# NC

## 1

#### Spooky skepticism is true and it negates

#### You could be a test tube in a witch’s laboratory or be hypnotized by a mad scientist – that negates since it would mean the status quo as outlined by the aff doesn’t exist and truth implies certainty – the sentence “It is true that ghosts exist but I’m not sure they exist” is incoherent.

#### The ghost of the undecidable – every decision is haunted by the interpretation that follows it. Lawlor 19

Lawlor, Leonard, "Jacques Derrida", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/derrida/>. js

Derrida calls the second aporia “the ghost of the undecidable” (Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, pp. 24–26). A decision begins with the initiative to read, to interpret, and even to calculate. But to make such a decision, one must first of all experience what Derrida calls “undecidability.” One must experience that the case, being unique and singular, does not fit the established codes and therefore a decision about it seems to be impossible. The undecidable, for Derrida, is not mere oscillation between two significations. It is the experience of what, though foreign to the calculable and the rule, is still obligated. We are obligated – this is a kind of duty—to give oneself up to the impossible decision, while taking account of rules and law. As Derrida says, “A decision that did not go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process” (Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, p. 24). And once the ordeal is past (“if this ever happens,” as Derrida says), then the decision has again followed or given itself a rule and is no longer presently just. Justice therefore is always to come in the future, it is never present. There is apparently no moment during which a decision could be called presently and fully just. Either it has not followed a rule, hence it is unjust; or it has followed a rule, which has no foundation, which makes it again unjust; or if it did follow a rule, it was calculated and again unjust since it did not respect the singularity of the case. This relentless injustice is why the ordeal of the undecidable is never past. It keeps coming back like a “phantom,” which “deconstructs from the inside every assurance of presence, and thus every criteriology that would assure us of the justice of the decision” (Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, pp. 24–25). Even though justice is impossible and therefore always to come in or from the future, justice is not, for Derrida, a Kantian ideal, which brings us to the third aporia

#### Knowledge is as real as the monsters under your bed – either any inquiry is known or unknown. If known, then it doesn’t have to be discovered, but if unknown then it’s impossible to know that you have discovered it. Negate on presumption because the quest for knowledge or truth in the aff is fundamentally impossible

#### To is defined as “expressing motion in the direction of” according to the first result on the internet as in “I am going to my neighbors for candy” – that negates since ought statements can’t “move” anywhere.

## 2

#### Permissibility negates: a) negate means “to deny the truth of,” so the neg can disprove an obligation through permissibility since the 1ac must defend an active obligation to act, b) lack of obligation proves the res false – it says you have to prove obligation, but you cannot be obligated and lack obligation simultaneously

#### Presumption negates: a) we assume statements false until proven true which is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories, b) statements are more often false then true – if I say this pen is red, I can only prove it true by showing its red, but I can prove it false in infinite ways

#### Now negate:

#### 1] Inherency – either a) the aff is non-inherent and you vote neg on presumption, or b) it is and won’t happen for the reasons it hasn’t already.

#### 2] Zeno’s Paradox – to go anywhere, you must go halfway first, and then half the remaining distance, and half the remaining distance, and so on to infinity – thus, motion fails cuz it requires traversing infinite spaces in finite time. If movement fails, reducing IP isn’t a logical consequence of the rez.

#### **3] The holographic principle is the most reasonable conclusion**

Stromberg 15[Joseph Stromberg- “Some physicists believe we're living in a giant hologram — and it's not that far-fetched” <https://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8847863/holographic-principle-universe-theory-physics> Vox. June 29th 2015] War Room Debate AI

Some physicists actually believe that the universe we live in might be a hologram. The idea isn't that the universe is some sort of fake simulation out of The Matrix, but rather that even though we appear to live in a three-dimensional universe, it might only have two dimensions. It's called the holographic principle. The thinking goes like this: Some distant two-dimensional surface contains all the data needed to fully describe our world — and much like in a hologram, this data is projected to appear in three dimensions. Like the characters on a TV screen, we live on a flat surface that happens to look like it has depth. It might sound absurd. But when physicists assume it's true in their calculations, all sorts of big physics problems — such as the nature of black holes and the reconciling of gravity and quantum mechanics — become much simpler to solve. In short, the laws of physics seem to make more sense when written in two dimensions than in three. "It's not considered some wild speculation among most theoretical physicists," says Leonard Susskind, the Stanford physicist who first formally defined the idea decades ago. "It's become a working, everyday tool to solve problems in physics." But there's an important distinction to be made here. There's no direct evidence that our universe actually is a two-dimensional hologram. These calculations aren't the same as a mathematical proof. Rather, they're intriguing suggestions that our universe could be a hologram. And as of yet, not all physicists believe we have a good way of testing the idea experimentally.

#### 4] member[[1]](#footnote-1) is “a body part or organ” but an organ can’t have obligation

#### 5] of[[2]](#footnote-2) is the abbreviation of “outfield” but the rez isn’t a baseball game.

#### 6] the[[3]](#footnote-3) is “god” but the WTO isn’t god.

#### 7] to[[4]](#footnote-4) is to “used as a function word to indicate direction toward” but the rez doesn’t have a location

#### 8] reduce[[5]](#footnote-5) is to “to draw together or cause to converge” but the case gains offense from diminishing IP.

#### 9] for[[6]](#footnote-6) is “in place of or on behalf of” but medicines aren’t replacing IP.

#### 10] medicine[[7]](#footnote-7) is “a substance (such as a drug or potion) used to treat something other than disease” but the aff is about things that treat disease.

#### 11] If all truths are knowable, then all truths must in fact be known. One cannot search for what they don’t know – and everything you can search for, you already know. It also means one cannot learn – for to know about what is already known is to learn nothing at all – that means you should vote negative on presumption because they have neither known nor forgotten the world beneath the 1AC.

#### 12] Interpreting speech is impossible since it relies on a subjective frame of reference which causes regress.

**Harman** Gilbert “Quine’s Semantic Relativity” June 30, 2009 SJCP//JG

Philosophers sometimes approach meaning metaphorically, for example, by speaking of “grasping” meanings, as if understanding consists in getting mental hands around something.1 Philosophers say that a theory of meaning should be a theory about the meanings that people assign to expressions in their language, that to understand other people requires identifying the meanings they associate with what they are saying, and that to translate an expression of another language into your own is to find an expression in your language with the same meaning as the expression in the other language. One difficulty with taking seriously such metaphors of grasping, assigning, and attaching meanings is that people are not aware of doing these things in the way that they are aware of grasping doorknobs, attaching post-it notes, and assigning tasks to employees. In any event, Quine did not find such metaphors to be useful. In his view, to understand someone else is to interpret them—that is, to find a way to translate from their outlook into one’s own. Interpretation is translation. And translation is indeterminate. Part of Quine’s argument for indeterminacy of translation involves an appeal to ontological relativity.2 He argues that there is no fact of the matter as to whether another person’s word ‘gavagai’ refers to rabbits, rabbit-stages, undetached rabbit parts, rabbithood, or various other possibilities. Given any reasonable interpretation of a language, consider the total universe of entities in the extension of predicates or referred to by singular terms in that language so interpreted, and then consider any one-one mapping of that universe onto itself. Then define new relations of reference and extension, using this mapping, so that a term that originally referred to something now refers to what that thing is mapped to and a predicate with an extension originally containing various things now has an extension containing what those things are mapped to. Since, the sentences that are true with respect to the original interpretation are also true with respect to the new one, it would seem that the new interpretation satisfies the same reasonable constraints as the original. Quine argues that reference is a relative matter, like position and velocity. Non-relative absolute reference is, he says, like “absolute position, or absolute velocity, rather than position or velocity relative to a given frame of reference” (201). Furthermore in Quine’s view, radical translation begins at home . . . It is meaningless to ask whether, in general, our terms ‘rabbit’, ‘rabbit part’, ‘number’, etc., really refer respectively to rabbits, rabbit parts, numbers, etc., rather than to some ingeniously permuted denotations. It is meaningless to ask this absolutely; we can meaningfully ask it only relative to some background language. . . . Querying reference in any more absolute way would be like asking about absolute position, or absolute velocity, rather than position or velocity relative to a given frame of reference. When we ask, “Does ‘rabbit’ really refer to rabbits?” someone can counter with the question: “Refer to rabbits in what sense of ‘rabbits’?” thus launching a regress; and we need the background language to regress into. The background language gives the query sense, if only relative sense; sense relative in turn to it, this background language (200-201).

#### 12] You can’t be sure anything besides yourself exists so the res is incoherent and you can’t meet either burden:

#### a) we could be deceived by a demon, dreaming, or in a simulation so the whole world could be nonexistent

#### b) Solipsism is true and is the only way to account for our low-entropy universe – takes out your framework because there’s no societal ideals and no need for the veil of ignorance

**Albrecht 8** [Andreas Albrecht and Lorenzo Sorbo (Department of Physics, UC Davis) “Can the universe afford inflation?” February 1st 2008 <http://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0405270v2.pdf> JW 1/22/15]

A century ago Boltzmann considered a “cosmology” where the observed universe should be regarded as a rare ﬂuctuation out of some equilibrium state. The prediction of this point of view, quite generically, is that we live in a universe which maximizes the total entropy of the system consistent with existing observations. Other universes simply occur as much more rare ﬂuctuations. This means as much as possible of the system should be found in equilibrium as often as possible. From this point of view, it is very surprising that we ﬁnd the universe around us in such a low entropy state. In fact, the logical conclusion of this line of reasoning is utterly solipsistic. The most likely ﬂuctuation consistent with everything you know is simply your brain (complete with “memories” of the Hubble Deep ﬁelds, WMAP data, etc) ﬂuctuating brieﬂy out of chaos and then immediately equilibrating back into chaos again. This is sometimes called the “Boltzmann’s Brain” paradox.

#### Reject uncarded responses—theoretical physics requires deep scientific knowhow.

#### 13] In order to decide to do the affirmative we need a decision-making procedure to enact it, vote for it, and to determine it is a good decision. But to chose a decision-making procedure requires another meta level decision making procedure leading to infinite regress since every decision requires another decision to chose how to make a decision.

#### 14] In order to say I want to fix x problem, you must say that you want x problem to exist, since it requires the problem exist to solve, which makes any moral attempt inherently immoral and theory sets bad norms because we vote for interps that are marginally better than other interps, rather the best version of the interp, so it doesn’t achieve the voter.

#### 15] Premise 1 is that there are an infinite number of ways for the affirmative to fail. Atoms or dust particles could be shifted in an infinite number of ways that don't affect the aff failing.

#### Premise 2: Let the cases where the aff succeeds equal x. The probability of the aff succeeding is x divided by (x + the number of ways the aff could fail). However, infinity + some x is still equal to infinity, meaning the chances the aff succeeds is x/infinity which converges to zero because as infinity grows larger the probability grows infinitely smaller.

#### Premise 3: If the probability of the aff succeeding is 0, the probability of the aff failing is 100 so vote neg on presumption since the aff has no solvency.

#### 16] GCB

Himma

[Kenneth Eimar Himma, “Anselm: Ontological Argument for God's Existence” Internet Encyclopedia of Philsophy, <https://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/>] LHSSN

Perhaps the most influential of contemporary modal arguments is Plantinga's version. Plantinga begins by defining two properties, the property of maximal greatness and the property of maximal excellence, as follows: 1. A being is maximally excellent in a world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in W; and 2. A being is maximally great in a world W if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world. Thus, maximal greatness entails existence in every possible world: since a being that is maximally great at W is omnipotent at every possible world and non-existent beings can't be omnipotent, it follows that a maximally great being exists in every logically possible world. Accordingly, the trick is to show that a maximally great being exists in some world W because it immediately follows from this claim that such a being exists in every world, including our own. But notice that the claim that a maximally great being exists in some world is logically equivalent to the claim that the concept of a maximally great being is not self-contradictory; for the only things that don't exist in any possible world are things that are conceptually defined in terms of contradictory properties. There is no logically possible world in which a square circle exists (given the relevant concepts) because the property of being square is inconsistent with the property of being circular. Since, on Plantinga's view, the concept of a maximally great being is consistent and hence possibly instantiated, it follows that such a being, i.e., God, exists in every possible world. Here is a schematic representation of the argument:

#### The sqou is the best world because the GCB is morally perfect

#### 17] text: do the plan tmrw, today god told us to rest

## 3

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the Resolution; the aff must prove it true and the neg must prove it false.

#### Prefer: [A] Text: Five dictionaries[[8]](#footnote-8) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[9]](#footnote-9) as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution’s truth or falsity. This outweighs on common usage – it is abundantly clear that our roles are verified. Any other role of the ballot enforces an external norm on debate, but only truth testing is intrinsic to the process of debate i.e. proving statements true or false through argumentation. Constitutivism outweighs because you don’t have the jurisdiction not to truth test – if a chess player says you should break the rules for a more fun game, the proper response is to ignore them as a practice only makes sense based on its intrinsic rules.

#### [B] Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because every property assumes truth of the property i.e. if I say, “I am awake” it is the same as “it is true that I am awake” which means they are also a question of truth claims because it’s inherent. It also means their ROB warrants aren’t mutually exclusive with mine.

#### [C] Inclusion: Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for inclusive debates because people without every technical skill or comprehensive debate knowledge are shut out of your scholarship which turns your ROB- truth testing solves because you can do what you’re good at and so can I. This is also better for education because me engaging in a debate I know nothing about doesn’t help anyone. o/w since it is a real-world implication in round

# Case

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/member> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/of [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/to [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reduce [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/for [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/medicine [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-9)