## Off 1

**The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing**

**First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues**.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values**.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable**.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes**:** “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

**Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.**

**Bostrom 12** [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)] These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

**Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one.**

**Bostrom 12** [Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.], Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdfEven if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives**. **This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives.** The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10 54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10 52 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. **One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives.** And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€”positive or negativeâ€”is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.

ts used in wind turbines can be recycled more easily than those used in other rare-earth permanent magnet products," he notes.

## Off 2 -

#### Kant’s criteria for personhood violently excludes the disabled.

Lucas G. Pinheiro 17 [(Lucas G. Pinheiro, ) The Ableist Contract Intellectual Disability and the Limits of Justice in Kant’s Political Thought, Cambridge Core Online publication date: March 2017, pp 43-78] AT

With these theoretical considerations in mind, this chapter probes the political and moral spaces occupied by intellectually disabled subjects in the political, ethical, and moral thought of Immanuel Kant. To this end, I place particular emphasis on the ways in which Kant’s “empirical” observations on disability fundamentally impact his political formulations of justice, freedom, citizenship, personhood, and the human species. My approach to interpreting intellectual disability in Kant’s theory of justice begins with a close reading of his practical definitions of disability in lesser-known works on anthropology, physical geography, and natural history. I then deploy this reading as a source for contextualizing his political ideas and thus uncovering the meaning and political significance of his exclusionary terminology in the Metaphysics of Morals as it pertains to the treatment of intellectually disabled subjects in his theory of justice. It is important to note that, in the context of Kant’s political and moral philosophy, I use the term “contract” figuratively, since my argument applies broadly to contractarian ideas of rights, freedom, civil society, and justice in the history of modern political thought as a whole. So, with respect to Kant, “contract” operates as a placeholder for the totality of his political constituency which is composed by his moral laws, doctrines of rights and duties (private and public), theory of the state, scale of progress, and formulation of civil society. To be sure, Kant’s political ideas – including his definitions of justice, personhood, freedom, rights, duties, citizenship, and the state – are not limited to the Metaphysics of Morals, just as they are not exclusive to his writings on practical and transcendental philosophy. Much the contrary, in fact, Kant articulates his political theory through an expansive and eclectic array of sources, scattered across an impressively diverse range of fields and genres well beyond his strictly political writings and moral philosophy.8 Although perhaps unfamiliar to a contemporary political theory audience, Kant’s empirical works encompass a detailed, rich, and intricate sociopolitical system, whose relevance to his political ideas I attempt to recover by interpreting his onomasiology of intellectual disability. Indeed, as I will argue, Kant’s understanding of disability affects and informs his theory of justice in such constitutive ways that its continual neglect has resulted in an insufficiently critical and accurate interpretation of Kant’s political thought writ large. From a broader perspective, my interpretation of disability in Kant seeks to recast the political thrust of Kant’s theory by rearticulating its relationship to other strains of the Kantian corpus that, while less accepted, less philosophical, and undoubtedly less agreeable, are, on my account, no less politically and philosophically significant to his thought than the “strictly” political and philosophical works. As of late, a host of scholars in disability studies have vocally contested Kant’s moral theory of personhood. This burgeoning literature on Kant and disability is largely composed of critical responses to the works of Jeff McMahan (1995, 1996, 2002, 2005, 2009) and Peter Singer (1994, 2009), both of whom vindicate non-human moral standing by grounding the corporeal existence of animals within an ethically defensible, intra-species moral realm, akin to that of Kant’s person. In his work, McMahan (2009: 583–4) invokes cognitive disability as the premise of a reduction argument that figures the severely intellectually disabled as a rhetorical device tasked with exposing the logical contradiction of theories that grant moral status to the severely mentally disabled while denying it to non-human animals with commensurate cognitive capacities. Singer likewise argues that, since many non-human animals possess cognitive capacities that are often on a par with or superior to, those of severely intellectually disabled humans, it is altogether groundless and unjustifiable – that is, “speciesist” – to deny the former group (animals) moral standing while extending it to the latter (the disabled) (1994, 2009: 567–8). In building their philosophical arguments for intra-species moral standing, both Singer (2009: 573–4) and McMahan (2002: 245–6, 252–5) rely prominently on Kant’s personhood–animality split as a means to support their formulations of extra-corporeal moral status, grounded on intellectual predispositions and cognitive capacities. Yet, both philosophers part ways with Kant insofar as they believe human animality and species membership should play no role as criteria for determining moral life (Singer 2009: 572–3; McMahan 2002: 148, 209–17).9 McMahan’s (2009: 604) idea that “differences of moral status are grounded in differences of psychological capacity” prefigures Singer’s (2009: 575) suggestion to “abandon the idea of the equal value of all humans” and replace it with a “graduated view in which moral status depends on some aspects of cognitive ability.” As a result, both Singer and McMahan advocate integrating non-human animals to a moral community of “persons” at the expense of denying personhood to humans who fall below a Kantian moral threshold rooted entirely in cognitive capacity as opposed to human animality. Unsurprisingly, Singer and McMahan have received ample criticism from scholars seeking to include or maintain the cognitively disabled within the bounds of our moral community of persons. As I see it, the central and most politically salient aspect of these critiques resides in the Kantian discourse Singer and McMahan mobilize in support of their projects. Pushing back against rationalist conceptions of moral status, philosopher Eva Kittay (2001, 2005a, 2005b, 2009a, 2009b) has argued that species membership alone should suffice as a criterion for equal moral status among human beings. Licia Carlson (2009, 2010), who furthers Kittay’s critique of reason-centric moral theories, questions the political discourse through which these conceptions of personhood have been articulated. She recalls, for example, that viewing humans as animals “is precisely the basis on which the most horrific atrocities are justified” (2010: 160). Carlson also outlines important ways in which critiques of speciesism, such as Singer’s, “rely on ableist assumptions and arguments” (2010: 157). Although Kittay and Carlson do not comment directly on Kant’s specific formulation of moral personhood, they effectively highlight how and why elevating cognitive capacity to the role of arbiter for moral life, as is the case with Kant’s theory of personhood, has deeply problematic repercussions for the intellectually disabled.10 Other scholars writing on disability and political theory have also expressed profound skepticism toward rationalist formulations of moral personhood rooted in Kant’s categorical imperative.11 One notable critic of Kantian personhood from the standpoint of disability is Barbara Arneil (2009), whose key charge against Kant’s moral theory is his crowning of rational autonomy as the foundation for human dignity (2009: 224). In its quest to “protect human dignity through the mutual recognition of others as rational self-legislating ‘persons,’” Arneil remarks, Kant’s moral theory consequently figures the “irrational” as “not ‘autonomous’ and strictly speaking not ‘persons’ and therefore not due the dignity accorded to ‘rational beings’” (2009: 224–5).12 Moreover, Arneil exposes how Kant’s formulation of personhood has pervasively found its way to the backdrop of influential political theories of justice by the likes of John Rawls and Charles Taylor. Because Kant locates personhood in the human ability to reason, Arneil argues that contemporary authors who draw on Kant (such as Taylor) are consequently “forced to define those incapable of ‘rationality’ as outside the ‘normal’ meaning of personhood,” as possessing an unrealizable potential to become human (2009: 225, 228). Together, these works by critical disability scholars illustrate how Kant’s moral philosophy has sustained a political discourse that categorically exempts the disabled from the remits of justice. Overall, three important conclusions can be drawn from the literature on Kant and disability. First, scholars working on intellectual disability and political theory have provided convincing arguments as to how Kantian conceptions of personhood misrecognize the inherent humanity of the intellectually disabled. Second, these scholars have compellingly identified why, from a political standpoint of justice, liberty, and equality, it is desirable to move away from such reason-centric formulations of moral status that privilege the able-minded over the intellectually disabled. Third, many of these commentators have conclusively outlined how Kant’s moral philosophy is conceptually, albeit indirectly, implicated in the political marginalization of the disabled persons. Notwithstanding the merits of their projects, the authors in question have limited their critiques of Kant’s political thought to his moral and practical philosophies, or what is colloquially known as the “pure” segment of his work. Take Tobin Siebers’ (2011: 89) following claim for instance: “Theories of rationality […] configure rationality itself in terms of the objective properties and identifying characteristics of those agents whom Kant called rational beings, and these characteristics do not allow for the inclusion of people with disabilities.” Siebers’ point here illustrates a general trend in critiques of Kant’s moral philosophy from the perspective of disability in which Kant’s empirical views on the disabled are persistently overlooked. Because of this oversight, discussions of Kant and disability are limited to speculative arguments that hinge on the impenetrability of Kant’s moral theory by the intellectually disabled. As such, Kant’s extensive definitions of cognitive disability and lively figurations of disabled subjects have yet to be weighed against the political arguments of his moral and practical philosophy in an effort to assess how these views may effectively, rather than merely potentially, impact the meaning of his ideas about justice and thus sway their political and theoretical significance. As I argue throughout this chapter, Kant’s empirical writings on disability are critical to this scholarly debate for two reasons. First, it is in these texts that Kant entertains political questions concerning the civil and moral standing of intellectually disabled subjects. Second, Kant’s empirical works are essential to our understanding of his transcendental philosophy and political system, especially regarding the categorical imperative, because it is here – in his construction of the intellectually disabled – that Kant outlines the identity of those exceptional, irrational beings barred from the political concessions of justice. By turning my attention to how, where, and why Kant’s approach to justice fails with respect to the intellectually disabled, I intend to cast light on what I consider to be the margins of his moral philosophy and, as a result, delineate the limits of his political theory of justice. This marginal space wherein the intellectually disabled are enclosed exemplifies what Uday Mehta (1999) describes as the explicit exclusion of the unfamiliar, along with the erasure of their “sentiments, feelings, sense of location, and forms of life” (1999: 20–1). Such occult “spaces” of exception are, in Mehta’s words, “places that when identified by the grid of Enlightenment rationality [become] only spots on a map or past points on the scale of civilizational progress, but not dwellings in which peoples lived and had deeply invested identities” (1999: 21).13 To the extent that it moves toward recasting the meaning of his theory of justice, my interpretation of disability in Kant endeavors to reaffirm the political and conceptual significance of disability to the history of political thought and contemporary politicized identity. Read as such, I intend for the reach of my argument to stretch beyond interpretations of Kant. By demonstrating just how problematic Kant’s conception of justice is with regards to intellectual disability, this chapter consequently interrogates contemporary political theories whose ambit of justice, in being bound by reason, effectively forecloses the intellectually disabled from freedom, citizenship, and personhood.

## Off 3

#### States ought to call a global constitutional convention and establish a constitution reflecting intergenerational concern with exclusive authority to ban appropriation of outer space by private entities and bind participating bodies to its result by forefronting an ethic of incommensurability

#### That solves the aff – it addresses shared anxieties while building political consensus

**Gardiner 14 1** [Stephen M. Gardiner, Professor of Philosophy and Ben Rabinowitz Endowed Professor of Human Dimensions of the Environment at the University of Washington, Seattle, “A Call for a Global Constitutional Convention Focused on Future Generations,” 2014, *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 28, Issue 3, pp. 299-315, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679414000379>, EA]

**A Constitutional Convention**

In my view, the above line of reasoning leads naturally to a more specific proposal: that we—concerned individuals, interested community groups, **national governments**, and transnational organizations—**should** initiate a **call for a global constitutional convention focused on future generations.** This proposal has two components. The first component is procedural. **The proposal takes the form of a “call to action.” It is explicitly an attempt to engage a range of actors, based on a claim that they** have or **should take on** a set of **responsibilities, and** a view about **how to go about discharging those responsibilities.** The second component is substantive. The main focus for action is a push for the creation of a constitutional convention at the global level, whose role is to pave the way for an overall constitutional system that appropriately embodies intergenerational concern.

**The substantive idea rests on several key ideas. Still, for the purposes of a basic proposal, I suggest that these be understood in a relatively open way that, as far as is practicable, does not prejudge the outcome of the convention, and especially its main recommendations. First, the convention itself should be understood as “a** representative **body called** together **for some occasional or temporary purpose” and “constituted by statute to represent the people in their primary relations.”14 Second, a constitutional system should be thought of in a minimalist sense as “a set of norms (rules, principles or values) creating, structuring, and possibly defining the limits of government power or authority.”15 Third, the “instigating” role of the convention should be to discuss, develop, make recommendations toward, and set in motion a process for the establishment of a constitution. Fourth, its primary subject matter should be the need to adequately reflect and embody intergenerational concern, where this would include at least the protection of future generations, the promotion of their interests (where “interests” is to be broadly conceived so as to include rights, claims, welfare, and so on), and the discharging of duties with respect to them. It may also (and in my view should) include some way of reflecting concern for past generations, including responsiveness to at least certain of their interests and views. However, I will leave** **that issue aside in what follows.**

**The proposal to initiate a call for a global constitutional convention has at least two attractive features. First, it is based in a deep political reality, and does not underplay the challenge. It acknowledges the problem as** it **is, both specific and general, and calls attention to the heart of that problem, including to the failures of the current system, the need for an alternative, and the background issue of responsibility. Moreover, though the proposal is dramatic and rhetorically eye-catching, it is so in a way that is appropriately responsive to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the persistent political inertia surrounding more modest initiatives, and the fact that (grave though concerns about it are) climate change is only one instance of the tyranny of the contemporary (and the wider perfect moral storm), and we should expect others to arise over the coming decades and centuries.**

**The second attractive feature of the proposal is that, though ambitious, it is not alienating. While it does not succumb to despair in the face of the challenge, neither does it needlessly polarize and divide from the outset (for example, by leaping to specific recommendations about how to fill the institutional gap). Instead, it acknowledges that there are fundamental difficulties and anxieties, but uses them to start the right kind of debate, rather than to foreclose it. As a result, the proposal is a promising candidate to serve as the subject of a wide and overlapping political consensus, at least among those who share intergenerational concern.**

Selective Mirroring

To quell some initial anxieties, it is perhaps worth clarifying the open-ended and non-alienating character of the proposal. **One temptation would be to view** the call for **a global constitutional convention as a** fairly naked plea for **world government**, a prospect that would be deeply alienating—indeed anathema—to many. However, that is not my intention. **Though it is possible that a global constitutional convention would lead in this direction, it is by no means certain.**

At a minimum, **no** such **body could** plausibly **recommend any** form of **“world government” without simultaneously advancing detailed suggestions** about how **to avoid** the **standard threats such an institution might pose.** Moreover, it seems perfectly conceivable, even likely under current ways of thinking, that **a global constitutional convention would pursue** what we might call a **selective mirroring** strategy. Specifically, **a convention would seek to develop** a **broader** system of **institutions and practices that reflected** the **desirable features of a powerful and** highly **centralized global authority but neutralized** the **standing threats posed by it** (for example, it might employ familiar strategies such as the separation of powers). In all likelihood, one feature of a selective mirroring approach would be the significant preservation of existing institutions to serve as a bulwark against the excesses of any newly created ones. Whether and how such a strategy might be made effective against the perfect moral storm, and whether something closer to a “world government” would do better, would be a central issue for discussion by the convention.

#### It spills over to foster broader intergenerational representation, but independence is key

**Gardiner 14 2** [Stephen M. Gardiner, Professor of Philosophy and Ben Rabinowitz Endowed Professor of Human Dimensions of the Environment at the University of Washington, Seattle, “A Call for a Global Constitutional Convention Focused on Future Generations,” 2014, *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 28, Issue 3, pp. 299-315, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679414000379>, EA]

One set of **guidelines concern**s **how the global constitutional convention relates to other institutions. The first** guideline **concerns** relative **independence:**

(1) **Autonomy: Any global constitutional convention should have considerable autonomy from other institutions**, and **especially from those dominated by factors that** generate or **facilitate the tyranny of the contemporary** (and the perfect moral storm, more generally).

Thus, for example, **attempts should be made to insulate the global constitutional convention from** too much **influence from short-term** and narrowly economic **forces.**

**The second guideline concerns limits to** that **independence**:

(2) **Mutual Accountability:** Any global constitutional convention should be to some extent accountable to other **major institutions**, and they **should be accountable to it.**

Thus, for example, though the global constitutional convention should not be able to decide unilaterally that national institutions should be radically supplanted, nevertheless such **institutions should not have a simple veto on** the **recommendations of the convention**, including those that would result in sharp limits to their powers.

**A third guideline concerns adequacy:**

(3) **Functional Adequacy: The global constitutional convention should be constructed in** such **a way that it is highly likely to produce recommendations** that are **functionally adequate to the task.**

Thus, for example, the **tasks** of the global constitutional convention **should not be assigned to any currently existing body** whose design and authority is clearly unsuitable. In my view, this guideline rules out proposals such as the Royal Society’s suggestion that governance of geoengineering should be taken up by the United Nations’ Commission on Sustainable Development,20 or the Secretary-General’s recommendation of a new United Nations’ High Commissioner for Future Generations.21 Though **such proposals** may have merit for some purposes (for example, **as pragmatic**, incremental **suggestions to highlight the importance of intergenerational issues**), they **are too modest**, in my opinion, **to reflect the gravity of** the **threats** posed by climate change in particular, **and the perfect moral storm** more generally.

Aims

A second set of guidelines concerns the aims of the global constitutional convention. Here, **the perfect moral storm analysis would suggest**:

(4) **Comprehensiveness: The convention should be under a mandate to consider a very broad range of global, intergenerational issues, to focus on** such issues **at a foundational level, and to recommend institutional reform accordingly.**

(5) **Standing Authority**: Though **the convention** may recommend the establishment of some temporary and issue-specific bodies, its focus **should** be on the **establish**ment of **institutions with standing authority over the long term.**

**These guidelines** are significant in that they **stand against existing issue-specific approaches to global** and **intergenerational problems**, **and encourage** not only **a less ad hoc** but also a **more proactive approach**. In particular, the global constitutional convention might be expected to recommend institutions that would be charged with identifying, monitoring, and taking charge of intergenerational issues as such. For example, such **institutions should address not only specific policy issues** (such as climate change, large asteroid detection, and long-term nuclear waste) **but also** the need to **identify similar threats before they arise.**

#### Proactive measures mitigate a laundry list of emerging catastrophic risks – extinction

**Beckstead et al. 14** [Nick Beckstead, Nick Bostrom, Niel Bowerman, Owen Cotton-Barratt, William MacAskill, Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh, Toby Ord, \* Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, \*\* Director, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, \*\*\* Global Priorities Project, Centre for Effective Altruism; Department of Physics, University of Oxford, \*\*\*\* Global Priorities Project, Centre for Effective Altruism; Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, \*\*\*\*\* Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, \*\*\*\*\*\* Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Risk; Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, \*\*\*\*\*\*\* Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, “Policy Brief: Unprecedented Technological Risks,” 2014, *The Global Priorities Project, The Future of Humanity Institute, The Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology, and The Centre for the Study of Existential Risk*, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Unprecedented-Technological-Risks.pdf>, Accessed: 03/13/21, EA]

In the near future, **major technological developments will give rise to new unprecedented risks**. In particular, like nuclear technology, **developments in synthetic biology, geoengineering, distributed manufacturing and artificial intelligence create risks of catastrophe on a global scale.** These **new technologies will have very large benefits** to humankind. **But, without proper regulation**, they **risk** the creation of **new weapons of mass destruction**, the start of **a new arms race, or** catastrophe through **accidental misuse**. Some experts have suggested that these **technologies are** even **more worrying than nuclear weapons, because they are more difficult to control.** Whereas nuclear weapons require the rare and controllable resources of uranium-235 or plutonium-239, once these new technologies are developed, they will be very difficult to regulate and easily accessible to small countries or even terrorist groups.

Moreover, **these risks are** currently **underregulated**, for a number of reasons. **Protection against such risks is a global public good and** thus **undersupplied by the market. Implementation** often **requires cooperation among many governments, which adds political complexity. Due to the unprecedented nature of** the **risks, there is little** or no **previous experience from which to draw lessons and form policy.** And **the beneficiaries of preventative policy include people who have no sway over current political processes — our children and grandchildren.**

Given the unpredictable nature of technological progress, **development of** these **technologies may be unexpectedly rapid. A political reaction to these technologies only** when they are already **on the brink of development may** therefore **be too late. We need** to implement **prudent and proactive policy measures in the near future, even if no** such **breakthroughs currently appear imminent.**

#### Maintaining sustainable use of outer space is key to future generations

**Islam 18** [Mohammad Saiful Islam, Mohammad works for the Institute of Advanced Judicial Studies and the Beijing Institute of Technology. 4-27-2018, "The Sustainable Use of Outer Space: Complications and Legal Challenges to the Peaceful Uses and Benefit of Humankind," Beijing Law Review, <https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201> accessed 12/12/21] Adam

4.2. **Ensure the Rights of Future Generations in Outer Space**

**Sustainable development is the establishing principle for achieving present human needs without damaging the demands of future generations maintaining integrity and constancy of the natural systems.** The **modern idea of sustainable development is derived from the Brundtland Report in 1987.** Generally considered in **modern application and exploration of outer space, fundamental elements are the area must be dedicated to peaceful purposes**; and the **area must be preserved for future generations** [(Heim, 1990)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref17) . It is an **indispensable and inordinate challenge to confirm uphold the healthy environment and make sure development without destroying the rights of future generations in space**. **Article IX of The Outer Space Treaty provided, in the exploration and use of outer space, States should pursue studies and conduct exploration of outer space so as to avoid harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth** [(Outer Space Treaty, 1967)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref35) . The issues of what constitutes harmful contamination in Earth’s environment have yet to be interpreted. The legal definition of “adverse” and “harmful” will also modification as Earth, indigenous sciences progress, separately or in concert, with the planetary exploration space sciences [(Robinson, 2005)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref38) . As a result of multifaceted political, economic, scientific, technological, educational, and other global problems, **there has been practicing exclusively only international cooperation for sustainable space development among the developed countries** [(Noichim, 2005)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref34) **.** The **space faring nations should promote a supportive environment for peaceful and sustainable use of space, decrease environmental effects on Earth and protect the terrestrial environment**. We should escape a regime that will ultimately reflect the over-exploitation of resources and environmental havoc [(Fountain, 2002)](https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=85201#ref9) .