### 1

#### First, the value must be justice, defined as giving each their due, as per the word ‘unjust’ in the resolution.

#### That’s distinct from ethics – what’s just is what arises out of just history of transfers.

Nozick 74 [Robert Nozick, Renowned American Philosopher, “Anarchy, State and Utopia,” Part II, Section I, ]/ lm

If the hypothetical just history involves each person's consenting to the institutional structure and to any limitations on his rights (specified by the moral side constraints on the behavior of others) it embodies, then if some actual person would not consent, one must view the institutional structure as unjust (unless it counts as just via some other hypothetical history). Similarly, one must hold the institutional structure unjust if the hypothetical just history involves some people's consenting who didn't, and some now would not assent to those others having done so. If the institutional structure could arise by some hypothetical just history which does not involve anyone's consent to that structure, then one's evaluation of the structure will depend upon one's evaluation of the process which would give rise to it. If that process is viewed as better (along dimensions other than justice where, by hypothesis, it excels) than the actual history, this probably will improve one's evaluation of the structure. That a just process would have led to the institutional structure, but only if manned by despicable individuals, will not enhance one's evaluation of that institutional structure.

The entitlement principles of justice in holdings that we have sketched are historical principles of justice. To better understand their precise character, we shall distinguish them from another subclass of the historical principles. Consider, as an example, the principle of distribution according to moral merit. This principle requires that total distributive shares vary directly with moral merit; no person should have a greater share than anyone whose moral merit is greater. (If moral merit could be not merely ordered but measured on an interval or ratio scale, stronger principles could be formulated.) Or consider the principle that results by substituting “usefulness to society” for “moral merit” in the previous principle. Or instead of “distribute according to moral merit,” or “distribute according to usefulness to society,” we might consider “distribute according to the weighted sum of moral merit, usefulness to society, and need,” with the weights of the different dimensions equal. Let us call a principle of distribution patterned if it specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions. And let us say a distribution is patterned if it accords with some patterned principle. (I speak of natural dimensions, admittedly without a general criterion for them, because for any set of holdings some artificial dimensions can be gimmicked up to vary along with the distribution of the set.) The principle of distribution in accordance with moral merit is a patterned historical principle, which specifies a patterned distribution. “Distribute according to I.Q.” is a patterned principle that looks to information not contained in distributional matrices. It is not historical, however, in that it does not look to any past actions creating differential entitlements to evaluate a distribution; it requires only distributional matrices whose columns are labeled by I.Q. scores. The distribution in a society, however, may be composed of such simple patterned distributions, without itself being simply patterned. Different sectors may operate different patterns, or some combination of patterns may operate in different proportions across a society. A distribution composed in this manner, from a small number of patterned distributions, we also shall term “patterned.” And we extend the use of “pattern” to include the overall designs put forth by combinations of end-state principles.

Whether or not Locke’s particular theory of appropriation can be spelled out so as to handle various difficulties, I assume that any adequate theory of justice in acquisition will contain a proviso similar to the weaker of the ones we have attributed to Locke. A process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened. It is important to specify this particular mode of worsening the situation of others, for the proviso does not encompass other modes. It does not include the worsening due to more limited opportunities to appropriate (the first way above, corresponding to the more stringent condition), and it does not include how I “worsen” a seller’s position if I appropriate materials to make some of what he is selling, and then enter into competition with him. Someone whose appropriation otherwise would violate the proviso still may appropriate provided he compensates the others so that their situation is not thereby worsened; unless he does compensate these others, his appropriation will violate the proviso of the principle of justice in acquisition and will be an illegitimate one.\* A theory of appropriation incorporating this Lockean proviso will handle correctly the cases (objections to the theory lacking the proviso) where someone appropriates the total supply of something necessary for life.\*

#### The standard is consistency with the Self Ownership Proviso.

Feser 05 [Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California, Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation, “There is no such thing as unjust initial acquisition,” Section II]/ lm

If what I have argued so far is correct, then the way is opened to the following revised case for strongly libertarian Lockean-Nozickian prop erty rights: We are self-owners, having full property rights to our body parts, powers, talents, energies, etc. As self-owners, we also have a right, given the SOP, not to have our self-owned powers nullified—we have the right, that is, to act within the extra-personal world and thus to acquire rights to extra-personal objects that the use of our self-owned powers requires.39 This might involve the buying or leasing of certain rights or bundles of rights and, correspondingly, the acquiring of lesser or greater degrees of ownership of parts of the external world, but as long as one is able to exercise one’s powers to some degree and is not rendered incapable of acting within that world, the SOP is satisfied. In any case, such rights can only be traded after they are first established by initial acquisition. In initially acquiring a resource, an agent does no one an injustice (it was unowned, after all). Furthermore, he has mixed his [their] labor with the resource, significantly altering it and/or bringing it under his control, and is himself solely responsible for whatever [the] value or utility the resource has come to have. Thus, he has a presumptive right to it, and, if his control and/or alteration (and thus acquisition) of it is (more or less) complete, his ownership is accordingly (more or less) full. The system of strong private property rights that follows from the acts of initial acquisition performed by countless such agents results, as a matter of empirical fact, in a market economy that inevitably and dramatically increases the number of resources available for use by individuals, and these benefited individuals include those who come along long after initial acquisition has taken place. (Indeed, it especially includes these latecomers, given that they were able to avoid the hard work of being the first to “tame the land” and draw out the value of raw materials.)40 The SOP is thus, in fact, rarely, if ever, violated. The upshot is that a system of Lockean-Nozickian private property rights is morally justified, with a strong presumption against tampering with existing property titles in general. In any case, there is a strong presumption against any general egalitarian redistribution of wealth, and no case whatsoever to be made for such redistribution from the general theory of property just sketched, purged as it is of the Lockean proviso, with all the egalitarian mischief-making the proviso has made possible.

This outcome has the virtue of restoring to Nozick’s system the theoretical simplicity and elegance that his (rather unsystematically articulated) commitment to the Lockean proviso threatened to distort. At the same time, replacement of the Lockean proviso with the self-ownership proviso allows us to sidestep the (arguably) counterintuitive consequences of rejecting the former. Still, since there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition, very strong property rights to unowned external objects come to be quite easy to obtain; and they, together with the thesis of self-ownership, give us Nozick’s principle of justice in transfer, with all its highly anti-egalitarian and anti-redistributionist consequences. The picture that results is very much a libertarianism with foundations.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1] Self Ownership is a pre-req to debate itself.

Kinsella 11 [Stephan Kinsella, Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers., Mises Institute, "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide," 05/23/11, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide]

In essence, Hoppe's view is that argumentation, or discourse, is by its nature a conflict-free way of interacting, which requires individual control of scarce resources. In genuine discourse, the parties try to persuade each other by the force of their argument, not by actual force: Argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting. Not in the sense that there is always agreement on the things said, but in the sense that as long as argumentation is in progress it is always possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement about the validity of what has been said. And this is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his [their] own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation (note again, that it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth). ([TSC](http://mises.org/resources/431/A-Theory-of-Socialism-and-Capitalism), p. 158) Thus, self-ownership is presupposed by argumentation. Hoppe then shows that argumentation also presupposes the right to own homesteaded scarce resources as well. The basic idea here is that the body is "the prototype of a scarce good for the use of which property rights, i.e., rights of exclusive ownership, somehow have to be established, in order to avoid clashes" ([TSC](http://mises.org/resources/431/A-Theory-of-Socialism-and-Capitalism), p. 19). As Hoppe explains, “The compatibility of this principle with that of nonaggression can be demonstrated by means of an argumentum a contrario. First, it should be noted that if no one had the right to acquire and control anything except his own body … then we would all cease to exist and the problem of the justification of normative statements … simply would not exist. The existence of this problem is only possible because we are alive, and our existence is due to the fact that we do not, indeed cannot, accept a norm outlawing property in other scarce goods next and in addition to that of one's physical body. Hence, the right to acquire such goods must be assumed to exist.

#### 2] Justice is intrinsic to institutions, not based off consequences – it’s not just to punish a wrongly accused person just because it will deter others.

#### Now negate –

#### Appropriation in initial acquisition of space is never unjust.

Feser 05 [Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California, Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation, “There is no such thing as unjust initial acquisition,” Section II]/ lm

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition.

Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intuitions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acquisition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our understanding of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification.

The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A [them to] commits an injustice in acquiring R, it [there] would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisition of R, B [they] would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after someone has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

### 2

#### Their view of appropriation of outer space solely by space ompanies and focuse on private appropriation of space mystifies the relationship between private companies and the state in neoliberalism that hides the true nature of capitalism by fragmenting it’s in specific actors and spaces.

Shammas and Holen 19 [Victor L. Shammas Oslo Metropolitan University, Work Research Institute (AFI), Oslo, Norway, Tomas B. Holen Independent scholar, Oslo, Norway, nature, Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, “One giant leap for capitalistkind: private enterprise in outer space,” January 29 2019, [https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9]/](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9%5d/)lm

What role, then, for the state? The frontiersmen of NewSpace tend to think of themselves as libertarians, pioneers beyond the domain of state bureaucracy (see Nelson and Block, [2018](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9#ref-CR46)). ‘The government should leave the design work and ownership of the product to the private sector', the author of a 2017 report, Capitalism in Space, advocates. ‘The private companies know best how to build their own products to maximize performance while lowering cost' (Zimmerman, [2017](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9#ref-CR72), p. 27). One ethnographer notes that ‘politically, right-libertarianism prevails' amongst NewSpace entrepreneurs (Valentine, [2016](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9#ref-CR66), p. 1047–1048). Just as Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the opponents to the Iraq War as ‘Old Europe', so too are state entities’ interests in space exploration shrugged off as symptoms of ‘Old Space'. Elon Musk, we are told in a recent biography, unlike the sluggish Big State actors of yore, ‘would apply some of the start-up techniques he’d learned in Silicon Valley to run SpaceX lean and fast…As a private company, SpaceX would also avoid the waste and cost overruns associated with government contractors' (Vance, [2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9#ref-CR67), p. 114). This libertarianism-in-space has found a willing chorus of academic supporters. The legal scholar Virgiliu Pop introduces the notion of the frontier paradigm (combining laissez-faire economics, market competition, and an individualist ethic) into the domain of space law, claiming that this paradigm has ‘proven its worth on our planet' and will ‘most likely…do so in the extraterrestrial realms' as well (Pop, [2009](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9#ref-CR51), p. vi). This frontier paradigm is not entirely new: a ‘Columbus mythology', centering on the ‘noble explorer', was continuously evoked in the United States during the Cold War space race (Dickens and Ormrod, [2016](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9#ref-CR14), pp. 79, 162–164).

But the entrepreneurial libertarianism of capitalistkind is undermined by the reliance of the entire NewSpace complex on extensive support from the state, ‘a public-private financing model underpinning long-shot start-ups' that in the case of Musk’s three main companies (SpaceX, SolarCity Corp., and Tesla) has been underpinned by $4.9 billion dollars in government subsidies (Hirsch, [2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9#ref-CR29)). In the nascent field of space tourism, Cohen ([2017](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9#ref-CR8)) argues that what began as an almost entirely private venture quickly ground to a halt in the face of insurmountable technical and financial obstacles, only solved by piggybacking on large state-run projects, such as selling trips to the International Space Station, against the objections of NASA scientists. The business model of NewSpace depends on the taxpayer’s dollar while making pretensions to individual self-reliance. The vast majority of present-day clients of private aerospace corporations are government clients, usually military in origin. Furthermore, the bulk of rocket launches in the United States take place on government property, usually operated by the US Air Force or NASA.This inward tension between state dependency and capitalist autonomy is itself a product of neoliberalism’s contradictory demand for a minimal, “slim” state, while simultaneously (and in fact) relying on a state reengineered and retooled for the purposes of capital accumulation (Wacquant, [2012](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9#ref-CR68)). As Lazzarato writes, ‘To be able to be “laissez-faire”, it is necessary to intervene a great deal' ([2017](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9#ref-CR36), p. 7). Space libertarianism is libertarian in name only: behind every NewSpace venture looms a thick web of government spending programs, regulatory agencies, public infrastructure, and universities bolstered by research grants from the state. SpaceX would not exist were it not for state-sponsored contracts of satellite launches. Similarly, in 2018, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the famed origin of the World Wide Web—announced that it would launch a ‘responsive launch competition', meaning essentially the reuse of launch vehicles, representing an attempt by the state to ‘harness growing commercial capabilities' and place them in the service of the state’s interest in ensuring ‘national security' (Foust, [2018b](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0218-9#ref-CR18)).

#### And that entrenches us in the system making it impossible to resist – which takes out the plan’s solvency because neoliberalism is the root cause of the aff and all impacts.

Monbiot 16 [George Monbiot is a Guardian columnist and the author of Feral, The Age of Consent and [Out of the Wreckage: a New Politics for an Age of Crisis](https://www.guardianbookshop.com/out-of-the-wreckage.html), The Guardian, “Neoliberalism – the ideology at the root of all our problems,” <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot>] lm

The ideology that dominates our lives has, for most of us, no name. Mention it in conversation and you’ll be rewarded with a shrug. Even if your listeners have heard the term before, they will struggle to define it. Neoliberalism: do you know what it is? Its anonymity is both a symptom and cause of its power. It has played a major role in a remarkable variety of crises: the [financial meltdown](https://www.theguardian.com/business/financial-crisis) of 2007‑8, the offshoring of wealth and power, of which the [Panama Papers](https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/panama-papers) offer us merely a glimpse, the slow collapse of public health and education, resurgent child poverty, [the epidemic of loneliness](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/14/age-of-loneliness-killing-us), the collapse of ecosystems, the rise of [Donald Trump](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/donaldtrump). But we respond to these crises as if they emerge in isolation, apparently unaware that they have all been either catalysed or exacerbated by the same coherent philosophy; a philosophy that has – or had – a name. What greater power can there be than to operate namelessly? So pervasive has neoliberalism become that we seldom even recognise it as an ideology. We appear to accept the proposition that this utopian, millenarian faith describes a neutral force; a kind of biological law, like Darwin’s theory of evolution. But the philosophy arose as a conscious attempt to reshape human life and shift the locus of power. Neoliberalism sees competition as the defining characteristic of human relations. It redefines citizens as consumers, whose democratic choices are best exercised by buying and selling, a process that rewards merit and punishes inefficiency. It maintains that “the market” delivers benefits that could never be achieved by planning. Attempts to limit competition are treated as inimical to liberty. Tax and regulation should be minimised, public services should be privatised. The organisation of labour and collective bargaining by [trade unions](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/tradeunions) are portrayed as market distortions that impede the formation of a natural hierarchy of winners and losers. Inequality is recast as virtuous: a reward for utility and a generator of wealth, which trickles down to enrich everyone. Efforts to create a more equal society are both counterproductive and morally corrosive. The market ensures that everyone gets what they deserve. We internalise and reproduce its creeds. [The rich persuade themselves](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/07/one-per-cent-wealth-destroyers) that they acquired their wealth through merit, ignoring the advantages – such as education, inheritance and class – that may have helped to secure it. The poor begin to blame themselves for their failures, even when they can do little to change their circumstances. Never mind structural unemployment: if you don’t have a job it’s because you are unenterprising. Never mind the impossible costs of housing: if your credit card is maxed out, you’re feckless and improvident. Never mind that your children no longer have a school playing field: if they get fat, it’s your fault. In a world governed by competition, those who fall behind become defined and self-defined as losers. But in the 1970s, when Keynesian policies began to fall apart and economic crises struck on both sides of the Atlantic, neoliberal ideas began to enter the mainstream. As Friedman remarked, “when the time came that you had to change ... there was an alternative ready there to be picked up”. With the help of sympathetic journalists and political advisers, elements of neoliberalism, especially its prescriptions for monetary policy, were adopted by Jimmy Carter’s administration in the US and Jim Callaghan’s government in Britain. After Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan took power, the rest of the package soon followed: massive tax cuts for the rich, the crushing of trade unions, deregulation, privatisation, outsourcing and competition in public services. Through the IMF, the World Bank, the Maastricht treaty and the World Trade Organisation, neoliberal policies were imposed – often without democratic consent – on much of the world. Most remarkable was its adoption among parties that once belonged to the left: Labour and the Democrats, for example. As Stedman Jones notes, “it is hard to think of another utopia to have been as fully realised.” Neoliberal policies are everywhere beset by market failures. Not only are the banks too big to fail, but so are the corporations now charged with delivering public services. As Tony Judt pointed out in [Ill Fares the Land](https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/apr/11/ill-fares-land-tony-judt), Hayek forgot that vital national services cannot be allowed to collapse, which means that competition cannot run its course. Business takes the profits, the state keeps the risk. Perhaps the most dangerous impact of neoliberalism is not the economic crises it has caused, but the political crisis. As the domain of the state is reduced, our ability to change the course of our lives through voting also contracts. Instead, neoliberal theory asserts, people can exercise choice through spending. But some have more to spend than others: in the great consumer or shareholder democracy, votes are not equally distributed. The result is a disempowerment of the poor and middle. As parties of the right and [former left](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/series/looking-back-on-new-labour) adopt similar neoliberal policies, disempowerment turns to disenfranchisement. Large numbers of people have been shed from politics. Chris Hedges [remarks](http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/the_revenge_of_the_lower_classes_and_the_rise_of_american_fascism_20160302) that “fascist movements build their base not from the politically active but the politically inactive, the ‘losers’ who feel, often correctly, they have no voice or role to play in the political establishment”. When political debate no longer speaks to us, people become responsive [instead to slogans, symbols and sensation](https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/mar/04/genius-donald-trumpspeak-steven-poole-words). To the admirers of Trump, for example, facts and arguments appear irrelevant. Judt explained that when the thick mesh of interactions between people and the state has been reduced to nothing but authority and obedience, the only remaining force that binds us is state power. The totalitarianism Hayek feared is more likely to emerge when governments, having lost the moral authority that arises from the delivery of public services, are reduced to “cajoling, threatening and ultimately coercing people to obey them”. Every invocation of Lord Keynes is an admission of failure. To propose Keynesian solutions to the crises of the 21st century is to ignore three obvious problems. It is hard to mobilise people around old ideas; the flaws exposed in the 70s have not gone away; and, most importantly, they have nothing to say about our gravest predicament: the environmental crisis. Keynesianism works by stimulating consumer demand to promote economic growth. Consumer demand and economic growth are the motors of environmental destruction. What the history of both Keynesianism and neoliberalism show is that it’s not enough to oppose a broken system. A coherent alternative has to be proposed. For Labour, the Democrats and the wider left, the central task should be to develop an economic Apollo programme, a conscious attempt to design a new system, tailored to the demands of the 21st century.

#### The alternative is to Join the Party – reject working alongside the bourgeois state and to build dual power instead.

Escalante 18 [Alyson, philosophy at U of Oregon, 08/24/2018. “Against Electoralism, For Dual Power!” <https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/>] lm

I am sure that at this point, the opportunists reading this have already begun to type out their typical objection: the world is different than it was in 1917, and the conditions of the United States in no way echo the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve revolutionary success. To this tried and true objection, there is one simple answer: you are entirely correct, and that is why we need to abandon electoralism and working within the bourgeois state. What were the conditions which allowed the Bolsheviks to successfully revolt? The conditions were that of Dual Power. Alongside the capitalist state, there existed a whole set of institutions and councils which met the needs of the workers. The soviets, a parallel socialist government made up of individual councils, successfully took over many governmental responsibilities in some parts of Petrograd. In the radical Viborg district, the Bolshevik controlled soviets provided government services like mail, alongside programs that could meet the needs of workers. When a far right coup was attempted against the provisional government, it was troops loyal to the Bolshevik factions within the soviet who repelled the coup plotters, proving concretely to the workers of Petrograd that the socialists could not only provide for their needs, but also for their defense. In short: the Bolsheviks recognized that instead of integrating into the bourgeois state, they could operate outside of it to build dual power. They could establish programs of elected representatives who would serve the workers. They would not bolster the capitalist state in the name of socialism, they would offer an alternative to it. And so, when the time came for revolt, the masses were already to loyal to the Bolsheviks. The only party who had never compromised, who had denounced the unpopular imperialist wars, who had rejected the provisional government entirely, was the party who successfully gained the support of the workers. And so, many of us on the more radical fringes of the socialist movement wonder why it is the the DSA and other socialist opportunists seem to think that we can win by bolstering the capitalist state? We wonder, given this powerful historical precedent, why they devote their energy to getting more Ocasios elected; what good does one more left democrat who will abandon the workers do for us? The answer we receive in return is always the same: we want to win small changes that will make life for the workers easier; we want to protect food stamps and healthcare. And do this, we reply: what makes you think reformism is the only way to do this. When the bourgeois state in California was happy to let black children go to school unfed, the Black Panthers didn’t rally around democratic candidates, they became militant and fed the children themselves. In the 40s and 50s, socialists in New York saw people going without healthcare and instead of rallying behind democratic candidates, they built the IWO to provide healthcare directly. Both these groups took up our pressing revolutionary task: building dual power. Imagine if all those hours the DSA poured into electing Ocasio were instead used to feed the people of New York, to provide them with medical care, to ensure their needs were met. Imagine the masses seeing socialism not as a pipe dream we might achieve through electing more imperialists, but as a concrete movement which is currently meeting their needs? The fact is, we are not nearly ready for revolution. Socialists in the United States have failed to meet the needs of the people, and as long as their only concrete interaction with the masses is handing them a voter registration form, they will continue to fail the people. Our task now is not to elect representatives to advocate for the people; it is much more gruelingly laborious than that. Our task is to serve the people. Our task is to build dual power. The movement to do this is underway. Members of the DSA refoundation caucus have begun to move the left of the DSA in this direct, socialist groups like Philly Socialists have begun to build dual power through GED programs and tenants unions, many branches of the Party For Socialism and Liberation have begun to feed the people and provide for their concrete needs, and Red Guard collectives in Los Angeles have built serve the people programs and taken on a stance of militant resistance to gentrification. The movement is growing, its time is coming, and dual power is achievable within our life time. The opportunists are, in a sense, correct. We are not where we were in 1917, but we can begin to move in that direction and dual power can take us there. In order to achieve dual power we have to recognize that Lenin was right: there will be no socialist gains by working within state institutions designed to crush socialism. Furthermore, we must recognize that the strategies of the electoral opportunists trade off with dual power. Electing candidates drains resources, time, and energy away from actually serving the people. And so, we should commit to undertake the difficult and dangerous task of building dual power. We must reject opportunism, we must name the democratic party as our enemy, we must rally around power directly in the hands of the socialist movement. We do not have a parallel system of soviets in the United States. We can change that. Someday the cry “all power to the soviets” will be heard again. Lets make it happen.

### 3

#### Baudrillard is racist, sexist, and contradictory – vote them down

Best 91, Steven (Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas El Paso), and Douglas Kellner. Postmodern theory: Critical interrogations. Guilford Press, 1991.

Furthermore, Baudrillard's analysis operates on a excessively high level of abstraction. He fails to make key distinctions and engages in misplaced abstraction. For instance, Ron Silliman pointed out in his response to Baudrillard at the Montana conference that Baudrillard failed to distinguish between tranvestism and transexuality. Transvestites play at dressing as members of the opposite sex and enjoy the 'gender fucking' and subversion of dress codes; transsexuals, by contrast, are often tortured and suffering individuals who can appear uncomfortable in either sex —as evidenced by the high rate of suicides of those who undergo sex change operations. But human suffering is erased from Baudrillard's semiological universe which abstractly describes certain sign spectacles abstracted from material underpinnings.

The same bad abstraction appears in his travelogue America (1988d). Baudrillard speeds through the desert of America and merely sees signs floating by. He looks at Reagan on TV and sees only his smile. He hangs out in southern California and concludes that the United States is a 'realized utopia'. He fails to see, however, the homeless, the poor, racism and sexism, people dying of AIDS, oppressed immigrants, and fails to relate any of the phenomena observed to the vicissitudes of capitalism (he denies that capital ever existed in America!), or to the conservative political hegemony of the 1980s. Baudrillard's imaginary is thus a highly abstract sign fetishism which abstracts from social relations and political economy in order to perceive the play of signs in the transvestite spectacles of the transaesthetic, transsexual, and transpolitical. Baudrillard's 'trans' manoeuvres, however, are those of an idealist skimming the surface of appearances while speeding across an environment which he never contextualizes, understands, or really comes to terms with. Indeed, Baudrillard's erasure of the fundamentality of sexual and racial differences is highly insensitive and even grotesque. Most blacks and people of colour experience virulent racism in the United States and the fact of racial difference — Baudrillard to the contrary — remains a salient feature of contemporary US society. Most blacks do not achieve the media fame and wealth of a Michael Jackson and cannot easily mix racial and sexual features in new configurations. As is obvious to anyone who has lived for any length of time in the United States, racial oppression and difference is a deep-rooted feature of contemporary US society from which Baudrillard abstracts in his 'theory' of fractal value. Indeed, Baudrillard's current positions are profoundly superficial and are characterized by sloppy generalizations, extreme abstraction, semiological idealism and oft repeated banalities, such as: we are in a 'post-orgy condition' of simulations, entropy, fractal subjects, indifference, transvestism, and so on, ad nauseam. If he were merely expressing opinions or claiming to present a possible perspective on things, one would be able to enjoy his pataphysical meanderings, but Baudrillard's writing is increasingly pretentious, claiming to describe 'the real state of things', to speak for the masses, and to tell `us' what we really believe. For instance, the essay on Transaesthetics' opens with the declamation:

It is commonly held that the avant-garde no longer exists, whether this avant-garde is sexual, political or artistic; that this movement which corresponds to the linear acceleration of a history, to an anticipatory capacity and henceforth of a radical critique in the name of desire, in the name of the revolution, in the name of the liberation of forms, that this revolutionary movement has come to a close. Essentially this is true. This glorious movement which is called modernity did not lead us to a transmutation of all values, as we had once dreamed, but to a dissemination and involution of value which resulted in a state of utter confusion for us. This confusion expresses itself, first and foremost, by our inability to grasp anew the principle of an aesthetic determinacy of things, might it be political or sexual.

Baudrillard thus contradicts himself in denying that reality exists any longer in an era of simulations and hyperreality, and then constantly appealing to 'the real conditions of things today'. Note also the glib references to 'this is true' and 'utter confusion' that has resulted 'for us', while pointing to 'our inability' to perceive this or that. The easy complicity of Baudrillard and the masses, him and 'us', is pretentious and hypocritical in addition, for the implication of the whole lecture is that he really understands what is going on while 'we' remain confused and deluded. His positions are grounded in mere subjective intuition or ironic play which he wants to pass off as profound truths and which his gullible followers appropriately praise. Despite postmodern critiques of totalizing thought, Baudrillard represents totalizing thought at its worst and despite critiques of representational thought which is confident that it is describing reality as it is, Baudrillard foists his musings and asides as insight into the very heart of things.

### Underview

#### 1] Presumption negates – infinite ways for something to be false but only one way for them to be true.

#### 2] 2n theory, neg gets it, its k2 preventing abuse in the 1ar.

#### 3] No 1ar theory, A] any response to my CI will be new in the 2ar which will require judge intervention and B] incentives friv theory dumps over substance debates.

# 2NR