### SOP

#### First, the value must be justice, defined as giving each their due, as per the word ‘unjust’ in the resolution.

#### That’s distinct from ethics – what’s just is what arises out of just history of transfers.

Nozick 74 [Robert Nozick, Renowned American Philosopher, “Anarchy, State and Utopia,” Part II, Section I, ]/ lm

If the hypothetical just history involves each person's consenting to the institutional structure and to any limitations on his rights (specified by the moral side constraints on the behavior of others) it embodies, then if some actual person would not consent, one must view the institutional structure as unjust (unless it counts as just via some other hypothetical history). Similarly, one must hold the institutional structure unjust if the hypothetical just history involves some people's consenting who didn't, and some now would not assent to those others having done so. If the institutional structure could arise by some hypothetical just history which does not involve anyone's consent to that structure, then one's evaluation of the structure will depend upon one's evaluation of the process which would give rise to it. If that process is viewed as better (along dimensions other than justice where, by hypothesis, it excels) than the actual history, this probably will improve one's evaluation of the structure. That a just process would have led to the institutional structure, but only if manned by despicable individuals, will not enhance one's evaluation of that institutional structure.

The entitlement principles of justice in holdings that we have sketched are historical principles of justice. To better understand their precise character, we shall distinguish them from another subclass of the historical principles. Consider, as an example, the principle of distribution according to moral merit. This principle requires that total distributive shares vary directly with moral merit; no person should have a greater share than anyone whose moral merit is greater. (If moral merit could be not merely ordered but measured on an interval or ratio scale, stronger principles could be formulated.) Or consider the principle that results by substituting “usefulness to society” for “moral merit” in the previous principle. Or instead of “distribute according to moral merit,” or “distribute according to usefulness to society,” we might consider “distribute according to the weighted sum of moral merit, usefulness to society, and need,” with the weights of the different dimensions equal. Let us call a principle of distribution patterned if it specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions. And let us say a distribution is patterned if it accords with some patterned principle. (I speak of natural dimensions, admittedly without a general criterion for them, because for any set of holdings some artificial dimensions can be gimmicked up to vary along with the distribution of the set.) The principle of distribution in accordance with moral merit is a patterned historical principle, which specifies a patterned distribution. “Distribute according to I.Q.” is a patterned principle that looks to information not contained in distributional matrices. It is not historical, however, in that it does not look to any past actions creating differential entitlements to evaluate a distribution; it requires only distributional matrices whose columns are labeled by I.Q. scores. The distribution in a society, however, may be composed of such simple patterned distributions, without itself being simply patterned. Different sectors may operate different patterns, or some combination of patterns may operate in different proportions across a society. A distribution composed in this manner, from a small number of patterned distributions, we also shall term “patterned.” And we extend the use of “pattern” to include the overall designs put forth by combinations of end-state principles.

Whether or not Locke’s particular theory of appropriation can be spelled out so as to handle various difficulties, I assume that any adequate theory of justice in acquisition will contain a proviso similar to the weaker of the ones we have attributed to Locke. A process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened. It is important to specify this particular mode of worsening the situation of others, for the proviso does not encompass other modes. It does not include the worsening due to more limited opportunities to appropriate (the first way above, corresponding to the more stringent condition), and it does not include how I “worsen” a seller’s position if I appropriate materials to make some of what he is selling, and then enter into competition with him. Someone whose appropriation otherwise would violate the proviso still may appropriate provided he compensates the others so that their situation is not thereby worsened; unless he does compensate these others, his appropriation will violate the proviso of the principle of justice in acquisition and will be an illegitimate one.\* A theory of appropriation incorporating this Lockean proviso will handle correctly the cases (objections to the theory lacking the proviso) where someone appropriates the total supply of something necessary for life.\*

#### The standard is consistency with the Self Ownership Proviso.

Feser 05 [Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California, Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation, “There is no such thing as unjust initial acquisition,” Section II]/ lm

If what I have argued so far is correct, then the way is opened to the following revised case for strongly libertarian Lockean-Nozickian prop erty rights: We are self-owners, having full property rights to our body parts, powers, talents, energies, etc. As self-owners, we also have a right, given the SOP, not to have our self-owned powers nullified—we have the right, that is, to act within the extra-personal world and thus to acquire rights to extra-personal objects that the use of our self-owned powers requires.39 This might involve the buying or leasing of certain rights or bundles of rights and, correspondingly, the acquiring of lesser or greater degrees of ownership of parts of the external world, but as long as one is able to exercise one’s powers to some degree and is not rendered incapable of acting within that world, the SOP is satisfied. In any case, such rights can only be traded after they are first established by initial acquisition. In initially acquiring a resource, an agent does no one an injustice (it was unowned, after all). Furthermore, he has mixed his [their] labor with the resource, significantly altering it and/or bringing it under his control, and is himself solely responsible for whatever [the] value or utility the resource has come to have. Thus, he has a presumptive right to it, and, if his control and/or alteration (and thus acquisition) of it is (more or less) complete, his ownership is accordingly (more or less) full. The system of strong private property rights that follows from the acts of initial acquisition performed by countless such agents results, as a matter of empirical fact, in a market economy that inevitably and dramatically increases the number of resources available for use by individuals, and these benefited individuals include those who come along long after initial acquisition has taken place. (Indeed, it especially includes these latecomers, given that they were able to avoid the hard work of being the first to “tame the land” and draw out the value of raw materials.)40 The SOP is thus, in fact, rarely, if ever, violated. The upshot is that a system of Lockean-Nozickian private property rights is morally justified, with a strong presumption against tampering with existing property titles in general. In any case, there is a strong presumption against any general egalitarian redistribution of wealth, and no case whatsoever to be made for such redistribution from the general theory of property just sketched, purged as it is of the Lockean proviso, with all the egalitarian mischief-making the proviso has made possible.

This outcome has the virtue of restoring to Nozick’s system the theoretical simplicity and elegance that his (rather unsystematically articulated) commitment to the Lockean proviso threatened to distort. At the same time, replacement of the Lockean proviso with the self-ownership proviso allows us to sidestep the (arguably) counterintuitive consequences of rejecting the former. Still, since there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition, very strong property rights to unowned external objects come to be quite easy to obtain; and they, together with the thesis of self-ownership, give us Nozick’s principle of justice in transfer, with all its highly anti-egalitarian and anti-redistributionist consequences. The picture that results is very much a libertarianism with foundations.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1] Self Ownership is a pre-req to debate itself.

Kinsella 11 [Stephan Kinsella, Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers., Mises Institute, "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide," 05/23/11, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide]

In essence, Hoppe's view is that argumentation, or discourse, is by its nature a conflict-free way of interacting, which requires individual control of scarce resources. In genuine discourse, the parties try to persuade each other by the force of their argument, not by actual force: Argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting. Not in the sense that there is always agreement on the things said, but in the sense that as long as argumentation is in progress it is always possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement about the validity of what has been said. And this is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his [their] own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation (note again, that it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth). ([TSC](http://mises.org/resources/431/A-Theory-of-Socialism-and-Capitalism), p. 158) Thus, self-ownership is presupposed by argumentation. Hoppe then shows that argumentation also presupposes the right to own homesteaded scarce resources as well. The basic idea here is that the body is "the prototype of a scarce good for the use of which property rights, i.e., rights of exclusive ownership, somehow have to be established, in order to avoid clashes" ([TSC](http://mises.org/resources/431/A-Theory-of-Socialism-and-Capitalism), p. 19). As Hoppe explains, “The compatibility of this principle with that of nonaggression can be demonstrated by means of an argumentum a contrario. First, it should be noted that if no one had the right to acquire and control anything except his own body … then we would all cease to exist and the problem of the justification of normative statements … simply would not exist. The existence of this problem is only possible because we are alive, and our existence is due to the fact that we do not, indeed cannot, accept a norm outlawing property in other scarce goods next and in addition to that of one's physical body. Hence, the right to acquire such goods must be assumed to exist.

#### 2] Justice is intrinsic to institutions, not based off consequences – it’s not just to punish a wrongly accused person just because it will deter others.

#### Now negate –

#### Appropriation in initial acquisition of space is never unjust.

Feser 05 [Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California, Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation, “There is no such thing as unjust initial acquisition,” Section II]/ lm

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition.

Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intuitions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acquisition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our understanding of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification.

The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A [them to] commits an injustice in acquiring R, it [there] would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisition of R, B [they] would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after someone has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

### Security DA

#### Commercial space activity is key to security and stability in Space.

Rogers and Nye 21 [Mike Rogers is a former Republican representative Congress who was a chair of the House Intelligence Committee. He is now the David Abshire chair at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress. Glenn Nye is a former Democratic representative in Congress. He is now chief executive with the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, The Hill, “We have to maintain national security momentum in space,” 04/30/2021, [https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/550775-we-have-to-maintain-national-security-momentum-in-space?rl=1]/](https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/550775-we-have-to-maintain-national-security-momentum-in-space?rl=1%5d/) lm

Our institution will launch our latest bipartisan set of national security space program recommendations next week. This report leverages the knowledge and experience of space policy experts from across military, government, private sector, nonprofit, and academic communities. Our goal is to not merely admire these challenges but to produce a series of actionable recommendations that the White House, Congress, and the Pentagon can use to strengthen our national security on orbit.

The onus of getting this right is not on the shoulders of the Space Force alone. While it enjoys the preponderance of resources, it cannot secure our interests in space by itself. It needs coordination and collaboration within and across the federal government. It has to work with the State Department to define the new rules of the road for space, to present our positions on issues like space traffic management and debris mitigation, and to coordinate with our allies on space security and diplomacy. It has to work with the Commerce Department to establish sensible procedures to foster commercial space activity [and]. It must work with the Transportation Department to cement safety issues and launch procedures.

Most importantly, the Space Force and the intelligence community must work more closely with the commercial space sector. This is not simply about buying capabilities but about developing critical partnerships with commercial space providers, matching the speed of innovation with the speed of acquisition. It is about developing the culture within the Space Force which strategically plans for next generation capabilities, rapidly ingests emerging technology, and smartly embraces the risks.

Our exciting and advanced future in space depends upon the decidedly unexciting discussion of acquisition reform. If the Space Force does not address how it does business, the United States will lose its competitive edge in space. When we talk about acquisition reform, we are not talking about simply shaving a few months off a multiyear contracting process. We are talking about fundamentally changing what and how the Space Force, the broader Defense Department, and the intelligence community buy. It means creating pathways for innovative technologies to go from the drawing board to programs of record, rather than allowing such new capabilities for space to die in the acquisition valley of death.

It also means encouraging and embracing competition. We have seen a revolution in commercial space, one that is opening up unprecedented opportunities by reducing the cost of access and operating in space. Yet such structures for looking at space have not concomitantly changed or adapted, and the block buys, multiyear contracts, lengthy and expensive development timelines have to end if we are to succeed here.

It means looking at space as a system and closing the “kill chain” of links in orbit. We cannot afford to view platforms and capabilities in isolation, apart from the broader mission plan, just like we cannot view the Space Force apart from the national security and economic prosperity mission. This necessitates an approach to acquisition that focuses on capabilities rather than platforms. It will allow the commercial sector to innovate new and novel solutions to military problems. It will also assist in sustaining the growth of the emerging space ecosystem, which is a critical development if the United States desires to maintain its competitive edge.

The goal of all of this effort must be nothing less than the establishment of an American led multilateral order with rules for orbit and other planetary bodies. This is no longer the realm of science fiction but is today a matter of diplomacy and military fact. If we fail to define such an order, or allow a different order to be defined for us by either China or Russia, then we will see increased instability that will benefit no one in the future.

#### And that stops space conflicts in the future.

Steer 20 [Dr. Cassandra Steer, CERL Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law, University of Pennsylvania, “Why Outer Space Matters for National and International Security,” January 8th 2020, [https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/10053-why-outer-space-matters-for-national-and]/](https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/10053-why-outer-space-matters-for-national-and%5d/) lm

Commercial actors have a key role in increasing cooperation and transparency because they often support multiple international clients among whom political relations may be unclear or shifting. Some commercial actors have an explicit desire to remain neutral, others have fixed alliances. All these factors may complicate the development of policies that support collaboration and TCBMs. However, it is undeniable that increased data sharing of SSA and the development of mechanisms to clarify intentions behind space-based maneuvers are essential to ensure stability in space. There is a critical need for clear representations from States as to their position on national and international law applicable to space and well-informed policy positions on the emerging weaponization of space. Due to the specificity of the space domain, specialized expertise must be provided to decision-makers, and interdisciplinary opinions must be sought from a multitude of stakeholders. Finding answers to these questions requires interdisciplinary engagement and collaboration, not only among substantive experts in different fields but also between public agencies and private commercial entities. This is not merely aspirational. There are lessons to be learned from the Cold War era when scientists pushed for increased collaboration even during periods of high tension between the two superpowers. There is a need for exchange of information and evidence-based policy, particularly in terms of SSA, cross-domain thinking, minimization of the escalatory cycle, and appreciation of the long-term effects of any space-based conflict. The challenge will be knowing how to balance this against the need to protect one’s own space assets and the need to maintain secrecy about one’s own capabilities. Space is a unique domain and requires a unique way of thinking about policy and strategy.

#### Space conflicts are uniquely likely and lead to nuclear war.

Grego 15 [Laura Grego is a physicist in the Global Security program at UCS. She is an expert in space weapons and security; ballistic missile proliferation; and ballistic missile defense. "Preventing Space War." https://allthingsnuclear.org/lgrego/preventing-space-war]

So says a very good New York Times editorial “Preventing a Space War” this week. Sounds right, if X-Wing fighters come to mind when you think space conflict. But in reality conflict in space is both more likely than one would think and less likely to be so photogenic. Space as a locus of conflict The Pentagon has known that space could be a flash point at least since the late 1990s when it began including satellites and space weapons in earnest as part of its wargames. The early games revealed some surprises. For example, attacking an adversary’s ground-based anti-satellite weapons before they were used could be the “trip wire” that starts a war: in the one of the first war games, an attack on an enemy’s ground-based lasers was meant to defuse a potential conflict and protect space assets, but instead was interpreted as an act of war and initiated hostilities. The games also revealed that disrupting space-based communication and information flow or “blinding” could rapidly escalate a war, eventually leading to nuclear weapon exchange. The war games have continued over the years with increased sophistication, but continue to find that conflicts can rapidly escalate and become global when space weapons are involved, and that even minor opponents can create big problems. The report back from the 2012 game, which included NATO partners, said these insights have become “virtually axiomatic.” Participants in the most recent Schriever war games found that when space weapons were introduced in a regional crisis, it escalated quickly and was difficult to stop from spreading. The compressed timelines, the global as well as dual-use nature of space assets, the difficulty of attribution and seeing what is happening, and the inherent vulnerability of satellites all contribute to this problem. Satellite vulnerability & solutions Satellites are valuable but, at least on an individual basis, physically vulnerable. Vulnerable in that they are relatively fragile, as launch mass is at a premium and so protective armor is too expensive, and a large number of low-earth-orbiting satellites are no farther from the earth’s surface than the distance from Boston to Washington, DC.

**Even limited nuclear war would result in extinction.**

Starr 15 [Steven Starr “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. <https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html>]

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that [ends human history](https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StarrNuclearWinterOct09.pdf). There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to [destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer](https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/just-published/3995/nuclear-war-and-ultraviolet-radiation) and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

### Regulation CP

#### Counterplan: Establish an international body to regulate Commercial Space Activity.

**Iliopoulos 20** [Iliopoulos, Nikolaos [University of Tokyo], and Miguel Esteban [Waseda University]. "Sustainable space exploration and its relevance to the privatization of space ventures." Acta Astronautica 167 (2020): 85-92.]

The envisioned legal regime to encourage private firms to undertake the high risk and high cost involved in activities of space exploration would have to explicitly recognize extra-terrestrial property claims of individuals and corporations that meet specified conditions. As such, based on the conclusions made through this paper ,it is considered that with the right negotiation terms, the current treaties can be revised so as to become steppingstones for the advancement of space exploration that could potentially bring forth significant changes to the environment surrounding planet Earth. Finally, one way that such privatization efforts could be seen to benefit of [hu]mankind as a whole is that any taxation resulting from it should be paid directly to the United Nations, or that at least some fraction of the profits should fund this organization.

#### Taxation of massive space profits to the UN solves inequality through redistribution.

**Qureshi 20** [Qureshi, Zia, visiting fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution. He holds a D.Phil. in economics from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. "Tackling the inequality pandemic: Is there a cure?" Brookings, 17 Nov. 2020, www.brookings.edu/research/tackling-the-inequality-pandemic-is-there-a-cure.]

Is rising inequality an inevitable consequence of today’s technology-driven economic transformations—and globalization? The answer is no. Policies have been slow to respond to the challenges of change. With better, more responsive policies, more inclusive economic outcomes are possible.

The first order of business is to contain the pandemic and address its immediate health and economic consequences that disproportionately hurt the less well-off. Countries have responded in varying degrees by taking preventive measures against the pandemic, shoring up health systems, strengthening safety nets, and implementing policies to cushion the impact on jobs and economic activity. The more successful these actions are in protecting the vulnerable and supporting economic recovery, the less will be the direct impact of the crisis in worsening existing inequalities.

Beyond these immediate actions is a longer-term agenda to address the underlying drivers of the secular rise in inequality. Policies to reduce inequality are often seen narrowly in terms of redistribution―tax and transfer policies. This is of course an important element, especially given the erosion of the state’s redistributive role. In particular, systems for taxing income and wealth should be bolstered in light of the new distributional dynamics. But there is a much broader policy agenda of “predistribution” that can make the growth process itself more inclusive.[7]

### Case

#### Reject util –

#### 1] Util can’t explain justice.

Miller 17 [Miller, David, "Justice", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/justice/>.]/ lm

Yet despite these efforts to reconcile justice and utility, three serious obstacles still remain. The first concerns what we might call the currency of justice: justice has to do with the way that tangible benefits and burdens are assigned, and not with the happiness or unhappiness that the assignees experience. It is a matter of justice, for example, that people should be paid the right amount for the jobs that they do, but, special circumstances aside, it is no concern of justice that John derives more satisfaction from his fairly-earned income than Jane does from hers (but see Cohen 1989 for a different view). There is so to speak, a division of labour, under which rights, opportunities, and material benefits of various kinds are allocated by principles of justice, while the conversion of these into units of utility (or disutility) is the responsibility of each individual recipient (see Dworkin 2000, ch. 1). Utilitarians will therefore find it hard to explain what from their point of view seems to be the fetishistic concern of justice over how the means to happiness are distributed, rather than happiness itself.

The second obstacle is that utilitarianism judges outcomes by totalling up utility levels, and has no independent concern for how that utility is distributed between persons. So even if we set aside the currency issue, utilitarian theory seems unable to capture justice’s demand that each should receive what is due to her regardless of the total amount of benefit this generates. Defenders of utilitarianism will argue that when the conduct-guiding rules are being formulated, attention will be paid to distributive questions. In particular, when resources are being distributed among people we know little about individually, there are good reasons to favour equality, since in most cases resources have diminishing marginal utility – the more of them you have, the less satisfaction you derive from additional instalments. Yet this is only a contingent matter. If some people are very adept at turning resources into well-being – they are so-called ‘utility monsters’ – then a utilitarian should support a rule that privileges them. This seems repugnant to justice. As Rawls famously put the general point, ‘each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice which….even the welfare of every one else cannot override’ (Rawls 1971, p. 28; Rawls 1999, pp. 24–25).

The third and final difficulty stems from utilitarianism’s thoroughgoing consequentialism. Rules are assessed strictly in the light of the consequences of adopting then, not in terms of their intrinsic properties. Of course, when agents follow rules, they are meant to do what the rule requires rather than to calculate consequences directly. But for a utilitarian, it is never going to be a good reason for adopting a rule that it will give people what they deserve or what they are entitled to, when desert or entitlement are created by events in the past, such as a person’s having performed a worthwhile action or entered an agreement. Backward-looking reasons have to be transmuted into forward-looking reasons in order to count. If a rule such as pacta sunt servanda (‘agreements must be kept’) is going to be adopted on utilitarian grounds, this is not because there is any inherent wrongness in defaulting on a compact one has made, but because a rule that compacts must be kept is a useful one, since it allows people to co-ordinate their behaviour knowing that their expectations about the future are likely to be met. But justice, although not always backward-looking in the sense explained, often is. What is due to a person is in many cases what they deserve for what they have done, or what they are entitled to by virtue of past transactions. So even if it were possible to construct a forward-looking rationale for having rules that closely tracked desert or entitlement as these are normally understood, the utilitarian still cannot capture the sense of justice – why it matters that people should get what is due to then – that informs our common-sense judgements.

#### 2] Util calc fails – butterfly effect makes consequences unpredictable.

Kidder 95 [Rushworth, Founder of institute of global ethics, professor, “How good people make tough choices,” ] lm

How, critics argue, can you possibly foresee all the consequences of any personal action, let alone of actions on a broad social scale? Humans are notoriously poor speculators, these critics argue, routinely missing the most important consequences and stumbling into unforeseen problems of their own making. Did our ancestors really understand consequences when they imported African slaves into the American colonies with little thought to future racial inharmonies? Did they have a clear sense of end results when they built nuclear reactors with little concern for nuclear waste disposal or put CFCs into aerosol cans with no understanding of the ozone layer? Then how can we possibly be entrusted to determine the “greatest good”? Nor, they object, are humans any good at understanding the “greatest number,” since actions have such unforeseen consequences that they may affect vast numbers of people far beyond those first identified. Finally, critics raise serious practical objections. Taking this theory to its logical extreme, they note

#### 3] Self Ownership is a side constraint – morality presumes that you own yourself and your actions.

#### 4] It implies u should kill your mother if you could distribute her organs to two more sikc ppl.

#### If I win framework you auto-vote neg on our first off.

#### Miscalculation is highly unlikely.

Pavur 19 [Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science at Oxford University and Ivan Martinovic, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.), [https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art\_12\_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf]/](https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf%5d/) lm  
A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the [mean] attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### Turn space debris – companies are uniquely key to solving. Astroscale proves.

Ruehl 19 [Mercedes Ruehl, Financial Times, “Companies vie to develop ways to dispose of space junk,” April 10th 2019, [https://www.ft.com/content/fe4e89a0-5b51-11e9-939a-341f5ada9d40]/](https://www.ft.com/content/fe4e89a0-5b51-11e9-939a-341f5ada9d40%5d/) lm  
A new space race is ready for lift-off: garbage disposal. The danger to satellites and space stations from millions of pieces of orbital wreckage after more than 60 years of space exploration has become a commercial opportunity and one of the best-funded companies in the sector is based in Asia. “Cleaning up space is critical,” said Nobu Okada, the founder and chief executive of Japan-based company Astroscale. “People know about global warming. People know about ocean clean-up. But they don’t know anything about the space debris issue.” Astroscale said it has raised $132m following its most recent investment round this week, which coincides with the opening of its US office. Investors include developer Mitsubishi Estate, venture capitalist SBI Investment and airline group ANA Holdings. Mr Okada said no other company with a mission solely to clean up space debris has raised as much. Astroscale, as well as the RemoveDEBRIS project in the UK and US group Rocket Lab, are pitching the destruction of discarded rocket parts and defunct satellites as a business proposal. “Debris removal is a small but growing market,” said Laura Forczyk, owner of Atlanta-based space consulting firm Astralytical. “Until recently, there wasn’t a financial incentive for companies to take on the task of removing orbital debris. Now we’re seeing this become a viable business case.” At stake is the survival of what will be a $2.7tn market by 2045, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch. The value of the space market — ranging from the manufacture and use of infrastructure to space-enabled applications such as satellite phones and weather services — reached $339bn in 2017, according to the US bank.

# 2NR

### SOP O/V

#### Justice requires Self Ownership to explain how we can justly come to own things – we each naturally own our labor, and by mixing our labor with natural resources, we can come to own them. In doing so, no one is wronged, since no one has rightful claim to truly unowned things.

#### That means you negate, since space is unowned by anyone, and no one has access to it – thus, in the appropriation of outer space by private entities, no one is done an injustice.

#### Reject util –

#### 1] Util can’t explain justice.

Miller 17 [Miller, David, "Justice", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/justice/>.]/ lm

Yet despite these efforts to reconcile justice and utility, three serious obstacles still remain. The first concerns what we might call the currency of justice: justice has to do with the way that tangible benefits and burdens are assigned, and not with the happiness or unhappiness that the assignees experience. It is a matter of justice, for example, that people should be paid the right amount for the jobs that they do, but, special circumstances aside, it is no concern of justice that John derives more satisfaction from his fairly-earned income than Jane does from hers (but see Cohen 1989 for a different view). There is so to speak, a division of labour, under which rights, opportunities, and material benefits of various kinds are allocated by principles of justice, while the conversion of these into units of utility (or disutility) is the responsibility of each individual recipient (see Dworkin 2000, ch. 1). Utilitarians will therefore find it hard to explain what from their point of view seems to be the fetishistic concern of justice over how the means to happiness are distributed, rather than happiness itself.

The second obstacle is that utilitarianism judges outcomes by totalling up utility levels, and has no independent concern for how that utility is distributed between persons. So even if we set aside the currency issue, utilitarian theory seems unable to capture justice’s demand that each should receive what is due to her regardless of the total amount of benefit this generates. Defenders of utilitarianism will argue that when the conduct-guiding rules are being formulated, attention will be paid to distributive questions. In particular, when resources are being distributed among people we know little about individually, there are good reasons to favour equality, since in most cases resources have diminishing marginal utility – the more of them you have, the less satisfaction you derive from additional instalments. Yet this is only a contingent matter. If some people are very adept at turning resources into well-being – they are so-called ‘utility monsters’ – then a utilitarian should support a rule that privileges them. This seems repugnant to justice. As Rawls famously put the general point, ‘each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice which….even the welfare of every one else cannot override’ (Rawls 1971, p. 28; Rawls 1999, pp. 24–25).

The third and final difficulty stems from utilitarianism’s thoroughgoing consequentialism. Rules are assessed strictly in the light of the consequences of adopting then, not in terms of their intrinsic properties. Of course, when agents follow rules, they are meant to do what the rule requires rather than to calculate consequences directly. But for a utilitarian, it is never going to be a good reason for adopting a rule that it will give people what they deserve or what they are entitled to, when desert or entitlement are created by events in the past, such as a person’s having performed a worthwhile action or entered an agreement. Backward-looking reasons have to be transmuted into forward-looking reasons in order to count. If a rule such as pacta sunt servanda (‘agreements must be kept’) is going to be adopted on utilitarian grounds, this is not because there is any inherent wrongness in defaulting on a compact one has made, but because a rule that compacts must be kept is a useful one, since it allows people to co-ordinate their behaviour knowing that their expectations about the future are likely to be met. But justice, although not always backward-looking in the sense explained, often is. What is due to a person is in many cases what they deserve for what they have done, or what they are entitled to by virtue of past transactions. So even if it were possible to construct a forward-looking rationale for having rules that closely tracked desert or entitlement as these are normally understood, the utilitarian still cannot capture the sense of justice – why it matters that people should get what is due to then – that informs our common-sense judgements.

#### 2] Util calc fails – butterfly effect makes consequences unpredictable.

Kidder 95 [Rushworth, Founder of institute of global ethics, professor, “How good people make tough choices,” ] lm

How, critics argue, can you possibly foresee all the consequences of any personal action, let alone of actions on a broad social scale? Humans are notoriously poor speculators, these critics argue, routinely missing the most important consequences and stumbling into unforeseen problems of their own making. Did our ancestors really understand consequences when they imported African slaves into the American colonies with little thought to future racial inharmonies? Did they have a clear sense of end results when they built nuclear reactors with little concern for nuclear waste disposal or put CFCs into aerosol cans with no understanding of the ozone layer? Then how can we possibly be entrusted to determine the “greatest good”? Nor, they object, are humans any good at understanding the “greatest number,” since actions have such unforeseen consequences that they may affect vast numbers of people far beyond those first identified. Finally, critics raise serious practical objections. Taking this theory to its logical extreme, they note

#### 3] Self Ownership is a side constraint – morality presumes that you own yourself and your actions.

#### 4] It implies u should kill your mother if you could distribute her organs to two more sikc ppl.

#### If I win framework you auto-vote neg on our first off.