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#### The intertwined regimes of power that construct society define themselves in opposition to the queer Other that directly threatens the “good” National population. Binaries that paint the Other as the virus infiltrating the healthy population that must be located and “cured” mark queer bodies for violence and death.

Spade 2011 - Dean Spade is a lawyer, writer, trans activist, and Associate Professor of Law at Seattle University School of Law. In 2002, he founded the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, a non-profit law collective in New York City that provides free legal services to transgender, intersex and gender non-conforming people who are low-income and/or people of color (“Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law,” South End Press) hrmb.

This way of understanding the dispersion of power helps us realize that power is not simply about certain individuals being targeted for death or exclusion by a ruler, but instead about the creation of norms that distribute vulnerability and security. When we think about power this way, we undertake a different kind of examination of conditions that concern us, asking different questions. Mitchell Dean describes how this kind of analysis attends to the routines of bureaucracy; the technologies of notation, recording, compiling, presenting and transporting of information, the theories, programmes, knowledge and expertise that compose a field to be governed and invest it with purposes and objectives; the ways of seeing and representing embedded in practices of government; and the different agencies with various capacities that the practices of government require, elicit, form and reform. To examine regimes of government is to conduct analysis in the plural: there is already a plurality of regimes of practices in a given territory, each composed from a multiplicity of in principle unlimited and heterogeneous elements bound together by a variety of relations and capable of polymorphous connections with one another. Regimes of practices can be identified whenever there exists a relatively stable field of correlation of visibilities, mentalities, technologies and agencies, such that they constitute a kind of taken- for- granted point of reference for any form of problematization.6 This kind of analysis can be seen in the work of those using “industrial complex” terms to describe and resist the forces of militarization and criminal punishment that pervade US society. It can also be seen in the work that is being done for disability justice.

Critical disability studies and the disability rights and disability justice movements have shown us how regimes of knowledge and practices in every area of life establish norms of “healthy” bodies and minds, and consign those who are perceived to fall outside those norms to abandonment and imprisonment.7 Policies and practices rooted in eugenics have attempted (and continue to attempt) to eliminate the existence of people who fall outside those norms. Native scholars and activists have shown how white European cultural norms determine everything from what property is to what gender and family structure should look like, and how every instance of the imposition of these norms has been used in the ser vice of the genocide of indigenous people. In these locations and many others, we can see how the circulation of norms creates an idea that undergirds conditions of violence, exploitation, and poverty that social movements have resisted— the idea that the national population (*constructed* as those who meet racial, gender, sexual, ability, national origin, and other norms) must be protected from those “ others” (those outside of such norms) who are portrayed again and again in new iterations at various historical moments as “threats” or “drains.” This operation of norms is central to producing the idea of the national body as ever- threatened and to justifying the exclusion of certain populations from programs that distribute wealth and life chances (white schools, Social Security benefits, land and housing distribution programs) and the targeting of these same populations for imprisonment and violence (including criminal punishment, immigration enforcement, racist drug laws, sterilization, and medical experimentation). Even though norms are incorporated into various spaces and institutions inconsistently and applied arbitrarily, they still achieve the overall purpose of producing security for some populations and vulnerability for others. Many social movements have produced analyses of how various groups are harmed by the promotion of a national identity centered in norms about race, bodies, health, gender, and reproduction. These constructs often operate in the background and are presumed as “neutral” features of various administrative systems. The existence and operation of such administrative norms is therefore less visible than those moments when people are fired or killed or excluded explicitly because of their race or body type or gender, yet they sometimes produce more significant harm because they structure the entire context of life. I am going to return again and again in the chapters that follow to key examples, such as the dismantling of welfare programs and the expansion of criminal and immigration enforcement, that are central to contemporary politics and help illustrate how life chances are distributed through racialized- gendered systems of meaning and control, often in the form of programs that attest to be race- and gender- neutral and merely administrative.

#### Furthermore, the assumptions of the west that through the spread and accessibility of medicine that it “SOLVES FOR DEATH” is one that ignores the situation of those otherized: they may not want to talk about why they got the disease, or the homosexual lives they lead and the “corrective r\*pe” that they had to go through. The West through doing this will further conflate sexual activity with sexual identity and consigns those who are homosexual to be diseased. Spurlin ‘18

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The biomedicalization of homosexuality under National Socialism was by no means a momentary aberration as nationalist discourses in much of the postcolonial world today read homosexuality as a colonial import and as a form of western decadence that is foreign to indigenous cultural traditions. **Western biomedicine has played a role historically as a tool of imperial power.** Frantz Fanon, an early postcolonial theorist originally from Martinique who studied medicine and psychiatry in France, and served a medical residency in Algeria and became involved in Algeria’s struggle for independence, noted that medical knowledge was one of the most insidious tools of colonial conquest and contributed to the dehumanizing logic of colonial rule (1963, 296). Similarly speaking of the French colonial conquest of Algeria, Richard Keller notes in Colonial Madness that physicians, surgeons, and pharmacists saw diagnosis and treatment as a contest over civilization alongside health and disease (2007, 11). In terms of sexuality, this meant that European physicians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries read Africa in particular as “a space of savage violence and lurid sexuality” (1). Largely as a result of the effects of the so-called civilizing mission of colonialism, and the remnants of homophobic laws that often have their origins in colonial administration, **HIV/AIDS sufferers in many postcolonial societies today bear the stigma of sexual deviance and moral laxity**, and **these markings have been shaped by a history of imperialism, outdated western psychiatric opinion on the etiology of homosexuality, and causal links between homosexuality and HIV/AIDS constructed by western biomedicine in the early history of the pandemic.** Yet the effects of the biomedical justification of colonial rule continue in the contemporary surveillance and tracking of HIV/AIDS by global health institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNAIDS. As Cindy Patton has argued, the term “African AIDS,” used early in the pandemic, mobilized racist ideologies of unchecked, unbridled sexuality amongst indigenous Africans and amongst blacks in general.8 The rhetorical strategies of medical thought-styles in representations of HIV/AIDS globally, Patton notes, have been deeply layered with social ideologies around race, class, and sexuality, and have the power “to structure the terms through which bodies become visible as the locations of disease, of an epidemic” (2002, 26). Another problem with the effects of imperialism was the initial reluctance of many African nations to admit to a presence of homosexuality within their borders and even higher rates of HIV infection than were originally assumed or predicted. This was tied to **deep-seated historical anxieties** about discursive appropriations of African sexuality by the West in decadent terms, a legacy of colonialism which remains, as with the term “African AIDS,” in discourses surrounding the global surveillance and tracking of HIV/AIDS. At the same time, the reading of homosexuality as un-African by some strands of African cultural nationalism produced a significant gap for those at risk for HIV who escaped the categories of the West, given that some indigenous African men practiced anal sex with other men but did not identify as gay and lived heterosexual lives publicly, which was compounded by the fact that the WHO saw HIV transmission in Africa largely in heterosexual terms in the early days of the pandemic. **AIDS educators were not initially sensitive to the fact that anal sex has different meanings and values in different cultural systems that needed to be addressed in helping those men,** who engaged in the practice of anal sex with other men as partners, recognize that safer sex applied to them as well, even if they resisted taking on a gay identity as it is understood in the West. The adoption of the descriptive phrase “men who have sex with men,” or MSM, by the WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS provided a thinly veiled screen, or closet, at the time, not of mere secrecy but of a “safe” identity that was more legibly heterosexual but later, it was realized, no less at risk for HIV transmission or infection. The **problem with western understandings of homosexuality, initially imposed by global health organizations on indigenous men who have sex with men, was not so much the conflation of anal sex with homosexuality but the conflation of sexual practice with sexual identity**, which places Foucault’s proposition of a shift in homosexuality in the nineteenth century from a temporary aberration to an emergent identic category (1980, 42-43) even more firmly in the West. More important, such imperialist thinking missed significant forms of HIV transmission not immediately apparent to western thinking, which was based on the confluence of sexual practice with sexual identity and resulted in subsequent gaps and delays in education and prevention programs in large parts of sub-Sahara Africa early in the pandemic. **Additionally, placid assumptions in the West that the availability of anti-retroviral (ARV) medication no longer signifies eventual death for those who are HIV-positive fail to recognize that this is precisely what it does signify for the many indigenous Africans in sub-Sahara Africa dying from AIDS-related illnesses each day.** South Africa has the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the world, estimated by the South African government’s statistical report of 2015 to be at about 6.19 million of its total population of 54.96 million with the highest impact of HIV/AIDS falling on indigenous African women (Statistics South Africa 2015). A report on violence against women and HIV/AIDS by the UNAIDS Coalition on Women and AIDS and the WHO points to the everyday realities of gender inequality and intimate partner violence in South Africa. It is difficult for women, particularly younger women, to negotiate condom use with intimate male partners. High rates of gender-based violence and rape often serve as barriers to women seeking HIV testing, anti-retroviral treatment, and access to services which could prevent mother to child transmission (UNAIDS Global Coalition on Women and AIDS and WHO 2005). Alarming numbers of indigenous African women who identify as lesbian experience “corrective rape” as a cure for their so-called aberrant desires, placing them at risk for HIV/AIDS as well. **Another issue pointing to the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa is that in the late 1990s and in the early part of the last decade, some global health officials argued that those living in poverty were not literate enough to follow the prescribed regimen of treatment for taking ARV medication; this racist argument, in turn, was appropriated by western pharmaceutical companies as a rationale for not lowering the cost of the drugs so that they would be affordable to poorer South Africans, arguing that a failure to take the drugs responsibly could lead to drug-resistant strains of HIV.** The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa has been the most vocal and visible lobby fighting for the rights of HIV-positive people for equal access to treatment; in the late 1990s, TAC willfully ignored international trade agreements pertaining to the production, import, and use of less costly generic versions of patented ARV drugs for the treatment of HIV infection. More recently, TAC has put pressure on UNAIDS not to overstate the likelihood of ending HIV/AIDS given the deleterious effects this could have on donorship for global HIV/AIDS funding and the politics of sexual healthcare in the developing world. The French nongovernmental human rights organization, Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors without Borders, has worked in some of the most impoverished townships in South Africa providing ARV and TB medication to those living with HIVAIDS who are facing the challenges of poverty, marginalization, and stigma. Their work defies earlier biomedical discourses on HIV/AIDS in Africa purporting that poor Africans were too uneducated to take the medications responsibly. Given South Africa’s history of disobedience, struggle, and resistance to oppressive regimes, this work calls attention to the production and distribution of power which certainly is imbricated with biomedical thinking around ARV access and pricing in the developing world. In conclusion**, if sexual desire can become a mechanism for various forms of social manipulation, how does western biomedicine continue to play a significant political role in the cultural management of gender and sexual norms? How might the relationship between the clinical and cultural spheres be better engaged in biomedical knowledge and practice**, especially around the topic of sexual health, given biomedicine’s historic failure to recognize the influence of homophobia and transphobia in, and their reproduction through, the diagnostic histories of homosexuality and GIDC, and the racial, gender, class, and sexual ideologies that constructed early readings of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the West and in the postcolonial world? While the identification of risk groups is key for understanding patterns of disease transmission, especially in the case of HIV/AIDS in the context of sexual health, and is essential to helping people to avoid becoming ill, what social and cultural ideologies are operating in epidemiological discourses about specific risk groups and their behavior? **Where will this theorization occur?**

#### The WTO is historically oppressive – it is a system that can not be fixed because the issue of its oppression is INTRINSIC. Every justification that the WTO is something that is needed for such and such reason is one that tells the protestors that the oppression isn’t real and that they aren’t e otherized – this justifies queer oppression. Adler ‘21

[Adler, Paul. No Globalization Without Representation: U.S. Activists and World Inequality. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021. JSTORwww.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv18dvv2w. Accessed 4 Sept. 2021.]kitkat

On the other hand, **many in the Seattle activist community exhibited no trepidation about demanding the WTO’s abolition.** “No to WTO” served as their rallying cry. One moment of tension between these conflicting instincts came when Sally Soriano sent an organizing packet to the CTC offices in Washington, D.C. to show off the work being done in Seattle. The packet was titled “No to WTO,” and it sparked a firm pushback.8 Disagreements over the name of the coalition inspired weeks of debates. Dolan and others advocated for the name “People for Fair Trade” while many others wanted “No to WTO.” As recalled by activists on both sides, **this debate became a two-month slog that ended in the “ultimate wishy-washy compromise”**: **calling the group People for Fair Trade/No2WTO**.9 While choosing a name might seem a slight matter, it offered a window into other, more serious issues. One of the most contentious dilemmas for those organizing the protests revolved around representation, diversity, and accountability. The Sierra Club, Public Citizen, and others drew most of their support (and staffs) from white, middle-class professionals. **Though Seattle’s population was predominantly white, there were significant communities of color, including Filipinx, Black, Chinese, Chicanx and Mexican, and indigenous peoples**.10 **Many of the most politically involved people from the communities of color were radicals. Their analyses of inequality centered on white supremacy and the legacies of slavery and colonialism in the United States and abroad.** They saw a range of oppressions and issues as deeply interconnected and in need of inclusion in the protests’ messaging and actions. They also wanted to push past critiques of neoliberalism as something extraordinary or unprecedented. Instead, they understood this newest phase of political economy as the most recent iteration of colonialism and imperialism, forces to be understood not as problems of the past but as lived realities into the present. For example, Ace Saturay, who organized with the Filipinx community action group Sentenaryo ng Bayan linked agitation against the WTO to the century-long history of U.S. colonialism and neoimperialism in the Philippines. Brown Collective organizer Denise Cooper argued that calls to transform the criminal justice system should be included, viewing law enforcement suppression of anti-WTO demonstrators as a natural outgrowth of a long history of law enforcement repression of communities of color.11 In trying to insert such issues into the coalition, few worked harder than Lydia Cabasco, a Seattle local and the only woman of color and only queer person of color on the staff of People for Fair Trade/No2WTO.12 Attempts by radical activists of color and their allies to connect the WTO to such critiques proved a nonstarter with the big, predominantly white groups. Public interest groups also assiduously avoided discussion of immigration, seeing it as a “divisive” issue for their white working- and middle-class bases.13 Cabasco and some other organizers of color argued that these decisions made mobilizing people of color quite difficult. **Frustrating as well was the tokenization that activists of color experienced. Cabasco, for instance, remembered being placed “in charge of people of color, whatever that meant.”14 She proposed creating popular education tools that showed how the WTO’s decisions affected “what a person utilizes throughout his or her day,” from breakfast cereal to clothing, as a way of making it more tangible for more communities, but her idea received relatively little support.**15 Recollecting later, local immigrant and labor activist Juan Bocanegra argued that some of the disdain from white activists “was overt and some of it was innate to those types of groups. They’re racist, liberal, bullshitting groups.”16 Of course, people of color across Seattle did not profess a single, monolithic political view. While Cabasco tried to engage with white-dominant groups, other organizations beat their own paths. Ace Saturay noted that his organization remained “friends with Mike Dolan, also, because, as a coalition, we have to work together.” Yet, at the same time, he noted, “We have to carry our own message,” and Sentenaryo ng Bayan organizers worked diligently in their own communities to take action.17 Regino Martinez of El Centro de la Raza similarly accumulated his share of criticisms, but declared that, for this particular action, “You know what? We’re going to look past our differences, because this goes beyond differences. . . . This goes to justice and equality for people in the world.”18 However, **the fact that many of the radical, people of color led groups had to, yet again, bite their tongues and go around the liberal mainstream further showed how the “pragmatic” politics of Washington, D.C. constrained more transformative visions**.

#### The 1AC’s apocalyptic rhetoric focuses on futurity and the importance of survival through future reproduction excluding queer people.

Kouri-Towe 13 (Natalie; 6/16/13; Assistant Professor and Program Director for the Interdisciplinary Studies in Sexuality program at the Simone de Beauvoir Institute at Concordia University; Fuse, “Queer Apocalypse: Survivalism and Queer Life at the End” <http://fusemagazine.org/2013/06/36-3_kouri-owe>) SJZD

Queer adjective • Strange, odd, peculiar, eccentric. Also: of questionable character; suspicious, dubious. noun informal • colloq. (freq. derogatory). A homosexual; esp. a male homosexual. verb informal • To put out of order; to spoil. Also: to spoil the reputation or chances of (a person); to put (a person) out of favour (with another). • To cause (a person) to feel queer; to disconcert, perturb, unsettle. Now rare. [1] The apocalypse is coming and queers are going to spoil it. As narratives of impending apocalypse and postapocalyptic survival permeate our cultural and political landscapes, it becomes increasingly easy to imagine our end. Whether the end of a sustainable environment, the end of culture, or the end of global capitalist economies, the end of life as we know it is both a terrifying possibility and a promising fantasy of a radically different form of life beyond the present. Mainstream depictions of postapocalyptic survival largely centre on the archetypical figure of the male saviour or hero, and advance a familiar patriarchal instrumentalization of women’s bodies as vessels for the survival of the human species. But what alternate stories might we tell about the end, and how might a queer framework reshape our apocalyptic narratives? The proposal to think queerly about the apocalypse is not an attempt to rescue apocalypse stories from the insidious reproduction of hegemonic relations; rather it is an opportunity to playfully consider what queer approaches to survival at the end might offer to our rethinking of the present. Apocalyptic narratives are appealing because we find it hard to imagine a radically different social and political world without the complete destruction of the institutions and economies that were built and sustained through colonial and imperial violence and exploitation. If we are already thinking and talking about the apocalypse, then queer thinking about the apocalypse serves as an opportunity for rethinking narratives of politics in both the future and the present. As global, structural, economic and political asymmetries accelerate, more people live in conditions lacking basic resources like food and water, and increasingly suffer from criminalization and incarceration. It is clear that postapocalyptic survival is also not simply a fiction but a daily reality for many people. From refugee camps to welfare reforms, survival is more than an exercise in imagining a different world. But, even for those who are not living through conditions of catastrophic loss, thinking about apocalypse is enticing. We take pleasure in imagining how we might prepare or attempt survival in a shifted environment because to imagine how we might live differently is to introduce new realms of possibility for living differently in our present. So how can we reconcile both the demand for attending to the crisis of survival in the present and the fantasy of postapocalypse? Here queerness might offer us some considerations for rethinking the apocalypse and narratives of survival. Queer Survivalism Survivalism noun • A policy of trying to ensure one’s own survival or that of one’s social or national group. • The practicing of outdoor survival skills. [2] If survivalism is wrapped up in the preservation of the nation state, of race, of gender or of our social order in general, then the first contribution of queerness to the apocalypse is its disruption to the framing of who and what survives, and how. There can be no nation in queer postapocalyptic survival, because the nation presents a foundational problem to queer survival. The nation, which regulates gender and reproduction, requires normalized organizations of sexual and family life in order to reproduce or preserve the national population. If we are already at the end, then why not consider survival without the obligation of reproduction and the heteronormative family? Masculinist narratives of postapocalyptic survival deploy the male protagonist as the extension of the nation. Here, the male hero stands in the place of the military, the police or the law by providing safety and security to his family and “weak” survivors like children and animals. Queer survivalism, on the other hand, disrupts the normative embodiments of survivalism by redirecting our desires to queer bodies, opening up survival to those outside of the prototypes of fitness and health. Because postapocalyptic narratives replicate racist and ableist eugenic tropes of “survival of the fittest,” a queering of survivalism opens up space for thinking about, talking about and planning for more varied and accessible frameworks for doing survival. Conversely, a queering of survival might also open up the option of choosing not to survive, through the refusal of reproduction or the refusal of life itself. The Queer Apocalypse Apocalypse noun • More generally: a disaster resulting in drastic, irreversible damage to human society or the environment, esp. on a global scale; a cataclysm. [3] If we are going to imagine the destruction of the world as we know it, then why not make these fictions meaningful to the present? Lee Edelman has argued that queerness is “the place of the social order’s death drive.” [4] If queerness is a kind of end to the norms and structures of our world, then it makes sense that queerness might say something meaningful about imagining the end. Narratives of postapocalyptic survival function primarily as stories of individual survival against a hostile world, and often a hostile other — in the form of dangerous strangers or zombies. These narratives privilege the individual as the basic unit for survival, replicating the neoliberal values of individualism. At best, these narratives expand beyond the individual survivor when he is joined by his immediate family or builds a new family. Queer models of kinship offer alternate frameworks for imagining survival beyond the individual, through collectivity and alternative kinships. If we are going to imagine surviving either our present or our impending futures, we need collectives to survive. This is old news to people who have long survived through collective struggle and collective support. This is not to simply produce a romantic fantasy of a utopian community, but rather to acknowledge and recognize that strength comes from organizing together. If capitalist, nationalist, patriarchal, heteronormative and neoliberal logics tell us that we’re each responsible for our own lives, then what better queering can we offer than to reimagine stories of how we think about survival, or even to refuse to survive? So what tools do we need for queer survival? First, we need alternative models for building survival strategies. For instance, learning how to repurpose everyday objects, everyday networks and everyday resources. [5] Second, we need to consider models of communalism, and to develop better ways of communicating and working through conflict. Third, we need to strategize collectively, share skills, build skills and foster collaboration. And lastly, we need to mobilize what queers do best — spoiling, twisting and perverting the normative narratives that dominate survivalism and stories of apocalypse.

#### Debilitation and slow death are forms of control that emerge in order to avoid the spectacle of casualties; these biopolitical controls are wielded through social institutions, access to basic needs and medical care, and entrapment in cycles of oppression. As long as the state maintains its current power, militarily and economically, there can be no true change, just the endless shifting of other forms of control to maintain the same violent dynamics the current social empire necessitates. Puar ‘17

Jasbir Puar 2017 (The Right To Maim, Duke University Press pg x-xiv)

The might of Israel’s military—one of the most powerful in the world— is built upon the claim of an unchanging ontological vulnerability and precarity, driven by history, geopolitics, and geography. Alongside the “right to kill,” I noted a complementary logic long present in Israeli tactical calculations of settler colonial rule—that of creating injury and maintaining Palestinian populations as perpetually debilitated, and yet alive, in order to control them. The Israeli Defense Forces (idf) have shown a demonstrable pattern over decades of sparing life, of shooting to maim rather than to kill. This is ostensibly a humanitarian practice, leaving many civilians “permanently disabled” in an occupied territory of destroyed hospitals, rationed medical supplies, and scarce resources. This pattern appeared again during Operation Protective Edge; the number of civilian casualties was reported daily and justified through the logic of collateral damage, while the number of injuries was rarely commented upon and never included in reflections of the daily toll of the siege. Shooting to maim in order not to kill might appear as minor relief given the proclivity to shoot to kill. Why indeed were so many unarmed black victims of police brutality riddled with scores of bullets? But oscillations between the right to kill and the right to maim are hardly haphazard or arbitrary. The purportedly humanitarian practice of sparing death by shooting to maim has its biopolitical stakes not through the right to life, or even letting live, but rather through the logic of “will not let die.” Both are part of the deliberate debilitation of a population—whether through the sovereign right to kill or its covert attendant, the right to maim—and are key elements in the racializing biopolitical logic of security. Both are mobilized to make power visible on the body. Slated for death or slated for debilitation—both are forms of the racialization of individuals and populations that liberal (disability) rights frameworks, advocating for social accommodation, access, acceptance, pride, and empowerment, are unable to account for, much less disrupt. Fast-forward to the summer of 2016. July 10, 2016, was the fourth day of Black Lives Matter protests going on in New York City, as well as in many other locations across the United States. During the previous week, Hands Up, Don’t Shoot! xi the police shootings of Philando Castile in St. Paul, Minnesota, and Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, had galvanized protests all around the country. The shooting and killing of five police officers during a Black Lives Matter rally in Dallas had only amplified the lines of battle between civilians and law enforcement. The June 12 shooting in an Orlando queer club magnified a homonationalist discourse that posits Muslim homophobes as the primary danger to queer liberals of all colors, resulting in increased policing of lgbtq pride events during the summer. Bombings by isis in the previous month had targeted Nice, Istanbul, and Dhaka. Protesters started gathering at Standing Rock to fight the Dakota Access Pipeline. There were more shootings of black bodies to come. On this particular day, the main Black Lives Matter protest in New York City was happening in Times Square. Not far from this location, the Second Annual Disability Pride parade, marketed as a festival and celebration, was marching on Broadway from Union Square to Madison Square Park. International in scope, the parade included veterans and actors involved in the development of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. I was in a part of Manhattan equidistant from both activities, one being an action and the other being an event. The relationship between the two confounded me. I recalled that on June 24, Black Lives Matter withdrew from the San Francisco Pride Parade, citing fear of increased police presence in the parade post-Orlando. On July 3, Black Lives Matter, selected as the Toronto Pride Parade’s Honored Group, brought the parade to a complete halt in order to demand a series of conditions, including banning police from marching in the parade. I was struck by the discord between an increasingly visible disability empowerment discourse in human rights platforms, cultural productions, and public discourse, and the divestment of Black Lives Matter from narratives of pride, with dominant messaging at Black Lives Matter actions including: “Hands up, don’t shoot!” and “I can’t breathe!” I remained in the middle, perplexed. This is not an either/or situation, but neither is it resolved by the commonsense logic of both/and. Disability empowerment and pride are part of rights discourses even as expressions of maiming, debilitation, and disabling are central to economies and vocabularies of violence and exploitation. What kinds of biopolitical fissures produce a spectacle of disability empowerment and pride mere blocks from a movement protesting the targeted debilitation of an entire racialized population, contesting the production of disability that is central to state securitization practices? The New York City branch of the Peoples Power Assemblies (ppa), a part of the Movement for Black Lives, organizes a presence yearly at the Disability Pride March. Participants carry Black Disabled Lives Matter banners, signs that say “Stop the War on Black America” and “Support the Black Lives Matter Movement,” and placards noting that more than 50 percent of police shootings of black bodies involve individuals with disabilities. It is a direct action rather than a pride celebration, one demanding attention to both targeting of the disabled and targeting to disable, with distinctly dif­ferent terms from empowerment and pride rhetorics. As ppa member Colin Ashley put it, “Those on the sidelines either get it automatically and really cheer, or seem completely mystified as to why we would be in the march. We feel it is necessary to go in order to disrupt the normative messaging.”1 For its part, Black Lives Matter has been clear that people with disabilities are both survivors of injustice and also part of their assembly. Alicia Garcia writes that “Black Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, Black-undocumented folks, folks with records, women, and all Black lives along the gender spectrum. It centers those that have been marginalized within Black liberation movements. It is a tactic to (re)build fig. pref.1. Peoples Power Assemblies providing powerful counternarratives at the NYC Disability Pride March, July 10, 2016. the Black liberation movement.”2 And yet, the Movement for Black Lives received important feedback, specifically from the Harriet Tubman Collective, “A Collective of Black Deaf & Black Disabled organizers, community builders, activists, dreamers, lovers striving for radical inclusion and collective liberation,” about the absence of any acknowledgment of or discussion about the impact of disability in black communities in their six-point platform released in August 2016. 3 The intervention from the Harriet Tubman Collective not only highlights ableist frameworks of resistance; it also raises questions about how, in this time of political upheaval and dissent, meetings, protests, and actions could become more accessible to people with varying debilities, capacities, and disabilities. Today the solidarity pathways between Black Lives Matter and Free Palestine are rhizomatic and bountiful.4 Pro-Palestinian antiwar activists will join ppa next year, protesting both the targeting of disabled Palestinians by the idf and the targeting to debilitate, part of a biopolitics not of disability alone but a biopolitics of debilitation. I contend that the term “debilitation” is distinct from the term “disablement” because it foregrounds the slow wearing down of populations instead of the event of becoming disabled. While the latter concept creates and hinges on a narrative of before and after for individuals who will eventually be identified as disabled, the former comprehends those bodies that are sustained in a perpetual state of debilitation precisely through foreclosing the social, cultural, and political translation to disability. It is this tension, the tension between targeting the disabled and targeting to debilitate, the tension between being and becoming, this is the understated alliance that I push in this project. The first presumes a legitimate identification with disability that is manifest through state, market, and institutional recognition, if not subjective position: I call myself disabled. But this cannot be the end of the story, because what counts as a disability is already overdetermined by “white fragility” on one side and the racialization of bodies that are expected to endure pain, suffering, and injury on the other.5 As such, the latter is an understanding of biopolitical risk: to extrapolate a bit from Claudia Rankine’s prose: “I am in death’s position.”6 And to expand: I am in debility’s position. The biopolitics of debilitation is not intended to advocate a facile democratization of disability, as if to rehash the familiar cant that tells us we will all be disabled if we live long enough. In fact, depending on where we live, what resources we have, what traumas we have endured, what color our skin is, what access we have to clean water, air, and decent food, what type of health care we have, what kind of work we do . . . we will not all be disabled. Some of us will simply not live long enough, embedded in a distribution of risk already factored into the calculus of debilitation. Death’s position. Others, at risk because of seeming risky, may encounter disability in ways that compound the debilitating effects of biopolitics.

#### The collective resistance of the Stonewall riots is a spirit we need to recapture – embrace the mindset and radically refuse the police state is the only way to prevent the continuation of state violence towards the queer Other and the death of the revolutionary spirit

**Stanley 11** Stanley, E. A., & Smith, N. (2011). Captive genders: Trans embodiment and the prison industrial complex. Oakland, CA: AK Press.

Bright lights shattered the dark anonymity of the dance floor. The flicker warned of the danger of the coming raid. Well experienced, people stopped dancing, changed clothing, removed or applied makeup, and got ready. The police entered, began examining everyone’s IDs, and lined up the trans/gender-non-conforming folks to be “checked” by an officer in the restroom to ensure that they were wearing the legally mandated three pieces of “gender appropriate clothing.” Simultaneously the cops started roughing up people, dragging them out front to the awaiting paddy wagon. In other words, it was a regular June night out on the town for trans and queer folks in 1969 New York City. As the legend goes, that night the cops did not receive their payoff or they wanted to remind the patrons of their precarious existence. In the shadows of New York nightlife, [at] the **Stonewall** Inn, like most other “**gay bars**,” was owned and run by the mafia, which tended to have the connections within local government and the vice squad to know who to bribe in order to keep the bar raids at a minimum and the cash flowing. As the first few captured queers were forced into the paddy wagon, people hanging around outside the bar began throwing pocket change at the arresting **officers**; then the bottles started flying and then the **bricks**. With the majority of the patrons now outside the bar, a **crowd of angry trans/queer folks had gathered and forced the police to retreat** back **into the Stonewall**. **As their collective fury grew, a** few people uprooted a parking meter and used it as a battering ram in hopes of knocking down the bar’s door and escalating the physical confrontation with the cops. A tactical team was called to rescue the vice squad now barricaded inside the Stonewall. They eventually arrived, and the street battle raged for two more nights**. In a** blast of **radical collectivity**, trans/gender-non-conforming folks, queers of color, butches, drag queens, hair-fairies, homeless street youth, sex workers, and others **took up arms and fought back against** the **generations of oppression** that they were forced to survive.[1] Forty years later, on a similarly muggy June night in 2009, history repeated itself. At the Rainbow Lounge, a newly opened gay bar in Fort Worth, Texas, the police staged a raid, verbally harassing patrons, calling them “faggots” and beating a number of customers. One patron was slammed against the floor, sending him to the hospital with brain injuries, while seven others were arrested. These instances of brutal force and the administrative surveillance that trans and queer folks face today are not significantly less prevalent nor less traumatic than those experienced by the Stonewall riot[s] ers of 1969, however the way [of] s this violence is currently underst[anding violence] ood is quite different.[from the Rainbow Lounge] While community vigils and public forums were held in the wake of the Rainbow Lounge raid, the immediate response was ***not to fight back***, ***nor has there been*** much attempt to understand the raid in the broader context of the systematic violence trans and queer people face under the relentless force of the prison industrial complex (PIC).[2] Captive Genders is in part an attempt to think about the historical and political ideologies that continually naturalize the abusive force of the police with such power as to make them appear ordinary. This is not to argue that the types of resistance present at the Stonewall riots were commonplace during that time, nor to suggest that trans and queer folks do not fight back today; nonetheless one of our aims is to chart the multiple ways that trans and queer folks are subjugated by the police, along with the multiple ways that we have and that **we continue to resist in the face of these overwhelming structures**.[3] I start **with the Stonewall riot** not because it **was** **the** first, most important, or last instance of **radical refusal of the police state.** Indeed, the riots at San Francisco’s Compton’s Cafeteria in 1966 and at Los Angeles’s Cooper’s Doughnuts in 1959 remind us that the history of resistance is as long as the history of oppression. However, what is unique about the Stonewall uprising is that, within the United States context, it is made to symbolize the “birth of the gay rights movement.” Furthermore, dominant lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) political organizations like the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) attempt to build an arc of progress starting with the oppression of the Stonewall moment and ending in the current time of “*equality*” evidenced by campaigns for gay marriage, hate crimes legislation, and gays in the military. Captive Genders works to undo this narrative of progress, assimilation, and police cooperation by building an analysis that highlights the **historical and contemporary antagonisms between trans/queer folks and the police state**.[4] This collection argues that **prison abolition must be one of the centers of trans and queer liberation struggles**. Starting with abolition we open questions often disappeared by both mainstream LGBT and anti-prison movements. Among these many silences are the radical trans/queer arguments against the proliferation of hate crimes enhancements. Mainstream LGBT organizations, in collaboration with the state, have been working hard to make us believe that hate crimes enhancements are a necessary and useful way to make trans and queer people safer. Hate crimes enhancements are used to add time to a person’s sentence if the offense is deemed to target a group of people. However, hate crimes enhancements ignore the roots of harm, do not act as deterrents, and reproduce the force of the PIC, which produces more, not less harm. Not surprisingly, in October 2009, when President Obama signed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act into law, extending existing hate crimes enhancements to include “gender and sexuality,” there was no mention by the LGBT mainstream of the historical and contemporary ways that the legal system itself works to deaden trans and queer lives. As antidote, this collection works to understand how gender, sexuality, race, ability, class, nationality, and other markers of difference are constricted, often to the point of liquidation, in the name of a normative carceral state. Among the most volatile points of contact between state violence and one’s body is the domain of gender. An understanding of these connections has produced much important activism and research that explores how non-trans women are uniquely harmed through disproportionate prison sentences, sexual assault while in custody, and nonexistent medical care, coupled with other forms of violence. This work was and continues to be a necessary intervention in the ways that prison studies and activism have historically imagined the prisoner as always male and have until recently rarely attended to the ways that gendered difference produces carceral differences. Similarly, queer studies and political organizing, along with the growing body of work that might be called trans studies— while attending to the work of gender, sexuality, and more recently to race and nationality—has (with important exceptions) had little to say about the force of imprisonment or about trans/queer prisoners. Productively, we see this as both an absence and an opening for those of us working in trans/queer studies to attend—in a way that centers the experiences of those most directly impacted—to the ways that the prison must emerge as one of the major sites of trans/queer scholarship and political organizing.[5] In moments of frustration, excitement, isolation, and solidarity, Captive Genders grew out of this friction as a rogue text, a necessarily unstable collection of voices, stories, analysis, and plans for action. What these pieces all have in common is that they suggest that gender, ability, and sexuality as written through race, class, and nationality must figure into any and all accounts of incarceration, even when they seem to be nonexistent. Indeed, the **oftentimes ghosted ways that gender and heteronormativity function most forcefully are in their presumed absence.** In collaboration and sometimes in contestation, this project offers vital ways of understanding not only the specific experience of trans and queer prisoners, but also more broadly the ways that regimes of normative sexuality and gender are organizing structures of the prison industrial complex. To be clear, Captive Genders is not offered as a definitive collection. Our hope is that it will work as a space where conversations and connections can multiply with the aim of making abolition flourish.

## Case

#### Both Kant and his theories are inherently immoral – laundry list:

#### 1] It’s incoherent and immoral; CX proves. AFF can’t answer the basic “hiding Jews in your attic question,” and Kant is crystal clear that lying in this exact scenario is immoral.

**Kant 1799**

Immanuel Kant, *On A Supposed Right To Lie From Altruistic Motives (1799)*  <http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/~davpy35701/text/kant-sup-right-to-lie.pdf>

Thus the definition of a lie as merely an intentional untruthful declaration to another person does not require the additional condition that it must harm another, as jurists think proper in their definition (mendacium est falsiloquium in praeidicium alterius). For a lie always harms another; if not some other particular man, still it harms mankind generally, for it vitiates the source of law itself. This benevolent lie, however, can become punishable under civil law through an accident (casus), and that which escapes liability to punishment only by accident can also be condemned as wrong even by external laws. For instance, if by telling a lie you have prevented murder, you have made yourself legally responsible for all the consequences; but if you have held rigorously to the truth, public justice can lay no hand on you, whatever the unforeseen consequences may be. After you have honestly answered the murderer's question as to whether this intended victim is at home, it may be that he has slipped out so that he does not come in the way of the murderer, and thus that the murder may not be committed. But if you had lied and said he was not at home when he had really gone out without your knowing it, and if the murderer had then met him as he went away and murdered him, you might justly be accused as the cause of his death. For if you had told the truth as far as you knew it, perhaps the murderer might have been apprehended by the neighbors while he searched the house and thus the deed might have been prevented. Therefore, whoever tells a lie, however well intentioned he might be, must answer for the consequences, however unforeseeable they were, and pay the penalty for them even in a civil tribunal. This is because truthfulness is a duty which must be regarded as the ground of all duties based on contract, and the laws of these duties would be rendered uncertain and useless if **even the least exception** to them were admitted. To be truthful (honest) in all declarations, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited by no expediency.

#### 2] The Argument From Marginal Cases. Kant mistakenly grounds human dignity in rationality.

**Kant 1785**

Immanuel Kant, *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785). <https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf>

So morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, are the only things that have dignity. Skill and diligence in work have a •market price; wit, lively imagination, and humour have a •luxury price; but fidelity in promises and benevolence on principle (not benevolence from instinct) have •intrinsic value ·which I have called dignity·. If you don’t have these, neither nature nor art can supply anything that would make up for that lack in you; for their value doesn’t lie in the effects that flow from them—their usefulness, the advantages they bring—but only in the attitudes, i.e. the maxims of the will, that are ready to express themselves in this manner through actions, even if the actions don’t meet with success. For us to look on these actions with immediate favour and pleasure, we don’t have to bring in any of our subjective states, any immediate liking for or attraction to such actions. The actions exhibit the will that generates them as the object of an immediate respect, since nothing but reason is required to get the will to act like that. (Note that reason imposes these actions on the will; it doesn’t coax it into performing them, for that would flatly contradict the notion of duty.) This esteem lets the value of such a turn of mind be recognized as dignity ·or intrinsic value·, and puts it infinitely above any price; to compare it with, or weigh it against, things that have price would be to violate its holiness, as it were. And what is it, then, that justifies virtue, or a morally good frame of mind, in making such lofty claims ·for itself·? It is its enabling the rational being to have a share in the giving of universal laws and thus to become fit to be a member in a possible realm of ends. (His nature has already marked him out for this role, as an end in himself and therefore as a law-giver in the realm of ends.). . . . For a rational being has no value except what the law confers on it. The law-giving that confers all value must therefore have dignity (i.e. an unconditional and incomparable value); and the •esteem that a rational being must have for this is best described as ‘respect’ [Achtung; some of Kant’s uses of this suggest that ‘reverence’ would be a better translation]. Autonomy is thus the basis for the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.

#### That implies marginal cases lack equal basic rights.

**Tanner 06**

FACTA UNIVERSITATIS Series: Philosophy, Sociology and Psychology Vol. 5, No 1, 2006, pp. 47 - 63 MARGINAL HUMANS, THE ARGUMENT FROM KINDS AND THE SIMILARITY ARGUMENT UDC 17.02 Julia Tanner Department of Philosophy Durham University, United Kingdom http://facta.junis.ni.ac.rs/pas/pas2006/pas2006-05n.pdf

One of the earliest modern formulations of the AMC is that made by Peter Singer in Animal Liberation (first published in 1975): human beings are not equal; and if we seek some characteristic that all of them possess, then this characteristic must be a kind of lowest common denominator, pitched so low that no human being lacks it. The catch is that any such characteristic that is possessed by all human beings will not be possessed only by human beings. (Singer 1995:237) Richard Ryder points out that animals are often treated in ways that we would find unacceptable in MH who are "less intelligent… communicative and… able to stand up for themselves than the average dog, cat or monkey" (Ryder 1975:3). Andrew Linzey is often quoted as an advocate of the AMC, which he outlines thus:13 If we accord moral rights on the basis of rationality, what of the status of newly born children, "low grade" mental patients, "intellectual cabbages" and so on? Logically, accepting this criterion, they must have no, or diminished, moral rights. (Linzey 1976:24) Tom Regan distinguishes two versions of the AMC: (1) certain animals have certain rights because these [marginal] humans have these rights or that (2) if these [marginal] humans have certain rights, then certain animals have these rights also. The former alternative represents what might be termed the stronger argument for animal rights; the latter, the weaker. (Regan 1979:189) Above I have given a few formulations of the AMC, there are many more, but the above are sufficiently representative for my purposes.

#### This leads to potentially infinite abuse

**Carruthers 92**

Peter Carruthers, Professor of Philosophy, University of Maryland. *The Animals Issue*. https://books.google.com/books?id=UcKPAYLFQR0C&pg=PA114&lpg=PA114&dq=%22there+are+no+sharp+boundaries+between+a+baby+and+an+adult%22&source=bl&ots=VDpIvhpLLr&sig=ACfU3U1YK0FoBOhyEQqyJxQLjNHlHMHfJA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiY3JqXtqzkAhUlnOAKHYGmC3sQ6AEwAHoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=%22there%20are%20no%20sharp%20boundaries%20between%20a%20baby%20and%20an%20adult%22&f=false

There is a very different way in which contractualists, of whatever variety, can attempt to secure direct moral rights for all human beings. As with Rawls’s suggestion, this one too, will leave animals without moral standing. The strategy depends upon the fact that there are no sharp boundaries between a baby and an adult, between a not-very-intelligent adult and a severe mental defective, or between a normal old person and someone who is severely senile. The argument is then that the attempt to accord direct moral rights only to rational agents (normal adults) would be inherently dangerous and open to abuse. This is, of course, a version of slippery slope argument. The suggestion is that if we try to deny moral rights to some human beings on the grounds that they are not rational agents, we shall be launched on a slippery slope which may lead to all kinds of barbarisms against those who ***are*** rational agents. It is important to be clear about the level on which this argument is supposed to operate, however. For there is nothing to stop us, at the level of theory, from insisting that only rational agents have rights, leaving a large range of cases in which possession of rights would be indeterminate.

#### 3] Kant’s epistemology erroneously assumes that *a priori* is “pure reason,” free from error.

**Kant 1785**

Immanuel Kant, *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785). <https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf>

What I have said makes ·five things· clear: that •all moral concepts have their origin entirely a priori in reason, and this holds as much for the most ordinary common-sense moral concepts as for ·the ones used in· high-level theorizing; that •moral concepts can’t be formed by abstraction from any empirical knowledge or, therefore, from anything contingent; that •this purity ·or non-empiricalness· of origin is what gives them the dignity of serving as supreme practical principles; that •any addition of something empirical takes away just that much of their influence and of the unqualified worth of actions ·performed in accordance with them·; and that •not only is it necessary in developing a moral theory but also important in our practical lives that we derive the concepts and laws of morals from pure reason and present them pure and unmixed, determining the scope of this entire practical but pure rational knowledge (the entire faculty of pure practical reason). [What follows is meant to flow on from that fifth point; Kant wrote this paragraph as one sentence.] This ·determination of scope· is to be done not on the basis of principles of human reason that non-moral philosophy might allow or require, but rather (because moral laws are to hold for every rational being just because it is rational) by being derived from the universal concept of rational being. To apply morals to men one needs anthropology; but first morals must be completely developed as pure philosophy, i.e. metaphysics, independently of anthropology; this is easy to do, given how separate the two are from one another. For we know—·and here I repeat the fifth of the points with which I opened this paragraph·—that if we don’t have such a metaphysic, it is not merely •pointless to ·try to· settle accurately, as a matter of theory, what moral content there is in this or that action that is in accord with duty, but •impossible to base morals on legitimate principles even for ordinary practical use, especially in moral instruction; and that’s what is needed for pure moral dispositions to be produced and worked into men’s characters for the purpose of the highest good in the world.

#### But that’s stupid; math errors prove.

**Huemer 93**

Michael Huemer, “A Critique of the Kantian Ethics”. Spring, 1993. Professor of Philosophy at University of Colorado, Boulder. <http://www.owl232.net/papers/kant1.htm>

***A. Appearance and thing in itself*** It is open to serious doubt whether this distinction is intelligible. What is a thing in itself? I've never seen one of them. I can see cats, cars, and clouds, for example; but Kant assures me those things are not things in themselves. They are mere appearances. So it appears that a Kantian 'mere appearance' is what I understand by a "thing", and what a Kantian 'thing in itself is' I have no idea. But I doubt the difference between Kant and myself is simply verbal. Like the regular skeptic, he seems, at least prima facie, by calling ordinary things "appearances" to be claiming that the nature of the world is radically different from what we generally take it to be. And how it really is we can never know. A very pessimistic view. If this is the meaning of the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction, the skeptical part of it is in desperate need of justification. If this is not what it means, then Kant has failed to explain what he did mean. However, this issue really harks back to the *Critique of Pure Reason* and is not particularly ethical, so we should move on. Even granting the validity of the distinction, it is very doubtful whether Kant was right in equating all empirical knowledge with the 'mere appearance' side (at which rate, incidentally, it is obscure what entitles such beliefs to be considered 'knowledge'). Kant says that sense-perceptions enable us only to know objects 'as they affect us,' but it's not clear why we can't tell also how they really are, perhaps on the *basis* of how they affect us (isn't that the common-sense view of perception?) He was also wrong to equate the a priori with knowledge of reality, since beliefs not based on experience and beliefs involving a priori concepts are just as subject to error as empirically derived ones. I myself have frequently made errors in mathematics -- and the diversity of opinions in philosophy shows it must be even more subject to error. It seems that in contrasting the sensible world with the intelligible world, Kant did not really mean to say (absurdly) that beliefs based on perception are always false and beliefs based on armchair reasoning are always true. Rather, it emerges that, though both kinds of beliefs can be either true or false, some true beliefs are more true than others -- empirically based beliefs, *even when true,* do not correspond with reality as much as true a priori beliefs do. But this, of course, only raises again the question of the intelligibility of the distinction. **This issue is not irrelevant to** the **Kantian ethics. It is essential to Kant's argument**. The equation 'empirical = appearance, a priori = reality' is the reason -- at least the only reason I can discern -- why Kant insists, as he does repeatedly, that empirical principles are unworthy to serve as parts of morality. And the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction is at the heart of the reason he gives in section three for why we should obey the dictates of reason rather than inclinations, granting that they can conflict:

#### That means there’s no inherent reason to reject consequences in a moral calculus, which defeats deontology.

#### 4] Kant is also wrong about internal and external causes of actions, which is the root of Kant’s epistemology.

**Huemer 93**

Michael Huemer, “A Critique of the Kantian Ethics”. Spring, 1993. Professor of Philosophy at University of Colorado, Boulder. <http://www.owl232.net/papers/kant1.htm>

Finally, the very distinction between internally and externally caused actions, on which the definition of freedom is based, is dubious. Of course, Kant is not the only one who uses this concept (it's implied in current debates about how much of a person's behavior is explained by his environment). Suppose that I take an ice cube out of the freezer. The ice cube's melting point is 32°F, and the room's temperature is 70°F. The ice melts. Now which factor was more responsible for the melting: the ice's chemical properties (internal cause), or the temperature of the room (external cause)? **Such a question is senseless**. Any action that any object -- whether human or inanimate -- partakes of is the outcome of the properties it has together with the circumstances in which it is placed. There is no answer to the question which factor is more responsible. And there is no such thing as an action that is caused solely by internal factors. Dutiful action on the part of human beings is certainly not an example of such a thing, for supposing that, for example, I give someone ten dollars in payment of a debt, because I believe in a duty to keep promises: then my action is surely caused, among other things, by my having the ten dollars and by my belief that I made a promise, which belief is empirical. Or if I give money to a poor man because I believe in a duty of charity, then my action is caused, among other things, by the presence of this man and his being poor. He would be the cause of my action no more nor less than any object of the inclinations is ever a cause of action. There is, therefore, no reason for declaring action from the sense of duty 'autonomous' and action from (emotional or instinctive) desire 'heteronomous'. Nor are the actions of inanimate objects examples of purely externally caused actions. If physical determinism is true, then the brain processes that (in part) determine our behavior are no less internal than any beliefs or other psychological cause might be. So there is no reason for equating natural necessity with external causes and freedom with internal causes.

#### Reject 1AR Theory arguments – a) double bind – either you can put minor ink next to answer of my responses and extend your arguments to auto-win or the judge has to intervene to see if the 2ar answers to the 2n are good enough. Intervention o/w since it takes the round out of debater’s hands b) they have 2 speeches on theory while I have 1 which means they can structurally preempt my answers and respond to them and I can’t do either c) infinite abuse in the context of aff abuse doesn’t make sense since you can read 1ac theory and uplayer with other 1ar offs like Ks d) they have 1 more minute on the theory debate due to a 7-6 skew which o/w since theory is mainly about substance e) evaluate 2n paradigm issues and framing since they have 2 speeches to answer and weigh against 1 argument and I need another speech to compensate f) some judges evaluate 2ar theory arguments when a 2n kicks out of an uncondo CP which means they can generate 3 speeches of theory offense g) they can blow up dropped arguments in the next speech and I don’t have the chance to frame them out but they can which means only dropped arguments for them are game over.

#### 1AR theory is drop the argument – they can initiate theory in the aff and the 1ar which means they have 2 speeches to devastate the 1n with no risk auto-loss issues.