## T

#### Interpretation: Debaters must defend that the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines and ought not generate offense external to the policy implementation.

#### “Resolved” means to enact by law.

Words & Phrases ’64

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Nations are defined territories with governments

**Merriam Webster** [Merriam Webster, 8-22-2021, accessed on 9-6-2021, Merriam-webster, "Definition of NATION", <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation>] Adam

Definition of nation (Entry 1 of 2) 1a(1): [NATIONALITY sense 5a](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationality)three Slav peoples … forged into a Yugoslavia without really fusing into a Yugoslav nation— Hans Kohn (2): a politically organized [nationality](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationality) (3)in the Bible : a non-Jewish nationalitywhy do the nations conspire— Psalms 2:1 (Revised Standard Version) b: a community of people composed of one or more [nationalities](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalities) and possessing a more or less defined territory and government Canada is a nation with a written constitution— B. K. Sandwell c: a territorial division containing a body of people of one or more nationalities and usually characterized by relatively large size and independent statusa nation of vast size with a small population— Mary K. Hammond 2archaic : [GROUP](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/group), [AGGREGATION](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation) 3: a tribe or federation of tribes (as of American Indians)the Seminole Nation in Oklahoma

#### Medicines refer to physical substances.

American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 18 The American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 2018 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company <https://www.yourdictionary.com/medicine> //Elmer

"A **substance**, **especially a drug**, **used to treat** the signs and symptoms of a **disease**, condition, or injury."

#### There are 4 types of IP the aff could reduce.

**Brewer 19** [Trevor Brewer, 5-16-2019, accessed on 8-11-2021, BrewerLong, "What Are The 4 Types of Intellectual Property Rights? BrewerLong", <https://brewerlong.com/information/business-law/four-types-of-intellectual-property/>] Adam

There are four types of intellectual property rights and protections (although multiple types of intellectual property itself). Securing the correct protection for your property is important, which is why consulting with a lawyer is a must. The four categories of intellectual property protections include: TRADE SECRETS Trade secrets refer to specific, private information that is important to a business because it gives the business a competitive advantage in its marketplace. If a trade secret is acquired by another company, it could harm the original holder. Examples of trade secrets include recipes for certain foods and beverages (like Mrs. Fields’ cookies or Sprite), new inventions, software, processes, and even different marketing strategies. When a person or business holds a trade secret protection, others cannot copy or steal the idea. In order to establish information as a “trade secret,” and to incur the legal protections associated with trade secrets, businesses must actively behave in a manner that demonstrates their desire to protect the information. [Trade secrets are protected without official registration](https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/protection.htm); however, an owner of a trade secret whose rights are breached–i.e. someone steals their trade secret–may ask a court to ask against that individual and prevent them from using the trade secret. PATENTS As defined by the [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office](https://www.uspto.gov/help/patent-help#patents) (USPTO), a patent is a type of limited-duration protection that can be used to protect inventions (or discoveries) that are new, non-obvious, and useful, such a new process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter. When a property owner holds a patent, others are prevented, under law, from offering for sale, making, or using the product. COPYRIGHTS Copyrights and patents are not the same things, although they are often confused. A copyright is a type of intellectual property protection that protects original works of authorship, which might include literary works, music, art, and more. Today, copyrights also protect computer software and architecture. Copyright protections are automatic; once you create something, it is yours. However, if your rights under copyright protections are infringed and you wish to file a lawsuit, then registration of your copyright will be necessary. TRADEMARKS Finally, the fourth type of intellectual property protection is a trademark protection. Remember, patents are used to protect inventions and discoveries and copyrights are used to protect expressions of ideas and creations, like art and writing. Trademarks, then, refer to phrases, words, or symbols that distinguish the source of a product or services of one party from another. For example, the Nike symbol–which nearly all could easily recognize and identify–is a type of trademark. While patents and copyrights can expire, trademark rights come from the use of the trademark, and therefore can be held indefinitely. Like a copyright, registration of a trademark is not required, but registering can offer additional advantages.

#### Violation – : You didn’t

#### First, competitive equity –

#### A] Ground: they get to pick the topic ex post facto which incentivizes vague argumentation that’s not grounded in a consistent, stable mechanism – they’re playing dodgeball with hand grenades – caselists are concessionary, unpredictable, beaten by perms, and don’t justify their model.

#### B] Limits: their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months. Cutting negs to every possible aff is a commitment even large squads can’t handle, let alone small schools. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution

#### C] Causality- debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negatable.

#### D] Fairness is an impact –

#### [1] it’s an intrinsic good – some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity – if it didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way they wanted regardless of the competing arguments made

#### [2] probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews

#### [3] internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### [4] comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. This means they don’t get to weigh the aff.

#### Second, switch-side debate –

#### A] It forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it. That’s good – cross was clear that having engagement is key to recognition and spreading literature

#### B] topical version of the aff solves – they can still have all their advantages under TVA – defend reducing IP as breaking down the ability of capitalism. It’s unethical to destroy it for everyone when we can make reform.

#### This is especially tru under their case since they talk about ipr and COVID but choose to be untopical. They just want to win the debate

#### Vote negative –

#### a] this procedurally evaluates whether their model is good, which is a prior question

#### b] they can’t get offense: we don’t exclude them, only persuade you that our methodology is best. Every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time

#### c] Exclusions are inevitable like the Cap K – we should draw them around reciprocal grounds

## FW

#### The role of the judge is to weigh the fiated implementation of the plan against a competitive alternative. We get to weigh the whole aff, regardless of prior questions:

#### 1] Fairness: prior questions are infinitely regressive because the neg can choose any arbitrary standard in the block. This moots 1AC offense, sandbags the 1AR, and artificially inflates offense under their model.

#### 2] Advocacy skills: weighing and debating the consequences of the plan is necessary for detailed clash and topic education. Their model skirts these questions by shifting the focus to abstract prior questions that aren’t opportunity costs to the plan.

#### 3] Movement building: all movements must compare strategies, create blueprints, and evaluate trade-offs. Our interp produces the best model to compare and test tactics for resistance.

#### 4] Fiat is good and we get it: no one actually thinks the plan happens, but it does generate consequential forecasting where we are forced to assess the broad consequences of the plan on a larger scale. It’s best for clash and argument refinement, which is a prerequisite to making their framework portable.

## **Trigger warning Shell**

#### **A. Interpretation: If the affirmative reads arguments related to sexual assualt they must give a content warning before their speech. These conversations are empirically trauma inducing and warnings are a good idea. Carter 15,** [Angela Carter (Ph.D. Candidate in Feminist Studies, University of Minnesota), "Teaching with Trauma: Trigger Warnings, Feminism, and Disability Pedagogy," Disabilities Studies Quarterly, 2015] Similarly, in their original petition, Oberlin students suggested trigger warnings when "issues of privilege and oppression" arise in the classroom (AAUP). Such suggestions also conflate potential discomfort, or personal injury, with the disabling affects of trauma and being triggered. However, an opportunity arises when students make these conflations. As educators, rather than dismissing trigger warnings outright, we could engage students about how systems of oppression work and explain the difference between pedagogically productive discomfort and trigger-induced re-traumatization. As educators, we could use this conversation as an opportunity to discuss the use of trigger warnings before the Internet. Historically, trigger warnings, Andrea Smith reminds us, began as "a part of a complex of practices" within the anti-violence movement working to recognize "that we are not unaffected by the political and intellectual work that we do" and that "the labor of healing has to be shared by all" (Smith).

#### **B. Violation: They didn’t give a content warning.**

#### **C. Standard:**

#### **1. Access – Content warnings for those who suffer from trauma or anxiety are excluded from the conversation without content warnings. Carter 15,** [Angela Carter (Ph.D. Candidate in Feminist Studies, University of Minnesota), "Teaching with Trauma: Trigger Warnings, Feminism, and Disability Pedagogy," Disabilities Studies Quarterly, 2015] Given these findings, it is imperative that the debate on trigger warnings focus on the inherent questions of access. However, because of the misuse of "triggered" to reference anything that makes someone uncomfortable, disagreements about the classroom as a "safe space" often divert the conversation away from any real discussion of pedagogy and access in higher education. In his 2012 research, Mark Salzer found that students with mental illness were more likely to withdraw because of the impact of "perceived sigma and discrimination" than because of personal struggles with the symptoms or stresses related to their disability (Salzer 1). Because such students are "often viewed as disruptive, lacking academic skill, prone to violence" they are often socially isolated and left alone to question "how welcome they are on campus" (2). These findings suggest that simply providing information about mental illness and "chiding the audience to treat individuals with mental illness" by noting the available resources, is not an effective approach to decreasing the rate of withdraw for disabled students (6). The false conflations of access with "safety" allow accommodations to be dismissed, and only serve to further marginalize mentally disabled students by telling them they are in fact not welcome because their needs disrupt the processes of learning their peers deserve. In the most basic sense, accommodations are not about "safety," but about access to opportunity for a more livable life. When disability is denied because it is not understood or seen, or when access is denied because it is inconvenient or complicated, humanity is denied. While it is certainly possible to recognize trauma as a mental disability and still be hesitant toward trigger warnings as an accommodation practice,14 the content and tenor of that conversation would be far removed from the outright hostility and rejection that has reverberated most widely. When presented as an access measure, it becomes evident that trigger warnings do not provide a way to "opt out" of anything, nor do they offer protection from the realities of the world. Trigger warnings provide a way to "opt in" by lessening the power of the shock and the unexpectedness, and granting the traumatized individual agency to attend to the affect and effects of their trauma. Traumatized individuals know that trigger warnings will not save us. Such warnings simply allow us to do the work we need to do so that we can participate in the conversation or activity. They allow us to enter the conversation, just like automatic doors allow people who use wheelchairs to more easily enter a building.

Voters: Access is an independent voter – a) it’s a prior question to engaging in the space b) it’s a violation of the humanity of the opponent c) we are people before we’re debaters which makes it most intrinsic to the nature of the activity

## Case

#### – justifies perm do both. If the alt can solve links to the squo it solves links to the plan. LD incentivizes sandbagging K explanation to the 1ar, which justifies new contextualization.

#### A] Empirics prove gains are possible.

Winant 15 – (2015, Howard, Professor of Sociology at UC-Santa Barbara, “The Dark Matter: Race and Racism in the 21st Century,” Critical Sociology 2015, Vol. 41(2) 313–324). NS

The World-Historical Shitpile of Race Structural racism – an odious stinkpile of shit left over from the past and still being augmented in the present – has been accumulated by ‘slavery unwilling to die’,4 by empire, and indeed by the entire racialized modern world system. The immense waste (Feagin et al., 2001, drawing on Bataille) of human life and labor by these historically entrenched social structures and practices still confronts us today, in the aftermath of the post-Second World War racial ‘break’. Our antiracist accomplishments have reduced the size of the pile; we have lessened the stink. But a massive amount of waste still remains. So much racial waste is left over from the practice of racial domination in the early days of empire and conquest, to the present combination of police state and liberalism! Indeed it often seems that this enormous and odious waste pinions the social system under an immovable burden. How often have despair and hopelessness overcome those who bore this sorrow? How often have slave and native, peon and maquiladora, servant and ghetto-dweller, felt just plain ‘sick and tired’ (Nappy Roots, 2003), encumbered by this deadening inertia composed of a racial injustice that could seemingly never be budged? How often, too, have whites felt weighed down by the waste, the guilt and self-destruction built into racism and the ‘psychological wage’? Yet racial politics is always unstable and contradictory. Racial despotism can never be fully stabilized or consolidated. Thus at key historical moments, perhaps rare but also inevitable, the sheer weight of racial oppression – qua social structure – becomes insupportable. The built-up rage and inequity, the irrationality and inutility, and the explosive force of dreams denied, are mobilized politically in ways that would have seemed almost unimaginable earlier. Racism remains formidable, entrenched as a structuring feature of both US and global society and politics. Indeed it often seems impossible to overcome. Yet That’s Not the Whole Story We are so used to losing! We can’t see that the racial system is in crisis both in the US and globally. Large-scale demographic and political shifts have overtaken the modern world (racial) system, undermining and rearticulating it. During and after the Second World War a tremendous racial ‘break’ occurred, a seismic shift that swept much of the world (Winant, 2001). The US was but one national ‘case’ of this rupture, which was experienced very profoundly: racial transformations occurred that were unparalleled since at least the changes brought about by the US Civil War. Omi and I (1994) – and many, many others – have proposed that the terrain of racial politics was tremendously broadened and deepened after the War. The increased importance of race in larger political life not only grounded the modern civil rights movement but shaped a whole range of ‘new social movements’ that we take for granted today as central axes of political conflict. In earlier stages of US history it had not been so evident that ‘the personal is political’ – at least not since the end of Reconstruction. From the explicit racial despotism of the Jim Crow era to the ‘racial democracy’ (of course still very partial and truncated) of the present period … : that is a big leap, people. In the modern world there were always black movements, always movements for racial justice and racial freedom. The experience of injustice, concrete grievances, lived oppression, and resistance, both large and small, always exists. It can be articulated or not, politicized or not. These movements, these demands, were largely excluded from mainstream politics before the rise of the civil rights movement after the War. Indeed, after the Second World War, in a huge ‘break’ that was racially framed in crucial ways, this ‘politicization of the social’ swept over the world. It ignited (or reignited) major democratic upsurges. This included the explicitly anti-racist movements: the modern civil rights movement, the anti-apartheid movement, and the anti-colonial movement (India, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.). It also included parallel, and more-or-less allied, movements like ‘secondwave’ feminism, LGBTQ (née gay liberation) movements, and others. In short, the world-historical upheaval of the Second World War and its aftermath were racial upheavals in significant ways: the periphery against the center, the colored ‘others’ against ‘The Lords of Human Kind’ (Kiernan, 1995). These movements produced: • Demographic, economic, political, and cultural shifts across the planet • The destruction of the old European empires • The coming and going of the Cold War • The rise of the ‘new social movements’, led by the black movement in the US And this is only the start of what could be a much bigger list. A Crisis of Race and Racism? ‘[C]risis’, Gramsci famously wrote, ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass’ (Gramsci, 1971: 276). Using the Gramscian formula, I suggest that there is such a crisis of race and racism. On the one hand, the old verities of established racism and white supremacy have been officially discredited, not only in the US but fairly comprehensively around the world. On the other hand, racially-informed action and social organization, racial identity and race consciousness, continue unchecked in nearly every aspect of social life! On the one hand, the state (many states around the world) now claims to be colorblind, non-racialist, racially democratic; while on the other hand, in almost every case, those same states need race to rule. Consider in the US alone: race and electoral politics, race and social control, race and legal order … Why don’t our heads explode under the pressures of such cognitive dissonance? Why doesn’t manifest racial contradiction provoke as much uncertainty and confusion in public life and political activity as it does in everyday experience? Are we just supposed to pretend that none of this is happening? Can anyone really sustain the view that they are operating in a nonracial, ‘colorblind’ society? The ‘colorblind’ claim is that one should not ‘notice’ race. For if one ‘sees’ race, one wouldn’t be ‘blind’ to it, after all.5 But what happens to race-consciousness under the pressure (now rather intense in the US, anyway) to be ‘colorblind’? Quite clearly, racial awareness does not dry up like a raisin in the sun. Not only does it continue as a matter of course in everyday life, but in intellectual, artistic and scientific (both social and natural) life race continues to command attention.6 ‘Colorblind’ ideologies of race today serve to impede the recognition of racial difference or racial inequality based on claims that race is an archaic concept, that racial inclusion is already an accomplished fact, and so on. Just so, persistent race-consciousness highlights racial differences and particularities. ‘Noticing’ race can be linked to despotic or democratic motives, framed either in defense of coercion, privilege, and undeserved advantage, or invoked to support inclusion, human rights, and social justice (Carbado and Harris, 2008; see also Brown et al., 2003). Obama Is he a mere token, a shill for Wall Street? Or is he Neo, ‘the one’? If neither alternative is plausible, then we are in the realm of everyday 21st-century US politics. This is the territory in which, as Sam Rayburn famously said, ‘There comes a time in the life of every politician when he [sic] must rise above principle.’ Yet Barack Obama has transformed the US presidency in ways we cannot yet fully appreciate. Obama is not simply the first nonwhite (that we know of) to occupy the office. He is the first to have lived in the global South, the first to be a direct descendent of colonized people, the first to have a genuine movement background. Consider: How many community meetings, how many movement meetings did Obama attend before entering electoral politics? But he is no more powerful than any of his predecessors; he is constrained as they were by the US system of rule, by the US racial regime, by structural racism. In addition he is constrained by racism as no other US president has ever been. No other president has experienced racism directly: Moreover, while my own upbringing hardly typifies the African American experience – and although, largely through luck and circumstance, I now occupy a position that insulates me from most of the bumps and bruises that the average black man must endure – I can recite the usual litany of petty slights that during my forty-five years have been directed my way: security guards tailing me as I shop in department stores, white couples who toss me their car keys as I stand outside a restaurant waiting for the valet, police cars pulling me over for no apparent reason. I know what it’s like to have people tell me I can’t do something because of my color, and I know the bitter swill of swallowed back anger. I know as well that Michelle and I must be continually vigilant against some of the debilitating story lines that our daughters may absorb – from TV and music and friends and the streets – about who the world thinks they are, and what the world imagines they should be. (Obama, 2006: 233) On the other hand: he has a ‘kill list’. All presidents kill people, but Obama is the first systematically and publicly to take charge of these egregious and unconstitutional uses of exceptional powers. In this he echoes Carl Schmitt, the Nazi political theorist, whose famous dictum is ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (2004 [1922]). The drones, the surveillance, and the numerous right turns of his administration all stand in sharp contradiction not only to his campaign rhetoric, but to the anti-racist legacy of the civil rights movement that arguably put him in office. Obama has not interceded for blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in US history, the ‘great recession’ of 2008. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of color are concentrated. Obama himself largely deploys colorblind racial ideology, although he occasionally critiques it as well. Beneath this ostensibly postracial view the palpable and quite ubiquitous system of racial distinction and inequality remains entrenched. Though modernized and ‘moderated’, structural racism has been fortified, not undermined, by civil rights reform; Obama is not challenging it, at least not directly. Reframing the Discussion What should we be studying and teaching now? The list of themes I have highlighted here is partial of course, and perhaps impressionistic as well. If the argument I have proposed has any validity, then the ‘dark matter’ of race, which is even more invisible now than it was in the past – in its present ‘post-civil rights’, ‘colorblind’, and even ‘presidential’ forms – continues to exercise its gravitational pull on our politics. It continues to shape what is called (and improperly deprecated as) ‘identity politics’. The ‘dark matter’ takes on new significance as a central feature of neoliberalism, which is enacted today through the deployment of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, ‘states of exception’, state violence, and exclusionary politics – all political practices that rely on racism. Yet the legacy of centuries of resistance to these depredations, the undeniable achievements of anti-racist and ant-imperialist struggles, the extension of democracy – often tortuous and always incomplete – to peoples of color, also exerts a significant political force. Race-based ‘freedom dreams’ (Kelley again) sustain the hope of democracy, inclusion, equality, and justice in the US and elsewhere.

#### B] Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence – it’s not our burden to disprove ontology, but their burden to convince you 100%. Voting Rights Act, Bailey v Patterson and structural improvements like life expectancy prove no ontology.

#### C] Regardless of ontology, materialism matters – police brutality and poverty prove the lived experiences of black people can be changed and are important regardless of the structural position they occupy.

#### 4] Vague antiracist alternatives solve nothing- history proves specific political engagement is the most effective method.

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Antiracism is a favorite concept on the American left these days. Of course, all good sorts want to be against racism, but what does the word mean exactly? The contemporary discourse of “antiracism” is focused much more on taxonomy than politics. It emphasizes the name by which we should call some strains of inequality—whether they should be broadly recognized as evidence of “racism”— over specifying the mechanisms that produce them or even the steps that can be taken to combat them. And, no, neither “overcoming racism” nor “rejecting whiteness” qualifies as such a step any more than does waiting for the “revolution” or urging God’s heavenly intervention. If organizing a rally against racism seems at present to be a more substantive political act than attending a prayer vigil for world peace, that’s only because contemporary antiracist activists understand themselves to be employing the same tactics and pursuing the same ends as their predecessors in the period of high insurgency in the struggle against racial segregation. This view, however, is mistaken. The postwar activism that reached its crescendo in the South as the “civil rights movement” wasn’t a movement against a generic “racism;” it was specifically and explicitly directed toward full citizenship rights for black Americans and against the system of racial segregation that defined a specific regime of explicitly racial subordination in the South. The 1940s March on Washington Movement was also directed against specific targets, like employment discrimination in defense production. Black Power era and post-Black Power era struggles similarly focused on combating specific inequalities and pursuing specific goals like the effective exercise of voting rights and specific programs of redistribution. Clarity lost Whether or not one considers those goals correct or appropriate, they were clear and strategic in a way that “antiracism” simply is not. Sure, those earlier struggles relied on a discourse of racial justice, but their targets were concrete and strategic. It is only in a period of political demobilization that the historical specificities of those struggles have become smoothed out of sight in a romantic idealism that homogenizes them into timeless abstractions like “the black liberation movement”—an entity that, like Brigadoon, sporadically appears and returns impelled by its own logic.

#### 5] Warren links to all their critiques of temporality – only future-based politics solves.

Lillvis, PhD, 17

( Kristen, associate professor of English at Marshall University ( “Posthuman Blackness and the Black Female Imagination,” p. 80-92)

Concieve of time as western and that white people own time - Warren thinks that there can’t be universals b/c time isn’t equally accessible to white people which assumes white people have ontologically controlled evolution of time

Anyanwu's Middle Passage experience—her travel from Africa to colonial New York aboard a slave ship—transforms the shape shifter. While Anyanwu can alter her body from female to male, young to old, and human to animal, the Middle Passage journey signals her conversion from selfpossessed subject to Doro-directed object. The subject-object transition that occurs for the fictional Anyanwu mirrors that of historical captured Africans during the Middle Passage. Toni Morrison, Greg Tate, Calvin L. Warren, and Kodwo Eshun argue that the Middle Passage stands as the moment in history when black subjects became abstracted into metaphysical elements or objects (Gilroy, Small 178; Eshun, "Further" 297-98; Warren 237).' As Warren asserts, "the literal destruction of black bodies" during and following the transatlantic slave voyage enables "the psychic, economic, and philosophical resources for modernity to objectify, forget, and ultimately obliterate Being" (237). With the Middle Passage standing in for the bar that, according to Tate, separates signifier from signified, the black body becomes "objectified, infused with exchange value, and rendered malleable within a sociopolitical order" of white power (Eshun, "Further" 297-98; Warren 226, 237). In order to recognize and overcome the abstraction of black bodies and identities that began with the Middle Passage, new types of consciousness must be developed. If W. E. B. Du Bois's double consciousness describes the ability to recognize the black body's signification in white culture, and Frantz Fanon's triple consciousness marks an awareness of the move from black subject to black object within this system, then the multiple consciousness of black posthumanism and Afrofuturism assists the black individual in viewing the self from outside the system of signification altogether. Eshun asserts that the "triple consciousness, quadruple consciousness" of Afrofuturism makes the black subject privy to "previously inaccessible alienations" ("Further" 298). Eshun's "previously inaccessible alienations" correspond to the abstraction of blackness since the Middle Passage, the positioning of the sign of blackness within the ontology and cosmology of white power. Like Afrofuturism's triple or quadruple consciousness, black posthumanism's multiple consciousness allows the subject to understand and potentially surmount this alienation. Viewing identity as part of but separate from the system of signification corresponds with the posthuman imperative to blur dividing lines but celebrate distinctions between temporalities and subjectivities, an imperative reflected in posthuman constructions of identity and solidarity. Transformative Middle Passage experiences in Butler's science fiction cultivate a posthuman multiple consciousness that allows characters and readers to recognize blackness both within and outside of the ontology and cosmology of white power. As Nadine Flagel argues, "Much speculative fiction is explicitly or implicitly engaged with issues of slavery and freedom, possession and liberation, but divorces these issues from the material conditions of slavery" (224). While Butler features literal and metaphorical Middle Passages in several of her works, including Wild Seed (as mentioned above), Dawn (1987), and "Bloodchild" (1984), in the novel Kindred (1979) Butler directly acknowledges the material conditions of slavery that, as Flagel points out, speculative and science fiction authors all-too-often ignore. Butler's use of time travel in the neo-slave narrative Kindred compels her African American protagonist, Dana Franklin, to undergo alienating notions of racial identity in the past, present, and future. Dana's Middle Passage experiences aid her development of a posthuman multiple consciousness through which she recognizes both temporality and subjectivity as liminal. Although Warren and Eshun argue that black subjectivity exists only in the past—prior to the Middle Passage—and Warren warns that the achievement of black subjectivity in the future would mean the end of blackness as we know it (Eshun, "Further" 298; Warren 244), Dana, as a possessor of posthuman multiple consciousness, resides within a liminal temporality and, as such, understands that black subjectivity exists in those places accepted as well as those denied: the past, present, and future. Additionally, Butler's posthumously published "A Necessary Being" (2014) models posthuman multiple consciousness for readers who may otherwise struggle to view any racial identity as distinct from white supremacy. By depicting power relations in a world unlike ours, Butler enables her readers to understand races and cultures as connected to but differentiated from one another. Specifically, in "A Necessary Being" Butler presents readers with the familiar åconcept of hierarchies based on skin color, yet through her character development, she dismisses the subsumption of one race under another. Butler's otherworldly protagonist, a blue-fleshed female named Tahneh, sees herself as part of and also distinct from the Kohn culture in which she exists, paradoxically, as both ruler and slave. By considering power systems in this alien environment—an environment distinct from white, Western cosmologies—readers can join Tahneh in cultivating a posthuman multiple consciousness and acknowledging new ways of understanding both self and other identities. The Middle Passage commences a series of psychological, physical, and ontological shifts for captured Africans. Aboard ships and on soil, women, men, and children experience a violence that literally and figuratively disrupts black subjectivity. Valerie Loichot asserts, "The slave family is marked by a series of amputations: an immense and abrupt severing from original African roots and memory; a dismemberment of family units by practices of kidnapping or selling; literal amputations of limbs of fugitive slaves; splits between bodies turned into economic tools of production and mind; substitution of mothering and fathering by breeding; and attempted disassociation of humanity from black subjects" (41). The Middle Passage alters not only black communities and bodies in the past but also black identities in the present. The effects of enslavement on the form and concept of blackness—as Loichot says, the relationship between black subjectivity and humanity—means that the Middle Passage shapes historical and contemporary ideas of race. Theorizing the Middle Passage extends the transatlantic slave trade beyond the four centuries of trauma that triangulated Africa, Europe, and the Americas. For instance, Morrison finds that Middle Passage dislocations foreshadow modernist alienations (Gilroy, Small 178). Tate extends these Middle Passage dislocations to the field of semiotics, arguing that the Middle Passage operates as the bar between signifier and signified (Eshun, "Further" 297-98). Warren furthers Tate's semiotic approach, asserting that the meaninglessness of signification following the Middle Passage institutes a black nihilism. And Eshun "reroutes" the alien abductions of the Middle Passage through contemporary Afrofuturist science fictions in order to offer alternative histories and futures ("Further" 300). Each of these theorists marks the Middle Passage as both a defining, centuries-long moment in history as well as an experience that exceeds the specific time period during which it occurs. Moreover, each theorist recognizes that during and following the Middle Passage, constructions of blackness develop in opposition to, yet support of, whiteness. Theories of black identity provide concrete examples of the paradoxical opposition to and support of white power structures cultivated by constructions of blackness since the Middle Passage. Du Bois's double consciousness describes the internalization of both black- and white-determined ideas of blackness. He explains that the black subject inhabits "a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world" (Du Bois 38). The "other world"—the white world—views the black subject with "amused contempt and pity," which Du Bois argues compels the black subject to observe himself similarly (38). Du Bois's black subject, though situated in opposition to the "other world" of the white subject, supports white power structures with his "longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self" (39)—a self determined by or at least incorporating white-authored notions of humanity. Du Bois describes a system of signification in which whiteness shapes the cultural significance of blackness. Although his assertion of a double consciousness suggests the existence of a "Negro" consciousness distinct from a white "American" consciousness (Du Bois 38), white supremacy shapes both entities. Rejecting the mutual exclusivity of blackness and whiteness in Du Boisian double consciousness, Paul Gilroy argues that Du Bois's theory acknowledges the "transformation and fragmentation of the integral racial self," indicating that although ideas of blackness vary across black communities, "constricting or absolutist understandings of ethnicity" driven by white power structures limit the expression of black humanity (Black 138). As Gilroy asserts, Du Bois's "two warring ideals" have "democratic potential disfigured by white supremacy" (Du Bois 38; Gilroy, Black 113); in other words, whiteness, by cultivating meaning through the opposition of blackness, distorts blackness for blacks and whites. Fanon similarly addresses the supremacy of white power structures in shaping ideas about blackness. However, whereas Du Bois posits a double consciousness, Fanon contends that blacks possess a "triple" personhood or consciousness. Like Du Bois, Fanon argues that the black individual exists as^ a subject and also in relation to the white other. Fanon then adds a third element: via the relation to the white other, the black individual loses subjectivity and occupies object status (84). Fanon expresses his desire to "be a man among other men," but he concludes that he has "made [himself] an object"—the third aspect of his triple consciousness—because "his inferiority comes into being through the other" (85, 83). Fanon's triple consciousness thus offers blacks not only a vision of black and white notions of blackness, as Du Bois's double consciousness does, but also a glimpse of the "other," the larger white power structure that shapes rhetorical concepts of race. Despite labeling white supremacist systems as "other," neither Du Bois nor Fanon argues that blackness influences whiteness in the same way whiteness distorts blackness. Rejecting the equal reflexivity of blackness and whiteness, Fanon assigns triple consciousness specifically to black men and women: Ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. Some critics will take it on themselves to remind us that this proposition has a converse. I say that this is false. The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man. Overnight the Negro has been given two frames of reference within which he has had to place himself. His metaphysics, or, less pretentiously, his customs and the sources on which they were based, were wiped out because they were in conflict with a civilization that did not know and that imposed itself on him. (82-83) Diana Fuss explains that for Fanon, whiteness operates as a "transcendental signifier," a "self-identical, self-reproducing term" that proclaims freedom from blackness as well as "the very category of'race'" (22). Fuss follows Fanon in asserting that whiteness, in mandating independence from racial categories, colonizes blackness and reserves subjectivity for whites alone (Fuss 23). If white power structures regulate the rhetoric of race and the assignation of subjectivity, then blackness—even in its opposition to whiteness— supports white supremacy. Semiotics—what Warren calls the "very structure of meaning in the modern world"—depends upon the existence of blackness and, specifically, the othering of blackness, which takes the concrete form of "anti-black violence" during and following the Middle Passage (226). While Du Bois and Fanon explain through their theories of double and triple consciousness that antiblack violence exists as a byproduct of white supremacist systems, Warren positions black suffering as foundational to semiotics and Western metaphysics (237-38): "If literal black bodies sustain modernity and metaphysics—though various forms of captivity, terror, and subjection," he asks, "then what would emancipation entail for blacks? How do we allow metaphysics to self-consume and weaken when blackness nourishes metaphysics?" (Warren 239). Warren follows Morrison in interweaving the origins of modernity and black oppression, though he extends her premise by arguing that historical and contemporary American culture depends on antiblack violence. Warren's black nihilist philosophy provides no answer to the problem of black suffering within white power structures; however, his argument that blackness contributes to the perpetuation of these structures indicates the need for a new type of consciousness: one that not only recognizes the impact of whiteness on black subjectivity (like Du Bois's double consciousness) and black metaphysics (like Fanon's triple consciousness) but also acknowledges the reflexive relationship of blackness and whiteness within white supremacist systems. Posthuman multiple consciousness affords this perspective. Posthuman multiple consciousness perceives black identities as contributing to but also potentially independent of white, Western metaphysics. In particular, considering identity within the temporal liminality of posthumanism allows the black subject to conceive of a future in which blackness destroys rather than facilitates black objectification. While Warren argues that this type of "'blackened' world" would put an "end to metaphysics" and "the world itself" (244), posthumanism projects nonapocalyptic possibilities for the future as well as the past and present. MULTIPLE CONSCIOUSNESS AND BLACK NIHILISM IN BUTLER'S Kindred When read through the lens of posthuman multiple consciousness, black science fiction—including Afrofuturist texts concerning the oppression of black identities and objectification of black bodies in the past, present, or future—promotes the existence of black subjectivity throughout time. Eshun asserts that Afrofuturism relies on "extraterrestrialityas a hyperbolic trope to explore the historical terms, the everyday implications of forcibly im- v posed dislocation, and the constitution of Black Atlantic subjectivities: from slave to negro to coloured to euolue to black to African to African American" ("Further" 298-99). Black science fiction's alien abductions mirror the black subject's real-world alienations in historical and contemporary white power structures. However, in addition to engaging with the past and present, black science fiction texts blend these time periods with the future to create a liminal temporality. By disrupting "the linear time of progress" and "the temporal logics that condemned black subjects to prehistory"—the time before the Middle Passage and slavery—black science fiction presents "a series of powerful competing futures that infiltrate the present at different rates" (Eshun, "Further" 297). Reading black science fiction through posthuman multiple consciousness shows that although the Middle Passage strips captured Africans of subjectivity, as Tate, Warren, and Eshun assert, the texts' liminal temporality brings black subjectivity into the present and future. In her science fictional neo-slave narrative Kindred, Butler makes posthuman liminality literal through the depiction of time travel. Middle Passage experiences take Butler's characters not across the ocean but through time and space. Dana, Butler's African American protagonist, journeys between 1976 California, her present, and antebellum Maryland, her ancestral past. Even Dana's first trip back to 1811 or 1812 engages with the temporal, spatial, and subjective shifts indicative of the Middle Passage experience. On June 9, 1976—her twenty-sixth birthday—Dana feels "dizzy, nauseated" while organizing books in her new home with her husband, Kevin (Butler, Kindred 13). Dana's books, house, and husband "blur" into nonexistence as trees, a river, and a drowning child come into view (Kindred 13). Present changes to past, indoors to outdoors, and friend to foe—though Dana does not yet understand her fraught relationship with the white child, Rufus—during her voy- age from 1976 to the i8ios. While these shifts seem like the direct exchange of opposites, Butler blurs not only Dana's vision but also the binaries. For instance, Dana draws upon her knowledge of artificial respiration from the present (or the future, considering the perspective of antebellum Dana) to save the child in the past (or the present, again keeping in mind Dana's antebellum point of view). Accordingly, seemingly distinct periods and places overlap for Dana not only during her Middle Passage travels between present and past but also during her time in each temporality. Kindred's liminality allows both Butler's protagonist and her readers to consider race, and, in particular, blackness, within and outside of specific cosmologies of white power. The novel depicts the implications of Dana's blackness during both her personal present and her familial past. As a black woman in 1976, Dana faces racial bigotry and sexual harassment. Her coworker murmurs, "Chocolate and vanilla porn!" when seeing her with Kevin, who is white, and Kevin's sister and brother-in-law as well as Dana's uncle object to the news of their interracial relationship (Kindred 56, no). Although the novel suggests that Dana and Kevin have a happy and healthy marriage, 19705 gender roles relegate Dana to a subordinate position: both Dana and Kevin identify as writers, but Kevin, the "primary breadwinner" (Parham 1322), asks Dana to type his manuscripts. Similarly, Dana notes that after moving into their new house, Kevin leaves her to finish unpacking, since he "had stopped when he got his office in order" (Kindred 12). In both situations, Kevin changes his behavior after he recognizes Dana's discomfort, but Dana, and not Kevin, seeks reconciliation after their fights, and she makes excuses for Kevin's behavior. For example, Dana thinks that the "look" Kevin gives her in response to a passive-aggressive comment is not "as malevolent as it seem[s]" and that he would try "to intimidate [. . .] [sjtrangers" but not her (Kindred 13). Considering these power imbalances, Marc Steinberg argues that Dana and Kevin's relationship "smacks of a kind of servitude," and the "line between slavery and marriage" becomes "blurred" as the novel continues (469). As Dana finds herself beholden to others—including her husband—both in the present and past, the influence ofwhite power structures on black subjectivity becomes apparent to readers. Late-twentieth-century conventions of race and gender intersect with early nineteenth-century customs when Kevin follows Dana through time to the antebellum Upper South. After Rufus meets Kevin and asks the white man, "Does Dana belong to you now?" Kevin affirms the boy's suspicion: "In a way," he answers. "She's my wife" (Kindred 60). The intolerance Dana and Kevin experience as an interracial couple in 1976 likewise returns, anachronistically speaking, in 1819, with Rufus, first, denying the plausibility of their relationship and, second, asserting its illegality. Rufus again conveys the period's white supremacist and patriarchal views when, near the end of the novel, he asks Dana to take the place of Alice—his unwilling wife and Dana's great-great-grandmother—as his lover. Lisa Yaszek notes, "The bargain seems perfectly reasonable to Rufus—after all, Dana and Alice are nearly identical doubles of one another, and black women are supposed to accede ' to the wishes of white men" ("Grim" 1063). Dana's performance as a slave during her time in Maryland exposes her to the physical and emotional violence born of black women's object status. While Dana's position as a black woman within a white power structure shifts as she moves throughout time, her objectification persists. Steinberg asserts that Butler "assumes a non-Western conceptualization of history— one in which history is cyclical, not linear—in order to demonstrate ways in which certain forms of race and gender oppression continue late into the twentieth century and beyond" (467). Steinberg's argument about racism, when broadened to considerations of race in general, reveals that the temporal liminality in Kindred incorporates a subjective liminality: blackness—in relation to and distinct from whiteness and, in particular, white supremacy—holds historical as well as trans-temporal significance. Although Warren argues that the fantasy of political progress, represented by a linear timeline extending into the future of improved race relations, "allows one to disregard the historicity of anti-blackness and its continued legacy" (221), Butler's novel uses liminality rather than linearity to acknowledge white supremacy in the past, present, and future. Specifically, Dana's temporal and subjective liminality imbue her with a posthuman multiple consciousness through which she situates blackness within and outside of white power structures. During her second peregrination between past and present, Dana meets a white patroller who attempts to rape her. Dana's fear propels her forward—or back—to the future, where she finds herself "kicking" and "clawing" Kevin, whom she mistakes for the patroller (Kindred 43). Kevin never physically threatens Dana in the novel, but his whiteness—when considered from her new, temporally liminal perspective—endangers her. Lauren J. Lacey asserts, "Dana has had to become a different kind of subject in order to see herself through the eyes of a white male patroller in the past, and the transition to the present is not particularly simple. Kevin's status as a white male is newly complicated for Dana by her experiences in the past" (75). In discussing Dana observing herself "through the eyes of a white male patroller," Lacey acknowledges Dana's multiple consciousness: Dana believes herself to be a subject, but when considering that the patroller views her as a body to be used, exchangeable for any of the other black female bodies she's "just like" (Kindred 42), she understands her object status. Loichot similarly acknowledges Dana's awareness of her object position, noting that "Dana realizes two important things at once. Her own name and body disappear under the function of the female slave, sexualized object at the mercy of the white master" (44). Dana's knowledge of her subordinate status in the past shapes her view of herself and others in the present when she attacks her husband upon her return to California. She positions blackness within the ontology of whiteness in the past as well as the present when she brings the historicity of her object status into her life with her husband. However, posthuman multiple consciousness not only positions blackness within the ontology of whiteness but also provides a view of blackness divorced from white supremacy. Dana's subjectivity, when considered within the Middle Passage timeline suggested by Tate, Warren, and Eshun, shifts throughout Kindred. Specifically, time travel allows her to simultaneously possess and be denied the subjectivity of Middle Passage prehistory. If, as Eshun argues, black subjectivity exists only in "prehistory"—before the Middle Passage—then the existence of time travel in Kindred means that Dana can neither claim nor be denied subjectivity at any point in the story: her prehistory, like her present and future, is ubiquitous (Eshun, "Further" 297). According to Lacey, temporal liminality in the novel shapes Dana's understanding of herself: "Butler uses the device of time travel to create a narrative that absolutely refuses to see past and present as discrete, closed off, or even formal categories. Dana's life—her home, her life with her husband—are caught up in the demand to see the relationship between past and present as mutually constitutive. Throughout the novel, Butler emphasizes how difficult it is for Dana to 'leave the past behind'" (73). Indeed, Dana cannot "leave the past behind" because she always already inhabits the past: each Middle Passage venture takes Dana to a tripartite temporality. After her initial trip to the antebellum Upper South, Dana's travels to Maryland place her in a future-past—a past more recent than that of her previous visit—which becomes her present. Similarly, Dana's return to the "normalcy" of 1976 California situates her in a future-present—a present more recent than the one she left—which, considering the physical and emotional toll time travel exacts upon her, becomes part of her past. While the historical Middle Passage takes place during Dana's ancestral past, her personal Middle Passage experiences occur in the past, present, and future; accordingly, her "prehistory," her pre-Middle Passage subjectivity, simultaneously occurs within and exceeds all three temporalities. However, Kindred's temporal liminality means that Dana's post-Middll Passage objectification simultaneously occurs within and exceeds past, present, and future. If, as Tate argues, the Middle Passage marks the moment of the black subject's abstraction and objectification—that is, "the bar between signifier and the signified could be understood as standing for the Middle Passage that separated signification (meaning) from sign (letter)" (Eshun, "Further" 297)—then the final chapter of Butler's novel gives the bar physical and spatial significance. During her last trip to the past, Dana stabs Rufus to prevent him from raping her. Simultaneously with Rufus's death, Dana experiences the "terrible, wrenching sickness" of her Middle Passage travels between past and present (Kindred 260). Despite her weakened state, she manages to move Rufus's body off of hers before she travels through time, but his hand remains on her arm. Recounting the process of her return to 1976, Dana reports: "Something harder and stronger than Rufus's hand clamped down on my arm, squeezing it, stiffening it, pressing into it—painlessly, at first—melting into it, meshing with it as though somehow my arm were being absorbed into something. Something cold and nonliving" (Kindred 260-61). The "cold and nonliving" force that grasps Dana's arm and divides her body, permanently, between past and present corresponds to the bar in the system of signification, the bar of the Middle Passage. This bar, which indicates the separation of signifier and signified and, in this instance, the distance between the physical black body and cultural constructions of blackness, transforms Dana's arm—her body—into an object consumed by Rufus in 1831 and her wall in 1976. Dana, thus, experiences not only temporal liminality but also subjective liminality: her pre-Middle Passage subjectivity exists throughout time, just as her post-Middle Passage objectification surpasses the limits of linear temporality. Time travel makes impossible the separation of past, present, and future states of being. Considering the relationship between temporality and identity, Lacey asserts that Dana "literally becomes a multiple subject, defined in and through both the past and the present" (72). Additionally, the future—which cannot be separated from other temporalities in the novel—defines Dana. For instance, Butler's novel, and Dana's story, begins at the end, after Dana returns to 1976 for the last time, without her left arm. While Lisa Long argues that in killing Rufus, Dana "literally kills her past" (470), and Lacey asserts that with Dana losing an arm, "History has taken a piece of Dana's body" (72), the past remains alive for Dana, and the past, along with the present and future, permanently alters her identity. As such, Butler's novel draws a comparison between the blurred boundaries of time and being. This liminal temporality and subjectivity accords with a posthuman multiple consciousness that makes possible an understanding of blackness in relation to the history of white supremacy and also beyond that history. Although Dana finds herself, like other black women, men, and children, oppressed regardless of the time period she inhabits, Butler's temporal and subjective disturbances indicate not the inevitability of antiblack violence but the potential for black freedom, including the freedom from the "transcendental signifier" of whiteness (Fuss 22). Steinberg argues that by depicting time as a circle or "zigzag," "Butler creates an historical possibility of the perception of self (and how it might be affected by matters of possession and ownership)" (472, 475). In addition to inspiring perceptions of the self as determined by dominating forces, liminal temporality encourages Butler's characters and readers to acknowledge subjectivities free from domination as well. With his black nihilist theory, Warren presents the possibility of blackness as distinct from whiteness, although he positions both the achievement and product of this altered state of being as beyond comprehension. Considering, first, the dismantling of white supremacist systems, Warren rejects historical strategies for emancipation, arguing that "every emancipatory strategy that attempted to rescue blackness from anti-blackness inevitably reconstituted and reconfigured the anti-blackness it tried to eliminate" (239). Likewise, he dismisses future-focused solutions, since the promise of a more egalitarian future only promotes the continuation of struggle (Warren 233). In his philosophy of black nihilism, Warren advocates for the rejection of political action in the present as a tactic through which to separate black identity from the American Dream and Western metaphysics. He states, "Black nihilism demands a traversal, but not the traversal that reintegrates 'the subject' (and Being) back into society by shattering fundamental fantasies of metaphysics, but a traversal that disables and invalidates every imaginative and symbolic function" (240). "Because anti-blackness infuses itself into every fabric of social existence," Warren asserts, positioning the black subject outside of white supremacist systems "becomes something like death for the world," which makes sense, if, as he argues, divorcing the black subject from white supremacy "disables and invalidates every imaginative and symbolic function" we know (239, 240). Nevertheless, Warren pushes for a black nihilism that resists statements of purpose or progress, a nihilism that seeks to destroy white supremacy by denying the resuscitation of the past and the hope for the future that have, unwittingly, maintained the systems they seek to move beyond. Yet temporality proves as slippery in Warren's "Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope" as it does Butler's Kindred. Despite Warren's explicit rejection of "[p]rogress" and "futurity" (218), his philosophy fails to extricate itself from the language of Western metaphysics and, specifically, ideas of linear temporality: he must provide background and arrive, despite his protestations, at a "point" by the end of the article (243). However, Warren acknowledges the impossibility of his project: he gets as close to articulating a nonlinear theory of black nihilism—a theory that "does not extinguish hope but reconfigures it"—as semiotics and the conventions of academic writing allow (244). If, as Warren acknowledges, we cannot yet articulate or perhaps even imagine a reconfigured hope, then perhaps the key to freedom lies not in the rejection of temporality but the embrace of it. For instance, if we should not dismiss black suffering by simply hoping for a future more empowering than our present, why should we dismiss emancipation projects by anticipating a future as oppressive as our present? In the tradition of Du Bois and Fanon, who introduce ideas of liminal subjectivity that posthumanists have now applied to all individuals, regardless of race, and Eshun, who considers liminal temporality and subjectivity together, the theory of posthuman blackness provides a view of black subjectivity related to but also distinct from the linear trajectories of Western metaphysics.

6) their card proves tva you could talk about the state being anit blacvk while still beimg topical

7) no reason to vote for them

8) they have read this before and nothing happened

9)