# Ag Workers

## Worker Spec Bad

Interpretation: Affirmatives must defend the resolution: resolved, Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### Definition of unconditional

Merriam Webster, xx, Definition of UNCONDITIONAL, No Publication, xx-xx-xxxx, DOA: 10-29-2021, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unconditional, r0w@n

Definition of unconditional 1: not conditional or limited : ABSOLUTE, UNQUALIFIED unconditional surrender unconditional love 2: UNCONDITIONED sense 2

Violation- they specify the national labor relations act- it’s got lots of conditions

National Labor Relations Board, 21, The Right to Strike, No Publication, 11-19-2021, DOA: 11-20-2021, https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes, r0w@n

If the Board finds that economic strikers or unfair labor practice strikers who have made an unconditional request for reinstatement have been unlawfully denied reinstatement by their employer, the Board may award such strikers backpay starting at the time they should have been reinstated. Strikes unlawful because of purpose. A strike may be unlawful because an object, or purpose, of the strike is unlawful. A strike in support of a union unfair labor practice, or one that would cause an employer to commit an unfair labor practice, may be a strike for an unlawful object. For example, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge an employee for failure to make certain lawful payments to the union when there is no union-security agreement in effect (Section 8(a)(3). A strike to compel an employer to do this would be a strike for an unlawful object and, therefore, an unlawful strike. Strikes of this nature will be discussed in connection with the various unfair labor practices in a later section of this guide. Furthermore, Section 8(b)(4) of the Act prohibits strikes for certain objects even though the objects are not necessarily unlawful if achieved by other means. An example of this would be a strike to compel Employer A to cease doing business with Employer B. It is not unlawful for Employer A voluntarily to stop doing business with Employer B, nor is it unlawful for a union merely to request that it do so. It is, however, unlawful for the union to strike with an object of forcing the employer to do so. These points will be covered in more detail in the explanation of Section 8(b)(4). In any event, employees who participate in an unlawful strike may be discharged and are not entitled to reinstatement. Strikes unlawful because of timing—Effect of no-strike contract. A strike that violates a no-strike provision of a contract is not protected by the Act, and the striking employees can be discharged or otherwise disciplined, unless the strike is called to protest certain kinds of unfair labor practices committed by the employer. It should be noted that not all refusals to work are considered strikes and thus violations of no-strike provisions. A walkout because of conditions abnormally dangerous to health, such as a defective ventilation system in a spray-painting shop, has been held not to violate a no-strike provision. Same—Strikes at end of contract period.Section 8(d) provides that when either party desires to terminate or change an existing contract, it must comply with certain conditions. If these requirements are not met, a strike to terminate or change a contract is unlawful and participating strikers lose their status as employees of the employer engaged in the labor dispute. If the strike was caused by the unfair labor practice of the employer, however, the strikers are classified as unfair labor practice strikers and their status is not affected by failure to follow the required procedure. Strikes unlawful because of misconduct of strikers. Strikers who engage in serious misconduct in the course of a strike may be refused reinstatement to their former jobs. This applies to both economic strikers and unfair labor practice strikers. Serious misconduct has been held to include, among other things, violence and threats of violence. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a “sitdown” strike, when employees simply stay in the plant and refuse to work, thus depriving the owner of property, is not protected by the law. Examples of serious misconduct that could cause the employees involved to lose their right to reinstatement are:

**Semantics outweigh**

1. **We can only decide between pragmatics with semantics**

**2] Limits:**

**A] Quantitative – there are tens of of thousands of affs because they can call anything that stops work a strike and only spec that– unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden**

**B] Qualitative – they take away generic turns like strikes bad and functionally jettison "unconditional" from the topic, which shifts away from the core topic lit of the – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs**

**3] TVA solves – read the aff as advantage – most authors writing about strikes policy talk about lots of different types**

**4] No PICs offense – potential neg abuse doesn’t justify aff abuse because that would permit infinite 1AC abuse**

**D] Paradigm Issues –**

**1] T is DTD – it’s the whole aff so dta doesn’t work**

**2] Comes before 1AR theory -- A] If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff B] T outweighs on scope because their abuse affected every speech that came after the 1AC C] Topic norms outweigh on urgency – we only have a few months to set them**

**3] Competing interps- reasonability arbitrary and invites intervention**

**4] No RVIs – A] Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat B] discourages checking real abuse C] Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly**

## 2- Daoism K

#### Welcome to the realm of desire. Society controls desires- forgetting these structures overwhelms the language barrier that makes all other reformation fail. Thus the role of the ballot is to overwhelm desire.

Hansen, Chad, 3, Daoism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), No Publication, 2-19-2003, DOA: 9-4-2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/daoism/, r0w@n

With the importation of Indo-European Buddhism from India, wu-wei started to be interpreted via the Western conceptual apparatus contrasting desire or purpose and reason. This shaped the modern Chinese interpretation and probably undermined the ideal. It became the target of attack among “modern” Chinese who regarded Daoist “non-striving” or “purposelessness” as the source of Chinese passivity. The activist 19th century reformer, Kang You-wei (Kang have-wei) took the denial of the slogan as his scholarly name. 9.5 Pusimplicity (Pre-linguistic Purity) 樸 The Daoist “primitivist” ideal as expressed mainly in the Laozi. It metaphorically represents the result of forgetting mingnames and desires (See Wu-wei). Translations include simplicity, “raw” wood, and D. C. Lau’s more elaborate “uncarved block.” The detailed translation more sensitively expresses Laozi’s point in using the metaphor in the context of a view of names as “cutting” things into types and Laozi’s distinctive theory that such socially constructed distinctions (institutions) control us by controlling our desires. When societies adopt names or terms, it does so in order to instill and regulate desires for one of the pair created by the name-induced distinction. Thus Daoist forgetting requires forgetting names and distinctions, but in doing so, frees itself from the socially induced, unnatural desires that cause strife and unhappiness in society (e.g. status, rare objects, fame, authority). Hence: “The Nameless uncarved block thus amounts to freedom from desire.” (Daode Jing 37) 10. Texts and Textual History Questions of textual theory are the focus of the bulk of modern scholarship. They include these kinds of questions. Existence (did Laozi or Zhuangzi actually exist) Authorship (did they write the texts attributed to them?) Dating (when did they exist or write their texts?) Relations (did Laozi influence Zhuangzi?)

#### The aff’s conceptualization of the subject mentally distances us from the real world- this prevents them from acting with the confines of the environing particulars of the ten thousand things

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, <https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103>, r0w@n

Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, he or she is not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, he or she seeks to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. While we wrestle with whether we are profound enough, however, we can always, as the Tao te ching recommends, keep the state’s biggest guns out of sight, treat them as unattractive (no parades or fly-pasts), use overt force extremely reluctantly, ensure that collateral human damage is kept to an absolute minimum if we do have to use force, and treat any success as a tragedy not a triumph. The ultimate issue in the politico-strategic realm is war. How does wu-wei apply here? Human warring is regularly analysed rationally in terms of a range of causes, kinds and consequences. The results of these analyses are used to plan appropriate politico-strategic practices, whether of an offensive, defensive, or pre-emptive kind. Human warring can also be analysed by meditating, however – that is, by not cogitating so self-consciously upon the ways in which we relate to each other and the world. The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict

#### The aff’s move towards justice lacks the re-evaluation of the relationality of desire and subjecthood that would enable real progress

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87

#### Thus the alternative is creating a harmonious consciousness, making the law integrative, contemplative, and reconsiderate of the Western paradigm

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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. 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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 19 purely material gain—a sense that the individual self could outstrip the whole. It was a wrong step in a right direction. With a holistic consciousness, people again will be free to create and invent new ways of doing things. These new ways, moreover, will accord with the underlying natural order and thus be more productive than the former methods. In the present, post-capitalistic-industrial era, this harmonious approach will open up new metaphysical-physical possibilities, which have few, if any, of the negative side effects, such as pollution, cancer and war, of the discordant system. Just as America’s early homesteading outstripped feudalistic agricultural systems, a holistic approach to manufacturing will surpass the capitalistic-industrial order’s methods. In connection with a harmonious economy, this consciousness, by creating a stable community of secure individuals, will free people from the alienation and thus errant desire and displacement activity of modern societies. In the balanced state, people will be free to experience the world on a deeper and fuller basis. 90 Each person will have the opportunity to realize his or her unique contribution to the whole and thereby attain the happiness that ordinary existence promises. The social norms that previously channeled and controlled displacement activity will become redundant. When it comes to any such displacement conflict, the law will seek integrative ways to restore individual and societal balance. Finally, this consciousness, by showing individual health is related to universal principles of balance and harmony, will encourage people to lead healthy lives and 90 CLS scholars seeking to transcend ill-liberal tendencies have noted this relationship. See, e.g., Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 20 take responsibility for their illnesses. Daoist metaphysics demonstrates that harmony between the Yin and Yang applies all the way down to the cellular level (and farther). 91 When people live in balance, they accord with universal principles and experience physical, spiritual, and mental health. People will also recognize disease is a sign of imbalance and a call for adjusting a person’s consciousness. This natural health and individual responsibility will greatly reduce the need for tertiary social welfare norms. This basic change, of course, goes deeper than general legal norms. It calls for a reconsideration of the modern Western paradigm based on material separation (e.g., Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology, Freudian psychology, and Weberian sociology). As already noted, Daoism shows that the explicit separation is only for an implicit connection and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. 92 At the same time, this change in consciousness calls for a return to a holistic sense, as America’s founders understood, of people and the world as inherently good (the divine essence itself). This lucidity will resolve many disputes within academic fields and between science and religious forums. It will bring the various strands of thinking back under a single roof. In this respect, Daoism is a complete account of reality. 93 91 See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 2, citing the 200 C.E. Huangdi Neijing. 92 Quantum physics certainly challenges the traditional order, and some notable physicists have already argued an approach similar to Daoism. See, e.g., DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER (1980). See also, DAVID BOHM,ON CREATIVITY 104 (1996) (calling for a new mathematics that calls attention to a whole movement and to particular things only in some secondary function). 93 It’s not that this grand unified theory can be proven rationally, as Daoism holds, it can only be shown that it could be no other way. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 21 At some point, this change in consciousness is inevitable—as Daoism illustrates, the present situation is unsustainable. Conflict has served its purpose: disharmony is necessary for the experience of harmony and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. As described in Part III, however, the current economic conflict is dysfunctional, and the cultural and social welfare strife crippling.94 Throughout history, a conflicted society has always had to evolve or it would collapse;95 and, again, neither the law nor any other social norm could do anything about it. Many of America’s late 18th century constitutionalists understood that the conflict between liberalism and republicanism was inimical to democracy and a natural happiness. As Daoism also notes, this question is not a philosophical issue, it is a metaphysical point. Daoism demonstrates the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When the implicit connection and explicit separation come together in harmony, a person may experience Oneness and ultimately the Dao.96 This ancient wisdom is simple but profound. In the modern era, thinkers must work to understand its implications. 97 There is much to do within current fields like physics, health, and divinity. In typical 94 Externalities are much greater than most people recognize, and include things like routine pollution, war and cancer. 95 Feudalism, for example, either transitioned to a balanced homesteading (something akin to early America) or collapsed (like what happened in Russia). 96 Professor Wang also noted this point. See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 223 (describing how “[t]he whole emergent regularity is more than the sum of its parts”). 97 For the many nuances of just the Yin and Yang, see Professor Wang’s book. WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 22 Daoist fashion, this Eastern understanding calls for a Western pragmatism.98 In such a harmoniousstate may lie the solution to the world’s present challenges.

## 3- Cap K

#### The right to strike is a form of class management- designed to limit the spread of revolutionary energy. The only way to solve is violently striking against the foundations of capitalism.

**Crepon 19**

Marc Crepon is a professor of philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure.. “The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin’s “Toward the Critique of Violence””. Translated by Micol Bez. DOI: 10.1215/26410478-7708331, published August 2019, accessed 11-4-21 r0w@n

In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles. We might consider this to be the perfect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of questioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benjamin dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class struggles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The difference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing thatthe right to strike isgranted and guaranteed unconditionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to contain class struggles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means. On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, after claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufficient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that justifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) left once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufficient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufficient rationale, allowing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support. The second conflict of interpretation concerns what is at stake in the strike. For the state, the strike implies a withdrawal or act of defiance vis-à-vis the employer, while for the workers it is a means of pressuring, if not of blackmail or even of “hostage taking.” The diference is thus between an act of suspension (which can be considered nonviolent) and one of extortion (which includes violence). Does this mean that “pure means” are not free of ambiguity, and that there can be no nonviolent action that does not include a residue of violence? It is not clear that Benjamin’s text allows us to go this far. Nevertheless, the problem of pure means, approached through the notion of the right to strike, raises the following question: Could it be that the text “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” which we are accustomed to reading as a text on violence, deals in fact with the possibility and ambiguity of nonviolence? The opposition between the aforementioned conflicts of interpretation manifests itself in Benjamin’s excursus on the revolutionary strike, and specifically in the opposition between the political strike and the proletarian general strike, and in the meaning we should attribute to the latter. As previously discussed, the state will never admit that the right to strike is a right to violence. Its interpretative strategy consists in denying, as much as possible, the effective exercise of the right that it theoretically grants. Under these conditions, the function of the revolutionary strike is to return the strike to its true meaning; in other words, to return it to its own violence. In this context, the imperative is to move beyond idle words: a call to strike is a call to violence. This is the reason why such a call is regularly met with a violent reaction from the state, because trade unions force the state to recognize what it is trying to ignore, what it pretends to have solved by recognizing the right to strike: the irreducible violence of class struggles. This means that the previously discussed alternative between “suspension” and “extortion” is valid only for the political strike—in other words, for a strike whose primary vocation is not, contrary to that of the proletarian general strike, to revolt against the law itself. Essentially, the idea of a proletarian general strike, its myth (to borrow Sorel’s words), is to escape from this dichotomous alternative that inevitably reproduces and perpetuates the violence of domination.

#### Capitalism is collapsing by 2050 and with it comes extinction, the role of the ballot is to prevent extinction since it forecloses all future improvement

**Streeck 16 (Wolfgang,** Emeritus Director of the Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, *How Will Capitalism End?: Essays on a Failing System*, p. 1-15) r0w@n

Capitalism has always been an improbable social formation, full of conflicts and contradictions, therefore permanently unstable and in flux, and highly conditional on historically contingent and precarious supportive as well as constraining events and institutions. Capitalist society may be described in shorthand as a 'progressive' society in the sense of Adam Smith 1 and the enlightenment, a society that has coupled its 'progress' to the continuous and unlimited production and accumulation of productive capital, effected through a conversion, by means of the invisible hand of the market and the visible hand of the state, of the private vice of material greed into a public benefit.' Capitalism promises infinite growth of commodified material wealth in a finite world, by conjoining itself with modern science and technology, making capitalist society the first industrial society, and through unending expansion of free, in the sense of contestable, risky markets, on the coat-tails of a hegemonic carrier state and its market -opening policies both domestically and internationally. 3 As a version of industrial society, capitalist society is distinguished by the fact that its collective productive capital is accumulated in the hands of a minority of its members who enjoy the legal privilege, in the form of rights of private property, to dispose of such capital in any way they see fit, including letting it sit idle or transferring it abroad. One implication of this is that the vast majority of the members of a capitalist society must work under the direction, however mediated, of the private owners of the tools they need to provide for themselves, and on terms set by those owners in line with their desire to maximize the rate of increase of their capital. Motivating non-owners to do so- to work hard and diligently in the interest of the owners - requires artful devices - sticks and carrots of the most diverse sorts that are never certain to function - that have to be continuously reinvented as capitalist progress continuously renders them obsolescent. The tensions and contradictions within the capitalist political-economic configuration make for an ever-present possibility of structural breakdown and social crisis. Economic and social stability under modern capitalism must be secured on a background of systemic restlessness4 produced by competition and expansion, a difficult balancing act with a constantly uncertain outcome. Its success is contingent on, among other things, the timely appearance of a new technological paradigm or the development of social needs and values complementing changing requirements of continued economic growth. For example, for the vast majority of its members, a capitalist society must manage to convert their ever-present fear of being cut out of the productive process, because of economic or technological restructuring, into acceptance of the highly unequal distribution of wealth and power generated by the capitalist economy and a belief in the legitimacy of capitalism as a social order. For this, highly complicated and inevitably fragile institutional and ideological provisions arc necessary. The same holds true for the conversion of insecure workers - kept insecure to make them obedient workers - into confident consumers happily discharging their consumerist social obligations even in the face of the fundamental uncertainty oflabour markets and employment.' In light of the inherent instability of modern societies founded upon and dynamically shaped by a capitalist economy, it is small wonder that theories of capitalism, from the time the concept was first used in the early 1800s in Germany" and the mid-1800s in England/ were always also theories of crisis. This holds not just for Marx and Engels but also for writers like Ricardo, Mill, Sombart, Keynes, Hilferding, Polanyi and Schumpeter, all of whom expected one way or other to see the end of capitalism during their lifetime." What kind of crisis was expected to finish capitalism off differed with time and authors' theoretical priors; structuralist theories of death by overproduction or underconsumption, or by a tendency of the rate of profit to fall (Marx), coexisted with predictions of saturation of needs and markets (Keynes), of rising resistance to further commodification oflife and society (Polanyi), of exhaustion of new land and new labour available for colonization in a literal as well as figurative sense (Luxemburg), of technological stagnation (Kondratieff), financial-political organization of monopolistic corporations suspending liberal markets (Hilferding), bureaucratic suppression of entrepreneurialism aided by a worldwide trahison des clercs (Weber, Schumpeter, Hayek) etc., etc." While none of these theories came true as imagined, most of them were not entirely false either. In fact, the history of modern capitalism can be written as a succession of crises that capitalism survived only at the price of deep transformations of its economic and social institutions, saving it from bankruptcy in unforeseeable and often unintended ways. Seen this way, that the capitalist order still exists may well appear less impressive than that it existed so often on the brink of collapse and had continuously to change, frequently depending on contingent exogenous supports that it was unable to mobilize endogenously. The fact that capitalism has, until now, managed to outlive all predictions of its impending death, need not mean that it will forever be able to do so; there is no inductive proof here, and we cannot rule out the possibility that, **next time**, whatever cavalry capitalism may require for its rescue may fail to show up. A short recapitulation of the history of modern capitalism serves to illustrate this point. 10 Liberal capitalism in the nineteenth century was confronted by a revolutionary labour movement that needed to be politically tamed by a complex combination of repression and co-optation, including democratic power sharing and social reform. In the early twentieth century, capitalism was commandeered to serve national interests in international wars, thereby converting it into a public utility under the planning regimes of a new war economy, as private property and the invisible hand of the market seemed insufficient for the provision of the collective capacities countries needed to prevail in international hostilities. After the First World War, restoration of a liberal-capitalist economy failed to produce a viable social order and had to give way in large parts of the industrial world to either Communism or Fascism, while in the core countries of what was to become 'the West' liberal capitalism was gradually succeeded, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, by Keynesian, state-administered capitalism. Out of this grew the democratic welfare-state capitalism of the three post-war decades, with hindsight the only period in which economic growth and social and political stability, achieved through democracy, coexisted under capitalism, at least in the OECD world where capitalism came to be awarded the epithet, 'advanced'. In the 1970s, however, what had with hindsight been called the 'post-war settlement' of social-democratic capitalism began to disintegrate, gradually and imperceptibly at first but increasingly punctuated by successive, ever more severe crises of both the capitalist economy and the social and political institutions embedding, that is, supporting as well as containing it. This was the period of both intensifying crisis and deep transformation when 'late capitalism', as impressively described by Werner Sombart in the 1920s, 11 gave way to neoliberalism. Crisis Theory Redux Today, after the watershed of the financial crisis of 2008, critical and indeed crisis-theoretical reflection on the prospects of capitalism and its society is again en vogue. Does Capitalism Have a Future? is the title of a book published in 2013 by five outstanding social scientists: Immanuel Wallerstein, Randall Collins, Michael Mann, Georgi Derluguian and Craig Calhoun. Apart from the introduction and the conclusion, which are collectively authored, the contributors present their views in separate chapters, and this could not be otherwise since they differ widely. Still, all five share the conviction that, as they state in the introduction, 'something big looms on the horizon: a structural crisis much bigger than the recent Great Recession, which might in retrospect seem only a prologue to a period of deeper troubles and transformations: 12 On what is causing this crisis, however, and how it will end, there is substantial disagreement- which, with authors of this calibre, may be taken as a sign of the multiple uncertainties and possibilities inherent in the present condition of the capitalist political economy. To give an impression of how leading theorists may differ when trying to imagine the future of capitalism today, I will at some length review the prospects and predictions put forward in the book. A comparatively conventional crisis theory is probably the one offered by Wallerstein (pp. 9-35), who locates contemporary capitalism at the bottom of a Kondratieff cycle (Kondratieff B) with no prospect of a new (Kondratieff A) upturn. This is said to be due to a 'structural crisis' that began in the 1970s, as a result of which 'capitalists may no longer find capitalism rewarding'. Two broad causes are given, one a set of long-term trends 'ending the endless accumulation of capital', the other the demise, after the 'world revolution of 1968', of the 'dominance of centrist liberals of the geoculture' (p. 21 ). Structural trends include the exhaustion of virgin lands and the resulting necessity of environmental repair work, growing resource shortages, and the increasing need for public infrastructure. All of this costs money, and so does the pacification of a proliferating mass of discontented workers and the unemployed. Concerning global hegemony, Wallerstein points to what he considers the final decline of the U.S.-centred world order, in military and economic as well as ideological terms. Rising costs of doing business combine with global disorder to make restoration of a stable capitalist world system impossible. Instead Wallerstein foresees 'an ever-tighter gridlock of the system. Gridlock will in turn result in ever-wilder fluctuations, and will consequently make short-term predictions - both economic and political - ever more unreliable. And this in turn will aggravate ... popular fears and alienation. It is a negative cycle' (p. 32). For the near future Wallerstein expects a global political confrontation between defenders and opponents of the capitalist order, in his suggestive terms: between the forces of Davos and of Porto Alegre. Their final battle 'about the successor system' (p. 35) is currently fomenting. Its outcome, according to Wallerstein, is unpredictable, although 'we can feel sure that one side or the other will win out in the coming decades, and a new reasonably stable world-system (or set of world-systems) will be established: Much less pessimistic, or less optimistic from the perspective of those who would like to see capitalism dose down, is Craig Calhoun, who finds prospects of reform and renewal in what he, too, considers a deep and potentially final crisis (pp. 131-61). Calhoun assumes that there is still time for political intervention to save capitalism, as there was in the past, perhaps with the help of a 'sufficiently enlightened faction of capitalists' (p. 2). But he also believes 'a centralized socialist economy' to be possible, and even more so 'Chinese-style state capitalism': 'Markets can exist in the future even while specifically capitalist modes of property and finance have declined' (p. 3). Far more than Wallerstein, Calhoun is reluctant when it comes to prediction (for a summary of his view see pp. 158-61 ). His chapter offers a list of internal contradictions and possible external disruptions threatening the stability of capitalism, and points out a wide range of alternative outcomes. Like Wallerstein, Calhoun attributes particular significance to the international system, where he anticipates the emergence of a plurality of more or less capitalist political-economic regimes, with the attendant problems and pitfalls of coordination and competition. While he does not rule out a 'large-scale, more or less simultaneous collapse of capitalist markets ... not only bringing economic upheaval but also upending political and social institutions' (p. 161), Calhoun believes in the possibility of states, corporations and social movements re-establishing effective governance for a transformative renewal of capitalism. To quote, The capitalist order is a very large-scale, highly complex system. The events of the last forty years have deeply disrupted the institutions that kept capitalism relatively well organized through the postwar period. Efforts to repair or replace these will change the system, just as new technologies and new business and financial practices may. Even a successful renewal of capitalism will transform it ... The question is whether change will be adequate to manage systemic risks and fend off external threats. And if not, will there be widespread devastation before a new order emerges? (p. 161) Even more agnostic on the future of capitalism is Michael Mann ('The End May Be Nigh, But for Whom?: pp. 71-97). Mann begins by reminding his readers that in his 'general model of human society', he does 'not conceive of societies as systems but as multiple, overlapping networks of interaction, of which four networks - ideological, economic, military and political power relations - are the most important. Geopolitical relations can be added to the four .. : Mann continues: Each of these four or five sources of power may have an internal logic or tendency of development, so that it might be possible, for example, to identify tendencies toward equilibrium, cycles, or contradictions within capitalism, just as one might identify comparable tendencies within the other sources of social power. (p. 72) Interactions between the networks, Mann points out, are frequent but not systematic, meaning that 'once we admit the importance of such interactions we are into a more complex and uncertain world in which the development of capitalism, for example, is also influenced by ideologies, wars and states' (p. 73). Mann adds to this the possibility of uneven development across geographical space and the likelihood of irrational behaviour interfering with rational calculations of interest, even of the interest in survival. To demonstrate the importance of contingent events and of cycles other than those envisaged in the Wallerstein-Kondratieff model of history, Mann discusses the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of 2008. He then proceeds to demonstrate how his approach speaks to the future, first of U.S. hegemony and second of 'capitalist markets'. As to the former, Mann (pp. 83-4) offers the standard list of American weaknesses, both domestic and international, from economic decline to political anomy to an increasingly less effective military- weaknesses that 'might bring America down' although 'we cannot know for sure: Even if U.S. hegemony were to end, however, 'this need not cause a systemic crisis of capitalism'. What may instead happen is a shift of economic power 'from the old West to the successfully developing Rest of the world, including most of Asia. This would result in a sharing of economic power between the United States, the European Union and (some of) the BRICS, as a consequence of which 'the capitalism of the medium term is likely to be more statist' (p. 86). Concerning 'capitalist markets' (pp. 86-7), Mann believes, pace Wallerstein, that there is still enough new land to conquer and enough demand to discover and invent, to allow for both extensive and intensive growth. Also, technological fixes may appear any time for all sorts of problems, and in any case it is the working class and revolutionary socialism, much more than capitalism, for which 'the end is nigh: In fact, if growth rates were to fall as predicted by some, the outcome might be a stable low-growth capitalism, with considerable ecological benefits. In this scenario, 'the future of the left is likely to be at most reformist social democracy or liberalism. Employers and workers will continue to struggle over the mundane injustices of capitalist employment [ ... ] and their likely outcome will be compromise and reform .. .' Still, Mann ends on a considerably less sanguine note, naming two big crises that he considers possible, and one of them probable - crises in which capitalism would go under although they would not be crises of capitalism, or of capitalism alone, since capitalism would only perish as a result of the destruction of **all human** civilization. One such scenario would be nuclear war, started by collective human irrationality, the other an ecological catastrophe resulting from 'escalating climate change'. In the latter case (pp. 93ff.), capitalism figures - together with the nation state and with 'citizen rights', defined as entitlements to unlimited consumption - as one of three 'triumphs of the modern period' that happen to be ecologically unsustainable. 'All three triumphs would have to be challenged for the sake of a rather abstract future, which is a very tall order, perhaps not achievable' (p. 95). While related to capitalism, ecological disaster would spring from 'a causal chain bigger than capitalism' (p. 97). However, 'policy decisions matter considerably', and 'humanity is in principle free to choose between better or worse future scenarios- and so ultimately the future is unpredictable' (p. 97). The most straightforward theory of capitalist crisis in the book is offered by Randall Collins (pp. 37-69) - a theory he correctly characterizes as a 'stripped-down version of (a] fundamental insight that Marx and Engels had formulated already in the 1840s' (p. 38). That insight, as adapted by Collins, is that capitalism is subject to 'a long-term structural weakness: namely 'the technological displacement of labor by machinery' (p. 37). Collins is entirely unapologetic for his strictly structuralist approach, even more structuralist than Wallerstein's, as well as his mono-factorial technological determinism. In fact, he is convinced that 'technological displacement of labor' will have finished capitalism, with or without revolutionary violence, by the middle of this century - earlier than it would be brought down by the, in principle, equally destructive and definitive ecological crisis, and more reliably than by comparatively difficult-to-predict financial bubbles. 'Stripped-down' Collins's late-Marxist structuralism is, among other things, because unlike Marx in his corresponding theorem of a secular decline of the rate of profit, Collins fails to hedge his prediction with a list of countervailing factors,' 3 as he believes capitalism to have run out of whatever saving graces may in the past have retarded its demise. Collins does allow for Mann's and Calhoun's non-Marxist, 'Weberian' influences on the course of history, but only as secondary forces modifying the way the fundamental structural trend that drives the history of capitalism from below will work itself out. Global unevenness of development, dimensions of conflict that are not capitalism-related, war and ecological pressures may or may not accelerate the crisis of the capitalist labour market and employment system; they cannot, however, suspend or avert it. What exactly does this crisis consist of? While labour has gradually been replaced by technology for the past two hundred years, with the rise of information technology and, in the very near future, artificial intelligence, that process is currently reaching its apogee, in at least two respects: first, it has vastly accelerated, and second, having in the second half of the twentieth century destroyed the manual working class, it is now attacking and about to destroy the middle class as well - in other words, the new petty bourgeoisie that is the very carrier of the neocapitalist and neoliberal lifestyle of 'hard work and hard play', of careerism-cum-consumerism, which, as will be discussed infra, may indeed be considered the indispensable cultural foundation of contemporary capitalism's society. What Collins sees coming is a rapid educational work by machinery intelligent enough even to design and create new, more advanced machinery. Electronicization will do to the middle class what mechanization has done to the working class, and it will do it much faster. The result will be **unemployment in the order of 50 to 70 per cent** by the middle of the century, hitting those who had hoped, by way of expensive education and disciplined job performance (in return for stagnant or declining wages), to escape the threat of redundancy attendant on the working classes. The benefits, meanwhile, will go to 'a tiny capitalist class of robot owners' who will become immeasurably rich. The drawback for them is, however, that they will increasingly find that their product 'cannot be sold because too few persons have enough income to buy it. Extrapolating this underlying tendency', Collins writes, 'Marx and Engels predicted the downfall of capitalism and its replacement with socialism' (p. 39), and this is what Collins also predicts. Collins's theory is most original where he undertakes to explain why technological displacement is only now about to finish capitalism when it had not succeeded in doing so in the past. Following in Marx's footsteps, he lists five 'escapes' that have hitherto saved capitalism from self-destruction, and then proceeds to show why they won't save it any more. They include the growth of new jobs and entire sectors compensating for employment losses caused by technological progress (employment in artificial intelligence will be miniscule, especially once robots begin to design and build other robots); the expansion of markets (which this time will primarily be labour markets in middle-class occupations, globally unified by information technology, enabling global competition among educated job seekers); the growth of finance, both as a source of income ('speculation') and as an industry (which cannot possibly balance the loss of employment caused by new technology, and of income caused by unemployment, also because computerization will make workers in large segments of the financial industry redundant); government employment replacing employment in the private sector (improbable because of the fiscal crisis of the state, and in any case requiring ultimately 'a revolutionary overturn of the property system' [p. 51]); and the use of education as a buffer to keep labour out of employment, making it a form of 'hidden Keynesian ism' while resulting in 'credential inflation' and 'grade inflation' (which for Collins is the path most probably taken, although ultimately it will prove equally futile as the others, as a result of demoralization within educational institutions and problems of financing, both public and private). All fiveescapes closed, there is no way society can prevent capitalism from causing accelerated displacement of labour and the attendant stark economic and social inequalities. Some sort of socialism, so Collins concludes, will **finally** have to take capitalism's place. What precisely it will look like, and what will come after socialism or with it, Collins leaves open, and he is equally agnostic on the exact mode of the transition. Revolutionary the change will be - but **whether it will be a violent social revolution** that will end capitalism or a **peaceful institutional revolution accomplished under political leadership** cannot be known beforehand. Heavy taxation of the super-rich for extended public employment or a guaranteed basic income for everyone, with equal distribution and strict rationing of very limited working hours by more or less dictatorial means a la Keynes' 4 - we are free to speculate on this as Collins's 'stripped-down Marxism' does not generate predictions as to what kind of society will emerge once capitalism will have run its course. **Only one thing is certain: that capitalism will end, and much sooner than one may have thought**. Something of an outlier in the book's suite of chapters is the contribution by Georgi Derluguian, who gives a fascinating inside account of the decline and eventual demise of Communism, in particular Soviet Communism (pp. 99-129). The chapter is of interest because of its speculations on the differences from and the potential parallels with a potential end of capitalism. As to the differences, Derluguian makes much of the fact that Soviet Communism was from early on embedded in the 'hostile geopolitics' (p. 110) of a 'capitalist world-system' ( 111).

#### Thus the alternative is committing ourselves to the communist party as an organizing principle. All other resistance gets coopted by the system and is overwhelmed by alienation.

[Jodi Dean 16, Prof. of Political Science @ Hobart and William Smith, Crowds and Party, pp. 153-154. Dean received her B.A. in History from [Princeton University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princeton_University) in 1984. She received her MA, MPhil, and PhD from [Columbia University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia_University) in 1992. Before joining the Department of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, she taught at the [University of Texas at San Antonio](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Texas_at_San_Antonio). She has held visiting research appointments at the Institute for the Human Sciences in Vienna, [McGill University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McGill_University) in Montreal, and [Cardiff University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cardiff_University) in Wales.] r0w@n

How do and can we imagine political change underthe conditions of communicative capitalism? Is political change just aggregated personal transformation, communism as viral outbreak or meme-effect, #fullcommunism? Do we think that “autonomous zones of freedom and equality will emerge like so many mushrooms out of the dregs left behind in capital flight and the shrinking of state social provisioning? Or do we optimistically look to democracy, expecting (all evidence to the contrary) that communism, or even upgraded social democracy, will arise out of electoral politics? All these **fantasies imagine that political change can come about without political struggle.** **Each pushes away the fact of antagonism, division, and class struggle as if late neoliberalism were not already characterized by extreme inequality, violence, and exploitation, as if the ruling class did not already use military force**, police force, legal force, and illegal force **to maintain its position.** Politics is a struggle over power. **Capital uses every resource—**state, non-state, interstate**—to advance its position**. A Left that refuses to organize itself in recognition of this fact will never be able to combat it. “In communicative capitalism, **individual acts of resistance**, subversion, cultural production, and opinion expression, no matter how courageous, **are easily absorbed into the circulatory content of global personal media networks**. Alone, they don’t amplify; they can’t endure. **They are easily forgotten** as new content rushes into and through our feeds. We indulge in fantasies of the freedom of our expression, our critical edge and wit, disavowing the way such individuated freedom is the form of collective incapacity. Against states and alliances wielded in the service of capital as a class, diverse and separate struggles are so many isolated resistances, refusals to undertake the political work of pulling together in organized, strategic, long-term struggle. The constant churn of demands on our awareness disperses our efforts and attention. What **the Left should** **be** doing is **coordinating**, consolidating, and linking **its efforts so that they can amplify each other**. We don’t need multiple, different campaigns. **We need an organized struggle against capitalism capable of operating along multiple issues in diverse locations**. “Crowds push back. From the perspective of the party, we see them as the insistent people. Fidelity to the insistence of the egalitarian discharge demands that **we build the infrastructure capable of maintaining the gap of their desire. The more powerful the affective infrastructure we create, the more we will feel its force, interiorizing the perspective of the many into the ego-ideal that affirms our practices and activities and pushes us to do more than we think we can.** Radical pluralists and participatory democrats sometimes imply that there can be a left politics without judgment, condemnation, exclusion, and discipline. **Denying the way that collective power works back on those who generate it, they suggest we can have the benefits of collectivity without its effects.** But **“working back” is an inextricable dimension of collectivity’s capacity to cut through the self-interest of individual needs and produce enduring bonds of solidarity.** Collective activities always have effects in excess of their immediate goals. Rather than fearing these effects, **rather than remaining stuck in the fantasy that an individual can change the world**, and rather than remaining so gripped by fears of power that “we fantasize a politics that can abolish it, we should confront the force of collectivity directly and take responsibility for generating it and using it. **The party capable of building an affective infrastructure that can cut through the barriers of capitalist expectation will err.** **It is not, cannot be, and should not be believed to be infallible.** Sometimes it may turn its immense energies on itself. **If we can’t bear it, we aren’t the Left, the communists, we need.** Anyone who is unwilling to talk about the party should not talk about political transformation.”

## Case

### FW/Underview

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up a blippy 20 second shell to 3 min of the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it.

### Case Proper

#### Their extinction evidence is terrible- ‘existential threat’ does not mean everyone dies- it means it could risk collapsing civilization

#### No impact – humans can survive post-collapse and there’s no relationship between survival and biodiversity – their authors use flawed data analysis

**Hough** **14** [Rupert, Environmental Scientist with Expertise in Risk Modelling and Exposure Assessment and PhD from Nottingham University, February, “Biodiversity and human health: evidence for causality?” Biodiversity and Conservation, Vol. 23 No. 2, pg. 272-3/ FI

Large country-level assessments (e.g. MEA 2005; Huynen et al. 2004; Sieswerda et al. 2001) must be interpreted with some caution. Data measured at country-level are likely to mask regional and local-level effects. Apart from the fact that there are **limitations to regression analysis** in providing any proof of causality, least squares regression models assume linear relationships between reductions in biodiversity and human health and thus imply a linear relationship between loss of biodiversity and the provision of relevant ecosystem goods and services. A number of authors, however, have suggested that **ecosystems can lose a proportion of their biodiversity without adverse consequences** to their functioning (e.g. Schwartz et al. 2000). Only when a threshold in the losses of biodiversity is reached does the provision of ecosystem goods and services become compromised. These models also tend to assume a positive relationship between socio-economic development and loss of biodiversity. One problem with this expectation is that the loss in biodiversity in one country is not per definition the result of socio-economic developments in that particular country, but could also be the result of socio-economic developments in other parts of the world (Wackernagel and Rees 1996). Furthermore, the use of existing data means researchers can only make use of available indicators. Unlike for human health and socio-economic development, there are no broadly accepted core-set of indicators for biodiversity (Soberon et al. 2000). The **lack of correlation** between biodiversity indicators (Huynen et al. 2004) shows that the selected indicators do not measure the same thing, which **hinders interpretation of results.** Finally, there is likely to be some sort of latency period between ecosystem imbalance and any resulting health consequences. To date, this has not been investigated using regression approaches. Finally, it is thought that provisioning services are more crucial for human health and well-being that other ecosystem services (Raudsepp-Hearne et al. 2010). Trends in measures of human well-being are clearly correlated with food provisioning services, and especially with meat consumption (Smil 2002). While \*60 % of the ecosystem services assessed by the MEA were found to be in decline, most of these were regulating and supporting services, whereas the majority of **expanding services were provisioning services** such as crops, livestock and aquaculture (MEA 2005). Raudsepp-Hearne et al. (2010) investigated the impacts on human well-being from decreases in non-food ecosystem services using national-scale data in order to reveal human well-being trends at the global scale. At the global scale, forest cover, biodiversity, and fish stocks are all decreasing; while water crowding (a measure of how many people shared the same flow unit of water placing a clear emphasis on the social demands of water rather than physical stress (Falkenmark and Rockstro¨m 2004)), soil degradation, natural disasters, global temperatures, and carbon dioxide levels are all on the rise, and land is becoming increasingly subject to salinization and desertification (Bennett and Balvanera 2007). However, across countries, Raudsepp-Hearne et al. (2010) found **no correlation between** measures of **wellbeing and the available data for** non-food **ecosystem services**, including forest cover and percentage of land under protected-area status (proxies for many cultural and regulating services), organic pollutants (a proxy for air and water quality), and water crowding index (a proxy for drinking water availability, Sieswerda et al. 2001; WRI 2009) This suggests there is **no direct causal link between biodiversity decline and health**, rather the relationship is a ‘knock-on’ effect. I.e. if biodiversity decline affects mankind’s ability to produce food, fuel and fibre, it will therefore impact on human health and well-being. As discussed in the introduction, the fact that humans need food, water and air to live is an obvious one. All these basic provisions **can be produced in a diversity-poor environment.** Therefore, to understand whether there is a potential causality relationship between biodiversity in its own right and human health, we need to move beyond the basic provisioning services.

#### Bio-d’s past the tipping point – tons of alt causes

**Gaworecki 16** (Mike, New York-based journalist who writes about energy, climate, and forest issues, ““Ecological recession”: Researchers say biodiversity loss has hit critical threshold across the globe,” Mongabay, July 25, 2016, https://news.mongabay.com/2016/07/ecological-recession-researchers-ring-the-alarm-as-biodiversity-loss-hits-critical-threshold-across-the-globe/) FI

An international team of researchers has concluded that biodiversity loss has become so **severe and widespread** that it could **affect Earth’s ability to sustain human life**. The researchers examined **2.38 million records** of **39,123 terrestrial species** collected at **18,659 sites** around the world to model the impacts on biodiversity of land use and other pressures from human activities that cause habitat loss. They then estimated down to about the one-square-kilometer level the extent to which those pressures have caused changes in local biodiversity, as well as the spatial patterns of those changes. They found that, across nearly **60 percent** of Earth’s land surface, biodiversity has declined **beyond “safe” levels** as defined by the planetary boundaries concept, which seeks to quantify the environmental limits within which human society can be considered sustainable. “We estimate that land use and related pressures have already reduced local biodiversity intactness — the average proportion of natural biodiversity remaining in local ecosystems — beyond its recently proposed planetary boundary across **58.1%** of the world’s land surface, **where 71.4% of the human population live**,” the researchers write in an article published this month in the journal Science. In other words, more than 70 percent of the global population lives in areas where the level of biodiversity loss has been so substantial that the ability of ecosystems to support humanity is now in question. Biodiversity intactness has already sunk below the safe planetary boundary in **most biomes**, but **grasslands**, **savannas**, and **shrublands** were found to have been hit the hardest, with biodiversity **hotspots** such as forests and woodlands following close behind. Levels of biodiversity loss are so high, the researchers said, that they could even undermine plans to continue developing the world’s economies without destroying precious natural resources. “Such widespread transgression of safe limits suggests that biodiversity loss, if unchecked, will undermine efforts toward long-term sustainable development,” the authors of the Science article added. “It’s worrying that **land use** has **already** pushed biodiversity below the level proposed as a safe limit,” Andy Purvis, a professor in the Department of Life Sciences at Imperial College London and a co-author of the study, said in a statement. “Decision-makers worry a lot about economic recessions, but an ecological recession could have even worse consequences — and the biodiversity damage we’ve had means we’re at risk of that happening. Until and unless we can bring biodiversity **back up,** we’re playing **ecological roulette.”** Purvis and team said that it is possible proactive conservation could prevent future losses. They’ve made the maps from their paper and all of the underlying data publicly available in the hope that their results will be used to inform conservation policy at the national and international level. “The greatest changes have happened in those places where most people live, which might affect physical and psychological wellbeing,” Dr. Tim Newbold of the University College London, the lead author of the study, said in a statement. “To address this, we would have to preserve the remaining areas of natural vegetation **and restore human-used lands**.”