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#### Welcome to the age of pharmacopornographic biocapitalism – post-Fordism has exposed the processes of capital that turn concepts of femininity and sex into estrogen and Viagra. Subjects are no longer subjectivities, but rather defined through the substances that metabolize bodies into “real” agents – the 1AC’s dedication to these “drugs” is simply an arm that produces these “subjectivities” to mass produce them on a global scale

Preciado 08. Paul Preciado (Spanish philosopher, queer theorist, and king), 2008, “Testo Junkie,” translated by Bruce Benderson, I have a pdf, if you need it, sean!

From an economic perspective, the transition toward a third form of capitalism, after the slave-dependent and industrial systems, is generally situated somewhere in the 1970s; but the establishment of a new type of “government of the living”3 had already emerged from the urban, physical, psychological, and ecological ruins of World War II—or, in the case of Spain, from the Civil War. How did sex and sexuality become the main objects of political and economic activity? Follow me: The changes in capitalism that we are witnessing are characterized not only by the transformation of “gender,” “sex,” “sexuality,” “sexual identity,” and “pleasure” into objects of the political management of living (just as Foucault had suspected in his biopolitical description of new systems of social control), but also by the fact that this management itself is carried out through the new dynamics of advanced technocapitalism, global media, and biotechnologies. During the Cold War, the United States put more money into scientific research about sex and sexuality than any other country in history. The application of surveillance and biotechnologies for governing civil society started during the late 1930s: the war was the best laboratory for molding the body, sex, and sexuality. The necropolitical techniques of the war will progressively become biopolitical industries for producing and controlling sexual subjectivities. Let us remember that the period between the beginning of World War II and the first years of the Cold War constitutes a moment without precedent for women’s visibility in public space as well as the emergence of visible and politicized forms of homosexuality in such unexpected places as, for example, the American army.4 Alongside this social development, American McCarthyism—rampant throughout the 1950s—added to the patriotic fight against communism the persecution of homosexuality as a form of antinationalism while at the same time exalting the family values of masculine labor and domestic maternity.5 Meanwhile, architects Ray and Charles Eames collaborated with the American army to manufacture small boards of molded plywood to use as splints for mutilated appendages. A few years later, the same material was used to build furniture that came to exemplify the light design of modern American disposable architecture.6 During the twentieth century, the “invention” of the biochemical notion of the hormone and the pharmaceutical development of synthetic molecules for commercial uses radically modified traditional definitions of normal and pathological sexual identities. In 1941, the first natural molecules of progesterone and estrogens were obtained from the urine of pregnant mares (Premarin) and soon after synthetic hormones (Norethindrone) were commercialized. The same year, George Henry carried out the first demographic study of “sexual deviation,” a quantitative study of masses known as Sex Variants. 7 The Kinsey Reports on human sexual behavior (1948 and 1953) and Robert Stoller’s protocols for “femininity” and “masculinity” (1968) followed in sexological suit. In 1957, the North American pedo-psychiatrist John Money coined the term “gender,” differentiating it from the traditional term “sex,” to define an individual’s inclusion in a culturally recognized group of “masculine” or “feminine” behavior and physical expression. Money famously affirms that it is possible (using surgical, endocrinological, and cultural techniques) to “change the gender of any baby up to 18 months.”8 Between 1946 and 1949 Harod Gillies was performing the first phalloplastic surgeries in the UK, including work on Michael Dillon, the first female-to-male transsexual to have taken testosterone as part of the masculinization protocol.9 In 1952, US soldier George W. Jorgensen was transformed into Christine, the first transsexual person discussed widely in the popular press. During the early 50s and into the 60s, physician Harry Benjamin systematized the clinical use of hormonal molecules in the treatment of “sex change” and defined “transsexualism,” a term first introduced in 1954, as a curable condition.10 The invention of the contraceptive pill, the first biochemical technique enabling the separation between heterosexual practice and reproduction, was a direct result of the expansion of endocrinological experimentation, and triggered a process of development of what could be called, twisting the Eisenhower term, “the sex-gender industrial complex.”11 In 1957, Searle & Co. commercialized Enovid, the first contraceptive pill (“the Pill”) made of a combination of mestranol and norethynodrei. First promoted for the treatment of menstrual disorders, the Pill was approved for contraceptive use four years later. The chemical components of the Pill would soon become the most used pharmaceutical molecules in the whole of human history.12 The Cold War was also a period of transformation of the governmental and economic regulations concerning pornography and prostitution. In 1946, elderly sex worker and spy Martha Richard convinced the French government to declare the “maison closes” illegal, which ended the nineteenth-century governmental system of brothels in France. In 1953, Hugh Hefner founded Playboy, the first North American “porn” magazine to be sold at newspaper stands, with a photograph of Marilyn Monroe naked as the centerfold of the first publication. In 1959, Hefner transformed an old Chicago house into the Playboy Mansion, which was promoted within the magazine and on television as a “love palace” with thirty-two rooms, becoming soon the most popular American erotic utopia. In 1972, Gerard Damiano produced Deep Throat. The film, starring Linda Lovelace, was widely commercialized in the US and became one of the most watched movies of all times, grossing more than $600 million. From this time on, porn film production boomed, from thirty clandestine film producers in 1950 to over 2,500 films in 1970. If for years pornography was the dominant visual technology addressed to the male body for controlling his sexual reaction, during the 1950s the pharmaceutical industry looked for ways of triggering erection and sexual response using surgical and chemical prostheses. In 1974, Soviet Victor Konstantinovich Kalnberz patented the first penis implant using polyethylene plastic rods as a treatment for impotency, resulting in a permanently erect penis. These implants were abandoned for chemical variants because they were found to be “physically uncomfortable and emotionally disconcerting.” In 1984 Tom F. Lue, Emil A. Tanaghoy, and Richard A. Schmidt implanted a “sexual pacemaker” in the penis of a patient. The contraption was a system of electrodes inserted close to the prostate that permited an erection by remote control. The molecule of sildenafil (commercialized as Viagra© by Pfizer laboratories in 1988) will later become the chemical treatment for “erectile dysfunction.” During the Cold War years psychotropic techniques first developed within the military were extended to medical and recreational uses for the civil population. In the 1950s, the United States Central Intelligence Agency performed a series of experiments involving electroshock techniques as well as psychedelic and hallucinogen drugs as part of a program of “brainwashing,” military interrogation, and psychological torture. The aim of the experimental program of the CIA was to identify the chemical techniques able to directly modify the prisoner’s subjectivity, inflecting levels of anxiety, dizziness, agitation, irritability, sexual excitement, or fear.13 At the same time, the laboratories Eli Lilly (Indiana) commercialized the molecule called Methadone (the most simple opiate) as an analgesic and Secobarbital, a barbiturate with anaesthetic, sedative, and hypnotic properties conceived for the treatment of epilepsy, insomnia, and as an anaesthetic for short surgery. Secobarbital, better known as “the red pill” or “doll,” became one of the drugs of the rock underground culture of the 1960s.14 In 1977, the state of Oklahoma introduced the first lethal injection composed of barbiturates similar to “the red pill” to be used for the death penalty.15 The Cold War military space race was also the site of production of a new form of technological embodiment. At the start of the 60s, Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline used the term “cyborg” for the first time to refer to an organism technologically supplemented to live in an extraterrestrial environment where it could operate as an “integrated homeostatic system.”16 They experimented with a laboratory rat, which received an osmotic prosthesis implant that it dragged along—a cyber tail. Beyond the rat, the cyborg named a new techno-organic condition, a sort of “soft machine”17 (to use a Burroughs term) or a body with “electric skin” (to put it in Haus-Rucker & Co. terms) subjected to new forms of political control but also able to develop new forms of resistance. During the 1960s, as part of a military investigation program, Arpanet was created; it was the predecessor of the global Internet, the first “net of nets” of interconnected computers capable of transmitting information. On the other hand, the surgical techniques developed for the treatment of “les geules cassées” of the First World War and the skin reconstruction techniques specially invented for the handling of the victims of the nuclear bomb will be transformed during the 1950s and 1960s into cosmetic and sexual surgeries.18 In response to the threat inferred by Nazism and racist rhetoric, which claims that racial or religious differences can be detected in anatomical signs, “de-circumcision,” the artificial reconstruction of foreskin, was one of the most practiced cosmetic surgery operations in the United States.19 At the same time, facelifts, as well as various other cosmetic surgery operations, became massmarket techniques for a new middle-class body consumer. Andy Warhol had himself photographed during a facelift, transforming his own body into a bio-pop object. Meanwhile, the use of a viscous, semi-rigid material that is waterproof, thermally and electrically resistant, produced by artificial propagation of carbon atoms in long chains of molecules of organic compounds derived from petroleum, and whose burning is highly polluting, became generalized in manufacturing the objects of daily life. DuPont, who pioneered the development of plastics from the 1930s on, was also implicated in nuclear research for the Manhattan project.20 Together with plastics, we saw the exponential multiplication of the production of transuranic elements (the chemical elements with atomic numbers greater than 92—the atomic number of Uranium), which became the material to be used in the civil sector, including plutonium, that had, before, been used as nuclear fuel in military operations.21 The level of toxicity of transuranic elements exceeds that of any other element on earth, creating a new form of vulnerability for life. Cellulosic, polynosic, polyamide, polyester, acrylic, polypylene, spandex, etc., became materials used equally for body consumption and architecture. The mass consumption of plastic defined the material conditions of a large-scale ecological transformation that resulted in destruction of other (mostly lower) energy resources, rapid consumption, and high pollution. The Trash Vortex, a floating mass the size of Texas in the North Pacific made of plastic garbage, was to become the largest water architecture of the twenty-first century.22 We are being confronted with a new kind of hot, psychotropic, punk capitalism. Such recent transformations are imposing an ensemble of new microprosthetic mechanisms of control of subjectivity by means of biomolecular and multimedia technical protocols. Our world economy is dependent on the production and circulation of hundreds of tons of synthetic steroids and technically transformed organs, fluids, cells (techno-blood, techno-sperm, technoovum, etc.), on the global diffusion of a flood of pornographic images, on the elaboration and distribution of new varieties of legal and illegal synthetic psychotropic drugs (e.g., bromazepam, Special K, Viagra, speed, crystal, Prozac, ecstasy, poppers, heroin), on the flood of signs and circuits of the digital transmission of information, on the extension of a form of diffuse urban architecture to the entire planet in which megacities of misery are knotted into high concentrations of sex-capital.23 These are just some snapshots of a postindustrial, global, and mediatic regime that, from here on, I will call pharmacopornographic. The term refers to the processes of a biomolecular (pharmaco) and semiotic-technical (pornographic) government of sexual subjectivity—of which “the Pill” and Playboy are two paradigmatic offspring. Although their lines of force may be rooted in the scientific and colonial society of the nineteenth century, their economic vectors become visible only at the end of World War II. Hidden at first under the guise of a Fordist economy, they reveal themselves in the 1970s with the gradual collapse of this phenomenon. During the second half of the twentieth century, the mechanisms of the pharmacopornographic regime are materialized in the fields of psychology, sexology, and endocrinology. If science has reached the hegemonic place that it occupies as a discourse and as a practice in our culture, it is because, as Ian Hacking, Steve Woolgar, and Bruno Latour have noticed, it works as a material-discoursive apparatus of bodily production.24 Technoscience has established its material authority by transforming the concepts of the psyche, libido, consciousness, femininity and masculinity, heterosexuality and homosexuality, intersexuality and transsexuality into tangible realities. They are manifest in commercial chemical substances and molecules, biotype bodies, and fungible technological goods managed by multinationals. The success of contemporary technoscientific industry consists in transforming our depression into Prozac, our masculinity into testosterone, our erection into Viagra, our fertility/sterility into the Pill, our AIDS into tritherapy, without knowing which comes first: our depression or Prozac, Viagra or an erection, testosterone or masculinity, the Pill or maternity, tritherapy or AIDS. This performative feedback is one of the mechanisms of the pharmacopornographic regime. Contemporary society is inhabited by toxic-pornographic subjectivities: subjectivities defined by the substance (or substances) that supply their metabolism, by the cybernetic prostheses and various types of pharmacopornographic desires that feed the subject’s actions and through which they turn into agents. So we will speak of Prozac subjects, cannabis subjects, cocaine subjects, alcohol subjects, Ritalin subjects, cortisone subjects, silicone subjects, heterovaginal subjects, double-penetration subjects, Viagra subjects, $ subjects . . . There is nothing to discover in nature; there is no hidden secret. We live in a punk hypermodernity: it is no longer about discovering the hidden truth in nature; it is about the necessity to specify the cultural, political, and technological processes through which the body as artifact acquires natural status. The oncomouse,25 the laboratory mouse biotechnologically designed to carry a carcinogenic gene, eats Heidegger. Buffy kills the vampire of Simone de Beauvoir. The dildo, a synthetic extension of sex to produce pleasure and identity, eats Rocco Siffredi’s cock. There is nothing to discover in sex or in sexual identity; there is no inside. The truth about sex is not a disclosure; it is sexdesign. Pharmacopornographic biocapitalism does not produce things. It produces mobile ideas, living organs, symbols, desires, chemical reactions, and conditions of the soul. In biotechnology and in pornocommunication there is no object to be produced. The pharmacopornographic business is the invention of a subject and then its global reproduction.

#### Why do we have drugs for erections but not malaria? Biocapitalism and the pharmaceutical industry invent sickness, illness, and the drugs themselves that create the affective subjectivities that sustain the entire structure

Preciado 2. Paul Preciado (Spanish philosopher, queer theorist, and king), 2008, “Testo Junkie,” translated by Bruce Benderson, I have a pdf, if you need it, sean!

Within the context of biocapitalism, an illness is the conclusion of a medical and pharmaceutical model, the result of a technical and institutional medium that is capable of explaining it discursively, of realizing it and of treating it in a manner that is more or less operational. From a pharmacopornopolitical point of view, a third of the African population infected with HIV isn’t really sick. The thousands of seropositive people who die each day on the continent of Africa are precarious bodies whose survival has not yet been capitalized as bioconsumers/producers by the Western pharmaceutical industry. For the pharmacopornographic system, these bodies are neither dead nor living. They are in a prepharmacopornographic state or their life isn’t likely to produce an ejaculatory benefit, which amounts to the same thing. They are bodies excluded from the technobiopolitical regime. The emerging pharmaceutical industries of India, Brazil, or Thailand are fiercely fighting for the right to distribute their antiretrovirus therapies. Similarly, if we are still waiting for the commercialization of a vaccine for malaria (a disease that was causing five million deaths a year on the continent of Africa), it is partly because the countries that need it can’t pay for it. The same Western multinational companies that are launching costly programs for the production of Viagra or new treatments for prostate cancer would never invest in malaria. If we do not take into account calculations about pharmacopornographic profitability, it becomes obvious that erectile dysfunction and prostate cancer are not at all priorities in countries where life expectancies for human bodies stricken by tuberculosis, malaria, and AIDS don’t exceed the age of fifty-five.43 In the context of pharmacopornographic capitalism, sexual desire and illness are produced and cultivated on the same basis: without the technical, pharmaceutical, and mediatic supports capable of materializing them, they don’t exist. We are living in a toxopornographic era. The postmodern body is becoming collectively desirable through its pharmacological management and audiovisual advancement: two sectors in which the United States holds—for the moment but, perhaps not for long—worldwide hegemony. These two forces for the creation of capital are dependent not on an economy of production, but on an economy of invention. As Philippe Pignare has pointed out, “The pharmaceutical industry is one of the economic sectors where the cost of research and development is very high, whereas the manufacturing costs are extremely low. Unlike in the automobile industry, nothing is easier than reproducing a drug and guaranteeing its chemical synthesis on a massive scale, but nothing is more difficult or more costly than inventing it.”44 In the same way, nothing costs less, materially speaking, than filming a blowjob or vaginal or anal penetration with a video camera. Drugs, like orgasms and books, are relatively easy and inexpensive to fabricate. The difficulty resides in their conception and political dissemination.45 Pharmacopornographic biocapitalism does not produce things. It produces movable ideas, living organs, symbols, desires, chemical reactions, and affects. In the fields of biotechnology and pornocommunication, there are no objects to produce; it’s a matter of inventing a subject and producing it on a global scale.

#### Epidemics are not a viral crisis but one of governmentality - the 1AC reliance on technocratic pandemic prevention only furthers the grasp of biocapitalism on the body – only our method can truly heal

Preciado 20. Paul Preciado (Spanish philosopher, queer theorist), May/June 2020, “Learning from the Virus,” ArtForum, <https://www.artforum.com/print/202005/paul-b-preciado-82823> sean!

Epidemics, through the declaration of a state of exception, are great laboratories of social innovation, the occasion for the large-scale reconfiguration of body procedures and technologies of power. Foucault analyzed the transition from leper management to plague management as the process through which the disciplinary techniques of the spatialization of power were deployed in modernity. While lepers had been treated with strictly necropolitical measures that excluded them—condemning them, if not to physical death, then at least to social death, to life outside the community—early-modern efforts to control the plague ushered in disciplinary management, with its strict segmentation of the city and confinement of each body in every home. Strategies adopted by countries confronting Covid-19 exemplify two completely different types of biopolitical technology. The first, involving home confinement for the whole population and operating first in Wuhan, China, then in Italy, Spain, and France, and later in the UK and US, applies strict disciplinary measures that in many respects are not very different from the eighteenth-century approaches documented by Foucault. Strict spatial partitioning, the closing of towns and outlying districts, a prohibition against leaving the area. Everyone is ordered to stay indoors. If it is necessary to leave the house, it will be done by one person at a time, avoiding any meeting. The gaze is absolutely pervasive. Everyone locked up in their cage, everyone at their window. Only the town stewards, medical teams, and police officers will move about the streets and among the infected bodies, from one corpse to another, the “crows” or “terminators” who can be left to die: These are working-class, racialized people “who carry the sick, bury the dead, clean and do many vile and abject offices.” To reread the chapter on plague management in Europe in Discipline and Punish is to be struck by the fact that French border policies with regard to epidemics have not changed much in centuries. What is at work here is the logic of the architectural frontier, which emphasizes not only home quarantine but also the treatment of infection in isolated hospital wards. That technique has not proven entirely effective. The second strategy, implemented in Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan, among other places, involves moving away from modern techniques of disciplinary and architectural control to pharmacopornographic techniques. The emphasis here is on the individual detection of the viral load through the multiplication of tests and constant digital surveillance of patients through their mobile devices. Cell phones and credit cards become surveillance tools that allow close tracking of individual bodies that may be carrying the virus. We do not need biometric bracelets. The cell phone has become the best bracelet: No one parts with it even when sleeping. GPS informs the police of the movement of any body that is suspect. The individual’s temperature and other vital signs are observed in real time by the digital instruments of a cyberauthoritarian eye. Here, society is a community of users, and sovereignty is above all digital dominion and the management of big data. In April, Apple and Google signed an agreement to launch a new smartphone-tracking application for Covid-19. If the phone user tests positive, the app notifies public-health authorities; they would then alert anyone whose smartphone has come near the infected person’s phone during the previous fourteen days. But such techniques of political immunization are not new and were not only previously deployed for research and the capture of so-called terrorists. Since the early 2010s, for example, Taiwan has legalized access to all activity from sexual-encounter apps, with the ostensible goal of preventing the propagation of AIDS as well as prostitution over the internet. Covid-19 has legitimized and extended such governmental practices of biosurveillance and digital control by standardizing them and making them “necessary” to maintain a feeling of immunity and national health. Nevertheless, the governments that have implemented extreme digital-surveillance measures have not yet envisioned prohibiting the traffic and consumption of wild animals or the industrial production of birds and mammals—which is at the origin of viral zoonosis production, including SARS-COV-2—nor the reduction of CO2 emissions. What has grown is not the immunity of the social body but the tolerance of citizens under the cybernetic control of the state and corporations. The political management of Covid-19 as a form of administration of life and death gives shape to a new subjectivity. What will have been invented after the crisis is a new utopia of the immunitary community and a new form of high-tech mass control of human bodies. The subjects of the neoliberal technical-patriarchal societies that Covid-19 is in the midst of creating do not have skin; they are untouchable; they do not have hands. They do not exchange physical goods, nor do they pay with money. They are digital consumers equipped with credit cards. They do not have lips or tongues. They do not speak directly; they leave a voice mail. They do not gather together and they do not collectivize. They are radically un-dividual. They do not have faces; they have masks. In order to exist, their organic bodies are hidden behind an indefinite series of semio-technical mediations, an array of cybernetic prostheses that work like digital masks: email addresses, Facebook, Instagram, Zoom, and Skype accounts. They are not physical agents but rather tele-producers; they are codes, pixels, bank accounts, doors without names, addresses to which Amazon can send its orders. Covid-19 has also made visible a cartography of unproductive zones of the social body within the new pharmacopornographic system, which are emerging as obsolete in the new regime of technical-digital production. These are zones or population groups that had already been left on the other side of the biopolitical frontier but that today appear twice as vulnerable: the elderly, in particular those who are institutionalized within the death industries known as nursing homes, for whom it is too late to transform into technical-cybernetic subjects; people considered handicapped, in particular those institutionalized within the death industries known as homes for the disabled; criminalized and incarcerated people within the death industries known as prisons and detention centers, parallel universes totally outside the market bubble of the internet. Homeless bodies (outside of domestic disciplinarity as well as digital consumption and control) are considered criminal by the very fact of eluding confinement and are secluded in detention centers that promise more contagion than cure. That wage labor is itself an institution of confinement has never been clearer than now, as we witness “essential” workers as de-munized bodies brutally forced into spaces of lethal risk. The subways of New York are as crowded as ever because the transit authority has severely cut back on the number of trains. The essential workers forced to ride are disproportionately low-income, disproportionately migrants, disproportionately racialized bodies. Their forced mobility is also a type of incarceration. In relation to all of them, traditional confinement institutions, including hospitals, now appear not as enclaves where social and disciplinary order is maintained, but as fragile links in a mutating bio-necropolitical chain. One of the fundamental biopolitical changes in pharmacopornographic techniques characterizing the Covid-19 crisis is that the domestic space, and not traditional institutions of social confinement and normalization (hospital, factory, prison, school, etc.), now appears as the new center of production, consumption, and political control. The home is no longer only the place where the body is confined, as was the case under plague management. The private residence has now become the center of the economy of tele-consumption and tele-production, but also the surveillance pod. The domestic space henceforth exists as a point in a zone of cybersurveillance, an identifiable place on a Google map, an image that is recognized by a drone. When I studied the Playboy Mansion a few years ago—first the original gothic manor in Chicago, then the Los Angeles successor—I was interested in how it was already functioning, in the midst of the Cold War, as a laboratory in which new pharmacopornographic devices for controlling the body and sexuality were invented. Such devices began to spread through the West as early as the end of the twentieth century and with the Covid-19 crisis have extended to the entire population of the world. When I was conducting my research into the mansion, I was struck by the fact that Hugh Hefner, one of the richest men on earth, had spent nearly forty years lounging around at home, dressed in pajamas, a bathrobe, and slippers, drinking Pepsis and eating Butterfingers. Hefner directed and produced the largest-circulation men’s magazine in the United States without leaving the house, often without leaving his bed. Connected to a telephone, a radio, a stereo, and a video camera, Hefner’s bed was a genuine multimedia production platform. His biographer Steven Watts characterized Hefner as a voluntary recluse in his own paradise. A fan of every means of archiving audiovisual material long before cell phones, Facebook, or WhatsApp, Hefner made more than twenty video- and audio cassettes a day, containing material ranging from interviews to instructions for his employees. Covered in wood paneling and thick curtains but penetrated by thousands of cables and filled with the era’s most advanced telecommunication technologies, the mansion was at once entirely opaque and completely transparent. Hefner had installed a closed-circuit camera in the residence, where there also lived some dozen Playmates, and he could access every room in real time from his control center. The material filmed by the surveillance cameras also ended up in the pages of the magazine. Beyond the transformation of heterosexual pornography into mass culture, the silent biopolitical revolution launched by Playboy signified a challenge to the divisions that had been at the root of nineteenth-century industrial society: the separation of the spheres of production and reproduction, the difference between the factory and the home, and, along with that, the patriarchal distinction between masculinity and femininity. Playboy tackled that difference by proposing the creation of a new life enclave: the bachelor pad, connected to new technologies of communication. Its new semio-technical producer need never leave, either for work or to make love—and what’s more, those activities had become indiscernible. His round bed was at once his worktable, his manager’s desk, a photo-shoot set, and a place for sexual encounters; it was also a television studio where the famous program Playboy After Dark was filmed. Playboy anticipated discourses on telecommuting and immaterial production that the management of the Covid-19 crisis has transformed into a national duty. Hefner called this new social producer the “horizontal worker.” The vector of social innovation that Playboy set in motion promoted the erosion (and then the destruction) of distance between work and pleasure, production and sex. The life of the playboy, constantly filmed and diffused through magazines and television, was entirely public, even if the playboy never left his home or even his bed. Playboy’s challenge to the division between the masculine and feminine spheres lay in turning the new multimedia operator into an “indoors man,” which seemed like an oxymoron at the time. Watts reminds us that that productive isolation needed chemical support: Hefner was a consumer of the amphetamine Dexedrine. So, paradoxically, the man who never got out of bed did not get much sleep. The bed as a new multimedia operation center was a pharmacopornographic cell: It could only function with the use of the contraceptive pill, with drugs that sustained a high level of production and, eventually, with a broadband connection so as to maintain the constant flux of semiotic codes, which had become the playboy’s sole true sustenance. The bed as a new multimedia operation center could only function with the use of the contraceptive pill, with drugs that maintained a high level of production and, eventually, with a broadband connection so as to maintain the constant flux of semiotic codes. Does all this seem familiar to you now? Does all this oddly resemble your own confined life? Let us remember the slogans used by French and American leaders alike: We are at war. Do not leave your home. Telecommute. The biopolitical measures for contagion management imposed during the Covid-19 crisis have turned horizontal workers—more or less playboyesque, their labor cognitive or immaterial—into the most likely survivors of this pandemic. Each of our domestic spaces is today ten thousand times more technical than Hefner’s rotating bed was in 1968. Telecommuting and devices of telecontrol are henceforth at the tip of our fingers. Outside, subaltern vertical workers, racialized and feminized bodies, have been condemned. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault analyzed monks’ cells as vectors of and models for the transition from the sovereign regime, with its bloody techniques of controlling the body and subjectivity, to the disciplinary architectures and devices of confinement that arose in the eighteenth century for the management of entire populations. Disciplinary architectures were secular versions of monastic cells, spaces in which the modern individual was made into a soul confined within a body—a literate soul able to read the orders of the state. When the writer Tom Wolfe visited Hefner, he wrote that the latter was living in a prison that was as soft as an artichoke heart. One might say that the Playboy Mansion and Hefner’s rotating bed, transformed into objects of pop consumption, functioned during the Cold War as spaces of transition where the new prosthetic, the ultraconnected subject, and also the new forms of pharmacopornographic production and consumption that would come to characterize contemporary society were invented. That mutation has become widespread and has amplified with the management of the Covid-19 crisis: Our portable telecommunication machines are our new jailers and our own domestic interiors have become the soft and ultraconnected prisons of the future. All this could be bad news or a great opportunity. It is precisely because our bodies are the new enclaves of biopower and because our apartments are the new cells of biovigilance that it is more urgent than ever to invent new strategies of cognitive emancipation and resistance, to set in motion new forms of antagonism. Contrary to what one might imagine, our health will not come from a border or separation, but only from a new understanding of community with all living creatures, a new sharing with other beings on the planet. We need a parliament not defined in terms of the politics of identity or nationality: a parliament of (vulnerable) bodies living on planet Earth. The Covid-19 event and its consequences summon us to once and for all go beyond the violence with which we have defined our social immunity. Healing and rehabilitation cannot be a simple negative gesture of social retreat, of the immunological closing of the community. Healing and care can only stem from a process of political transformation. Healing as a society would mean inventing a new community beyond the identity and border politics with which we have produced sovereignty until now, but also beyond the reduction of life to cybernetic biosurveillance. To stay alive, to maintain life as a planet, in the face of the virus, but also in the face of the effects of centuries of ecological and cultural destruction, means implementing new structural forms of global cooperation. Just as the virus mutates, if we want to resist submission, we must also mutate. We must go from a forced mutation to a chosen mutation. We must operate a critical reappropriation of biopolitical techniques and their pharmacopornographic devices. First, it is imperative to modify the relationship between our bodies and biovigilant machines of biocontrol: They are not only communication devices. We must learn collectively to alter them. We must also learn to de-alienate ourselves. Governments are calling for confinement and telecommuting. We know they are calling for de-collectivization and telecontrol. Let us use the time and strength of confinement to study the tradition of struggle and resistance among racial and sexual minority cultures that have helped us survive until now. Let us turn off our cell phones, let us disconnect from the internet. Let us stage a big blackout against the satellites observing us, and let us consider the coming revolution together.

#### The 1AC’s fetishization of immunization creates a state of exception where unprotected bodies are placed in a zone of combat, imagined to be at war – this is the re-subjectification of the modern body at work

Arthur 18. Marc Arthur, 2018, “AIDS Memorialisation: A Biomedical Performance,” New York University, <https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/57326463/Arthur2018_Chapter_AIDSMemorialisationABiomedical.pdf?1536421010=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DAIDS_Memorialisation_A_Biomedical_Perfor.pdf&Expires=1629695482&Signature=EnZcB2HXOjwLq3UkSkosQY4FpoqTW9CgyVvJRcR-PW0TH0kBpj-GV0oxTms5h-Ug09YVNmH9woKJzmX7noqsACgiP8soscYTed6rUUEIHbGHcfUsbMXrWsC7u5osuES7exjebr0tQzRCX1lLmzhxkdp9pFECuAE5V-rEvnXXnK4EZO1AU-s-8yUa2ZrS~fcDpvWlKBFsz9fdo0lfBrQD5SPN8jTcfF0BSH5FKETUxTpV2OSBg4fCg5VhY218LjgBNfU-a~jejpe-JFwLLzhqMqaOVoed4weM1H2q9QENJIHRnrq~KFN1YwgZOkkuPexlS-EomvJt-YajJQ5fZm3Wdg__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA> sean!

Early on in the crisis the writer and activist Susan Sontag (1989) took issue with militarised AIDS metaphors like these, as she believed they had a negative impact on people living with HIV and AIDS and even obstructed the development of scientific cures. That militarised allegories of immunity persist with the introduction of PrEP is evidence of how deeply they are embedded in political power struggles over the formation of the modern body. This is what the transdisciplinary scholar Ed Cohen (2009) discovers in his research into the legal notion of immunity. He argues that, since the middle of the seventeenth century, the concept of immunity has been transmuted into the body through a process in which ‘scientific medicine deftly fuses a bellicose ideology (which sees environmental challenge as a hostile attack) with a political notion of legal exception (which nevertheless affirms the law’s universal applicability)’ (Cohen 2009: 6). Cohen is particularly interested in how legal exception is configured in bodies as a singular possessive zone of combat that needs to be protected and, at times, go to war. The shielded and abstracted body in the What Is PrEP video supports this theory, as it imagines people on PrEP to have their own individual armour against the virus. This premise, though, implies (and extends) a logic in which people living with HIV have T-cells that are unprotected from the virus, and are thus imagined to be at war. In fact, the drug used in PrEP, Truvada, is also used as part of antiretroviral therapy treatments for people living with HIV. It equally protects their T-cells in the same way as PrEP. People living with HIV who are lucky enough to have access to antiretroviral therapy, which is roughly half of people living with HIV globally (World Health Organization 2016), have, as a result, a hugely improved chance of managing the effects of the virus. If Cohen argues that modern bodies have become singular spaces of exception, this animation shows how an ideology of immunity is allegorically employed to insinuate that HIVnegative people on PrEP are more protected, and exist in a space of exception, from the war-like experiences of HIV-positive bodies, when in reality, the T-cells of individuals living with HIV who regularly take their medication share the same medical protections as those on PrEP.

#### The alternative is voluntary auto-intoxication – this performative act of communal self administration of chemical prosthesis both preserves liberation strategies in bodily practices and disrupts biocapitalist control over subjectivity

Preciado 5. Paul Preciado (Spanish philosopher, queer theorist, and king), 2008, “Testo Junkie,” translated by Bruce Benderson, I have a pdf, if you need it, sean!

The first principle of a trans-feminism movement capable of facing porno-punk modernity: the fact that your body, the body of the multitude and the pharmacopornographic networks that constitute them are political laboratories, both effects of the process of subjection and control and potential spaces for political agency and critical resistance to normalization. I am pleading here for an array of politics of physical experimentation and semiotechnology that (in the face of the principle of political representation, which dominates our social life and is at the core of political mass movements, which can be as totalitarian as they are democratic) will be regulated by the principle that—in accordance with Peter Sloterdijk’s intuitions—I will call the “principle of the auto-guinea pig.”12 In China, in 213 BC, all books were burned by order of the emperor. In the fifth century, after a series of wars had ransacked and decimated the library at Alexandria, it was accused of harboring pagan teachings contrary to the Christian faith and was destroyed by the decree of Emperor Theodosius. The greatest center of research, translation, and reading disappeared. Between 1330 and 1730, thousands of human bodies were burned during the Inquisition, thousands of books were destroyed, and hundreds of works related to the expertise and production of subjectivity were relegated to oblivion or to the underground. In 1813, American soldiers took York (now Toronto) and burned the parliament and legislative library. A year later, the Library of Congress was razed. In 1933, one of the first actions of the Nazi government was the destruction of the Institut für Sexualwissenschaft (Institute for Sexual Research) in Berlin. Created in 1919 by Magnus Hirschfeld, this center had for years played a role in the research and dissemination of progressive ideas and practices concerning sex and sexuality. Twenty thousand books from the Hirschfeld Institute were burned on May 10, 1933, on Opernplatz on a gigantic pyre whose flashing flames were imprinted on the camera film of Hitler’s reporters. On the night of March 9, 1943, an air raid on a library in Aachen destroyed five hundred thousand books. In 1993, Croatian militia destroyed dozens of libraries (among them, those in Stolac). In 2003, American bombs and Saddam loyalists sacked and destroyed the National Library of Baghdad13 . . . The theorico-political innovations produced during the past forty years by feminism, the black liberation movement, and queer and transgender theory do seem to be lasting acquisitions. However, in the context of global war, this collection of scholarship could be destroyed also, as fast as a microchip melting under intense heat. Before all the existing fragile archives about feminism and black, queer, and trans culture have been reduced to a state of radioactive shades, it is indispensible to transform such minority knowledge into collective experimentation, into physical practice, into ways of life and forms of cohabitation. We are no longer pleading, like our predecessors in the 1970s and 1980s, for an understanding of life and history as effects of different discursive regimes. We are pleading to use discursive productions as stakeholders in a wider process of the technical materialization of life that is occurring on the planet. A materialization that each day resembles more and more a total technical destruction of all animal, vegetable, and cultural forms of life and that will end, undoubtedly, in the annihilation of the planet and the self-extinction of most of its species. Alas, it will become a matter of finding ways to record a planetary suicide. Until the end of the eighteenth century, self-experimentation was still a part of the research protocols of pharmacology. Animal experimentation was not yet called into question, but an ethical precept dictated that the researcher take on the risk of unknown effects on his or her own body before enacting any test on the body of another human. Relying on the rhetoric of objectivity, the subject of scientific learning would progressively attempt to generate knowledge outside him- or herself, to exempt his or her body from the agonies of self-experimentation. In 1790, the physician Samuel Hahnemann self-administered strong daily doses of quinine in order to observe its effects in fighting malaria. His body reacted by developing symptoms that resembled the remittent fever characteristic of malaria. The experiment would serve as the basis for the invention of the homeopathic movement, which, based on the law of similars, maintains that it is possible to treat illness using minute doses of a substance that, in much larger amounts, would provoke the same symptoms of that illness in a healthy body, in the manner of a therapeutic mirror. Peter Sloterdijk, inspired by Hahnemann, will call the process of controlled and intentional poisoning “voluntary auto-intoxication” and will sum it up as follows: “If you intend to be a doctor, you must try to become a laboratory animal.”14 In order to transform conventional frameworks of the “cultural intelligibility”15 of human bodies, it is necessary to evolve toward practices of voluntary autointoxication. From Novalis to Ritter, the romanticism from which Sloterdijk draws his inspiration for a counterproject to modernity will make autoexperimentation the central technique of the self in a dystopian society. Nevertheless, romantic autoexperimentation carries the risk of individualism and depolitization. On the other hand, two of the discourses around which the critique of modern European subjectivity will develop—those of Sigmund Freud and Walter Benjamin—will begin under the form of the invention of new techniques of the self and repertories of practices of voluntary intoxication. But the dominant discourse of disciplinary modernity will brush them aside; the process of institutionalization that both psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School will experience will go hand in hand with the pathologizing of intoxication and the clinical industrialization of experimentation. “It would be a good thing if a doctor were able to test many more drugs on himself,” declared the young doctor Mikhail Bulgakov in 1914, in “Morphine,” a text in which the protagonist describes the effects of morphine on his own body.16 Likewise, it seems urgent today, from the perspective of a trans-feminist project, to use our living bodies as biopolitical platforms to test the pharmacopornopolitical effects of synthetic sex hormones in order to create and demarcate new frameworks of cultural intelligibility for gender and sexual subjects. In an era in which pharmaceutical laboratories and corporations and state medico-legal institutions are controlling and regulating the use of gender and sex biocodes (the active molecules of progesterone, estrogen, and testosterone) as well as chemical prostheses, it seems anachronistic to speak of practices of political representation without going through performative and biotechnological experiments on sexual subjectivity and gender. We must reclaim the right to participate in the construction of biopolitical fictions. We have the right to demand collective and “common” ownership of the biocodes of gender, sex, and race. We must wrest them from private hands, from technocrats and from the pharmacoporn complex. Such a process of resistance and redistribution could be called technosomatic communism. As a mode of the production of “common” knowledge and political transformation, the auto–guinea pig principle would be critical in the construction of the practices and discourses of trans-feminism and the coming liberation movements of gender, sexual, racial, and somatic-political minorities. To echo Donna J. Haraway’s expression, it will consist of a positioned, responsible corporal political practice, so that anyone wishing to be a political subject will begin by being the lab rat in her or his own laboratory

#### Thus the role of the ballot is to vote for the best strategy of body centric praxis

#### Our method is a form of radical amateurism that gives the power to the people – biocapitalism has erased lower class knowledge and power, placing an arbitrary caesaura between medical care and the people receiving it – only our method creates patient-focused communities of care that can disrupt global capitalism and biopolitical pharmaceutical institutions

Hester 18. Helen Hester (Helen Hester (United Kingdom, 1983) is associate professor of media and communication at the University of West London. Her lines of research include digital technologies, reproductive policies and the future of work), 2018, “Xenofeminism,” I have a pdf, sean!

The American second-wave self-help movement explicitly framed its activities as a means of restoring bodily autonomy to people who felt disenfranchised by their interactions with the medical establishment, and who were excluded from active decision making regarding their own care. As Ehrenreich and English put it, ‘When we demand control over our own bodies, we are making that demand above all to the medical system. It is the keeper of the keys.’12 The relationship between the providers and recipients of professionalized medical care in the 1970s was both highly gendered and deeply unequal, with service users ‘dependent on the medical system for the most basic control over their own reproductivity’.13 This was in the face of the threat of involuntary tubal ligations, unnecessary hysterectomies, and under-tested or unethically tested contraceptives. Initially developing out of the consciousnessraising activities of the second wave, ‘feminist self-help involved women meeting in small groups, sharing information and stories, educating themselves about their bodies and the medical establishment, and looking for remedies to minor bodily problems’.14 Its focus was on developing lay knowledge not only as a means to assert immediate agency over one’s own body – to more fully understand its workings – but also as part of a shareable process of self-enfranchisement and a first step in agitating for more patient-focused practices of care. Arguably, however, it is the movement’s attempts to wrest control away from the medical establishment for which it is most famous. This DIY approach spawned initiatives such as the seminal women’s heath book Our Bodies, Ourselves (OBOS) – first published in 1971 as the proceedings of a small self-help workshop that later became the Boston Women’s Health Book Collective. The collective faced many barriers to finding information about gynaecology and the reproductive body; it was often difficult for lay people to even get into medical libraries, and the writing process ‘involved the clandestine borrowing of library cards from bona fide medical students’.15 Much of the material included in the original edition of OBOS was the result of painstaking individual research in the face of scant information and resources – the sidestepping of medical gatekeepers and university librarians alike! Given the difficulties in obtaining even the most basic information about human health, the barriers in providing and accessing care beyond the professionalized medical establishment were remarkable. This was particularly the case when it came to procedures widely restricted by legislation. It was radical enough to include a chapter on abortion in OBOS (considering its publication two years before Roe v. Wade), but the need to widen actual access to abortion in the early seventies was particularly pressing. The feminist response to this was to set up abortion counselling and referral services, such as Jane in Chicago. Originally established as one of a number of networks in the US intended to connect people with so-called ‘backstreet abortionists’, the group’s activities later took a quite distinctive turn: At first the women in Jane concentrated on screening abortionists, attempting to determine which ones were competent and reliable. But they quickly realized that as long as women were dependent on illegal practitioners, they would be virtually helpless. Jane determined to take control of the abortion process so that women who turned to Jane could have control as well. Eventually, the group found a doctor who was willing to work closely with them. When they discovered that he was not, as he claimed to be, a physician, the women in Jane took a bold step: ‘If he can do it, then we can do it, too.’ Soon Jane members learned from him the technical skills necessary to perform abortions.16 Through witnessing and assisting with the performance of abortions beyond a professionalized clinical environment, members of Jane developed a new understanding of and attitude towards the procedure: ‘The techniques were very straightforward. [. . .] They were skills that, with practice and care’, any lay person could learn.17 With abortion thus demythologized, members of the service came to the conclusion that ‘the barriers that the medical establishment erected between patient and practitioner were not a function of either a woman’s needs or the needs of the situation’.18 Instead, they were a function of disciplinary power and a means of hoarding both institutional authority and useful knowledge. The group set itself a mission to further feminist reproductive sovereignty by making service users active participants in their own care – a process intended to denaturalize the condescending treatment that many received at the hands of doctors. Initially and primarily, Jane relied upon dilation and curettage abortions – a procedure in which the cervix is opened and the contents of the uterus are scraped out. Later, however, some members switched to a manual aspiration model using cannulas and syringes, which they learned about via the inventors of the Del-Em. Whilst Jane used methods related to menstrual extraction, rather than deploying the Del-Em itself, the accounts of those involved with the service remain useful to us for their critical engagement with medical instruments. Laura Kaplan organizes much of her history of Jane around the necessity of gaining ‘access to the tools and skills to affect the conditions’ of technomaterial existence – that is, she frames the circumnavigation of gatekeepers as a process of seizing technologies.19 Again, we see that the development and appropriation of technology was a crucial part of the feminist movement’s efforts to challenge medical sexism and profiteering. The Del-Em itself, as a technology designed by feminists to route around the juridical and medical restrictions upon access to abortion, demands to be seen in just these terms. In this case, there is another level to the general tendency towards free information exchange and the bypassing of gatekeepers. The Del-Em arguably represents an engagement with the principles of free and open source design as a means of ensuring the equitable dissemination of tools and technologies. Whilst the device was patented by its original designer (Lorraine Rothman), it was always intended to circulate in a free and non-commoditized fashion. The formal turn to intellectual property was not about securing individualized ownership of menstrual extraction and its instruments, but was in fact a concerted attempt to ensure that the Del-Em would remain freely available, protected, and shareable amongst those who might need it. This is important when contextualizing the emergence of the device, which was designed in California during the 1970s – a time and space associated with considerable innovation in software development. The emphasis on shareability associated with self-help in general, and with menstrual extraction in particular, can be thought of as ‘analogous to modes of shared and circulated production that gave birth to software such as UNIX, and later LINUX, as well as the open-source patent’20 – developments which some contemporary commentators see as suggestive of the rise of a new economy of contribution, grounded upon participatory knowledge exchange. An emerging interest in free and open source design and dissemination was characteristic of the Del-Em’s historical moment. In its commitment to non-market mechanisms, and its focus on information sharing and voluntary cooperation, the feminist self-help movement arguably demonstrates an ethos akin to that of what we now call the Creative Commons; this was one key prong of feminist efforts to work around oppressive pathways of healthcare. The xenofeminist manifesto touches upon the link between medical technologies and free and open source platforms in a different context – namely, healthcare for trans\* people in the twenty-first century. Paul B. Preciado is amongst those who have discussed the bypassing of gatekeepers within trans\* communities. His ground-breaking book Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era describes his self-experimentation with Testogel – a synthetic androgen administered through the skin. As he remarks, whilst some people choose to use the drug ‘as part of a protocol to change sex’, others are ‘self-medicating without trying to change their gender legally or going through any psychiatric follow-up’.21 Preciado positions himself within this latter camp, taking testosterone outside of the narrowly defined territories of its institutionally sanctioned usage. He is not taking it with the permission of doctors in order to transition from ‘female’ to ‘male’; he is illicitly self-administering it, appropriating and repurposing specific molecules in an act of autoexperimentation without preconceived goals or ideal outcomes. The decision to not seek an official diagnosis is in part a refusal to submit to the policing gaze of medical and juridical authorities. As Joshua Rivas observes in his engagement with Testo Junkie: Before a transgender individual can generally be prescribed a course of hormone replacement therapy (and in France have its associated costs covered by social security), the trans-person must first meet certain minimum eligibility criteria set forth in the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association’s Standards of Care, including diagnosis with a gender identity disorder by a mental health professional or physician. Preciado in this way situates herself [sic] within a biopolitically constructed space of clandestinity and non-recognition . . . .22 Some commentators see this dynamic as characteristic of wider tensions between trans\* communities and disciplinary powers in the Global North, arguing that trans\* people ‘seek access to surgical, hormonal and psychotherapeutic treatments, but seek to avoid pathologisation and stigmatisation – this is a defining characteristic, perhaps the central dilemma, of their relationship with clinicians’.23 This dilemma is one reason why some people with the means to do so might choose to sidestep an official diagnosis as a means of accessing treatments and technologies. As with feminist self-help in the 1970s, a fractious relationship with healthcare infrastructures drives people to find different ways of accessing care, often tied to self-experimentation within politicized support networks. The grasp of gatekeepers upon both knowledges and technologies has loosened significantly in recent years, however, as reflected by clinical guidelines. The Royal College of Psychiatrists notes that ‘Hormones and hormone-blockers are readily available via the internet. The medical practitioner or specialist must consider the risks of harm to the patient by not prescribing hormones in these circumstances.’24 The guidance, therefore, is that GPs or other non-specialist medical practitioners ‘prescribe “bridging” endocrine treatments as part of a holding and harm reduction strategy while the patient awaits specialised endocrinology or other gender identity treatment’.25 We can see that having alternative means of accessing information, peer support, and pharmaceuticals has forced profound changes in the way the medical establishment conceives of treatment. This represents a new means of resisting those institutions that have historically fought to restabilize the disciplinary grid of gender in the face of biotechnical innovations that might unsettle it. By taking testosterone in an unsanctioned fashion, Preciado uses technical intervention within and upon the body as a means of contesting the pharmacopornographic regime that constitutes him. He expresses this quite forcefully at times, insisting that ‘your body, the body of the multitude and the pharmacopornographic networks that constitute them are political laboratories, both effects of the process of subjection and control and potential spaces for political agency and critical resistance to normalization’.26  In a move that clearly resonates with self-help’s privileging of the lay healer, Preciado explicitly frames auto-experimental engagements with embodiment as part of a tradition of radical amateurism. This is associated particularly with herbalists, midwives, and witches – practitioners who were deliberately excluded from medicine in order to enable its simultaneous professionalization and masculinization. Preciado claims that the coming of modernity involved a widespread ‘process of eradicating knowledge and lower-class power while simultaneously working to reinforc[ing]e the hegemonic knowledge of the expert, something indispensable to the gradual insertion of capitalism on a global scale’.27 Networked communication technologies, however, have made it increasingly difficult to continue stockpiling knowledge in exclusionary ways.

## Case

### 1NC – Util

#### 1 – we win under util – Preciado 5 proves capitalist exploitation justified by the control of subjectivity causes extinction through biodiversity collapse which proves that this debate should be about the epistemologies that justify our immenent trend towards extinction

#### 2 – a focus on only consequences is flawed – epistemology CREATES consequences the way that gendered mindsets produce material transphobia – only the kritik examines the root causes of the 1AC

#### Moen:

#### 1 – this can’t explain masochists who like pain

#### 2 – you can’t calculate the difference between 10 headaches and 1 migraine which also freezes action under their framing and turns actor spec

#### 3 – it doesn’t have warrants for why it’s intrinsically good or better than other frameworks, just says that people like it

#### EXT doesn’t outweigh: 1 – distracts away from discussions of material violence that doesn’t necessarily cause extinction 2 – no moral uncertainty – we’ve been debating about morals for 4000 years, why will we figure it out in a couple hundred? 3 – you haven’t won that future gens have VTL which biocapitalism constrains for more and more subjects

### 1NC – Credibility

#### Impact Turning the WTO:

#### 1] Food Security - WTO destroys small farms – that hurts food security.

Keyman 14 Ariana Keyman 7-17-2014 “Drawing links between food security and land rights in an era of globalization” [www.e-ir.info/2014/07/17/drawing-links-between-food-security-and-land-rights-in-an-era-of-globalization/](http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/17/drawing-links-between-food-security-and-land-rights-in-an-era-of-globalization/) //Elmer

Exacerbating the existent injustice was the imposition of **neoliberal** economic **development policies imposed by** institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and **WTO** following independence. These policies have included trade liberalization and the subsequent **flooding** of **local markets with cheap** food **imports**, against **which local famers can hardly compete**; **cutting price supports and subsidies for food producers**; **and excessive export promotion**. This **culminated in credit being** **inadequate** or too expensive, and prices too low **for** smaller and **poorer farmers to cover** rising **production costs**. The result has been that the access of the poor to land has continued to deteriorate significantly, as they are forced to sell the land they own, cannot afford land rentals, or lose by defaulting on credit.[26] The export-led, free **trade-based, industrial ag**riculture model of large farms and land concentration has attempted to address the problem of food insecurity and hunger by boosting exports from the giant plantations owned by the wealthy as the way to generate income to import cheap food. However, not only does this **increase food insecurity** **as** the **local population** is then **subjected to** the **volatility of the international market**, but they also often cannot afford to buy what is grown as export-oriented crops in their own countries.[27] Grassroots movements led by family farmers, peasants, rural workers, and indigenous people have taken root against insecure and unjust land tenure systems in many parts of the world. Perhaps the most prominent and concentrated of these is the global alliance, La Via Campesina, founded in 1993 by farmers’ organizations from Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. More recently, however, international institutions, led by the World Bank, have started to take note of the significance of land in broad-based sustainable development objectives and food security.[28] The report titled, “Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?,” published by the Bank in 2011, was perhaps the first major initiative indicative of this growing concern.

#### Food insecurity goes Nuclear

FDI 12 (Future Directions International, a Research institute providing strategic analysis of Australia’s global interests; citing Lindsay Falvery, PhD in Agricultural Science and former  Professor at the University of Melbourne’s Institute of Land and Environment, “Food and Water Insecurity: International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points,” <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/workshop-papers/537-international-conflict-triggers-and-potential-conflict-points-resulting-from-food-and-water-insecurity.html)//Elmer>

There is a growing appreciation that the **conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over** a **lack of resources**. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. . He writes (p.36), “…**if people are hungry**, especially in cities, **the state is not stable** – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.” “Hunger feeds anarchy.” This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, **bloody wars are liable to follow**.” He continues: “An increasingly **credible scenario for World War 3 is** not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a **festering**, self-perpetuating **chain of resource conflicts**.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.” As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry. A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify **famine as a** **potential trigger for** conflicts and possibly even **nuclear war**.

#### 2] Low WTO causes regional trade – yes trade-off

Isfeld 14 Gordon Isfeld 3-17-2014 business.financialpost.com/2014/03/17/with-rise-of-shot-gun-trade-agreements-is-the-wto-even-relevant-anymore/ “With the rise of 'shot-gun' trade agreements, is the WTO even relevant anymore” //Elmer

OTTAWA — It’s getting awfully crowded out there in the free-trading world. The seemingly endless hunt for new global partners is redefining the traditional and hard-fought rules of engagement between nations. So much so, observers say, the old world order — remember the WTO, and GATT before it — has increasingly become a sideshow to the proliferation of bilateral, **trilateral** **and**, often, **multi-lateral** agreements. Even the term “free trade” no longer accurately describes the “new world” of negotiations — one that encompasses far more than what and how products are permitted to slide under domestic tariff radars. For Canada, we can now add South Korea and the European Union — deals long in the making but only weeks in the signing — after a string of minor agreements since the landmark free trade act 25 years ago with the United States, and later to include Mexico. Now, as the growing mass of country-to-country, region-to-region agreements has made apparent, it’s open season on anything that moves between borders — not only products, investments and intellectual property, but also new rules on competition, and the inclusion of labour laws and environmental guidelines. These are just some of the areas of possible disputes that the World Trade Organization “does not deal with,” said Debra Steger, a professor of law at University of Ottawa, specializing in international trade and development. “These are new models. These are not traditional trade agreements, per se.” Ms. Steger, who worked for the federal government on the Uruguay Round of negotiations that led to formation of the WTO, said the framework of recent deals goes “way beyond subjects that NAFTA dealt with.” “Trade, even in the WTO, isn’t only about tariffs. It’s not just about customs and border measures,” she said. “But it’s not about behind-the-border regulatory matters, like environmental regulation and labour standards, competition policy and human rights, corruption, and on and on it goes.” Free trade, between where ever, has become the go-to issue for politicians, business leaders, public-policy makers and private interest groups. Note, this month’s sudden but long-rumoured announcement by the Harper government of a free-trade deal with South Korea, nearly 10 years after talks began and stumbled, and resumed again. Arguably, the deal was finally done as a result of the resolution to Canada’s drawn-out dispute with Seoul over our beef exports — the so-called “mad cow” disease leading to a ban in that county and others. Of course, the United States, the European Union and Australia, among others, already had agreements in hand with South Korea. A few months earlier, Ottawa inked its EU deal — the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement — which was again the outcome of a seemingly endless circle of negotiations that still left Canada trailing similar pacts by the U.S. and others. Even so, these pacts “affect the WTO and WTO negotiations for a number of reasons. That’s a major problem,” said Ms. Steger. “The major developed countries have gone off and started these efforts to negotiate these big FTAs [free trade agreements] as a response to the declining situation in the Doha Round. The WTO — reborn in 1995 out of the General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade, the original body created in 1948 — has been struggling to maintain its relevance as the global arbiter of trade agreements and dispute resolution. The cachet of the 159-member body, however, has been diminished in recent years as countries moved to seal their own free-trade deals with major partners in the absence, some would argue, of any significant movement by the WTO on its own 2001 trade liberalization initiative, launched in Doha, Qatar. Late last year, members managed to agree to only limited movement on trade under the Doha Round of talks. Even now, details remain to be worked out. “One of the reasons why we’re seeing this sort of shot-gun approach [to trade agreements outside of the WTO] is because a number of countries are concerned that the big global deals are probably next to impossible at this stage, given how the Doha Round went and what we ended up with there, which was next to nothing,” said Douglas Porter, chief economist at BMO Capital Markets in Toronto. “They did manage to reach a tiny deal when all was said and done, but it was very modest in terms of its scope.” The move toward bilateral or multi-lateral agreements “is a symptom of the problems that we were running into at the WTO,” Mr. Porter said. “Important players are probably quietly questioning the future for the WTO…. Is it that death knell for the WTO? I don’t think so. [But] it just means we might not be able to accomplish grand, global deals in the future.” However, “there’s really no other way to approach trade disputes with, say, a country like China, then through that body at this point.” “Even 10 years ago, I think it was more straightforward to come to global trade rules. You had two major players, Europe and the U.S., and a few next tier players, including Japan,” Mr. Porter said. “Now, though, you have all kinds of important big players that have a huge chunk of global trade, and have very different goals and aims, and it might be the nature of the global economy now — the reality that we have many different groups in many different regions. “It might be impossible to square that circle.” Over the course of 25 years, Canada has piled on more than a dozen free trade agreements. The first — taking effect on Jan. 1, 1989 — was with the United States. A heated political issue in the 1988 federal election, which Brian Mulroney’s Conservatives won, the FTA was expanded in 1994 to include Mexico and rebranded as NAFTA. Other free trade deals, though much smaller, were signed in subsequent years, some yet to take effect: Israel, Jordan and Chile, followed later by Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, Honduras and Colombia, leading up to the pacts with EU and South Korea. Negotiations are ongoing for at least another dozen agreements. For countries such as Colombia, which has had an agreement in effect with Canada since 2011, the goal is “to insert our economy into the world economy,” said Alvaro Concha, trade commissioner of Proexport Colombia, based in Toronto. “At the beginning of this decade, we had only our preferential access to over 500 million consumers,” Mr. Concha said. “With all the potential FTAs we’ve been signing with potential markets and with potential partners, we believe that not just the potential buyers of our products, but also the potential investors in our country, we have opened our preferential access to over 1.5 billion consumers.” Likely to push the WTO further into the shadows of global trade will be the Trans Pacific Partnership. “In many ways, the Trans Pacific Partnership will be, if it is successful, an updating of the NAFTA, because the U.S. and Mexico are involved, as well as some [trading] partners we already have within Latin America, like Peru,” said Ms. Steger, at the University of Ottawa. “But [there are] also some key countries in Asia that we don’t have agreements with yet. And some other developed countries in that regional, New Zealand and Australia, that we don’t have agreements with,” she adds. “So that [TPP] agreement is very, very important. It’s also the first major plur-lateral agreement that the world has seen.”

#### Regionalism promotes trade and stops war – avoids their impact because our regionalism is different than protectionist blocs.

Brkić 13, Snježana, and Adnan Efendic. "Regional Trading Arrangements–Stumbling Blocks or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?." 5th International Conference «Economic Integration, competition and cooperation», Croatia, Opatija. 2013. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2239275 (Economics Prof at U of Sarajevo) //Elmer

Besides those advocating the optimistic or pessimistic view on regionalism effect on global trade liberalization, some economists, such as Frankel and Wei, hold a neutral position, in a way. Frankel and Wei believe that forms and achievements of international economic integrations can vary and that, for this reason, regionalism can be – depending on circumstances – linked to greater or smaller global trade liberalization. In the years-long period of regional integration development, four periods have been identified during which the integration processes were becoming particularly intensive and which have therefore been named "waves of regionalism". The first wave was taking place during the capitalism development in the second half of the 19th century, in the course of British sovereign domination over the world market. Economic integrations of the time primarily had the form of bilateral customs unions; however, owing to the comparative openness of international trading system based on the golden standard automatism, this period is called the "era of progressive bilateralism". The next two waves of **regionalism** occurred in the years following the world wars. Since the disintegration processes caused by the wars usually spawned economic nationalisms and autarchic tendencies, it is not surprising that post-war regionalisms were marked by discriminatory international economic integrations, primarily at the level of so-called negative integration, with expressedly “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that resulted in considerable trade deviations. This particularly refers to the regionalism momentum after the First World War, which was additionally burdened by the consequences of Big Economic Crisis. The current wave of regionalism started in late 1980s and spread around the world to a far greater extent than any previous one did: it has covered almost all the continents and almost all the countries, even those which have mis to join all earlier regional initiatives, such as the USA, Canada, Japan and China. Integration processes, however, do not show any signs of flagging. Up till now, over 200 RTAs have been registered with GATT/WTO, more than 150 of them being still in force, and most of these valid arrangement have been made in the past ten years. Specific in many ways, this wave was dubbed "new regionalism". The most specific **characteristics** of new regionalism **include: geographic spread** **of RTAs** **in** terms of **encompassing entire continents;** **greater speed**; integration forms success; deepening of integration processes; **and**, the most important for this theoretical discussion, generally **non-negative impact on outsiders, world economy as a whole, and** the **multilateral liberalization** process. Some theorists (Gilpin) actually distinguish **between** the "**benign**" **and** "**malign**" **regionalism**. On the one hand, **regionalism can advance** the **international economic stability**, multilateral liberalization **and world peace**. On the other, it can have mercantilist features leading to economic well-being degradation and increasing international tensions and conflicts. Analyses of trends within the contemporary integration processes show that they mainly have features of "benign" regionalism. Reasons for this are numerous. **Forces driving** the **contemporary** **regionalism** development **differ from** those that used to drive **earlier** regionalism periods in the 20th century. The **present regionalism emerged in** the period characterized by the **increasing economic inter-dependence** between different world economy subjects, countries attempts to resolve trade disputes and multilateral framework of trade relations. As opposed to the 1930s episode, contemporary regional initiatives represent **attempts to make** the members' **participation in the world economy easier**, rather than make them more distant from it. As opposed to 1950s and 1960s episode, new **initiatives** are **less frequently motivated** **exclusively by political interests**, and are **less frequently** being used **for mercantilist purposes**. After the Second World War, more powerful countries kept using the economic integration as a means to strengthen their political influence on their weaker partners and outsiders. The examples include CMEA and European Community arrangements with its members' former colonies. As opposed to this practice, the new regionalism, mostly driven by common economic interests, yielded less trade diversion than previous one, and has also **contributed to** the **prevention of military conflicts of greater proportions**. Various analyses have shown that many regional integrations in earlier periods resulted in trade deviations, particularly those formed between less developed countries and between socialist countries. In recent years, however, the newly formed or revised regional **integrations** primarily seem to **lead to trade creation**. Contrary to the “beggar thy- neighbor” model of former international economic integrations, the integrations now offer certain advantages to outsiders as well, by stimulating growth and spurring the role of market forces. The analyses of contemporary trends in world economy also speak in favor of the "optimistic" proposition. The structural analysis shows that the world trade is growing and that this growth results both from the increase in intra-regional and from the increase in extra-regional trade value (Anderson i Snape 1994.)28. Actually, the intraregional trade has been growing faster, both by total value and by its share in world GDP. The extra-regional trade share in GDP was increasing in some regions – in North America, Asia-Pacific and Asian developing countries. However, the question arises as to whether the extra-regional trade would be greater without regional integrations or not? The answer would primarily depend both on the estimate of degree of some countries' trade policy restrictedness in such circumstances, and on factors such as geographic distance, transport communications, political relations among states. One should also take into account certain contemporary integration features – the primarily economic, rather than strategic motivation, and continuous expansion, which mostly includes countries that are significant economic partners. With respect to NAFTA, many believe that the negative effects on outsiders will be negligible, since the USA and Canada have actually been highly integrated economies for a long time already, while the Mexican economy is relatively small. The same view was pointed out by the EU, with respect to its expansion. It particularly refers to the inclusion of the remaining EFTA countries, because this will actually only complete, in institutional terms, the EU strong economic ties with these countries. Most EFTA countries have been part of the European economic area (EEA), i.e. the original EC-EFTA agreement, for a few years already, and conduct some 70% of their total international exchange with the Union countries. EU countries are also the most significant foreign-trade partners of Central and East Europe countries, and the recent joining the Union of several of them is not expected to cause a significant trade diversion. Besides, according to some earlier studies, during the previous wave of regionalism, in the 1967-70 period, the creation of trade in EEC was far greater than trade diversion: trade creation ranged from 13 to 23% of total imports, while trade diversion ranged from 1 to 6%. In Latin America, the new regionalism resulted in the faster growth of intra-regional trade, while the extra-regional exports and imports also continued to grow. Since early 1990s, the value of intra-regional imports registered the average annual growth of 18%. In the same time, the extra-regional exports were also growing, although at a lower rate of 9% average a year; its share in the total Latin America exports at the end of decade amounted to 18% as compared to 12% in 1990. In the 1990-1996 period, the intraregional imports grew by some 18% a year. The extra-regional imports were also growing very fast, reaching the 14% rate. These data reflect a great unbalance in the trade with extra-regional markets, since the imports from countries outside the region grew much faster the exports.30 Since the described trends point to the continued growth of extra-regional imports and exports, they also show that regional integration in Latin America has had the open regionalism character. Besides, the pending establishment of FTAA – Free Trade Area of Americas will gather, in the same group, the so-called "natural" trade partners – countries that have had an extremely extensive mutual exchange for years already, and the outsiders are therefore unlikely to be affected by strengthening of regionalism in this part of the world. Contemporary research shows that intra-regional trade is growing, however, same as interdependence between North America and East Asia and between the EU and East Asia. It can also be seen that the biggest and the **most powerful** countries, i.e. **blocs**, **are extremely dependent** **on the rest of the world in terms of trade.** For the EU, besides the intra-European trade, which is ranked first, foreign trade has the vital importance since it accounts for 10% of European GDP. In early 1990s, EU exchanged 40% of its foreign trade with non-members, 16% out of which with North America and East Asia together. EU therefore must keep in mind the rest of the world as well. The growing EU interest in outsiders is confirmed by establishing "The Euro-Med Partnership", which proclaimed a new form of cooperation between the EU and the countries at its South periphery32. Besides, the past few years witnessed a series of inter-regional agreements between the EU on the one hand, and certain groups from other regions on the other (MERCOSUR, CARICOM, ASEAN and GCC). In case of North America the ratio between intra-regional and inter-regional trade is 40:60, and in East Asia, it is 45:55. Any attempt to move towards significantly closed blocs ("fortresses") would require overcoming the significant inter-dependence between major trading blocs. Besides the analysis of contemporary trends in extra- and intra-regional trade, other research was conducted that was supposed to point to the reasons why the **new regionalism has** mainly a **non-negative impact on** outsiders and **global liberalization**. The distinctive features of new regionalism were also affected to characteristics of international economic and political environment it sprouted in. In the 1980s, economic nationalisms were not so expressed as in the interventionism years following the Second World War; however, the neo-liberalism represented by GATT activities did not find the "fertile ground” in all parts of the world. Regionalism growth in the circumstances of multilateral system existence is, among other things, the consequence of distrust in multilateralism. „The revival of the forces of regionalism stemmed from frustration with the slow pace of multilateral trade liberalization... If the world trade regime could not be moved ahead, then perhaps it was time for deeper liberalization within more limited groups of like-minded nations... Such efforts would at least liberalize some trade... and might even prod the other nations to go along with multilateral liberalization.“33 Kennedy's round and Tokyo round of trade negotiations under GATT auspices brought a certain progress in the global trade liberalization. However, the 1980s witnessed significant changes in the world economy that the GATT trade system was not up to. Besides. GATT had not yet managed to cover the entire trade in goods, since there were still exceptions in the trade in agricultural and textile products that particularly affected the USA and developing countries. GATT system of conflict resolutions, and its organizational and administrative mechanism in general also required revision. In this vacuum that was created in promoting trade and investment multilateralism from the point when GATT inadequacy became obvious until the start of the Uruguay round and the establishment of World Trade Organization, the wave of regionalism started spreading across the world again. Prodded by the Single European Act and the success of European integration, many countries turned to an alternative solution – establishment of new or expansion and deepening of the existing economic integrations. Even the USA, the multilateralism bastion until then, made a radical turn in their foreign-trade policy and started working on designing a North American integration.

#### That outweighs—multilateral trade causes wars with a larger impact

Thoma 7 Mark Thoma July 2007 “Trade Liberalization and War” <http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/07/trade-liberaliz.html> (Economics Professor at the University of Oregon)//Elmer

Globalisation is by construction an increase in both bilateral and multilateral trade flows. What then was the net effect of increased trade since 1970? We find that it **generated an increase in the probability of a bilateral conflict by** around **20%** for those **countries separated by less than 1000kms,** the group of countries for **which the risk of disputes that can escalate militarily is the highest.** The effects are much smaller for countries which are more distant. Contrary to what these results (aggravated by our nationality) may suggest, we are not anti-globalisation activists even though we are aware that some implications of our work could be (mis)used in such a way. The result that bilateral trade is pacifying brings several more optimistic implications on globalisation. First, if we think of a world war as a war between two large groups or coalitions of countries, then globalisation makes such a war less likely because it increases the opportunity cost of such a conflict. Obviously, this conclusion cannot be tested but is a logical implication of our results. From this point of view, our work suggests that globalisation may be at the origin of a change in the nature of conflicts, less global and more local. Second, our results do confirm that increased trade flows **created by regional trade agreements** (such as the EU) are indeed **pacifying** as intended. Given that most military conflicts are local, because they find their origins in border or ethnic disputes, **this is not a small achievement**. These beneficial political aspects of regional trade agreements are not usually considered by economists who often focus on the economic distortions brought by their discriminatory nature. Given the huge human and economic costs of wars, this political effect of regional trade agreements should not be discounted. This opens interesting questions on how far these regional trade agreements should extend – a topical issue in the case of the EU. The entry of Turkey in the EU would indeed pacify its relations with EU countries (especially Greece and Cyprus), but also increase the probability of a conflict between Turkey and its non-EU neighbours. However, our simulations suggest that in this case, the first effect dominates the second by a large margin. More generally, our results should be interpreted as a word of caution on some political aspects of globalisation. As it proceeds and weakens the economic ties of proximate countries, those with the highest risk of disputes that can escalate into military conflicts, local conflicts may become more prevalent. Even if they may not appear optimal on purely economic grounds, regional and bilateral trade agreements, by strengthening local economic ties, may therefore **be a necessary political counterbalance to economic globalisation**.

### 1NC – developing countries

#### Vaccine imperialism: 1- they don’t solve – ev talks broadly about IP law

#### India – they have not read evidence that present conflict escalates more, or that that conflict goes nuclear – indopak has been on the brink for 20 years, err heavily negative

#### South Africa – they did not read a spillover card that South African instability causes broader African instability that their Mead ev talks about – they also haven’t contextualized a brink which means a ton of other stuff should have triggered their impacts.

#### Lack of knowledge transfer decks solvency

Eccleston-Turner and Rourke 5/27. Mark Eccleston-Turner and Michelle Rourke (Dr Mark Eccleston-Turner is a Lecturer in Law at Keele University. He holds a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and a Master of Laws with distinction in Medical Law and Ethics from the University of Edinburgh. Captain Michelle Rourke is an affiliate of the Center for Global Health Science & Security. She joined the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps in 2009.), 5-27-2021, "The TRIPS Waiver is Necessary, but it Alone is not Enough to Solve Equitable Access to COVID-19 Vaccines," No Publication, https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/25/issue/9 sean!

Crucially, the proposed waiver (if passed) could represent an important efficiency gain in COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing. The current arrangement is such that a potential vaccine manufacturer must survey the patent landscape, identify all of the relevant patents that apply to the manufacture of a particular COVID-19 vaccine, negotiate a license for each of these technologies, and only then can they begin manufacturing a COVID-19 vaccine. Given the expansive range of patent protections over COVID-19 vaccine technologies,[15] this is a deeply inefficient process to undertake while millions of lives are lost to a vaccine preventable disease. Furthermore, there is a high likelihood of not obtaining appropriate licenses from the IP holders and no guarantee that some relevant IP has not been missed in the process, opening the manufacturer up to expensive litigation. The waiver would empower countries like India and South Africa to promise legal certainty to any manufacturers in their territory that produce COVID-19 vaccines: the manufacturers will not be held legally liable for patent infringement. While the TRIPS waiver would significantly reduce red-tape and provide much needed legal certainty to manufacturers in LMICs, it alone is not enough to expand manufacturing capacity. Transfer of Technology and International Law Unlike chemical pharmaceuticals (most drugs), vaccines are large-molecule biological products requiring a great deal of information and know-how to manufacture—information that is not disclosed through patents.[16] Thus, waiving patent rights alone will not enable new manufacturers to come online. The initial text of the proposed waiver by India and South Africa recognizes the crucial role that know-how plays in vaccine manufacturing capacity. However, unlike with patent rights, there is no clear, easy fix contained within the proposed waiver, and pharmaceutical companies will likely strenuously resist such technology transfer. Without knowledge transfer, it will be extremely difficult for LMICs to start COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing, regardless of the removal of patent barriers from the TRIPS waiver.

#### Compulsory licensing solves

Bacchus 20. James Bacchus, December 16, 2020, "An Unnecessary Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiver-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines# sean!

Now comes the COVID-19 crisis. In the debate over the proposed COVID-19 waiver, mostly we have heard the usual arguments, all of them reminiscent of the HIV/AIDS debate. The pharmaceutical companies in the global vaccine chase have been quick to express their opposition to the proposed waiver of IP rights for the pandemic’s duration. They have warned that allowing their COVID-19 vaccines to be copied without their permission through recourse to compulsory licensing “would undermine innovation and raise the risk of unsafe viruses.”12 The reaction of most nongovernmental health organizations and other global advocacy groups to these arguments is summed up in the Access Campaign’s response: “Since the start of the pandemic, pharmaceutical companies have continued with their ‘business‐​as‐​usual’ approaches either by maintaining rigid control over their proprietary IP rights or by pursuing secretive and monopolistic commercial deals and excluding countries affected by COVID-19.”13 What we have not heard in the waiver debate is any clear explanation from waiver advocates of why they believe that the right to compulsory licensing that they already possess will prove insufficient to ensuring access to COVID-19 vaccines. In requesting a broad waiver of IP rights to COVID-19 vaccines, India and South Africa maintained that “many countries especially developing countries may face institutional and legal difficulties when using flexibilities available” under existing WTO rules. They also noted that a “particular concern for countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity” is that the 2017 amendment that permits countries that produce generic medicines under compulsory license to export all of those medicines to least‐​developed countries that lack their own manufacturing capabilities will lead to a “cumbersome and lengthy process.”14 India and South Africa did not offer any further explanation or any evidence to support these assertions. In an effort at an explanation, two Canadian university professors contended, “The TRIPS flexibilities are important policies but they are not perfect. Rules allowing compulsory licensing apply only on a case‐​by‐​case and product‐​by‐​product basis. This slows down the ability of countries to scale up production of needed COVID-19 products.”15 But this is advocacy, not evidence. At the time, this point was purely prospective; it was a prejudgment before any COVID-19 vaccine had been given final approval or reached the market. Before such a sweeping waiver of IP rights is taken up, it should first be demonstrated that the option of compulsory licensing and other flexibilities under the current trade rules will not suffice. At this point, the developed countries that have opposed the waiver are correct. There is no evidence of the need for such a waiver. Action by the WTO should be contemplated only if, and when, the current flexibilities in WTO rules prove to be inadequate. Should that happen, any such action should be no broader than necessary to address the global medical need.

#### A vaccine waiver greenlights counterfeit medicine – independently turns Case.

Conrad 5-18 John Conrad 5-18-2021 "Waiving intellectual property rights is not in the best interests of patients" <https://archive.is/vsNXv#selection-5353.0-5364.0> (president and CEO of the Illinois Biotechnology Innovation Organization in Chicago.)//Elmer

The Biden's administration's support for India and South Africa's proposal before the World Trade Organization to temporarily waive anti-COVID vaccine patents to boost its supply will fuel the **development of counterfeit vaccines and weaken the already strained global supply chain**. The proposal will not increase the effective number of COVID-19 vaccines in India and other countries. The manufacturing standards to produce COVID-19 vaccines are **exceptionally complicated**; it is unlike any other manufacturing process. To ensure patient safety and efficacy, only manufacturers with the **proper facilities and training should produce the vaccine, and they are**. Allowing a temporary waiver that permits compulsory licensing to allow a manufacturer to export counterfeit vaccines will **cause confusion and endanger public health**. For example, between 60,000 and 80,000 children in Niger with fatal falciparum malaria were treated with a counterfeit vaccine containing incorrect active pharmaceutical ingredients, resulting in more than **100 fatal infections.** Beyond the patients impacted, counterfeit drugs erode public confidence in health care systems and the pharmaceutical industry. Vaccine hesitancy is a rampant threat that feeds off of the distribution of misinformation. Allowing the production of vaccines from improper manufacturing facilities further opens the door for antivaccine hacks to stoke the fear fueling **vaccine hesitance**.

#### Can’t make enough vaccines vital components are too scarce

Tepper 4-10 James Tepper, 4/10 [James Tepper, (James M. Tepper is an American neuroscientist currently a Board of Governors Professor of Molecular and Behavioral Neuroscience and Distinguished Professor at Rutgers University and an Elected Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.)]. "Global Covid vaccine rollout threatened by shortage of vital components." Guardian, 4-1-2021, Accessed 8-8-2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/10/global-covid-vaccine-rollout-threatened-by-shortage-of-vital-components // duongie

Vaccine-makers around the world face shortages of vital components including large plastic growbags, according to the head of the firm that is manufacturing a quarter of the UK’s jab supply. Stan Erck, the chief executive of Novavax – which makes the second vaccine to be grown and bottled entirely in Britain – told the Observer that the shortage of 2,000-litre bags in which the vaccine cells were grown was a significant hurdle for global supply. His warning came as bag manufacturers revealed that some pharmaceutical firms were waiting up to 12 months for the sterile single-use disposable plastic containers, which are used to make medicines of all kinds, including the Pfizer, Moderna and Novavax Covid-19 vaccines. But Erck and his British partners said they were confident they had enough suppliers to avoid disruption to the supply of Novavax. The vaccine is waiting for approval from the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) but the first of 60 million doses ordered by the government are already in production in Teesside. The Fujifilm Diosynth Biotechnologies factory began growing the first cells for the Novavax vaccine in Billingham, County Durham this month and in a few weeks they will fill the bioreactor bag, ready to be transported to GlaxoSmithKline’s plant at Barnard Castle to be put into vials for distribution. “The first hurdle is showing it works and we don’t have that hurdle any more,” Erck said. But he added there were others still to overcome. “There’s the media that the cells have to grow in,” Erck said. “You grow them in these 2,000-litre bags, which are in short supply. Then you pour it out and you have to filter it, and the filters are in short supply. The little things count.” Novavax almost ran out of bags at one of its 20 factories earlier this year, but there had been no delays for the UK operation, according to Martin Meeson, global chief executive of Fujifilm Diosynth. “We started working on our part of the supply chain in summer last year,” he said. “We had to accelerate some of the investment here, but the commitment we made last summer to start manufacturing in February has been fulfilled.” Production of coronavirus vaccines is being ramped up. Production of coronavirus vaccines is being ramped up. Photograph: Christophe Archambault/AP Both Meeson and Erck said the UK’s vaccine taskforce had been helpful in sorting out supply issues so far, but other countries and other medical supplies might be affected. ABEC makes bioreactor bags at two plants in the US and two in Fermoy and Kells in Ireland, and delivered six 4,000-litre bags to the Serum Institute in India last year for its Covid vaccines. Brady Cole, vice-president of equipment solutions at ABEC, said: “We are hearing from our customer base of lead times that are pushing out to nine, 10, even 12 months to get bioreactor bags. We typically run out at 16 weeks to get a custom bioreactor bag out to a customer.” He said ABEC was still managing to fulfil orders at roughly that rate. “The bag manufacturing capacity can’t meet demand right now,” he added. “And on the component side, the tubes and the instruments and so forth that also go into the bag assembly – those lead times are also starting to get stretched as well. But the biggest problem we see is it really is just the ability to get bags in a reasonable amount of time.” ABEC expanded its factories last year and has now started making 6,000-litre bags, which are roughly the size of a minibus. Other firms including MilliporeSigma, part of German company Merck, have also been expanding their manufacturing facilities. American firm Thermo Fisher Scientific expects it will finish doubling its capacity this year. The US government has also blocked exports of bags, filters and other components so it can supply more Pfizer vaccines for Americans. Adar Poonawalla, the chief executive of the Serum Institute of India, said the restrictions were likely to cause serious bottlenecks. Novavax is hoping to avoid delays and “vaccine nationalism” by operating on four continents, with 20 facilities in nine countries. “One year ago, we had exactly zero manufacturing capacity,” Erck said. “We’re self-sufficient. The two main things we need to do are done in the UK. And in the EU we have plants in Spain and the Czech Republic and fill-and-finish in Germany and the Netherlands.” There was no need for vaccines to cross borders to fulfil contracts, he said. The Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine was hit by a delay to a delivery of 5 million doses from India and a problem with a batch made in Britain, and the company has been dragged into a lengthy row between the UK and the EU over vaccine exports.

#### The plan only hurts manufacturing moving bottlenecks to less efficient manufacturers

Alex **Knapp, 5/7** [Alex Knapp, (senior editor at Forbes covering healthcare, science, and cutting edge technology.)]. "Patent Waivers Won’t Impact Big Pharma’s Bottom Line—But Could Slow Covid Vaccine Rollouts." Forbes, 5-7-2021, Accessed 8-5-2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2021/05/07/patent-waivers-wont-impact-big-pharmas-bottom-line-but-could-slow-covid-vaccine-rollouts/?sh=78866f727862 // duongie

On Wednesday, the Biden Administration stated that it would support a proposal to temporarily waive protection of intellectual property (IP) rights for Covid vaccines during the pandemic, in a bid to boost production and accelerate vaccine distribution throughout the world. Industry trade groups immediately criticized the move, and investors reacted simultaneously—share prices plummeted, though they’ve been slowly recovering Thursday and Friday. Wall Street analysts at Morgan Stanley, Jefferies and Brookline Capital Markets, however, said in reports this week that waiving vaccine IP was unlikely to impact the financials of major vaccine makers, noting that current bottlenecks in vaccine production are related to supply chain, technical knowledge and difficulty in scaling up production. However, they caution that for the same reason, waivers could slow down current production by disrupting the market for raw materials. “Manufacturing supplies, raw materials, vials, stoppers and other key materials are in limited supply for 2021, and certainly for the 2021 calendar year,” wrote analysts from Jeffries, meaning that waivers can’t solve immediate vaccination needs in India and South Africa, where Covid-19 cases are surging. That report also notes that the mRNA vaccines from Pfizer and Moderna have yet to be authorized for use in India, as regulators desired local clinical trial data, which is another hurdle to overcome. Morgan Stanley commented that U.S. support alone doesn’t necessarily mean that a World Trade Organization agreement on the waiver would happen, especially since Germany has expressed opposition. The firm additionally notes that “manufacturing vaccines is a much more complicated process than making chemical drugs, and a patent waiver by itself would not enable other entities to manufacture their own copies of complex vaccines.” Jefferies analysts also remarked that another barrier to increased vaccine production is “ensuring the quality of the product, which is also not trivial.” Contractors for vaccine makers Pfizer, AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson have all run into quality-control issues that have led to millions of vaccine doses being discarded. On a company earnings call yesterday, Moderna CEO Stéphane Bancel said he doubted that waiving IP rights would impact his company much, because it would take months or even years for other companies to scale up manufacturing. Meanwhile, the biotech company has recently committed to expanding its own manufacturing capacity and expects to be able to make up to 3 billion doses of vaccine in 2022. Morgan Stanley analysts noted that in October 2020, Moderna “stated it would not enforce its patents during the pandemic, but to our knowledge, no one else has started manufacturing a vaccine that would violate Moderna’s patents.” The team at Brookline Capital markets noted that if a company did begin manufacturing vaccines based on Moderna’s patents, the upside would be an additional licensing revenue stream for the company. On Friday, vaccine manufacturer Novavax, which has reached an agreement with the private-public global health partnership Gavi to provide 1.1 billion vaccine doses to low income countries, stated its opposition to the WTO waiving patents, arguing that it “could further constrain resources by diverting them to entities incapable of manufacturing safe and effective vaccines in the near term.”