# 2nr

# 1NC

## 1

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should exclusively define the division of affirmative and negative ground

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### The WTO is a trade organization

**WTO No Date** (<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm>) EE

What is the WTO?

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their business

#### Reduce means to diminish

**Idaho State Court of Appeals 03**

(State v. Knutsen, 71 P. 3d 1065 - Idaho: Court of Appeals 2003) EE

By its plain language, Rule 35 grants a district court the authority within a limited period of time to reduce or modify a defendant's sentence after relinquishing jurisdiction. To "reduce" means to diminish in size, amount, extent or number, or to make smaller, lessen or shrink. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1905 (1993). To "modify" means to make more temperate and less extreme, or to lessen the severity of something. Id. at 1452. Thus, under the plain meaning of its language, Rule 35 authorizes a district court to diminish, lessen the severity of, or make more temperate a defendant's sentence. An order placing a defendant on probation lessens the severity of a defendant's sentence and thus falls within the district court's authority granted by Rule 35. Other state jurisdictions have held likewise in interpreting similar rules for reduction of sentence. See [State v. Knapp, 739 P.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Wy.1987)](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1318610396541051353&q=%22the+term+reduce%22+OR+%22the+word+reduce%22+OR+%22the+phrase+reduce%22+OR+%22reduce+means%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2006) (similar rule of criminal procedure authorizes reduction of a sentence of incarceration to probation); [People v. Santana, 961 P.2d 498, 499 (Co.Ct.App.1997)](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17890892396701062585&q=%22the+term+reduce%22+OR+%22the+word+reduce%22+OR+%22the+phrase+reduce%22+OR+%22reduce+means%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2006) (grant of probation is a "reduction" under Colorado Cr. R. 35(b))

#### Nation means a community with a defined territory and government

**Merriam Webster no date** (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation>) EE

b: a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government

Canada is a nation with a written constitution

— B. K. Sandwell

#### Violation: they defend the resolution as a trans genealogy and a critical interrogation of history – not its hypothetical implementation. Independently, garnering offense from form implies their speech act is an advocacy. Hold the line – at best, they’re Extra-T which still links to our predictability offense. No cheesy we meets – their advocacy ev doesn’t mention intellectual property in the entire book

#### Vote neg for predictable limits - post-facto topic adjustment manipulates the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution. The resolution is the only official and public stasis point for pre-round prep.

#### Two impacts

#### Clash – the resolution as a stasis point is key for thorough examining of both sides of topic – that deconstructs dogma through self-reflection and consideration of multiple viewpoints AND is a prerequisite for third- and fourth-level iteration that develops advocacy skills which turn all their out-of-round impacts.

#### Outweighs:

#### It iteratively teaches the skills of persuasive organizing and relationality through face-to-face dialogue over what is at stake and how to solve it—this is the foundation of successful movement organizing, which outweighs and turns the aff.

Battistoni, 19—editor at Jacobin, Department of Political Science, Yale University (Alyssa, “Spadework: On political organizing,” <https://nplusonemag.com/issue-34/politics/spadework/>, dml)

By the time I started organizing so much that it felt like a full-time job, it was the spring of 2016, and I had plenty of company. Around the country there were high-profile efforts to organize magazines, fast-food places, and nursing homes. Erstwhile Occupiers became involved in the Bernie Sanders campaign and joined the exploding Democratic Socialists of America, whose members receive shabby business cards proclaiming them an “official socialist organizer.” Today’s organizers — not activists, thank you — make clear that they are not black bloc participants brawling with police or hippies plotting a love-in. They are inspired by a tradition of professional revolutionaries, by Lenin’s exhortation that “unless the masses are organized, the proletariat is nothing. Organized — it is everything.” Organizing, in other words, is unembarrassed about power. It recognizes that to wield it you need to persuade untold numbers of people to join a cause, and to begin organizing themselves. Organizing means being in it to win. But how do you win? Historical materialism holds that crises of capitalism spark revolts, perhaps even revolutions, as witnessed in the eruption of Occupy and Black Lives Matter; uprisings in Spain, Greece, and Egypt; and the British student movement against tuition fees. But there’s no guide for what happens in the long aftermath, as the left has often learned the hard way. In previous moments of upheaval and promise the left has often turned to Antonio Gramsci, who sought to understand why working-class revolts in Europe following the Russian Revolution had led to fascism. Gramsci concluded that on some level people consent to subservience, even take it for granted, when the order in which they live comes to seem like common sense. Hegemony was subtler than outright coercion, more pervasive, permeating the tempos of daily life. It was hegemony, Stuart Hall argued in 1983, that was key to understanding the disappointment of his own generation — why Thatcher and the new right had triumphed in remaking common sense after a decade of labor union revolt. Hegemony shaped how people acted when they weren’t thinking about it, what they thought was right and wrong, what they imagined the good life to be. A hegemonic project had to “occupy each and every front” of life, “to insert itself into the pores of the practical consciousness of human beings.” Thatcherism had understood this better than the left. It had “entered the struggle on every single front on which it calculated it could advance itself,” put forth a “theory for every single arena of human life,” from economics to language, morality to culture. The domains the left dismissed as bourgeois were simply the ones where the ruling class was winning. Yet creating hegemony was “difficult work,” Hall reminded us. Never fully settled, “it always has to be won.” In other words, there is no economic deus ex machina that will bring the revolution. There are still people, in their stubborn, contradictory particularities, as they exist in concrete space and time. It is up to you to figure out how to act together, or not; how to find common ground, or not. Gramsci and Hall insist that you must look relentlessly at things and people as they are, face your prospects with brutal honesty, and act in ways that you think can have an effect. In these ways they are an organizer’s theorists. BUT IN FACT, one doesn’t become an organizer by reading theory, or at least I didn’t. I went to graduate school to study political theory, in hopes of figuring out what to do about the dilemmas that weighed on me. But it took something else to give that theory meaning in my own life. This was the experience of graduate school, which wasn’t necessarily your typical workplace — so the Yale administration kept telling us. I’d joined the union as a matter of course, stopping by the Graduate Employees and Students Organization (GESO) table at the extracurriculars fair before I’d gone to a single day of class. Politically, it seemed obvious: I supported unions in general, so why not join? Plus my college roommate had been at Yale and organizing for years already: I’d heard from him of struggles and triumphs, of how he’d knocked doors all summer to help a slate of union members and supporters take over city government the year prior. A few days after I signed my card, I went to a union pizza lunch in my department to welcome our new cohort — I was one of just three people who’d showed up, out of seventeen — and nodded along with the organizer’s rap about why the union was good. I didn’t need convincing. Yet when another organizer asked me to join the union communications team a few weeks later, I burst into tears. I was already completely overwhelmed with hundreds of pages of reading I couldn’t possibly hope to complete, response papers to write and presentations to give on said reading, obligatory departmental workshops and talks to attend. Doing one more thing seemed impossible. She talked me down from panic and I agreed to do something small — an interview with a union member for a newsletter we hoped to revive. I took on a series of other projects — more interviews, filming testimonials for a new website. At the end of our first year, my closest friend in my graduate cohort ran for a municipal office on the union slate, and I spent the summer knocking doors for his campaign. I met up with other organizers for “visits,” where we walked around campus looking for members to sign whatever petition we were running at the time, and joined my department’s organizing committee. I cried in many more meetings. Graduate school, I came to realize, was not the place to go to learn about politics. I was bewildered by its rituals, which counterintuitively seemed structured around avoiding intellectual conversation in favor of gossip and shoptalk. At house parties and department receptions, we rarely talked about the things we’d read or thought about; instead we complained about how many papers we’d written that week, how many deadlines loomed for funding applications or summer programs, how little sleep we’d gotten. We tiptoed around more sensitive conversations: access to mental-health care, caring for children on a stipend, the cratering job market and growing pool of adjunct labor. I was desperate for those conversations, and organizing, I found, was the way to have them. Like a consciousness-raising group, organizing conversations allowed you to air grievances long suppressed in the name of politeness or professionalism, to create a space for politics where it wasn’t supposed to be. The point was to locate the fundamental experience of powerlessness lurking beneath the generalized misery. Yet for all that we griped about how much we worked, in organizing conversations the question of whether we were really workers came up constantly. Why was it so hard to see ourselves as people who might need a union? Gramsci had observed that any individual’s personality was “strangely composite,” made up of a mixture of beliefs, thoughts, and ideas gleaned from family history, cultural norms, and formal education, filtered through their own life experiences read through the prevailing ideology of the time. Hall had taken this up to argue that when the working class failed to espouse revolutionary thought, women to embrace feminism, or people of color to advocate antiracism, it wasn’t because they suffered from false consciousness. The idea that consciousness could be true or false simply made no sense: it was always, Hall stated, “complex, fragmentary, and contradictory.” This was just as true for those on the left as for anyone else. “A tiny bit of all of us is also somewhere inside the Thatcherite project,” Hall had warned in 1988. “Of course, we’re all one hundred per cent committed. But every now and then — Saturday mornings, perhaps, just before the demonstration—we go to Sainsbury’s and we’re just a tiny bit of a Thatcherite subject.” The Thatcherite project was since then much advanced, and we had internalized its dictates. For our whole lives we had learned to do school very well; in graduate school we learned to exploit ourselves on weekends and vacations before putting ourselves “on the market.” Many of us still believed in meritocracy, despite learning every day how it was failing us. The worse the conditions of academic life became, the harder everyone worked, and the harder it became to contest them. Plus, we were so lucky to be there — at Yale! Compared to so many grad students, we had it good, and surely jobs were waiting on the other side for us, if for anyone. Who were we to complain? Organizing a union of graduate students at Yale seemed to many like an act of unbearable privilege — a bunch of Ivy League self-styled radicals doing worker cosplay. Then there was the prevailing ideology. Many people liked unions in the abstract, for other people, but had reservations about whether one made sense for us. We worked independently for the most part (getting paid to read!); we exercised control over our own work — or at least hoped to one day. Nearly all of us had grown up hearing about how bad teachers’ unions were for our own precious educations. Few of us came from union families; almost no one had belonged to a union before, and those who had sometimes cited bad experiences. Even among those who were nominally sympathetic, “I think unions are good, but . . . ” was a common refrain. The really controversial thing, though, wasn’t joining the union but organizing it. We asked people to help build the union, and to help lead it. We asked them to sign a card, then to ask a friend to sign one, too; to commit to meeting regularly with an organizer; to join the organizing committee and bring the people they knew to meetings and to rallies. We asked a lot — too much, some thought. Many people were happy to sign a membership card and a petition from time to time but didn’t want to go to more meetings or talk to colleagues about the union: they were already busy, so busy. They supported the union, they said, but they wanted it to leave them alone. This seemed like a distinctive challenge of organizing graduate students, who on the one hand were notoriously overworked and never really off the clock, and on the other were not quite immiserated, at least at Yale. (In fact, this was partly because the university had increased graduate stipends and benefits over the years in order to undercut the union; it was the price of success.) Yet I came to think it was part of the challenge of organizing more generally. Reading Charles Payne’s I’ve Got the Light of Freedom, about civil rights organizing in the Jim Crow South, I was struck by the list compiled by Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) canvassers of reasons black Mississippians gave for not wanting to register to vote in the early 1960s, which could by and large have been given by grad students: “Just not interested.” “Don’t have the time to discuss voting.” “Feel the politicians are going to do whatever they want, regardless of votes cast.” “Too busy, engaged in personal affairs.” “Wants time to think it over.” “Satisfied with things as they are.” We were not, of course, fighting Jim Crow. Yale was miserable and feudal in many respects, but we were there temporarily and by choice; many of us feared our advisers but did not fear for our lives. We might give the same excuses, but they didn’t mean the same things. Still, certain dynamics of the two organizing campaigns were similar, despite the obvious differences. People often told you why they weren’t going to do something, often with perfectly good reasons, and you tried to convince them that they should. We were all too busy, but the too-busyness wasn’t really about time, or at least not only. Being too busy meant people didn’t see why the union was worth making time for. Your job as an organizer was to find out what it was that people wanted to be different in their lives, and then to persuade people that it mattered whether they decided to do something about it. This is not the same thing as persuading people that the thing itself matters: they usually know it does. The task is to persuade people that they matter: they know they usually don’t. “THE BEGINNER WHO has learned a new language always translates it back into his mother tongue,” Marx observed in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, “but he assimilates the spirit of the new language and expresses himself freely in it only when he moves in it without recalling the old and when he forgets his native tongue.” Organizing requires you to learn the language of politics so well that it becomes your own. Like any other language, it takes a lot of practice, during which time you often feel awkward and unsure. For this stage there are exercises like “stake, take, do,” which lays out a sequence of questions for you: What is at stake for you? What will it take to win? What will you do about it? You have to start with what matters to you and the person you’re organizing before jumping into how hard it’s going to be and why they should do it anyway. These exercises are useful, but they can be stiff and artificial, because you’re not really speaking politics yet: you’re still translating. It’s why new organizers often sound slightly robotic, repeating something they’ve clearly learned from someone else. But eventually you learn to leave this scaffolding behind and speak as yourself. Often, however, you have to learn to speak differently — to speak as a different version of yourself. This means discarding many of your most familiar habits. Like many women, for a while I managed to get by on likability; I was already good at a certain kind of emotional labor. But as the asks got bigger, I hit a wall: people might spend thirty seconds signing a petition they didn’t think mattered much because they liked me, but they weren’t going to piss off their boss just to stay in my good graces. So I had to learn something else. “An axiom of organizers,” writes Jane McAlevey, “is that every good organizing conversation makes everyone at least a little uncomfortable.” The most awkward part is what McAlevey calls “the long uncomfortable silence” — the moment when you make an ask and let someone think about their answer. For a long time my biggest weakness was my tendency to shy away from making sure people knew that winning the things they said they wanted was up to them. Too often I tried to gloss over the discomfort instead of letting it sit. It was a lot easier to talk about our brilliant plan or how much support we had from our allies than to insist with the people I was organizing that whether we won our own union or not depended on them. As a result, people saw me as the union person who would deliver information and lay out a plan and keep them posted; they did not see themselves as union people who were also responsible for helping to win the things they said they wanted. McAlevey would call this a shortcut; we called it protecting people from the organizing. To soften the ask seems compassionate, but like any other protective measure, it condescends, and like any other shortcut, it makes things harder in the long run. Realizing that it was not enough for people to like me was revelatory. I had to learn to be more comfortable with antagonism and disagreement, with putting a choice in front of people and letting them make it instead of smiling away tension and doing the work myself. I had to expect more from other people. With other organizers, I role-played the conversations I feared most before having them; afterward, I replayed them over and over in my head. I struggled to be different: the version of myself I wanted to be, someone who could move people and bend at least some tiny corner of the universe. It’s not easy to be the site of a battle for hegemony. It’s not a beatific Whitmanesque “I contain multitudes”; it’s an often painful struggle among your competing selves for dominance. You have one body and twenty-four hours in a day. An organizer asks what you’ll do with them, concretely, now. You may not like your own answer. Your inner Thatcherite will raise its voice. You can’t kill it off entirely; you will almost certainly find that it’s a bigger part of you than you thought. But organizing burrows into the pores of your practical consciousness and asks you to choose the part of yourself that wants something other than common sense. It’s unsettling. It can be alienating. And yet I also often felt I was finally reconciling parts of myself I’d tried to keep separate — what I thought, what I said, what I did. To organize, and to be organized, you have to keep in mind Hall’s lesson: there is no true or false consciousness, no true self that organizing discovers or undoes. You too, Hall reminds us, were made by this world you hope to change. The more distant the world you want to live in is from the world that exists, the more deeply you yourself will feel this disjuncture. “I’m not cut out for this,” people often say when they struggle with organizing. No one is: one isn’t born an organizer, but becomes one. THE SOBER, UNSEXY character of organizing is often reromanticized in paeans to the “real work.” Organizing’s defenders are the most likely to insist that it is boring. For a generation maligned as flighty and self-absorbed, the mundanity and dullness signify authenticity, like political normcore. Organizing signals heroic commitment rather than faddish dilettantism, a noble resolve to do something in real life rather than trade memes in Facebook groups or dunk on Twitter enemies. It’s true that organizing is the day-to-day work of politics — what Ella Baker called “spadework,” the hard labor that prepares the ground for dramatic action. But I’ve never understood the charge of mundanity. Canvassing on a slow day can be tedious, but no other part of organizing has ever felt dull to me. Quite the opposite: nothing has ever felt more thrilling or more wrenching. Nothing has ever been harder to do, or harder to stop thinking about. In The Romance of American Communism, Vivian Gornick tells a story I think about often, about a young woman tasked with selling the Communist Party newsletter The Daily Worker. “My God! How I hated selling the Worker!” she recalls. “I used to stand in front of the neighborhood movie on a Saturday night with sickness and terror in my heart, thrusting the paper at people who’d turn away from me or push me or even spit in my face. I dreaded it. Every week of my life for years I dreaded Saturday night. . . . God, I felt annihilated. But I did it, I did it. I did it because if I didn’t do it, I couldn’t face my comrades the next day. And we all did it for the same reason: we were accountable to each other.” No one ever spat in my face, but the rest I recognize. Though I didn’t always dread organizing, I often woke up with a pit in my stomach, thinking of the phone calls I’d have to make that day and the people I was supposed to catch in the hallway after class. If anything, it was worse: the people I was talking to weren’t strangers on the street, but friends and colleagues. It hurt when they stopped picking up the phone or looked away in the halls. Why on earth did I keep doing it? Why did anyone? Because of their political beliefs? Maybe at first — I didn’t want to be an armchair revolutionary. But sheer ideological conviction is rarely a predictor of someone’s organizing stamina. More importantly: because your father was in a union, or — more likely — your mother needed to be; because your friend needed child care or you needed a therapist. These things genuinely mattered. But at some point you took a leap into excess. Was I really organizing forty hours a week because I wanted dental? At the rate we were going, I was unlikely to see any of the benefits anyway. If much of my daily struggle was against the experience of grad school itself, I had also been looking for something like the union for a long time. I had ended up at the community-organizing nonprofit all those years prior after a few months spent volunteering with an anarchist collective in the ruins of New Orleans after Katrina, frustrated with the limits of mutual aid in the face of total state breakdown, and had been grasping for some kind of political activity that was both transformative and pragmatic ever since. Organizing was all about that dialectic. The union connected our demands — which were real but not exactly world-historical — to the long history of labor struggles, contemporary efforts to rebuild worker power, visions of a radically different future that we could play a role in bringing about. So we demanded bread and butter, but we were ultimately organizing for the future of academic life, which was visibly crumbling around us; or for the revival of the labor movement, which had mostly already crumbled; or because it was intolerable to live in a city as segregated as New Haven and not do something about it. That our union had been organizing for three decades was both motivating and burdensome. We knew the past triumphs and failures, attachments and wounds; we inherited hope and melancholy. In this, it was not unlike the broader left: so much history, so much struggle — sometimes too much. We knew we had tuition waivers and stipends and health care because of the union; still, the fact that no one yet had won the whole thing in the end could be sobering. Why would we be the ones to succeed where so many others had failed? But it was also comforting: as there was GESO before us, so there would be GESO after. The campaign to unionize US Steel had taken nearly fifty years; more recently, Smithfield Foods had taken twenty-four. Sometimes I felt I was organizing for the future of the entire world, in a deductive train that went: capitalism was going to devastate the planet; to fight it we needed strong unions, which meant new organizing, particularly in low-carbon fields like teaching, which meant building the academic labor movement — which meant that I needed to unionize the Yale political science department. It was absurd. Could I have been more quixotic, more grandiose, more self-important? Our style of organizing was intense, often all-consuming, and I knew that, too. I didn’t always like it. Often I longed for a nice life, an easy life, the life of the mind that academics were supposed to have. Couldn’t I just go to demonstrations here and there on the weekends before stopping off for groceries, the way I had before? But that hadn’t worked. And the gap between the smallness of everything I could realistically do and the largeness of everything I wanted to happen was so immense. I was deeply pessimistic, intellectually. The time in which to transform the global economy in order to prevent untold death and destruction shrank daily, and the forces of reaction grew stronger just as fast. So I wanted to do something ambitious and hard: something commensurate with the monstrosity of the world, with the distance of utopia and the nearness of catastrophe. There was so much I wanted to change, so many people I wanted to move. In the daily struggle to build the union and beat the boss and the odds, I saw something I desperately wanted to learn. THE RELATIONALITY of organizing is maybe the hardest thing to understand before you’ve done it. But it is the most important. This is not because people are governed by emotions instead of reason, though they sometimes are. It’s because the entire problem of collective action is that it’s rational to act collectively where it’s not to act alone. And you build the collective piece by piece. Organizing relationships can be utopian: at their best, they offer the feminist dream of intimacy outside of romance or family. In the union, I loved people I did not know very well. In meetings I was often overcome with awe and affection at the courage and wisdom of the people there with me. I came to count many of the people I organized with as my dearest friends. When I needed help, there were always people I could call, people who would always pick up the phone, people I could and did talk to about anything. These relationships often served as a source of care and support in a world with too little of those things. But they were not only friendships, and not only emotional ballast. The people I looked to for support would also push me when it was called for, as I would them; that, I knew, was the deal. Our relationships forged the practical commitments to one another that held the union together. They made us accountable to each other. They were difficult and multifaceted, often frustrating, intensely vulnerable, and potentially transformative but no less prone than any other relationship to carelessness, hurt, and betrayal, and always a lot of work. We were constantly building them and testing their limits, pushing each other harder the closer we got. They had to bear a lot of weight. In more abject moments, I wondered whether they were anything more than instrumental. More often, though, I wondered what was so menacing about usefulness that it threatened to contaminate all else. The word comrade, Jodi Dean argues, names a political relationship, not a personal one: you are someone’s comrade not because you like them but because you are on the same side of a struggle. Comrades are not neighbors, citizens, or friends; nor are they any kind of family, though you might call them brother or sister. The comrade has no race, gender, or nation. (As one meme goes: “My favorite gender-neutral pronoun is comrade.”) Comrades are not even unique individuals; they are “multiple, replaceable, fungible.” You can be comrades with millions of people you have never met and never will. Your relationship is ultimately with the political project you have in common. To many noncommunists, Dean readily admits, this instrumentalism is “horrifying”: a confirmation that communism means submitting to the Borg. But the sameness of the comrade is a kind of genuine equality. Being an organizer is like being a comrade in some ways but different in others. The people you organize alongside may be comrades, but the people you are organizing often aren’t; the point of organizing, after all, is to reach beyond the people who are already on your side and win over as many others as you can. So you can’t assume the people you organize share your values; in fact, you should usually assume they don’t. This means that unlike comrades, organizers aren’t interchangeable. It matters who you are. McAlevey’s theory of the organic leader is that people have to be organized by people they know and trust, not by strangers who claim to have the right ideas. The SNCC looked for “strong people” — not necessarily traditional leaders, but people who were respected and trusted among their peers, on the logic that people would only take risky political action alongside people they trusted. When organizers reflect the people they organize, they win: when women of color organize other women of color, a 2007 paper by Kate Bronfenbrenner and Dorian Warren shows, they win almost 90 percent of elections. This cuts both ways: when women and people of color led the organizing in my department, we often struggled to get white men to take us seriously. Yet the comradely element of organizing can also open up space for building relationships with people beyond those boundaries. It’s not that class and race and gender disappear, transcended by the cause — but the need to work together to achieve a shared end provides a baseline of commonality that makes it possible to relate across difference and essential to figure out how. That’s why you meet people one-on-one and talk about what you both care about, why you open up to someone you only know as a colleague or share with a stranger things you hardly even discuss with your friends. It’s why I cried about the humiliation of the grad-school pecking order with my organizer when I wouldn’t admit to anyone else that I was struggling. One-on-ones are countercultural: the conversations you have in them challenge your default expectations of who you can relate to, force you outside of the demographic categories that organize most of your life and the scripts you’ve learned for interacting with people accordingly. You build trust with people you have no prior reason to trust not simply by affirming your commitment to the shared project, your devotion to the Borg, but by coming to understand what brought someone else to it.

#### Procedural Fairness – speech times, speaker positions, and wins and losses prove debate is a game structured around competition. Procedural equity is necessary for the sustainability and value of that game otherwise no one will play – any interpretation that upsets it should lose. Independently, its assessment is inevitable because it’s the logical evaluative structure that undergirds their arguments.

### 1NC – Paradigm Issues – Short

#### T outweighs case – in-round engagement is structured by pre-round abuse – anything else nullifies topicality and insulates their arguments from testing, so presume them false.

#### Drop the debater on T – the entire aff is abusive; at worst, our engagement with every part of it was skewed – anything else greenlights 1AR restart.

#### Use competing interps – reasonable limits invite unpredictable intervention and are impossible to determine while prepping – deviating from the topic is a conscious commission, so you should be able to justify it.

#### No RVIs – it’s illogical – you shouldn’t win because the debate was good. It also encourages baiting theory and chills reading topicality which destroys the neg’s ability to check abuse – 1AR theory solves all of their offense.

#### TVA solves your offense – defend wholeres with your advantage cards – the simple reading of the 1AC should be sufficient to create trans genealogy which means there’s no reason being extra T is intrinsic to their offense

#### Switch side debate solves their offense because they can read their aff as a K on the negative

## 2

#### The ontological status of the queer is overkill – the specter of life that has to be forced beyond death, out of time. It’s the irrational violence that liberal democracy needs to remove the dangerous queer.

Eric Stanley, Summer 2011, “Near Life, Queer Death Overkill and Ontological Capture,” Duke University Press, pg 9, <https://queerhistory.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/near-life-queer-death-eric-stanley.pdf> sean!

Overkill is a term used to indicate such excessive violence that it pushes a body beyond death. Overkill is often determined by the postmortem removal of body parts, as with the partial decapitation in the case of Lauryn Paige and the dissection of Rashawn Brazell. The temporality of violence, the biological time when the heart stops pushing and pulling blood, yet the killing is not finished, suggests the aim is not simply the end of a specific life, but the ending of all queer life. This is the time of queer death, when the utility of violence gives way to the pleasure in the other’s mortality. If queers, along with others, approximate nothing, then the task of ending, of killing, that which is nothing must go beyond normative times of life and death. In other words, if Lauryn was dead after the first few stab wounds to the throat, then what do the remaining fifty wounds signify? The legal theory that is offered to nullify the practice of overkill often functions under the name of the trans- or gay-panic defense. Both of these defense strategies argue that the murderer became so enraged after the “discovery” of either genitalia or someone’s sexuality they were forced to protect themselves from the threat of queerness. Estanislao Martinez of Fresno, California, used the trans-panic defense and received a four-year prison sentence after admittedly stabbing J. Robles, a Latina transwoman, at least twenty times with a pair of scissors. Importantly, this defense is often used, as in the cases of Robles and Paige, after the murderer has engaged in some kind of sex with the victim. The logic of the trans-panic defense as an explanation for overkill, in its gory semiotics, offers us a way of understanding queers as the nothing of Mbembe’s query. Overkill names the technologies necessary to do away with that which is already gone. Queers then are the specters of life whose threat is so unimaginable that one is “forced,” not simply to murder, but to push them backward out of time, out of History, and into that which comes before. In thinking the overkill of Paige and Brazell, I return to Mbembe’s query, “But what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing?”28 This question in its elegant brutality repeats with each case I offer. By resituating this question in the positive, the “something” that is more often than not translated as the human is made to appear. Of interest here, the category of the human assumes generality, yet can only be activated through the specificity of historical and politically located intersection. To this end, the human, the “something” of this query, within the context of the liberal democracy, names rights-bearing subjects, or those who can stand as subjects before the law. The human, then, makes the nothing not only possible but necessary. Following this logic, the work of death, of the death that is already nothing, not quite human, binds the categorical (mis)recognition of humanity. The human, then, resides in the space of life and under the domain of rights, whereas the queer inhabits the place of compromised personhood and the zone of death. As perpetual and axiomatic threat to the human, the queer is the negated double of the subject of liberal democracy. Understanding the nothing as the unavoidable shadow of the human serves to counter the arguments that suggest overkill and antiqueer violence at large are a pathological break and that the severe nature of these killings signals something extreme. In contrast, overkill is precisely not outside of, but is that which constitutes liberal democracy as such. Overkill then is the proper expression to the riddle of the queer nothingness. Put another way, the spectacular material-semiotics of overkill should not be read as (only) individual pathology; these vicious acts must indict the very social worlds of which they are ambassadors. Overkill is what it means, what it must mean, to do violence to what is nothing

#### No matter how radical the aff’s performance is, it is still just a cruelly optimistic dream for a better future for the queer. Their attempts for a more perfect social order are simply the shaking queer hand holding up the child it can never attain – they succumb to reproductive futurism. Queerness exists outside their framework – the social order’s death drive.

**Edelman 4** (Lee, Professor of English @ Tufts University, “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” Edited by Michèle Aina Barale, Jonathan Goldberg, Michael Moon, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Page 101-107) sean!

But what helped him most in these public appeals on behalf of America's children was the social consensus that such an appeal is.im possible to refuse. Indeed, though these public service announcements concluded with the sort of rhetorical flourish associated with hard-fought political campaigns ("We're fighting for the children. Whose side are you on?"), that rhetoric was intended to avow that this issue, like an ideological Mobius strip, only permitted one side. Such "self-evident" one-sidedness the affirmation of a value so unquestioned, because so obviously unquestionable, as that of the Child whose innocence solicits our defense-is precisely, of course, what distinguishes public service announcements from the partisan discourse of political argumentation. But it is also, I suggest, what makes such announcements so oppressively political, political not in the partisan terms implied by the media consultant, but political in a far more insidious way: political insofar as the fantasy subtending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought. That logic compels us, to the extent that we would register as politically responsible, to submit to the framing of political debate-and, indeed, of the political field-as defined by the terms of what this book describes as reproductive futurism: terms that impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations. For politics, however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to produce a more desirable social order, remains at its core, conservative insofar as it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child. That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention. Even proponents of abortion rights, while promoting the freedom of women to control their own bodies through reproductive choice, recurrently frame their political struggle, mirroring their anti-abortion foes, as a "fight for our children -for our daughters and our sons," and thus as a fight for the future. What, in that case, would it signify not to be "fighting for the children"? How could one take the other "side," when taking any side at all necessarily constrains one to take the side '1f, by virtue of taking a side within, a political order that returns to the Child as the image of the future it intends? Impossibly, against all reason, my project stakes its claim to the very space that "politics" makes unthinkable: the space outside the framework within which politics as we know it appears and so outside the conflict of visions that share as their pre· supposition that the body politic must survive. Indeed, at the heart of my polemical engagement with the cultural text of politics and the politics of cultural texts lies a simple provocation: that queerness names the side of those not fighting for the children, the side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of reproductive futurism. The ups and downs of political fortune may measure the social order's ' pulse, but queerness, by contrast, figures, outside and beyond its political symptoms, the place of the social order's death drive: a place, to be. sure, of abjection expressed in the stigma, sometimes fatal, that follows from reading that figure literally, and hence a place from which liberal politics strives-and strives quite reasonably, given its unlimited faith in reason-to disassociate the queer. More radically, though, as I argue here, queerness attains its ethical value precisely insofar as it accedes to that place, accepting its figural status as resistance to the viability of the social while insisting on the inextricability of such resistance from every social structure.

#### Their performativity of protest is cruel optimism and inevitably fails – the state clenches its iron fist and all that’s left is queer blood

Stanley 18. Eric Stanley, 2018, “THE AFFECTIVE COMMONS: Gay Shame, Queer Hate, and Other Collective Feelings” Duke University Commons, <https://escholarship.org/content/qt54m9f1db/qt54m9f1db_noSplash_951ed6c356105fd9be867b6dcd0722e9.pdf> sean!

Gay Shame’s actions, like the Exploitation Runway, use the performativity of protest to incite cooperation — resistance in common. They break the circuits of spectatorship and audience that tend to divest those who show up from feeling connected to the event. Shortly after Gay Shame assembled, about two dozen cops suited in riot gear and state power formed a blue wall of revenge in front of the center’s glass doors. Newsom and his wife arrived and were smuggled in under armed guard, which signaled the locking of doors behind them by the center’s staff. Moments later, the police advanced toward those still assembled on the sidewalk and began beating people with batons, tackling others to the concrete, including myself, and leaving at least one person bleeding from head wounds with multiple missing teeth. While the attack raged, the center’s staff, straight politicians, and their gay best friends cheered the police on in celebration from the building’s rooftop bar and behind the safety of locked glass doors. The night ended on the pavement with protesters receiving medical treatment and at least four arrests, including a Black Gay Shame protester who was held under felony lynching charges for breaking the fall of a victim of police violence. Here, the polemics of their analysis crashed into the absurd force of the real. Or put another way, Gay Shame’s critiques, speci­cally those targeting the constitution of LGBT politics as, and in service of, white normativity, manifested in incarceration and spilled blood for trans/queer people who were denied entrance to “gay space” (Read 2003).

#### Genealogy centers queer narratives around futurism and the heterosexual child

**Gill-Peterson 12** Julian Gill-Peterson is a PhD candidate in American Studies at Rutgers University, a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) Doctoral Fellow, and a Canadian living in Brooklyn., 4/18/12, Thinking Gender Papers, “Virtual(ly) Queer: Anti-Genealogy and Obsessive-Compulsion in Bechdels’ Fun Home”, pg 2 <http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2qb5c1qk> Singed

I have a concern, however, with what genealogy does to time. I’m interested in queer children: not the proto-gays we adults used to be when we were younger, nor the figure of the Child with a capital C, but rather the actually existing queer children in the world, ones that are mostly absent from queer theory. The problem with genealogy is that its territorialization of the past in an arborescent form leaves no time for childhood at all. Queer theory’s investment in genealogy tends to make it always look backward from the present or forward toward the future, and so it tends to turn queer children into protogay kids, making them the back-formation of an already achieved adulthood. The once potentially queer child is subject to a freeze-frame, reducing it to a fantasy or a narrative that queer adults tell one another. I would intensify this point to say that the child actually troubles queer theory’s investment not only in genealogy, but the very developmental, humanist teleology of queer theory’s normalizing subject. The proto-gay child’s dominant deployment in queer theory—think here, for example, of Jack Halberstam’s arguments about children in The Queer Art of Failure2—is actually the far more conservative securing of the becoming human of the queer subject (which is an adult). When, as in models of “feeling backward” or “queer futurity,” queer theory’s role is always and only to subvert the normative through its queering, the very same structures that animate one form of investment in a regulatory future (the capital C Child as futurity) are simply replaced with a new, “good” object (the proto-gay capital C Child as queer futurity). In these parallel structures, the human exceptionalism of queer theory’s subject is left intact. Creating anything new is difficult because we are stuck in genealogical time.

#### The alternative is to negate the social – it’s the only way to expose the inescapability of the order and provide access to jouissance to the queer

**Edelman 4** (Lee, Professor of English @ Tufts University, “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” Edited by Michèle Aina Barale, Jonathan Goldberg, Michael Moon, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Page 101-107) sean!

Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order-such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer-but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: If not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force, of negativity into " some determinate stance or "position" whose determination would thus: negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what is surely impossible-to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism I do not intend to propose some "good" that will thereby be assured. To the contrary, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the "good," can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic. Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that's always purchased at our expense, though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic's undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying to turn its intelligibility against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for "none of the above," for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law of the Symbolic, which would echo that law's foundational act, its selfconstituting negation. The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic's negativity to the very letter of the law, that attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses, that turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself, even if that order can access its constant access to jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer.

## Case

### 1NC---Generics

#### Patents keep generic drugs off the market.

Gupta et. Al 10, Gupta, Himanshu et al. (Faculty of Pharmacy, Jamia Hamdard (Hamdard University), New Delhi-110 062, India1School of Pharmacy and Technology Management, SVKM's NMIMS University, Mumbai-56, India )“Patent protection strategies.” Jan-March 2010, Journal of pharmacy & bioallied sciences vol. 2,1 (2010): 2-7. doi:10.4103/0975-7406.62694

A patent is a legal device that grants an inventor market exclusivity over a new invention or medication. Market exclusivity can mean tremendous economic rewards for the patent holder because it provides the inventor with a monopoly over the invention for the 20-year patent term. Obtaining a patent and retaining market exclusivity can be a treacherous process, especially in the arena of pharmaceutical patents. Pharmaceutical companies today are facing increased costs for drug discovery and development and aggressive competition from generic drug companies [Table 1]. As research costs skyrocket, generic drug companies sit poised and are ready to compete as soon as a patent expires [Table 2]. Maximizing patent term for successful products is an effective strategy for fending off generic competition and extending product lifecycle. Patents grant the creators of new inventions exclusive control and possession over these inventions. This allows the inventor to prevent others from commercially using ideas or inventions without the creator's permission during the life of the patent.[1] Scientific, legal, and practical considerations must be carefully weighed to best protect an inventor's rights. Creating and protecting or attacking pharmaceutical patents requires close interaction between pharmaceutical scientists and lawyers. It also requires a good understanding of key concepts of each other's discipline. Therefore, there should be collaboration between scientists and attorneys.[2,3]

#### Generic drugs do more harm than good – don’t cure illnesses and cause superbugs.

**Eban 19**, Eban, Katherine. (an investigative journalist and the author of the New York Times bestseller Bottle of Lies: The Inside Story of the Generic Drug Boom. ) “How Some Generic Drugs Could Do More Harm than Good.” How Some Generic Drugs Could Do More Harm Than Good, Time, 17 May 2019, time.com/5590602/generic-drugs-quality-risk/.

But **many** of the **generic drug companies** that Americans and Africans alike depend on, which I spent a decade investigating, hold a dark secret: they routinely **adjust their manufacturing standards** depending **on the country buying their drugs**, a practice **that could endanger** not just those who take the lower-quality medicine but **the population at large**. **These companies send** their **highest-quality drugs to** markets with the most **vigilant regulators**, such as **the U.S. and** the **E**uropean **U**nion. **They send** their **worst drugs** — made **with lower-quality ingredients and less** scrupulous **testing — to countries** with the **weak**est review. The U.S. drug supply is not immune to quality crises — over the last ten months, dozens of versions of the generic blood pressure drugs valsartan, losartan and irbesartan have been subject to sweeping recalls. The active ingredients in some, manufactured in China, contained a probable carcinogen once used in the production of liquid rocket fuel. But the patients who suffer most are those in so-called “R.O.W. markets” — the generic-drug industry’s shorthand for “Rest of World.” **In** swaths of Africa, Southeast Asia and other **areas with developing markets**, some **generic drug companies** have made a cold calculation: they can **sell their cheapest drugs** where they will be **least likely to get caught**. **In Africa**, for instance, pharmaceuticals used to come from more developed countries, through donations and small purchases. So when Indian drug reps offering cheap generics started arriving, the initial feeling was positive. But Africa soon became an avenue “to send anything at all,” said Kwabena Ofori-Kwakye, associate professor in the pharmaceutics department at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana. The poor quality has affected every type of medication, and the adverse impact on health has been “astronomical,” he told me. Multiple **doctors** I spoke to throughout the continent said they have adjusted their medical treatment in response, sometimes tripling recommended doses to produce a therapeutic effect. Dr. Gordon Donnir, former head of the psychiatry department at the Komfo Anokye teaching hospital in Kumasi, treats middle-class Ghanaians in his private practice and **says** that **almost all** the **drugs** his **patients take are substandard**, leading him to increase his patients’ doses significantly. While his European colleagues typically prescribe 2.5 milligrams of haloperidol (a generic form of Haldol) several times a day to treat psychosis, he’ll prescribe 10 milligrams, also several times a day, because he knows the 2.5 milligrams “won’t do anything.” Donnir once gave ten times the typical dose of generic Diazepam, an anti-anxiety drug, to a 15-year-old boy, an amount that should have knocked him out. The patient was “still smiling,” Donnir said. Many hospitals also keep a stash of what they call “fancy” drugs — either brand-name drugs or higher-quality generics — to treat patients who should have recovered after a round of treatment but didn’t. Confronted with the ailing boy at the Mulago hospital, Westerberg’s colleagues swapped in the more expensive version of ceftriaxone and added more drugs to the treatment plan. But it was too late. In the second week of his treatment, the boy was declared brain dead. Westerberg’s Ugandan colleagues were not surprised. Their patients frequently died when treated with drugs that should have saved them. And there were not enough “fancy” drugs to go around, making every day an exercise in pharmaceutical triage. It was also hard to keep track of which generics were safe and which were not to be trusted, said one doctor in Western Uganda: “It’s anesthesia today, ceftriaxone tomorrow, amoxicillin the next day.” Westerberg, shaken by his newfound knowledge, flew back to Canada and teamed up with a Canadian respiratory therapist, Jason Nickerson, who’d had similar experiences with bad medicine in Ghana. They decided to test the chemical properties of the generic ceftriaxone that had been implicated in the Ugandan boy’s death. Another of Westerberg’s colleagues brought him a vial from the Mulago hospital pharmacy. The drug had been made by a manufacturer in northern China, which also exported to the U.S. and other developed markets. But when they tested the ceftriaxone at Nickerson’s lab, it contained less than half the active drug ingredient stated on the label. At such low concentration, the drug was basically useless, Nickerson said. He and Westerberg published a case report in the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. Although they couldn’t say with certainty that the boy had died due to substandard ceftriaxone, their report offered compelling evidence that he had. Some companies claim that, while their drugs are all high-quality, there may be some variance in how they are produced because regulations differ from market to market. But Patrick H. Lukulay, former vice president of global health impact programs for USP (formerly U.S. Pharmacopeia), one of the world’s top pharmaceutical standard-setting organizations, calls that argument “totally garbage.” For any given drug, he says, “There’s only one standard, and that standard was set by the originator,” meaning the brand-name company that developed the product. It’s not just those in developing markets who should be alarmed. Often, **substandard drugs do not contain enough** active **ingredient to** effectively **cure** sick **patients. But** they do contain **enough to kill** off the **weakest microbes while leaving the strongest intact.** These **surviving microbes** go on to **reproduce**, **creating** a new generation of **pathogens capable of resisting even** fully potent, **properly made medicine**. **In 2011**, during **an outbreak of drug-resistant malaria** on the Thailand-Cambodia border, USP’s chief of party in Indonesia Christopher Raymond strongly **suspected substandard drugs as a culprit**. Treating patients with drugs that contain a little bit of active ingredient, as he put it, is like “putting out fire with gasoline.” USP is so concerned about this issue that in 2017 it launched a center called the Quality Institute, which funds research into the link between drug quality and resistance. In late 2018, Boston University biomedical engineering professor Muhammad Zaman studied a commonly used antibiotic called rifampicin that, if not manufactured properly, yields a chemical substance called rifampicin quinone when it degrades. When Zaman subjected bacteria to this substance, it developed mutations that helped it resist rifampicin and other similar drugs. Zaman concluded from his work that substandard drugs are an “independent pillar” in the global menace of drug resistance. **The low cost of generic drugs makes them essential to global public health. But** if those bargain drugs are of low quality, **they do more harm than good**. For years, politicians, regulators and aid workers have focused on ensuring access to these drugs. Going forward, they must place equal value on quality, through an exacting program of unannounced inspections, routine testing of drugs already on the market and strict legal enforcement against companies manufacturing subpar medicine. One model is the airline industry, which through international laws and treaties, has established clear global standards for aviation safety. Without something similar for safe and effective drugs, the twin forces of subpar medicine and growing drug resistance will be so destructive that developed countries won’t be able to ignore them. As Elizabeth Pisani, an epidemiologist who has studied drug quality in Indonesia, put it, “The fact is, pathogens know no borders.”

#### Turns case – makes people less likely to seek care for things like ART which uniquely impacts trans people

Alcorn 18. Keith Alcorn, 2-7-2018, "Generic drugs for HIV treatment may save money, but barriers to prescription make savings elusive," aidsmap, https://www.aidsmap.com/news/feb-2018/generic-drugs-hiv-treatment-may-save-money-barriers-prescription-make-savings-elusive sean!

The potential savings from prescribing generic antiretrovirals predicted by economic models may be overstated and numerous barriers need to be overcome to bring down the cost of HIV treatment in higher-income countries, according to the findings of several recently published analyses. Switching to cheaper generic versions of some antiretrovirals has been proposed as a means of freeing up money to treat more people with HIV in the United States and other higher-income countries where generics are beginning to become available. One modelling study estimated that nearly $1 billion would be saved in a single year if everyone taking Atripla (efavirenz/tenofovir/emtricitabine) switched to generic efavirenz and lamivudine plus branded tenofovir (Viread). But in an article for the New England Journal of Medicine, Erika Martin of the State University of New York and Bruce Schackman of Weill Cornell Medical College identify a number of barriers that stand in the way of the more optimistic scenarios. Scepticism among healthcare providers, patients and pharmacists about the safety and efficacy of generic medications is an important barrier, the authors say. A systematic review of studies of perceptions of generic medications in the general population found that around one in three lay people viewed generic medicines as less effective. Similarly, one in three lay people had a negative attitude towards generic substitution. Pharmacists were significantly more likely to view generics as inferior quality products compared to doctors or lay people, even though generic drugs must pass stringent quality tests to be approved for use in the United States and European Union.

#### And pandemics independently outweigh and turn the case – cause massive suffering that’s a prerequisite to engaging in the methodology of the aff AND trans people are the last one to receive things like vaccines

### 1NC---WTO

#### Every reason the WTO is bad would be far worse without it.

Narlikar 18 Amrita Narlikar 3-5-2018 "A Trade War on the Poor" <https://archive.is/sD9sf#selection-1337.0-1340.0> (President of the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies and a professor at the University of Hamburg.)//Elmer

Recurrent deadlocks have plagued the Doha negotiations since their launch in 2001, damaging the credibility of the organization that oversees this unfortunate negotiation process. The WTO’s Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in 2015, which coincided with the 20th anniversary of the WTO’s founding, should have been a moment for celebration. Instead, it turned out to be an embarrassment: for the first time the Ministerial Declaration reflected not consensus but fundamental division over whether even to reaffirm the Doha mandates, which had sought to launch an ambitious round of multilateral trade liberalization with a close eye on development issues. At its Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, in 2017, the WTO sank to a new low: this conference was unprecedented in its failure to even produce a Ministerial Declaration. The WTO seems to be whimpering its way to an inglorious end. And if the global trading mechanism does indeed collapse, the consequences will be adverse for **all parties**, but especially so for the poorest of the world. PUNISHING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE POOREST PEOPLE In 2010, the Millennium Development Goals reached one of its targets, of **cutting extreme poverty by half**. The most important factor that contributed to this achievement was economic growth in many developing countries, especially China and India. Although such growth was fueled by several factors, **one critical driver was international trade**. Extensive research shows that the countries and regions that harnessed the opportunities afforded by low tariffs and open markets did particularly well, aided as they were by a reliable system of enforceable trade rules—all negotiated, monitored, and implemented under the auspices **of the WTO**. Still, between 600 million and 700 million people currently live under $1.90 per day and are concentrated in middle-income and lower-income developing countries. For instance, 4.5 percent of Brazilians live below the extreme poverty line, six percent do in India, and 34 and 42 percent do in Afghanistan and Nigeria. Much work still has to be done to address the concerns of the poor worldwide, and a minimal step toward this would be to ensure **continued market access** for developing countries and to maintain the **predictability of tariff and non-tariff barriers**. If the WTO collapses, rich countries would easily be able to **crank up tariffs against poorer countries**, while introducing many **other protectionist measures to discourage imports**. Developing countries, which have experienced growth through exports, and have adapted their production chains to export markets, would be hit hard. A decline in their exports would directly affect their producers and workers in the affected industries, resulting **in losses for poor people** who can least afford such losses. The costs, moreover, would go beyond the immediate job losses and price hikes in basic goods. The first fundamental benefit that poor countries derive from the WTO is that they get a relatively level playing field for negotiating with more powerful countries. Outside the WTO, in bilateral and regional settings, it is much easier to coerce countries into accepting harsh terms in a trade deal, such as through stringent environmental and labor standards that they would find virtually impossible to meet. In contrast, the institutional setting of the WTO offers developing countries some indispensable advantages. Formally, all members in the WTO have **one vote each** (very different from voting procedures at the UN Security Council and the International Monetary Fund). This is **a powerful equalization tool**, which is rendered all the more potent by the fact that consensus-based decision-making allows even the smallest and weakest player de jure veto power. Informally, having an audience within the institution, and a range of partners to work with, enables **poor countries to form coalitions** with like-minded states. Some powerful coalitions have emerged over the years, which have allowed poor and middle-income countries to band together (sometimes also with developed countries) to punch considerably above their weight in the Doha negotiations. One example is **the G-33. It began as a coalition of 33 developing countries including China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and others, but now comprises 47 members and has managed to resist calls for greater market opening for agricultural products in developing economies**. **The G-20, a coalition led by Brazil, China, and India at the time of its founding, which now includes 23 developing countries, has demanded more ambitious market opening for agricultural products in developed country markets**. Without the WTO, developing countries would have neither the institutional rules to protect them nor the support of coalitions to enhance their bargaining power. The second important benefit that developing countries derive from the WTO is its Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), which allows members to take another member “to court” over violating trade rules. In the event a judgment is made, the WTO can then authorize retaliatory measures against the responding party. Even though there are several deterrents that might make poor countries reluctant to make use of this facility (including the fact that bringing a dispute against a rich country requires extensive technical and legal know-how, and low-income countries sometimes lack the resources and capacity to initiate a case), the figures show considerable learning and growing effectiveness on their part. While the United States and the European Union have been the most avid users of the DSM (they have brought 115 and 97 cases, respectively, since 1995), many large developing countries have also frequently lodged complaints. China, for example, has brought 15 cases; India, 23; and Brazil, 31. Nor should one assume that the DSM has been the stomping ground of only developed countries and rising powers. David has sometimes taken on Goliath. Ecuador, for example, filed a complaint against U.S. action against its shrimp exports in 2005, and won, despite the extreme asymmetry of power. Allow the WTO to wither away and the world returns to **a system of unchecked power politics.** The costs, moreover, would not necessarily be limited to the “global South” and its poorest people. FROM WIN-WIN TO LOSE-LOSE Even if a WTO collapse would strike the poorest nations the hardest, rich countries will not escape its impact, as the resulting protectionism would greatly hurt poor consumers in developed economies. They would lose access to cheap and competitive imports from developing countries, including essential items such as fruits and vegetables, garments, footwear, and other items on which the average person spends a large proportion of his or her disposable income. The impact of increased tariffs on employment, however, would be, at best, mixed. Any gains would be restricted to specific sectors. For instance, a tariff increase on steel imports may see job increases in that particular industry—although tariffs would not save the job losses that have occurred due to technological innovation—but many other U.S. industries that rely on steel imports, such as producers of cars or electrical machinery, would see their production costs rise. This, in turn, would negatively affect their domestic and international competitiveness, profit margins, and their ability to hire and pay wages. Further, it is unlikely that other countries will accept such treatment sitting down. Retaliatory action could potentially go considerably beyond the steel and steel-consuming sector. China is the second-largest market for agricultural exports from the United States; if China increased trade barriers against soybeans, coarse grains, meat products, and cotton, it could hurt U.S. jobs across several sectors. Of course, such measures by China would be welfare-reducing for its own consumers too, who benefit from these key and competitive U.S. imports. Almost all parties would thus end up in an entirely unnecessary and sad lose-lose situation. In sum, a trade war would be a lose-lose for all, but particularly the poorest in developed and rising powers. EXPLAINING THE MESS There is widespread perception that current U.S. trade policy is the main cause for the mess that has become the WTO, given Trump’s anti-free-trade rhetoric, the United States’ current backseat role in the WTO negotiations, and its attempt to hobble the organization’s DSM by blocking new appointments to its Appellate Body. Unfortunately, the miseries of the WTO run much deeper. The United States’ protectionist leanings predate the election of Trump. The Obama administration, for example, imposed a fivefold increase on steel imports duties from China, dabbled in the rhetoric of protecting U.S. workers, showed great reluctance to make concessions in the Doha negotiations, and precipitated a fundamental turn away from the WTO’s multilateralism via its commitment to the mega-regionals of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The institutional processes of the WTO have also failed its members. Decision-making still relies on consensus diplomacy, a great idea in principle, but unwieldy for a 160-member organization with wildly divergent interests and worldviews. The principle of “single undertaking”—nothing is agreed until everything is agreed—has allowed different interests to hold the wide-ranging Doha negotiations to ransom. The organization needs new rules to adapt to the changing balance of power and the changing needs of the time, and it has failed abysmally on this front. Rising powers, such as China and India, must take some share of the blame for the WTO’s failures. Through much of the Doha negotiations, the larger developing countries were quick to demand greater market access in developed countries, but were unwilling to open up their own markets in return. As the BRICs have moved up the development ladder, demands that these developing countries take on more international responsibility have understandably increased. This means showing greater readiness to make reciprocal concessions toward developed countries and among themselves, too. China has been talking the talk on this, but it has yet to open up its own markets. Other middle-income developing countries should also share this responsibility. If they did, at best, this move could bring the United States back to the negotiating table. At the very least, such action would help preserve some **essential trade opportunities** for the remaining members of the WTO. Both rich and poor members of the WTO would do well to recognize the gains from multilateral trade, but they must also acknowledge and address the domestic costs that international trade generates in specific sectors at home. A failure to do so in the past has contributed significantly to a misguided resentment against the WTO. Correcting this could have a transformative and positive effect on the organization. Even though Trump alone cannot be blamed for the looming collapse of the WTO, the current panic that he has generated over a WTO collapse and impending trade wars might galvanize the organization to set itself on the right course.

### 1NC---Genealogy

#### Focusing on Certain Queer Genealogy Buries Other Stories

**Halberstram 11** Judith Halberstram is Professor of English and Director of The Center for Feminist Research at University of Southern California, published 2011 by Duke University Press, The Queer Art of Failure, Chapter 5, “The Killer in Me Is the Killer in You”, pg 148 Singed

It is conventional to describe early narratives of gay and lesbian life as “hidden from history”; this notion, taken from the title of a well- known anthology edited by George Chauncey and others, constitutes gay and lesbian history as a repressed archive and the historian as an intrepid archaeologist digging through homophobic erasure to find the truth. But as much as we have to excavate some histories that have been rendered invisible, we also bury others, and sometimes we do both at the same time. You could say that gay and lesbian scholars have also hidden history, unsavory histories, and have a tendency to select from historical archives only the narratives that please. So new formulations of queer history have emerged from scholars like Heather Love, who argue for a contradictory archive filled with loss and longing, abjection and ugliness, as well as love, intimacy, and survival. An example of a history from which gay and lesbian scholarship has hidden is the history of relations between homosexuality and fascism. This is the topic of this chapter as I push toward a model of queer history that is less committed to finding heroic models from the past and more resigned to the contradictory and complicit narratives that, in the past as in the present, connect sexuality to politics. When I say that scholarship has hidden from this at times overlapping history, I do not mean that no one has discussed homosexuality and fascism; in fact there is a large body of work on the topic. But because the role of homosexuality in fascism is very ambiguous and complicated and has been subject to all kinds of homophobic projection, we often prefer to talk about the persecution of gays by the Nazis, leaving aside the question of their collaboration in the regime. So, from the outset, I think it is important to say that there is no single way of describing the relationship between Nazism and male homosexuality, but also that we should not shy away from investigating the participation of gay men in the regime even if we fear homophobic fallout from doing so. Finally, the purpose of any such investigation should not be to settle the question of homosexuality in the Nazi Party, but to raise questions about relations between sex and politics, the erotics of history and the ethics of complicity.

#### Genealogical projects fail – they cause political stagnation and move-away from their ultimate objective.

**Wolin 2002** [Richard, Prof at CUNY in Modern European Intellectual History, South Central Review, Vol. 19, No. 2/3, 9/11, (J Stor), pp. 39-49]

Amid the fog of postmodern relativism disseminated by Baudrillard, Zizek and others, something essential is missing. Going back to the Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue, the massacre of civilian innocents has been a touchstone of civilized moral judgment. It remains today the cornerstone of human rights law and just war theory. Yet, for the “cultural left,” slavishly following the “genealogical” approach recommended by Nietzsche and Foucault, moral reasoning is merely another one of civilization’s clever “normalizing” ruses—hence, an intellectual weakness to be avoided at all costs. Once again, postmodernism’s right-wing intellectual pedigree—Nietzsche, Spengler, and Heidegger—has left it morally impotent and politically clueless. For years the Left has demonstrated a predilection to romanticize the “other”—Ho Chi Minh, Che, Fidel, as well as countless other apostles of Third World revolution—in the hope that the Wretched of the Earth would provide a remedy for our own seemingly intractable political impasse. Predictably, at a conference I attended recently, a friend with impeccable left- wing credentials who, until communism’s recent collapse, had been an ardent champion of the proletarian cause, jumped on the pan-Arab bandwagon, reciting the names of obscure Muslim intellectuals who, she claimed, offered a promising political alternative to the debilities of Western liberalism. Plus ça change. The Left can ignore the imperatives of morality and international law only at its own peril. By romanticizing the lifestyles and mores of non-Western peoples, it suspends critical judgment, destroys its own credibility, and guarantees its own political irrelevance.

#### Genealogy is useless and essentializing

**Lightbody 10** [Brian, “Philosophical Genealogy: An Epistemological Reconstruction of Nietzsche and Foucault's Genealogical Method, Volume 1”, 2010, p. 4-6 //GK]

A second theme of this book is to tackle some of the epistemic problems scholars have leveled against genealogy in the secondary literature. Jurgen Habermas, Paul Bove, Axel Honneth, and Alasdair Maclntyre to name but a few, argue that genealogy cannot make any positive claims (whether method-ological, epistemological, ethical or otherwise), because it equates all values with power and, therefore, cannot be any more valid nor any less valid than any other method of historical and/or philosophical investigation.' In sum, since genealogy argues that all concepts, ideas and institutions are historical and contingent constructions of power, then this same analysis must apply, ceteris paribus, to the genealogical method itself. Genealogies and even the genealogical method itself are incapable of making any truth claims what-soever because the genealogist admits that all truths are reducible to power formations. I demonstrate that these sorts of arguments—ironically—presuppose that the question: `What is genealogy?' has already been answered, when in fact the question has not even been asked. Without answering what, precisely, geneal-ogy is, one cannot criticize it in any lucid nor detailed manner. I should also point out that my intention in this book is not just to provide an answer to the question: `What is philosophical genealogy?' but indeed is far more ambitious. I demonstrate how all of the sub-questions that stem from this investigation are interrelated to one another with the consequence that all must be asked together and all must be answered together in order to understand, in precise terms, what genealogy is and what it is not. What I offer in the follow-ing work therefore is not a mere summary and exposition of On the Genealogy of Morals and Discipline and Punish. Nor is my primary purpose even a critical examination of these works (though I do engage in this). Rather, the principal aim of this book is to provide nothing less than a reconstruction, indeed, one might even say a radical reconstruction of the aims, methods and techniques of genealogy qua genealogy. That is to say, I will attempt to outline the schemat-ics for a successful genealogical inquiry: both what is required (epistemically and ontologically) and how a genealogical investigation gets off the ground. In sum, this work outlines, in explicit detail, the components, interrelate ionship between these components and goals for a successful, epistemically justified, genealogical investigation. A further caveat is in order before we proceed. Nietzsche and Foucault have been interpreted as post-modern philosophers. Though post-modernism is difficult to define because it eschews all attempts of universal definition, we might begin by claiming that post-modernism is that position which claims that there is no single Truth (with a capital T), but only multiple truths. There is no grand narrative in which everything may be explained, but an infinite number of narratives which are incommensurable with each other. My aim in this hook is not to interpret philosophical genealogy along these well trodden paths. These interpretations have been tried and are abject fail-ures. They fail because they are not philosophical. They fail because they are incoherent. What I propose to do is to use the techniques, distinctions and concepts developed in recent analytic philosophy to show that we can have our cake and eat it too. We can provide a rigorous justification of genealogy while preserving its novelty, its profundity, its fecundity. We can preserve the genealogists' call for the transvaluation of all values while also maintaining that some transvaluations are more meritorious than others. We can affirm the perspectivity of truth by showing that a disengaged, objective relation-ship to truth is an incoherent concept. We can view the body and our lives as works of art, but as artifacts that, at the same time, we may only transform because we understand them as natural entities.

#### Genealogy re-entrenches White privilege

**Lents14** (Nathan H. Lents, Dr. Nathan H. Lents is a Professor of Molecular Biology at John Jay College of The City University of New York and author of "Not So Different: Finding Human Nature in Animals," available in May 2016. The Meaning and Meaninglessness of Genealogy| December 29, 2014 <https://thehumanevolutionblog.com/2014/12/29/the-meaning-and-meaninglessness-of-genealogy/>)

[First person pronouns represent the author’s viewpoint]

For many African Americans in the US, what could genealogical research reveal that we don’t already know? Except for recent African immigrants, most African Americans have a similar genealogical story: five or six generations ago, an ancestor was abducted, bound, and transported to the US to be sold into slavery. Nothing was or ever will be known about her or him other than possibly the general region from which they were purchased within the larger West African slave market. Then, two or three generations after that, an ancestor was freed and took the last name of his former captor. Since that time, the family has persevered despite systematic oppression, marginalization, and threats of violence. The romantic fascination with genealogy starts to feel like white privilege if you consider how the different the story is for African Americans. The story is similar for Native Americans. While genealogical research can undoubtedly uncover stories of courageous defiance and dedication to tradition, heritage, and, family at great cost, most of those stories were lost long ago. The family trees of all Native Americans are filled with courage, tragedy, and grief. The process of genealogy produces a few heartening stories that exclusively “belong” to some families when really they should belong to all of them. Another problem with putting so much stock in our genealogy is that this over-emphasizes genetic relationships over social and cultural history (or at least attempts to). We draw our identity from our experiences and we are deeply imprinted by the cultural themes of our society and the parents that raised us, regardless of where we got our chromosomes.