### SOP

#### First, the value must be justice, defined as giving each their due, as per the word ‘unjust’ in the resolution.

#### That’s distinct from ethics – what’s just is what arises out of just history of transfers.

Nozick 74 [Robert Nozick, Renowned American Philosopher, “Anarchy, State and Utopia,” Part II, Section I, ]/ lm

If the hypothetical just history involves each person's consenting to the institutional structure and to any limitations on his rights (specified by the moral side constraints on the behavior of others) it embodies, then if some actual person would not consent, one must view the institutional structure as unjust (unless it counts as just via some other hypothetical history). Similarly, one must hold the institutional structure unjust if the hypothetical just history involves some people's consenting who didn't, and some now would not assent to those others having done so. If the institutional structure could arise by some hypothetical just history which does not involve anyone's consent to that structure, then one's evaluation of the structure will depend upon one's evaluation of the process which would give rise to it. If that process is viewed as better (along dimensions other than justice where, by hypothesis, it excels) than the actual history, this probably will improve one's evaluation of the structure. That a just process would have led to the institutional structure, but only if manned by despicable individuals, will not enhance one's evaluation of that institutional structure.

The entitlement principles of justice in holdings that we have sketched are historical principles of justice. To better understand their precise character, we shall distinguish them from another subclass of the historical principles. Consider, as an example, the principle of distribution according to moral merit. This principle requires that total distributive shares vary directly with moral merit; no person should have a greater share than anyone whose moral merit is greater. (If moral merit could be not merely ordered but measured on an interval or ratio scale, stronger principles could be formulated.) Or consider the principle that results by substituting “usefulness to society” for “moral merit” in the previous principle. Or instead of “distribute according to moral merit,” or “distribute according to usefulness to society,” we might consider “distribute according to the weighted sum of moral merit, usefulness to society, and need,” with the weights of the different dimensions equal. Let us call a principle of distribution patterned if it specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions. And let us say a distribution is patterned if it accords with some patterned principle. (I speak of natural dimensions, admittedly without a general criterion for them, because for any set of holdings some artificial dimensions can be gimmicked up to vary along with the distribution of the set.) The principle of distribution in accordance with moral merit is a patterned historical principle, which specifies a patterned distribution. “Distribute according to I.Q.” is a patterned principle that looks to information not contained in distributional matrices. It is not historical, however, in that it does not look to any past actions creating differential entitlements to evaluate a distribution; it requires only distributional matrices whose columns are labeled by I.Q. scores. The distribution in a society, however, may be composed of such simple patterned distributions, without itself being simply patterned. Different sectors may operate different patterns, or some combination of patterns may operate in different proportions across a society. A distribution composed in this manner, from a small number of patterned distributions, we also shall term “patterned.” And we extend the use of “pattern” to include the overall designs put forth by combinations of end-state principles.

Whether or not Locke’s particular theory of appropriation can be spelled out so as to handle various difficulties, I assume that any adequate theory of justice in acquisition will contain a proviso similar to the weaker of the ones we have attributed to Locke. A process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened. It is important to specify this particular mode of worsening the situation of others, for the proviso does not encompass other modes. It does not include the worsening due to more limited opportunities to appropriate (the first way above, corresponding to the more stringent condition), and it does not include how I “worsen” a seller’s position if I appropriate materials to make some of what he is selling, and then enter into competition with him. Someone whose appropriation otherwise would violate the proviso still may appropriate provided he compensates the others so that their situation is not thereby worsened; unless he does compensate these others, his appropriation will violate the proviso of the principle of justice in acquisition and will be an illegitimate one.\* A theory of appropriation incorporating this Lockean proviso will handle correctly the cases (objections to the theory lacking the proviso) where someone appropriates the total supply of something necessary for life.\*

#### The standard is consistency with the Self Ownership Proviso.

Feser 05 [Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California, Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation, “There is no such thing as unjust initial acquisition,” Section II]/ lm

If what I have argued so far is correct, then the way is opened to the following revised case for strongly libertarian Lockean-Nozickian prop erty rights: We are self-owners, having full property rights to our body parts, powers, talents, energies, etc. As self-owners, we also have a right, given the SOP, not to have our self-owned powers nullified—we have the right, that is, to act within the extra-personal world and thus to acquire rights to extra-personal objects that the use of our self-owned powers requires.39 This might involve the buying or leasing of certain rights or bundles of rights and, correspondingly, the acquiring of lesser or greater degrees of ownership of parts of the external world, but as long as one is able to exercise one’s powers to some degree and is not rendered incapable of acting within that world, the SOP is satisfied. In any case, such rights can only be traded after they are first established by initial acquisition. In initially acquiring a resource, an agent does no one an injustice (it was unowned, after all). Furthermore, he has mixed his [their] labor with the resource, significantly altering it and/or bringing it under his control, and is himself solely responsible for whatever [the] value or utility the resource has come to have. Thus, he has a presumptive right to it, and, if his control and/or alteration (and thus acquisition) of it is (more or less) complete, his ownership is accordingly (more or less) full. The system of strong private property rights that follows from the acts of initial acquisition performed by countless such agents results, as a matter of empirical fact, in a market economy that inevitably and dramatically increases the number of resources available for use by individuals, and these benefited individuals include those who come along long after initial acquisition has taken place. (Indeed, it especially includes these latecomers, given that they were able to avoid the hard work of being the first to “tame the land” and draw out the value of raw materials.)40 The SOP is thus, in fact, rarely, if ever, violated. The upshot is that a system of Lockean-Nozickian private property rights is morally justified, with a strong presumption against tampering with existing property titles in general. In any case, there is a strong presumption against any general egalitarian redistribution of wealth, and no case whatsoever to be made for such redistribution from the general theory of property just sketched, purged as it is of the Lockean proviso, with all the egalitarian mischief-making the proviso has made possible.

This outcome has the virtue of restoring to Nozick’s system the theoretical simplicity and elegance that his (rather unsystematically articulated) commitment to the Lockean proviso threatened to distort. At the same time, replacement of the Lockean proviso with the self-ownership proviso allows us to sidestep the (arguably) counterintuitive consequences of rejecting the former. Still, since there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition, very strong property rights to unowned external objects come to be quite easy to obtain; and they, together with the thesis of self-ownership, give us Nozick’s principle of justice in transfer, with all its highly anti-egalitarian and anti-redistributionist consequences. The picture that results is very much a libertarianism with foundations.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1] Self Ownership is a pre-req to debate itself.

Kinsella 11 [Stephan Kinsella, Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston, director of the Center for the Study of Innovative Freedom, and editor of Libertarian Papers., Mises Institute, "Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide," 05/23/11, https://mises.org/library/argumentation-ethics-and-liberty-concise-guide]

In essence, Hoppe's view is that argumentation, or discourse, is by its nature a conflict-free way of interacting, which requires individual control of scarce resources. In genuine discourse, the parties try to persuade each other by the force of their argument, not by actual force: Argumentation is a conflict-free way of interacting. Not in the sense that there is always agreement on the things said, but in the sense that as long as argumentation is in progress it is always possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement about the validity of what has been said. And this is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his [their] own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation (note again, that it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth). ([TSC](http://mises.org/resources/431/A-Theory-of-Socialism-and-Capitalism), p. 158) Thus, self-ownership is presupposed by argumentation. Hoppe then shows that argumentation also presupposes the right to own homesteaded scarce resources as well. The basic idea here is that the body is "the prototype of a scarce good for the use of which property rights, i.e., rights of exclusive ownership, somehow have to be established, in order to avoid clashes" ([TSC](http://mises.org/resources/431/A-Theory-of-Socialism-and-Capitalism), p. 19). As Hoppe explains, “The compatibility of this principle with that of nonaggression can be demonstrated by means of an argumentum a contrario. First, it should be noted that if no one had the right to acquire and control anything except his own body … then we would all cease to exist and the problem of the justification of normative statements … simply would not exist. The existence of this problem is only possible because we are alive, and our existence is due to the fact that we do not, indeed cannot, accept a norm outlawing property in other scarce goods next and in addition to that of one's physical body. Hence, the right to acquire such goods must be assumed to exist.

#### 2] Justice is intrinsic to institutions, not based off consequences – it’s not just to punish a wrongly accused person just because it will deter others.

#### Now negate –

#### Appropriation in initial acquisition of space is never unjust.

Feser 05 [Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California, Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation, “There is no such thing as unjust initial acquisition,” Section II]/ lm

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition.

Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intuitions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acquisition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our understanding of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification.

The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A [them to] commits an injustice in acquiring R, it [there] would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisition of R, B [they] would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after someone has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

### Sec K

#### Their narrative of an unstable world on the brink of war justifies endless securitization by fragmenting the problems of the state onto private entities and posing state intervention as the only solution.

Chernus 1 — Ira Chernus is a Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder.   
2001. [“Fighting Terror in The National Insecurity State,” http://spot.colorado.edu/~chernus/WaronTerrorismEssays/FightingTerror.html]

Just as the outcome of World War I sowed the seeds of World War II, and the outcome of World War II the seeds of the cold war, so the outcome of the cold war sowed the seeds of the war on terrorism. And this newest war is already, quite visibly, sowing the seeds of insecurity to come. It may be most useful to view the whole period from the early cold war years through the present war as a single historical era: the era of the national insecurity state. Throughout that era, U.S. policy decisions made in the name of national security consistently breed a greater sense of vulnerability, frustration, and insecurity.

It is not hard to see why. Four decades of cold war enshrined two fundamental principles at the heart of our public life: there is a mortal threat to the very existence of our nation, and our own policies play no role in generating the threat. The belief structure of the national insecurity state flows logically from these premises. If our nation bears no responsibility, then we are powerless to eradicate the threat. If others threaten us through no fault of our own, what can we do? There is no hope for a truly better world, nor for ending the danger by mutual compromise with "the other side." The threat is effectively eternal. The best to hope for is to hold the threat forever at bay.

Yet the sense of powerlessness is oddly satisfying, because it preserves the conviction of innocence: if our policies are so ineffectual, the troubles of the world can hardly be our fault. And the vision of an endless status quo is equally satisfying, because it promises to prevent historical change. If peril is permanent, the world is an endless reservoir of potential enemies. Any fundamental change in the status quo portends only catastrophe.

The only path to security, it seems, is to prevent change by imposing control over others. When those others fight back, the national insecurity state protests its innocence: we act only in self-defense; we want only stability. The state sees no reason to re-evaluate its policies; that would risk the change it seeks, above all, to avoid. So it can only meet violence with more violence. Of course, the inevitable frustration is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the demand for absolute control through violence.

The goal of total control is self-defeating; each step toward security becomes a source of, and is taken as proof of, continuing insecurity. This makes the logic of the insecurity state viciously circular. Why are we always fighting? Because we always have enemies. How do we know we always have enemies? Because we are always fighting. And knowing that we have enemies, how can we afford to stop fighting? In the insecurity state, there is no way to talk about security without voicing fears of insecurity, no way to express optimism without expressing despair. On every front, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy; a self-confirming and self-perpetuating spiral of violence; a trap that seems to offer no way out.

But that is just what most Americans expect, in any event. Caged inside the logic of the insecurity state, they can see no other possibility. So the official story hardly seems to be one option among many. Its premises and conclusions seem so necessary, so inevitable, that no other story can be imagined. For huge numbers of Americans, the peace movement’s alternative story is not mistaken. It is simply incomprehensible, like a foreign language, for it assumes that we can take steps to address the very sources of insecurity. That denies the most basic foundations of the prevailing public discourse. Quite naturally, then, the majority embraces the only story it can understand. The story is persuasive because the alternative seems to be having no story at all.

For years to come, we shall live in the shadow of the tragic deaths of September 11, 2001. As long as the official story prevails, death will be piled upon death, and suffering upon suffering. The national insecurity state affords no prospect beyond death and suffering. So this war pushes us further into the shadow of the most tragic death of all: the death of hope for a better, a more peaceful, a genuinely secure future.

#### Next, their obsession with nuclear apocalypse is groundless and justifies endless preemptive wars.

**Mueller 18** [John Mueller, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at Ohio State University, “Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2018, Vol 97 No 6, accessed 12.21.18]

The unleashed power of the atom,” Albert Einstein wrote in 1946, “has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” Winston Churchill noted in 1955, however, that nuclear deterrence might produce stability instead and predicted that “safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.” Einstein’s view became the touchstone of the modern peace movement. Churchill’s view evolved into mainstream Western nuclear strategy and doctrine. Both argued that the nuclear revolution had fundamentally transformed international politics. Both were wrong. Since the 1940s, nuclear weapons have greatly affected defense budgets, political and military posturing, and academic theory. Beyond that, however, their practical significance has been vastly exaggerated by both critics and supporters. Nuclear weapons were not necessary to deter a third world war. They have proved useless militarily; in fact, their primary use has been to stoke the national ego or to posture against real or imagined threats. Few states have or want them, and they seem to be out of reach for terrorists. Their impact on international affairs has been minor compared with the sums and words expended on them. The costs resulting from the nuclear weapons obsession have been huge. To hold its own in a snarling contest with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the United States spent $5–$10 trillion maintaining a vast nuclear arsenal— resources that could have been used more productively on almost anything else. To head off the imagined dangers that would result from nuclear proliferation, Washington and its allies have imposed devastating economic sanctions on countries such as Iraq and North Korea, and even launched a war of aggression— sorry, “preemption”—that killed more people than did the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The time has long since come to acknowledge that the thinkers of the early nuclear age were mistaken in believing that the world had been made anew. In retrospect, they overestimated the importance of the nuclear revolution and the delicacy of the balance of terror. This spurred generations of officials to worry more about nuclear matters than they should have and to distort foreign and security policies in unfortunate ways. Today’s policymakers don’t have to repeat the same mistakes, and everybody would be better off if they didn’t.

#### The impact is never-ending war – outweighs and turns case b/c securitization is the root cause of warfare.

Ritchie 11—Nick, PhD, Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies @ University of Bradford, Executive Committee of the British Pugwash Group and the Board of the Nuclear Information Service [“Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review” International Affairs Volume 87, Issue 2, Article first published online: 17 MAR 2011]

Third, the legitimating narrative of acting as a ‘force for good’ that emerged in the 1998 SDR to justify an expensive, expeditionary, war-fighting military doctrine in the name of ‘enlightened self-interest’ must be scrutinized. But the relationship between the rhetoric and the reality is highly questionable. From a critical perspective it can be argued that successive governments have framed interventionist policy choices as positive, progressive and ‘good’ to generate support for ‘risk transfer’ military operations of choice that are presented as essential to the security of UK citizens but in fact [that] reproduce a state-centric construction of a particular ‘national role’. This reflects Hirshberg’s contention that ‘the maintenance of a positive national self-image is crucial to continued public acquiescence and support for government, and thus to the smooth, on-going functioning of the state’. 86 The notion that Afghanistan is a ‘noble cause’ for the British state reflects a state-centric concern with ideas of status and prestige and the legitimating moral gloss of the ‘force for good’ rhetoric. 87 Furthermore, the rhetoric of ‘enlightened self-interest’ implies that the exercise of UK military force as a ‘force for good’ will lessen security risks to the British state and citizenry by resolving current security threats and pre-empting future risks. But, returning again to Iraq and Afghanistan, we must ask whether sacrificing solders’ lives, killing over 100,000 Iraqi civilians including a disproportionate number of women and children, destroying the immediate human security of several million others through injury, displacement, persecution and trauma, and sparking long-term trends of rising crime rates, property destruction, economic disruption, and deterioration of health-care resources and food production and distribution capabilities, all while providing profits for largely western corporations through arms deals, service contracts and private military contractors, constitutes being a ‘force for good’ when the outcomes of these major military interventions have proven at best indeterminate. 88 The legitimacy of this question is reinforced by Curtis’s analysis of the deadly impact of British foreign policy since the 1950s. Curtis argues that ‘the history of British foreign policy is partly one of complicity in some of the world’s worst horrors … contrary to the extraordinary rhetoric of New Labour leaders and other elites, policies are continuing on this traditional course, systematically making the world more abusive of human rights as well as more unequal and less secure’. 89 Add to this the statistic that the UK was involved in more wars between 1946 and 2003 (21 in total) than any other state, and the ‘force for good’ rationale begins to unravel. 90 Furthermore, the militarized ‘force for good’ narrative encompasses the active defence of the ‘rules-based system’ as a global good. But it is clear that the current ‘rules-based system’ of western-dominated multilateral institutions and processes of global governance does not work for billions of people or for planetary ecological systems. The Human Development Reports produced by the United Nations Development Programme routinely highlight the global political and economic structures and systems that keep hundreds of millions of people poor, starving, jobless, diseased and repressed. 91 A stable ‘rules-based system’ is no doubt in the interests of UK citizens and the interests of global human society. With stability comes predictability, which can minimize uncertainty, risk and insecurity. But there is a growing consensus that long-term stability, particularly the reduction of violent conflict, will require far greater political, economic and environmental equity on a global scale, as advocated in the Department for International Development’s 2009 white paper on Eliminating world poverty. 92 An interventionist, military-oriented, state-centric, global risk management doctrine and the risks it can generate are unlikely to stabilize and transform the rules-based system into a more equitable form. A growing literature now argues that prevailing western approaches to understanding, managing and ameliorating global insecurity and its violent symptoms are inadequate and unsustainable. They are proving, and will continue to prove, increasingly incapable of providing security for both the world’s poor and immiserated, concentrated in the Global South, and the world’s elite of around one billion, mainly located in the North Atlantic community, Australasia and parts of East Asia, which will remain unable to insulate itself from violent responses to pervasive insecurity. 93 This is not to suggest that the UK should not exercise elements of national power to alleviate others’ suffering as a consequence of natural or man-made disasters. Indeed, the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 2001 ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine sets out clearly the principle of conditional sovereignty and the grounds for legitimate intervention when a state cannot or will not protect its citizens from pervasive and severe harm. 94 More broadly, if we accept that in an increasingly complex, interdependent world the human security of UK citizens enmeshed in global networks of risk and opportunity is intertwined with the human security of others, particularly in conflict-prone regions often characterized by poverty, weak governance and underdevelopment, then actions to improve others’ long-term human security does constitute a form of ‘enlightened self-interest’. But we must question the assumption that war-fighting interventionist missions of choice do, in fact, serve the long-term human security interests of UK citizens as opposed to the interests of the state based on prevailing conceptions of national role. Utility of force Connected to this critique is a reappraisal of the utility of force within the conception of national security as global risk management, on two counts. First, security risks are increasingly likely to arise from a complex mixture of interdependent factors. Environmental, economic, military and political sources of insecurity could include the effects of climate change, mass poverty and economic injustice, global pandemic disease, mass migration and refugee flows, poor governance, weak and failing states, international terrorism and asymmetric warfare, the spread of WMD and advanced conventional military technologies, ethnic and sectarian nationalism, and competition over access to key resources such as oil and water. Future conflicts are therefore likely to be complex and diverse. They are unlikely to be susceptible to purely military solutions, and the use of military force in regional crises will be messy, indeterminate and of limited value and effectiveness. 95 It is not obvious that the armed forces have a significant war-fighting role to play in mitigating these risks, as opposed to supporting police, intelligence and security forces in countering terrorist plots—and possibly launching a limited, precision strike against WMD capabilities in the event of the extreme scenario of robust intelligence that a WMD attack is imminent. In fact, the 2009 National Security Strategy limited the role of the armed forces to ‘defence against direct threats to the UK and its overseas territories’ (which one could qualify as ‘direct violent, or military, threats’) together with a contributory role in ‘tackling threats to our security overseas by helping to address conflict, instability and crises across the globe’. 96 This broad but essentially supportive remit for the military was reinforced in the 2010 National Security Strategy’s catalogue of priority risks. The three-tiered list enumerated 15 risks, which can be reduced to five: terrorism, civil emergencies, international crime, trade disputes and an attack by another state. 97 The role of military force is limited in all of these except the last, which remains by far the least likely. As Jenkins argues, almost none of the above is a threat. They are crimes, catastrophes, or, in the case of being ‘drawn in’ to a foreign conflict, a matter of political choice … as for the threat of conventional attack on the British Isles by another state, we can only ask who? The threat is so negligible as to be insignificant. It is like insuring one’s house for billions of pounds against an asteroid attack. 98 Bob Ainsworth, then Defence Secretary, seemed to grasp this in 2009, arguing that ‘our initial conclusions on the character of warfare should be first that international intervention will be more difficult not less. We will have to consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit of national security. And second, and related to this, that the timely application of soft power and methods of conflict prevention will be a high priority.’ 99 Yet the government also insists on maintaining an interventionist, expeditionary military doctrine and corresponding capabilities based on a seemingly unquestioned national security role as a ‘force for good’ in global risk management operations. Second, risk management through military intervention in a complex international security environment characterized by asymmetric cultures, actors and distributions of power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels, can generate significant negative feedback, or ‘blowback’, from unintended outcomes that create more risk. This challenges notions of effective risk management and control through linear change via the exercise of military power. 100 In fact, as Williams argues, the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky: in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from the effects of a decision ‘inevitably leads to a loss of control’. 101 The danger is that military-based risk management becomes a cyclical process with no end in sight. 102 Rogers, for example, presciently envisaged a post-9/11 ‘never-ending war’ of military-led risk mitigation generating new and potentially more dangerous risks deemed susceptible to further military solutions, and so on. 103 This risk is not limited to distant theatres of conflict, but also applies to the very ‘way of life’ the current militarized risk management doctrine is meant to protect, through the erosion of civil liberties and the securitization of daily life. There is a powerful argument that the exercise of UK military force for optional expeditionary war-fighting operations will be an increasingly dangerous, expensive and ethically dubious doctrine that could generate more, and potentially more lethal, risks than it resolves or contains. Since absolute security cannot be achieved, the value of any potential, discretionary increment in UK security through the exercise of military force must take into account its political, economic and human cost. As Wolfers argues, ‘at a certain point, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it’, and the exercise of military force becomes ineffective or, worse, wholly counterproductive. 104 After following George W. Bush on a risky adventure into Iraq, the UK must question the effectiveness of a militarized ‘risk transfer’ strategy as the foundation for managing globalized security risks in relation to the long-term human security needs of British citizens.

#### The alternative is to reject securitization in order to form an alternative political language in debate.

Neocleous 08 — Mark Neocleous, Professor of Political Economy at Brunel University,   
2008, “Critique of Security”, McGill-Queen’s University, pp. 184-186, Published 2008

CLOSING GAMBIT: RETURN THE GIFT

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to [reject] eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.

This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The con - stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.

Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re - affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.

#### They can’t weigh case –

#### 1] Fiat illusory

#### 2] Scholarship first

### ‘Mankind’ K

#### The gendered language of ‘mankind’ excludes other genders and causes real world violence – that’s a reason to vote them down.

Herzer 21 [Linda Herzer, Cofounder of Transformation Journeys Worldwide, Transformation Journeys Worldwide, “4 Reasons Why Gender-Neutral Language Matters,” January 15 2021, <https://transformationjourneysww.com/4-reasons-why-gender-neutral-language-matters/#:~:text=The%20purpose%20of%20gender%2Dneutral,social%20gender%20is%20the%20norm.&text=Simply%20stated%3A%20because%20language%20matters.]/> lm

When I was in seminary, back in the ‘80s, there was a big push towards using gender inclusive language. That was the time when people recognized that the word “man” did not feel inclusive to women, nor did it acknowledge and affirm  our newly emerging lived experiences. A cultural shift occurred in language as we moved from naming things in exclusively male terms. Mailmen became mail carriers, stewardesses became flight attendants, clergy men became the clergy, chairmen became chair persons and mankind became humanity.

As a young, female seminarian, I was on the frontlines of this battle for gender inclusive language. Those of us engaged in the struggle recognized that language both reflects and shapes how we experience the world. As the European Parliament’s statement pointed out, the shift to gender inclusive language actually did promote social change and it did contribute to achieving greater gender equality… 40 years ago.

Today there is a rapidly growing, global recognition that gender is no longer simply binary; that there are more than just two genders, more than just male and female. Non-binary persons also exist, along with gender fluid individuals and people who identify as bi-gender or agender. (For definitions, see the glossaries linked off our website’s [Resources](https://transformationjourneysww.com/resources/) Page.) Likewise, intersex people are making the world aware that even sex is not binary, that some people have bodies that fall outside of a strictly female or male classification.

Evidence of this growing awareness is demonstrated by the [19 US States](https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/identity_document_laws), and the District of Columbia, which, along with the expected M or F, now offer their residents an “X” gender marker option on their driver’s licenses. Globally, there are [numerous countries](https://www.enei.org.uk/resources/news/gender-x-passports/) which allow citizens a third gender option on their passports as well.

In the same way that gender inclusive language began being used in the ‘80s to foster equity for women [and], gender-neutral language is now emerging to promote equality for gender diverse people.

From the European Parliament and the US House of Representatives to the [National Council of Teachers of English](https://ncte.org/statement/genderfairuseoflang/), organizations throughout the world are introducing Gender-Neutral Language Guidelines as part of their [best practices for creating inclusive cultures](https://transformationjourneysww.com/training/#business_case). In recognition of the gender diversity of its employees and customers, [Air Canada](https://www.aviation24.be/airlines/air-canada/replaces-gendered-terms-in-scripted-greetings-with-gender-neutral-words/) has changed its scripted greetings. Now, instead of welcoming “ladies and gentlemen—mesdames et messieurs” flight attendants welcome “everyone—tout le monde.” Just last year [Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2020/07/08/how-to-use-gender-neutral-language-and-why-its-important-to-try/?sh=42caba1226ba) ran an article on “How to Use Gender-Neutral Language, and Why It’s Important to Try.” Three years ago [Teen Vogue](https://www.teenvogue.com/story/how-to-use-gender-neutral-words) was already instructing its young readers on “How to Use Gender-Neutral Words: And Why They’re Important.” Which brings us to our fourth reason.

#### Our language comes first since it carries outside the round and shapes the real world.

**Sani 13** [Shehu Sani – Nigerian senator, an author, playwright and a human rights activist. He is President of the Civil Rights Congress of Nigeria - (CRCN). and the Chairman of Hand-in-Hand, Africa. He was a leading figure in the struggle for the restoration of democracy in Nigeria] “Hatred for Black People” November 2013.]

The important point here is that language plays a role in the state's definition and policing of "the epistemological limits of what society can be." Language is not simply a cultural epiphenomenon of more fundamental economic processes. It functions as a "measure of population" setting both the outer limits of society—that is, the question of who legitimately belongs to the national community—and its inner limits or demarcations. The reality is that language is a strong force in society that segregates groups according to specific cultures, sexes, races, classes, etc. The underlying issue that allows language to build up such barriers is the subconscious fight to possess the English language. Language segregates members of society, either forcing them out or accepting them into the larger, accepted group. Languages force people out of the majority, while at the same time segregating them into smaller and smaller groups within their minority.

#### They can’t weigh case –

#### 1] Fiat Illusory and

#### 2] Scholarship first

### Mining DA

#### The private sector is set to start asteroid mining through innovation and investment happening now.

Gilbert 21 [Alex Gilbert is a complex systems researcher and a PhD student in space resources at the Colorado School of Mines. "Mining in Space Is Coming." Milken Institute Review, April 26, 2021, [www.milkenreview.org/articles/mining-in-space-is-coming](http://www.milkenreview.org/articles/mining-in-space-is-coming)]

Space exploration is back. after decades of disappointment, a combination of better technology, falling costs and a rush of competitive energy from the private sector has put space travel front and center. indeed, many analysts (even some with their feet on the ground) believe that commercial developments in the space industry may be on the cusp of starting the largest resource rush in history: mining on the Moon, Mars and asteroids.

While this may sound fantastical, some baby steps toward the goal have already been taken. Last year, NASA awarded contracts to four companies to extract small amounts of lunar regolith by 2024, effectively beginning the era of commercial space mining. Whether this proves to be the dawn of a gigantic adjunct to mining on earth — and more immediately, a key to unlocking cost-effective space travel — will turn on the answers to a host of questions ranging from what resources can be efficiently.

As every fan of science fiction knows, the resources of the solar system appear virtually unlimited compared to those on Earth. There are whole other planets, dozens of moons, thousands of massive asteroids and millions of small ones that doubtless contain humungous quantities of materials that are scarce and very valuable (back on Earth). Visionaries including Jeff Bezos imagine heavy industry moving to space and Earth becoming a residential area. However, as entrepreneurs look to harness the riches beyond the atmosphere, access to space resources remains tangled in the realities of economics and governance.

Start with the fact that space belongs to no country, complicating traditional methods of resource allocation, property rights and trade. With limited demand for materials in space itself and the need for huge amounts of energy to return materials to Earth, creating a viable industry will turn on major advances in technology, finance and business models.`

That said, there’s no grass growing under potential pioneers’ feet. Potential economic, scientific and even security benefits underlie an emerging geopolitical competition to pursue space mining. The United States is rapidly emerging as a front-runner, in part due to its ambitious Artemis Program to lead a multinational consortium back to the Moon. But it is also a leader in creating a legal infrastructure for mineral exploitation. The United States has adopted the world’s first spaceresources law, recognizing the property rights of private companies and individuals to materials gathered in space.

However, the United States is hardly alone. Luxembourg and the United Arab Emirates (you read those right) are racing to codify space-resources laws of their own, hoping to attract investment to their entrepot nations with business-friendly legal frameworks. China reportedly views space-resource development as a national priority, part of a strategy to challenge U.S. economic and security primacy in space. Meanwhile, Russia, Japan, India and the European Space Agency all harbor space-mining ambitions of their own. Governing these emerging interests is an outdated treaty framework from the Cold War. Sooner rather than later, we’ll need new agreements to facilitate private investment and ensure international cooperation.

What’s Out There

Back up for a moment. For the record, space is already being heavily exploited, because space resources include non-material assets such as orbital locations and abundant sunlight that enable satellites to provide services to Earth. Indeed, satellite-based telecommunications and global positioning systems have become indispensable infrastructure underpinning the modern economy. Mining space for materials, of course, is another matter.

In the past several decades, planetary science has confirmed what has long been suspected: celestial bodies are potential sources for dozens of natural materials that, in the right time and place, are incredibly valuable. Of these, water may be the most attractive in the near-term, because — with assistance from solar energy or nuclear fission — H2O can be split into hydrogen and oxygen to make rocket propellant, facilitating in-space refueling. So-called “rare earth” metals are also potential targets of asteroid miners [are] intending to service Earth markets. Consisting of 17 elements, including lanthanum, neodymium, and yttrium, these critical materials (most of which are today mined in China at great environmental cost) are required for electronics. And they loom as bottlenecks in making the transition from fossil fuels to renewables backed up by battery storage.

#### Asteroid mining boosts the economy, solves resource scarcity, lowers costs of space exploration, and solves climate change.

Mallick 19 [Senjuti Mallick graduated from ILS Law College, Pune, in 2016. She was a Law Researcher at the High Court of Delhi from 2016 to 2018 and is currently pursuing LL.M in International Law at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, USA. She has been doing research on Outer Space Law since she was a student at ILS. Presently, she is working on different aspects of Space Law, in particular, Space debris mitigation and removal, and the law of the commons. She has published articles on Space Law in the All India Reporter Law Journal and The Hindu, Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.  Dr Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019).  She was also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020.  As a senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues, Observer Research Foundation, “If space is ‘the province of mankind’, who owns its resources?” January 24th 2019, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn8]/> lm

Indeed, the economic imperative for space mining is evident and analysts predict that these extraction activities could translate to a multibillion-dollar industry. NASA estimates, for example, that the [value of asteroids](https://metro.co.uk/2018/06/11/new-asteroid-gold-rush-earn-everyone-earth-75-billion-7622439/)out there could be in the vicinity of US$700 quintillion – that amount is roughly equivalent to US$95 billion for each of us here on Earth.[[iv]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn4)  Another major attraction for the prospective extraterrestrial mining companies is the availability of precious minerals in abundance on the Moon, on Mars and the asteroids (among them—lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, zinc, niobium, molybdenum, lanthanum, europium, tungsten, and gold).[[v]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn5) After all, these metals and mineral resources have grown scarce on Earth, and both governments and commercial actors are pushing to look to celestial bodies for resources.[[vi]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn6)

Technological innovation—primarily brought about by commercial players such as Elon Musk[[2]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_ftn2) and Jeff Bezos[[3]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_ftn3)—is changing the landscape of space exploration. Leading the way in this new-era race are the startups including Planetary Resources, Deep Space Industries, Ispace, and Kleos Space.[[vii]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn7) Research into the feasibility of human and robotic missions to asteroids is being conducted by both governmental organisations, like NASA and JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency), as well as private companies such as Planetary Resources.[[viii]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn8) However, for realising affordable space travel and space industrialisation, it is essential to find extraterrestrial materials such as metals, minerals and water that do not have to be transported from Earth. Thus, the first objective in carrying out asteroid mining activity is to obtain elements that are critical for basic sustenance on Earth. It has been identified that the asteroid belt in our solar system contains eight-percent metal-rich (M type) asteroids and 75-percent volatile-rich carbonaceous (C type) asteroids.[[ix]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn9)

The second incentive for celestial mining companies is to haul precious minerals and cargo raw materials to Earth to fuel its fast depleting resources. This would significantly increase the mining company’s valuation and greatly impact the global economy. According to a 2012 Reuters interview with Planetary Resources, a 30-meter-long (98-foot) asteroid can hold platinum worth somewhere from US$25 billion to US$50 billion.[[x]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn10)  These metals are highly useful and valuable, both on Earth and in space.[[xi]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn11)

Third, asteroids give humans the potential to create tools in space, since iron, nickel and cobalt are in abundance.[[xii]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn12) Chris Lewicki, Planetary Resources CEO, has said, “Using 3D printing technology one can grab material off asteroids and 3D print something that never has to be on a rocket. Tools, machines and even habitats can then be built off Earth, reducing the cost of exploration even further.[[xiii]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn13) Fourth, resource extraction is also becoming a focus for many Middle Eastern nations.[[xiv]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn14) The Middle Eastern oil States, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are investing heavily in this industry as they are looking at space as a way to diversify out of the earthly benefits of fossil fuel.[[xv]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn15) Fifth, countries such as India and China are looking to mine the Moon for extracting Helium-3, which is considered a clean and efficient form of energy. It is thought that th[at]is isotope could provide safer nuclear energy in a fusion reactor, since it is not radioactive and would not produce dangerous waste products.[[xvi]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn16)

Finally, the water available in outer space could be used to make rocket propellants. According to scientists, since water is abundant in outer space, in some or the other form, it could be extracted and electrolysed to derive hydrogen and oxygen, the key ingredients of rocket fuel.[[xvii]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn17) Thus, instead of carrying one’s own fuel all the way, asteroids could serve as extraterrestrial/orbital “gas stations” for fuelling future deep space missions. This would simultaneously make space travel more cost-effective and productive. Such ventures are also seen to be intrinsic to further science and discovery, in addition to revolutionising commercial development in outer space. The mining of asteroids could also provide a near-infinite [supply of the precious resources for Earth to use.](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/9222766/Planetary-Resources-unveils-cosmic-plan-to-boldly-go-and-mine-asteroids-for-gold-and-platinum.html)[[xviii]](https://www.orfonline.org/research/if-space-is-the-province-of-mankind-who-owns-its-resources-47561/#_edn18)

#### That’s key to offsetting emissions from terrestrial mining and maintaining the tech advancements necessary to transitioning off fossil fuels and stopping species extinction.

**Bell 19** [Aidan Bell is the co-founder of EnviroBuild, a sustainable building materials company based in London. PhD from Manchester in Inorganic Chemistry. "The Conflict of Tech Innovation and Sustainability." TechNative, 22 Jan. 2019, technative.io/the-conflict-of-tech-innovation-and-sustainability]

The current technological dilemmas that we face today are similar to those of ancient time.  Overuse of a resource for immediate human benefit risks longer-term negative influence.  A report conducted by Greenpeace found that Internet data centres have incredibly large carbon footprints, accounting for 3% of global electricity use, much of it in locations that offer cheap, but dirty, electricity. Likewise, the minerals that are found in electronic devices like mobile phones, such as tantalum and gold, often originate from unregulated mining that releases harmful substances into the surrounding soil, air and water. Mining also contributes hugely to deforestation, which is responsible for 15% of global greenhouse gas emissions.

The negative impacts of technological innovation are increasing and action needs to be taken soon to resolve this crisis for the sake of future generations. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report last month warned that we have just 12 years to reduce the rate of global warming before widespread flooding and droughts become unavoidable. The demand for minerals and energy brought about by technological advancements shows no sign of slowing down, painting a worrying picture for the future of the planet.

Faced with the consequences of our intelligence, humanity now has to use its incredible versatility to overcome the challenges it has created for itself. For example, wind and solar power are increasingly becoming economically-viable sources of unlimited, free electricity and provide us with the opportunity to reduce our dependence on harmful fossil fuels. Bioengineering should help us protect surface soils and the ecosystems that depend on them by maintaining healthy levels of nutrients and soil salinity. Technological advancements will even help us prevent species extinction events that would otherwise destroy our Earth altogether, with NASA already developing spacecraft to push approaching asteroids out of our orbit.

#### That causes extinction.

Strona 18 Giovanni, Flinders University, Bradshaw, Corey J. A., Scientific Reports, Science Daily, “Climate Change risks ‘extinction domino effect,’” https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/11/181129122506.htm

New research reveals the extinction of plant or animal species from extreme environmental change increases the risk of an [leads to] 'extinction domino effect' that could annihilate all life on Earth. This would be the worst-case scenario of what scientists call 'co-extinctions', where an organism dies out because it depends on another doomed species, with the findings published today in the journal Scientific Reports. Think of a plant's flower pollinated by only one species of bee -- if the bee becomes extinct, so too will the plant eventually. "Even the most resilient species will inevitably fall victim to the synergies among extinction drivers as extreme stresses drive ecosystems to collapse." says lead author Dr Giovanni Strona of the European Commission's Joint Research Centre based in Ispra in northern Italy. Researchers from Italy and Australia simulated 2,000 'virtual earths' linking animal and plant species. Using sophisticated modelling, they subjected the virtual earths to catastrophic environmental changes that ultimately annihilated all life. Examples of the kinds of catastrophes they simulated included runaway global warming, scenarios of 'nuclear winter' following the detonation of multiple atomic bombs, and a large asteroid impact. "What we were trying to test is whether the variable tolerances to extreme global heating or cooling by different species are enough to explain overall extinction rates," "But because all species are connected in the web of life, our paper demonstrates that even the most tolerant species ultimately succumb to extinction when the less-tolerant species on which they depend disappear." "Failing to take into account these co-extinctions therefore underestimates the rate and magnitude of the loss of entire species from events like climate change by up to 10 times," says co-author Professor Bradshaw of Flinders University in South Australia Professor Bradshaw and Dr Strona say that their virtual scenarios warn humanity not to underestimate the impact of co-extinctions. "Not taking into account this domino effect gives an unrealistic and exceedingly optimistic perspective about the impact of future climate change," warns Professor Bradshaw. It can be hard to imagine how the demise of a small animal or plant matters so much, but the authors argue that tracking species up to total annihilation demonstrates how the loss of one can amplify the effects of environmental change on the remainder. "Another really important discovery was that in the case of global warming in particular, the combination of intolerance to heat combined with co-extinctions mean that 5-6 degrees of average warming globally is enough to wipe out most life on the planet," says Dr Strona. Professor Bradshaw further warns that their work shows how climate warming creates extinction cascades in the worst possible way, when compared to random extinctions or even from the stresses arising from nuclear winter.

### Underview

#### 1] Presumption negates – infinite ways for something to be false but only one way for them to be true.

#### 2] 2n theory, neg gets it, its k2 preventing abuse in the 1ar.

### AT Util [1:00]

#### Reject util –

#### 1] Util can’t explain justice.

Miller 17 [Miller, David, "Justice", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/justice/>.]/ lm

Yet despite these efforts to reconcile justice and utility, three serious obstacles still remain. The first concerns what we might call the currency of justice: justice has to do with the way that tangible benefits and burdens are assigned, and not with the happiness or unhappiness that the assignees experience. It is a matter of justice, for example, that people should be paid the right amount for the jobs that they do, but, special circumstances aside, it is no concern of justice that John derives more satisfaction from his fairly-earned income than Jane does from hers (but see Cohen 1989 for a different view). There is so to speak, a division of labour, under which rights, opportunities, and material benefits of various kinds are allocated by principles of justice, while the conversion of these into units of utility (or disutility) is the responsibility of each individual recipient (see Dworkin 2000, ch. 1). Utilitarians will therefore find it hard to explain what from their point of view seems to be the fetishistic concern of justice over how the means to happiness are distributed, rather than happiness itself.

The second obstacle is that utilitarianism judges outcomes by totalling up utility levels, and has no independent concern for how that utility is distributed between persons. So even if we set aside the currency issue, utilitarian theory seems unable to capture justice’s demand that each should receive what is due to her regardless of the total amount of benefit this generates. Defenders of utilitarianism will argue that when the conduct-guiding rules are being formulated, attention will be paid to distributive questions. In particular, when resources are being distributed among people we know little about individually, there are good reasons to favour equality, since in most cases resources have diminishing marginal utility – the more of them you have, the less satisfaction you derive from additional instalments. Yet this is only a contingent matter. If some people are very adept at turning resources into well-being – they are so-called ‘utility monsters’ – then a utilitarian should support a rule that privileges them. This seems repugnant to justice. As Rawls famously put the general point, ‘each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice which….even the welfare of every one else cannot override’ (Rawls 1971, p. 28; Rawls 1999, pp. 24–25).

The third and final difficulty stems from utilitarianism’s thoroughgoing consequentialism. Rules are assessed strictly in the light of the consequences of adopting then, not in terms of their intrinsic properties. Of course, when agents follow rules, they are meant to do what the rule requires rather than to calculate consequences directly. But for a utilitarian, it is never going to be a good reason for adopting a rule that it will give people what they deserve or what they are entitled to, when desert or entitlement are created by events in the past, such as a person’s having performed a worthwhile action or entered an agreement. Backward-looking reasons have to be transmuted into forward-looking reasons in order to count. If a rule such as pacta sunt servanda (‘agreements must be kept’) is going to be adopted on utilitarian grounds, this is not because there is any inherent wrongness in defaulting on a compact one has made, but because a rule that compacts must be kept is a useful one, since it allows people to co-ordinate their behaviour knowing that their expectations about the future are likely to be met. But justice, although not always backward-looking in the sense explained, often is. What is due to a person is in many cases what they deserve for what they have done, or what they are entitled to by virtue of past transactions. So even if it were possible to construct a forward-looking rationale for having rules that closely tracked desert or entitlement as these are normally understood, the utilitarian still cannot capture the sense of justice – why it matters that people should get what is due to then – that informs our common-sense judgements.

#### Turn private entities deescalate tensions

Steer 20 [Dr. Cassandra Steer, CERL Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law, University of Pennsylvania, “Why Outer Space Matters for National and International Security,” January 8th 2020, [https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/10053-why-outer-space-matters-for-national-and]/](https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/10053-why-outer-space-matters-for-national-and%5d/) lm

Commercial actors have a key role in increasing cooperation and transparency because they often support multiple international clients among whom political relations may be unclear or shifting. Some commercial actors have an explicit desire to remain neutral, others have fixed alliances. All these factors may complicate the development of policies that support collaboration and TCBMs. However, it is undeniable that increased data sharing of SSA and the development of mechanisms to clarify intentions behind space-based maneuvers are essential to ensure stability in space. There is a critical need for clear representations from States as to their position on national and international law applicable to space and well-informed policy positions on the emerging weaponization of space. Due to the specificity of the space domain, specialized expertise must be provided to decision-makers, and interdisciplinary opinions must be sought from a multitude of stakeholders. Finding answers to these questions requires interdisciplinary engagement and collaboration, not only among substantive experts in different fields but also between public agencies and private commercial entities. This is not merely aspirational. There are lessons to be learned from the Cold War era when scientists pushed for increased collaboration even during periods of high tension between the two superpowers. There is a need for exchange of information and evidence-based policy, particularly in terms of SSA, cross-domain thinking, minimization of the escalatory cycle, and appreciation of the long-term effects of any space-based conflict. The challenge will be knowing how to balance this against the need to protect one’s own space assets and the need to maintain secrecy about one’s own capabilities. Space is a unique domain and requires a unique way of thinking about policy and strategy.

#### Space conflict unlikely

Pavur 19 [Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science at Oxford University and Ivan Martinovic, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.), [https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art\_12\_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf]/](https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf%5d/) lm  
A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the [mean] attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### Just have CHM on earth and diff principle in space not that hard