## Underview theory

Interp- nothing of what they said in their underview is fair

Standards – I think it’s abusive

If they don’t drop it they lied- that’s bad

A2 indexicals

## 1-disclosure theory

Interpretation: Debaters must disclose the aff at least 30 minutes before the round – to clarify, this can be informal disclosure  
Violation: they didn’t disclose the changes

1 - forces us to rely on generics rather than strategies tailored to the affirmative— kills nuanced clash since every debate is the same.

2- they get infinite time to frontline their aff, while I come into the round guessing – kills fairness

3 - discourages cheap shot aff’s. If the aff isn’t inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, the case should lose- surprise factor affs incentivize cases that are as fringe as possible instead of well-researched realistic affirmatives- incentivizes useless education

Voters

1. fairness -we can’t determine truth of arguments if they’re not tested fairly
2. education -only reason why schools fund debate
3. clash- key to learning about policymaking, only portable skill we get from debate

Critical thinking is non-unique because people would still have to come up with answers to the aff before the round.

Drop the debater on disclosure- the theory is on the entire aff so dta means they lose

Competing interps, reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention

NO RVI A. incentives good theory debaters to bait abuse b- chills debaters from running theory on good teams even if they deserve it c- illogical, you don’t win for proving you’re fair

## 1-Daoism K

#### Welcome to the realm of desire. Society controls desires- forgetting these structures overwhelms the language barrier that makes all other reformation fail. Thus the role of the ballot is to overwhelm desire.

Hansen, Chad, 3, Daoism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), No Publication, 2-19-2003, DOA: 9-4-2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/daoism/, r0w@n

With the importation of Indo-European Buddhism from India, wu-wei started to be interpreted via the Western conceptual apparatus contrasting desire or purpose and reason. This shaped the modern Chinese interpretation and probably undermined the ideal. It became the target of attack among “modern” Chinese who regarded Daoist “non-striving” or “purposelessness” as the source of Chinese passivity. The activist 19th century reformer, Kang You-wei (Kang have-wei) took the denial of the slogan as his scholarly name. 9.5 Pusimplicity (Pre-linguistic Purity) 樸 The Daoist “primitivist” ideal as expressed mainly in the Laozi. It metaphorically represents the result of forgetting mingnames and desires (See Wu-wei). Translations include simplicity, “raw” wood, and D. C. Lau’s more elaborate “uncarved block.” The detailed translation more sensitively expresses Laozi’s point in using the metaphor in the context of a view of names as “cutting” things into types and Laozi’s distinctive theory that such socially constructed distinctions (institutions) control us by controlling our desires. When societies adopt names or terms, it does so in order to instill and regulate desires for one of the pair created by the name-induced distinction. Thus Daoist forgetting requires forgetting names and distinctions, but in doing so, frees itself from the socially induced, unnatural desires that cause strife and unhappiness in society (e.g. status, rare objects, fame, authority). Hence: “The Nameless uncarved block thus amounts to freedom from desire.” (Daode Jing 37) 10. Texts and Textual History Questions of textual theory are the focus of the bulk of modern scholarship. They include these kinds of questions. Existence (did Laozi or Zhuangzi actually exist) Authorship (did they write the texts attributed to them?) Dating (when did they exist or write their texts?) Relations (did Laozi influence Zhuangzi?)

#### The aff’s conceptualization of the subject mentally distances us from the real world- this prevents them from acting with the confines of the environing particulars of the ten thousand things

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, <https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103>, r0w@n

Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, he or she is not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, he or she seeks to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. While we wrestle with whether we are profound enough, however, we can always, as the Tao te ching recommends, keep the state’s biggest guns out of sight, treat them as unattractive (no parades or fly-pasts), use overt force extremely reluctantly, ensure that collateral human damage is kept to an absolute minimum if we do have to use force, and treat any success as a tragedy not a triumph. The ultimate issue in the politico-strategic realm is war. How does wu-wei apply here? Human warring is regularly analysed rationally in terms of a range of causes, kinds and consequences. The results of these analyses are used to plan appropriate politico-strategic practices, whether of an offensive, defensive, or pre-emptive kind. Human warring can also be analysed by meditating, however – that is, by not cogitating so self-consciously upon the ways in which we relate to each other and the world. The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict

#### The aff’s move towards justice lacks the re-evaluation of the relationality of desire and subjecthood that would enable real progress

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87

#### Thus the alternative is creating a harmonious consciousness, making the law integrative, contemplative, and reconsiderate of the Western paradigm

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. 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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87 Opposite theories like formalism and realism as well as naturalism and positivism unite in a wise contemplation to restore the Dao. 88 Others have noted that a common vision of the “Good” reduces explicit laws and legal institutions. See, e.g., ROBERT MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 241-242 (1976). 89 The Daodejing stresses this natural way. See, e.g., TAO TE CHING, supra note 5, at 73 (ch. 17). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 19 purely material gain—a sense that the individual self could outstrip the whole. It was a wrong step in a right direction. With a holistic consciousness, people again will be free to create and invent new ways of doing things. These new ways, moreover, will accord with the underlying natural order and thus be more productive than the former methods. In the present, post-capitalistic-industrial era, this harmonious approach will open up new metaphysical-physical possibilities, which have few, if any, of the negative side effects, such as pollution, cancer and war, of the discordant system. Just as America’s early homesteading outstripped feudalistic agricultural systems, a holistic approach to manufacturing will surpass the capitalistic-industrial order’s methods. In connection with a harmonious economy, this consciousness, by creating a stable community of secure individuals, will free people from the alienation and thus errant desire and displacement activity of modern societies. In the balanced state, people will be free to experience the world on a deeper and fuller basis. 90 Each person will have the opportunity to realize his or her unique contribution to the whole and thereby attain the happiness that ordinary existence promises. The social norms that previously channeled and controlled displacement activity will become redundant. When it comes to any such displacement conflict, the law will seek integrative ways to restore individual and societal balance. Finally, this consciousness, by showing individual health is related to universal principles of balance and harmony, will encourage people to lead healthy lives and 90 CLS scholars seeking to transcend ill-liberal tendencies have noted this relationship. See, e.g., Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 20 take responsibility for their illnesses. Daoist metaphysics demonstrates that harmony between the Yin and Yang applies all the way down to the cellular level (and farther). 91 When people live in balance, they accord with universal principles and experience physical, spiritual, and mental health. People will also recognize disease is a sign of imbalance and a call for adjusting a person’s consciousness. This natural health and individual responsibility will greatly reduce the need for tertiary social welfare norms. This basic change, of course, goes deeper than general legal norms. It calls for a reconsideration of the modern Western paradigm based on material separation (e.g., Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology, Freudian psychology, and Weberian sociology). As already noted, Daoism shows that the explicit separation is only for an implicit connection and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. 92 At the same time, this change in consciousness calls for a return to a holistic sense, as America’s founders understood, of people and the world as inherently good (the divine essence itself). This lucidity will resolve many disputes within academic fields and between science and religious forums. It will bring the various strands of thinking back under a single roof. In this respect, Daoism is a complete account of reality. 93 91 See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 2, citing the 200 C.E. Huangdi Neijing. 92 Quantum physics certainly challenges the traditional order, and some notable physicists have already argued an approach similar to Daoism. See, e.g., DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER (1980). See also, DAVID BOHM,ON CREATIVITY 104 (1996) (calling for a new mathematics that calls attention to a whole movement and to particular things only in some secondary function). 93 It’s not that this grand unified theory can be proven rationally, as Daoism holds, it can only be shown that it could be no other way. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 21 At some point, this change in consciousness is inevitable—as Daoism illustrates, the present situation is unsustainable. Conflict has served its purpose: disharmony is necessary for the experience of harmony and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. As described in Part III, however, the current economic conflict is dysfunctional, and the cultural and social welfare strife crippling.94 Throughout history, a conflicted society has always had to evolve or it would collapse;95 and, again, neither the law nor any other social norm could do anything about it. Many of America’s late 18th century constitutionalists understood that the conflict between liberalism and republicanism was inimical to democracy and a natural happiness. As Daoism also notes, this question is not a philosophical issue, it is a metaphysical point. Daoism demonstrates the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When the implicit connection and explicit separation come together in harmony, a person may experience Oneness and ultimately the Dao.96 This ancient wisdom is simple but profound. In the modern era, thinkers must work to understand its implications. 97 There is much to do within current fields like physics, health, and divinity. In typical 94 Externalities are much greater than most people recognize, and include things like routine pollution, war and cancer. 95 Feudalism, for example, either transitioned to a balanced homesteading (something akin to early America) or collapsed (like what happened in Russia). 96 Professor Wang also noted this point. See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 223 (describing how “[t]he whole emergent regularity is more than the sum of its parts”). 97 For the many nuances of just the Yin and Yang, see Professor Wang’s book. WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 22 Daoist fashion, this Eastern understanding calls for a Western pragmatism.98 In such a harmoniousstate may lie the solution to the world’s present challenges.

## 2-Util

**First- Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues**.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values**.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable**.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes**:** “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

**Second- every other value criterion can be explained in reference to pleasure and pain- they say koorsgrd good cuz they think it’ll make stuff better**

## Case

### Framing

#### Universalism

#### Different things apply differently to different agents- companies have different rights than people

#### have to reconcile different intersets- topic stuff proves

### Topic stuff

**1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.**

**Gourevitch 18** [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d/SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy **recognizes** that workers have a **right** to **strike**. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose **serious** **problems** for **liberal** **societies**. They involve **violence** and **coercion**, they often violate some **basic** **liberal** **liberties**, they appear to **involve** group rights having **priority** over **individual** **ones**, and they can **threaten** **public** **order** itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of **disruptive** **collective** **protest** in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ **froze** major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as **statewide** in **West** **Virginia**, **Oklahoma**, **Arizona**, and **Colorado**; a **strike** by taxi drivers played a **major** role in debates and court decisions regarding **immigration**; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises **far** more **issues** than a **single** **essay** can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its **relation** to **coercive** **strike** **tactics**. I argue that strikes present a **dilemma** for liberal societies because for **most** **workers** to have a reasonable chance of **success** they need to use some **coercive** **strike** **tactics**. But these coercive strike tactics both **violate** the law and **infringe** upon what are widely held to be **basic** **liberal** **rights**. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know **why** workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of **understanding** the right to strike is as a right to **resist** the **oppression** that workers face in the **standard** **liberal** **capitalist** **economy**. This way of **understanding** the right explains why the use of **coercive** **strike** **tactics** is not morally **constrained** by the requirement to respect the **basic** **liberties** nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

**2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.**

**3] The aff homogenizes all strikes as an unconditional right which is unethical.**

**Loewy 2K**, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

It would seem then that the ethical considerations for workers striking in an industry such as a shoe factory or a chain grocery store are quite different from the ethical considerations for workers in sanitation, police, or fire departments, or for professionals such as teachers or those involved directly in healthcare. Even in the latter “professional” category, there are subtle but distinct differences of “rights” and obligations. However, one cannot conclude that for workers in essential industries strikes are simply ethically not permissible, whereas they are permissible for workers in less essential industries. Strikes, by necessity, injure another, and injuring another cannot be ethically neutral. Injuring others is prima facie ethically problematic—that is, unless a good and weighty argument for doing so can be made, injuring another is not ethically proper. Striking by a worker, in as much as doing so injures another or others, is only a conditional right. A compelling ethical argument in favor of striking is needed as well as an ethical argument in favor of striking at the time and in the way planned. It remains to delineate the conditions under which strikes, especially strikes by workers in essential industries and even more so by persons who consider themselves to be “professionals,” may legitimately proceed and yet fulfill their basic purpose.

#### Space col causes inter-colony wars and war with ETs---extinction.

Marko **Kovic 18**. Social scientist (PhD in political communication, University of Zurich), co-founder and CEO of the consulting firm ars cognitionis, co-founder and president of the thinktank ZIPAR, the Zurich Institute of Public Affairs Research. 06-12-18. “Political, moral, and security challenges of space colonization.” ZIPAR. https://zipar.org/discussion-paper/political-moral-security-challenges-space-colonization/

3.3 Extraterrestrial life The scientific understanding of the origins of humankind and of life on Earth thus far paints a clear picture: We are the “products” of biological evolution, just as all other life forms on Earth. Furthermore, we know that life **can come into existence** where there **was no life before**, through so-called abiogenetic mechanisms. These basic facts lead to a clear conclusion: It is **very improbable that life on Earth is a once-in-a-universe event**; it is **highly** probable that life **has come into existence elsewhere in the universe as well**. We do not know whether extraterrestrial life currently exists, and whether there is any extraterrestrial life in our vicinity (as far as we know, there is none in our Solar System). In theory, our galaxy might be **full** of life and even **highly intelligent and technologically advanced** life, but, as the famous Fermi paradox posits32, there is no trace of any extraterrestrial intelligence. Be that as it may, it is possible that there is extraterrestrial life beyond Earth, and it is possible that **we will come into contact with extraterrestrial life due to colonization activity**. What should our moral attitude towards extraterrestrial life look like? The moral issue of our attitudes towards extraterrestrial life can be divided into three classes of problems, according to the type of life we are dealing with: Primitive non-sentient life. Primitive sentient life. Non-primitive sentient life. Primitive non-sentient life are life forms that resemble microbial life forms on Earth, such as bacteria. Extraterrestrial microbial life can be of great instrumental value, specifically to humans, but also in a more general sense. That is a strong argument in favor of studying and preserving extraterrestrial microbial life33; we should not go out of our way to destroy microbial life, because that life might be very useful. The main moral issue about primitive non-sentient life, however, is not the question of instrumental value, but rather the question of intrinsic value: Is there a moral obligation for humans not to manipulate or even end extraterrestrial microbial life forms? This problem is, in all likelihood, the most pressing moral issue about extraterrestrial life and space colonization and one that deserves greater practical attention34. A common argument in favor of the intrinsic value position is that of conation or goal-orientedness35 36: Because even microbial life forms act vaguely rational (they have goals and behave so as to achieve their goals), their existence has some intrinsic value. The problem with this moral argument is that it can easily lead to the conclusion of strong conservationism, whereby any habitable planet or moon should remain uncolonized, lest we interfere with microbes that we might have failed to detect37. In addition, if we accept a strong version of the intrinsic value argument, we already have immense moral problems: On Earth, we do not particularly care for any microbial life form on intrinsic grounds, and we even actively fight some of them. Primitive sentient life are life forms that are not as intelligent as humans, but that are sentient, in the sense of being able to experience positive or negative affective states. Even though sentience is not a perfectly precise concept38, and even though we lack the means for truly assessing qualia (subjective experiences) of life forms other than humans39, it is almost certain that we humans are not the only life form capable of experiencing pain and pain-related suffering and that many animals on our planet are sentient as well40. Sentient extraterrestrial life forms require a different moral stance than non-sentient life forms. Imagine, for example, that two human space ship are about to land on an exoplanet. As the space ships are landing, the exhaust from their engines heats up the ground. Space ship A is landing on a nest of insect-like non-sentient life forms, frying them alive in the process. Space ship B is landing on a herd of bunny-like sentient creatures, frying them alive in the process. Both outcomes are unfortunate, but undoubtedly, killing the sentient bunny-like creatures must be morally worse than killing the non-sentient insect-like creatures, because the bunnies experienced enormous pain while they were being killed. Our moral stance towards sentient primitive extraterrestrial life will have to take sentience into account. Avoiding suffering in sentient extraterrestrial life should be a universal rule of space colonization. Somewhat obviously, such a rule would also prohibit treating sentient extraterrestrial life forms as food (But it is highly improbable that humans would have to routinely rely on extraterrestrial sentient life forms as sources of nutrition, even though we would be technologically advanced enough to engage in intersolar space colonization. We are in the process of overcoming traditional agriculture today41; reverting to traditional agriculture on future extrasolar colonies would amount to an extraordinarily improbable and inefficient anachronism.). Non-primitive sentient life are life forms that are sentient and possess a general intelligence at least as great as our own (It is possible that highly intelligent life forms might be non-sentient, but at least on Earth, sentience seems to correlate with intelligence.). The moral challenge of this type of extraterrestrial life is the same as with primitive sentient life, and there are additional moral problems to consider. If there are intelligent life forms beyond Earth, their levels of technological development will have great variance; some life forms will be intelligent, but not yet developed, whereas others will be intelligent and much more technologically advanced than we are. Intelligent life forms that are less technologically developed than we are present us with a moral problem: Should we interact with such civilizations and try to help them develop faster and overcome problems? This moral problem has perhaps most famously been explored in the television show Star Trek with its “Prime Directive”: The fictional United Federation of Planets is never to interfere with a technologically undeveloped civilization in order to avoid doing damage (Alas, the protagonists of Star Trek end up violating the Prime Directive time and again; doing so makes for a good story.). More generally, the problem of non-interference can be described as a reversed Zoo hypothesis42, whereby it is not extraterrestrial civilizations treating Earth like a conservation project, but us humans pondering whether we should treat extraterrestrial civilizations as conservation projects. A strong argument in favor of non-interference is the risk of both causing bad outcomes, both in the short- as well as in the long-term. Interacting with less developed civilizations might inadvertently do more harm than good, and it might steer the affected civilizations away from a path to development that might be beneficial to humankind in the long run. On the other hand, however, not investing a small amount of resources to greatly improve lives and reduce suffering seems morally dubious. If an extraterrestrial civilization that is going through a historical era similar to our Middle Ages is confronted with some catastrophic disease like our Black Death pandemic, not helping that civilization fight that pandemic seems cruel; not least because the cost for helping that civilization would almost certainly be trivially low. 3.4 Cosmic suffering Imagine that humankind has successfully mastered phase II colonization (colonization beyond our Solar System). All the problems described in the previous sections and subsections have long been successfully solved, and humankind is progressing steadily and peacefully. Then, something happens. At some point and for some reason, future humans decide that they do not want to merely engage in space colonization, but to do more: Actively seed the universe with (non-human) life43. Given the technological development of future humankind, it is relatively easy to send out non-sentient primitive life forms across the galaxy. Unfortunately, something horrible happens: The primitive microbial life-forms sent out into the cosmos mutate into aggressive bacteria that attack any life form they encounter, including sentient life – and in doing so, they cause tremendous pain and agony in the organisms they attack. The benevolent idea of spreading life has quickly turned into unimaginable suffering of trillions of sentient beings across the galaxy. Colonizing humans have thus created suffering on a cosmic, or astronomical, scale44. Cosmic suffering is the risk of creating suffering on a scale that is either not possible or not as probable without space colonization. There are many potential scenarios in which successful space colonization results in cosmic suffering. For example, the general problem of the repugnant conclusion discussed further above can also be regarded as an example of this class of risks. Cosmic suffering is a severe problem because it is contingent on, or at least made more likely by, successful space colonization. The conceptually challenging aspect of cosmic suffering is the correlation of cosmic suffering with the degree of space colonization: The greater the level of space colonization, the greater the risks of cosmic suffering become. This is the opposite of the relationship between space colonization and existential risks: The greater the level of space colonization, the lower existential risks become – this is one of the main motivations for space colonization, after all. In other words, successful space colonization decreases the probability that something goes wrong for humankind in terms of existential risks, but it increases the probability that something goes wrong in terms of suffering for the whole universe. 4. Security challenges In the above discussions of political and moral challenges, it is presumed that the problems and challenges that arise do so in a generally peaceful system of colonization. However, peace in the sense of a lack of armed conflict is not guaranteed with space colonization. On the contrary: Space colonization might produce new kinds of security challenges. 4.1 Inter-colonial war Violence and war have been decreasing over the course of our civilization’s history45 46 47. The decrease in violent armed conflict has coincided with an increase in cultural, political, and economic interconnectedness. Even though major armed conflicts are not yet a thing of the past48, humankind will probably continue on its current trajectory of peace. With space colonization, however, the trend of growing closer together might reverse because of increasing fragmentation, and with that reversal, peaceful cooperation might again give way to armed conflict. Some amount of **human fragmentation** due to space colonization is almost **inevitable**. One of the strongest biases we humans have is the **intergroup** bias49: We tend to separate people into ingroups and outgroups, and we generally favor our own ingroup over any outgroup. Our ingroup favoritism is often the source of **collective identity**: We identify with our home city and think it is better than other cities; we identify with our favorite football team and think it is better than other teams; we identify with our country of origin and think it is better than other countries. In a future in which humans have successfully mastered type I colonization (colonization within our Solar System) and perhaps even type II colonization (intersolar colonization), belonging to one habitat rather than another will almost certainly also be a source of collective identity. Humans born and raised on Venus would probably have more positive general attitudes towards Venus than towards **Earth**. That is not a problem in and of itself, but it **can become a problem**: If humankind is very successful at space colonization and manages to establish colonies across the galaxy, the **ingroup dynamics within colonies** and regions of colonies might grow **so much** that the **perceived benefits of armed conflict increase**, and the perceived costs decrease. In part, this might be due to the infrahumanization (or dehumanization) bias50: Our intergroup bias can have the effect of perceiving members of the outgroup as less human than members of our own ingroup. The problem of intergroup bias and armed conflict could be compounded by real **biological** differences in the long-term future. In the long term, different colonies of humans might adopt different stances on human enhancement technology and embrace different kinds of enhancement technologies. These differential paths of human enhancement might result in **technology-induced quasi-speciation**, whereby different strands of humans have increasingly distinct biological traits. The ultimate result of such a development might be a strong fragmentation of humankind and an increasing arms race in order to defend against the outgroup of all the (former) humans that are different from the ingroup (former) humans51. 4.2 Extraterrestrial (existential) risks Space colonization will increase the probability of discovering and coming into contact with **extraterrestrial intelligence**, either **biological** or **artificial** (in the sense of hypothetical advanced artificial general intelligence52). That prospect poses some moral challenges, as argued in subsection 3.3. However, it might also pose a **security challenge** if an extraterrestrial intelligence more technologically advanced than humankind has goals and preferences that go **against the goals and preferences of humankind.** In general, there are three categories of attitudes an extraterrestrial intelligence can have towards humankind53. First, an extraterrestrial intelligence can be benevolent. A benevolent extraterrestrial intelligence is one that would change its goals and preferences upon learning of humankind. Humankind is a benevolent intelligence: If we, for example, came into contact with an extraterrestrial civilization, we would obviously take the goals and preferences of that civilization into account and update our own goals and preferences, since we are morally advanced enough to do so. Second, an extraterrestrial intelligence can be apathetic. An apathetic extraterrestrial intelligence is one that does not at all change its goals and preferences upon learning of humankind. An apathetic intelligence would neither try to accommodate humankind, nor would it react in some non-friendly way. It would not care at all. The attitude of an apathetic intelligence is similar to the attitude we humans have when it comes to some random microbial life form on Earth: We might understand that that life form exists, but we do not care either way. Third, an extraterrestrial intelligence can be **hostile**. Hostility in a general sense means that an intelligence reacts to learning of humankind by regarding its own goals and preferences as categorically more important than humankind’s. A hostile extraterrestrial intelligence is not necessarily a security threat to humankind; hostility in this context does not mean hostility in the Hollywood kind but hostility in the sense of active disregard of humankind’s goals and preferences. That, however, might still represent a **tremendous security risk**. For example, a hostile intelligence might **prefer humankind not to exist** because our **mere existence** is perceived as a **slight discomfort** to the extraterrestrial intelligence. Hostile extraterrestrial intelligence thus represents a **form of existential risk.**

### Advantage 2

#### Democracy causes war

**Harald Muller 15**, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, “Democracy, Peace, and Security,” Lexington Books pp. 44-49

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). **turns the issue upside down**: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to **act aggressively** against non-democracies. We note that—apart from **self-defense** where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——**democratic states go to war**—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold **international law** (or their own interpretation thereof), **to prevent anarchy** through state failure, to **“save strangers”** when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to **promote democracy**. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War **other than for self-defense** thus can only be fought **by democracies** against non-democracies because **against a fellow democracy** justification **would fail.** Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, **major powers** with the capability to project power into the region of concern. **The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict**. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a **fairly ambivalent relation** with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, **it is predictable** that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct **a multi- pronged nuclear arms race** (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. **They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma** in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of **Serbia in 1914**— **a ‘spoiler” state** with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove **Europe into World War I** a century ago. and **it contains a nuclear component.** To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation **needs quite a lot of optimism** Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for **a worsening of relationships.** While democracy is useful in excluding certain **conflict dyads** in the whole complex, such as **India** and the **U**nited **S**tates. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. **it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies.** To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less **moral-emotional inclination** **to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree,** and to feel a missionary drive **to turn them democratic**. This might exacerbate **the existing**, more **interest-based conflicts** between democracies and non-democracies, and it **creates fears** in the hearts of **autocratic leaders** that **they might be up for democratization sooner or later**. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace **tends to produce**, in turn, only **exacerbate these fears** as democracies tend to be **rich**, **well organized**, and **powerful** and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to **exacerbate the security dilemma** which exists between **democracies and non-democracics** an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in

# Accessibility Version

## 1-Daoism K

#### Welcome to the realm of desire. Society controls desires- forgetting these structures overwhelms the language barrier that makes all other reformation fail. Thus the role of the ballot is to overwhelm desire.

Hansen, Chad, 3, Daoism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), No Publication, 2-19-2003, DOA: 9-4-2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/daoism/, r0w@n

With the importation of Indo-European Buddhism from India, wu-wei started to be interpreted via the Western conceptual apparatus contrasting desire or purpose and reason. This shaped the modern Chinese interpretation and probably undermined the ideal. It became the target of attack among “modern” Chinese who regarded Daoist “non-striving” or “purposelessness” as the source of Chinese passivity. The activist 19th century reformer, Kang You-wei (Kang have-wei) took the denial of the slogan as his scholarly name. 9.5 Pusimplicity (Pre-linguistic Purity) 樸 The Daoist “primitivist” ideal as expressed mainly in the Laozi. It metaphorically represents the result of forgetting mingnames and desires (See Wu-wei). Translations include simplicity, “raw” wood, and D. C. Lau’s more elaborate “uncarved block.” The detailed translation more sensitively expresses Laozi’s point in using the metaphor in the context of a view of names as “cutting” things into types and Laozi’s distinctive theory that such socially constructed distinctions (institutions) control us by controlling our desires. When societies adopt names or terms, it does so in order to instill and regulate desires for one of the pair created by the name-induced distinction. Thus Daoist forgetting requires forgetting names and distinctions, but in doing so, frees itself from the socially induced, unnatural desires that cause strife and unhappiness in society (e.g. status, rare objects, fame, authority). Hence: “The Nameless uncarved block thus amounts to freedom from desire.” (Daode Jing 37) 10. Texts and Textual History Questions of textual theory are the focus of the bulk of modern scholarship. They include these kinds of questions. Existence (did Laozi or Zhuangzi actually exist) Authorship (did they write the texts attributed to them?) Dating (when did they exist or write their texts?) Relations (did Laozi influence Zhuangzi?)

#### The aff’s conceptualization of the subject mentally distances us from the real world- this prevents them from acting with the confines of the environing particulars of the ten thousand things

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, <https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103>, r0w@n

Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, he or she is not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, he or she seeks to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. While we wrestle with whether we are profound enough, however, we can always, as the Tao te ching recommends, keep the state’s biggest guns out of sight, treat them as unattractive (no parades or fly-pasts), use overt force extremely reluctantly, ensure that collateral human damage is kept to an absolute minimum if we do have to use force, and treat any success as a tragedy not a triumph. The ultimate issue in the politico-strategic realm is war. How does wu-wei apply here? Human warring is regularly analysed rationally in terms of a range of causes, kinds and consequences. The results of these analyses are used to plan appropriate politico-strategic practices, whether of an offensive, defensive, or pre-emptive kind. Human warring can also be analysed by meditating, however – that is, by not cogitating so self-consciously upon the ways in which we relate to each other and the world. The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict

#### The aff’s move towards justice lacks the re-evaluation of the relationality of desire and subjecthood that would enable real progress

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87

#### Thus the alternative is creating a harmonious consciousness, making the law integrative, contemplative, and reconsiderate of the Western paradigm

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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. 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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 19 purely material gain—a sense that the individual self could outstrip the whole. It was a wrong step in a right direction. With a holistic consciousness, people again will be free to create and invent new ways of doing things. These new ways, moreover, will accord with the underlying natural order and thus be more productive than the former methods. In the present, post-capitalistic-industrial era, this harmonious approach will open up new metaphysical-physical possibilities, which have few, if any, of the negative side effects, such as pollution, cancer and war, of the discordant system. Just as America’s early homesteading outstripped feudalistic agricultural systems, a holistic approach to manufacturing will surpass the capitalistic-industrial order’s methods. In connection with a harmonious economy, this consciousness, by creating a stable community of secure individuals, will free people from the alienation and thus errant desire and displacement activity of modern societies. In the balanced state, people will be free to experience the world on a deeper and fuller basis. 90 Each person will have the opportunity to realize his or her unique contribution to the whole and thereby attain the happiness that ordinary existence promises. The social norms that previously channeled and controlled displacement activity will become redundant. When it comes to any such displacement conflict, the law will seek integrative ways to restore individual and societal balance. Finally, this consciousness, by showing individual health is related to universal principles of balance and harmony, will encourage people to lead healthy lives and 90 CLS scholars seeking to transcend ill-liberal tendencies have noted this relationship. See, e.g., Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 20 take responsibility for their illnesses. Daoist metaphysics demonstrates that harmony between the Yin and Yang applies all the way down to the cellular level (and farther). 91 When people live in balance, they accord with universal principles and experience physical, spiritual, and mental health. People will also recognize disease is a sign of imbalance and a call for adjusting a person’s consciousness. This natural health and individual responsibility will greatly reduce the need for tertiary social welfare norms. This basic change, of course, goes deeper than general legal norms. It calls for a reconsideration of the modern Western paradigm based on material separation (e.g., Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology, Freudian psychology, and Weberian sociology). As already noted, Daoism shows that the explicit separation is only for an implicit connection and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. 92 At the same time, this change in consciousness calls for a return to a holistic sense, as America’s founders understood, of people and the world as inherently good (the divine essence itself). This lucidity will resolve many disputes within academic fields and between science and religious forums. It will bring the various strands of thinking back under a single roof. In this respect, Daoism is a complete account of reality. 93 91 See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 2, citing the 200 C.E. Huangdi Neijing. 92 Quantum physics certainly challenges the traditional order, and some notable physicists have already argued an approach similar to Daoism. See, e.g., DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER (1980). See also, DAVID BOHM,ON CREATIVITY 104 (1996) (calling for a new mathematics that calls attention to a whole movement and to particular things only in some secondary function). 93 It’s not that this grand unified theory can be proven rationally, as Daoism holds, it can only be shown that it could be no other way. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 21 At some point, this change in consciousness is inevitable—as Daoism illustrates, the present situation is unsustainable. Conflict has served its purpose: disharmony is necessary for the experience of harmony and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. As described in Part III, however, the current economic conflict is dysfunctional, and the cultural and social welfare strife crippling.94 Throughout history, a conflicted society has always had to evolve or it would collapse;95 and, again, neither the law nor any other social norm could do anything about it. Many of America’s late 18th century constitutionalists understood that the conflict between liberalism and republicanism was inimical to democracy and a natural happiness. As Daoism also notes, this question is not a philosophical issue, it is a metaphysical point. Daoism demonstrates the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When the implicit connection and explicit separation come together in harmony, a person may experience Oneness and ultimately the Dao.96 This ancient wisdom is simple but profound. In the modern era, thinkers must work to understand its implications. 97 There is much to do within current fields like physics, health, and divinity. In typical 94 Externalities are much greater than most people recognize, and include things like routine pollution, war and cancer. 95 Feudalism, for example, either transitioned to a balanced homesteading (something akin to early America) or collapsed (like what happened in Russia). 96 Professor Wang also noted this point. See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 223 (describing how “[t]he whole emergent regularity is more than the sum of its parts”). 97 For the many nuances of just the Yin and Yang, see Professor Wang’s book. WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 22 Daoist fashion, this Eastern understanding calls for a Western pragmatism.98 In such a harmoniousstate may lie the solution to the world’s present challenges.

## 2-Util

**First- Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues**.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values**.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable**.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes**:** “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

**Second- every other value criterion can be explained in reference to pleasure and pain- they say ripstein good cuz they think it’ll make stuff better**

**Third- governments need to use expected wellbeing when they make decisions because it’s the only way to weigh conflicting concerns- empirically proven since they weigh concerns of workers vs business owners**

## Case

### Framing

#### Universalism

#### Different things apply differently to different agents- companies have different rights than people

#### have to reconcile different intersets- topic stuff proves

### Topic stuff

**1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.**

**Gourevitch 18** [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d/SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy **recognizes** that workers have a **right** to **strike**. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose **serious** **problems** for **liberal** **societies**. They involve **violence** and **coercion**, they often violate some **basic** **liberal** **liberties**, they appear to **involve** group rights having **priority** over **individual** **ones**, and they can **threaten** **public** **order** itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of **disruptive** **collective** **protest** in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ **froze** major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as **statewide** in **West** **Virginia**, **Oklahoma**, **Arizona**, and **Colorado**; a **strike** by taxi drivers played a **major** role in debates and court decisions regarding **immigration**; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises **far** more **issues** than a **single** **essay** can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its **relation** to **coercive** **strike** **tactics**. I argue that strikes present a **dilemma** for liberal societies because for **most** **workers** to have a reasonable chance of **success** they need to use some **coercive** **strike** **tactics**. But these coercive strike tactics both **violate** the law and **infringe** upon what are widely held to be **basic** **liberal** **rights**. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know **why** workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of **understanding** the right to strike is as a right to **resist** the **oppression** that workers face in the **standard** **liberal** **capitalist** **economy**. This way of **understanding** the right explains why the use of **coercive** **strike** **tactics** is not morally **constrained** by the requirement to respect the **basic** **liberties** nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

**2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.**

**3] The aff homogenizes all strikes as an unconditional right which is unethical.**

**Loewy 2K**, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

It would seem then that the ethical considerations for workers striking in an industry such as a shoe factory or a chain grocery store are quite different from the ethical considerations for workers in sanitation, police, or fire departments, or for professionals such as teachers or those involved directly in healthcare. Even in the latter “professional” category, there are subtle but distinct differences of “rights” and obligations. However, one cannot conclude that for workers in essential industries strikes are simply ethically not permissible, whereas they are permissible for workers in less essential industries. Strikes, by necessity, injure another, and injuring another cannot be ethically neutral. Injuring others is prima facie ethically problematic—that is, unless a good and weighty argument for doing so can be made, injuring another is not ethically proper. Striking by a worker, in as much as doing so injures another or others, is only a conditional right. A compelling ethical argument in favor of striking is needed as well as an ethical argument in favor of striking at the time and in the way planned. It remains to delineate the conditions under which strikes, especially strikes by workers in essential industries and even more so by persons who consider themselves to be “professionals,” may legitimately proceed and yet fulfill their basic purpose.

#### Space col causes inter-colony wars and war with ETs---extinction.

Marko **Kovic 18**. Social scientist (PhD in political communication, University of Zurich), co-founder and CEO of the consulting firm ars cognitionis, co-founder and president of the thinktank ZIPAR, the Zurich Institute of Public Affairs Research. 06-12-18. “Political, moral, and security challenges of space colonization.” ZIPAR. https://zipar.org/discussion-paper/political-moral-security-challenges-space-colonization/

3.3 Extraterrestrial life The scientific understanding of the origins of humankind and of life on Earth thus far paints a clear picture: We are the “products” of biological evolution, just as all other life forms on Earth. Furthermore, we know that life **can come into existence** where there **was no life before**, through so-called abiogenetic mechanisms. These basic facts lead to a clear conclusion: It is **very improbable that life on Earth is a once-in-a-universe event**; it is **highly** probable that life **has come into existence elsewhere in the universe as well**. We do not know whether extraterrestrial life currently exists, and whether there is any extraterrestrial life in our vicinity (as far as we know, there is none in our Solar System). In theory, our galaxy might be **full** of life and even **highly intelligent and technologically advanced** life, but, as the famous Fermi paradox posits32, there is no trace of any extraterrestrial intelligence. Be that as it may, it is possible that there is extraterrestrial life beyond Earth, and it is possible that **we will come into contact with extraterrestrial life due to colonization activity**. What should our moral attitude towards extraterrestrial life look like? The moral issue of our attitudes towards extraterrestrial life can be divided into three classes of problems, according to the type of life we are dealing with: Primitive non-sentient life. Primitive sentient life. Non-primitive sentient life. Primitive non-sentient life are life forms that resemble microbial life forms on Earth, such as bacteria. Extraterrestrial microbial life can be of great instrumental value, specifically to humans, but also in a more general sense. That is a strong argument in favor of studying and preserving extraterrestrial microbial life33; we should not go out of our way to destroy microbial life, because that life might be very useful. The main moral issue about primitive non-sentient life, however, is not the question of instrumental value, but rather the question of intrinsic value: Is there a moral obligation for humans not to manipulate or even end extraterrestrial microbial life forms? This problem is, in all likelihood, the most pressing moral issue about extraterrestrial life and space colonization and one that deserves greater practical attention34. A common argument in favor of the intrinsic value position is that of conation or goal-orientedness35 36: Because even microbial life forms act vaguely rational (they have goals and behave so as to achieve their goals), their existence has some intrinsic value. The problem with this moral argument is that it can easily lead to the conclusion of strong conservationism, whereby any habitable planet or moon should remain uncolonized, lest we interfere with microbes that we might have failed to detect37. In addition, if we accept a strong version of the intrinsic value argument, we already have immense moral problems: On Earth, we do not particularly care for any microbial life form on intrinsic grounds, and we even actively fight some of them. Primitive sentient life are life forms that are not as intelligent as humans, but that are sentient, in the sense of being able to experience positive or negative affective states. Even though sentience is not a perfectly precise concept38, and even though we lack the means for truly assessing qualia (subjective experiences) of life forms other than humans39, it is almost certain that we humans are not the only life form capable of experiencing pain and pain-related suffering and that many animals on our planet are sentient as well40. Sentient extraterrestrial life forms require a different moral stance than non-sentient life forms. Imagine, for example, that two human space ship are about to land on an exoplanet. As the space ships are landing, the exhaust from their engines heats up the ground. Space ship A is landing on a nest of insect-like non-sentient life forms, frying them alive in the process. Space ship B is landing on a herd of bunny-like sentient creatures, frying them alive in the process. Both outcomes are unfortunate, but undoubtedly, killing the sentient bunny-like creatures must be morally worse than killing the non-sentient insect-like creatures, because the bunnies experienced enormous pain while they were being killed. Our moral stance towards sentient primitive extraterrestrial life will have to take sentience into account. Avoiding suffering in sentient extraterrestrial life should be a universal rule of space colonization. Somewhat obviously, such a rule would also prohibit treating sentient extraterrestrial life forms as food (But it is highly improbable that humans would have to routinely rely on extraterrestrial sentient life forms as sources of nutrition, even though we would be technologically advanced enough to engage in intersolar space colonization. We are in the process of overcoming traditional agriculture today41; reverting to traditional agriculture on future extrasolar colonies would amount to an extraordinarily improbable and inefficient anachronism.). Non-primitive sentient life are life forms that are sentient and possess a general intelligence at least as great as our own (It is possible that highly intelligent life forms might be non-sentient, but at least on Earth, sentience seems to correlate with intelligence.). The moral challenge of this type of extraterrestrial life is the same as with primitive sentient life, and there are additional moral problems to consider. If there are intelligent life forms beyond Earth, their levels of technological development will have great variance; some life forms will be intelligent, but not yet developed, whereas others will be intelligent and much more technologically advanced than we are. Intelligent life forms that are less technologically developed than we are present us with a moral problem: Should we interact with such civilizations and try to help them develop faster and overcome problems? This moral problem has perhaps most famously been explored in the television show Star Trek with its “Prime Directive”: The fictional United Federation of Planets is never to interfere with a technologically undeveloped civilization in order to avoid doing damage (Alas, the protagonists of Star Trek end up violating the Prime Directive time and again; doing so makes for a good story.). More generally, the problem of non-interference can be described as a reversed Zoo hypothesis42, whereby it is not extraterrestrial civilizations treating Earth like a conservation project, but us humans pondering whether we should treat extraterrestrial civilizations as conservation projects. A strong argument in favor of non-interference is the risk of both causing bad outcomes, both in the short- as well as in the long-term. Interacting with less developed civilizations might inadvertently do more harm than good, and it might steer the affected civilizations away from a path to development that might be beneficial to humankind in the long run. On the other hand, however, not investing a small amount of resources to greatly improve lives and reduce suffering seems morally dubious. If an extraterrestrial civilization that is going through a historical era similar to our Middle Ages is confronted with some catastrophic disease like our Black Death pandemic, not helping that civilization fight that pandemic seems cruel; not least because the cost for helping that civilization would almost certainly be trivially low. 3.4 Cosmic suffering Imagine that humankind has successfully mastered phase II colonization (colonization beyond our Solar System). All the problems described in the previous sections and subsections have long been successfully solved, and humankind is progressing steadily and peacefully. Then, something happens. At some point and for some reason, future humans decide that they do not want to merely engage in space colonization, but to do more: Actively seed the universe with (non-human) life43. Given the technological development of future humankind, it is relatively easy to send out non-sentient primitive life forms across the galaxy. Unfortunately, something horrible happens: The primitive microbial life-forms sent out into the cosmos mutate into aggressive bacteria that attack any life form they encounter, including sentient life – and in doing so, they cause tremendous pain and agony in the organisms they attack. The benevolent idea of spreading life has quickly turned into unimaginable suffering of trillions of sentient beings across the galaxy. Colonizing humans have thus created suffering on a cosmic, or astronomical, scale44. Cosmic suffering is the risk of creating suffering on a scale that is either not possible or not as probable without space colonization. There are many potential scenarios in which successful space colonization results in cosmic suffering. For example, the general problem of the repugnant conclusion discussed further above can also be regarded as an example of this class of risks. Cosmic suffering is a severe problem because it is contingent on, or at least made more likely by, successful space colonization. The conceptually challenging aspect of cosmic suffering is the correlation of cosmic suffering with the degree of space colonization: The greater the level of space colonization, the greater the risks of cosmic suffering become. This is the opposite of the relationship between space colonization and existential risks: The greater the level of space colonization, the lower existential risks become – this is one of the main motivations for space colonization, after all. In other words, successful space colonization decreases the probability that something goes wrong for humankind in terms of existential risks, but it increases the probability that something goes wrong in terms of suffering for the whole universe. 4. Security challenges In the above discussions of political and moral challenges, it is presumed that the problems and challenges that arise do so in a generally peaceful system of colonization. However, peace in the sense of a lack of armed conflict is not guaranteed with space colonization. On the contrary: Space colonization might produce new kinds of security challenges. 4.1 Inter-colonial war Violence and war have been decreasing over the course of our civilization’s history45 46 47. The decrease in violent armed conflict has coincided with an increase in cultural, political, and economic interconnectedness. Even though major armed conflicts are not yet a thing of the past48, humankind will probably continue on its current trajectory of peace. With space colonization, however, the trend of growing closer together might reverse because of increasing fragmentation, and with that reversal, peaceful cooperation might again give way to armed conflict. Some amount of **human fragmentation** due to space colonization is almost **inevitable**. One of the strongest biases we humans have is the **intergroup** bias49: We tend to separate people into ingroups and outgroups, and we generally favor our own ingroup over any outgroup. Our ingroup favoritism is often the source of **collective identity**: We identify with our home city and think it is better than other cities; we identify with our favorite football team and think it is better than other teams; we identify with our country of origin and think it is better than other countries. In a future in which humans have successfully mastered type I colonization (colonization within our Solar System) and perhaps even type II colonization (intersolar colonization), belonging to one habitat rather than another will almost certainly also be a source of collective identity. Humans born and raised on Venus would probably have more positive general attitudes towards Venus than towards **Earth**. That is not a problem in and of itself, but it **can become a problem**: If humankind is very successful at space colonization and manages to establish colonies across the galaxy, the **ingroup dynamics within colonies** and regions of colonies might grow **so much** that the **perceived benefits of armed conflict increase**, and the perceived costs decrease. In part, this might be due to the infrahumanization (or dehumanization) bias50: Our intergroup bias can have the effect of perceiving members of the outgroup as less human than members of our own ingroup. The problem of intergroup bias and armed conflict could be compounded by real **biological** differences in the long-term future. In the long term, different colonies of humans might adopt different stances on human enhancement technology and embrace different kinds of enhancement technologies. These differential paths of human enhancement might result in **technology-induced quasi-speciation**, whereby different strands of humans have increasingly distinct biological traits. The ultimate result of such a development might be a strong fragmentation of humankind and an increasing arms race in order to defend against the outgroup of all the (former) humans that are different from the ingroup (former) humans51. 4.2 Extraterrestrial (existential) risks Space colonization will increase the probability of discovering and coming into contact with **extraterrestrial intelligence**, either **biological** or **artificial** (in the sense of hypothetical advanced artificial general intelligence52). That prospect poses some moral challenges, as argued in subsection 3.3. However, it might also pose a **security challenge** if an extraterrestrial intelligence more technologically advanced than humankind has goals and preferences that go **against the goals and preferences of humankind.** In general, there are three categories of attitudes an extraterrestrial intelligence can have towards humankind53. First, an extraterrestrial intelligence can be benevolent. A benevolent extraterrestrial intelligence is one that would change its goals and preferences upon learning of humankind. Humankind is a benevolent intelligence: If we, for example, came into contact with an extraterrestrial civilization, we would obviously take the goals and preferences of that civilization into account and update our own goals and preferences, since we are morally advanced enough to do so. Second, an extraterrestrial intelligence can be apathetic. An apathetic extraterrestrial intelligence is one that does not at all change its goals and preferences upon learning of humankind. An apathetic intelligence would neither try to accommodate humankind, nor would it react in some non-friendly way. It would not care at all. The attitude of an apathetic intelligence is similar to the attitude we humans have when it comes to some random microbial life form on Earth: We might understand that that life form exists, but we do not care either way. Third, an extraterrestrial intelligence can be **hostile**. Hostility in a general sense means that an intelligence reacts to learning of humankind by regarding its own goals and preferences as categorically more important than humankind’s. A hostile extraterrestrial intelligence is not necessarily a security threat to humankind; hostility in this context does not mean hostility in the Hollywood kind but hostility in the sense of active disregard of humankind’s goals and preferences. That, however, might still represent a **tremendous security risk**. For example, a hostile intelligence might **prefer humankind not to exist** because our **mere existence** is perceived as a **slight discomfort** to the extraterrestrial intelligence. Hostile extraterrestrial intelligence thus represents a **form of existential risk.**

**4] Free-riding: strikes are a form of free-riding since those who don’t participate still reap the benefits.**

**Dolsak and Prakash 19** [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes;<https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>] Justin

While strikes and protests build **solidarity** among their supporters, they are susceptible to **collective action problems**. This is **because** **the goals that strikers pursue tend to create non-excludable benefits**. That is, benefits such as climate protection can be **enjoyed** by both **strikers** and **non**-**strikers**. Thus, large participation in climate strikes will reveal that in spite of **free-riding problems**, a large number of people have a strong preference for climate action.

**[5] Strikes fail to fulfill duty**

**Fourie 17** Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers"<https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

Kantian Ethics Kantian ethics suggest that actions are morally permissible based on whether it fulfils a person's duty (Banks, 2006). To further the concept of duty, Kantian ethics held the notion of Categorical Imperatives which is believed to determine the morality of duties as it enforces and commands adherence, complicity and application. The Categorical Imperatives consist of three formulas. Once such a formula is to "act only on the maximum whereby at the same time you can will that it become a universal law" (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). Through this perspective, Kant held that persons are to engage in actions that they are willing to allow others to engage in as well without conditions and exceptions. Applying this formula to the ethicality of social workers **participating in labor strike** demonstrations, it becomes evident that such an action is **not morally permissible or executing its duty**. Arguably, as much as social workers are trained professionals and rendering services that are crucial to the functioning and well-being of society, they remain ordinary citizens who also at some point will **require crucial services**. Examples of these crucial services that may cause significant harm because of its absence due to labor strike action are **medical personnel, suicide watch centers, mental health care professionals, law enforcement, court systems**, municipal service delivery, etc. With these services not available, social workers will experience suffering, frustration, unhappiness, harm as the clients will do with their absence from the office. To this regard, participating and demonstrating labor strike action is not adhering to duty or morally permissible.

**[6] Uses others as a mere means to an end**

**Fourie 17** Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers"<https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

A further formula of the Categorical Imperative is "so, act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other context, never solely as a means to an end but always as an end within itself' (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). By this Kant meant people should be valued and respected as an individual and not used for the benefit of others. Participating in a labor-strike demonstration/action is **a direct violation of this** categorical perspective as it would not be ethically permissible because the severe dependence and well-being of clients, the effective functioning of the employer organization, and society **is used to duly and unduly influence the bargaining process for better working conditions**. In participating in the labor strike demonstration, the humanity, and well-being of clients and society **is not seen as crucial** **and as an 'end'**, but rather used to demonstrate the undeniable need for the skills and expertise of social workers. Furthermore, through withholding services, social worker professionals demonstrate that the well-being and welfare of society have lost its inherent importance/value. Though the value of overall well-being is taught throughout the social work training process and is enshrined in the professional ethical codes.

**[7] Violates the commitment to not cause harm**

**Fourie 17** Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers"<https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

In addition to the above, engaging in a labor strike demonstration is a gross violation of the **prima facie duty of the social worker**, nonmaleficence: **to not cause harm**, and display a commitment to the well-being of the client, organization as well as society. As Social Workers withdraw their labor, services are ceased, and automatic disruption occurs which can inflict serious harm on clients, organizational functioning as well as society. According to Mehta and Swell (2014), examples of the harm caused to clients and organizational functioning include severe and fatal delays in executing or developing timeous interventions **for at-risk clients,** miscommunication, and no service delivery. Moreover, by withdrawing their labor in a strike demonstration, ethical principles such as beneficence and social justice are also not adhered to as no acts of kindness, empathy is shown, and the most vulnerable members of society **will be impacted the most**.

**[8] Strikes in essential services hurt the patient but not the employer which reduces the patient to a mere means to an end.**

**Loewy 2K**, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

“Essential” Work and Strikes Healthcare professionals, garbage collectors, and other “essential” workers have a responsibility that is considered to be different from, say, the responsibilities of workers in a supermarket chain. There are almost certainly other supermarkets, but there is generally only one municipal garbage collection service**, one police force, and one fire department; and in general, only one healthcare system available to us. In the medical setting, furthermore, workers are much more apt to deal with identified lives**: they know their patients and often have known them for some time. Striking against their employer (even if it is done in part to benefit the patient) is **denying meaningful and often essential services to some of these identified lives**. We tend to relate differently with those lives we know and therefore call “identified” from those whom we consider “unidentified” or statistical lives, in part, because we have obligations as a result of relationships; in part because we fail to recognize that these so-called unidentified lives are not in fact unidentified but are merely not identified by us.4 When strikes are called by healthcare professionals, both types of lives are apt to be injured or, at least, severely inconvenienced. Except in the pocketbook, strikes in the healthcare setting generally do not directly hurt the employer. The employer **is hurt through the** **patient**. The patient thus becomes a **means toward the employees’ ends**, a football being kicked between two contending parties—**even if one of the employees’ goals is to serve the good of patients in general.** Theoretically, patients will then bring pressure on the employer (be it the government or a managed care organization), thus, quite frankly, using the patient as a means toward the ends of the health professionals.5 The dilemma, of course, is that without significantly inconveniencing or even endangering patients, no pressure is likely to be brought and, therefore, no amelioration of working conditions is effected. To be effective, a strike of healthcare professionals has to “hurt” patients and often patients known to the healthcare professionals.

### Larp

#### STRIKES ARE HIGH NOW AND MORE ARE COMING- PROVES NO UNIQUENESS OR REASON WHY THE AFF IS KEY

**Romero 10-21** Dani Romero (REPORTER, yahoo finance) 10/21/21, ‘Strikes are contagious’: Wave of labor unrest signals crisis in tight job market,<https://news.yahoo.com/strikes-are-contagious-wave-of-labor-unrest-signals-crisis-in-tight-jobs-market-135052770.html>

As employers of all sizes grapple with an acute worker shortage amid what’s being called the pandemic era’s Great Resignation, it’s become increasingly clear that people with jobs aren’t all that happy, either. At an ever-lengthening list of workplaces around the country, workers this year have been getting loud about the state of wages, working hours and conditions. **From healthcare to entertainment, nearly 100,000 U.S. workers are either striking or preparing to strike in a bid to improve working conditions. New data signals that worker unrest is growing: a Cornell Labor Action Tracker shows that more than 180 strikes have been recorded this year, and over 24,000 workers have walked off the job this month.** This all plays out against a backdrop of an economy bouncing back from an economic shutdown during the pandemic. More than 10,000 John Deere workers went on strike Thursday, the first major walkout at the agricultural machinery giant in more than three decades. “**We have noticed a bit of an uptick in late September into early October,** for example, we've already documented 39 strikes on the month of October,” Johnnie Kallas, a Ph.D. student at Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations, or ILR, who tracks labor actions across the country, said in an interview. “Those numbers are already the **largest of any month in 2021,**” he added. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which records only large work stoppages, has documented **12 strikes involving 1,000 or more workers.** That represents a big jump from when the pandemic started over 19 months ago. “What will happen is you'll see **more workers going on strike**,” Kate Bronfenbrenner, director of labor education research and senior lecturer at Cornell school of industrial and labor relations, told Yahoo Finance. “Each time **there's a ripple effect with each one of those**, if the John Deere strike isn’t settled, you're going to see another big group go out,” she said. **“If companies don't move, you're going to see this spread from one group to another. Strikes are contagious,”** Bronfenbrenner added.

**strikes hurt working conditions in the long term.**

**Lovenheim and Bio 20** Lovenheim, M. F., & Bio, A. W. A. (2020, August 5). *A Bad Bargain*. Education Next. https://www.educationnext.org/bad-bargain-teacher-collective-bargaining-employment-earnings/. Sosa Re-Cut Justin

These data enable us to examine the effects of teacher collective-bargaining policies on multiple indicators of students’ labor-market success. Taken as a whole, our results clearly indicate that **laws supporting collective bargaining for teachers have adverse long-term consequences for students**.

Earnings. We find strong evidence that teacher collective bargaining has a negative effect on students’ earnings as adults. **Attending school in a state with a duty-to-bargain law for all 12 years of schooling reduces later earnings by $795 dollars per year (see Figure 3). This represents a decline in earnings of 1.9 percent relative to the average**. Although the individual effect is modest, it **translates into a large overall loss of earnings for the nation as a whole**. In particular, our results suggest a total loss of **$196 billion per year** accruing to those who were educated in the 34 states with duty-to-bargain policies on the books.

Hours worked. Consistent with this reduction in earnings, we also find that exposure to a duty-to-bargain law throughout one’s school years is **associated with a decline of 0.49 hours worked per week. This is a 1.4 percent decline relative to the average**, and it suggests that a reduction in hours worked is a main driver of the lower earnings.

Wages. The reduced earnings caused by unionization could also reflect lower wages, and **the evidence suggests a negative relationship between collective-bargaining exposure and wages.** While this relationship is not statistically significant, it is consistent with our other results and suggests that teacher collective bargaining may also have a modest adverse effect on average wages.

Employment. The fact that teacher collective bargaining reduces working hours suggests that duty-to-bargain laws may also affect employment levels. In fact, when we use the share of individuals who are employed as the outcome variable, we find that duty-to-bargain laws reduce employment. Specifically, **exposure** to a duty-to-bargain law for all 12 years of schooling **lowers the likelihood that a worker is employed by 0.9 percentage points.** Duty-to-bargain laws have no impact on unemployment rates, however, suggesting that they reduce employment by **leading some individuals to drop out of the labor force altogether.**

Occupational skill level. **Finally, we analyze the effects of collective bargaining on the skill level of a student’s selected occupation, as measured by the share of workers in that occupation who have any education beyond a high school diploma.** The results suggest yet another negative effect: **being exposed** to a duty-to-bargain law for all 12 years of schooling **decreases the proportion of such workers in an occupation by** almost half of a percentage point (or **0.6** percent relative to the average). This effect is modest in size, but it **implies that teacher collective bargaining leads students to work in occupations requiring lower levels of skill.**

Educational attainment. The reduced earnings and labor force participation associated with teacher collective bargaining raise the possibility that affected students may have completed less education. Our analysis, however, finds little evidence of bargaining power having a significant effect on how much schooling students completed. This finding is surprising in light of the substantial labor-market effects we document, but it comports with prior research that has found no effect of duty-to-bargain law passage on high-school dropout rates.

Additionally, educational attainment is but one measure of the amount of human capital students accumulate. Even if students do not complete fewer years of education, they may be acquiring fewer skills while they are in school. We believe that **our results** concerning earnings and employment are driven by other aspects of school quality that are not reflected in educational attainment, and they **reinforce the importance of studying** labor-market outcomes directly in order to understand **how** major reforms such as the enactment of teacher **collective-bargaining laws affect students’ life outcomes.**

#### Strikes are yet another set of temporal reification- they empty worker’s pockets, and get circumvented by employer awareness, scabs, and power balances.

Organizing Work, 19, Why don’t strikes achieve more?, No Publication, 5-1-2019, DOA: 10-28-2021, https://organizing.work/2019/05/why-dont-strikes-achieve-more/, r0w@n

Acknowledging that unions are signing two-tier or rollback contracts is demoralizing. It is especially so at a time when labor is supposed to be in a strong bargaining position because of a decent economy with low unemployment. If strikes are the best tactic labor has, and the economic circumstances are in our favor, why are unions signing crappy contracts? Why don’t strikes achieve more? There are a number of factors that contain how effective strikes can be, and impel unions to settle them. For one thing, they are expensive. If a union is providing even minimal strike pay, it needs a war chest of millions of dollars to be able to support even a few hundred workers. Strikes drain union coffers, and they take a financial, physical, and emotional toll on workers as well, who aren’t usually earning as much in strike pay as they would on the job, while getting yelled at or hit by cars or freezing on the picket line. Quite often, strikes don’t succeed in completely shutting down a business, not least because employers can legally hire scabs. The product may suffer, and employers may take a hit, but they can hobble along (while draining the union’s bank account). (A note on the alleged $100 million loss suffered by Stop & Shop during the recent strike, which leftists also celebrated: that figure was put out by the employer, and is more than double an estimate put forward by an industry analyst. We should always remain skeptical about boss communications. In this case, they may be crying poverty to get workers to sign the proposed collective agreement.) Sometimes strikes end because of government intervention, as when workers are legislated back to work, or fired en masse. Less dramatically, the government can intervene to bring about some kind of settlement in the form of binding arbitration. Sometimes employers even goad unions into striking, knowing what a heavy toll strikes take. If an employer knows they can weather a strike much better than the union, they are perfectly incentivized to provoke one and starve the union out. The bottom line is that strikes, under the current labor relations system, are not the slam-dunk tactic the left takes them to be. Strikes can only take place when the contract has expired, and once the membership has been balloted. This means that the employer has years to prepare, knowing when the contract is set to expire. They probably even know roughly how long the strike can last. They’ve also seen strikes before, and aren’t bowled over by them. There is no element of surprise. They know the union won’t do anything too drastic like occupy the workplace or chain the doors shut. They hire scabs, they manage public relations (often by crying poverty or publicly claiming the union won’t come to the table), and they wait it out. Of course we in left labor circles sympathize with strikers and see their cause as morally and politically righteous. But sympathy is one matter, and clear-eyed analysis is another. That we wish workers victory does not mean we suspend judgement about the effectiveness of their tactics. Nor is any of this meant to judge or condemn unions for choosing the tactics that they do. Instead, it is about zooming out and understanding what factors are constraining the situation in general. When leftists picture strikes, they are probably in part remembering black-and-white images of workers in the 1910s and 1920s streaming out of factories and mines and violently clashing with Pinkerton guards. But strikes have been tamed by the labor relations framework established by the Wagner Act (the National Labor Relations Act) of 1935 and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Those legislative measures were passed in response to massive upheaval, in which workers shut down production with strikes, or employers shut down production with lockouts. The goal of the Wagner Act is right there in its full title: “to diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce.” The NLRA forced employers to sit down and bargain with workers, not out of a desire to strengthen workers as a class, but to funnel disputes between workers and bosses into a less disruptive process – in boardrooms and away from the shopfloor — so that economic production could continue. Taft-Hartley further contained strikes in numerous ways, again in response to creative and effective forms of economic disruption, by outlawing sympathy strikes, political strikes, “wildcat” strikes taken without the authorization of union leadership, secondary picketing and boycotts, and so on. Under this legal framework, strikes are a blunted tactic, quite intentionally so. They do accomplish something – in each of the three cases described above, workers would almost certainly have got a worse deal had they not struck. There are also strikes that yield apparently better deals, such as the contract bargained by Unite Here with Marriott hotels – arguably in part because contracts at seven different bargaining units expired simultaneously, allowing almost 8,000 workers to strike at once. But strikes don’t change the big-picture balance of power between employers and workers. Most of the time, strikes are like a fistfight in which one side gets a bloody nose, the other gets a black eye, and each walks away saying “You shoulda seen the other guy.” At best, a win looks like giving the other side two wounds while you only suffer one.

### Advantage 1

#### Warming Key to stop an Ice age

Alex **Morales**, 1-13-**2016**, "The Good News on Global Warming: We've Delayed the Next Ice Age," Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-13/the-good-news-on-global-warming-we-ve-delayed-the-next-ice-age

Global warming caused by fossil fuel emissions is blamed by scientists for intensifying storms, raising sea levels and prolonging droughts. Now there’s growing evidence of a positive effect: we may have delayed the next ice age by 100,000 years or more. QUICKTAKE Climate Change The conditions necessary for the onset of a new ice age were narrowly missed at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the 1800s, researchers at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research near Berlin wrote Wednesday in the journal Nature. Since then, rising emissions of heat-trapping CO2 from burning oil, coal and gas have made the spread of the world’s ice sheets even less likely, they said. “This study further confirms what we’ve suspected for some time, that the carbon dioxide humans have added to the atmosphere will alter the climate of the planet for tens to hundreds of thousands of years, and has canceled the next ice age,” said Andrew Watson, a professor of Earth sciences at the University of Exeter in southwest England who wasn’t involved in the research. "Humans now effectively control the climate of the planet." The study reveals new findings on the relationship between insolation, a measure of the Sun’s energy reaching the planet, levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and the spread of ice sheets that characterize an ice age. The researchers in Germany were able to use computer models to replicate the last eight glacial cycles and provide predictions on when the next might occur. The scientists found that even without further output of heat-trapping gases, the next ice age probably wouldn’t set in for another 50,000 years. That would make the current so-called inter-glacial period “unusually long,” according to the lead author, Andrey Ganopolski. “However, our study also shows that relatively moderate additional anthropogenic CO2-emissions from burning oil, coal and gas are already **sufficient to postpone the next ice age** for another 50,000 years,” which would mean the next one probably won’t start for 100,000 years, he said. “The bottom line is that we are basically skipping a whole glacial cycle, which is unprecedented.

#### Extinction

David **Deming 2009** (geophysicist and associate professor of Arts and Sciences at the University of Oklahoma) The Coming Ice Age, 5/13/09, http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/05/the\_coming\_ice\_age.html

In northern Europe, the Little Ice Age kicked off with the Great Famine of 1315. Crops failed due to cold temperatures and incessant rain. Desperate and starving, parents ate their children, and people dug up corpses from graves for food. In jails, inmates instantly set upon new prisoners and ate them alive. The Great Famine was followed by the Black Death, the greatest disaster ever to hit the human race. One-third of the human race died; terror and anarchy prevailed. Human civilization as we know it is only possible in a warm interglacial climate. Short of a catastrophic asteroid impact**, the greatest threat to the human race is the onset of another ice age**. The oscillation between ice ages and interglacial periods is the dominant feature of Earth's climate for the last million years. But the computer models that predict significant global warming from carbon dioxide cannot reproduce these temperature changes. This failure to reproduce the most significant aspect of terrestrial climate reveals an incomplete understanding of the climate system, if not a nearly complete ignorance. Global warming predictions by meteorologists are based on speculative, untested, and poorly constrained computer models. But our knowledge of ice ages is based on a wide variety of reliable data, including cores from the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. In this case, it would be perspicacious to listen to the geologists, not the meteorologists. By reducing our production of carbon dioxide, we risk hastening the advent of the next ice age. Even more foolhardy and dangerous is the Obama administration's announcement that they may try to cool the planet through geoengineering. Such a move in the middle of a cooling trend could provoke the irreversible onset of an ice age. **It is not hyperbole to state that such a climatic change would mean the end of human civilization as we know it.** Earth's climate is controlled by the Sun. In comparison, every other factor is trivial. The coldest part of the Little Ice Age during the latter half of the seventeenth century was marked by the nearly complete absence of sunspots. And the Sun now appears to be entering a new period of quiescence. August of 2008 was the first month since the year 1913 that no sunspots were observed. As I write, the sun remains quiet. We are in a cooling trend. The areal extent of global sea ice is above the twenty-year mean. We have heard much of the dangers of global warming due to carbon dioxide. But the potential danger of any potential anthropogenic warming is trivial compared to the risk of entering a new ice age. Public policy decisions should be based on a realistic appraisal

#### CO2 promotes the greening effect – leads to fewer deaths from starvation

**Bell 16** (Cfact, “Co2 ‘pollution’ is greening the planet,” Larry Bell, 5/9/16, <http://www.cfact.org/2016/05/09/co2-pollution-is-greening-the-planet/)> // SR

If there’s anything that climate crisis theology clerics hate more than fossil fuels, it’s got to be any glad tidings about CO2. Like, for example, results of a global satellite study published last month in the journal Nature. It reported that thanks to that “pollutant,” the planet is producing lots more veggies even the most strident non-carnivorous ideologically superior planetary salvationists should truly celebrate. How much more? Well according to the 32 researchers from nine countries, **it amounted to “a persistent and widespread increase” of greening over 25% to 50% of the “global vegetated area”** over the past 35 years. Less than 4% of the globe showed a reduction. Of the 85% of Earth’s ice-free lands, the areas covered in green average about 32% of that amount. The additional leaves laid out in a carpet would cover the continental U.S. twice over. If you have been holding your breath wondering why this is occurring, go ahead relax . . . take some blameless credit. Based upon simulated ecosystem models, the researchers credited 70% of this green bounty to CO2 fertilization benefits. They Lush-Green-Forestattributed another 9% to nitrogen fertilizers and 4% to shifts in land management, neither of which explain observed added forest growth. A 2013 study of temperate and boreal forests in the Northern Hemisphere (also published in the journal Nature), reported a substantial increase in water-use efficiency over the past two decades that was much larger than predicted by biosphere models. This was attributed to increased ecosystem-level photosynthesis, net carbon uptake, and decreasing evapotranspiration (water loss). And here’s the part some authors of the most recent report obviously had to struggle with. **They attributed the third greatest beneficial influence — 8% — to “climate change**”. This admission must have been particularly painful for co-author Philippe Ciais from the Laboratory of Climate and Environmental Sciences in France, who has also served as an author for reliably alarmist UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports. True to form, Ciais said: “The fallacy of the contrarian argument is two-fold. First, the many negative aspects of climate change are not acknowledged. “Second, studies have shown that plants acclimatize to rising CO2 concentration and the fertilization effect diminishes over time.” Well actually, no. He’s wrong on both accounts. Regarding the first “fallacy,” as Judith Curry, former chair of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at the Georgia Institute of Technology, has pointed out, “It is inappropriate to dismiss the arguments of the so-called contrarians, since their disagreement with the consensus reflects conflicts of values and preference for the empirical [i.e., what has been observed] versus the hypothetical [i.e. what is projected from climate models].” As for claims that CO2 fertilization benefits are temporary, leading CO2 plant growth authority Craig Idso, who chairs the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, finds no empirical evidence exists to support a model-based claim that future carbon uptake by plants will diminish due to rising temperatures. In fact, just the opposite has been observed in the real world. Over the past 50 years, global carbon uptake has doubled. CO2 boosts water use efficiency. Increased CO2 fertilization enables plant leaves to extract more carbon from the air — lose less water — or both — during photosynthesis, a process that converts sunlight and soil nutrients into sugars which fuel life. Many plants also tolerate heat better when CO2 levels are higher, a condition evidenced by satellite imagery of deserts and savannas where greenery expansion is more apparent than in wet locations. Lead author Zaichun Zhu from Peking University told BBC News, “The greening reported in this study has the ability to fundamentally change the cycling of water and carbon in the climate system.” In many regions of the world a warmer planet will lead to more precipitation and longer growing seasons. **This results in far fewer deaths from starvation and winter hypothermia**. And yes, although just not happening very recently, climate change is very real. Despite “record high” atmospheric CO2 levels, other than 1998 and 2015 ocean El Nîno temperature spikes, satellites have recorded no statistically significant global warming over nearly the past two decades. Nevertheless, this “pause” is occurring within a nearly two-century-long natural warming trend which began before the Industrial Revolution introduced fossil-fueled smokestacks and SUVs. Those same fossil fuels displaced the use of firewood, preserving more forests to exchange CO2 for oxygen we and Bambi depend upon while also returning plant fertilizer to grow more food in the bargain.

#### The best experiments prove rising CO2 is needed for large increases in food yields.

**Taub 13** (Daniel Taub, Professor of Environmental Studies at Southwestern University, and Xianzhong Wang, Professor of Biology at Indiana University-Perdue University Indianapolis. Effects of carbon dioxide enrichment on plants. In Pielke, R. Editor-in-Chief, Climate Vulnerability. 2013. Academic Press: San Diego, ISBN 978012384703)

Concentrations of carbon dioxide in Earth’s atmosphere have been steadily increasing, from an average of approximately 280 ppm (parts per million) prior to the Industrial Revolution (Gerhart and Ward 2010), to approximately 315 ppm in 1959, to a current (2012) average of approximately 392 ppm (Conways and Tans 2012) Projections of concentrations for the year 2100 vary widely, but are mostly in the range of 500-1000 ppm (Solomon et al 2007). These increases in atmospheric CO2 concentrations have received a great deal of attention as a potential influence on climate. However, increasing atmospheric concentrations of CO; also directly affect biogeochemical processes that directly involve the carbon dioxide molecule including (1) effects on organisms that uptake CO2 in photosynthesis, (2) decreasing ocean pH due to increased dissolution of CO2 to form carbonic acid, (3) alterations in oceanic carbonate chemistry, with impacts on marine organisms with calciﬁed body parts. ln this review we will focus on direct CO2 effects on terrestrial plants. We refer readers to Denman et al. (2011), Pabty et al. (2008), and Guniotte and Fabry (2008) for reviews of the effects of rising atmospheric CO2 on ocean chemistry and marine organisms. In this review, we ﬁrst discuss the experimental method- ology that has been used to discover the effects of growth under elevated concentrations of CO2 on plants and plant communities. We then consider the various ways that **increased atmospheric concentrations of CO2 can affect plant growth**, chemistry, and **physiological functioning**, and examine the impact of CO2 enrichment on plant community structure and function. Finally, we examine ways that the effects of elevated CO2 on plants may negatively impact the ecosystem services that plants provide. Throughout, it should be noted that we are concerned with the direct effects of increasing atmospheric CO2 on plants rather than the effects that may occur indirectly through the influence of rising atmospheric CO2 on other aspects of the climate system. 4.04.1.2 Experimental Methodology of Elevated C02 Research **Our knowledge of the effects on plants of increased concentrations of atmospheric CO2 comes from experiments in which plants have been artiﬁcially exposed to the CO2 concentrations** anticipated to occur over the next century (aka elevated CO2 conditions). A wide range of facilities have been used to fumigate plants with elevated CO2 in this manner. These facilities can be divided into three broad categories. 1. Closed facilities. These facilities include growth chambers, CO2 controlled greenhouses, and other indoor facilities. Closed facilities have been used widely, and were the earliest technology used for CO2 enrichment studies. One major advantage of these facilities is the ability to precisely control environmental conditions, including CO2 concentration, temperature, light intensity, photo- period, and relative humidity. Another advantage is a relatively low cost of operation. The chief drawback of these facilities is a lack of realism: plants are typically rooted in soil in pots that restrict root growth and environmental conditions inside these facilities can be quite different from field conditions. 2. Semi-open systems. This category is best represented by open-top chambers (OTC). These can be placed in natural and agriculture field settings. Plants in these experiments are often rooted naturally in the soil, and because the chambers have open tops, the environment is much closer to field conditions than inside enclosed facilities. However, plants grown in OTCs usually experience warmer, more humid conditions and lower light intensity than those grown outside. 3 3. Free-air CO2 enrichment (FACE). In FACE facilities, gas emitters are used to fumigate vegetation with gases such as CO2 and ozone without enclosing chambers of any kind. FACE can therefore simulate changes in atmospheric composition **under realistic ﬁeld conditions**. Because FACE rings are typically larger in size (up to 15-25 m diameter) than either enclosed facilities or OTCs, FACE facilities can also incorporate a large number of plants, and can be used to study ecosystem interactions that occur over somewhat larger spatial scales than for other methods of CO 2 enrichment The shortcomings of FACE include a high cost of setup and maintenance, and problems maintaining steady CO2 levels under windy conditions. All things considered, FACE offers the most realistic simulation of the real-world environmental conditions of the future. The ﬁrst generation of FACE experiments have largely been completed, and researchers have recently been considering ambitious plans for new types of FACE experiments that could operate at even larger scales and with enhanced realism (Ainsworth et al. 2008; Calfapierta et al. 2009). Ln this article, we incorporate results from all types of CO2 enrichment facilities, **focusing on results from FACE experiments** when available. Throughout, we identify the type of research facility from which particular results have been obtained, so the data can be interpreted in the proper context. If we do not specify a particular type of facility, we (or the previous authors we cite) are discussing results drawn from all types of facilities. 4.04.2 Effects of Elevated CO2 on Plants 4.04.2.1 Physiological Effects Plants assimilate carbon dioxide through the process of photosynthesis, chemically reducing the carbon to form organic molecules. These organic molecules make up more than 95% of the dry mass of a typical plant and provide energy for the plant’s metabolism. Because CO2 plays this pivotal role in plant metabolism, rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations can be expected to alter a great many aspects of plant physiology and chemistry. 4.04.2.1.1 Photosynthesis and Growth Plants grown under elevated CO2 conditions typically experience increased rates of photosynthetic carbon fixation. Reviewing FACE studies performed on a broad range of plant species, Ainsworth and Rogers (2007) **found an average increase in photosynthetic rates under elevated CO2** (475-600 ppm) **of 40%**. The increased availability of reduced carbon compounds such as carbohydrates provided by this increased photosynthesis **increases the growth rate for most plants**. In FACE experiments, elevated CO2 increased dry matter production of above-ground tissues by an average of 17% and production of below ground tissues by more than 30% (Ainsworth and Long 2005; de Graaf et al. 2006). Norby and Zak (2011) found an average of stimulation of net primary productivity (roughly defined as the amount of organic biomass entering an ecosystem through the photosynthetic organisms living there) of 23% in FACE experiments in forest ecosystems. Crop yields are also increased under elevated CO2. **Yields of wheat, rice, barley, and soybean increase by an average of 12-17% in FACE experiments** (Ainsworth 2008; Ainsworth and McGrath 2010; Long et al 2006). Yields of potato tubers increase **even more**, by ~30% on average (Ainsworth and McGrath 2010; Kimball 2010).

#### We are on the brink of food crisis which causes World War III

**Heneghan 15** (Carolyn Heneghan, staff writer at FoodDive who cites the following: Hiroyuki Konuma, Assistant General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization; the Global Harvest Initiative; Scott Ickes, a Professor of Public Health and Nutrition at the College of William & Mary. “Where food crises and global conflict could collide” January 22, 2015 <http://www.fooddive.com/news/where-food-crises-and-global-conflict-could-collide/350837/>)

**World War III** is unimaginable for many, but some experts believe that not only is this degree of global conflict imminent, but it **may be instigated** not by military tensions, oil and gas, or nuclear threats, but instead **by**, of all things, food. As it stands, **countries** across the globe are **enduring food crises**, and the U.N.’s Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that about 840 million people in the world are undernourished, including the one in four children under the age of 5 who is stunted because of malnutrition. Assistant director-general of U.N. FAO Asia-Pacific Hiroyuki Konuma told Reuters that social and **political unrest, civil wars, and terrorism could all be possible results of food crises**, and “world security as a whole might be affected.” Such consequences could happen **unless the world increases its output of food production** 60% by mid-century. This includes maintaining a stable growth rate at about 1% to have an even theoretical opportunity to circumvent severe shortages. These needs are **due to** the **growing** global **population**, which is expected to reach 9 billion by 2050 while demand for food will rise rapidly. Where the problems lie Exacerbating this issue is the fact that the world is spending less on agricultural research, to the dismay of scientists who believe global food production may not sustain the increased demand. According to American Boondoggle, “The pace of investment growth has slowed from 3.63 percent per year (after inflation) during 1950–69, to 1.79 percent during 1970–89, to 0.94 percent during 1990– 2009.” Decreased growth in agricultural research and development spending has slowed across the world as a whole, but it is even slower in high-income countries. Water scarcity is another problem, including in major food-producing nations like China, as well as climate change. Extreme weather events are having a severe effect on crops, which have been devastated in countries like Australia, Canada, China, Russia, and the U.S., namely due to floods and droughts. An Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change recently warned that climate change may result in “a 2% drop each decade of this century,” according to RT. Rising food costs also contribute to poor food security across the world as prices remain high and volatile. Higher food costs inhibit lower socioeconomic people’s access to food, which contributes to the FAO’s disturbing figure of global malnutrition. In addition to an inability for people to feed themselves, poverty can also reduce food production, such as some African farmers being unable to afford irrigation and fertilizers to provide their regions with food. Still another issue for decreased food production is the fact that many farmers are turning crops like soy, corn, and sugar into sources for biofuel rather than edible consumption, which means these foods are taken away from people to eat. Could these shortages lead to a major global conflict? Studies suggest that **the food crisis could begin as early as 2030**, just a short 15 years from now, particularly in areas such as East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Both regions have significant problems with domestic food production. Some experts believe that, to secure enough food resources for their populations, **countries may go to war over the increasingly scarce food supply**. This could be due in part to warring parties blocking aid and commercial food deliveries to areas supporting their enemies, despite the fact that such a practice breaks international humanitarian law. Conflict also leads to lack of food supply for populations as people become displaced and forced from their homes, jobs, and income and thus cannot buy food to feed themselves. Displaced farmers are also unable to produce their normal crops, contributing still more to food shortages in certain countries. **Food insecurity is a major threat to world peace** and could potentially incite violent conflict between countries across the world. Thus, the U.N. and other governmental bodies are desperately trying to find ways to solve the problem before it becomes something they cannot control.

### Advantage 2

#### Democracy causes war

**Harald Muller 15**, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, “Democracy, Peace, and Security,” Lexington Books pp. 44-49

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). **turns the issue upside down**: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to **act aggressively** against non-democracies. We note that—apart from **self-defense** where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——**democratic states go to war**—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold **international law** (or their own interpretation thereof), **to prevent anarchy** through state failure, to **“save strangers”** when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to **promote democracy**. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War **other than for self-defense** thus can only be fought **by democracies** against non-democracies because **against a fellow democracy** justification **would fail.** Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, **major powers** with the capability to project power into the region of concern. **The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict**. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a **fairly ambivalent relation** with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, **it is predictable** that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct **a multi- pronged nuclear arms race** (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. **They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma** in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of **Serbia in 1914**— **a ‘spoiler” state** with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove **Europe into World War I** a century ago. and **it contains a nuclear component.** To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation **needs quite a lot of optimism** Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for **a worsening of relationships.** While democracy is useful in excluding certain **conflict dyads** in the whole complex, such as **India** and the **U**nited **S**tates. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. **it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies.** To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less **moral-emotional inclination** **to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree,** and to feel a missionary drive **to turn them democratic**. This might exacerbate **the existing**, more **interest-based conflicts** between democracies and non-democracies, and it **creates fears** in the hearts of **autocratic leaders** that **they might be up for democratization sooner or later**. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace **tends to produce**, in turn, only **exacerbate these fears** as democracies tend to be **rich**, **well organized**, and **powerful** and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to **exacerbate the security dilemma** which exists between **democracies and non-democracics** an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in