# 1AC

## 1AC – The Voice of Woman

#### Language may be neutral, but discourse has power: the economy of the Same is a historical process of representation that reproduces the figure of the woman that can only be defined as the outside to Man. The only ethical form of debate is to speak as woman - a practice of signification without one meaning, one that may operate in the interval between these signs - the figure the regime cannot understand

Haney-Peritz 87. Janice Haney-Peritz, 1987, “Speculum of the Other Woman , and: This Sex which is Not One , and: Reading Lacan (review),” Minnesota Review, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/428728/pdf> sean!

According to Luce Irigaray, woman cannot be understood apart from the "historic causes" which have (re)produced her: "Property systems, philosophical, mythological, or religious systems, [and] the theory and practice of psychoanalysis" (129). Although at one point or another Speculum ofthe Other Woman touches on all of these systems, it emphasizes the connections between and internal workings of two discursive practices: Freudian psychoan- alysis and metaphysics. The book opens with a reading of Freud on femininity ("The Blind Reviews 123 Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry"), moves through a middle section that includes chapters devoted to Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Descartes, Kant, and Hegel ("Speculum"), and closes with a stunning analysis of Plato's parable of the cave ("Plato's Hystera"). There, in Plato's cave, Irigaray discovers the womb that man would both appropriate and transcend by engendering a system of representation based on symmetry or the law of the Same. Working by analogy, Plato turns the womb into a sensible metaphor, a theater of fantasy set off against and ruled by the intelligible—the self-same eye of God. The truth of this metaphysical scenario is reinforced by a pedagogy through which other men—like Aristotle, Descartes, and Hegel—inherit the tools and tricks of the master's trade. Hence, in one way or another, they reproduce a scenario in which the conditions for representation are identity, sameness, and masterful "specul(ariz)ation." As Irigaray (re)presents it, Freud's discourse on female sexuality unwittingly participates in this economy of representation. In his story of how a female becomes a woman, the little girl begins as a "little man" and ends as a "man-minus" (27). Although this beginning and end generate numerous gaps and contradictions along the way, Freud sutures the gaps and covers up the contradictions by formulating a phallocentric theory of desire, a theory in which castration, the Oedipus complex, and penis envy are crucial. These formulas enable Freud to colonize the "dark continent" of female sexuality and in so doing, to make the unconscious a property of the master's discourse. Thus, he who was willing to challenge the rule of reason in the discourse of man reversed himself when it came to women's dreams, puns and fantasies. Failing to examine the "social dimension of sexual relations" (120) as well as the "historical determinants" (139) of both his discourse and his desire, Freud not only (re)produced an ideology of the feminine that "bailed out the current regimes of property" (121), he also engendered a practice of normalizing hysterics by seducing them into the position of the eternal feminine. In Speculum, Irigaray suggests that Freud and the philosophers have a stake in a certain economy of representation, one that upholds the rule of the Same by erasing the specificity of woman's relation to origins. In this system of representation, the "subject has always been appropriated by the 'masculine'" (133); woman functions as nothing more than an object or complement; she is the mirror of and for man. Lacking any "signifier" for a desire that is not already part of man's system of representation, woman is "ill prepared to mediate, metaphorize, or 'displace'" her specific "relation to generation" (1 10). All she has to "remind [her] of what has been" is her "body" (61). How then might it be possible for her to represent her desire, her difference, and her relation to an other—most especially to another woman? The possibility Irigaray both advocates and enacts in Speculum is a "disconcerting of language" (143). Not only does she play with words, she also engages in a "mimicry" that contests both the system of representation and the logic of the masters by overdoing and un(der)doing their discourse (142). In "The Bund Spot and Old Dream of Symmetry," Freud is permitted to deüver his lecture of "Femininity"—but not without interruptions from an impertinent questioner who notes contradictions, remarks on gaps, and engenders seeming- ly assymetrical connections and unauthorized analogies. In the second section of Speculum, the mimicry seems much less impertinent, for here Irigaray functions more or less like a passive mirror of man; the chapters devoted to Plato and Plotinus are entirely composed of extracts from each man's writings, while the chapters on Aristotle, Descartes, and Hegel are rather conventional mixtures of summary and commentary. However, this portion of Speculum opens and closes with two essays that establish a frame of reference for the mirroring, a frame different from the one each of the philosophers used; whereas they framed their remarks with reference to man, Irigaray frames her mirroring with reference to a female spectator or reader. And lest we forget that frame of reference, Irigaray interrupts her philosophical reflections to introduce a dazzling female, a figure who, in her utter abjection before God, becomes a "burning glass": "La Mystérique." Finally, in the closing essay on Plato's cave, Irigaray disconcerts the language of the master by painstakingly overdoing what many of us have come to associate with deconstructive analysis. Acting like a "toogood" student, she outdoes Plato by over-valuing his word: seizing on marginal details, she patiently unravels their implications, and in so doing, turns a short and seemingly lucid allegory into a frustratingly long and opaque text. At one point in Speculum, Irigaray writes that "now and again it is advisable to say things very clearly" (38). Under interrogation is Freud's notion of a "seduction fantasy." Having noted how Freud uses his law (the Oedipus complex) to defend against the "distress" he feels when his women patients tell him that they have been seduced by their fathers, Irigaray wonders how this censured psychoanalytical scene would ever make it possible for "the daughter [to] recognize herself in her desire, particularly her desire for her father." But no sooner has she posed this question than Irigaray decides to make it "clear" that her questioning "does not mean that the father necessarily makes love to his daughter" (38). At issue here are a matter of fact and a matter of necessity—matters which make it advisable for a feminist to speak clearly—at least now and then. Unlike Speculum, This Sex Which Is Not One is mostly a collection of occasional pieces in which Irigaray chooses to speak clearly. Indeed, of the eleven essays in the collection, only four deploy the deliberate mimicry that permeates Speculum; the rest either summarize ideas one might have gleaned from Speculum ("This Sex Which is Not One," "Psychoanalytic Theory: Another Look," "The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine," and "Ques- tions"), or explicitly address matters of fact and necessity that often disconcert feminists: the traffic in women ("Women on the Market"), homosexual prejudice ("Commodities Among Themselves") and pornography ('"Frenchwomen, Stop Trying'"). Although much of what Irigaray has to say in these essays will not be "news" to American feminists, her forceful way of speaking about women reminds us that in an economy of representation based on the rule of the Same, some things clearly bear repeating. What is likely to seem different, if not entirely new, are Irigaray's attempts at "speaking (as) woman." Midway through the collection, there are two such attempts, both of which recall Irigaray's mimicry of Freud. "Cosi Fan Tutti" impertinently repeats Lacan's remarks on woman's lack in relation to the Other (Language), while "The 'Mechanic' of Fluids" exposes Lacan's specula(riza)tions on the object (a) in relation to the subject of desire. Both of these essays are extrordinarily difficult, not only because Lacan is at issue but also because in Speculum, Irigaray's discourse on woman seems to anticipate Lacan's. So why, one wonders, would Irigaray choose to mime Lacan in a way that calls such remarks and specula(riza)tions into question? Apparently, what disturbs Irigaray is that Lacan occasionally says things like the following: "There is no woman who is not yet excluded by the nature of things, which is the nature of words, and it must be said that, if there is something they complain a lot about at the moment, that is what it is—except that they don't know what they are saying, that's the whole difference between them and me" (87). As Irigaray (re)presents it, this way of talking for and about woman is inadvisable; not only does it aggrandize theoretical knowledge about the nature of words but in so doing it also devalues necessarily pragmatic attempts at "speaking (as) woman." Irigaray and Lacan may be caught up in each other's discourse; however, the two are not one and the same. In questioning language and the subject, Irigaray is concerned with both the nature of words and the power of discourse. Theoretically considered, language may be neutral; yet pragmatically speaking, discourse has power. Hence, even though Irigaray does not lack Lacan's knowledge, she remains committed to "speaking (as) woman." Irigaray flaunts that commitment in the two essays that frame This Sex Which is Not One. The opening essay re-views the Swiss film Les Arpenteurs in a way that is designed to uncover a possible space for woman, a place which lies on the other side of the looking glass. The closing essay, titled "When Our Lips Speak Together," projects the possibility that this space can be realized in and through a different language practice—a way of "speaking (as) woman" in analogy with an 'other' female body. The collection's title piece graphically describes the sex of this other body, a sex which is not one and the same (i.e., phallomorphic) but plural and heterogeneous: "two Ups in continuous contact" as well as "the breasts ... the vulva ... the posterior waU of the vagina ... the mouth of the uterus, and so on" (24; 28). Like this female body, "speaking (as) woman" would be something different, a heterogeneous practice in which signification does not return to one and the same meaning, to one and the same sex. Since Gillian Gill and Catherine Porter have done such a fine job of translating, it will now be possible to articulate the numerous points of contact between Irigaray and American feminist literary critics. So, for example, we might note the close connection between Irigaray's exposure of phallocentric discourse and Gilbert and Gubar's critique of patriarchal poetics. Similarly, we might relate Irigaray's ways of "speaking (as) woman" to Spacks's description of the female imagination, Gilbert and Gubar's identification of the female story, and Showalter's explorations of a female Uterary tradition. And finally, we might link Irigaray's remarks on a pre-Oedipal sexuality with the recent American interest in how a woman's writing figures her relationship to the pre-Oedipal mother. But even though numerous points of contact exist, articulating a relation with Irigaray will not be an unproblematic venture for American feminists. In Speculum as well as in This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray draws on both the practice and ideology of deconstructuve criticism. By exposing the interdependence and inequality of such structuring oppositions as same/other and male/female, deconstructive criticism seeks not only to reverse the metaphysical hierarchy that supports a certain economy of representation but also to displace this reversal. In consequence, such winning terms as "other" and "female" become conceptual disruptions—disconcerting figures which cannot be understood along the lines set down by the prior regime. In Irigaray's work, this deconstructive operation produces a fabulous figure: "speaking (as) woman." Although this woman exists, she does so only as a fiction. For those who believe that in reality there is a distinctive female imagination, female story, and female tradition, Irigaray's deconstructed figure is bound to cause problems.

#### This necessitates process ontology – the new forms of thinking that arise from potentially contradictory positions – that makes places like debate a unique space to explore new forms of subjectivity

Braidotti 06. Rosi Braidotti, 2006, “Posthuman, All Too Human: Towards a New Process Ontology,” Theory, Culture, and Society, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0263276406069232> sean!

Haraway raises a point that Deleuze (1986) also noted in his analysis of Foucault, namely that the Foucauldian diagrams of power describe what we have already ceased to be; like all cartography, they act a posteriori and therefore fail to account for the situation here and now. Whereas Foucault’s analysis rests on an early 20th-century view of the production system, Haraway inscribes her analysis of the condition of women into an up-to-date analysis of the post-industrial system of production. Arguing that white capitalist patriarchy has turned into the ‘informatics of domination’ (Haraway, 1991: 162), Haraway suggests that women have been cannibalized by the new technologies and have disappeared from the field of visible social agents. The post-industrial system makes it urgent to invent a new politics on the basis of a more adequate understanding of how the contemporary subject functions. Haraway’s cyborg inserts an oppositional consciousness at the heart of the debate on the new technological societies currently being shaped, in such a way as to highlight issues of gender and sexual difference within a much broader discussion about survival and social justice. More than ever, therefore, the question of power relations and of ethical and political resistance emerges as relevant in the age of informatics of domination. This philosophical post-humanism does not, therefore, result in antifoundationalism. It rather stresses the need for process ontology. Thinking is a nomadic activity, which takes place in the transitions between potentially contradictory positions. It is not topologically bound, especially in the age of the global economy and telematic networks, but this does not make it ungrounded, like a view from nowhere. To be in process or transition does not place the thinking subject outside history or time: postmodernity as a specific moment of our historicity is a major location that needs to be accounted for. A location is an embedded and embodied memory: it is a set of counter-memories, which are activated by the resisting thinker against the grain of the dominant representations of subjectivity. A location is a materialist temporal and spatial site of co-production of the subject, and thus anything but an instance of relativism. The politics of location, or situated knowledges, rests on process ontology to posit the primacy of relations over substances. Donna Haraway’s work dislocates the centrality of the human, in favor of the in/non/post-human and of bio-centered egalitarianism. Thus, in her criticism of the exploitative logic of Western techno-sciences from within, Haraway (1997) stresses a number of crucial features. The first is power as a dynamic web of interconnections or hybrid contaminations, as a principle of radical non-purity. The second is the refusal to fall into the pitfall of the classical nature/culture divide: there is no natural telos or order, as distinct from technological mediation. In order to restructure our collective relationship to the new nature/culture compound of contemporary techno-sciences, Haraway calls for a renewed kinship system, radicalized by concretely affectionate ties to the non-human ‘others’. Haraway (1992) argues that the subject-object, nature-culture divides are linked to patriarchal, oedipal familial narratives. Against them, she mobilizes an enlarged sense of community, based on empathy, accountability and recognition (Haraway, 1997). Moreover, she extends these prerogatives to non-human agents or subjects, such as animals, plants, cells, bacteria and the Earth as a whole.

#### And thus, we move to space: the dream-destiny, the vertical axis of patriarchy, the escape from capital: the resolution brings us to the question of private spaceflight, the extension of the spiderweb of Capital and masculinity to the cosmos.

#### When a fly is caught in a spiderweb, he can’t change the web: he must abandon the fly. To become a spider-fly, a soaring arachnid that is neither subject nor other, that mimics the power of the spider to become all the more fly – and we shall call her cyborg.

Russell 14. John Russell (the artist responsible for the show Sqrrl at the Bridget Donahue gallery, a feminist scholar studying the work of Irigaray, Haraway, and Grosz), 2014, “BRUCE WILLIS, IRIGARAY, AND THE AESTHETICS OF SPACE TRAVEL,” <https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/bruce-willis-irigaray-and-aesthetics-space-travel> sean!

Aristotle’s theorising of ‘place’ and selection of the model of ‘topos’ as a lynchpin of his philosophical system,[22] develops from his characterisation of the ‘womb’ as the primary example of place, whereby ‘thing’ (masculine) and place (feminine) are gendered hierarchically: ‘Irigaray emphasizes that the relationship between woman’s function as a dwelling for the embryo and her vagina’s figuration as a place for the man’s penis are not discrete’.[23] This is replayed as a phallo-nostalgic tragedy, where man yearns to return to the Mother's body, whilst at the same time (dis)locating his origin away from the corporeal (from matter): ‘In all his creations, all his works, man always seems to neglect thinking of himself as flesh, as one who has received his body as that primary home…’[24] In this sense, the vagina, according to Irigaray, functions as a ‘perforation’ toward this ‘first place’ as coffin or tomb.[25] But at the same time female sexual and reproductive functions furnish the system with the concept-metaphors to define place as immobile, in order to give limits to ‘Man and to his things’.[26] Everything in its place. Or placed. And so we may look to the skies, squinting upwards like Plato’s philosophers escaped from the deceptive materialities of the womb-cave, blinking up at the divine immateriality of the sun and the ‘good’ as the dream-destiny of mankind and the ‘greatest ideas of our civilisation’.[27] Delineating the vertical axis of patriarchy, as the Father of form – the 'progressive erection that goes from quadruped to Homo-erectus.’[28] As a phallus spurting out cum at the sky. As a Fantasy-outside or excess coordinate articulated as both an ‘escape’ from Capitalism (as transcendence, Light, Knowledge, Enlightenment, Truth), and, at the same time, as part of its mechanisms of expansion, as described, for instance, in Rosa Luxemburg’s analysis where capitalism always needs a periphery, a non-capitalist outside to appropriate: new land, new resources, new investment opportunities.[29] This figures space exploration as the export of our [slowed] and deadly social relations across the galaxy like the escaping monsters in The Thing or Alien – ‘carriers’ of our diseased archaic structurings of time and place.[30] The expansion, militarisation, marketisation, flexibilisation of the Cosmos. Or this can be reversed around as a parasiting of the present by the future. Ray Brassier, in a recent discussion on JG Ballard’s short story, ‘The Voices of Time’, described the disjunction between adaptation for the future and being in the present: Ballard’s story revolves around an apocalypse, where ‘Time’ is coming to an end; in response, a number of animals begin undergoing strange morphological changes, rapidly evolving to meet a future rushing towards them (a spider that weaves its own neural net outside of its body, a toad with a lead shell, an anemone that hears light). Brassier regards these as examples of the ‘future’s maladaptation to the present’. In Brassier’s analysis this moment is catastrophic[31] – the introduction of a necessary trauma as adaption or orientation towards the future. He describes this as a rehabilitated Prometheanism or enlightened catastrophism where we grasp our destiny in the admittedly corporate/capitalist technologies of advanced science and its applications, for instance, Space Travel.[32] As he describes we have to do something with Time because ‘we know time will do something with us’. The problem here is the brief mention that we should 'refunction' or 'repurpose' the technologies of capitalistic production to 'emancipatory ends'. This is obviously the difficult bit. [33] Mickey Mouse, Barack Obama, Justin Timberlake, or Nicki Minaj are sitting in a car – flicking their eyes up at the rear view mirror – they move the car forward a few feet to get a better angle to reverse – the view is partly obscured – thinking about what they have to do that day, the events that will unfold in the next few hours – they reverse the car – there is a nasty crunching sound – suspended nauseously between past and future – and they know they’ve just run over next door’s one year old child who has crawled out onto the drive. The emotion of terror/sickness/wonder reminds them of […] This is reminiscent of the avant-garde aesthetic (trauma) where our experience of experimentation with the configurations of form and space, in the example of an actual object, for instance a cubist painting (the manipulation of materials, colour, planes and so on) predicts future spatial and temporal configurations and radically transformed conditions of experience. An actualisation of the future in the present moment, as a prophecy or promise, of the forthcoming transformation (or not) of relations of exchange between humans, objects and places including (potentially) the transformation of political systems and redistribution of the means of production. In extension, this is played out affectively, as a kind of terror-aesthetic where these proposed transformations predict our own absence or erasure in the sublime of human potential – that is, the modes of experience which make and construct us as humans would now be incomprehensible to us and us to them.[34] At worst a personalised, 'correlationist' bourgeois histrionics (horror vacui).[35] But if this is viewed from a Deleuzian/Bergsonian perspective – vitalist image of ‘the ‘force of life’ as difference – as the excessive drive to differ – set against the force of repetition of the same, on both human and cosmic scales.[36] As Elizabeth Grosz describes it, through her Irigarayan/Bergsonian analysis of Darwin, as the expression of freedom tied to the capabilities of our own transformable/ transforming bodies telescoping back through the multi-millenial, material, cosmic-queering of life from the bacterial through to the excessive animal-aesthetics of sexual selection. In the extravagant plummage of birds, the decadence of mating ritual and the frenzied dance of bees, then this aesthetic or affect can be splayed out as an oscillation between the ludicrous and the operational, form and informe, possible and impossible, drama and melodrama, present and the future. And always the stratification of or movement between revolution (including social revolution) and banality – potentially revolutionary as well as potentially trivial. Like a gif.[37] A NOTHING as mediation with the future, where mimicry and sophistry operate as the play of the ‘given’ and the ‘made’.[38] There’s an ‘I’ and a ‘U’ in LUVIN. Or to return to the idea of the trap which Elizabeth Grosz discusses with reference to the work of the biologist Jacob von Uexkull who describes the development of fly and spider (in terms similar to Singleton) as a kind of ‘mutual adaption’ or ‘harmonic coordination’ where the spider’s web exists as ‘a kind spatial counterpoint to the movements of the fly’. The fly is ‘already mapped, signaled, its place accommodated [bodily/spatially] in, for example, its inability to see the smooth unmoving threads of the web’.[39] Given this structure, one of the ways the fly might escape is to not be a fly. The exceptional thing here is not only to escape the trap but to express a freedom as other to the logic of the trap. That is, to change the rules of the game. And the conditions which create the spider and the fly. This is the production of an aesthetics which is always concerned with affective experience of ontological force, as a virtual and material force of transformation acting in and on the actual drives and flesh of our bodies, as they exist now (positioned by class, race and sexual/sexuated relation) and as they have transformed over Time. [40] Which is why aesthetics is like sci-fi and why Outer Space is so important to aesthetics and politics. Sub-troped as post-alien category 7/humanoid, deep space cleansing operative 7S1A/Amboina, including tentacle attachments and penis-vagina refurb, moving across the blackness – galaxy reflected in her visor. Meat suit with bio implants. Rotating above Entrance hatch x117. She sprouts wings at her sides. Golden scales reflecting bright white. As an intensity of mimicry and acting out of the cadavers of place. Miming mime itself. Gliding upwards. An angel. As a movement across the material and the divine. As both. The space between.

#### In space, there is no place, and if woman is place, then there is no woman – the drive to colonize the heavens reinstitutes the subject in an Aristotelian theorization of a liberatory cosmos that is the final step towards the elimination of the feminine subject – why do we always desire a new outside?

Bianchi 14. Emanuela Bianchi (Emanuela Bianchi, a doctoral candidate in philosophy at the New School for Social Research, is a visiting scholar in the Department of Rhetoric at the University of California, Berkeley), 2014, “The feminine symptom : aleatory matter in the Aristotelian cosmos,” Fordham University Press, ask me for the pdf, sean!

- the feminine subject is reduced to place, the signifiers that represent femininity are all spaces to be entered and comfort the masculine subject

- in the cosmos, the masculine subject can enter the heavens where there is no place, but one can exist outside of physical time and space – that eliminates the space for the feminine subject

- this is also because there is no longer the need for the feminine to mediate the post-oedipal relationship between body and father (divine heavens, outer space, object of desire in a negative oedipal sense)

In Irigaray’s analysis, the concepts of Aristotelian physics correspond to the topologically experienced lived body in its sexual difference; she illuminates these latent dimensions of that physics which is not by any means scientific in our sense, but rather, as Edward Casey has put it, protophenomenological.20 Woman has been reduced to a topology—she is place. As container or envelope—as womb, matrix, vagina, mother, and lover—she gives place to man, granting him existential comfort and consolation, while she is placeless, lost, without any place: “I shall affirm that the masculine is attracted to the maternal-feminine as place. But what place does the masculine offer to attract the feminine?”21 This placelessness of woman, with its connotation of the abyss, of falling in a void, renders her threatening, terrifying. The analysis here takes us far beyond the Beauvoirean diagnosis of woman as aligned with or representing nature: rather, this territory is primordially existential. This abysmal threat, in turn, provokes in the masculine a need for compensatory containment or fixation, effected by woman’s exclusion and entrapment in the role of place giver. Irigaray reveals a gendered asymmetry in both topology and the motility of the contained with regard to the container. Desire, as it is expressed as movement, as locomotion toward, remains the preserve of the masculine. Without her own “proper place,” woman moves without direction, wanders or falls, is mise en abyme, or, to shift with Irigaray to the language of contemporary physics, she merely revolves about the center like an electron.22 Having thus diagnosed the situation, Irigaray offers a topological solution: the masculine must offer a kind of place in return, toward or away from which the feminine might then be able to move: “If there is no double desire, the positive and negative poles divide themselves between the two sexes instead of establishing a chiasmus or double loop in which each can go toward the other and come back to itself.”23 Irigaray contends that both sexes should move, and both sexes should find place, containment, shelter with the other, without absorption into or annihilation of the other: “Between the one and the other, there should be mutual enveloping in movement.”24 At the close of her essay, Irigaray introduces the theme of the rotation of the universe in Aristotle’s discussion of place, noting that for him the cosmos itself does not change place but moves in a circle. She recalls Aristophanes’s speech in Plato’s 122 The Physics of Sexual Difference in Aristotle and Irigaray Symposium, in which men and women were once one conjoint being, locked in embrace and moving in a circle. For Aristotle, by contrast, one sex claims to be the whole, constructing “his world into a closed circle.”25 To specify Irigaray’s critique of Aristotelian place more precisely in psychoanalytic terms, one can note that the main hazard presented by the Aristotelian topology of container and contained is the danger of engulfment faced by the male subject in relation to the maternal feminine. Freud describes such a relation as “anaclitic” or attachment type: the unmediated, pre-Oedipal object-choice characteristic of the little boy’s (and it is typically a little boy) love of his mother, and rooted, he says, in the nutritional instinct of attachment to the breast.26 Irigaray’s call for an interval, a spacing between container and contained, is a call for a relation to the sexuate other that would be mediated on and for both sides. However, Irigaray does not acknowledge either the preOedipal nature of this situation of containership and threat of engulfment, nor the traditional conduit by which this untenable situation may be mediated or resolved, namely the familial drama of the Oedipus complex. As is well known, in this classic narrative of male subject development it is the father who appears as the third term and therefore under whose sign resolution is enabled. The father threatens to intervene into the little boy’s dyadic bond with the mother, precipitating a struggle unto death, with the threat of castration or feminization of the son as the father’s trump card. The little boy fantasizes the elimination or death of the father. The father’s law responds thus: “Renounce your claim on the mother, for she is mine. If you do not, you will become like her, lacking, the object to be fought over and not a subject, not a player in this conflict. If you do, you will accede to masculinity.” The struggle over the body of the mother is resolved when the little boy indeed renounces her, and accepts the prohibition. His subjectivity and masculinity are guaranteed by the assurance that, not now, but in the future, he may have one “just like her”: a woman of his own as a legitimate object of erotic desire.27 The danger, or power, represented by the maternal feminine is thus neutralized through the Oedipal drama in which she is reduced to a cipher of phallic power, through whom father and son can enjoy a mediated relationship, now full of interval, allowing them both place and space without threat of obliteration.28 The spacing afforded by this resolution is also temporal: a deferral is introduced, a relation to futurity that is also a metonymic or analogic difference. In forcing The Physics of Sexual Difference in Aristotle and Irigaray 123 the son to wait, not for his mother but for another like her in certain respects (and most assuredly with respect to her femininity, the very quality that makes her capable of possession), and for an intimacy, nourishment and containment that comes later, the father’s law also gives temporality, an assuredly masculine temporality. If, then, we reframe Irigaray’s diagnosis of sexual difference in Aristotle’s account of place as a pre-Oedipal scene of anaclitic attachment, several questions arise. How might this impossible pre-Oedipal dyad be resolved? Are the logic and dynamics of the Oedipus complex reflected in Aristotelian physics and in the constitution of the Aristotelian cosmos, and what does this reveal about the mechanisms of the erasure of sexual difference in the architecture of Western thought? And might we find hints of a destabilization of that architectonic, a destabilization with potential for enriching Irigaray’s feminist philosophy? In Metaphysics XII, where Aristotle finally turns to a discussion of the prime mover as the teleological pinnacle of the text’s narrative, we may indeed observe a rather striking illustration of Oedipal resolution. Aristotle’s prime mover, the masculine signifier par excellence is unmoved and motionless, standing beyond the physical cosmos, outside space and time. And it is in relation to this divine and incorporeal entity that the universe rotates out of love. The divine prime thus creates motion not through any exertion of its own, but passively, through being loved (kinei de hōs erōmenon).29 This love, erotic rather than filial or friendly (erōs not philia), is not possessive, anaclitic, or sexually differentiated. Rather, it is mediated and identificatory: the moving spheres wish to be as much like the prime mover as possible, moving in perfect circles reflecting its perfection, and not desiring to close up the interval between them by occupying its place or seeking engulfment within it. This love is thus precisely homoerotic—an eros of like to like. There is, in psychoanalytic terms, a clear contrast between the anaclitic container-contained relationship between place and thing in the sublunary realm, and the identificatory, or perhaps narcissistic object choice of the moving spheres in the superlunary realm. This distinction lends itself explicitly to a reading in terms of the Oedipus complex: a pre-Oedipal relationship with an engulfing mother versus a postOedipal outcome of identification with the father.30 What then has transpired in the interval? How is this mediation achieved? Reading Aristotle’s cosmos via the developmental narrative of Oedipalization, we may conjecture that the dangers represented by unmediated, sexually differentiated containment in the sublunary world are resolved in the “higher” realm by a suppression or subjugation of the maternalfeminine. The matrilocal scene in which entities move toward place and rest in containment is mediated by the introduction of a third term, that of the father, or the prime mover. To develop this psychoanalytic reading of the dynamics of the Aristotelian heavens, we can draw on Kaja Silverman’s account of the negative Oedipus complex, forged in the context of the development of the superego. According to Freud’s Ego and the Id, the parent one ends up identifying with becomes the blueprint for the superego, where an image of that parent is set up within the ego and functions as the source of moral imperatives. As Silverman notes, the situation for the male subject is explosive, for if the son tries to become like the father, the superego prevents it “by decreeing: ‘You may not be like [your father] . . . you may not do all that he does; some things are his prerogative.’ The paternal law thus promotes the very thing that its severity is calculated to prevent, a contradiction which must function as a constant inducement to reconstitute the negative Oedipus complex.”31 In other words, the strength of the prohibitive moral law of the father is such that it threatens to push the son’s identification away from the father and onto the mother, while a new relation is established with the father: an erotic one. That paternal identification is haunted in this way by erōs is reflected in Aristotle’s use of that term, rather than the more chaste philia, to describe the affective relation between moving spheres and prime mover. In the Greek context, of course, there is nothing surprising about erotic relations between masculine subjects, especially in the rarified world of the Athenian elite where erotic relations between older and younger citizen, lover and beloved, are hierarchically formalized. The works of Plato constantly dramatize these relationships, especially between the figure of Socrates and his various young interlocutors, although any explicit mention of homoerotic love between men is limited to just a few remarks in the Aristotelian corpus.32 In the Aristotelian heavens, however, we can see that the Greek hierarchical ordering of lover and beloved, active and passive parties, is reversed. The heavenly bodies are the active lovers and the prime mover is the erōmenon, the beloved. While the divine prime mover does not act upon the world in any direct way, it is the manifestation of the good as such, which is for Aristotle that toward which most things, at least, tend. As the ultimate object of desire it can be understood to exercise a powerful moral and legislative force, a law of the father that paradoxically consists entirely in its unattainable erotic passivity (more usually associated with the boy in a Greek pederastic relationship). The beloved beautiful boy, so inspirational to the philosopher in Platonic philosophical love, thus reaches a kind of apotheosis in Aristotle. In relation to place, the prime mover, serves as a placeholder beyond the cosmos rather than occupying any specific place or space within the cosmos. Furthermore, the prime mover, qua unattainable paternal love object, points to possibilities beyond the prohibitive either/or of sexual difference decreed by both positive and negative Oedipus complexes, in which one must identify with one parent and desire the other. The Aristotelian heavens are driven by a force that is both identificatory and erotically desiring, that queers the Oedipus complex, so to speak, but from which women, the feminine, and sexual difference as such, have all but been eliminated. In contrast to Irigaray, for Aristotle it is not the woman that revolves about the center like an electron, but the masculine heavenly bodies that thus move in perfect circular motion, in a relation of pure, homoerotic identification with an impassive metaphysical father.34 In this narrative, then, there is a developmental movement from the local motions of the sublunary realm—rectilinear motions toward goals or places—to the broader, higher, and more perfected circular motions of the celestial realm. In the heavens, the feminine no longer has any place at all, not even as a giver of place. The woman/mother is superseded and the relation between subject and paternal function, now understood as that between heavenly body and divine prime mover, is mediated at her expense, at the price of her disappearance.

#### Thus, we affirm that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. A feminist affirmation of the resolution goes further than a value statement: an ethic of injustice must involve the mimicry and deconstruction of those discourses of power.

#### The “Wild West,” the “New Frontier,” the new signifiers of spaceflight are fully imbricated within the coloniality of patriarchy. What does it mean to mark that unjust?

#### Remember the opening act: language is neutral, but discourse has power. What does it mean to listen to a cyborg speak? We must ask ourselves how to use the technology of Empire against itself, the language of Empire against itself. The question of the resolution is not a question of appropriation, but rather, the question of the re-appropriation of the cyborg.

Banschbach 13. Sarah Banschbach (English professor at Texas Tech, PhD in English Literature, Masters from UT-PB), 2013, “Hi-Ho, Cyborg! Savages, Cyborgs, and Gender on the Science-Fiction Frontier” in “Contemporary Westerns,” edited by Andrew Patrick Nelson, I have the pdf [brackets are in the original] sean!

The United States is a country that has always looked westward for answers to political and social problems. Whether one is interested in the “Wild West” is irrelevant as the frontier pattern of expansion is ingrained in American culture. Though the West was officially “closed” in 1890, the saga of the cowboy, the Lone Ranger, the desperado, the settler, and the Indian lives on iconically in film and media. In more recent years these themes have been resurrected in science fiction, a genre that is no stranger to frontiers. Space and science are both considered the last frontiers of modern times and many films return to the history of the gunslinging West as a forecast of colonization on other planets. Though John Wayne’s West is the traditional movie depiction of the frontier, modern conceptions of the space and science frontier include the rough and tough lawlessness of the West but can also feature hallmarks of science fiction like aliens, robots, and cyborgs, robothuman hybrids. In the light of Donna Haraway’s seminal “A Cyborg Manifesto,” I examine what cyborgs tell us about these new frontiers of space and science by wedding her approach to the ideas of John Cawelti in order to guide an interpretation of the film Westworld (Michael Crichton, 1973) and the television series Firefly (2002) with its companion film Serenity (Joss Whedon, 2005). Focusing on how evolving conceptions of the positive and negative aspects of frontier cyborgs revise and resist the “John Wayne West” by questioning human power structures and morality, I claim that these new frontiers of space and science demand adherence to traditional Western motifs but that the science-fiction frontier also creates a technologically modified version of Cawelti’s savagery/civilization binary, which allows room for the resistance of cyborgs, especially female cyborgs, who, coded as sexual and maternal beings, resist the limitations of a purely technological mold and are the key to creating a lasting and working synthesis between binaries. In The Six-Gun Mystique Sequel Cawelti offers an extensive analysis of the Western, claiming that the genre is defined by three things: the setting, the types of characters, and the situation. 2 The setting includes not just geography but, even more importantly, the social and historical background of the time. He writes, The Western story is set at a certain moment in the development of American civilization, namely at that point when savagery and lawlessness are in decline before the advancing wave of law and order, but are still strong enough to pose a local and momentarily significant challenge. 3 Hence, the West is not just a place; it is a frame of mind and attitude. Though the geography gives a sense of place and sense of freedom, it is the social and political freedom that accompanies the new landscapes that is also appealing, for “the desert landscape of the West is seen as a terrain where individuals can escape from the past and the limits of tradition.” 4 However, maintaining traditions of personal integrity against the oppressive traditions of society is also part of the Western narrative. The characters of a Western are broken down into three camps: the townspeople/pioneers, which necessarily includes women; the hero, “the man with a gun” who “internalizes the conflict between savagery and civilization” and whose “personal honor and honor of the old wilderness” is the focal point of the story; and the savages who are “interchangeable between Indians and outlaws.” 5 The hero defends the townspeople and ultimately supports the town and “civilization,” while savages “usually have the capacity to live and move freely in the wilderness, [and have] mastery of the tools of violence and strong masculinity” as well as the propensity for pursuing “ruthless violence.” 6 One other vital aspect of the savage is the tendency toward madness since “both madness and savagery are forms of reaction against the lawful order of the town.” 7 Yet heroes and savages are both aligned with a strong “code of personal honor.” 8 Moreover, even though the hero defends the townspeople and ultimately supports the town and “civilization,” he is a character on the margins who “is something of an antihero to the self-made man and embodies strong feelings of hostility to the symbols and values of progress and success.” 9 Hi-Ho, Cyborg! 109 The situation or story line of the Western revolves around “the epic moment when society stands balanced against the savage wilderness.” 10 This relates back to place and setting and focuses on the conflict of the East and the West in the Western environment, also characterized as civilization against savagery or order against wildness. What is most important about this ritualized story is that it “affirmed the creation of America and explored not only what was gained but what was lost in the movement of American history.” 11 The romance of adventure is essential to the Western as well. 12 As the West closed and became a thing of the past, the space frontier opened up. Cawelti writes that “outer space can, of course, be treated as a frontier, and like the West in an earlier time, it is both a mythical landscape and a contemporary actuality.” 13 Fact and fiction find a place in the Western as well as in the science-fiction universe. On the science-fiction frontier, multicultural diversity and women play more active roles than they do in the Western. Carl Abbott states that “science fiction writers think historically when they envision path-dependent futures” since science fiction is about “the societal ramifications of change.” 14 Science-fiction and Western narratives have the similar motifs of expansion, new territory, homesteading, frontier environments, humans struggling with the forces of nature, “civilized” man contending with “natives” and “savages,” adventure, escape, possibility, and imperialism. Abbott points out that the West is important to an American understanding of the space frontier not only because of the motifs mentioned above, but also because the first wave of science-fiction films were shot in Western environments due to their strange, remote, and unfamiliar landscapes. 15 He cites President Kennedy as codifying space as the new Manifest Destiny for Americans when “he proclaimed that Americans stood ‘on the edge of a new frontier—the frontier of the 1960s—a frontier of unknown challenges and perils. . . . I am asking you to be new pioneers on that New Frontier.’” 16 With space exploration overtly linked with the Western mindset and with Western imagery, Cawelti’s concept of antithetical values clashing on a new frontier can easily provide both a narrative and interpretive framework for these new stories. As much as the science-fiction narrative draws from Western conventions, though, it also introduces the machine as a staple character. 17 How the hero interacts and interfaces with the machine becomes a new facet to be considered on two fronts. For one, in science fiction the machine is no longer subservient to humankind but rather moves toward equality or even superiority; and two, the machine enters the sci-fi narrative in the role of “other” or, relating back to the Western, as the “savage.” This new “savage” can be described in the same rhetoric as the Indian or outlaw as it is powerful in being unpredictable, is accepted by society as interesting and yet is held at arms’ length, incites a strange sense of pathos (think Roy Batty in Blade Runner), and has a strong (literal) personal code. And as with the original 110 Sarah Banschbach “savage,” the science-fiction hero must be able to recognize the potential of the machine and adapt/align himself to its forms in order to survive. However, as we will see, the initial masculinity associated with the “savage” in the Western will be questioned in the cyborg. The ultimate machine/human interface is the cyborg. Cyborgs are historically linked with the space frontier as the first instance of the term appears in the 1960 article “Cyborgs and Space” by Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline. A cyborg’s purpose is to provide an “organizational system” in which mundane “problems are taken care of automatically and unconsciously, leaving man free to explore, to create, to think, and to feel.” 18 Further, a cyborg adapts “man to his environment, rather than vice versa.” 19 Through cyborgs, the space frontier is revised at the basic level of adaptation and cyborg science fictions allow “new technologies [to] have the potential to create new virtual worlds and transhuman beings.” 20 However, still in sync with traditional Western patterns, the cyborg is, at its inception on the space frontier, connected “to the rhetoric of colonization and conquest.” 21 Published in 1985, Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” creates a mythos for cyborg identity that is linked with this rhetoric of the space frontier. She views cyborgs as a fusion of “organism and machine” engaged in “a border war” over the “territories of production, reproduction, and imagination.” 22 Haraway writes that her “cyborg myth is about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political work.” 23 Blurring boundaries of socially constructed ontologies, particularly in the realms of gender and race, is this political work of social revolution. Since dualities pose the possibility for dominance, such binaries must be removed and a new synthesis must take their place. Haraway looks for such a synthesis from science and technology because they are the “illegitimate” progeny of the current patriarchal society; because they reduce the world into a single language, the language of code; and because it is unclear “who makes and who is made in the relation between human and machine.” 24 A single language allows the reconstructing of identity without duality allowing for “disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange” while ambiguity of origin negates “universal” matrices and cycles.25 Cyborgs are the essence of this liminal reconstruction and “a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid . . . of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints.” 26 Since “the cyborg looks to the past as well as the future” it is therefore “precisely this double nature that allows cyborg stories to be imbricated within cultural narratives while still wrenching them in a new direction.” 27 Wrenching narratives in a new direction is facilitated by the speculative world of science fiction, where the ramifications of the past, present, and future can be safely explored as societal values, morality, and power structures are examined. Due to the increasing integration of society with technology, dystopian, cautionary cyborg tales give way to more positive yet still instructive cyborg narratives. Early science-fiction works immediately identified women with the machine, such as Fritz Lang’s 1927 film Metropolis, but the traditional deleterious treatment of the “other” prevails. Though not exclusively dealing with women, the human domination of cyborgs in Westworld also fits this pattern. The negative aspects of the cyborg are the main focus of the film Westworld, which predates “A Cyborg Manifesto” by twelve years, while a slow progression or revealing of the positive aspects mentioned in Haraway’s manifesto is present in the later Firefly series as it investigates the transformative possibilities of the female and the machine. The following discussion of films evoking the Western genre, space frontiers, and (re)visionary cyborgs illuminates the shift of perspective in posthuman and cyborg evolution.

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse an ethic of relationality. What is the subject but an interaction with the Other? Only the 1AC’s cyborgian ethic can operate in the “interval between” subject and discourse that disrupts patriarchal signification.

For spec purposes:

* The pre/post-fiat distinction makes no sense, we’ve made a claim about the resolutions relations to shaping subjectivities
* The role of the ballot uplayers theory or at least controls the direction of what theory impacts matter
* Determining a winner is based off of the flow. We think that performance and debate are intertwined which means that separating the two makes no sense
* If you want anything else, ask in cross, we’ve done more than we should have to.

Toye 12. Margaret Toye (Associate Professor; Women and Gender Studies at Wilfred Laurier University), 2012, “Donna Haraway's Cyborg Touching (Up/On) Luce Irigaray's Ethics and the Interval Between: Poethics as Embodied Writing,” Hypatia, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41328904> sean!

Much of Irigaray's work passes under the radar as ethics because her ap- proach is foreign to those who understand ethics more traditionally as a focus on issues of "choice," "individual will," or "the good life." Even within more contemporary ethical discussions, it can be difficult to place her work, since the ethical turn that started in Anglo- American theory in the late 1980s includes very different discourses under the umbrella term "ethics." In order to make sense of these very different ethical discourses, I have mapped out how post- structuralist ethics has a seeming dual focus in terms of an ethics of the rela- tionship the self has with itself, and an ethics of the relationship the self has with the Other (Toye 1999). Irigaray's ethics plays an important role in decon- structing this seeming binary opposition, helping to reveal that poststructuralist ethics is actually about both. Irigaray's ethics foregrounds an ethics of "rela- tionality" between multiple selves and others. In her explicit ethical tome, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray cites He- idegger, claiming that "each age has one issue to think through, and one only" (Irigaray 1993, 5). She names "sexual difference" as "probably the issue in our time which could be our 'salvation' if we thought it through" (5), arguing that we need a revolution in both thought and ethics, and that this revolution would involve rethinking space, time, and what she calls the "interval between" (7). While most critics focus on the specific naming of "sexual difference" as her most important concept, this element should be placed within a more gen- eral appeal for a "revolution in thought and ethics" to take place. It is through the specific rethinking of space, time, and the "interval between" that this rev- olution in thought and ethics will occur.9 Irigaray explains the implications of such a call, not only in terms of the rethinking of subjectivities but also with regard to relations between all selves and others: "We need to reinterpret ev- erything concerning relations between the subject and discourse, the subject and the cosmic, the microcosmic and the macrocosmic" (8). She sketches a list of subjects and ethical relations that need to be rethought in her declaration that "A new age signifies a different relation between: - man and god(s), - man and man, - man and world, - man and woman" (9). It is the emphasis on rethinking this intertwined tripartite of space, time, and the "interval between" that makes Irigaray's ethics an ethics of embodi- ment. Since male and female subjects have such different relationships to their bodies because of the opposing spatio-temporal relationships they have been accorded, a revolution in ethics must elaborate not one but two (or what Eliz- abeth Grosz constantly describes as "at least two") embodied ethics, based in these different bodies. A crucial and significant component of her work is her emphasis on both men and women needing to rethink their relationships both to their bodies and to transcendence; her concept of "the sensible transcen- dental" helps to reconceptualize both sides for both sexes. A conceptual revolution in space-time and its relationship to an embodied ethics is a large and broad endeavor; I noted in the introduction my desire to focus on the third item that Irigaray lists, that of the "interval between." Iriga- ray's ethics is based on what she has termed "between two," which is a subjectivity that is not about being but about becoming, and which is always becoming in relation. It is the "interval between" that mediates and determines the possibilities for an ethical relationship between these two subjects. As such, it gives us not just a relational ethics but also an ethics of mediation. As Mar- garet Whitford points out, "The between is a way of rethinking this space-time organization which detaches it from the spatio-temporality of the phallus" (Whitford 1991, 163). Irigaray underlines that within a phallocentric economy, this interval is embodied by the male morphological figure of the phallus, and therefore all relations between subjects are determined by the mediating economy determined by this reigning figure. Irigaray has provided multiple al- ternatives for thinking about this interval, and many of these figures are based instead in the female body, such as the two lips, placenta, and mucous. But she also has investigated other concepts such as the angel, wonder, love, and most recently yoga and the breath. This part of her philosophy can be difficult to negotiate because part of Irigaray's critique of phallogocentrism involves a de- sire not to repeat its way of thinking. Merely replacing the phallus with one of these other figures would be to participate in the phallogocentric economy of sameness and substitution. Instead, as Whitford has concisely described (Whitford 1991, 179), Irigaray thinks along the lines of metonymy, a trope that emphasizes difference, association, and contiguity, unlike its cousin, metaphor, a trope that emphasizes sameness, substitution, and similarity. Irigaray's revo- lution in ethics is therefore not only rooted in rethinking embodiment, but is also intimately tied to a revolution in aesthetics in terms of demanding a chal- lenging shift in understanding the world through an alternative economy of representation. That Irigaray's work is also fundamentally rooted in a feminist politics renders her revolution in ethics as one that includes a revolution that rethinks ethics, bodies, aesthetics, and politics together, or what I will discuss as upoethics." Irigaray also argues that we do not just need to generate alternate mediating figures to occupy the interval, but that the interval itself needs to be reconcep- tualized. This space of ethical mediation between subjects of the "interval between" has to be rethought along different spatio-temporal lines. Krzysztof Ziarek explains that the new economy Irigaray proposes is a radical economy of proximity: "a non-metaphysical economy of relating, predicated on the ethico- discursive notions of proximity and nearness" (Irigaray 2000, 151). The inter- val between the two subjects becomes both a space and not a space, in that to be in an ethical relationship is not to be in a one-plus-one relation, but instead, it is to enter into a whole other ontology, one of "between two." This concept, like so much of Irigaray's work, is a challenging one. Sometimes Irigaray stresses the space of distance that the "interval between" provides, which allows each entity, on either side of the relationship, to be a subject, with a space between them that prevents the reduction to the other's projections. At other times, Irigaray emphasizes the nearness in the concept. Critics struggle to make sense of this duality. Deutscher suggests that generally, the first stage of Irigaray's career is considered to be focused on "an ideal of being submerged in the other in a loss of boundaries between us" (Deutscher 2002, 81), whereas the second stage on the ethics of mediation stresses distance. However, Deutscher points out that a careful reading of Irigaray's earlier work reveals the presence of this "politics of mediation" as well, especially in terms of the mother/daughter re- lationship. Krzysztof Ziarek similarly argues: "proximity, mediation, and the interval is enacted as the trajectory of almost all of Irigaray's books and essays" (Ziarek 2000, 145). He suggests that instead of continuing to read Irigaray as a philosopher of difference, that we consider how much this concept provides us with "a new mode of thinking relation: one that would be attuned to nearness rather than difference, to the interval rather than opposites, and to the trans- formative opening rather than negation" (Ziarek 2000, 134). Donna Haraway Touches up/on Luce Irigaray's Interval Between10 In the introduction, I indicated that situating the cyborg within Irigaray's eth- ics might help us to theorize a particular feminist ethics of embodiment where the cyborg could be considered to be a crucial contemporary ethical figure that occupies what Irigaray describes as the "interval between" in our contemporary information age. As such, the cyborg is the figure that best describes what me- diates our relations to each other, to ourselves, and to our world in this context. I propose that we consider that the ethical subjectivity of the cyborg is this concept of the "between two" of the interval. In the "Cyborg Manifesto," Har- away indicates that the cyborg deconstructs troubling dualisms of self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, and so on, which are governed by the notion of a "One" that is autonomous, powerful, and godlike, but which is actually based in an illusion. Instead, she suggests a notion of subjectivity founded in other- ness, which is "to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial" (Haraway 1991a, 177). She then introduces a compelling phrase to describe cyborg subjectivity: "One is too few, but two are too many" (177) - a phrase that recalls Irigaray's notion of female sexuality as both multiple and as that which is not yet represented in the title of her collection This Sex Which Is Not One (1985). I propose that we take this notion of a cyborgian subjectivity, where one is too few and two are too many, and transfer it over to Irigaray's discussion of ethics. Irigaray's ethics is based in a Levinasian notion of ethics as first philosophy, where before "being," there is the Other. There is never a solo subject, and therefore, one is too few, because subjectivity is created in rela- tionship - we cannot be without the other. For the same reason, there can never two completely individual self-contained subjects. Although Irigaray ar- gues that women as well as men need to establish their own subjectivities, she also stresses how they are nevertheless connected by the "interval between" as a conjoined entity, and therefore the concept of two completely self-contained subjects is "too many." A cyborgian ethics would explain the interconnected- ness, not only between other humans, but also between animals, the environment, and the tools that mediate our existence and relations with one another. Undoing the opposition between nature and culture, Haraway's cyborg stresses that we do not conceive of these tools as wholly other, but as a part of ourselves, and that we relate to them in terms of "proximity." We need to hold our tools close to us, but we also have to consider them from an appro- priate distance in order to see them for what they are. Our technologies have not appeared independently and out of nothing. We have always been in re- lationship to our tools, but this relationship has not always been foregrounded as such, nor has it always been conceived as a relationship "between two." In my discussion of the concept of "between two," I have stressed its spatial components. However, Irigaray's revolution in ethics is a temporal one as well. Ewa Ziarek explains that Irigaray deconstructs Hegel to create a disruptive temporality that is linked with the Imaginary, and this "inaugural temporality has to be linked with the becoming of the body" (Ziarek 1998, 61). For Ewa Ziarek, Irigaray's tropes that invoke the imaginary such as touch and the two lips "do not merely indicate the constitution of the female body beyond the scopic economy of the image . . . but, precisely, link embodiment with tempore ality." Ewa Ziarek indicates that what is read as the "porosity and fluidity of female embodiment," in terms of an "attribute of the sexed body," could be considered "as an effect of the temporal structure of becoming" (61).11

#### The 1AC institutes itself in a discursively constructed affirmative nomadic subjectivity – our discussions necessarily must begin with agency, mobility, and embodiment

Braidotti 03. Rosi Braidotti, 2003, “Becoming Woman: Or Sexual Difference Revisited,” Theory, Culture, and Society, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/02632764030203004> sean!

The aim of this affirmative nomadic subjectivity is not only to undo the structures of phallogocentric power, as Irigaray would phrase it, or the voice of the majority, as Deleuze would put it, but also to express and empower constructive alternatives. Whether this is accomplished through the expression of the new ‘virtual feminine’, or through multiple becomingminoritarian, this pattern of subversion is open to both the empirical referents of the majority/the Same and to those of the minorities/the others. Both have to relinquish their ties, but they do so in very dissymmetrical ways. In so far as there is a structural dissymmetry in the starting position of the Same and of his Others, their lines of becoming are suitably discontinuous. In other words, some becomings operate a much-needed dislodgement of dominant subject positions (masculinity, heterosexuality, whiteness, gerontocracy, Euro-centrism in the imperialist mode). Others mark instead the conditions for the affirmation of new subject-positions and thus lay the foundations for possible futures. The difference between the two modes of becoming is not a matter of relativism, but of major power-dissymmetries and hence of structural differences. The point of the matter is that, whether we like it or not, the historical condition of postmodernity has accelerated the displacement of the key categories of definition of subjectivity. We live in a world where safety and certainty have forever left our lives. This has immediate repercussions for our sense of sexed identity, but not only for that. Contemporary, globalized societies are organized along multiple axes of mobility, circulation, flows of people and of commodities. All that was solid keeps on melting into the ether of the cathodic, digitalized and disembodied Eye/I of the new world order. Precisely because of the ubiquitous force of lives of displacement, I think it important to rethink embodiment in conjunction with movement; to rethink grounding in relation to nomadic shifts; to rethink a sense of belonging with the paradox of multiple and shifting locations; to rethink Irigaray with Deleuze, but both of them processed by a sobering dose of feminist politics of location. In other words: cartographies of power need to be produced and exchanged discursively. The differences in degrees, types, kinds and modes of mobility, rootlessness, exile and nomadism need to be mapped out with precision and sensitivity. This cartographic accuracy is made necessary by the fact that nomadism is precisely not a universal metaphor, but rather a generic term of indexation for qualitatively different degrees of access and entitlement to socially empowering (or not) subject-positions in an historical era, for people who are situated in one of the many poly-located centres which weave together the global economy. Power is the key issue here, and mobility is one of the terms which indexes access to it. Embodied and embedded subject-positions are the key issue at stake.

#### Knowledge is not objective fact, but rather constructed by the ideology of capital – the 1AC interpellates the discourses of power, becoming aware of the relationship to the other. This is an epistemological question that must come prior – everything you think you know about power is necessarily imbricated in the social fabric we exist within

Huston 11. Adam Huston (M.A. philosophy & religion – California Institute of Integral Studies), April 4, 2011, “Donna Haraway Diffracted: Interpellation, the Philosophy of Science and Modest Witnessing,” <https://iamadam.org/2011/04/04/donna-haraway-diffracted-interpellation-the-philosophy-of-science-and-modest-witnessing/> sean!

Interpellation is an incredibly provocative concept. A theory flowing from Althusser through Haraway to me, it considers how, “ideology constitutes its subjects out of concrete individuals by hailing them…interpellation occurs when a subject, constituted in the very act, recognizes or misrecognizes itself in the address of a discourse.”[2] I claim I am experiencing interpellation all the time. I am constituted by my subject positions: white, male, heterosexual, middle class, Christian, able-bodied – even beautiful, from the US – even powerful, and thoroughly educated. Some of my subject positions speak louder than the others; some speak before I’ve spoken; I am bound by all them – called out, hailed: interpellated. And even those subject positions are marginal when compared to what they equal in mass – I am more than the sum of my parts, more than those fragmented subjectivities. I’ll return to the demographics of self in a moment because they do not suffice to explain the full creativity of Althusser’s theory. Interpellation isn’t only about excavating the subject for the subject’s sake but more so about understanding how ideology lives and functions for some worlds and not others. Contained within Haraway’s book, Modest\_Witness, is Althusser’s example of interpellation which is worth quoting in its entirety: Althusser used the example of the policemen calling out, “Hey, you!” If I turned my head, I am a subject in that discourse of law and order; and so I am subject to a powerful formation. How I mis/recognize myself – will I be harassed by a dangerous armed individual with the legal power to invade my person and my community; will I be reassured that the established disorder is in well-armed hands; will I be arrested for a crime I too acknowledge as a violation; or will I see an alert member of a democratic community doing rotating police work? – speaks volumes both about the unequal positioning of subjects in discourse and about different worlds that might have a chance to exist. Althusser’s example provides that unfamiliar orientation, where I discover I am not alone – the foundation of ethical relationality and of politics. I am shaped by the ‘other’ both historical forces and the multitude of bodies with whom I share space. Attentiveness to ideology as it functions through interpellation becomes a work of responsibility. It requires attentiveness to structures of history that constitute the present in order to change it – to push it towards compassion. Becoming ‘aware’ is only marginally about fulfilling the liberal white dream of self-actualization, where everyone is ‘human’ and accepted; where the individual subject becomes the object of value worthy of investment and ‘integration’. Becoming ‘aware’ practices empathizing with the multiple positions both the subject and the context can inhabit, growing familiar with the unequal knowledge/power configurations that allow some worlds to live and force others to convert or parish and the discovery that few voices count, few histories are written, indeed, even the objects to study are always already – interpellated. Interpellation functions powerfully within the discourses of demographics. Returning again to the example of my body: my body signifies utter privilege – a body of global secular dominance, I fit the ‘universal’ subject. My body is an ‘object’ which shows up to count, research, map, organize and market – I am/become use-value. Within the second Christian millennium becoming the sum of my parts means fulfilling the liberal political order without remainder or retribution, counter-memory or critical discourse. Plug me in with out remorse because I have no memory. I am the fulfillment of both genetics and human reason pursuing perfection – never-mind legacies of violence, grief and mourning… we have better medicine, mobile labor, global capital and DuPont: “Building Better Worlds through Science.” The political power of interpellation goes much deeper now. Wielding responsible action out of theoretical concepts such as interpellation has occupied a central position in post-colonial and subaltern theory for some time. The relationship between theory and practice is still birthing new forms of consciousness. For example, I am interpellated in more than the dominant demographics that social science has developed over the last few hundred years – becoming the sum of my parts is always, already more than the quantified and qualified demographics I fulfill. This body, this subject, is also interpellated out of deep history, deep time – one that spans not only the formations of life on Earth but also the composition of the cosmos. A subject of stars, my DNA binds me to a history of organic evolution and constitutes living consciousness. Much more recently in the course of biotic time an envelope of human powers developed to unify productivity and purpose across semiotic-material landscapes. The possibilities of using a creative concept such as ‘interpellation’ expand beyond enlightenment reason to include intuitive leaps that birth different realities. Thinking the play of erstwhile superstitious concepts such as magic and myth and cutting the edge of biological determinism with theories like morphic resonance,[3] new contributions are often added to the possibility of understanding links between theory and practice, freedom and responsibility, the human and the divine. It is vital to sail our imagination toward post-enlightenment reason, counter-narratives and contested knowledge. Becoming the ‘modest witness’ of my own subject position requires provocative theories like Althusser’s “interpellation.” In order to wield the creative power of such concepts they must be loosed from the confines of modern convention. The concept helps the thinker think ideology but even the concept itself is ‘interpellated’ out of a world where ideology is another interconnected signifier – unissued and passing. I am moving towards thinking institutional figures and body politics – its semiotic-material relationality amidst cities and subjectivies. But first, in pursuit of free space to play with the politics of interpellation – of figuration and modest witnessing – thinking must critique bounded ideas, explore zones that will buffer the resistance against thinking new thoughts. I hope other life formations have a chance to live. In the next section the myth of certainty will be exposed to marginal praise and necessary critique. A Buffer to the Tyranny of Certainty Knowledge is better when it is wise and humble – call me a philosopher! Entertaining the buffers and bumpers that provide zones where wisdom might stand at the side of technoscience might be the most important work of the century. The purpose is to expose the tyranny of certainty to scrutiny, to suggest ‘other’ readings are possible that might satisfy more dimensions of the inter-experience we share and to extend the survival of our planetary era. The science of certainty, like every other human phenomenon, underwent a process of unfolding – at first its historical links can be readily traced, but its history eventually refracts back into an endless spectrum of events that make it like all other entities – traceless.[4] Despite the evolution of empiricism, mathematics, experimentation, and the secular liberal rationality, the Western culture of the past 500 years has been preoccupied by the most powerfully functioning myth ever formulated.[5] It colors interpretation while at the same time functions to suppress critical reflection. Indeed, Thomas Kuhn, goes to great lengths in demonstrating how scientific paradigms develop and shift. The whole of his work on the subject: The Structures of Scientific Revolutions, makes clear the point that, …historians (of science) confront growing difficulties in distinguishing the ‘scientific’ component of past observation and belief from what their predecessors had readily labeled ‘error’ and ‘superstition.’ The more carefully they study, say, Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain they feel that those once current views of nature were, as a whole, neither less scientific nor more the product of human idiosyncrasy than those current today. If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge.[6] Spirits do speak. It is important to recognize that the ‘authority’ given to ‘scientific rigor’ participates in the same mythical consciousness as did the ‘authority’ of 13th century theologians in Medieval Europe or the ‘authority’ of the primordial mythological sensibility captured in the epic Homeric poems the Iliad and Odyssey.[7] The technoscience mode of consciousness has become the most powerful mythos in our planetary era. Presently, technoscience is producing knowledge and machinery whose authority is practically non-negotiable. The confidence of technoscience culture to reach the heavens, secure labor and resources, improve health and speed, even fulfill moral imperatives provides this age with radical optimism in the future. Myths are both magnetic and magnificent; they occupy a space of religification and evangelization, where to be in critical relationship to scientific principles constitutes a position close to blasphemy. It is an understatement to remind the reader that the age of enlightenment was finished with modesty. Still, it is important, if not to worship, to make sure praise is given where praise is due. The Enlightenment – its power and success – is impressive. It was true that through rigor, experimentation, and the willingness to refine knowledge through mutual confirmation that our species could build foundations – knowledge/power would grow and yield great fruit through hard work. The heights of human engineering still climb and inspire. In an era that has brought a global awareness to humanity for the first time, when the planet Earth with all its inhabitants can be seen in its entirety in cosmic space as the single celestial body that it is, and when the universe has been revealed as a creative vastness expanding through millions of galaxies and billions of years of cosmic evolution from the big bang to the present, the collective consciousness now emerging recognizes as was never before possible that all participate in a single enormous history. At the same time, that history, for humanity and the Earth community, has reached a stage of rapidly deepening crisis and peril.[8] The blatant reification of mathematics, statistics, reductionism, and quantitative measurement has lead to the abstraction of a particular world torn away from the full presentational expression of concrete reality – of daily experience. “Such an abstraction arises from the growth of selective emphasis. It endows human life with three gifts, namely, an approach to accuracy, a sense of the qualitative differentiation of external activities, a neglect of essential connections.”[9] As technoscience increases its power, it looses sight of the results of its actions in a world of relationality. This mode of relation facilitates action that insists upon a ‘progress’ without ever considering that which is sacrificed for the progress; in the obsession with growth/addition/development a whole culture has lost the critical ability to subtract the difference that is annihilated in pursuit of ‘additive’ change. Let my critique not hinder the potential of future discovery, but be a modest witness that calls forth memories of compassion, injections of wisdom, and insists that it was only a recent discovery that all endeavors toward knowledge were and still are bound to the pursuit of wealth and the access to material and markets – thank you Karl Marx! In an implicated and globally dependent world the (contested) innocence science once operated within has eroded. Capitalism and its military-industrial growth complex do produce some worlds and not others. The growth of any significant power adheres toward arcs of increase and decrease – the science and certainty of our age is no exception. I am suggesting that only a serious relationship with humility and wisdom – calling forth the divine Sophia – will offer cause for hope against an increasingly mounting systemic crisis. Falling just short of claiming divine feminine status in this essay, Donna Haraway’s voice is a comforting, correcting presence that joins forces with another feminist philosopher’s of science, Sandra Harding, to rethink potential trajectories of technoscience. Harding, via Haraway’s book Modest\_Witness, insists on arguing for what she calls “strong objectivity” to replace and refine the standards that show up legitimating some facts and not others in the domain of scientific knowledge. By “strong objectivity” Harding is insisting that science admit that culture (ideology) plays as large a roll in shaping scientific research as determining ‘fact’ and methods; That “a stronger, more adequate notion of objectivity would require methods for systematically examining all of the social values shaping a particular research process…”[10] Haraway supports Harding’s claims that critical reflexivity must be a part of the continuing practice of science. Building buffer zones, where science meets its limits and Lady Wisdom has the opportunity to have a voice is a difficult matter. ‘Objectivity’ must finally admit that its existence is bound to relationality. As Bruno Latour goes to great lengths to remind us in his work, Science in Action – that the construction of facts is a collective process; that all knowledge must be witnessed or it passes into the void; infused with Haraway’s rigor we go further to insist that issues of race, class, gender, sex, nationality, religion – in short – culture – that culture shapes technoscience. Attempting to fuse practices of democracy and relationship to situated knowledges – cultures of value – redefines the possibilities of technoscience while at the same time admitting that, “Nothing comes without its world…”[11]

#### In an era of mass extinction, we risk losing touch with the world – the 1AC’s cyborg embraces an ethic of staying with the world that necessitates kinship and a fundamental understanding of our relationalities

Haraway 16. Donna Haraway (Donna J. Haraway is an American Professor Emerita in the History of Consciousness Department and Feminist Studies Department at the University of California, Santa Cruz, United States. She’s written tons of cool stuff), 2016, “Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Cthulucene,” Duke University Press, I have the pdf, sean!

It matters what thoughts think thoughts. It matters what knowledges know knowledges. It matters what relations relate relations. It matters what worlds world worlds. It matters what stories tell stories. Paintings by Baila Goldenthal are eloquent testimony to this mattering.17 What is it to surrender the capacity to think? These times called the Anthropocene are times of multispecies, including human, urgency: of great mass death and extinction; of onrushing disasters, whose unpredictable specificities are foolishly taken as unknowability itself; of refusing to know and to cultivate the capacity of response-ability; of refusing to be present in and to onrushing catastrophe in time; of unprecedented looking away. Surely, to say “unprecedented” in view of the realities of the last centuries is to say something almost unimaginable. How can we think in times of urgencies without the self-indulgent and self-fulfilling myths of apocalypse, when every fiber of our being is interlaced, even complicit, in the webs of processes that must somehow be engaged and repatterned? Recursively, whether we asked for it or not, the pattern is in our hands. The answer to the trust of the held-out hand: think we must. Instructed by Valerie Hartouni, I turn to Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann’s inability to think. In that surrender of thinking lay the “banality of evil” of the particular sort that could make the disaster of the Anthropocene, with its ramped-up genocides and speciescides, come true.18 This outcome is still at stake; think we must; we must think! In Hartouni’s reading, Arendt insisted that thought was profoundly different from what we might call disciplinary knowledge or science rooted in evidence, or the sorting of truth and belief or fact and opinion or good and bad. Thinking, in Arendt’s sense, is not a process for evaluating information and argument, for being right or wrong, for judging oneself or others to be in truth or error. All of that is important, but not what Arendt had to say about the evil of thoughtlessness that I want to bring into the question of the geohistorical conjuncture being called the Anthropocene. Arendt witnessed in Eichmann not an incomprehensible monster, but something much more terrifying—she saw commonplace thoughtlessness. That is, here was a human being unable to make present to himself what was absent, what was not himself, what the world in its sheer notone-selfness is and what claims-to-be inhere in not-oneself. Here was someone who could not be a wayfarer, could not entangle, could not track the lines of living and dying, could not cultivate response-ability, could not make present to itself what it is doing, could not live in consequences or with consequence, could not compost. Function mattered, duty mattered, but the world did not matter for Eichmann. The world does not matter in ordinary thoughtlessness. The hollowed-out spaces are all filled with assessing information, determining friends and enemies, and doing busy jobs; negativity, the hollowing out of such positivity, is missed, an astonishing abandonment of thinking.19 This quality was not an emotional lack, a lack of compassion, although surely that was true of Eichmann, but a deeper surrender to what I would call immateriality, inconsequentiality, or, in Arendt’s and also my idiom, thoughtlessness. Eichmann was astralized right out of the muddle of thinking into the practice of business as usual no matter what. There was no way the world could become for Eichmann and his heirs—us?—a “matter of care.”20 The result was active participation in genocide. The anthropologist, feminist, cultural theorist, storyteller, and connoisseur of the tissues of heterogeneous capitalism, globalism, traveling worlds, and local places Anna Tsing examines the “arts of living on a damaged planet,”21 or, in the subtitle of her book, “the possibility of life in Capitalist ruins.” She performs thinking of a kind that must be cultivated in the all-too-ordinary urgencies of onrushing multispecies extinctions, genocides, immiserations, and exterminations. I name these things urgencies rather than emergencies because the latter word connotes something approaching apocalypse and its mythologies. Urgencies have other temporalities, and these times are ours. These are the times we must think; these are the times of urgencies that need stories. Following matsutake mushrooms in their fulminating assemblages of Japanese, Americans, Chinese, Koreans, Hmong, Lao, Mexicans, fungal spores and mats, oak and pine trees, mycorrhizal symbioses, pickers, buyers, shippers, restaurateurs, diners, businessmen, scientists, foresters, dna sequencers and their changing species, and much more, Tsing practices sympoietics in edgy times. Refusing either to look away or to reduce the earth’s urgency to an abstract system of causative destruction, such as a Human Species Act or undifferentiated Capitalism, Tsing argues that precarity—failure of the lying promises of Modern Progress— characterizes the lives and deaths of all terran critters in these times. She looks for the eruptions of unexpected liveliness and the contaminated and nondeterministic, unfinished, ongoing practices of living in the ruins. She performs the force of stories; she shows in the flesh how it matters which stories tell stories as a practice of caring and thinking. “If a rush of troubled stories is the best way to tell contaminated diversity, then it’s time to make that rush part of our knowledge practices . . . Matsutake’s willingness to emerge in blasted landscapes allows us to explore the ruins that have become our collective home. To follow matsutake guides us to possibilities of coexistence within environmental disturbance. This is not an excuse for further human damage. Still, matsutake show one kind of collaborative survival.”

#### Outer Space definition

DoC 16 [Department of Commerce; February 22, 2016; National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, “Where is Space?”, <https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/news/where-space>] brett

But where is “space” exactly? This may seem like a simple question, but any answer beyond “up” may be more complicated than you think. Although most people are generally in agreement that space begins when Earth’s atmosphere ends— where exactly that is depends on who you ask.

International law states that outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all, but there is no definitive law stating where national air space actually ends and outer space begins. This leaves the door open for a variety of interpretations.

A common definition of space is known as the Kármán Line, an imaginary boundary 100 kilometers (62 miles) above mean sea level. In theory, once this 100 km line is crossed, the atmosphere becomes too thin to provide enough lift for conventional aircraft to maintain flight. At this altitude, a conventional plane would need to reach orbital velocity or risk falling back to Earth.

The world governing body for aeronautic and astronautic records, the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI), and many other organizations use the Kármán Line as a way of determining when space flight has been achieved.

#### Marxism is outdated and fetishizes labor

Wark 15. Mckenzie Wark (Wark is known for her writings on media theory, critical theory, new media, and the Situationist International. Her best known works are A Hacker Manifesto and Gamer Theory. She is Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at The New School in New York City), 9-28-2015, "Blog-Post for Cyborgs—McKenzie Wark on Donna Haraway's 'Manifesto for Cyborgs' 30 years later," Versobooks, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2254-blog-post-for-cyborgs-mckenzie-wark-on-donna-haraway-s-manifesto-for-cyborgs-30-years-later sean!

Haraway has on occasion described herself as an illegitimate daughter of Marx, and “something of an unreconstructed and dogged Marxist.” (MW8) She remains attentive to how relations congeal into apparently natural things. “Property is the kind of relationality that poses as the thing-in-itself, the commodity, the thing outside relationship, the thing that can be exhaustively measured, mapped, owned, appropriated, disposed.” (MW134) As we shall see, this becomes in her work a useful starting point for understanding how distinctly twenty-first century modes of property and technology are organized. Unlike many other Marxists, Haraway insists on including nonhuman actors in what would be an otherwise relentlessly human category of that-which-labors. “The actors are not all ‘us.’” (HR66) Techno-science explodes the already wobbly partition between object and subject, nature and culture, apparatus and labor. Marx may have shown how the commodity is full of labor, but the categories of chimerical objects, those mash-ups of flesh-tech, has much expanded, even if there is still a tendency for the fetish of the thing to obscure the relations of its making. Hence the world can now appear as a vast accumulation not just of commodities or spectacles but of ‘big data’ or ‘selfish genes.’ Haraway tries to keep in view the relations of production that the fetish of the commodity obscures. “I believe wealth is created by collective practice, figured by Marx as labor, but needing a messier metaphoric descriptive repertoire.” (MW94) There is a fetishism in Marx of labor itself – man-with-hammer – that needs attending to as well. If one takes the labor point of view to be what is central to Marx’s work, then what, in the age of techno-science, might now constitute such a point of view? If Marx proceeded through a critique of the dismal science of political economy, Haraway works through a rather more lively if no less difficult science – biology. “I have always read biology in a double way – as about the way the world works biologically, but also about the way the world works metaphorically.” (HLL24) One of the many functions of biology is defining the limits of what can be said about the potentials of the human, about our species-being. Is there a ‘human race’, or are some races not fully human? And if all races are human, what might the human become? It is not that biology is reducible to culture and politics. Rather, “the material-semiotic tissues are inextricably intermeshed.” (MW218) Haraway expands the object of critique from political economy to the life sciences, which are no less implicated in the production of the infrastructural givens of the contemporary commodity-world. This adds an essential dimension, if critique is going to grasp – such a primate metaphor! – Marx’s no less full-bodied metaphor of metabolic rift, and flesh it out. There have been three basic metaphors of causality of the human in the modern period: race, population and gene. Each has its dissenters, critics and utopian or dystopian writers. Each has its genuine scientists caught up in substitutions drawn from social organization which color and overshoot the process of producing evidence. Each also has its ideologues and moral entrepreneurs. Race causality held that accumulated cultural differences are somehow carried in the blood. Even among progressives, the very category of race could create a fear of race mixing. Haraway: “The evolution of language, the progress of technology, the perfection of the body, and the advance of social forms seemed to be aspects of the same fundamental human science. That science was constitutively physiological and hierarchical, organismic and holist, progressivist and developmental.” (MW233) A common response is a welter of attempts to categorize and characterize the races, arranged in some sort of hierarchy. Differences of culture or power become expressions of an order of nature. Haraway: “No wonder universal nature has been a less than appealing entity for those who were not its creators and its beneficiaries.” (MW237) To which one might add that the temptation to overcome a supposed biological destiny of race, by severing the social from biological being altogether, is and remains a powerful temptation. It has the unfortunate side effect of cutting critical thought off from thinking biology as a techno-science with powerful and perhaps increasing abilities to create new unequal relations for the production and reproduction of life. While popular racialism lives on, the substituting of racial for other kinds of difference did not survive in biological science. In the postwar years, after the debacle of racialized Nazi biology, and in the wake of new research methods, the basic metaphor of populationcausality arose in its place. A population is a semi-permeable group within a species. There may be as much variation within a population as between. Each may nevertheless be a pool which contain adaptations that are more or less successful. Populations are not types in a hierarchy; nor are they sets. Each is constantly in flux in changing environments. The metaphysical shift is from a hierarchy of self-same types, where miscegenation at the boundary produces less viable instances, towards a different way of figuring difference and similarity. Populations are internally differentiated but formally equivalent in relation to each other. Population became a central figure in the modern synthesis, which brought together naturalists, geneticists and experimentalists in a new kind of biological science and culture. Haraway: “This was a scientific humanism that emphasized flexibility, progress, cooperation, and universalism.” (MW238) It broke with the language of race and blood. It stressed the flexible and plastic nature of the human condition, and its capacity to change through education. The human can be socially self-constructing. Actual differences in power, such as the colonial relation, are elided by what ought to be: the ‘family of man.’ The organizational challenges of post-war capitalism put on the agenda the question of the limits to the adaptive nature of the human. Primate studies became a way of conducting experiments and building theories aimed at the adaptation of the human to the rising complexity of technics and organization. Primate researchers focused on two linked topics: sex and dominance. The male primate fights with other males for access to reproduction. Alongside interest in observing primates in their ‘natural’ setting, were experiments on the primate as an embodiment of drives to sex and power, to see how adaptable its species-being was to the office politics of living in cages and pressing levers for food. The primate was an experimental subject who could yield insights into techniques for regulating sexuality and power in the modern world for human primates too. Rather than repressing desire or the will to power, technologies and therapies could help the human primate adapt. It’s a small step from the study of primate behaviors to the hormones that supposedly regulate them, and then on to the construction of a techno-science of intervening in the hormonal regulation of primate sexuality – particularly that of humans. The contraceptive pill is here the great techno-science success story. Population causality naturalized the patriarchal family. Its origin myth is of man the hunter. It is man who is assumed to be the maker of tools, the inventor of elaborated social organization and hence of language. It is man who is curious, who explores, while woman is home yanking yams from the dirt with babies on her teats. This figure was supplemented rather belatedly by woman the gatherer, in some cases as a result of the work of feminist researchers. Haraway has paid particularly close attention to the role of field studies of natural primate populations in legitimating some elements of the family of man story. The figures of the headman, the sexual division of labor, woman as burdened by children, all pass back and forth from science to culture as substituted figures. Through a study of the basic metaphor of biological economy, Haraway hones her critique on the foundations of postwar American liberalism. That liberalism’s finest hour was its efforts to overcome, in both science and culture, the benighted effects of the category of race. Haraway wants to push on from that self-congratulatory ethos. “I believe that this capacity of reproducing the Same, in culpable innocence of its historical, power-charged specificity, characterizes not just me but people formed like me, who are liberal, scientific, and progressive…” (MW242) The problem with the liberal family of man is that “what’s not collected in a reproductive family story does not finally count as human. For all the… emphasis on difference, this is the grammar of indifference, or the multiplication of sameness.” (MW242) A functional causality reigns: that which survives is functional; that which is functional survives. The liberal family of man gave way to the neoliberal ‘selfish gene’ of socio-biology, and the basic metaphor of gene causality. The population regime took as its units of thought individual bodies and their social groups. The gene becomes the controlling code which uses both bodies and groups for its own ends. The causal metaphor is still functional, but the unit to which it applies is now molecular: The gene that survives is functional because the function of the gene is to survive. “My genes, my self, my investment, my future. It’s much more strictly capitalist.” (HLL152) Such a science is the product not only of a certain naturalizing of the exchange economy, but also of powerful technologies which produce the gene itself as an artifact in a database. Haraway: “something peculiar happened to the stable, family-loving, Mendelian gene when it passed into a database….” (MW244) The gene becomes one of the units of currency of the era of ‘big data’. Genomics and informatics merge. The gene can exist in a variety of media, from software to wetware, and some in between. Nature starts to yield not the authoritarian causality of race hierarchies or patriarchal families, but the exchange causality of property in a purified form. The genetic database is at once about the genes of specific individuals, but also sub-units of that code, and at the other extreme, about our species-being. The design of such a database shapes what can be compared, what kinds of labor can most easily be performed, but meanwhile the gene becomes a thing separated from a totality and accorded its own agency. Meanwhile sub-disciplines of biological science, such as genetics or population biology, start to fork off and coalesce around much more differentiated apparatus, practices and objects of knowledge. The construction of the gene as an object of techno-science is just one component in an important shift in the practices of substitution between organizational levels. Haraway: “Nineteenth century scientists materially constituted the organism as a laboring system, structured by a hierarchical division of labor, and an energetic system fueled by sugars and obeying the laws of thermodynamics. For us, the living world has become a command, control, communication, intelligence system… in an environment that demands strategies of flexible accumulation. Artificial life programs, as well as carbon-based life programs, work that way. These issues are about metaphor and representation, but they are about much more than that.” (MW97) Ideology is productive. The shift from thinking organization as energy systems alone to a combination of energy and information systems, enables not only new kinds of science, and technology, and power, but also opens up a space for their critique. Interestingly, some of the new modes of substitution producing both ideology and knowledge might no longer be metaphorical so much as algorithmic, a kind of software (Manovich) and database (Azuma) model of knowledge. Haraway sees genetic code and computer code as a new kind of fetishism that are partly, but not entirely, legible to the old Marxist and Freudian versions. One might call it the fetish of the program, a new kind of code causality, of which gene causality is but one instance. It is not entirely reducible to either authoritarian or exchange causality, although it has features of both. By way of illustration, Haraway points to an issue of Mamalian Genome journal which offered its readers a representation of the contents of the chromosomes of a mouse, under the headline, “the Complete Mouse (some assembly required).” (MW98) Code becomes the master layer in the stacked protocols by which an organization is managed. In genetics, code becomes the part via which a whole can be reductively understood. In place of messy bodies, the clean execution of command and control, although as we shall see there are code-based sciences where such a reduction is not easily made. Commodity fetishism is when relations between people take on the features of relations between things. Collective labor is what hides behind of the commodity. But perhaps it is not so easy to separate labor and thing. Haraway wants to broaden the fetish concept a little. “Curiously, fetishes – themselves ‘substitutes’, that is, tropes of a special kind – produce a particular ‘mistake’; fetishes obscure the constitutive tropic nature of themselves and of worlds.” (MW136) A fetish is a naturalizing of the very thing whose ‘nature’ needs calling into question, but while it may be limiting, it may like ideology be peculiarly productive: “There are amazingly creative aspects to commodity fetishism.” (HLL92) Gene technology is implicated in commodity fetishism, but maybe also in “another and obliquely related flavor of reification that transmutes material, contingent, human and nonhuman liveliness into maps of life itself and then mistakes the map that its reified entities for the bumptious, nonliteral world.” (MW135) Haraway’s détournement of the fetish repurposes it. Rather than the commodity fetish, she asks about the corporeal fetish. How do bodies appear as autonomous things against a background of invisible non-bodies? In commodity fetishism, the apparent world of things, governed by the code of exchange value, obscures social relations among people and the production of use value. In corporeal fetishism, the apparent world of bodies, governed by the code of the gene, obscures the tangle of both human and nonhuman processes that produce life. In corporeal fetishism, the gene becomes a source of value as a kind of thing-itself, or perhaps code-itself. “So the fetishist sees the gene itself in all the gels, blots, and printouts in the lab, and ‘forgets’ the natural-technical processes that produce the gene and genome as consensus objects in the real world.” (MW146) An abstraction replaces the concrete; the map becomes the territory. “Gene fetishists ‘forget’ that the gene and gene maps are ways of enclosing the commons of the body – of corporealizing – in specific ways, which, among other things, often put commodity fetishism into the program of biology at the end of the Second Millennium.” (MW148) Just as the commodity fetish makes all things property to be exchanged, so too the corporeal fetish makes all of life a thing to be commodified through ownership of its code. “Genomics ‘globalizes’ in specific ways. Species-being is materially and semiotically produced in gene-mapping practices, just as particular kinds of space and humanity were the fruit of earlier material-semiotic enclosures.” (MW163) Private property produces the split between commodities and the labor that makes it; Intellectual property produces the split between the gene and the organism that makes it. What was in Needham’s day biology’s commons of research materials becomes increasingly commodified. The ‘mutation’ of the private property form into strictly controlled ‘intellectual property’ makes whole new classes of things available for commodification. “Like the stigmata of gender and race, which signify asymmetrical, regularly reproduced processes that give some human beings rights in other human beings that they do not have in themselves, the copyright, patent and trademark are specific, asymmetrical, congealed processes – which must be constantly revivified in law and commerce as well as in science.” (MW7) Intellectual property grounds a new kind of class power. A patent defines what is nature and what is not. An artifact of ‘nature’ cannot be patented. For that to happen, nature has to be mixed with labor. Patent is a site of struggle over what counts as subject and what as object. Haraway’s famous example is DuPont’s OncoMouse, the first patented mammal, specifically engineered for the study of breast cancer. (And now itself an obsolete, discontinued ‘product’). All sorts of organisms are now integrated into a strange techno-nature meant to support human life, or at least those parts of it that can be commodified. Not only mice but dogs and all sorts of other beings are our ‘companions’ within techno-science. In place of the liberal-humanist family, quite another kind: “the technoscientific family is a cyborg nuclear unit, ”now that “life as a system to be managed.” (MW152) What kind of critical agency is possible in the world of OncoMouse? Do lab rats belong to the working class? Should battery hens be unionized? Should one have the right to share in the surplus produced by one’s cells, even when those cells are not in you body? Consider the case of Henrietta Lacks, an African-American tobacco worker who died of cervical cancer. Cells taken from her body, without her knowledge or consent, were cultured and used in all kinds of research long after her death, from the polio vaccine to AIDS treatments and gene mapping. Those cells proved not only useful for research but profitable for medical business, while her descendants could not even afford health insurance. How is one to think the molecular agencies of such a story? The figure which it famously proposed as a node of agency is the cyborg, in her ‘Manifesto for Cyborgs.’ “Like any important technology, a cyborg is simultaneously a myth and a tool…” (PV139) It is not the labor point of view, as if labor existed independently of the apparatus with which it is entangled. It is not women’s point of view, as if one could speak of it as a universal subjective perspective, existing prior to the social and technical relations in which it meshes. Cyborgs are affinities rather than identities, hybrids of human and other organics, information systems, ergonomic laboring, producing and desiring. Cyborgs are monsters, or rather demonstrations, in the double sense of to show and to warn, of possible worlds. “As monsters, can we demonstrate another order of signification? Cyborgs for earthly survival!” (SCW4) In place of the “god-trick” of speaking as if one had access to a portal to the absolute, the cyborg is a kind of ironic myth, a heretical counter-story to the human as pre-given. “Blasphemy protects one from the moral majority within, while still insisting on the need for community.” (SC149) Like the Marxist-feminist critic inside the research university, the cyborg is always an insider and outsider to techno-science, which after all is pretty much the case now for all of us. “I think the way I work is to take my own polluted inheritance – cyborg is one of them – and try to rework it.” (HLL103) The cyborg isn’t an innocent figure. “The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential.” (SCW152) Cyborgs are a kind of orphan, even if in a more troubling sense that parentage is not lost or forgotten but never quite existed, even though “the cyborg… doesn’t have a mother, but it does have a matrix.” (SCW129) The cyborg is a contemporary kind of conceptual personae. Haraway: “Too many people, forgetting the discipline of love and rage, have read the ‘Manifesto’ as the ramblings of a blissed-out, technobunny, fembot.” (HR3) Surely this stems from the persistence of the ideological pull of the figure of nature, and an inability to think and feel through the emerging forces of production as anything other than poisoned product of techno-science. Haraway: “From One Dimensional Man (Marcuse 1964)…. the analytic resources developed by progressives have insisted on the necessary domination of technics and recalled us to an imagined organic body to integrate our resistance…. But a slightly perverse shift of perspective might better enable us to contest for meanings, as well as for other forms of power and pleasure in technologically mediated societies.” (SCW154) Perhaps it would be possible to sense a web of human and nonhuman agents, more a mechanically and digitally reproducible compound eye than a single labor point of view. Perhaps this point of view could be broader than that of labor, and not separate out in advance production from reproduction. Perhaps it could also include something a bit distinct from either, a kind of activity that neither produces nor reproduces, but proposes other means of doing either, or neither, or both. Could it even include the hacker class as a distinctive point of view not entirely reducible to labor? One might start here with the notion of organization, rather than production, as a ‘basic’ level of analysis, but look aslant at its unquestioned functionalism. There is no real traction to be gained from trying to base a critique on nature versus culture, or the human versus the machine, nor is there leverage in play versus labor. In an era where there is money to be made from all sorts of effort people put in to voluntarily creating and sharing information, then labor itself is an unstable category. Haraway: “we are living through a movement from an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system — from all work to all play, a deadly game.” (SCW161) Information is more than a powerful metaphor extended via substitution into an explanatory causality for the world, or even for the cosmos. It becomes a powerful means of organizing worlds. Haraway: “communications science and modern biologies are constructed by a common move – the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange.” (SCW164) It’s a matter of seeing this as at once an actuality, as an ensemble of real phenomena, and yet also as historical, as the product of certain kinds of labor, or more specifically of techno-science as a central way that power works in this stage of the commodity economy – whatever it might be. It was prescient of Haraway to notice, and early on, that “the new communications technologies are fundamental to the eradication of ‘public life’ for everyone.” (SCW168) The reduction of a wide range of processes, and not just labor, to a thing, or in this case to code, supports a vast extension of private property relations. The monstrous omens Haraway detected in the late twentieth century came to pass: “A major social and political danger is the formation of a strongly bimodal social structure, with the masses of women and men of all ethnic groups, but especially people of color, confined to a homework economy, illiteracy of several varieties, and general redundancy and impotence, controlled by high-tech repressive apparatuses ranging from entertainment to surveillance and disappearance… The only way to characterize the informatics of domination is as a massive intensification of insecurity and cultural impoverishment, with common failure of subsistence networks for the most vulnerable.” (SCW169-172) And so it came to pass, only it came to be called, by Franco Berardi and others, precarity. Creating any kind of knowledge and power in and against something as pervasive and effective as the world built by postwar techno-science is a difficult task. It may seem easier simply to vacate the field, to try to turn back the clock, or appeal to something outside of it. But this would be to remain stuck in the stage of romantic refusal. Just as Marx fused the romantic fiction that another world was possible with a resolve to understand from the inside the powers of capital itself, so too Haraway begins what can only be a collaborative project for a new international. One not just of laboring men, but of all the stuttering cyborgs stuck in reified relations not of their making. God is dead, and so too is the Goddess. The disenchanting corrosion of all that is solid into the molecular abrades more than one way. If there is no thing-in-itself, no scientific-realist absolute, then there’s no prior and originary subject for a social movement, either. We are always and already insiders. Haraway: “Feminisms and Marxisms have run aground on Western epistemological imperatives to construct a revolutionary subject from the perspective of a hierarchy of oppressions and/or a latent position of moral superiority, innocence, and greater closeness to nature. With no available original dream of a common language or original symbiosis promising protection from hostile ‘masculine’ separation, but written into the play of a text that has no finally privileged reading or salvation history, to recognize ‘oneself’ as fully implicated in the world, frees us of the need to root politics in identification, vanguard parties, purity, and mothering. Stripped of identity, the bastard race teaches about the power of the margins…” (SCW176) What needs reworking is the struggle of labor in and against nature. Haraway: “Humanistic Marxism was polluted at the source by its structuring ontological theory of the domination of nature in the self-construction of man and by its closely related impotence to historicize anything women did that didn’t qualify for a wage. But Marxism was still a promising resource in the form of epistemological feminist mental hygiene that sought our own doctrines of objective vision. Marxist starting points offered tools to get to our versions of standpoint theories, insistent embodiment, a rich tradition of critiques of hegemony without disempowering positivisms and relativisms, and nuanced theories of mediation.” (SCW186) The cyborg point of view is shaped in part by social movements around labor, race, gender, sexuality and indigenous rights. The cyborg point of view is shaped in part by the sciences, by struggles to produce objective knowledge of the world, complete with substitutions transposed into it from the dominant forms of organization. The cyborg point of view has at least one other component: the point of view of the apparatus itself, of the electrons in our circuits, the pharmaecuticals in our bloodstreams, the machines that mesh with our flesh. The machinic enters the frame not as the good or the bad other, but as an intimate stranger. Apparatus, like sensation, is liminal and indeterminate – an in-between. It is an inhuman thing, neither object nor subject. One of its special qualities as such may however be to generate data about a nonhumanworld. The apparatus renders to the human a world that isn’t for the human. An apparatus is that which demonstrates some aspect of a monstrous, alien world. An apparatus yield aspects, particular monstrosities, which never add up to that consistent and absolute world that is remains the God, or Goddess, of all realists. An apparatus affords the real, material and historical form of mediation. I take up the significance of this in Molecular Red through a reading of Haraway’s colleague Karen Barad and former student Paul Edwards, who show the centrality of thinking the cyborg-apparatus for understanding techno-science today. Elsewhere I follow the same line of thought to Paul B Préciado. For while there has been a turn towards a revival of scientism and claims for the virtues of a universal rationality, these bypass the more difficult business of grasping how science is actually produced. Hence the centrality today of Haraway’s work, in which thinking the messy business of making science fully embraces its implication in nets of corporate and military power, its processing and reinforcing of metaphors not of its making, and its dependence on a vast cyborg apparatus. The strength of her work is in not abandoning the struggle for knowledge under such difficult conditions and retreating into mere philosophy.