# NC

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### K – Cap 3:22

#### The contemporary idea of objectivity is dominated by discourses of neoliberal understandings of truth, science and knowledge – this vicious system co-opts the benefits of the aff and reifies Western superiority.

Cunningham ’03 [Brent Cunningham (CJR’s managing editor), Aug 2003, Columbia Journalism Review, “Re-thinking Objectivity”, <https://archives.cjr.org/feature/rethinking_objectivity.php>] SLHS-CL

In his March 6 press conference, in which he laid out his reasons for the coming war, President Bush mentioned al Qaeda or the attacks of September 11 fourteen times in fifty-two minutes. No one challenged him on it, despite the fact that the CIA had questioned the Iraq-al Qaeda connection, and that there has never been solid evidence marshaled to support the idea that Iraq was involved in the attacks of 9/11. When Bush proposed his $726 billion tax cut in January, his sales pitch on the plan’s centerpiece — undoing the “double-taxation” on dividend earnings — was that “It’s unfair to tax money twice.” In the next two months, the tax plan was picked over in hundreds of articles and broadcasts, yet a Nexis database search turned up few news stories — notably, one by Donald Barlett and James Steele in Time on January 27, and another by Daniel Altman in the business section of The New York Times on January 21 — that explained in detail what was misleading about the president’s pitch: that in fact there is plenty of income that is doubly, triply, or even quadruply taxed, and that those other taxes affect many more people than the sliver who would benefit from the dividend tax cut. Before the fighting started in Iraq, in the dozens of articles and broadcasts that addressed the potential aftermath of a war, much was written and said about the maneuverings of the Iraqi exile community and the shape of a postwar government, about cost and duration and troop numbers. Important subjects all. But few of those stories, dating from late last summer, delved deeply into the numerous and plausible complications of the aftermath. That all changed on February 26, when President Bush spoke grandly of making Iraq a model for retooling the entire Middle East. After Bush’s speech “aftermath” articles began to flow like the waters of the Tigris — including cover stories in Time and The New York Times Magazine — culminating in The Wall Street Journal’s page-one story on March 17, just days before the first cruise missiles rained down on Baghdad, that revealed how the administration planned to hand the multibillion-dollar job of rebuilding Iraq to U.S. corporations. It was as if the subject of the war’s aftermath was more or less off the table until the president put it there himself. There is no single explanation for these holes in the coverage, but I would argue that our devotion to what we call “objectivity” played a role. It’s true that the Bush administration is like a clenched fist with information, one that won’t hesitate to hit back when pressed. And that reporting on the possible aftermath of a war before the war occurs, in particular, was a difficult and speculative story. Yet these three examples — which happen to involve the current White House, although every White House spins stories — provide a window into a particular failure of the press: allowing the principle of objectivity to make us passive recipients of news, rather than aggressive analyzers and explainers of it. We all learned about objectivity in school or at our first job. Along with its twin sentries “fairness” and “balance,” it defined journalistic standards. Or did it? Ask ten journalists what objectivity means and you’ll get ten different answers. Some, like The Washington Post’s editor, Leonard Downie, define it so strictly that they refuse to vote lest they be forced to take sides. My favorite definition was from Michael Bugeja, who teaches journalism at Iowa State: “Objectivity is seeing the world as it is, not how you wish it were.” In 1996 the Society of Professional Journalists acknowledged this dilemma and dropped “objectivity” from its ethics code. It also changed “the truth” to simply “truth.”

As E.J. Dionne wrote in his 1996 book, They Only Look Dead, the press operates under a number of conflicting diktats: be neutral yet investigative; be disengaged but have an impact; be fair-minded but have an edge. Therein lies the nut of our tortured relationship with objectivity. Few would argue that complete objectivity is possible, yet we bristle when someone suggests we aren’t being objective — or fair, or balanced — as if everyone agrees on what they all mean. Over the last dozen years a cottage industry of bias police has sprung up to exploit this fissure in the journalistic psyche, with talk radio leading the way followed by Shout TV and books like Ann Coulter’s Slander and Bernard Goldberg’s Bias. Now the left has begun firing back, with Eric Alterman’s book What Liberal Media? (CJR, March/April) and a group of wealthy Democrats’ plans for a liberal radio network. James Carey, a journalism scholar at Columbia, points out that we are entering a new age of partisanship. One result is a hypersensitivity among the press to charges of bias, and it shows up everywhere: In October 2001, with the war in Afghanistan under way, then CNN chairman Walter Isaacson sent a memo to his foreign correspondents telling them to “balance” reports of Afghan “casualties or hardship” with reminders to viewers that this was, after all, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. More recently, a CJR intern, calling newspaper letters-page editors to learn whether reader letters were running for or against the looming war in Iraq, was told by the letters editor at The Tennessean that letters were running 70 percent against the war, but that the editors were trying to run as many prowar letters as possible lest they be accused of bias. Objectivity has persisted for some valid reasons, the most important being that nothing better has replaced it. And plenty of good journalists believe in it, at least as a necessary goal. Objectivity, or the pursuit of it, separates us from the unbridled partisanship found in much of the European press. It helps us make decisions quickly — we are disinterested observers after all — and it protects us from the consequences of what we write. We’d like to think it buoys our embattled credibility, though the deafening silence of many victims of Jayson Blair’s fabrications would argue otherwise. And as we descend into this new age of partisanship, our readers need, more than ever, reliable reporting that tells them what is true when that is knowable, and pushes as close to truth as possible when it is not. But our pursuit of objectivity can trip us up on the way to “truth.” Objectivity excuses lazy reporting. If you’re on deadline and all you have is “both sides of the story,” that’s often good enough. It’s not that such stories laying out the parameters of a debate have no value for readers, but too often, in our obsession with, as The Washington Post’s Bob Woodward puts it, “the latest,” we fail to push the story, incrementally, toward a deeper understanding of what is true and what is false. Steven R. Weisman, the chief diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times and a believer in the goal of objectivity (“even though we fall short of the ideal every day”), concedes that he felt obliged to dig more when he was an editorial writer, and did not have to be objective. “If you have to decide who is right, then you must do more reporting,” he says. “I pressed the reporting further because I didn’t have the luxury of saying X says this and Y says this and you, dear reader, can decide who is right.” It exacerbates our tendency to rely on official sources, which is the easiest, quickest way to get both the “he said” and the “she said,” and, thus, “balance.” According to numbers from the media analyst Andrew Tyndall, of the 414 stories on Iraq broadcast on NBC, ABC, and CBS from last September to February, all but thirty-four originated at the White House, Pentagon, and State Department. So we end up with too much of the “official” truth. More important, objectivity makes us wary of seeming to argue with the president — or the governor, or the CEO — and risk losing our access. Jonathan Weisman, an economics reporter for The Washington Post, says this about the fear of losing access: “If you are perceived as having a political bias, or a slant, you’re screwed.” Finally, objectivity makes reporters hesitant to inject issues into the news that aren’t already out there. “News is driven by the zeitgeist,” says Jonathan Weisman, “and if an issue isn’t part of the current zeitgeist then it will be a tough sell to editors.” But who drives the zeitgeist, in Washington at least? The administration. In short, the press’s awkward embrace of an impossible ideal limits its ability to help set the agenda. This is not a call to scrap objectivity, but rather a search for a better way of thinking about it, a way that is less restrictive and more grounded in reality. As Eric Black, a reporter at the Minneapolis Star Tribune, says, “We need a way to both do our job and defend it.”

#### Neoliberal structure excludes the disadvantaged and directs power to the elites, which perpetuates cycles of inequality – turns case.

Monbiot ‘16

Monbiot, George. "Neoliberalism – the ideology at the root of all our problems." the Guardian. 15 Apr. 2016. Web. 9 Oct. 2017. <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot>. [Columnist for the Guardian, political activist, recipient of two honorary doctorates and one honorary fellowship.]

“Another paradox of neoliberalism is that universal competition relies upon universal quantification and comparison. The result is that workers, job-seekers and public services of every kind are subject to a pettifogging, stifling regime of assessment and monitoring, designed to identify the winners and punish the losers. The doctrine that Von Mises proposed would free us from the bureaucratic nightmare of central planning has instead created one. Neoliberalism was not conceived as a self-serving racket, but it rapidly became one. Economic growth has been markedly slower in the neoliberal era (since 1980 in Britain and the US) than it was in the preceding decades; but not for the very rich. Inequality in the distribution of both income and wealth, after 60 years of decline, rose rapidly in this era, due to the smashing of trade unions, tax reductions, rising rents, privatisation and deregulation. The privatisation or marketisation of public services such as energy, water, trains, health, education, roads and prisons has enabled corporations to set up tollbooths in front of essential assets and charge rent, either to citizens or to government, for their use. Rent is another term for unearned income. When you pay an inflated price for a train ticket, only part of the fare compensates the operators for the money they spend on fuel, wages, rolling stock and other outlays. The rest reflects the fact that they have you over a barrel. Those who own and run the UK’s privatised or semi-privatised services make stupendous fortunes by investing little and charging much. In Russia and India, oligarchs acquired state assets through firesales. In Mexico, Carlos Slim was granted control of almost all landline and mobile phone services and soon became the world’s richest man. Financialisation, as Andrew Sayer notes in Why We Can’t Afford the Rich, has had a similar impact. ‘Like rent,’ he argues, ‘interest is ... unearned income that accrues without any effort’. As the poor become poorer and the rich become richer, the rich acquire increasing control over another crucial asset: money. Interest payments, overwhelmingly, are a transfer of money from the poor to the rich. As property prices and the withdrawal of state funding load people with debt (think of the switch from student grants to student loans), the banks and their executives clean up. Sayer argues that the past four decades have been characterised by a transfer of wealth not only from the poor to the rich, but within the ranks of the wealthy: from those who make their money by producing new goods or services to those who make their money by controlling existing assets and harvesting rent, interest or capital gains. Earned income has been supplanted by unearned income. Neoliberal policies are everywhere beset by market failures. Not only are the banks too big to fail, but so are the corporations now charged with delivering public services. As Tony Judt pointed out in Ill Fares the Land, Hayek forgot that vital national services cannot be allowed to collapse, which means that competition cannot run its course. Business takes the profits, the state keeps the risk. The greater the failure, the more extreme the ideology becomes. Governments use neoliberal crises as both excuse and opportunity to cut taxes, privatise remaining public services, rip holes in the social safety net, deregulate corporations and re-regulate citizens. The self-hating state now sinks its teeth into every organ of the public sector. Perhaps the most dangerous impact of neoliberalism is not the economic crises it has caused, but the political crisis. As the domain of the state is reduced, our ability to change the course of our lives through voting also contracts. Instead, neoliberal theory asserts, people can exercise choice through spending. But some have more to spend than others: in the great consumer or shareholder democracy, votes are not equally distributed. The result is a disempowerment of the poor and middle. As parties of the right and former left adopt similar neoliberal policies, disempowerment turns to disenfranchisement. Large numbers of people have been shed from politics. Chris Hedges remarks that ‘fascist movements build their base not from the politically active but the politically inactive, the ‘losers’ who feel, often correctly, they have no voice or role to play in the political establishment’. When political debate no longer speaks to us, people become responsive instead to slogans, symbols and sensation. To the admirers of Trump, for example, facts and arguments appear irrelevant.”

#### The alternative is an interrogation of neoliberal thought and promotion of anti-neoliberal news– reject the affirmative in favor of an analysis of the political language of the 1AC. This comes prior to structural change – neoliberalism distorts our thought to preclude an effective strategy of engaging the system.

Massey ‘13

Doreen Massey. "Neoliberalism has hijacked our vocabulary." The Guardian. 11 Jun. 2013. Web. 9 Oct. 2017. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/11/neoliberalism-hijacked-vocabulary>. [Professor of geography at the Open University that specializes in globalization. Marxist scholar and recipient of three honorary doctorates.]

“At a recent art exhibition I engaged in an interesting conversation with one of the young people employed by the gallery. As she turned to walk off I saw she had on the back of her T-shirt ‘customer liaison’. I felt flat. Our whole conversation seemed somehow reduced, my experience of it belittled into one of commercial transaction. My relation to the gallery and to this engaging person had become one of instrumental market exchange. The message underlying this use of the term customer for so many different kinds of human activity is that in all almost all our daily activities we are operating as consumers in a market – and this truth has been brought in not by chance but through managerial instruction and the thoroughgoing renaming of institutional practices. The mandatory exercise of ‘free choice’ – of a GP, of a hospital, of schools for one's children – then becomes also a lesson in social identity, affirming on each occasion our consumer identity. This is a crucial part of the way that neoliberalism has become part of our commonsense understanding of life. The vocabulary we use to talk about the economy is in fact a political construction, as Stuart Hall, Michael Rustin and I have argued in our Soundings manifesto. Another word that reinforces neoliberal common sense is ‘growth’, currently deemed to be the entire aim of our economy. To produce growth and then (maybe) to redistribute some of it, has been a goal shared by both neoliberalism and social democracy. In its crudest formulation this entails providing the conditions for the market sector to produce growth, and accepting that this will result in inequality, and then relying on the redistribution of some portion of this growth to help repair the inequality that has resulted from its production. This of course does nothing to question the inequality-producing mechanisms of market exchange itself, and it has also meant that the main lines of struggle have too often been focused solely on distributional issues. What's more, today we are living with a backlash to even the limited redistributional gains made by labour under social democracy. In spite of all this, growth is still seen as providing the solution to our problems. The second reason our current notion of wealth creation, and our commitment to its growth, must be questioned is to do with our relationship with the planet. The environmental damage brought about by the pursuit of growth threatens to cause a catastrophe of which we are already witnessing intimations. And a third – and perhaps most important – defect of this approach is that increased wealth, especially as measured in the standard monetary terms of today, has few actual consequences for people's feelings of wellbeing once there is a sufficiency to meet basic needs, as there is in Britain. In pursuing ‘growth’ in these terms, as a means to realise people's life goals and desires, economies are pursuing a chimera. Instead of an unrelenting quest for growth, might we not ask the question, in the end: ‘What is an economy for?’, ‘What do we want it to provide?’ Our current imaginings endow the market and its associated forms with a special status. We think of ‘the economy’ in terms of natural forces, into which we occasionally intervene, rather than in terms of a whole variety of social relations that need some kind of co-ordination. Thus ‘work’, for example, is understood in a very narrow and instrumental way. Where only transactions for money are recognised as belonging to ‘the economy’, the vast amount of unpaid labour – as conducted for instance in families and local areas – goes uncounted and unvalued. We need to question that familiar categorisation of the economy as a space into which people enter in order to reluctantly undertake unwelcome and unpleasing ‘work’, in return for material rewards which they can use for consuming. This is a view that misunderstands where pleasure and fulfilment in human lives are found. Work is usually – and certainly should be – a central source of meaning and fulfilment in human lives. And it has – or could have – moral and creative (or aesthetic) values at its core. A rethinking of work could lead us to address more creatively both the social relations of work and the division of labour within society (including a better sharing of the tedious work, and of the skills). There are loads of other examples of rarely scrutinised terms in our economic vocabulary, for instance that bundle of terms clustered around investment and expenditure – terms that carry with them implicit moral connotations. Investment implies an action, even a sacrifice, undertaken for a better future. It evokes a future positive outcome. Expenditure, on the other hand, seems merely an outgoing, a cost, a burden. Above all, we need to bring economic vocabulary back into political contention, and to question the very way we think about the economy in the first place. For something new to be imagined, let alone to be born, our current economic ‘common sense’ needs to be challenged root and branch.”

#### The role of the ballot is to deconstruct communicative capitalism – the ideology of capitalism has commodified university spaces and completely crowded out other modes of thinking.

Lissovoy ‘13

Lissovoy, Noah De. “Pedagogy of the Impossible: Neoliberalism and the Ideology of Accountability.” *Policy Futures in Education*, vol. 11, no. 4, Aug. 2013, pp. 423–435, doi:[10.2304/pfie.2013.11.4.423](https://doi.org/10.2304/pfie.2013.11.4.423). [Department of Curriculum and Instruction, University of Texas at Austin.] //NG

The contemporary explosion of communicative possibilities and platforms open to a diversity of perspectives (coinciding with the development of the Internet and social media), which nevertheless subsists without challenging the fundamental political logic that underwrites it, has been called ‘communicative capitalism’ (Dean, 2009). ‘Communicative’ here indicates a modality of social life, and a certain historical periodization (the networked twenty-first century). By contrast, others have proposed the notion of ‘cognitive capitalism’ to indicate a new and privileged source of surplus value in late capitalism: knowledge, affect and intellect (Vercellone, 2009). Theorists have pointed to the importance of knowledge industries, and the education sector in particular, as a strategic battleground between the commodifying imperative of neoliberalism, on the one hand, and the collective and emancipatory impulses of the multitude, on the other (Hardt & Negri, 2004). This struggle can be seen, on the one hand, in present efforts to remake education as both a source of profit (for example, through the commodification of knowledge and indebtedness of students) and as a reorganization of subjectivity (i.e. in the organization of learning as the production of human capital), and, on the other hand, in the efforts of students and educators to resist this process (Edufactory Collective, 2009). In this latter context, the ideology of capitalist realism and the insistence on the impossibility of any alternatives can be understood as the effect of a kind of occupation or enclosure of the imagination.[1] Here, too, it is less a matter of a struggle over hegemonic versus counterhegemonic understandings according to an older Gramscian (1971) model of ideological contest. Instead, it is a matter of the defense of sites of social production – in this case, the creative production of the collective intelligence and ‘relational capacity’ of human beings (Virno, 2004). As capitalism colonizes the social field, including the affective, intellectual and physical capacities of subjects, it reorders it biopolitically from the inside. Diverting the generativity of humans as intelligent, communicative beings toward the production of surplus value, capitalism reorganizes the ideological contest from a struggle over what people think to a struggle over what people think for. The university, for instance, which is commonly thought of as a space of free intellectual exchange that is inherently valuable as such, is increasingly remade as a factory of commodifiable research within the transition to a broader knowledge economy (Olssen & Peters, 2005). In this context, if an alternative to capitalist exploitation and alienation becomes unthinkable in the present, this is because thinking itself has become increasingly captured by and embedded in circuits of capitalist production and valorization (Hardt & Negri, 2000). The ideological structure of capitalist realism described above, and the form of its exclusion of alternatives, implies a reconceptualization of the nature of resistance. The Gramscian notion of a war of position, in which contending classes struggle for cultural and intellectual hegemony through competing popular ‘common senses’, needs to be rethought in this context. If the ideology of the inevitability and inescapability of capitalism is sealed into the very environment we navigate as subjects within it, as well as into the organization of our own subjectivities, then it will be hard to locate the space in which traditional counter-hegemonic struggle can take place. Similarly, against the idea of emancipatory resistance as depending on the reorganization of consciousness among the oppressed (as it is usually understood in critical educational approaches), the analysis above suggests that even radical rearticulations of perspective will tend to founder on the ideological fantasies coded into late capitalist ‘reality’ itself (Žižek, 2008). For instance, I may develop a sophisticated critique of media representations and the elite interests that motivate them, but if my critique does not practically challenge (or even continues to depend on) the persistent structures of everyday life and subjectivity (for example, competition, consumerism and fear of others) that support the coherence of the media’s rationalization of domination, then I am doing little more in my critique of the system than reaffirming its inevitability. The analysis of ideology as fantasy suggests that beyond the development of a critical analysis, resistance requires a cut in the libidinal economy which takes us up continually into the ideological supports that we experience as the inalterable facts of our selves and our surroundings. The structure of our enjoyments and investments in this reality, at the level of being and desire, must change in order for the proper force of ideology to be confronted.

#### Three implications—

#### The role of the ballot is a prior question to other frameworks – capitalism fundamentally changes how we interpret the world and social interactions, which means it is impossible to accurately talk about agency in the real world without first contesting capitalism.

#### Pedagogy outweighs other framing issues – their arguments against the affirmative are epistemologically suspect because the university has been co-opted by capitalist forces. And, fiat is illusory – vote on what we do for the educational debate space, because that’s the only tangible impact.

#### Reject utopianism-based indicts – capitalism sustains itself based upon a narrow interpretation of “realism” that excludes all alternative modes of thought.