# NC

### 1

#### Interpretation: the affirmative must defend that only just governments ought to recognize the right to strike

#### Just governments respect liberties

Dorn 12 James A. Dorn, Cato Journal, "The Scope of Government in a Free Society", Fall 2012, https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2012/12/v32n3-10.pdf

If laws are just, liberty and property are secure. The most certain test of justice is negative—that is, justice occurs when injustice (the violation of natural rights to life, liberty, and property) is prevented. The emphasis here is on what Hayek (1967) called “just rules of conduct,” not on the fairness of outcomes. No one has stated the negative concept of justice better than the 19th century French classical liberal Frederic Bastiat ([1850] 1964: 65): When law and force confine a man within the bounds of justice, they do not impose anything on him but a mere negation. They impose on him only the obligation to refrain from injuring others. They do not infringe on his personality, or his liberty or his property. They merely safeguard the personality, the liberty, and the property of others. They stand on the defensive; they defend the equal rights of all. They fulfill a mission whose harmlessness is evident, whose utility is palpable, and whose legitimacy is uncontested. In short, the purpose of a just government is not to do good with other people’s money, but to prevent injustice by protecting property and securing liberty.

#### Violation—the US and specifically courts are not just.

Nellis, Ph.D., 18, Report to the United Nations on Racial Disparities in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/, Sentencing Project,

The United States criminal justice system is the largest in the world. At yearend 2015, over 6.7 million individuals1) were under some form of correctional control in the United States, including 2.2 million incarcerated in federal, state, or local prisons and jails.2) The U.S. is a world leader in its rate of incarceration, dwarfing the rate of nearly every other nation.3) Such broad statistics mask the racial disparity that pervades the U.S. criminal justice system, and for African Americans in particular. African Americans are more likely than white Americans to be arrested; once arrested, they are more likely to be convicted; and once convicted, and they are more likely to experience lengthy prison sentences. African-American adults are 5.9 times as likely to be incarcerated than whites and Hispanics are 3.1 times as likely.4) As of 2001, one of every three black boys born in that year could expect to go to prison in his lifetime, as could one of every six Latinos—compared to one of every seventeen white boys.5) Racial and ethnic disparities among women are less substantial than among men but remain prevalent.6) The source of such disparities is deeper and more systemic than explicit racial discrimination. The United States in effect operates two distinct criminal justice systems: one for wealthy people and another for poor people and people of color. The wealthy can access a vigorous adversary system replete with constitutional protections for defendants. Yet the experiences of poor and minority defendants within the criminal justice system often differ substantially from that model due to a number of factors, each of which contributes to the overrepresentation of such individuals in the system. As former Georgetown Law Professor David Cole states in his book No Equal Justice,

#### Standards:

#### 1] Precision — anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 2] Scholarship first – assuming racist countries like the US are just especially in educational spaces like debate is bad and uniquely a reason to drop them.

#### 3] TVA – read the aff as a whole res aff, same advantage area

#### The voters are

#### 1] Fairness b/c a) it’ an intrinsic good b) it control the internal link to education c) debate is a game, if it’s unfair no-one will want to play.

#### 2] Education b/c a) portability, it’s useful for the real world b) constitutive purpose, this is an educational activity.

#### And it’s drop-the-debater, k2 deterring further abuse, and I can’t engage with the debate if they’re untopical.

#### No RVI on T, you don’t win for being topical.

#### Competing interpretations, a) reasonability is bad it requires judge intervention and b) arguing about the norms is the only way to get to the best norms possible.

#### T before theory a] I only get 2 months to set norms they get 4 years b] any NC abuse was a necessary check against AC abuse

### 2

#### Interp – aff may not specify a government.

#### “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” in the res – means that you have to prove the resolution true in a vacuum, not a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### The article “a” implies a nonspecific or generic reading of the word “just government”.

Walden 20 Walden University [The Writing Center provides a broad range of writing instruction and editing services for students at Walden University, including writing assistance for undergraduates, graduate students, and doctoral capstone writers], “"A" or "An"” last modified July 14 2020, <https://academicguides.waldenu.edu/writingcenter/grammar/articles> SM

When to Use "A" or "An" "A" and "an" are used with singular countable nouns when the noun is nonspecific or generic. I do not own a car. In this sentence, "car" is a singular countable noun that is not specific. It could be any car. She would like to go to a university that specializes in teaching. "University" is a singular countable noun. Although it begins with a vowel, the first sound of the word is /j/ or “y.” Thus, "a" instead of "an" is used. In this sentence, it is also generic (it could be any university with this specialization, not a specific one). I would like to eat an apple. In this sentence, "apple" is a singular countable noun that is not specific. It could be any apple.

#### “a just government” is a generic indefinite singular.

Leslie 12 Leslie, Sarah-Jane. “Generics.” In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian Russell and Delia Fara, 355–366. Routledge, 2012. <https://www.princeton.edu/~sjleslie/RoutledgeHandbookEntryGenerics.pdf> SM

GENERICS VS. EXISTENTIALS The interpretation of sentences containing bare plurals, indefinite singulars, or definite singulars can be either generic as in (1) respectively or existential/specific as in (2): (1) Tigers are striped A tiger is striped The tiger is striped. (2) Tigers are on the front lawn A tiger is on the front lawn The tiger is on the front lawn. The subjects in (1) are prima facie the same as in (2), yet their interpretations in (1) are intuitively quite different from those in (2). In (2) we are talking about some particular tigers, while in (1) we are saying something about tigers in general. There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. For example, if it is true that tigers are on the lawn, then it will also be true that animals are on the lawn. This is not so if the sentence is interpreted generically. For example, it is true that tigers are striped, but it does not follow that animals are striped (Lawler 1973 Laca 1990; Krifka et al 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification (in the sense of Lewis 1975) with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in (1) (e.g. “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in (2) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g. “tigers are usually on the front lawn). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually”.)

#### This applies to the res – 1] Upward entailment test – “us ought to recognize the right to strike” doesn’t entail “just governments ought to recognize the right to strike” because there are just governments other than us 2] Adverb test – adverb test – adding “always” doesn’t change its meaning because recognition is unconditional.

#### Violation – they spec the US

#### Standards:

#### 1] Precision – any other interp lets affs do away with random words in the res a] that means no solid neg ground b] The judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote on affs that don’t affirm

#### 2] Limits – there are hundreds of governments that could be specified – explodes limits since there are tons of independent affs plus functionally infinite combinations – massive prep skew and strat skew.

#### CA voters

### 3

#### Morality arises from agents with conflicting interests that mutually agree on constraints to each other actions.

**Gauthier 86** Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print. // Park City NL

Moral principles are introduced as the objects of full voluntary ex ante agreement among rational persons. Su**ch agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices. But the parties to agreement are real, determinate individuals, distinguished by their capacities, situations, and concerns. In so far as [**Since] they would agree to constraints on their choices, restraining their pursuit of their own interests, they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do. As rational persons understanding the structure of their interaction, they recognize for mutual constraint, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with Contractarianism – agents have subjective conflicting desires that can only be resolved based on mutual agreement.

Stanford 0 [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Contractarianism.” <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism/> Published 18 June 2000]

A brief sketch of the most complete and influential contemporary contractarian theory, David Gauthier’s, is in order. Gauthier’s project in Morals By Agreement is to employ a contractarian approach to grounding morality in rationality in order to defeat the moral skeptic. (However, Anita Superson (2009) points out that Gauthier attempts to answer only the skeptic who asks “why should I be moral?” but leaves both the motive skeptic, who argues that it is enough to act morally but need not be motivated by morality, and the amoralist, who denies that there is any such thing as morality, that is, that there are true moral statements.) It is generally assumed that humans can have no perfect natural harmony of interests (otherwise morality would be largely superfluous), and that there is much for each individual to gain through cooperation. However, moral constraint on the pursuit of individual self-interest is required because cooperative activities almost inevitably lead to a prisoner’s dilemma: a situation in which the best individual outcomes can be had by those who cheat on the agreement while the others keep their part of the bargain. This leads to the socially and individually sub-optimal outcome wherein each can expect to be cheated by the other. But by disposing themselves to act according to the requirements of morality whenever others are also so disposed, they can gain each others’ trust and cooperate successfully. The contractarian element of the theory comes in the derivation of the moral norms. The compliance problem—the problem of justifying rational compliance with the norms that have been accepted—must drive the justification of the initial situation and the conduct of the contracting situation. It is helpful to think of the contract situation as a bargain, in which each party is trying to negotiate the moral rules that will allow them to realize optimal utility, and this has led philosophers to apply a number of bargaining solutions to the initial contract situation. Gauthier’s solution is the “minimax relative concession” (1986, ch. V). The idea of minimax relative concession is that each bargainer will be most concerned with the concessions that she makes from her ideal outcome relative to the concessions that others make. If she sees her concessions as reasonable relative to the others, considering that she wants to ensure as much for herself as she can while securing agreement (and thereby avoiding the zero-point: no share of the cooperative surplus) and subsequent compliance from the others, then she will agree to it. What would then be the reasonable outcome? The reasonable outcome, according to this view, is the outcome that minimizes the maximum relative concessions of each party to the bargain (Gauthier 1986, ch. V). Equally important to the solution as the procedure is the starting point from which the parties begin. For some contractarians (like Gauthier) there is no veil of ignorance—each party to the contract is fully informed of their personal attributes and holdings. However, without the veil of ignorance, contractors will be aware of the differences in bargaining power that could potentially affect the outcome of the bargain. It is important, then, that the initial position must have been arrived at non-coercively if compliance to the agreement is to be secured. A form of the “Lockean proviso” (modeled after Locke’s description of the initial situation of his social contract): that one cannot have bettered himself by worsening others, may turn out to be beneficial in cases without a veil of ignorance. In sum, the moral norms that rational contractors will adopt (and comply with) are those norms that would be reached by the contractors beginning from a position each has attained through her own actions which have not worsened anyone else, and adopting as their principle for agreement the rule of minimax relative concession (Gauthier 1986, ch. VII). On one line of thought, contractarianism produces liberal individuals who seem well suited to join the kind of society that Rawls envisioned (Gauthier 1986, ch. XI). On another line, the Hobbesian contractarian argument leads towards the sparse government of libertarianism (Narveson 1988). The controversy here turns on the primary motivation for individuals to make agreements and cooperate. As we said before, there are two such motivations for the Hobbesian contractarian: fear of the depredations of others and benefits from cooperation with others. Libertarianism results when the first of these is primary, whereas when the second is primary, the kind of reciprocity and supportive government that will be discussed in the final section becomes possible.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1] Epistemic modesty – philosophers have debated ethics for thousands of years – it’s unlikely that their ethical theory happens to be the correct one. Contractarianism allows everyone to operate by their own theory of ethics.

#### 2] Actor spec – governments and policies are created based on compromises and mutual agreements between representatives with different interests.

#### 3] Subjectivism – we can’t experience each other’s feelings or emotions and there is no view-from-nowhere, so only agreement between different subjects can provide a basis of ethics.

#### Now negate –

#### 1] Unconditional striking breaches different elements of contracts.

NLRB National Labor Relations Board. “The Right to Strike.” *The Right to Strike | National Labor Relations Board*, www.nlrb.gov/strikes. SJEP

Strikes unlawful because of timing—Effect of no-strike contract. A strike that violates a no-strike provision of a contract is not protected by the Act, and the striking employees can be discharged or otherwise disciplined, unless the strike is called to protest certain kinds of unfair labor practices committed by the employer. It should be noted that not all refusals to work are considered strikes and thus violations of no-strike provisions. A walkout because of conditions abnormally dangerous to health, such as a defective ventilation system in a spray-painting shop, has been held not to violate a no-strike provision. Same—Strikes at end of contract period.Section 8(d) provides that when either party desires to terminate or change an existing contract, it must comply with certain conditions. If these requirements are not met, a strike to terminate or change a contract is unlawful and participating strikers lose their status as employees of the employer engaged in the labor dispute. If the strike was caused by the unfair labor practice of the employer, however, the strikers are classified as unfair labor practice strikers and their status is not affected by failure to follow the required procedure.

#### 2] A worker has the ability to choose their employer and thus their contract. Therefore, there is no reason a worker can strike against a contract they have agreed to previously.

#### 3] Strikes inhibit the ability to create contracts, create power imbalances, and violate individual contracts.

**Levine 1** [Peter. "The Libertarian Critique of Labor Unions." Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 21.4 (2001): 17-24. (Peter Levine is the Associate Dean for Research and Lincoln Filene Professor of Citizenship & Public Affairs in Tufts University’s Jonathan Tisch College of Civic Life. He has secondary appointments in the Tufts Philosophy Department and the Tufts Clinical and Translational Sciences Institute. He was the founding deputy director (2001-6) and then the second director (2006-15) of Tisch College’s CIRCLE, The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, which he continues to oversee as an associate dean]

Libertarians strongly defend freedom of choice and association. Thus, when workers choose to act collectively, negotiate together, or voluntarily walk off the job, libertarians have no reasonable complaint--even if other people are harmed--because they support the right to make and exit voluntary partnerships. But unions gain strength by overriding private rights. They routinely block anyone from working under a non-union contract, and they prevent employers from making offers--even advantageous ones--to individual workers unless the union is informed and consents. Unions declare strikes and establish picket lines to prevent customers and workers from entering company property; they may fine employees who cross these lines. They also extract fees from all workers who are covered by their contracts. Although covered workers may avoid paying for certain union functions (such as lobbying) that are not germane to contract issues, they must pay for strikes and other activities that some of them oppose. The great libertarian theorist Friedrich Hayek concluded that unions “are the one institution where government has signally failed in its first task, that of preventing coercion of men by other men--and by coercion I do not mean primarily the coercion of employers but the coercion of workers by their fellow workers.” Hayek may have been thinking mainly of corrupt and unaccountable union leaders. But even a completely democratic union sometimes supplants private rights. As libertarians like Morgan O. Reynolds point out, majorities within a union are able to ignore minorities’ preferences.

### Underview

#### Presumption negates – infinite ways for something to be false but only one way for them to be true, and the aff has the burden of proof. Permissibility negates – if IPP isn’t bad then its morally neutral and permissible. No 1ar theory, any response to the CI will be new in the 2ar, means neg loses every rnd, and 7-6 time skew after 1n.

# Case

### AT Util (Contracts)

#### 1] Util collapses into contractarianism.

**Thrasher 13** [John J. Thrasher, Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department and the Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy at Chapman University, Reconciling Justice and Pleasure in Epicurean Contractarianism, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April 2013), pp. 423-436]

**If** you do not, on every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead turn prematurely to some other [criterion] in avoiding or pursuing [things], your actions will not be consistent with your reasoning (KD 25). **This goal of reasoning and action is the absence of pain** and the tranquility that comes from living without fear (KD 3).4 This kind of pleasure, ataraxia, is unhindered tranquility, rather than a sensation of active pleasure.5 It is a psychological fact, according to Epicurus, that we do actually seek ataraxia and that our lives go best, from a subjective point of view, when we pursue ataraxia. It is the natural goal of beings like us. If fear of the gods, death, and pain constitute sickness of the soul, removing those ailments constitutes its health. This psycho logical hedonism creates the justification for the normative hedonism that practical reason ing should aim at ataraxia.6 The normative ideal of Epicurean practical rationality is a hedonistic form of instrumental rationality with the final end of ataraxia. In the parlance of modern decision theory, it is a maximizing theory of rationality. Given a set of ordered preferences, individuals chose rationally when they choose to act on their highest valued goals. To choose less pleasure rather than more pleasure when given the choice is paradig matically irrational and contrary to nature. Given this conception of practical rationality and virtue, it is hard to see how one can single-mindedly pursue pleasure and accept the constraints of justice. Traditionally, virtue ethical theories solve this problem by making the virtue of justice constitutive of happiness with deontic restraints built into the formal conditions of happiness.7 To use the Rawlsian terminology, the right flows naturally out of the good.8 This solution, however, will not work for the Epicurean. Unlike in Aristotelian or Stoic virtue theory, the standard of Epicurean happiness is not an objective, formal standard, but rather the subjective, psychological state of ataraxia. The Epicurean has a reason to (j> only if he or she believes that (J)-ing will reliably lead to the final end of ataraxia. If all reasons are instrumental in this sense, how is it possible for the Epicurean to have reason to constrain his or her pursuit of the goal of nature by the deontic demands of justice? To give a plausible account of justice, the Epicurean needs to explain how to justify the demands of justice as a means to the final end of ataraxia. One version of this problem arises in the context of friendship. Epicurus claims . .every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake, though it takes its origin from the benefits it confers on us" (VS 23). Given this statement about the value of friendship and KD 25, how can friendship be non-instrumentally valuable while also being beneficial because of the benefit it confers? Some have argued that genuine friendship is impossible unless we amend the basic egoistic element of Epicurean practical rationality.9 In contrast, Matt Evans argues that there are two basic approaches to understanding friendship in a consistently egoistic way (Evans 2004, 413). Friendship as "indirect egoism" involves incorporating the good of a friend or of friendship generally into one's own good. This is the interpretation that Timothy O'Keefe favors (O'Keefe 2001a). The alternative is Evans's preferred view, "direct egoism," that one's own good "stands or falls" with the good of one's friend (Evans 2004, 413). Indirect egoism is, for O'Keefe, a two-level hedonistic theoiy. Choice of desires is governed directly by hedonic concerns and those desires then pick out particular actions, which are only indirectly related to the original hedonic calculus (O'Keefe 2001a, 300-302). In contrast, Evans's direct egoism applies the hedonic calculus to action selection. Evans maintains that Epicureans can "reason their way to friendship" through direct egoistic means (Evans 2004, 423). What is true of friendship will likely be true of justice so it is imperative to determine whether the Epicurean hedonic calculus is meant to apply to actions (direct egoism), desires (indirect egoism), or something else entirely. The direct egoist interpretation has the benefit of being the easiest to reconcile with KD 25. The indirect egoist interpretation makes it easier to understand how the Epicurean can incorporate friendship and justice into hedonism. Another possibility, between direct and indirect egoism, is what Gregory Kavka calls "rule egoism" (Kavka 1986, chap. 9). Although Kavka developed his version of rule egoism in the context of understanding Hobbes's ethical theory, there are enough similarities between the two accounts for a plausible Epicurean version as well. The hedonic calculus applies directly to rules rather than to desires or action. Furthermore, rules can be generalizations over desires or actions, e. g. "don't cultivate a desire for riches" or "seek out friends." The first is a rule that indicates what desires will lead to pleasure whereas the second is a rule that indicates a particular set of actions that will likely lead to pleasure, namely having friends. **Rule egoism has several benefits over direct and indirect egoism. First, it is more general. Both actions and desires are mentioned throughout KD and VS as the possible object of choice. Rule egoism recognizes the importance of both actions and desires to the end of ataraxia and accounts for both in terms of rules. Second, rule egoism is simpler and likely more reliable than direct or indirect egoism. It is reasonable to expect that the typical Epicurean would be bewildered in the face of the multiplicity and complexity of choices that would face him or her on any given day. The stress of deliberating over actions on the direct egoist interpretation of KD 25 would often create anxiety rather than tranquility. Similarly, it is not clear that, given the complexity of the world, the direct approach would reliably lead to ataraxia. The indirect approach is not better on this count partly because desires do not necessarily pick out unique action in decision situations, partly because the indirect egoist faces the same problem as the direct egoist at the level of desires. By using rules, however, the Epicurean can rely on the knowledge embodied in the rules without having to deliberate in each case.** This explains the reason that Epicurus spends so much time in his writing listing rules and maxims. He gives rules about how to reduce sexual passion (VS 18), the irrationality of suicide (VS 38), the danger of envy (KS' 53), and the dangers of great wealth (VS 67). In all of these cases, and many more, Epicurus is passing on wisdom about how to reliably achieve ataraxia. He is playing the part, of a guide who has walked down life's tangled road and is reporting to those who have yet to see everything he has seen. These maxims or rules are the embodiment of the successful use of practical rationality in the past. Following these types of rules is, therefore, an application of direct egoism in an indirect way. Given the limited cognitive capacity and time of the Epicurean rational agent, relying on rules as a guide can be, following Gigerenzer and Goldstein, a "fast and frugal" way of reasoning based on heuristics communicated as rules or maxims (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). **Instead of choosing over the expected outcome of individual acts, the rule egoist chooses sets of rules to follow based on the expected outcome of following that rule or set of rules** (Kavka 1986, 358-359). In the next section we will see how understanding Epicurean practical rationality as "rule-hedonism" makes it possible to reconcile Epicurean practical rationality with justice. 3 The Possibility of the Contract Once we understand Epicurean practical rationality as applying to rules rather than to particular actions or desires, we can see how the Epicurean can reconcile the imperatives of practical rationality with the demands of justice. **A particular social contract is a set of rules that regulates behavior in certain public settings.** The Epicurean agrees to a particular set of rules in order to more reliably achieve and maintain personal ataraxia. We might wonder, however, why the Epicurean would need a contract at all. Why wouldn't the first personal application of practical rationality be sufficient for ataraxia? Why is the social **contract** necessary? In a world of practically rational Epicureans, the social contract seems either otiose or harmful. Either the contract recommends what practical rationality would recommend or it conflicts with practical rationality. On its face, Epicurean contractarianism looks either unnecessary or impossible. I will argue here that the Epicurean social contract is both necessary and possible. **The social contract is necessary, as I will argue in the next section, for its coordinating, assuring, and specifying functions**. The social contract is possible because of the role that rules can play in Epicurean practical rationality. In this section I will argue that the Epicurean social contract is consistent with Epicurean practical rationality and, hence, possible, while fulfilling an important social role. The Epicurean social contract is fundamentally instrumental; **it is a "pledge of reciprocal usefulness neither to harm one another nor be harmed**" (KD 35). To be consistent with Epicurean practical rationality, then, the contract must secure benefits that would not be possible without the contract. If, however, one only has reason to enter into a contract because of the benefits, what reason does one have to follow the contract when there are no benefits and only costs? This is the heart of the concern that the Epicurean cannot be a good citizen. If citizenship involves the possibility of sacrifice, why should we expect the Epicurean to comply? Here again, we see the same kind of problem that we saw in §2 concerning friendship; the solution is also similar.

#### 2] Aggregation fails – people have subjective scales of pain which are incommunicable since we can’t experience other’s feelings.

#### 3] Butterfly effect – infinite consequences for every action – incalculable.

#### 4] Util calc opens the door to injecting bias into our moral equations.

Chappell on Mackie 5 “Indirect Utilitarianism” June 11 2005 Philosophy, et cetera <http://www.philosophyetc.net/2005/06/indirect-utilitarianism.html>

J.L. Mackie (p.91) offers six utilitarian reasons for opposing "the direct use of utilitarian calculation as a practical working morality": 1. Shortage of time and energy will in general preclude such calculations. 2. Even if time and energy are available, the relevant information commonly is not. 3. An agent's judgment on particular issues is likely to be distorted by his own interests and special affections. 4. Even if he were intellectually able to determine the right choice, weakness of will would be likely to impair his putting of it into effect. 5. Even decisions that are right in themselves and actions based on them are liable to be misused as precedents, so that they will encourage and seem to legitimate wrong actions that are superficially similar to them. 6. And, human nature being what it is, a practical working morality must not be too demanding: it is worse than useless to set standards so high that there is no real chance that actions will even approximate to them.

#### 5] You don’t know I feel pleasure or pain and immeasurable

#### Reject extinction first a] freezes action – every policy has a non-zero risk of causing extinction, b] It’s consequentialist – if we beat util, we beat extinction since it’s a consequence and we don’t look at them.

### Adv 1

#### TURN: Strikes slow tech innovation

Hanasoge 16 [Chaithra; Senior Research Analyst, Market Researcher, Consumer Insights, Strategy Consulting; “The Union Strikes: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,” Supply Wisdom; April/June 2016 (Doesn’t specifically say but this is the most recent event is cites); https://www.supplywisdom.com/resources/the-union-strikes-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/]//SJWen

The result: Verizon conceded to several of the workers’ demands including hiring union workers, protection against outsourcing of call-center jobs, and employee benefits such as salary hikes and higher pension contributions, among others and thus bringing an end to the strike in June.

The repercussion: The strike witnessed several instances of social disorder, violence and clashes, ultimately calling for third party intervention (Secretary of Labor – Thomas Perez) to initiate negotiations between the parties. Also, as a result of the strike, Verizon reported lower than expected revenues in the second quarter of 2016.

Trade unions/ labor unions aren’t just this millennia’s product and has been in vogue since times immemorial. Unions, to ensure fairness to the working class, have gone on strike for better working conditions and employee benefits since the industrial revolution and are as strong today as they were last century. With the advent of technology and advancement in artificial intelligence, machines are grabbing the jobs which were once the bastion of the humans. So, questions that arise here are, what relevance do unions have in today’s work scenario? And, are the strikes organized by them avoidable?

As long as the concept of labor exists and employees feel that they are not receiving their fair share of dues, unions will exist and thrive. Union protests in most cases cause work stoppages, and in certain cases, disruption of law and order. Like in March 2016, public servants at Federal Government departments across Australia went on a series of strikes over failed pay negotiations, disrupting operations of many government departments for a few days.  Besides such direct effects, there are many indirect effects as well such as strained employee relations, slower work processes, lesser productivity and unnecessary legal hassles.

Also, union strikes can never be taken too lightly as they have prompted major overturn of decisions, on a few occasions. Besides the Verizon incident that was a crucial example of this, nationwide strikes were witnessed in India in March and April this year when the national government introduced reforms related to the withdrawal regulations and interest rate of employee provident fund, terming it as ‘anti-working class’. This compelled the government to withhold the reform for further review. In France, strike against labor law reforms in May turned violent, resulting in riots and significant damage to property. The incident prompted the government to consider modifications to the proposed reforms.

However, aside from employee concerns, such incidents are also determined by a number of other factors such as the country’s political scenario, economy, size of the overall workforce and the unions, history of unionization, labor laws, and culture. For example, it is a popular saying that the French are always on strike as per tradition (although recent statistics indicate a decline in frequency). In a communist government like China, strikes have steadily risen in number. In 2015, China Labor Bulletin (CLB), a Hong Kong-based workers’ rights group recorded 2,700 incidents of strikes and protests, compared to 1,300 incidents in 2014. Most of them have stemmed out of failure by the government to respect the basic rights of employees and address labor concerns.

Interestingly, unions have not been able to gain a strong foothold in the IT-BPO industry. While many countries do have a separate union to represent workers from the sector, incidents of strikes like Verizon have been relatively low.  However, workplace regulations, in addition to other factors mentioned could be a trigger for such incidents, even if on a smaller scale. For example, a recent survey that interviewed several BPO employees in India revealed that while forming a union in the BPO sector was difficult, irksome workplace regulations such as constant surveillance, irregular timings and incentives have prompted employees to express their resentment in smaller ways such as corruption of internal servers and so on.  Such risks are further enhanced in a city like Kolkata, which carries a strong trade union culture.

#### Technological innovation solves every existential threat – and green tech innovation key to solving climate change.

Matthews 18 Dylan. Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University. 10-26-2018. "How to help people millions of years from now." Vox. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.

#### Climate strikes aren’t sufficient to reduce reliance on fuels.

Hayes 19 [Jason; Contributor to The Hill, director of environmental policy at the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, a research and education institute in Midland, Mich; “A global climate strike isn't enough,” The Hill; 9/19/19; <https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/461809-a-global-climate-strike-isnt-enough>] Justin

A collective of influential green groups and corporations is supporting a campaign for a global climate strike from Sept. 20-27. The strike pushes young people to walk out of schools and workplaces to protest the energy sources that keep us alive and thriving. That many people are concerned about the global climate is obvious, but how will encouraging them to abandon their jobs or schools for a day or two, or seven, reduce greenhouse gas emissions?

The campaign website — globalclimatestrike.net — tells people they must “demand an end to the age of fossil fuels.” But, in the United States, we rely on these fuels for over 80 percent of the energy we use to provide basic necessities such as food, clean water, heating and air conditioning, medicine, transportation and so much more.

To make things worse, the energy sources offered up as replacements for fossil fuels — typically wind and solar — couldn’t even exist without fossil fuels. Natural gas, oil and coal are needed to mine, refine, process and ship the metals, rare earth minerals, silicone, plastics and various chemicals that go into renewables. Without steel, there are no towers to hold up wind turbines. Without rare earths, there are no solar panels. Adding to this conundrum is the fact that wind and solar cannot provide reliable power. They are intermittent, meaning they must be propped up by more reliable energy sources, such as natural gas.

A group of environmental policy experts has put together MyClimatePledge.com as our response, because we’d like to challenge climate strikers and to help them appreciate that striking won’t be enough.

### Adv 2

#### Development of lethal AI is key to AI innovation

Asaro 19, [Dr. Peter Asaro, \*Associate Professor, School of Media Studies, The New School; Visiting Professor, Munich Center for Technology in Society, TU Munich; Affiliate Scholar, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School. This paper was originally presented at the National Security, Emerging Technologies and the Law Conference, American Bar Association SCOLANS, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, March 23, 2018, A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, “What is an ‘Artificial Intelligence Arms Race’ Anyway?” <https://moritzlaw.osu.edu/ostlj/wp-content/uploads/sites/125/2019/06/Asaro.pdf> pg. 55]

Another way to view the AI arms race is as the space race of our generation. The Cold War between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. played out not only in real proxy wars, but also in symbolic proxy wars. One need not look too far to find symbolic proxy wars during the Cold War, from chess championships to Olympic hockey. The most spectacular of these was the Space Race in which the two countries sought to put satellites and people into space, to reach the Moon, and probe the planets and deep space. Of course, the technologies developed in the space race had many direct military applications, from intercontinental ballistic missiles, to supersonic aircraft, to spy satellites and telecommunications satellites, and a host of advanced sensor technologies. But these probably could have been developed without the cost and spectacle of the Space Race. That spectacle was about capturing the public imagination and demonstrating technical superiority over one’s competitors. As such, it was largely a cultural battle fought through technological innovation. Insofar as the AI arms race is a cultural battle to convince the world which country has the greatest technical prowess, and which country holds the keys to the technological (and economic) future, then this is an apt analogy. Of course, like the Space Race, the culturally symbolic aspect of the AI arms race does not preclude the application of AI to more traditional forms of economic and military competition. Indeed, such an AI arms race would likely entail many of the same dual-use capabilities and applications that motivated government investments in the Space Race.

#### AI is k2 preventing climate change.

Bonnisseau 20, Nathan Bonnisseau is the co-founder and Chief Marketing Officer of Plan A. A specialist of cultural and social narratives, he holds two Masters from the Sorbonne and the IEDES and a BA (Hons) in Politics and International Relations. He has previously worked as a reporter in France and Brazil, as well as in development and management departments in educative institutions, plan A academy earth, “AI and Climate Change,” <https://plana.earth/academy/ai-climate-change/#:~:text=AI%20leads%20to%20sufficient%20energy,can%20help%20tackle%20climate%20change>

First of all, AI can help us, in understanding climate change better. Everything from global-scale modelling to individual weather forecasting relies on a massive number of variables, which is impossible for a human brain to do on its own. The interpretation of climate data is based on climate informatics, a discipline created in 2011. It covers a wide range of topics, such as predicting extreme weather events, reconstructing past climate conditions, or the socio-economic impacts of climate change and precipitations. This can help policymakers to take action and save lives. If you as an individual or as a company want to benefit yourself from an improved AI weather forecasting, [take a look here](https://newsroom.ibm.com/the-weather-company?item=30634).

Algorithms are not only getting better and better for specific weather events, but also for the more global changes and its consequences. An example is to predict the relationship between the measures we take and how fast we will go to the 2°C rise in global temperature. Instead of trying to write complex models based on physical laws (symbolic reasoning), the [study of Ise and Oba](https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frobt.2019.00032/full) gave global monthly temperatures of the last 30 years to a neural network. Without any other data, the neural network successfully predicts the rise and fall of warmth for the next 10 years, with an accuracy of 97%. AI could also help to understand the causes of climate change. It could, for example, based on satellite images, detect and map significant CO2 emitting sources in countries where the regulation about reporting is scarce.

A more concrete way in which AI can help us is in reducing CO2 emissions through the optimization of existing systems. ‘[Climate Change AI](https://www.climatechange.ai/)’, a group of volunteers that wants to bring together AI experts and climate science specialists, identified how ML can help in different areas (e.g. electricity systems, transportation, buildings and cities, farms). For example, in electricity systems, that account for ¼ of the global CO2 emissions. [Carbon Tracker](https://carbontracker.org/) is an independent financial think tank working towards the[UN goal of preventing new coal plants](https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018https:/www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018) from being built by 2020. It monitors coal plants emissions by using satellites data, and convince the finance industry that it is not profitable. Thanks to a [grant from Google](https://www.carbontracker.org/carbon-tracker-to-measure-worlds-power-plant-emissions-from-space-with-support-from-google-org/), Carbon Tracker is expanding the satellite imagery efforts to include gas-powered plants’ emissions and get a better sense of [where air pollution is coming from](https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/pollution/). Carbon Tracker will analyze emissions for 4000 to 5000 power plants, creating the biggest data bank and make it public. This could help us in having a global perspective, on tackling carbon emissions and reducing air pollution. It will also pinpoint companies responsible for carbon emissions, and implement an emission price.

Also, in research and development of technology, ML is getting more and more important. It is a promising tool in designing batteries with a longer life-span and higher energy storage capacity. It could also accelerate the research on nuclear fusion reactors, that can become a safe and carbon-free electricity production alternative. These require an intelligent experimental design as they have a large number of tunable parameters. Or if we dream bigger, and feed a deep learning algorithm with the right data about our universe, maybe it could help us to understand it better, or bring space travelling to a whole other dimension. No need to change the climate on the earth anymore. Thirty years ago we couldn’t even imagine how the internet was going to take over our lives, now, AI could maybe also make it possible to get a grip on our own future as humanity.

All these examples mentioned above are just a tiny tip of the iceberg of how AI could change the tide and help us in the transition towards a sustainable, green, but maybe also unimaginable future. So, in contrast to what the Matrix predicts, AI can become one of the most essential tools in helping humanity to sustain our race. The only thing we need is a collaboration between climate specialists, engineers, AI specialists, entrepreneurs, and governments to use our collective knowledge to make it happen.

#### Nuclear war won’t lead to extinction, prefer this study, it has 9 PhD’s and it more recent.

Reisner et al 18 [[Jon Reisner](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/doSearch?ContribAuthorStored=Reisner%2C+Jon) - Climate and Atmospheric Sciences PhD at Los Alamos National Laboratory;[Gennaro D'Angelo](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/doSearch?ContribAuthorStored=D%27Angelo%2C+Gennaro) – PhD[Los Alamos National Laboratory](https://www.researchgate.net/institution/Los_Alamos_National_Laboratory),[Theoretical Division](https://www.researchgate.net/institution/Los_Alamos_National_Laboratory/department/Theoretical_Division2)[Eunmo Koo](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/doSearch?ContribAuthorStored=Koo%2C+Eunmo) - Ph.D., Mechanical Engineering, University of California at Berkeley, Expertise: Atmospheric fluid dynamics, Modeling fluid-solid interactions, Fire spread in urban and wildland environment, Wind energy harvest, High-performance computing simulations;[Wesley Even](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/doSearch?ContribAuthorStored=Even%2C+Wesley) - Ph.D. Physics - Louisiana State University, Expertise: Computational Physics, Astrophysics[Matthew Hecht](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/doSearch?ContribAuthorStored=Hecht%2C+Matthew) – Expert in Climate and Ocean Modeling[Elizabeth Hunke](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/doSearch?ContribAuthorStored=Hunke%2C+Elizabeth) - Ph.D., Program in Applied Mathematics, University of Arizona, Expertise: Sea Ice Models;[Darin Comeau](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/doSearch?ContribAuthorStored=Comeau%2C+Darin) – PhD, Applied Mathematics, University of Arizona , Expert in High dimensional data analysis, statistical and predictive modeling, and uncertainty quantification, with particular applications to climate science, as well as process-based modeling of the cryosphere;[Randall Bos](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/doSearch?ContribAuthorStored=Bos%2C+Randall) – PhD, Expert in Nuclear Weapon Effects Modeling and Simulation[James Cooley](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/doSearch?ContribAuthorStored=Cooley%2C+James) - Ph.D. -- Physics, University of Maryland, Expert in Weapon Physics, Emergency Response, Computational Physics, Verification, and Validation (2018). Climate impact of a regional nuclear weapons exchange: An improved assessment based on detailed source calculations. Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres , 123 , 2752 – 2772. <https://doi.org/10.1002/2017JD027331> Received 20 JUN 2017 Accepted 1 FEB 2018 Accepted article online 13 FEB 2018 Published online 14 MAR 2018 ©2018. The Authors. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distri- bution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modi fi cations or adaptations are made.] LHSBC

Abstract We present a multiscale study examining the impact of a regional exchange of nuclear weapons on global climate. Our models investigate multiple phases of the effects of nuclear weapons usage, including growth and rise of the nuclear fireball, ignition and spread of the induced fi restorm, and comprehensive Earth system modeling of the oceans, land, ice, and atmosphere. This study follows from the scenario originally envisioned by Robock, Oman, Stenchikov, et al. (2007, <https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-7-2003-2007>), based on the analysis of Toon et al. (2007, <https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-7-1973-2007>), which assumes a regional exchange between India and Pakistan of fi fty 15 kt weapons detonated by each side. We expand this scenario by modeling the processes that lead to production of black carbon, in order to re fi ne the black carbon forcing estimates of these previous studies. When the Earth system model is initiated with 5 × 10 9 kg of black carbon in the upper troposphere (approximately from 9 to 13 km), the impact on climate variables such as global temperature and precipitation in our simulations is similar to that predicted by previously published work. However, while our thorough simulations of the fi restorm produce about 3.7 × 10 9 kg of black carbon, we find that the vast majority of the black carbon never reaches an altitude above weather systems (approximately 12 km). Therefore, our Earth system model simulations conducted with model-informed atmospheric distributions of black carbon produce significantly lower global climatic impacts than assessed in prior studies, as the carbon at lower altitudes is more quickly removed from the atmosphere. In addition, our model ensembles indicate that statistically signi fi cant effects on global surface temperatures are limited to the first 5 years and are much smaller in magnitude than those shown in earlier works. None of the simulations produced a nuclear winter effect. We fi nd that the effects on global surface temperatures are not uniform and are concentrated primarily around the highest arctic latitudes, dramatically reducing the global impact on human health and agriculture compared with that reported by earlier studies. Our analysis demonstrates that the probability of significant global cooling from a limited exchange scenario as envisioned in previous studies is highly unlikely, a conclusion supported by examination of natural analogs, such as large forest fires and volcanic eruptions.