# 1AC

### Advantage - LDP

#### Labor reforms check aggressive LDP military policy – budget tradeoffs kill military spending

Obata 3/15 [(Masako, The National Confederation of Trade Unions, Zenroren) “Japanese Workers: Raising the Standard of Living All the More Essential Due to Pandemic” UE Union, 3/15/2021. https://www.ueunion.org/ue-news/2021/japanese-workers-raising-the-standard-of-living-all-the-more-essential-due-to-pandemic] BC

The point is that real wages have been declining over the many years in Japan since before the outbreak of the coronavirus. The pandemic is exacerbating the employment situation and further holding down wages. Contingent workers and women workers are particularly affected by the contradictions, producing a surge in the number of suicides.

The immediate goal of our movement is the creation of a society that provides increased public support instead of sacrificing the working people as we make efforts to overcome the coronavirus crisis. We refuse to resign ourselves to life affected by the pandemic. We are aiming to win substantial wage increases while raising the standard of living in order to ensure that everyone can enjoy a decent life. We are demanding stable employment and strict working time regulations as part of the effort to establish rules to ensure that everyone can work with dignity. We are fighting for healthcare and other social services and public systems that guarantee people’s safety and life free from anxiety.

The coronavirus pandemic has revealed that wages for workers have fallen to levels that are inadequate for supporting their lives. The policies serving the best interest of the business sector at the cost of worker well-being have been exposed. We reject a choice between job security and pay increase, and fight for job security and substantial wage increases while raising the standard of living, along with a national minimum wage at 1,500 yen (about 14 dollars) per hour. We argue that these are all the more essential because of the pandemic. We are encouraged by the US workers’ fight making progress for raising the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour under the new administration of President Joe Biden.

Securing living wages for all workers is the only way to get over the present economic situation amid the COVID-19 pandemic. A taxi drivers’ union federation affiliated with Zenroren has successfully protected their jobs despite the pandemic having a severe impact on the industry. Many new unions have been created since last year among taxi drivers. Healthcare unions have refused to take a pay cut and are continuing to fight for workplace safety. In Okinawa, workers in the tourism industry have organized themselves in a new union. They successfully won monetary compensation for restaurant and other food service industry workers during business closures by influencing politics. Our fight is directed to win living wages for anyone who works 8 hours a day by increasing international solidarity.

Today, the Japanese government and the financial circles are trying to take advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to promote what they call “diversity and flexibility in work style” and “freedom to choose”. They are encouraging people to work remotely, have a second job or side business. They are calling for using a discretionary working system, easing rules for dismissals, and working in the gig economy, which is exempted from labor laws. The attempt to institute a system to let people work on their self-responsibility is underway in many countries, including Japan and the United States. We must reject attacks that obscure management’s responsibility for arranging reasonable work hours that allow workers to get appropriate rest.

On January 22, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) went into effect. The treaty is a milestone in banning nuclear weapons for the first time under international law. The nuclear-weapon countries are still continuing to compete for the development of nuclear-capable missiles and other weapons while modernizing and reinforcing their nuclear arsenals even at a time when their citizens are at high risk of COVID-19 exposure. We are increasing a movement to press the United States and Japan, which relies upon the US nuclear umbrella, to ratify the TPNW for the sake of preserving people’s lives and the Earth’s environment.

Japan’s government of Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga is calling for the largest-ever military expenditure in the fiscal 2021 (Apr. 2021-Mar. 2022) government budget. What is the point in compiling the largest-ever military budget at a time when the Japanese people are experiencing hardships? The government’s shopping spree for US military hardware continues. It is even purchasing weaponry, which is linked to the plan to acquire capability to attack enemy bases in violation of the Constitution. (The Japanese Constitution, adopted after World War II, prohibits Japan from having a standing military or attacking other countries to settle disputes. -Ed.) These are absolutely unnecessary for defending our country and its people. The demand for “slashing the military budget and redirecting the money towards securing jobs” is shared by Japanese and US workers.

#### **The LDP is pushing for Japanese proliferation**

Bosack 19 [(Michael MacArthur Bosack - special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow and is a former officer in the U.S. Air Force) “Revisiting Japan's nuclear arms debate” The Japan Times, November 28, 2019] FP

On the surface, Japan’s position toward nuclear weapons is clear. On Dec. 11,1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato (Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s great-uncle) announced Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” to the Diet, noting that it was his responsibility “to achieve and maintain safety in Japan under the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons, in line with Japan’s Peace Constitution.” The Diet later codified part of the principles in law, meaning that renewed legislative action is a prerequisite to any formal pursuit ﻿﻿ of a domestic nuclear arsenal.

While domestically that policy is black and white, Japan’s foreign policy takes a different approach. The government has consistently recognized the need for nuclear deterrence, achieving this by relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The allies periodically renew this deterrence commitment in senior-level joint statements and offered an explicit reference to it in the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. Those defense guidelines reassured that “the United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces.”

The allies also routinely conduct an “Extended Deterrence Dialogue” between senior U.S. and Japanese foreign policy and defense officials, the activities and discussions of which are anchored in the issue of nuclear deterrence.

Japan has also taken a measured approach to the international community’s activities toward nuclear disarmament. Where Japan can call for disarmament without impact to its nuclear umbrella, it does. In 1970, Japan signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and ratified it in 1976. The 2020 Review Conference for that treaty is upcoming, and Japan will take the opportunity to renew its commitment to the provisions of the treaty. Also, for the past 26 years, Japan has co-sponsored an annual United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for the total elimination of nuclear arms.

However, neither of those activities have binding impacts on existing nuclear deterrent capabilities. That is why Japan’s approach to the recent 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons differed: With this treaty, signatories accept a prohibition from developing, testing, producing, stockpiling, transferring and using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons, as well as assisting other countries to engage in prohibited activities or seeking assistance from anyone engaged in actions that violate the treaty. In other words, signing onto the treaty would mean Japan would have to change its position toward the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which is a bridge too far despite its own domestic principles.

Policies are not permanent though, and the nuclear weapons debate in Japan re-emerges every so often. It is especially salient now as North Korea has successfully tested nuclear weapons and demonstrated an effective delivery vehicle through its medium- and long-range ballistic missile testing. Compounding the debate are concerns related to U.S. foreign policy, especially alliance commitments. The doubt that exists within Japanese political, bureaucratic and academic circles may generate impetus to revisit the serious issue of nuclear proliferation as it has done in the past.

Several leading politicians, including former Liberal Democratic Party Secretary-General and prime minister-hopeful Shigeru Ishiba have already commented that Japan should have the freedom to build nuclear weapons if it wishes to do so. He is not alone in this position, but advocates of nuclear weapons face strong opposition both from the public and from within their respective political parties.

#### **Unification of the CDP and DPP prevents Japanese proliferation**

Johnston 20 [(Eric Johnston – staff writer) “New political party set to become Japan’s largest opposition force” Japan Times, August 19, 2020] FP

On Wednesday, the Democratic Party for the People, one of the largest opposition groups in the Diet, formally proposed that the party dissolve. If approved, the move will allow members to join the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan in order to form a new political party late next month that could see a membership of 150 lawmakers in total. In that case, it would become the nation’s largest opposition party and a serious challenge to the ruling coalition between the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito.

What is the current strength of the two parties in the Diet?

The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan has 89 members, including 56 in the 465-seat Lower House and 33 in the 242-seat Upper House. The Democratic Party for the People has 62 members, including 40 in the Lower House and 22 in the Upper House.

Both parties cooperate with each other in the Diet and during election campaigns. Cooperation includes coordinating Diet committee questions to the ruling parties and voting together on Diet legislation.

During election campaigns, the parties work together on election strategies, choose not to run candidates against each other in the same district and appear at each other’s campaign rallies.

What are some similarities and differences between the two parties?

Both parties oppose constitutional revision of the kind the LDP and Komeito have proposed, such as codifying the Self-Defense Forces. However, the DPP is positive towards discussion of changes to the Constitution while the CDP is negative towards the idea.

In addition to differences over the Constitution, they have also differed over the consumption tax increase. The CDP pledged to freeze the consumption hike tax to 10 percent and review corporate tax systems and income progressiveness. The DPP also said it was not necessary to raise the tax unless the economy had recovered. But following the tax introduction, and especially after the coronavirus hit, the DPP called for reducing it to 5 percent while the CDP said that, rather than reducing it, the government should prioritize aid to small- and medium-sized enterprises.

In addition, the two parties have different views on nuclear power and cooperation with the Japan Communist Party. The center-left CDP supports doing away with nuclear power entirely. The DPP, which calls itself a reformist/centrist party, favors reducing reliance on nuclear power. Many of its members do not want to go as far as the CDP and eliminate it entirely.

The CDP and the DPP have cooperated with the Japan Communist Party in some local elections by supporting the same candidate, and the CDP leadership has indicated it would be open to discussions with the JCP about cooperation in national elections or working together in the Diet.

But some DPP members, including current party leader Yuichiro Tamaki and former Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara, have fundamental policy differences with it and are strongly opposed to any cooperation. They have said they will remain in the DPP after it dissolves rather than joining the new party centered around the CDP.

How did the two parties come about?

Both parties are descended from the former opposition Democratic Party. In 2017, just before the general election in September, the DP’s center-left members split from the party.

Many of the DP’s Lower House members initially decided to run in Yuriko Koike’s newly formed Kibo no To (Party of Hope) or as independents, while Upper House DP members remained. But more liberal members who found their request for endorsements rejected by Koike and the party then formed the CDP in early October 2017.

The more center-right DPP was formed in May 2018 as a merger between DP members and the Party of Hope. Then, in April 2019, it merged with former political heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa’s opposition Liberal Party.

Who is behind the merger to form a new party?

Japan’s largest confederation of trade unions, Rengo, is key to understanding the new party and what its policies will be.

Rengo has about 6.7 million members in affiliated and associated organizations. Its members are strong supporters of both parties, providing votes and campaign support including financial support.

Yet while Rengo as a whole has supported the CDP and the DPP, different trade unions within Rengo have traditionally been closer to one party or the other.

For example, the CDP has enjoyed past support from left-leaning public workers’ unions such as the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers’ Union, which, according to Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Labor statistics, had about 774,000 members as of 2019. It has also been supported by 116,000 member General Federation of Private Railway & Bus Workers’ Unions of Japan as well as the 243,000 Japan Postal Group Union.

The DPP has enjoyed the support of center-right sector unions such as the 210,000 member Federation of Electric Power and Industry Workers’ of Japan, which includes many people working in the nuclear power industry who are particularly opposed to the CDP’s zero nuclear power goal. The DPP also enjoys a lot of support from the 1.77 million member Japanese Federation of Textile, Chemical, Food, Commercial, Service, and General Worker’s Unions.

What happens next?

Once the DPP is officially dissolved, its members will be able to join a new party centered around the CDP.

The new party is also expected to include a small group of like-minded independent Diet members, and will be launched next month.

#### Japan proliferates quickly – they have enough plutonium for 5,000 bombs

Winn 19 [(Patrick, PTI correspondent based in Bangkok. He was a senior correspondent with GlobalPost and his work has also appeared on NBC News, The Atlantic, the BBC and other outlets. He received the Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award as well as a prestigious National Press Club award. I’m also a two-time winner of Amnesty International’s Human Rights Press Awards.) “Japan has plutonium, rockets and rivals. Will it ever build a nuke?” PRI, 3/14/2019] BC

Most of the world’s nuke-ready plutonium is held by a few countries with powerful militaries: the United States, Russia, Israel, India, China, Pakistan, France and the United Kingdom.

And then there’s Japan.

Japan is perhaps the most pacifist, large nation on Earth. It also happens to own 100,000 pounds of primo, weapons-grade plutonium. That could be enough to create more than 5,000 nuclear bombs.

All of this plutonium has been processed, Japanese officials say, with the intention of generating electricity. Moreover, every last lump is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, says Tomohiko Taniguchi, a special adviser to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe.

For foreign inspectors, Japan’s plutonium storage units are “like 7-Eleven convenience stores,” Taniguchi says. “They’re open at 11 o’clock in the evening, and you can see everything from outside.”

“So, even if there may be some who’d wish to build those weapons in just a couple of months — even if Japanese technology is capable of doing so — there’s a process.” Clearing that process, Taniguchi says, would require the Japanese public allowing elected leaders to build nukes in full view of a disapproving world.

No one sees that happening anytime soon, he says. “The parliamentary process, plus our budgetary process, media checks and balances — they all make it impossible for Japan to do anything like that.”

Or next to impossible, at least.

Only 1 in 10 Japanese people want their government to acquire nuclear weapons. The horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still resonate. Conventional wisdom says that disdain for nuclear weapons is baked into the Japanese psyche.

But Japan’s identity is also in flux, and there are scattered groups working hard to tilt the status quo. They often pop up on street corners in Tokyo, yelling at passersby, determined to jolt their fellow Japanese from a pacifist slumber.

In Japan, you can usually hear the far-right coming.

The country’s 1,000 or so hypernationalistic groups will often broadcast their messages through loudspeakers mounted to the roofs of vans. They’ll pull up to a pedestrian crossing and blare out battle cries: End Yankee subjugation! Beware China! Crush North Korea! Revere the fallen empire!

Then, it’s off to the next spot.

“We’re a nuisance. That’s what a lot of people think,” says Sawatari Seiji, a long-haul trucker by trade. His weekends are devoted to right-wing campaigning.

On this crisp, Sunday morning, Seiji is driving a van painted bone white. There are red suns emblazoned on both sides. “I once thought similarly to the public. I just ignored the right-wingers,” he says. “Then, I met our great leader and realized, ‘Wait. This is a man who’ll actually express the things society is afraid to say out loud!’”

His aforementioned great leader is riding shotgun, rolling cigarettes and rifling through a box of cassette tapes. The man’s name is Hirotomi Igarashi. The 48-year-old heads a crew of about two dozen men calling themselves Dai Nippon Shinmin Juku or “Subjects of Great Japan’s Emperor.”

Their uniform: black army boots and blue jumpsuits, the kind electricians wear.

These men long to revive the once-mighty Japanese empire. Once powerful enough to lord over much of China and the Koreas, this imperium was robbed of its glory in 1945 by a bomb erupting over Nagasaki that contained 14 pounds of plutonium.

“When Japan was defeated by the Americans,” Igarashi says, “we were re-educated, and the Japanese were robbed of our souls.” An iron-willed people were made timid, he says, “and we fell into their trap. This is the greatest accomplishment ever by an occupying force.”

Igarashi is blessed with ursine heft. Earlier, when we shook hands, his rough hands swallowed mine. He works in construction. The rest of his crew are all blue-collar guys, as well.

Igarashi is still selecting the perfect, imperial anthem from his box of tapes. He finally slides a cassette into the van’s tape deck. I hear a nostalgic click and whir — and then, from the roof, comes throaty singing that exalts Japan’s fallen, imperial warriors. As we drive, the anthem resounds over Tokyo’s tidy streets.

“When I hear this music, something bubbles up inside me,” Igarashi says. “The song speaks for us and what we’re trying to do.”

Which is what, exactly?

“We demand that Japan remilitarize itself and acquire nuclear weapons,” Igarashi says. “We’re not saying Japan should do exactly what it did before — going to other nations and invading — but we have to learn to protect ourselves again.”

When nationalists such as Igarashi peer out from Japan, they see danger in every direction. There’s China, once brutalized by Japan, but now so strong it could likely fend off an attack from the United States.

Over on the Korean peninsula, there is a nuclear-armed dictator, Kim Jong-un, who has been brazen enough to fire missiles over Japan’s northern islands.

Eastward, across the vast Pacific, sits America’s commander in chief: Donald Trump, a leader who has wondered aloud why Japan doesn’t just acquire its own nukes, start defending itself and save US forces the trouble.

That scenario is actually unlawful — and any Japanese high school student can tell you why. After World War II, America defanged Japan by inserting a superpacifist clause in its constitution. It forbids the nation from ever building a military or going to war.

This rule is blurred by Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, a sophisticated, armed wing with tanks, warships and a defense budget of $48 billion — an amount exceeding the gross domestic product of many small countries.

Yet, these forces are still forbidden by the constitution from attacking targets away from Japanese soil — even when facing a direct threat. That remains the job of the United States, which maintains bases strewn across the islands. In Igarashi’s view, this arrangement is far too wobbly — especially since America appears more politically confused and unreliable every day.

“Japanese people have fallen into a slumber,” he says. “They’re so used to thinking the US will protect us that they never ask questions. Don’t they have pride? Don’t they see the threats all around us?”

It galls him that Japan, a scientific powerhouse, lacks the guts to turn its plutonium into an arsenal that would make “crazy dictators” like Kim Jong-un think twice. “We’re extremely proud of our technological skills,” Igarashi says. “I’m sure we could build nuclear weapons within a very short time.”

As Igarashi puffs his cigarette to a nub, war anthems keep booming from the van’s roof, washing over throngs of people waiting to cross the street. But as we turn a corner onto a smaller street, Igarashi twists the volume knob.

“Need to turn this down a bit,” he says. “We’re going through a quiet, residential area.”

About 10 minutes later, we arrive at their destination: a wide-open plaza next to a busy subway stop. A nearly identical white van pulls up, and now the whole crew — all seven guys — are hopping out to unfurl flags, some emblazoned with the imperial rising sun.

One man scrambles onto the roof and drapes banners over the side. Each bears a slogan painted in black script: Shinzō Abe is an American puppet! Defeat North Korea’s terrorist regime!

Igarashi, tying a white bandana around his brow, sets expectations before the show begins. “Unfortunately, you’ll see many people walking by without paying attention,” he says. “But even if 1 out of 1,000 pays attention, that’s great. That one person will go home, talk to their family and help bring on the awakening of the Japanese people.”

Perhaps even that modest goal is overly ambitious. For the next few hours, Igarashi and his men take turns pacing on the roof of their vans, shouting into a microphone plugged into a rack of loudspeakers.

Out on the concrete plaza, there are hundreds within earshot at any given time. But almost no one stops to listen to the Subjects of Great Japan’s Emperor. They are treated like street preachers — evangelical cranks spoiling a lovely Sunday with scary rants about missiles and traitors and Japan’s imminent demise.

There are an estimated 100,000 members of far-right groups in Japan. They’re great at making noise. But their followers amount to a speck within a population of 127 million people, most of whom are widely assumed to embrace pacifism.

So, why not just ignore the far-right?

Bad idea, says professor Koichi Nakano. He’s a political scientist at Tokyo’s prestigious Sophia University. “Many people are complacent in thinking Japan’s pacifist sentiments are rock solid,” he says. “But they are not.”

Japan’s citizens now face a huge question: Do they really want to remain pacifists forever — especially in a century defined by Chinese power?

And American, imperial decline?

And nukes spreading into the clutches of regimes such as North Korea?

While mainstream voices go squeamish at talk of war, the far-right is working overtime to articulate a new, Japanese destiny — one that taps into a militancy that was tamed after America’s nuclear attacks.

There are still red lines, Nakano says. Go to a dinner party in Tokyo, suggest that Japan build a nuke and “you will get strong, angry reactions,” he says. “From people who are left or right. A big chunk of people think going nuclear is not even an option.” He recalls Trump’s suggestion in 2016 that Japan acquire its own nukes to “protect itself against this maniac [Kim Jong-un].” Nakano says that comment totally “offended and confused the mainstream in Japan.”

But putting nukes aside, suggesting that Japan build a more potent military, one unshackled by its US-imposed constitution, is no longer all that taboo. In fact, Japan’s conservative prime minister hopes to do just that.

Shinzō Abe has said that the Japanese public will soon be able to vote on scrapping that constitutional ban against building an offensive military and going to war. He hopes to lock this down before the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo.

As he labors toward that goal, there are multiple forces working to revive a feisty Japanese militancy.

Some are quite innocent, such as a comic franchise that depicts Japan’s Self-Defense Forces fighting alien invaders. Then, there are the online revisionists, seeking to scrub the shame from the old, imperial army’s atrocities — namely systematic rape in China and Korea.

“People with direct experience of World War II are becoming fewer in number,” Nakano says. “Imagination is taking over. People find it easier to learn about their history on the internet rather than opening a thick, erudite book written by an actual historian.”

“There’s a very serious tug-of-war coming,” Nakano says, “and it’s hard to predict which way it will tilt.”

In late February, during the run-up to Trump’s backslapping summit with Kim Jong-un, the North Korean government sounded an alarm: According to the Kim regime, “catastrophic consequences” loom as Japan goes soft on its “non-nuclear principles” — and Japan has the power to “go nuclear anytime.”

This might be written off as hypocrisy spewing from a hyperbolic rogue state. Ultranationalists such as Igarashi spout the same line: If Japan only had the will, it could assemble nukes in short order.

But this also happens to be true.

Take it from Steve Fetter, a nuclear expert who served in Barack Obama’s White House for five years.

Given Japan’s “technological and scientific expertise,” he says, the government could probably build a bomb “within a matter of months.”

“Japan has 45,000 kilograms of plutonium,” says Fetter, who worked in the Office of Science and Technology Policy. “And it only takes 8 kilograms to build a nuclear weapon.

Japan has one of the world's largest stockpiles of plutonium

[chart]

But how would a nation forbidden to own attack weaponry even deliver a warhead to its target? “Japan doesn’t have long-range missiles,” Fetter says, “but it does have space-launch capabilities. If they choose, they could certainly build and deploy longer-range missiles armed with nuclear weapons.”

North Korea also isn’t the only nation fretting over this. During Fetter’s time with the White House, Chinese officials told him that Beijing views Japan’s plutonium stockpile with suspicion.

“Japan maintains — and I believe they’re entirely correct — that the plutonium stockpile was accumulated for civilian purposes,” Fetter says. Much of it would probably be fueling nuclear energy plants right now if it weren’t for the Fukushima disaster in 2011. Almost all of Japan’s nuclear energy sector was shut down in the ensuing panic.

But Fetter suspects some Japanese officials like keeping that stockpile of plutonium around to send a message to their neighbors. It works, he says, as a “symbol of their abilities to produce nuclear weapons if they chose to do so.”

The most important bulwark against Japan going nuclear, he says, is the public’s strong aversion to nuclear weapons — and a feeling that the US, no matter what, will never abandon them in a time of crisis. But that can be eroded, Fetter says, by Trump’s “talk of ‘America first’ and his suggestions that they should rely on themselves … which is very unhelpful.”

“I do worry about that [far-right] minority in Japan that says, ‘It’s time for us to do more for our self-defense, including acquiring nuclear weapons,’” Fetter says. “And I would not want to see the US do anything to strengthen that view.”

There is a yawning chasm between Igarashi, a husky man in black boots yelling outside train stations, and Shinzō Abe, Japan’s highest official.

On the same day that Igarashi’s crew were riding around in dinged-up vans blasting imperial songs, Abe was aboard a jet flying back to Tokyo from the Swiss Alps. The premier and his adviser, Taniguchi, had just attended the World Economic Forum at Davos.

Yet, both camps crave a Japanese army unbound by that old, pacifist decree in the constitution. What separates them is their views on the American empire.

The far-right imagines building a force so fierce it can go it alone, even if their islands are abandoned by the fickle Yankees. But the ruling party envisions a Japanese military tenacious enough to join its American brothers in battle — the two venturing out as a team to smash foreign threats should they arise.

“Japan’s military power is all about shielding us from a coming assault,” Taniguchi says. “The attacking part, the piercing part, is taken up by the United States.”

#### Japanese nukes lock in Sino-Japanese conflict and US draw-in – nationalism, ideological discrepancies, and miscalc mean even limited war causes extinction

Kulacki 19 [(Gregory, Ph.D. in Government and Politics from the University of Maryland, China Director for the Council on International Educational Exchange, Associate Professor at Green Mountain College, Director of External Stdies at Pitzer College, joined UCS in 2002, research focuses on China’s nuclear arms control policy and US extended nuclear deterrence policy in East Asia), “The Next Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” Union of Concerned Scientists, 8/18/2019] JL  
Japan was the first, the last and the only nation to be attacked with nuclear weapons. If it continues along the path set by Prime Minister Abe and the national security bureaucrats of his Liberal Democrat Party (LDP), it may also be the next.

The laws and norms restraining the development and deployment of nuclear weapons are dissolving in the same corrosive nationalism that led to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One by one laboriously negotiated constraints are disappearing. The latest to go was the INF Treaty. Mr. Abe’s government did nothing to preserve it, and may have intentionally hastened its demise. For more than a decade LDP bureaucrats have been lobbying the US government to redeploy US nuclear weapons in Asia. Some Japanese officials, including Vice Foreign Minister Takeo Akiba, have discussed putting US nuclear weapons back in Japan, training the Japanese Self-Defense Force to deliver them and obtaining US permission to decide when to use them.

Government and military officials in Japan and the United States are in the grips of increasing anxiety about China. The steady growth of a national economy containing nearly one-fifth of humanity is the cause of their worries and the animus guiding some of President Trump’s trade warriors. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) eclipsed Japan’s in 2010 and will soon surpass the GDP of the United States. China has held military spending to consistent 2% of GDP since 1979, but combined with the rapid pace of Chinese economic growth Chinese military expenditures have created the impression of an equally rapid military buildup US and Japanese security experts assume must be aimed at something other than self-defense.

Japanese security experts fear China will act the same way Japan did in the 1930s. US security experts worry China will behave the same way the United States does now. Neither feels comfortable living with those thoughts.

Both sets of officials imagine new nuclear weapons will relieve their anxiety. The Trump administration wants to offset China’s increasing conventional military capabilities with new “low-yield” or “non-strategic” nuclear weapons the United States can use to avoid defeat in a future war with China. The nuclear thinking within Abe’s LDP is similar but less clear cut. In a lengthy discussion about China in Washington in 2009, Mr. Akiba told me he believed that if Chinese leaders knew Japan had access to US nuclear weapons, a military trained to deliver them and a government with the authority to use them then China would be less assertive on everything from territorial disputes to trade negotiations.

The elevation of national ambitions, priorities and interests over international agreements that subordinate all three to shared peace and prosperity is rapidly overturning decades of halting but inspiringly successful efforts to not only avoid another world war but to create a more sustainable and equitable global economy. The collapse of international nuclear arms control is accelerating in a context where all international organizations are under assault, and many of the international laws and norms that created them are being disparaged or ignored.

Abe’s LDP was one of the first to subvert the post World War II consensus on the dangers of nationalism.  The prime minister and the leaders of his party bristled at the continuation of ritual expressions of remorse for the consequences of Japanese militarism and chose instead to ostentatiously honor the perpetrators. They sought to restore Japan’s national stature by overturning the “peace constitution” instituted in the wake of the atomic bombings and Japan’s defeat. Steve Bannon admiringly told the LDP that Abe was Trump before Trump. The only difference between Abe and his American idol is that the prime minister still values international trade agreements seen as essential to Japan’s economic survival.

It is unlikely President Trump is self-consciously leading an organized effort to redirect US foreign, economic and military policy. His only clear interest–the focus of all his presidential activity–appears to be simple self-aggrandizement. But the aberrant character of his campaign and his government repelled traditional US  foreign policy elites and attracted a cabal of sycophants, opportunists and ideologues, like Bannon, who mobilized longstanding popular resentments against post-war US internationalism that Trump shared and articulated. Public support for Trump’s “America-first” orientation enabled his underlings to institutionalize a rapid US withdrawal from many of its international obligations.

China, on the other hand, embraced the idea of global community and emerged as one of internationalism’s most vocal defenders. This difference may provide a new ideological foundation for anti-Chinese policies similar to those that organized US-China relations during the Cold War.

The war all three nations imagine might come would be fast and vast. US plans include preemptive long range missile strikes deep into central China. US leaders refuse to rule out the possibility that some of those missiles would be armed with nuclear warheads.

Chinese plans include large-scale missile launches at every imaginable US military target on its periphery, including US military bases in Japan. Some of China’s missiles are capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional warheads. Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated they will never, under any circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons but US and Japanese officials don’t believe them.

Within minutes of the beginning of a war between China and the United States–a war Abe’s new interpretation of the Japanese constitution obliges Japan to join even if it is a not party to the dispute that starts it–there will be hundreds of missiles headed for scores of targets spread over an incredibly large area of East Asia. The first things to be destroyed will be the antennas, radars and computer networks commanders on all sides rely upon to assess what’s happening and communicate with their troops. None of them can be certain some of the missiles headed in their direction are not armed with nuclear warheads.

In the midst of this fast-moving high-stakes chaos it is not inconceivable that a nuclear weapon could be used by either side, perhaps without authorization or by mistake, igniting a much broader nuclear war that could obliterate Japanese urban populations near US military bases and major metropolitan areas in the continental United States.

Even more frightening is the belief of Japanese and US defense officials that they can use use low yield nuclear weapons first to control the escalation of the war. They imagine if they use these nuclear weapons China will give up the fight without retaliating.  The idea is an old one stretching all the way back to the beginning of the nuclear age.

The Chinese communist leadership faced this type of US nuclear threat before during the Taiwan Straits Crisis of the 1950s. They did not have nuclear weapons then but were allied with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Declassified Chinese and Soviet archives show China’s leaders were prepared to take the blow and continue to fight. They did not expect Soviet retaliation on their behalf so long as the scale of the US nuclear attack was limited. Soviet leaders, however, insisted they must retaliate in order to preserve their own credibility.

It is impossible to know how a nuclear-armed China would respond today. I suspect even China’s leaders do not know what they would do. There is, however, a reasonable chance it would not be what US military planners expect. The United States foreign policy and defense establishment does not have a very good track record when it comes to understanding Chinese thinking or predicting Chinese behavior.

China does not have low yield nuclear weapons so if it did retaliate, even in a very limited way, it would be with missiles carrying nuclear warheads with an explosive force 30-40 times larger than the weapons the US dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One classified Chinese text on the operations of its nuclear forces suggests they would choose a relatively isolated but important military target in the theater of war, like Okinawa or Guam.  A single Chinese nuclear warhead targeting Kadena Air Base in Okinawa would kill approximately 90,000 people and injure 200,000 more, most of whom would be innocent Okinawans and the families of the 18,000 American and 4,000 Japanese personnel who work there. It’s hard to believe either side would be able exercise “escalation control” at that point in an already devastatingly massive conflict.

We’ve managed to avoid sliding into another “great power” conflict for 74 years because up until very recently our governments understood the dangers of nationalism and the necessity to subordinate national interests to international law and organization. Japan’s peace constitution embodies this better than any other legal document of the post-war era.

The constitution may have been imposed by the United States at the end of WW II but the Japanese people came to cherish it and transformed those commitments into a pillar of Japan’s post-war national identity.

I find it sadly ironic that US officials have been pressing their Japanese counterparts to abandon that language for decades to no avail until Abe’s LDP pledged to restore Japan’s national honor and autonomy by finally capitulating to this foreign demand.

Japan’s new nationalists and their US counterparts justify their challenge to the post-war international consensus by pointing to the rise of China. The implication is that China, not the United States and Japan, is to blame for the disintegration of the international order. Rhetorically, at least, nothing could be farther from the truth. The key component of the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign policy is the concept of a “community of common human destiny.” The five aims of the policy are to “build enduring peace, universal security, shared prosperity, openness and tolerance and a clean and beautiful world.”

Not exactly *Mein Kampf*, is it.

Despite its many horrible faults, the Chinese government is not championing nationalism or disparaging internationalism. It has a number of seemingly intractable sovereign disputes with some of its neighbors, including Japan, but those disputes do not necessarily foretell the emergence of another Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany or Soviet Union.

I’ve spent most of the last thirty-five years living, studying and working in China. The one constant in the breathtaking transformation of that country during this period is the consistently enormous gap between US perceptions of what is happening in China and the reality I experience when I am there. It’s possible US and Japanese fears may be exaggerated or misplaced.

Attempting to address those fears by exerting pressure, waging trade wars and flooding East Asia with new nuclear weapons will put all three nations on the path to a war none of them can win. The only way out of our present difficulties is to negotiate mutually acceptable compromises in the interest of the common good.

#### Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change

Starr 15 [(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,” Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015] DD  
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs.

Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.]

The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere.

Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.]

Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years?

The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death.

Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet.  Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

### Advantage 2 – Whaling

#### Japanese resurgence of whaling is imminent – LDP withdrew from IWC and will recruit other nations to do the same

Denyer and Kashiwagi 18 [(Simon Denyer, Washington Post Tokyo bureau chief covering Japan, North Korea and South Korea) (Akiko Kashiwagi, Reporter for The Washington Post based in Tokyo) “Japan to leave International Whaling Commission, resume commercial hunting” Washington Post, 12/26/2018] BC

TOKYO — Japan announced Wednesday that it is withdrawing from the International Whaling Commission and will resume commercial whale hunting next year, sparking swift condemnation from other governments and conservation groups.

Tokyo argues that the IWC has failed to live up to its initial dual mandate in 1946 to find a balance between preserving whale stocks and allowing the “orderly development” of the whaling industry. After failing to reach an agreement at a global conference in Brazil in September to resume commercial whaling, Japan is now following through on a threat to withdraw from the global body entirely.

“Regrettably, we have reached a decision that it is impossible in the IWC to seek the coexistence of states with different views,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said in a statement.

As a result, Japan will cease taking whales from the Antarctic Ocean and Southern Hemisphere — where it has been killing whales ostensibly for scientific research — and will conduct commercial whaling “within Japan’s territorial sea and its exclusive economic zone,” he said.

Suga said the hunt would respect catch limits based on IWC calculations, “to avoid negative impact on cetacean resources.”

Australia’s government said it was “extremely disappointed” by the decision, while New Zealand said it regretted Japan’s resumption of an “outdated and unnecessary practice.”

Conservation groups also condemned the decision.

“By leaving the International Whaling Commission but continuing to kill whales commercially, Japan now becomes a pirate whaling nation killing these ocean leviathans completely outside the bounds of international law,” said Kitty Block, president of Humane Society International.

The organization also expressed concern that Japan may recruit other pro-whaling nations to leave the IWC, “leading to a new chapter of renegade slaughter of whales for profit.”

Clare Perry of the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) said history has demonstrated the need for global precautionary management of whale populations.

“By leaving the IWC, Japan is rejecting multilateralism and setting a very bad precedent for conservation, which will likely have very serious negative consequences for the world’s whales,” she said. “It may bring a reprieve for the whale populations currently protected in international waters, but at a very high price.”

Faced with collapsing whale stocks, the IWC agreed to a moratorium on commercial whaling from 1986, a move credited with saving several species from extinction.

But Japan, Iceland and Norway have continued to hunt whales. Japan has justified its annual Antarctic whale hunt in the name of scientific research, which it says is necessary to evaluate global populations of whale species.

That argument was rejected in 2014 by the International Court of Justice, which ruled that Japan’s Antarctic hunt had no scientific basis. Japan stopped for a year, then resumed with a new “research program” that it claimed met the court’s concerns.

In October, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species also struck a blow against Japan’s whaling industry, deciding that Japan had broken its rules by taking sei whale meat from international waters — again under the guise of research — and selling it commercially in Japan.

The ruling undermined the legality of Japan’s high-seas whaling operations and potentially removed an important source of funding through the commercial sale of sei meat, experts said. In a sense, Japan’s whaling industry has retreated to waters closer to home.

“There are a number of ways to look at this announcement,” said Erica Jayne Lyman, a professor with the International Environmental Law Project at Lewis and Clark Law School in Portland, Ore. “On one hand, Japan has decided to abandon an international regime, which is lamentable. On the other hand, Japan is also recognizing that there is no fully legal path to high-seas commercial whaling, nor was there sufficient demand to make it economically viable.”

In a recent report, the EIA and the Animal Welfare Institute said Japan, Norway and Iceland have killed 38,539 whales since the moratorium took effect, with more than 22,000 killed by Japanese boats.

Wildlife groups say Japan’s “research” whaling was a thinly veiled attempt to keep the industry alive, making sure boats, skills and a market for whale meat are maintained.

Now, though, the veil has been removed.

Suga said the views of countries wanting to continue whaling in a sustainable manner “were not taken into account at all” during deliberations in Florianopolis, Brazil, in September.

“Consequently, Japan has been led to make this decision,” he said.

In September, Japan asked permission to hunt Antarctic minke whales, common minke whales, Bryde’s whales and sei whales, citing IWC population estimates in the tens of thousands for three of the species and of more than 500,000 for the Antarctic minke.

Under its research program, Japan has been killing 850 Antarctic minke a year, 220 common minke, 100 sei whales, 50 Bryde’s whales, 50 fin whales and 10 sperm whales. It calculated the take to be between 0.01 and 0.88 percent of total stocks of each species.

Conservationists argue that whale stocks have not recovered sufficiently from past overhunting and are hard to assess, easy to deplete and slow to rebuild. Marine mammals also face mounting existential threats from climate change and marine pollution, including plastics, chemicals and noise.

The idea of hunting and killing whales has stirred widespread revulsion in the West, although some proponents of whale hunting point to animal cruelty in Western factory farming, leveling accusations of hypocrisy.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s constituency includes the whaling port of Shimonoseki, and he has also come under pressure from lawmakers in his Liberal Democratic Party whose electoral districts include whaling or dolphin-hunting communities.

But the damage to Japan’s international reputation could be significant.

Australian Environment Minister Melissa Price and New Zealand’s foreign minister, Winston Peters, welcomed Japan’s withdrawal from the Southern Ocean but urged it to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the IWC.

Masayuki Komatsu, who served as the chief negotiator for Japan’s Fisheries Agency from 1991 to 2005, called the decision to withdraw a “misjudgment” and said it would not necessarily stem the steady decline of Japan’s whaling industry over the past decade and a half.

Japan will lose the right to conduct scientific research under the IWC without gaining any guaranteed rights to continue whaling, he said, potentially leaving itself open to legal challenge.

“Japan’s position will become weak,” he said in an interview. “If Japan is taken to an international court, it may suffer and lose ground. If I were in a responsible government position, I wouldn’t want to take such risks. Rather, I’d stay with the IWC convention and make the best use of its obligations and duties.”

Whale meat was a vital source of protein in Japan as it recovered from the ravages of World War II but is much less popular these days. Yet the government argues that it is part of Japan’s traditional culture, dating back centuries.

Japan’s government hopes to promote the consumption of whale meat, especially among young people, an official, who was not authorized to speak on the record, told reporters.

He said he hoped the decision to resume commercial whaling would increase the supply of whale meat but insisted it would not lead to “overfishing,” because Japan would observe guidelines laid down by the IWC’s Scientific Committee estimating sustainable catch limits.

“Engagement in whaling has been supporting local communities, and thereby developed the life and culture of using whales,” Suga said. “Japan hopes that more countries will share the same position to promote sustainable use of aquatic living resources based on scientific evidence, which will thereby be handed down to future generations.”

#### Decline of the LDP ends whaling in Japan – the industry only exists because of LDP support

Butler-Stroud 20 [(Chris, Chief Executive at Whale and Dolphin Conservation) “What now for the whales of Japan?” Whale and Dolphin Conservation, 8/28/2020] BC

News that Shinzo Abe is stepping down as Japan’s Prime Minister could be another nail in the coffin for the country’s whaling industry. It offers the Japanese Government a rare opportunity to press the reset button on a practice which costs it dearly, in subsidies and international reputation.

Abe is Japan’s longest serving prime minister. His ally Toshihiro Nikai is the country’s longest serving secretary general, the second most powerful party post after the president. These two men, who were both expected to step down in 2021, have been among the country’s staunchest supporters of commercial whaling.

During his leadership, Abe has sought to wrap whaling in the flag of domestic nationalism to help consolidate his power in the ever-present factional infighting of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) within Japan. He has close family links with whaling, and his parliamentary constituency includes Shimonoseki where Japan based its so-called ‘scientific whaling’ fleet of factory ships. He has used whaling to ‘evidence’ his leadership capabilities and ability to be a strong and decisive figure, reflecting his commitment to the Japanese concept of kimerareru seiji, or the ‘politics of decision’, in his campaign to counter criticisms that Japan has suffered from weak political leadership in the past.

As noted by the Japan Times, ‘Apart from [a few] brief interval[s], the LDP has been in power since it was formed in 1955, and every time it picks a new leader internal factions vie for power.’ Observers have noted that nationalism has been a significant political rallying call employed by Abe and others in his inner-circles to enrich their political status.

Even though whale meat consumption in Japan has reduced dramatically, the whale as a political totem remains significant for a few older individuals in the Japanese government and civil service.

In 2016, the BBC reported that Junko Sakuma, a researcher on Japanese whaling, noted that “…the answer lies in the fact that Japan's whaling is government-run, a large bureaucracy with research budgets, annual plans, promotions and pensions. If the number of staff in a bureaucrat's office decreases while they are in charge, they feel tremendous shame.

“Which means most of the bureaucrats will fight to keep the whaling section in their ministry at all costs. And that is true with the politicians as well. If the issue is closely related to their constituency, they will promise to bring back commercial whaling. It is a way of keeping their seats."’

Despite Abe’s support for whaling, consumption of whale meat in Japan declined by almost 99% from 1962 to 2017, when government data shows less than 4,000 tonnes were eaten, equating to the mass of about half an apple per Japanese person.

The domestic power of the whaling block within the Japanese Ministry of Fisheries should also not be underestimated. When it comes to Fisheries Aid, Japanese policy has been that Japan should receive a material or political benefit for any overseas aid that it gives. But work by academics suggests that the Fisheries Ministry, rather than the recipients and the Japanese public, has been the main beneficiary of an aggressive fisheries-related overseas development aid policy, within the context of the Japanese government solidifying its rhetoric around a distinctly nationalistic agenda.

It’s believed that this coalition of nationalistic pro-whaling interests, alongside the US’s signalling that international conventions ‘no longer mattered’ with its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, led to the domestic political environment in which Abe felt confident enough to lead his government out of the International Whaling Commission (the body that regulates whale hunts) and Japan’s whaling ships out of the Antarctic (for now). The decision appears to have been a surprise to many of Abe’s cabinet and to the Japanese research scientists who had been involved in the years of so-called ‘research whaling’.

The Japanese government had argued for years that its much-condemned Antarctic whaling was absolutely necessary, but the rebuke of this hunt by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2014 as ‘not being for the purposes of science’, was an unexpected slap in the face.

Faced with such forthright legal and scientific criticism in a forum that they could not manipulate (the Japanese government has long been condemned for its recruitment of supporters within the IWC through financial incentives), the Abe administration sought to avoid such shame again, by withdrawing Japan from the future jurisdiction of the ICJ on all fishery and marine resource issues.

So, what is the future of whaling in japan under a new prime minister?

As the BBC noted in 2016, ‘…Japan's determination to continue whaling may come down to a handful of MPs from whaling constituencies and a few hundred bureaucrats who don't want to see their budgets cut’.

Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party continues to enjoy majorities in both houses of parliament, while the opposition remains weak and fragmented. However the popularity of Abe’s cabinet has nosedived from over 70 per cent in 2013 to the low 30s today. There are currently seven LDP factions to which most parliamentarians belong, with the exception of those who run their own small groups or prefer to remain independent. No unaffiliated LDP parliamentarian has ever been elected as president.

There are believed to be several potential candidates whose names regularly appear in the media, but Prime Minister Abe and LDP Secretary General Toshihiro Nikai will be the most influential in steering the LDP’s choice in picking Abe’s successor - so maybe the whales will not be the winners in any forthcoming election, but we can hope that, whoever it is, relived of Abe’s personal link to whaling, they may be able to steer Japan away from whaling over time.

#### Whaling causes extinction – whales provide important ecosystem services key to marine food chains, ocean mixing, and removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere

AWI 17 [(The Animal Welfare Institute is an American, non-profit, charitable organization founded by Christine Stevens in 1951 with the goal of reducing pain and fear inflicted on animals by humans.) “A Whale of an Effect on Ocean Life: The Ecological and Economic Value of Cetaceans” Animal Welfare Group Online, fall 2017] BC

A Whale of an Effect on Ocean Life: The Ecological and Economic Value of Cetaceans

What if an animal could entertain and educate millions of people annually, enhance productivity (thereby increasing the number of fish in the sea), mitigate climate change, feed billions of marine animals, generate billions of dollars in revenue globally, and even help get tough stains out of your clothes? Does such an animal exist?

Whales—animals that humans nearly exterminated—can do all that and more. The unsubstantiated claims that whales compete with humans for fish or that they must be killed to ensure global food security are nonsense. Instead, a growing body of scientific evidence demonstrates that saving whales could help save the planet and, in turn, humankind.

Approaching Extinction

The era of large scale commercial whaling lasted nearly 400 years, from the early 17th century to 1986. During that period, whalers mercilessly pursued their prey, exploiting and depleting one species after the next. While the exact death toll amassed over these four centuries is not known, scientists have estimated that during the 20th century alone, over 3 million whales were killed, mainly for their valuable oil.

By the time a global moratorium on commercial whaling, approved by the International Whaling Commission (IWC), went into effect in 1986, scientists estimated that whale numbers had plummeted from 66 to 90 percent of their pre-whaling abundance, with some populations, like blue whales in the Southern Hemisphere, declining by 99 percent. While the moratorium remains intact today—saving countless whales—commercial and “scientific” whaling continue, with Iceland, Norway, and Japan killing more than 43,000 whales since 1986.

A previously ignored consequence of the slaughter was that it prevented whales from fulfilling their evolutionary role in the ecosystem. In every ecosystem, every native species has a role in the ecology of their habitat, from the smallest microorganisms to the most dominant predator. In a properly functioning ecosystem, they collaborate in a symbiotic dance that maximizes productivity and abundance within nature’s parameters.

Enhancing Productivity

Far from just providing huge amounts of meat, blubber, and oil for human consumption, whales provide important ecosystem services that have gone overlooked in debates about commercial whaling and whale conservation.

Whale fecal plumes contain valuable nutrients like iron, nitrogen, and phosphorus. They stimulate production of microscopic marine algae, or phytoplankton, which form the base of many marine food chains. Phytoplankton, via photosynthesis, convert chlorophyll, sunlight, and a variety of nutrients including carbon dioxide into energy, while expelling oxygen. Phytoplankton feed zooplankton, tiny animals that live in surface waters, and both are critical food sources for many marine species such as krill and other marine invertebrates, fish, and even marine mammals, including whales.

In a study of blue whales in Antarctica, scientists determined that iron concentration in blue whale feces is 10 million times that of Antarctic seawater. As iron is a limiting micronutrient in the Southern Ocean, its availability triggers phytoplankton blooms. Another study determined that blue whales in the Southern Ocean, via fecal plumes, increase primary production available to support fisheries by 240,000 (metric) tonnes of organic carbon (which all animals in the oceans need to survive) per year. If blue whales recover to pre-industrial whaling levels, this benefit will increase to 11 million tonnes of carbon per year—increasing, not decreasing, fishery yields. While this is only a small fraction of the overall primary production in the Southern Ocean, at the local scale where such fertilization benefits are realized, the impacts may be significant.

Indeed, scientists have determined that the slaughter of baleen whales in the Southern Ocean caused a long-term decline in primary production, which, in turn, caused the krill population to plummet to as low as 20 percent of pre-industrial whaling levels. Today, although whale stocks in the Southern Ocean are recovering—some more quickly than others—krill numbers have not recovered to pre-industrial whaling levels and are now threatened by direct harvest and climate change.

In the Gulf of Maine, scientists found that marine mammals enhance primary production in feeding areas by supplying nitrogen to surface waters through release of fecal plumes and urine. They determined that whales and seals may replenish 23,000 tonnes of nitrogen per year in the Gulf of Maine surface waters, more than the input of nitrogen from all of the rivers feeding the gulf combined.

In another study, endangered right whales in the Bay of Fundy in Canada were found to enhance primary productivity through the release of nitrogen and phosphorus in their fecal plumes. In Hawaii, the feeding behavior of 80 sperm whales transferred 100 tonnes of nitrogen from deep waters to surface waters, enhancing primary production by 600 tonnes of organic carbon per year. Due to the decimation of sperm whales by commercial whaling, however, Hawaiian waters have lost 2,000 tonnes of new nitrogen each year, decreasing primary production in the region by 1,000 tonnes of organic carbon annually.

The deep diving and surfacing behavior of sperm whales and some baleen whales transports nutrients in their fecal plumes from deeper water to the surface and, for gray and humpback whales, by carrying sediment from the sea floor and redistributing it in the water column, to the benefit of sea birds and other marine species. As noted by Drs. Joe Roman and James McCarthy, “Cetaceans feeding deep in the water column effectively create an upward pump, enhancing nutrient availability for primary production in locations where whales gather to feed.” This vertical transport of nutrients is referred to as the “whale pump” and was first postulated in 1983. Scientists have determined that biomixing by marine vertebrates, including whales, contributes one-third of total ocean mixing, comparable to the effect of tides or winds.

Whales also transport nutrients in their fecal plumes, urine, sloughed skin, and placental materials horizontally, a phenomenon referred to as the “whale conveyor belt,” as they migrate between nutrient-rich feeding areas and nutrient-limited breeding/birthing areas. Blue whales in the Southern Ocean, for example, transport approximately 88 tonnes of nitrogen per year from their feeding to their calving grounds. Before commercial whaling, blue whales would have transported 24,000 tonnes of nitrogen via the conveyor belt.

Sequestering Carbon

Phytoplankton use carbon dioxide during photosynthesis. Thus, enhancing phytoplankton productivity via the release of nutrients in whale feces increases the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. In the Southern Ocean, approximately 12,000 sperm whales deposit an estimated 36 tonnes of iron into surface waters each year, enhancing primary production in phytoplankton. While the carbon contained in some phytoplankton will continue to be recycled by marine animals feeding and defecating in surface waters, 20 to 40 percent of such carbon will settle to the sea floor as phytoplankton die and sink, effectively locking up the carbon for centuries to millennia. Globally, more than 200,000 tonnes of carbon may be sequestered—and its negative effects on climate removed—each year.

Sperm whales, by enhancing primary productivity, effectively remove 240,000 tonnes more carbon from the atmosphere than they add during respiration. Since sperm whale population numbers in the Southern Ocean have not recovered to pre-industrial whaling levels, an extra 2 million tonnes of carbon that could have been removed by a full complement of sperm whales remains in the atmosphere each year. Since Southern Ocean sperm whales represent only 3 percent of all sperm whales globally, the species may significantly contribute to iron fertilization and carbon drawdown.

When whales die, their massive bodies contain a large amount of carbon. As their carcasses sink to the ocean floor—often referred to as “whale fall,” this carbon is effectively stored in the ocean for centuries. Scientists have estimated that the combined global populations of nine great whale species (blue, fin, gray, humpback, bowhead, sei, Bryde’s, minke, and right whales) sequester nearly 29,000 tonnes of carbon per year via whale falls. Due to the significant loss of whales to commercial whaling, current populations of large baleen whales store 9.1 million tonnes less carbon than if their numbers were at pre-exploitation levels. If these whale stocks were rebuilt, they would remove 160,000 tonnes of carbon each year through whale falls, which is roughly equivalent to 110,000 hectares of forest (or an area the size of Rocky Mountain National Park).

Nourishing the Depths

In addition to storing carbon, whale carcasses feed an array of marine and terrestrial species. When whales strand on land, bears, other mammals, scavenging birds, and marine and terrestrial invertebrates benefit from the massive windfall of food and nutrients and, in turn, expand the nutrient flow from the sea to land.

Whale falls, according to the scientific literature, create habitat islands, benefiting scavengers like sharks and hagfish, crustaceans, gastropods, bivalves, clams, shrimp, anemones, bacteria, and a litany of other marine organisms, including some species heretofore unknown. Indeed, scientists have identified 129 new species collected from whale remains, including over 100 considered to be whale-fall specialists, and predict that hundreds of other whale-fall specialist species remain to be discovered.

The frequency of whale falls declined substantially due to industrial whaling and may have caused a substantial number of anthropogenic species extinctions in the deep sea. Whether such species would have had any value to humans will never be known—although, in an interesting twist, enzymes of psychrotrophic bacteria (bacteria adapted to extremely cold environments) found at whale falls have garnered commercial interest from the laundry detergent, pharmaceutical, and food processing industries. One biotechnology company has determined that clones of bacteria found on whale carcasses may be effective in removing stains from laundry during cold-water washing, potentially providing significant energy savings, increased profits, and cleaner clothes.

Creating Value

Whales have an enormous economic value as the popular subject of marine tourism. Globally, whale watching generated over 2 billion dollars in revenue in 2012 and supported some 13,000 jobs while providing millions of people an opportunity to observe and learn about whales and other marine species in the wild. Such revenue is well in excess of the value of whale meat, blubber, or other products sold commercially, demonstrating the obvious fact that a live whale is worth far more than a dead one.

The ecosystem services provided by whales, including increasing primary production, directly and indirectly sequestering carbon, and providing nutrients and habitat to myriad marine species, also have an economic value. Such values have been calculated for other species, including bats and pollinators. While economists have calculated the value of whale watching, no comprehensive assessment has been done of the direct and indirect value of whales and the economic and ecosystem services they provide.

Going Forward

The direct and indirect value of whales warrants attention. At its 2016 meeting, the IWC adopted a resolution that recognizes the contributions of cetaceans to ecosystem functioning and encourages IWC member governments to factor these contributions into decision-making. It further envisions a central role for the IWC Scientific Committee in (1) reviewing the ecological, economic, and other contributions of cetaceans to ecosystem functioning, (2) identifying gaps, and (3) creating a plan for future research needs. It also promotes collaboration with other multilateral environmental agreements to study the issue.

The subject has since been discussed at a conference about whales in Tonga. It was also the subject of an AWI-cohosted workshop in late July, at the Society for Conservation Biology’s International Congress for Conservation Biology in Cartegena, Colombia, that considered how to integrate this emerging issue into global environmental policy—for the good of the whales and the health of the planet. For example, although saving whales will not fully mitigate the impacts of climate change, it should be part of a comprehensive, global strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Whales may not swim with capes but, based on the evidence of their immense ecological and economic value, perhaps they should be considered superheroes saving the planet. They should no longer be considered as a source of consumables. Instead, they should be fully protected from commercial and “scientific” whaling, bycatch in fishing gear, and other threats to their survival, so that they can fulfill their role in helping to sustain the planet and humankind.

### Solvency

#### Plan: Japan should recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike

Ishida 15 [(Shinpei, of the University of Kitakyushu.) “The Right to Strike in Japan: A Need to Restore Its Political Function” King's Law Journal, 8/21/2015. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09615768.2015.1072987?journalCode=rklj20] BC

Article 28 of the Constitution of Japan declares: ‘The right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively is guaranteed.’ The right to strike is recognised as a necessary element of the right to act collectively. This right has, however, been restricted by subsequent legislation and narrowly interpreted by the courts. Government employees are deprived of the right to strike, and those public servants who take industrial action may be subject to criminal sanctions. In the private sector, the scope of the justifiable strike is limited because the criteria for legality—the lawful parties, purposes and means of the strike—are narrowly interpreted.

For instance, the right to strike in the private sector is seen by the courts to be permissible only when collective bargaining has failed. It is a ‘weapon of last resort’ in collective bargaining, and a mere extension of the collective bargaining process. If a strike is considered by the courts to be politically motivated, or appears to be intended to influence any matter beyond the conditions of employment, then the statutory immunities will not protect the union or the workforce from dismissal or claims to recover losses incurred as a result of the strike.

The purpose of this article is to show how the right to strike has become severely limited and to examine whether the circumstances in which strike action is protected should be broadened. Section I provides an overview of the history of the right to strike in Japan and Section II focuses on judicial influence on the right to strike. Finally, in Section III, I reflect on the appropriate role of strike action, with a particular focus on whether political strikes should be lawful and whether the right to strike should be so closely tied to the right to bargain collectively.

#### Labor disputes in Japan are on the brink of extinction –

Keiichiro 21 [(Hamaguchi, Research Director General at the Japanese Institute for Labor Policy and Training) “Labor-management Relations in Japan Part I: Characteristics of the Collective Labor Relations System”. Japan Labor Issues, vol.5, no.30. https://www.jil.go.jp/english/jli/documents/2021/030-02. pdf.] BC

While legal systems for disputes are fully developed, the unionization rate—the crucial element— is steadily declining, as just noted, and labor disputes also continue to decline. Moreover, a significant proportion of the infrequent labor disputes at present are labor disputes without acts of dispute—namely, disputes that are all talk and no strikes or other such practical actions. Most recent figures from 2019 show that, of the 268 disputes that year, only 49 were disputes with dispute acts, while the remaining 219 were merely all talk and no action. Furthermore, even of those 49 with dispute acts, only 27 involved a strike lasting half a day or more. At its peak in 1974, there was a total of 10,462 disputes, of which 9,581 were with dispute acts, and 5,197 involved strikes lasting half a day or more. Given that even prior to the Second World War, when labor unions were yet to receive legal approval, the total number of disputes was 2,456 in 1931, of which 998 involved dispute acts, it is even possible to suggest that labor disputes are now on the brink of extinction (Figure 3).

Moreover, the substance of these labor disputes demonstrates little of the typical characteristics of collective labor relations. In practice, the majority of cases are ostensibly labor union activities but in fact merely individual labor disputes on issues such as dismissals, changes to the terms and conditions of employment which are disadvantageous to workers, or harassment. This reflects the tendency toward individual labor relations, which we will explore in the next article (Part III). The very number of disputes appealed to the Labor Relations Commissions is also on the path of decline. In 2019 there were 203 cases, of which 150 involved regional general unions (gōdō rōso; non-enterprise-based unions open to individual membership, also referred to as community unions), and, furthermore, 85 were cases in which a worker had joined a regional general union after being subject to dismissal, harassment, or other such treatment, and the dispute was brought to a Labor Relations Commission by that union (cases known as kakekomi uttae, referred to below as “action with last-minute union membership”). In such cases, the labor union’s role is no more than that of a contractor tasked with resolving an individual dispute (Figure 4).

#### Only the right to strike solve –

Ishida 15 [(Shinpei, of the University of Kitakyushu.) “The Right to Strike in Japan: A Need to Restore Its Political Function” King's Law Journal, 8/21/2015. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09615768.2015.1072987?journalCode=rklj20] BC

As this article has shown, from a historical perspective, political strikes are the most effective way to restore the solidarity of workers. Such political strikes functioned to promote solidarity among trade unions until around 1975. This history suggests that we should restore the political functions of the trade union in order to restore the soli- darity of workers, which has been waning over several decades. The solidarity of workers is necessary, not in order to overthrow the government but as a bulwark against the economic markets. The modern political functions of the trade unions lie in promoting deliberative democracy through collective bargaining and political strikes.

#### Japanese policy against strikes prevents union success –

Penn 13 [(Michael, president of the Shingetsu News Agency, and author of the book, "Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US-Japanese Alliance") “Japanese labour unions feel pain of new era” Aljazeera, 2/18/2013. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/2/18/japanese-labour-unions-feel-pain-of-new-era] BC

Tokyo, Japan – The “spring offensive” used to strike fear into the hearts of Japan’s industrial managers.

Labour union demands for wage increases were boldly submitted. To underline their steely determination, workers walked off the job in the spring. Trains were halted, leaving millions of commuters stranded and angry. The world watched to see how many days or weeks it would take Japanese business leaders to fold and to agree to wage hikes large enough to satisfy the labour union negotiators.

Even before that earlier period ended, shunto, the Japanese term for “spring offensive”, had become more of a ritual than anything else, and union militancy faded perceptibly as the years went by. Today it is practically unknown.

“In the 1970s, there were almost 6,000 strikes on an average year, but last year there were only 68,” Motoaki Nakaoka, general secretary of the National Trade Union Council (Zenrokyo), points out. “This is an era in which even the labour leaders don’t know what it is like to prevail in a strike.”

Union survival

It is not only Japanese labour activism whose effectiveness is in question, but the very existence of Japanese labour unions themselves. According to a comprehensive survey carried out by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, the proportion of Japanese workers who are members of labour unions has fallen to 17.9 percent. At its peak in the early postwar years, that figure was above 55 percent.

Many factors contributed to this steady decline in the power of labour organisation in Japan, and it’s a story familiar to many developed nations.

For one thing, Japan’s conservative governments became less tolerant of labour activism and large-scale strikes as the years went by. Socialist and communist parties with which labour unions were affiliated either weakened substantially at the polls, or else disappeared altogether.

The Japan Socialist Party serves as a particularly striking example. In the 1990 general elections the party won 136 seats in the House of Representatives. Now called the Social Democratic Party, it gained only two seats in last December’s general election and is on the verge of losing its legal qualification as a full-fledged political party.

#### Without the right to strike unions are forced to resort to unproductive method of labor reform – alternatives like collective bargaining fail and weaken union power

Ishida 15 [(Shinpei, of the University of Kitakyushu.) “The Right to Strike in Japan: A Need to Restore Its Political Function” King's Law Journal, 8/21/2015. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09615768.2015.1072987?journalCode=rklj20] BC

As the number of strikes has reduced, the primary activity of the trade union has shifted from strikes to collective bargaining and its slogan has shifted from the struggle against employers to cooperation with employers. The purpose of the TUA 1949, which focuses not on strikes but on collective bargaining, might have played some part in bringing about this situation. As pointed out above, the judiciary has approved of the propriety of strikes only in limited circumstances. As a result, since the 1980s, collective bargaining has become the central focus of discussion of Japanese collective labour law.

The primary legal problem that stems from collective bargaining is an employer’s refusal of collective bargaining without a reasonable ground. The TUA 1949 regards this as an unfair labour practice. However, employers can refuse to bargain with the trade union if the subject matter of the negotiation is unrelated to labour conditions. Although most courts tend to interpret the meaning of labour conditions broadly, in favour of the trade union, they exclude negotiations concerning management or political matters; the refusal of the employer to bargain with trade unions concerning these issues is not considered an unfair labour practice. Like the right to strike, the right of collective bargaining can be properly exercised only in the cases concerning labour conditions.

Since 1990, as the restructuring of organisations has become increasingly common, an important issue has been whether parent or receiving enterprises must bargain with the trade unions organised by workers belonging to subsidiary or supplying enterprises. In addition, as the practice of ‘labour dispatch’ has been increasing, the controversial question has been whether the enterprises receiving the ‘dispatched’ workers can refuse to bargain with the trade union to which the dispatched workers belong. The judiciary has a tendency to hold that only employers in a direct contractual relationship with employees have a duty to bargain with trade unions.18 Therefore, parent or receiving enterprises have no duty to bargain with trade unions organised by workers belonging to subsidiary or supplying enterprises, except in those limited circumstances where the parent or receiving enterprise can be regarded as having a direct contractual relationship with those employees. The same is true of enterprises that receive dispatched workers.

The same principle has been applied, in the context of to the right to strike, with regard to sympathetic strikes. In the Kinushima Sogi Case, 19 the Tokyo District Court held that the purposes of strikes must be related to matters that could be dealt with independently by the parties involved in the strike, and that the sympathetic strike in question could not be justified. In parallel with the eligibility of parties to collective bargaining and the illegality of sympathetic strikes as mentioned above, strikes by dispatched workers against receiving enterprises will not be granted immunities from criminal and civil liabilities.

The judiciary has thus recognised both the right of collective bargaining and the right to strike as narrow and limited rights enforceable only against employers in direct contractual relationships with employees. This recognition is rooted in the proposition that the primary role of labour law lies in redressing the inequality of bargaining powers between employers and employees and achieving real freedom of contract.

#### Increasing the power of unions ensures LDP electoral defeat by unifying opposition parties

Yoda 10/10 [(Tsubasa, writer for Nikkei Asian Review) “Japan's largest union hopes for momentum with first female leader” Nikkei Asia, 10/10/2021. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Inside-Japanese-politics/Japan-s-largest-union-hopes-for-momentum-with-first-female-leader>] BC

TOKYO -- The Japanese Trade Union Confederation, known as Rengo, has been hoping to regain political influence for some time. The country's largest national labor organization supports the largest opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, and another opposition party, the Democratic Party for the People, but given their low support ratings, they are unlikely to take power anytime soon.

Former Rengo President Rikio Kozu, who led the organization for six years, tried to bring the opposition parties together, but without success. Tomoko Yoshino succeeded him on Wednesday, to the surprise of many, and became Rengo's first female leader since its founding in 1989. She will have to show her leadership in the runup to the general election slated for Oct. 31.

"Union activities are at a crossroads amid the coronavirus pandemic. I will listen to the members to help put the labor movement forward," Yoshino said at Rengo's regular convention in Tokyo on Oct. 6, when she officially became president.

Rengo was created as a confederation of public- and private-sector trade unions in 1989. Putting various unions together raised its profile, and four years later Rengo helped launch the first government that did not include the Liberal Democratic Party since its establishment in 1955.

There were two major national labor organizations in postwar Japan. One was the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo). The left-leaning council was founded in 1950 and supported the Socialist Party. The other was the right-leaning, anti-communist Japanese Confederation of Labor (Domei). It was formed in 1964 and backed the Democratic Socialist Party.

Although Sohyo had some private-sector unions from steelmaking and other industries, it was mostly made up of public-sector groups such as the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union (Jichiro) and the Japan Teachers' Union. It supported the Socialist Party, which was the largest opposition force at that time, in elections and played the central role in civic movements such as the campaign to oppose the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

In contrast, most members of Domei were private-sector unions from automobile, electricity, textile and other industries, and adopted a policy of collaborating with the management. Together with the Democratic Socialist Party that was formed by less liberal defectors from the Socialist Party, it aimed for "confronting totalitarianism of the right and the left."

Rengo's first president, Akira Yamagishi, played the pivotal role in merging the two national unions. The former union member of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corp. later said labor movements had been in decline, so the merger must be done quickly to break the stalemate.

In 1989, Sohyo and a Domei-related national center joined to create Rengo. But unions supporting the Japanese Communist Party criticized its formation as "a right-leaning realignment of labor unions," and founded the National Confederation of Trade Unions (Zenroren) the same year. This is why Rengo, which supports some of the opposition parties, is still at odds with the JCP.

With the organizational power of Japan's largest national center of trade unions, Yamagishi became a major player in the collaboration among opposition parties. He teamed up with influential lawmaker Ichiro Ozawa, who had left the LDP, in the 1993 general election to help launch the government of Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, which didn't include the LDP or the JCP.

Since then, Rengo presidents including Etsuya Washio (Nippon Steel Corp.) and Kiyoshi Sasamori (Tokyo Electric Power Co.) have been chosen from the private sector. They exercised influence on politics. Before the Democratic Party took power in 2009, then-President Tsuyoshi Takagi toured Rengo's local organizations with Ozawa, who had become the party's leader in 2006.

But since the Democratic Party lost a general election in 2012, the LDP and its coalition partner Komeito have stayed in power. The Democratic Party has broken up, and opposition groups are unwilling to get together. This has been reflected in differing opinions within Rengo. Jichiro and the Japan Teachers' Union are staunch advocates of the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution. Meanwhile, private-sector UA Zensen is positive about discussing constitutional amendments. As for ending nuclear power generation, private-sector unions that have utilities as their members and public-sector unions show different degrees of commitment.

Yoshino, who was chosen in the hope of uniting the labor unions and regaining political influence, is from the union of sewing machine maker Juki. She served as deputy head of the Japanese Association of Metal, Machinery and Manufacturing Workers (JAM), which is mainly made up of small and midsize manufacturers. She has worked to create a women-friendly working environment by making it easier to take childcare and nursing care leave. Her appointment is meaningful, showing that Rengo is committed to gender equality. But she has little experience in the world of politics.

Yoshino told reporters on Oct. 7 that she will urge the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Democratic Party for the People, the two opposition parties Rengo backs, to "become one large entity." But she said she has never met CDP leader Yukio Edano so far, adding that "political parties and labor unions are totally different organizations, and Rengo cannot intervene political parties' affairs."

Wages in Japan haven't risen as much as they have in the U.S. and some other countries over the past 20 years. This is partly because of the tradition of prioritizing keeping jobs over wage hikes, which has led unions to make modest requests for wage increases. Meanwhile, new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida from LDP has announced a plan to implement economic policies that focuses on wealth distribution. He has also unveiled an "income doubling plan" for the current Reiwa Era.

"We need to persuade individual members to be more interested in politics and think it as their own business." Yoshino is concerned about the declining interest in politics among union members. With its first female leader, Rengo's raison d'etre is at stake as the new government is trying to show that it's paying more attention to workers.

### Framing

**The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing**

**First, pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues**.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values**.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable**.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes**:** “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

**Moreover, *only* pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, **I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable.** Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, **there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values** that counts in hedonism’s favor**: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain.** To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, **wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly.** **Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after.** To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if **the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain** (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), **then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts.** **The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists.** The challenge can be phrased as the following question: **If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?**27

**Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.  
Bostrom 12** [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)]  
These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain**

about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

**Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one.   
Bostrom 12** [Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.], Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.  Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdfEven if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the   possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential   catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives**.  **This implies that the expected value of   reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the   value of a million human lives.**  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10  54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10  52  lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even   more starkly.  Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a   technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected   value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth   a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. **One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an   expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct   benefit of saving 1 billion lives.**  And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1  billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€”positive or negativeâ€”is almost   certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.