for months would soon end. “We have 90 percent of the bill agreed to and written. We just have some of the last decisions to be made,” Ms. Pelosi said on CNN’s “State of the Union,” adding that she hoped to pass an infrastructure bill that had already cleared the Senate and have a deal in hand on the social policy bill by the end of the week. “We’re pretty much there now.” Her comments came as Mr. Biden met with Senators Chuck Schumer of New York, the majority leader, and Joe Manchin III of West Virginia, one of the critical centrist holdouts on the budget bill. The White House called the breakfast at Mr. Biden’s Wilmington home a “productive discussion.” For weeks, intraparty divisions over the scope and size of their marquee [domestic policy plan](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/10/26/us/biden-spending-bill-deal) have delayed an agreement on how to trim the initial $3.5 trillion blueprint Democrats passed this year. In order to bypass united Republican opposition and pass the final bill, Democrats are using an arcane budget process known as reconciliation, which shields fiscal legislation from a filibuster but would require every Senate Democrat to unite behind the plan in the evenly divided chamber. The party’s margins in the House are not much more forgiving. Facing opposition over the $3.5 trillion price tag, White House and party leaders are coalescing around a cost of up to $2 trillion over 10 years. They have spent days negotiating primarily with Mr. Manchin and Senator Kyrsten Sinema, Democrat of Arizona and another centrist holdout. House Democratic leaders hope to advance both a compromise reconciliation package and the $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure package. Liberals have so far balked at voting on the bipartisan deal until the more expansive domestic policy package — which is expected to address climate change, public education and health care — is agreed upon. But Democrats are facing a new sense of urgency to finish the legislation before Mr. Biden’s trip to a major United Nations climate change conference, where he [hopes to point to the bill](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/15/climate/biden-clean-energy-manchin.html) as proof that the United States is serious about leading the effort to fight global warming. “The president looked us in the eye, and he said: ‘I need this before I go and represent the United States in Glasgow. American prestige is on the line,’” Representative Ro Khanna, a California Democrat who met with Mr. Biden last week at the White House, said on “Fox News Sunday.” Democrats are also increasingly eager to deliver the bipartisan legislation to Mr. Biden’s desk before elections for governor in Virginia and New Jersey on Nov. 2, to show voters the party is making good on its promise to deliver sweeping social change. And a number of transportation programs will lapse at the end of the month without congressional action on either a stopgap extension or passage of the infrastructure bill, leading to possible furloughs. The legislation is expected to include a one-year extension of payments to most families with children, first approved as part of the $1.9 trillion pandemic relief plan, as well as an increase in funds for Pell grants, support for home and elder care, and billions of dollars for affordable housing. It would also provide tax incentives to encourage use of wind, solar and other clean energy. While aides cautioned that details were in flux, the plan is also expected to address a cap on how much taxpayers can deduct in state and local taxes, a key priority for Mr. Schumer and other lawmakers who represent higher-income residents of high-tax states affected by the limit. But negotiators on Sunday were still haggling over a number of outstanding pieces, including the details of a federal paid family and medical leave program — already cut to four weeks from 12 weeks — Medicaid expansion and a push to expand Medicare benefits to include dental, vision and hearing. With Mr. Manchin pushing for a $1.5 trillion price tag, Democratic officials are urging for him to accept more spending in order to avoid dropping other programs.

#### Labor reform saps PC – empirically prove with Obama, corporate opposition, and Democratic resistance

Leon 21 Luis Feliz Leon, 01-06-2021, “"If we want it, we’re going to have to fight like hell for it" - Labor faces an uphill battle to pass the PRO Act,” Strike Wave, https://www.thestrikewave.com/original-content/labor-faces-uphill-battle-to-pass-pro-act/SJKS

The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which died in the Senate during President Barack Obama’s first term, had similar potential to increase union membership, as it would have enabled workers to get union representation if a majority signed union cards (“card check”) rather than through an election. It died because Obama was unwilling to put political capital behind it to overcome opposition from Republicans and center-right Democrats. “EFCA was very close to becoming law. At the end of the day, in my view, the Obama administration did not put the necessary political capital into securing its passage,” said EPI's McNicholas. “The Obama administration decided to focus on ‘bipartisan’ and ‘reach across the aisle’ type solutions to the 2008 financial crisis, and thus didn't care about EFCA in the face of the anti-EFCA mobilization by strong ‘antis’ like the Chamber of Commerce,” says Susan Kang, a professor of political science at John Jay College who studies political economy, labor, and human rights. “Basically, labor was swept aside by the Obama administration … at the exact moment when he had the strongest mandate and political capital.” Another issue, said Patrick Burke, an organizer with United Auto Workers Local 2322 in Massachusetts, was that EFCA's card-check provisions, when framed as a replacement for elections, “became very easy to demonize and difficult to explain to people not already familiar with labor law.” “The short story is that the EFCA was doomed from a few moderate Dems not being willing to go through with card check once actually in power to enact it. The long story is that the labor movement's disappearance from the ‘adult table’ of Democratic politics has cyclical downward effects. They're less able to convince Dems to go out on the limb for them and to prioritize their legislative requests,” said Brandon Magner, a labor lawyer in Indiana. Despite a history of betrayal and rejection, labor and immigrant rights organizations, [coalesced](https://progressive.org/dispatches/power-behind-win-feliz-leon-201123/) around Biden, a self-professed “[union guy](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/16/biden-holds-joint-meeting-with-union-leaders-and-retail-auto-tech-ceos.html),” after the primaries and [helped deliver](https://progressive.org/dispatches/bargaining-rights-with-that-feliz-leon-201229/) him to the White House in the hope that doing so would lead to [executive action](https://indypendent.org/2020/12/immigrants-rights-advocates-descend-on-delaware/) on immigration and labor law reform. “We call on Congress to pass and Biden to sign the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act early in 2021 to make sure every worker who wants to form or join a union is able to do so freely and fairly,” AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka said in a [statement](https://aflcio.org/press/releases/afl-cio-looks-forward-working-president-elect-joe-biden-0) after the election. But union organizers, researchers, and labor lawyers see dim prospects for winning significant labor reform during the Biden administration. “The PRO Act is obviously dead in the Senate unless Mitch McConnell gets knocked into the minority, but I don't see it being passed without full-throated support for gutting the filibuster from Biden, Harris, Schumer, Durbin, and more,” said Magner, the labor lawyer, adding that “the history of failed labor law reform efforts indicates you need 60 votes to pass anything.” That is particularly true of Democrats in “right-to-work” states like [South Carolina](https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/scs-rep-joe-cunningham-to-vote-against-pro-union-bill-in-break-with-democrats/article_426b38e2-4862-11ea-a0d9-77a96531c47e.html) where U.S. Rep. Joe Cunningham was a reliable opponent in the House. But the greatest liability might be Biden himself. “The few times that Biden met McConnell at the negotiating table during the Obama years, McConnell [left with Biden’s wallet](https://theintercept.com/2019/06/24/joe-biden-tax-cuts-mitch-mconnell/),” dryly [observed](https://theintercept.com/2020/12/28/mcconnell-trump-election/) The Intercept’s Ryan Grim. “Even if the Democrats capture the Georgia Senate seats, their margin will be too small to overcome a Republican filibuster or, if they change the rules, more than one Democrat will break ranks, and no Republicans will support the act,” said Friedman. Even if Biden were to somehow outmaneuver McConnell’s chicanery, there would be fierce opposition to contend with on the corporate side from the likes of Americans for Tax Reform, which has [used](https://www.atr.org/ab5) Georgia runoff elections as an opportunity to fearmonger on the PRO Act, and, when backed against the wall, Biden may revert to his timeworn moderate instincts and not go to bat for labor reform unless forced to. “Prospects for major labor law reform under the Biden administration are directly tied to unions’ and union federations’ willingness to hold the administration’s feet to the fire. They are not going to do it on their own – if we want it, we’re going to have to fight like hell for it,” said Pitkin, the former UNITE HERE organizer. “The biggest question is whether there is enough street heat and organizing to prioritize legislation like this," said Burke, the UAW organizer. “Workers in motion spur labor-law reforms, not the other way around.”

#### Infrastructure secures the grid against worsening and increasing cyberattacks.

Carney 21 [Chris; 8/6/21; Senior policy advisor at Nossaman LLC, former US Representative, former professor of political science at Penn State University; "*The US Senate Infrastructure Bill: Securing Our Electrical Grid Through P3s and Grants*," JDSupra, <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-us-senate-infrastructure-bill-4989100/>] Justin

As we begin to better understand the main components of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act that the US Senate is working to pass this week, it is clear that public-private partnerships ("P3s") are a favored funding mechanism of lawmakers to help offset high costs associated with major infrastructure projects in communities. And while past infrastructure bills have used P3s for more conventional projects, the current bill also calls for P3s to help pay for protecting the US electric grid from cyberattacks. Responding to the increasing number of cyberattacks on our nation’s infrastructure, and given the fragile physical condition of our electrical grid, the Senate included provisions to help state, local and tribal entities harden electrical grids for which they are responsible. Section 40121, Enhancing Grid Security Through Public-Private Partnerships, calls for not only physical protections of electrical grids, but also for enhancing cyber-resilience. This section seeks to encourage the various federal, state and local regulatory authorities, as well as industry participants to engage in a program that audits and assesses the physical security and cybersecurity of utilities, conducts threat assessments to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, and provides cybersecurity training to utilities. Further, the section calls for strengthening supply chain security, protecting “defense critical” electrical infrastructure and buttressing against a constant barrage of cyberattacks on the grid. In determining the nature of the partnership arrangement, the size of the utility and the area served will be considered, with priority going to utilities with fewer available resources. Section 40122 compliments the previous section as it seeks to incentivize testing of cybersecurity products meant to be used in the energy sector, including SCADA systems, and to find ways to mitigate any vulnerabilities identified by the testing. Intended as a voluntary program, utilities would be offered technical assistance and databases of vulnerabilities and best practices would be created. Section 40123 incentivizes investment in advanced cybersecurity technology to strengthen the security and resiliency of grid systems through rate adjustments that would be studied and approved by the Secretary of Energy and other relevant Commissions, Councils and Associations. Lastly, Section 40124, a long sought-after package of cybersecurity grants for state, local and tribal entities is included in the bill. This section adds language that would enable state, local and tribal bodies to apply for funds to upgrade aging computer equipment and software, particularly related to utilities, as they face growing threats of ransomware, denial of service and other cyberattacks. However, under Section 40126, cybersecurity grants may be tied to meeting various security standards established by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and/or submission of a cybersecurity plan by a grant applicant that shows “maturity” in understanding the cyber threat they face and a sophisticated approach to utilizing the grant. While the final outcome of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act may still be weeks or months away, inclusion of these provisions not only demonstrates a positive step forward for the application of federal P3s and grants generally, they also show that Congress recognizes the seriousness of the cyber threats our electrical grids face. Hopefully, through judicious application of both public-private partnerships and grants, the nation can quickly secure its infrastructure from cyberattacks.

#### Cyberattacks on the grid spiral to all-out nuclear conflict.

Klare 19 [Michael; November 2019; Professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College; “*Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation*,” Arms Control Association, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation>] Justin

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13 The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”14

#### Nuclear war is existential – climate, mass starvation, Ice Age, and meltdowns

Starr 14 [Steven, Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility (www.psr.org) and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. Starr has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, June 5, “The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear War has No Winner,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-lethality-of-nuclear-weapons-nuclear-war-has-no-winner/5385611]

Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate[i] and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer[ii]. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. [iii] These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race.[iv] In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,[v] begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth[vii]) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices[viii], including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic.[ix] In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,[xi] which can be launched with only a few minutes warning.[xii] Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase”, which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds.

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