# Jack Howe NC

### 1

#### Ethics starts with self-actualization, described as the capacity to abstract from one’s particular conditions through embodying personality in the world. Thus, the standard is consistency with the principles of mutual recognition.

Wood 90 [Allen W. Wood, Ruth Norman Halls Professor of Philosophy, Indiana University, "Hegel's Ethical Thought" Cambridge University Press, 1990, [https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/hegels-ethical-thought/D409B1F04527F36C32227799D0B303E5]/](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/hegels-ethical-thought/D409B1F04527F36C32227799D0B303E5%5d/) lm

If there is any hope for ethics as a branch of rational inquiry, it lies in showing how ethical conceptions and a theory of the human good can be grounded in human self -understanding.1 Ethics must be grounded in a knowledge of human beings that enables us to say that some modes of life are suited to our nature, whereas others are not. In that sense, ethical theories generally may be regarded as theories of human self-actualization. Plato grounds his ethics in psychology, and Aristotle identifies the human good with a life actualizing the human essence in accordance with its proper excellences. Even the ethical theories of modern times rest on some identifiable conception of human beings, Kantian theories conceiving human nature as finite rational will, and utilitarian theories identifying human beings with bundles of desires, preferences, or affective states.

Thus Kant identifies the will (the practical self) with practical reason (G 412/29). Concernful awareness of oneself is indispensable for a sense of one's identity, in two related senses: that which ties together all one's mental states as the states of a single person, and that which determines the content of one's self-interest and self-worth. Like Derek Parfit, Kant and his idealist followers regard the identity of a person as a rational construct. Contrary to Parfit, however, they think this enhances rather than diminishes the importance of individual selfhood. For it makes us our own work and our own task; our fundamental vocation is to make ourselves into what we are.2 Fichte's way of expressing this idea is to say that the self "posits itself" (W 98/99), and that the self is "not a being but a doing" (W 495/66). The self is the object of an awareness, but this awareness is not a detached contemplation. Fichte interprets self-awareness as an activity of reflection on another activity already given; this is practical activity or will (W 264/232-233, GNR 20/36). Self-awareness reflects on will, intuits its own identity with that will, and at the same time forms a concept of it (W 463-464/38-39). Thus selfawareness is always self-concern, involving issues of self-interest and selfworth. It is self-awareness, in fact, that turns given desires into concerns for self-interest and self-worth. To be a self is always simultaneously to be aware of something and to do something. It is to "posit" what one is by deciding or positing what one is to be. A self-conception involves simultaneously what one is and what one is striving to become. These Fichtean ideas are taken up into Hegel's theory of self-awareness, through the thesis that the will's "individuality" results from its own activity of self-determination, proceeding from "universality" through "particularity" (PR §§ 5-7). One can speak of a self at all only in relation to an actively willed system of practical concerns, but these concerns have a dimension that goes beyond my "particularity" - the traits, desires, and other qualities that distinguish me from other people. It is not merely a result of the philosopher's peculiar craving for generality that ethical theories focus on the human good rather than on the good of this or that individual.

In Hegel's ethical theory, the final good is not happiness but freedom. One consequence of this is the importance of the right of persons in Hegel's theory. Personal rights set limits to what may be done to a person in the name of interests, whether that person's own interests or the interests of others. If rights are there in order to override eudaemonistic considerations generally, then we might expect them to be ascribed to persons independently of those considerations. Hegel's theory meets this expectation, since "abstract" right is so called precisely because it abstracts from all considerations of well-being or happiness: In abstract right "it is not a matter of particular interests, my utility or my well-being" (PR § 37). Instead, it is a matter of securing the abstract freedom of a "person." As we saw in Chapter 2, § 2, Hegel holds that every human being has "formal freedom," the capacity to abstract from all particular determinations, desires, and interests. This capacity is what makes someone a person, "a self-consciousness of itself as a perfectly abstract I, in which all concrete limitedness and validity is negated and invalid" (PR § 35R). As persons, all human beings are equal (VPRig: 67-68). Even though the exercise of this capacity to abstract (as in negative freedom or arbitrariness) is not freedom in its most proper sense, Hegel holds just the same that it is essential to guarantee individuals in the modern state adequate room for the exercise of arbitrariness (Chapter 2, §§ 2, 5, and 11). This is the point of abstract right. "A person must give its freedom an external sphere in order to exist as Idea" (PR § 41). "Idea" for Hegel refers to a rational concept when it expresses or embodies itself in something real (WL6: 462-469/755-760; EL §§ 213-215; PR § 1); a spiritual being "exists as Idea" when it actualizes itself appropriately in the objective world. I "exist as Idea" when my personality, my capacity to make abstract choices, is given adequate scope to actualize itself, and in Hegel's view this happens when I have a sufficient "external sphere" subject to my arbitrary choice.

To justify the claim that human beings have abstract rights, what Hegel must show us is why formally free agents ought to guarantee one another exclusive spheres of arbitrary activity. Hegel's argument on this point is developed in his Jena period lectures and shows up again in the Encyclopedia (1817, final version 1830) (EG §§ 430-436). Much of it is merely presupposed in the Philosophy of Right, since that work deals with objective spirit, whereas the argument in question belongs to the Encyclopedia y s discussion of subjective spirit. Hegel's argument is based on the concept of "recognition" (Anerkennung), or mutual awareness. The gist of Hegel's position is that I can have an adequate consciousness of myself only if I am recognized by others, and recognition can be adequate only if it is fully mutual**.** Much in Hegel's discussion of recognition is novel and provocative, but both the concept of recognition and its use as the basis of a theory of natural right are derived from Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right (GNR) (1796). It will enhance our understanding of Hegel's theory of recognition and the rights of persons if we are aware of the Fichtean theory he adopts and modifies.

For Hegel, the "object" of a desire is never merely a subjective mental state, such as pleasure or the absence of pain. Hegel interprets desire as a function of self-conscious, spiritual being - an embodied being situated in a world of external objects toward which its desires are directed. Further, Hegel interprets this desire in accordance with his theory of spirit as selfactualization through the overcoming of otherness. The fundamental desire that Hegel attributes to self-consciousness is a desire for self-worth or "selfcertainty." As spirit, the self engages in an activity of positing an object and then interpreting itself in terms of it. Self-certainty is gained only through something external, which is brought into harmony with the self, an objectivity whose independence is done away with or "negated." This negation of the object refers to my using it up or consuming it (as when I literally eat it up), but also includes my shaping or forming it. Even more broadly, it covers any sort of integration of it into my plans and projects. In the most abstract form, it occurs when I assert my dominion over the object in the social forms suitable to property ownership (PR §§ 54-70). The attempt to achieve self-certainty through the appropriation of things proves inadequate. Satisfaction taken in external objects merely leads to a new desire for a new object. This result only points to the fact that the desiring self-consciousness is always dependent on a new object, whereas its aim was rather to establish its own independence, and the nothingness of the object (EG § 428). What self-consciousness needs is an object that brings about this negation within itself without ceasing to be an object. But only a self-consciousness is able to endure the "contradiction" of negating itself or being its own other (PhG 11162). In other words, "self-consciousness reaches its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (PhG 1 175).

From the standpoint of self-certainty, the fundamental problem with nonhuman objects of desire is that they can contribute to my self-worth only secondarily or indirectly, by confirming an image of myself that I already have independently of them. Even animals, which are living and conscious objects, cannot provide me directly with a sense of my self-worth, since they possess no conception of a free self, and so I can never find in them a confirming perspective on myself. The only "other" that can form a conception of me as a free self is another free self. Self-consciousness can find satisfaction for its desire for self-certainty only when it comes "outside itself," so that its object becomes "another self" (PhG K 179; EG § 429,A). "Self-consciousness has an existence only through being recognized by another self-consciousness" (NP 78); "Self-consciousness is in and for itself insofar and through the fact that it is in and for itself for another, i.e., it is only as something recognized" (PhG 1f 178). When I see my free selfhood reflected back to me out of another self, I actualize my self-consciousness in the form of "spirit," as a "self-restoring sameness." It is only in relation to another free self that I can be truly free, "with myself in another" as regards my self-certainty. Thus the full actualization of spirit is possible only through the relation between selves that recognize each other. This is why Hegel even goes so far as to say that the essence of spirit itself lies in recognition, in a community of selves, "the I that is a we and the we that is an I" (PhG 1 177; cf. EG § 436).-

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Epistemology – only my fws understanding of self-actualization can justify knowledge claims and overcome external world skep.

Haase 18 [Matthias Haase, Matthias Haase is Assistant Professor of Philosophy. He is a scholar in the research project Virtue, Happiness, & the Meaning of Life led by Candace Vogler and Jennifer Frey. His research is focused on foundational topics at the intersection of ethics and philosophy of mind. A central historical interest is the tradition of German Idealism, especially the aspects that are tied to Aristotle. He has also written on Wittgenstein and Frege. His current research project is devoted to the question whether there are specifically practical species of knowledge, reason and truth--and what this means for the philosophical account of our fundamental concepts of ethics like good, ought, justice as well as action, character and will, Scielo Brazil, “Knowing What I have Done,” October-December 2018, [https://www.scielo.br/j/man/a/z84BtYdYRgps9VZkyfwzDZy/?lang=en]/](https://www.scielo.br/j/man/a/z84BtYdYRgps9VZkyfwzDZy/?lang=en%5d/) lm

Now, our kitchen scene suggests that the kind of cognitive advance sketched above can be made in the first person perspective of acting. When I answer your question how I know that the spatula is in the left drawer by saying ‘I put it there’, I seem to claim that in this case I was epistemically excluding all those possibilities by determining reality accordingly – that is, through my actualizing my power to move things: I intentionally went, step by step, through the motions until there was no space for possible interference anymore. Our topic seems to be connected with what the tradition calls ‘practical’ or ‘spontaneous’ knowledge. It is said to differ[s] from ‘theoretical’ or ‘receptive’ knowledge through the way in which it relates to its object. While theoretical knowledge depends on the reality of its object, practical knowledge is productive of the reality of its object.16 As knowledge in general is the self-conscious exclusion of the possibility of things being otherwise, practical knowledge is understanding of necessity: in ‘producing’ the reality of its object practical knowledge is knowledge of why this reality comes about; it is, to quote the famous line G.E.M. Anscombe takes from Aquinas, knowledge that is “the cause of what it understands”.

#### 2] Linguistics – There’s no such thing as a private language game – language is entirely self-referential and predicated upon a relation between mutually recognizing Self and Other. Ethical theories must follow from this relation because you can’t look to something beyond language to justify them.

Wallace 95 [Robert M. Wallace, Robert M. Wallace is at Cornell University, Sage School of Philosophy. They are interested in Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics, Social and Political, University of Illinois Press, “Mutual Recognition and Ethics: A Hegelian Reformulation of the Kantian Argument for the Rationality of Morality,” July 1995, [https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20009827.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A0986530d043efabf564dd2903e28609a]/](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20009827.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A0986530d043efabf564dd2903e28609a%5d/) lm

6. This pair of problems is my way of spelling out what lies behind the pivotal paragraph 177 of the Phenomenology of Spirit, in which Hegel says: "a self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so does it in fact exist; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its other-being become explicit for it" (Ph?nomenologie des Geistes, vol. 3 in G. W. F. Hegel, Theorie Werkausgabe, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), pp. 144-45. The paragraph numbers are those of A. V. Miller's translation: G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977]). The final clause?"for only in this way . . . "? states the problem that the analysis of mutual recognition, in the following paragraphs (178-184), is meant to solve, for the unity-seeking agent. It is a neglect of this motivating problem (or "problems," in my version) that prevents the "mutual recognition" argument, in many published interpretations, from carrying conviction. In his Hegel's Ethical Thought (p. 85), Allen Wood suggests that "the only 'other' that can form a conception of me as a free self is another free self"(p. 85); and that I need such a "confirming perspective on myself"(p. 85), from some source other than myself, because that would be the ultimate "overcoming of otherness" (such overcom? ing being the essential characteristic of "spirit") (p. 84). What this account lacks is a systematic explanation of why I should be interested in participating in "spirit" in this sense. Michael Inwood, in his article on "Recognition and Acknowledgement" in his A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), suggests that in order to be self-conscious the o[ne]ther must think?must therefore speak a language?must therefore speak to others?and in order to speak to others must recognize them, so that if I need to see an other as an "I" in order to see myself as an "I" these connections would explain why I could not do this unless the other recognized me. What this does not explain is why I need to see an other as an "I" in order to see myself as an "I." Nor have I been able to find a convincingly integrated exposition of Hegel's argument in Ludwig Siep, Anerkennung als praktisches Prinzip: Untersuchungen zu Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes (Freiburg: Alber, 1979), Andreas Wildt, Autonomie und Anerkennung (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1982), or Robert R. Williams, Recognition. Fichte and Hegel on the Other (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), helpful though they (and Wood and Inwood) all are in interpreting particular passages and connecting different Hegelian themes and texts.

#### 3] Action theory – Every action can be broken down to infinite movements. Only the formation of a subject can unify the movements under a will.

#### 4] Performativity – debate requires mutual-recognition and self-actualization as the neg and aff recognize each other’s roles and personality is expressed in our cases.

#### 5] Subject formation is a side constraint as we can only have ethical obligations when we are ethical subjects that mutually recognize one another.

#### 6] Bindingness – You can deny the value of pleasure but you can’t deny mutual recognition because it’s intrinsic to language and the act of being. Bindingness outweighs since for the res to be true or false it must be binding and obligations presuppose that your binded to them.

#### Now negate –

#### 1] IPP are justified for enabling self-actualization.

Moore and Hinma 18 [Moore, Adam and Ken Himma, "Intellectual Property", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/intellectual-property/]/ lm

Personality theorists such as Hegel maintain that individuals have moral claims to their own talents, feelings, character traits, and experiences. We are self-owners in this sense. Control over physical and intellectual objects is essential for self-actualization—by expanding our selves outward beyond our own minds and mixing these selves with tangible and intangible items, we both define ourselves and obtain control over our goals and projects. For Hegel, the external actualization of the human will requires property (Hegel 1821). Property rights are important in two ways according to this view. First, by controlling and manipulating objects, both tangible and intangible, our will takes form in the world and we obtain a measure of freedom. Individuals may use their physical and intellectual property rights, for example, to shield their private lives from public scrutiny and to facilitate life-long project pursuit. Second, in some cases our personality becomes fused with an object—thus moral claims to control feelings, character traits, and experiences may be expanded to intangible works (Humboldt 1792; Kohler 1969).

Even if we acknowledge the force of these objections, there does seem to be something intuitively appealing about personality-based theories of intellectual property rights. Suppose, for example, that Mr. Friday buys a painting at a garage sale—a long-lost Crusoe original. Friday takes the painting home and alters the painting with a marker, drawing horns and mustaches on the figures in the painting. The additions are so clever and fit so nicely into the painting that Friday hangs it in a window on a busy street. There are at least two ethical worries to consider in this case. First, the alterations by Friday may cause unjustified economic damage to Crusoe. Second, and independent of the economic considerations, Friday’s actions may damage Crusoe’s reputation. The integrity of the painting has been violated without the consent of the author, perhaps causing long-term damage to his reputation and community standing. If these claims are sensible, then it appears that we are acknowledging personality-based moral “strings” attaching to certain intellectual works. By producing intellectual works, authors and inventors put themselves on display, so-to-speak, and incur certain risks. Intellectual property rights afford authors and inventors a measure of control over this risk. To put the point a different way, it is the moral claims that attach to personality, reputation, and the physical embodiments of these individual goods that justify legal rules covering damage to reputation and certain sorts of economic losses.

Moreover, personality-based theories of intellectual property often appeal to other moral considerations. Hegel’s personality-based justification of intellectual property rights included an incentive-based component as well—he asserts that protecting the sciences promotes them, benefiting society (Hegel 1821). Perhaps the best way to protect these intuitively attractive personality-based claims to intangible works is to adopt a more comprehensive system designed to promote progress and social utility.

#### 2] IPP is necessary for achieving mutual recognition through materializing the personality of the inventor in the market – no limitations are justified.

Hughes 88 [Justin Hughes, Prior to joining Loyola in 2013, Professor Justin Hughes taught at Cardozo Law School where he served as director of Cardozo’s Intellectual Property Program, 2004 through 2008, and founded the law school’s Indie Film Clinic, the first of its kind, “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property,” 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 330-350 (1988), [https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html]/](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html%5d/) lm

Not only does Hegel's personality theory pose no inherent objection to this kind of alienation of intellectual property, it also provides affirmative justifications. Hegel focuses on one such justification -- concern for the economic well-being of the intellectual property creator. [n243](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n243)

At first blush, this economic rationale seems far removed from the concerns of personality theory, [n244](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n244) yet it can be recast into the framework of the personality theory. From the Hegelian perspective, payments from intellectual property users to the property creator are acts of recognition. These payments acknowledge the individual's claim over the property, and it is through such acknowledgement that an individual is recognized by others as a person. [n245](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n245) "Recognition" involves more than lip service. If I say "this forest is your property" and then proceed to flagrantly trespass, cut your timber, and hunt your deer, I have not recognized your property rights. Similarly, verbal recognition of an intellectual property claim is not equal to the recognition implicit in a payment. Purchasers of a copyrighted work or licensees of a patent form a circle of people recognizing the creator as a person.

Furthermore, this generation of income complements the personality theory in as much as income facilitates further expression. When royalties from an invention allow the inventor to buy a grand piano he has always wanted, the transaction helps maximize personality. But this argument tends to be too broad. First, much income is used for basic necessities, leading to the vacuous position that life-sustenance is "personally maximizing" because it allows the personality to continue. Second, this approach could justify property rights for after-the-fact development of personality interests without requiring [\*350] such interests in the property at the time the property rights are granted.

The personality theory provides a better, more direct justification for the alienation of intellectual property, especially copies. The alienation of copies is perhaps the most rational way to gain exposure for one's ideas. This is a non-economic, and perhaps higher, form of the idea of recognition: [in] respect, honor, and admiration. Even for starving artists recognition of this sort may be far more valuable than economic rewards.

Two conditions appear essential, however, to this justification of alienation: first, the creator of the work must receive public identification, and, second, the work must receive protection against any changes unintended or unapproved by the creator.VARA Hegel's prohibition of "complete" alienation of intellectual property appears to result from his recognition of the necessity for these two conditions. While he would permit alienation of copies, and even the rights to further reproduction, [n246](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n246) he disapproves alienation of "those goods, or rather substantive characteristics, which constitute . . . private personality and the universal essence of . . . self-consciousness." [n247](https://cyber.harvard.edu/IPCoop/88hugh2.html#n247) Such alienation necessarily occurs if the recognition of the connection between a creator and his expression is destroyed or distorted. When the first condition is violated, this recognition is destroyed; when the second condition is violated, it is distorted.

### 2

#### The affs narrative of health inequality between developed and developing nations and desire for expanding Western medicine creates a Medical Gaze which objectifies Aboriginal bodies and continues colonialism.

Bradley 16 [Elain Bradley, Canadian Medical Education Journal, NCBI, PMC, US National Library of Medicine, National Institute of Health, “Changing perspectives: attempting to de-colonize the gaze of a Canadian medical student,” December 5th, 2016, [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/]/](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/%5d/) lm

In my final year of medical school, I undertook an elective focused on urban Indigenous health. I had a certain impression and idea of the learning I was going to gain, as the health inequities faced by Indigenous peoples in Canada are extensively documented.[2](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b2-cmej-07-37),[17](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b17-cmej-07-37)–[19](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b19-cmej-07-37) I was both confused and surprised when my first task as part of my elective was to locate Indigenous community events and find some to attend. I remember walking into a drum social, awkwardly finding a seat, and anxious about how the evening would unfold. As I watched people gather to eat, dance, and socialize, I was left feeling unsure of what my objective was; what knowledge was I to gain from this encounter?

Much of medical school involves observation: watching a lecture or procedure, sitting in on a patient interview. Our place as an observer is formalized within the medical system, with “observer-ships” and “shadowing” acting as both mandatory curricular components and elective experiences. The intent is to observe a physician, and, in turn, observe patients, utilizing the living model of illness in order to learn how to identify and diagnose. Rarely, if ever, is the impact of our observation on these objects, these people, discussed.

Gaze theory, originating in both psychoanalytic and feminist theory, postulates the idea of “gazing” as a “one way event that denies the agency of the perceived object.”[11](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b11-cmej-07-37) In Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema (1989), Laura Mulvey describes the concept of the “male gaze” in film;she describes how the male, as both the creator and observer of the film, uses his position of power and privilege to oppress and objectify the female subjects on screen.[14](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b14-cmej-07-37) Foucault (1994) describes the historical emergence of the “medical gaze;” describing how patients in Paris in the 18th Century were transformed into objects to be studied as they entered the physician’s office.[5](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b5-cmej-07-37) Foucault suggested that the “medical gaze” established a power relationship between the physician (the “gazer”) and the patient(the object of this “gaze”).[5](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b5-cmej-07-37) Foucault was not the first to reference this power imbalance, David T. Goldberg (1993) observes that “the neutrality and objectifying distantiation of the rational scientist” creates “the theoretical space for a view to develop subjectless bodies”.[8](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b8-cmej-07-37) He expands upon this to say, that once a person is “objectified” they could be “analyzed, categorized, classified, and ordered with the cold gaze of scientific distance.”[8](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b8-cmej-07-37)

The “study” of Indigenous people in Canada by the medical system has a long and difficult history, including the extensive experimentation that occurred as part of the residential school system, as “bureaucrats, doctors, and scientists... increasingly came to view Aboriginal bodies as “experimental materials.”[14](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b14-cmej-07-37) In more recent years, epidemiological studies of Indigenous communities have examined the inequities in health for Indigenous Canadians, but have “depicted Aboriginal and Native American peoples as sick, powerless, and lacking in capacity, information that is used to reinforce unequal power relations, paternalism, and dominance and to undermine their aspirations for sovereignty” resulting in communities expressing concern and resistance to outsider research.[12](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b12-cmej-07-37)

As this (certainly not exhaustive) set of examples illustrates, Foucault’s concept of a “medical gaze” is too simple to be applied in Canada; it fails to incorporate the intersectionality of the objects it looks upon. Gilman (1985) writes that “medical icons... are iconographic in that they represent these realities in a manner determined by the historical position of the observers, their relationship to their own time, and to the history of the conventions which they deploy”.[7](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b7-cmej-07-37) This idea is expanded upon by Yancy (2008), who argues that colonized peoples are subject to the “colonial gaze”, a historical perspective stemming from European colonizers who were able to “discern with “clarity” and “accuracy” the “truth” about certain human bodies vis-à-vis a white racist disc[o]ursive regime of truth.”[16](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b16-cmej-07-37) He continues on to suggest that “this racist form of colonial establishment precludes mutual recognition as equals.”

The existence of a “colonial gaze” in the medical literature is less clearly defined. The concept of a formalized “medical student gaze” is addressed by Davenport (2000) in her analysis of medical student involvement in a U.S. clinic for the homeless. She suggests that when students were outside formal medical institutions they were able to manifest “social reflexivity—scrutiny and revision of social beliefs and practices.”[4](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b4-cmej-07-37) Davenport’s analysis represents a positive outlook, indicating that students, outside the formalized objectivity of educational institutions are able to break down their “medical gaze.” Yet, not unlike Foucault, her analysis falls short in its simplicity, limiting the discussion of identity to that of socioeconomic status, and failing to incorporate the impact of institutionalized colonialism on the “medical gaze.” As such, her lack of reflexivity in this parameter limits the applicability of this analysis. In contrast, Bleakley et al. (2008) identify a colonial gaze in the process of the globalization of Westernized medical education, stating that educators in the metropolitan West working internationally “risk continuing the process of colonisation despite [their] good intentions.”[3](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b3-cmej-07-37) In the nursing literature, Racine (2011) in her examination of international nursing placements, echoes similar themes addressing the “potential for educational and scientific exploitation.”[15](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#b15-cmej-07-37) Despite the authors’ emphasis on reflexivity and examining gaze, the articles both focus entirely on international interactions and do not look at medical education as an agent of colonisation within Western nations themselves. Still, a common theme throughout these articles suggests a process of awareness and self-reflexivity among health care practitioners, but how can this translate into something that can be taught to medical students?

#### That feeds into the settler colonialist logic of elimination that causes Native erasure and justify genocides – the ROTB should be to combat Settler Colonialism.

Wolfe 06 [Patrick Wolfe is an Australian anthropologist and ethnographer whose work sparked a surge in studies of settler colonial societies, Taylor and Francis Online, “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native,” December 21st 2006, [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240]/](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240%5d/) lm

The question of genocide is never far from discussions of settler colonialism. Land is life—or, at least, land is necessary for life. Thus contests for land can be—indeed, often are—contests for life. Yet this is not to say that settler colonialism is simply a form of genocide. In some settler-colonial sites (one thinks, for instance, of Fiji), native society was able to accommodate—though hardly unscathed—the invaders and the transformative socioeconomic system that they introduced. Even in sites of wholesale expropriation such as Australia or North America, settler colonialism's genocidal outcomes have not manifested evenly across time or space. Native Title in Australia or Indian sovereignty in the US may have deleterious features, but these are hardly equivalent to the impact of frontier homicide. Moreover, there can be genocide in the absence of settler colonialism. The best known of all genocides was internal to Europe, while genocides that have been perpetrated in, for example, Armenia, Cambodia, Rwanda or (one fears) Darfur do not seem to be assignable to settler colonialism. In this article, I shall begin to explore, in comparative fashion, the relationship between genocide and the settler-colonial tendency that I term the logic of elimination.[1](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) I contend that, though the two have converged—which is to say, the settler-colonial logic of elimination has manifested as genocidal—they should be distinguished. Settler colonialism is inherently eliminatory but not invariably genocidal.

The logic of elimination not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people, though it includes that. In common with genocide as Raphaël Lemkin characterized it,[6](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) settler colonialism has both negative and positive dimensions. Negatively, it strives for the dissolution of native societies. Positively, it erects a new colonial society on the expropriated land base—as I put it, settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.[7](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) In its positive aspect, elimination is an organizing principal of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence. The positive outcomes of the logic of elimination can include officially encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations. All these strategies, including frontier homicide, are characteristic of settler colonialism. Some of them are more controversial in genocide studies than others.

As it developed on the colonial ground, the conquest of labour subordinated economic efficiency to the demands of building a self-sufficient proto-national Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) at the expense of the surrounding Arab population. This situated struggle produced the new Jew as subject of the labour that it conquered. In the words of Zionist architect Julius Posner, reprising a folk song, “We have come to the homeland to build and be rebuilt in it … the creation of the new Jew … [is also] the creator of that Jew.”[15](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) As such, the conquest of labour was central both to the institutional imagining of a goyim-rein (gentile-free) zone and to the continued stigmatization of Jews who remained unredeemed in the galut (diaspora). The positive force that animated the Jewish nation and its individual new-Jewish subjects issued from the negative process of excluding Palestine's Indigenous owners.

In short, elimination refers to more than the summary liquidation of Indigenous people, though it includes that. In its positive aspect, the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler-colonial society. It is both as complex social formation and as continuity through time that I term settler colonization a structure rather than an event, and it is on this basis that I shall consider its relationship to genocide.

The US parallel is significant because, unlike the South African case, the formal apparatus of oppression (slavery) was overcome but Whites remained in power.[76](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) On emancipation, Blacks became surplus to some requirements and, to that extent, more like Indians. Thus it is highly significant that the barbarities of lynching and the Jim Crow reign of terror should be a post-emancipation phenomenon.[77](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) As valuable commodities, slaves had only been destroyed in extremis. Even after slavery, Black people continued to have value as a source of super-cheap labour (providing an incitement to poor Whites), so their dispensability was tempered.[78](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) Today in the US, the blatant racial zoning of large cities and the penal system suggests that, once colonized people outlive their utility, settler societies can fall back on the repertoire of strategies (in this case, spatial sequestration) whereby they have also dealt with the native surplus. There could hardly be a more concrete expression of spatial sequestration than the West Bank barrier. There again, apartheid also relied on sequestration. Perhaps Colin Tatz, who insists that Israel is not genocidal,[79](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) finds it politic to allow an association between the Zionist and apartheid regimes as the price of preempting the charge of genocide. It is hard to imagine that a scholar of his perspicacity can have failed to recognize the Palestinian resonances of his statement, made in relation to Biko youth, that: “They threw rocks and died for their efforts.”[80](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) Nonetheless, as Palestinians become more and more dispensable, Gaza and the West Bank become less and less like Bantustans and more and more like reservations (or, for that matter, like the Warsaw Ghetto). Porous borders do not offer a way out.

#### Vote neg to reject the affs medical gaze – the K is an indict on their ability to read the aff and independent offense under our framework.

#### They can’t weigh case

#### 1] Fiat Illusory – ballots don’t pass policies in the real world, but our discourse spills up.

#### 2] Scholarship first – debate’s an educational activity before it’s a game.

#### 3] Reps first – they’re a prereq to all policy and action.

Doty, 1996 (Roxanne Lynn Doty, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University, “Imperial Encounters” 5-6)

This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices-that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth." The goal-of-analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine bow certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and, identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. AS Said (1979: 21) notes, Mere is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. SO, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real: though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada” to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion; a 'show of force," "training exercise, “a "rescue, “and SO on. What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of Dichotomies – thought/reality appearance essence, mind matter, word/world, subjective/objective - that a critical genealogy calls into Question. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms the material and performative character of discourse. 'In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices 1 am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a 'reality' whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the ‘first world'. Focusing on discursive practices enables one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

### Underview

#### Presumption negates – infinite ways for something to be false but only one way for them to be true, and the aff has the burden of proof. Permissibility negates – if IPP isn’t bad then its morally neutral and permissible. No 1ar theory, any response to the CI will be new in the 2ar, means neg loses every rnd, and 7-6 time skew after 1n. No new 2ar weighing a] arguments must be made in the first available speech to make them and b] they get two speeches to reply to NC weighing while I get none.

# Case